Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

The goals of ending extreme poverty by 2030 and working towards a more equal distribution of incomes are part of the United Nations' Sustainable Development Goals. Using data from 166 countries comprising 97.5 percent of the world's population, we simulate scenarios for global poverty from 2019 to 2030 under various assumptions about growth and inequality. We use different assumptions about growth incidence curves to model changes in inequality, and rely on a machine-learning algorithm called model-based recursive partitioning to model how growth in GDP is passed through to growth as observed in household surveys. When holding within-country inequality unchanged and letting GDP per capita grow according to World Bank forecasts and historically observed growth rates, our simulations suggest that the number of extreme poor (living on less than 1.90 US Dollars/day) will remain above 600 million in 2030, resulting in a global extreme poverty rate of 7.4 percent. If the Gini index in each country decreases by 1 percent per year, the global poverty rate could reduce to around 6.3 percent in 2030, equivalent to 89 million fewer people living in extreme poverty. Reducing each country's Gini index by 1 percent per year has a larger impact on global poverty than increasing each country's annual growth 1 percentage points above forecasts. We also study the impact of COVID-19 on poverty and find that the pandemic may have driven around 60 million people into extreme poverty in 2020. If the virus increased the Gini by 2 pecent in all countries, then more than 90 million may have been driven into extreme poverty in 2020.

The goals of ending extreme poverty by 2030 and working towards a more equal distribution of incomes are part of the United Nations' Sustainable Development Goals. Using data from 166 countries comprising 97.5 percent of the world's population, we simulate scenarios for global poverty from 2019 to 2030 under various assumptions about growth and inequality. We use different assumptions about growth incidence curves to model changes in inequality, and rely on a machine-learning algorithm called model-based recursive partitioning to model how growth in GDP is passed through to growth as observed in household surveys. When holding within-country inequality unchanged and letting GDP per capita grow according to World Bank forecasts and historically observed growth rates, our simulations suggest that the number of extreme poor (living on less than 1.90 US Dollars/day) will remain above 600 million in 2030, resulting in a global extreme poverty rate of 7.4 percent. If the Gini index in each country decreases by 1 percent per year, the global poverty rate could reduce to around 6.3 percent in 2030, equivalent to 89 million fewer people living in extreme poverty. Reducing each country's Gini index by 1 percent per year has a larger impact on global poverty than increasing each country's annual growth 1 percentage points above forecasts. We also study the impact of COVID-19 on poverty and find that the pandemic may have driven around 60 million people into extreme poverty in 2020. If the virus increased the Gini by 2 pecent in all countries, then more than 90 million may have been driven into extreme poverty in 2020.

The goals of ending extreme poverty by 2030 and working towards a more equal distribution of incomes are part of the United Nations' Sustainable Development Goals. Using data from 166 countries comprising 97.5 percent of the world's population, we simulate scenarios for global poverty from 2019 to 2030 under various assumptions about growth and inequality. We use different assumptions about growth incidence curves to model changes in inequality, and rely on a machine-learning algorithm called model-based recursive partitioning to model how growth in GDP is passed through to growth as observed in household surveys. When holding within-country inequality unchanged and letting GDP per capita grow according to World Bank forecasts and historically observed growth rates, our simulations suggest that the number of extreme poor (living on less than 1.90 US Dollars/day) will remain above 600 million in 2030, resulting in a global extreme poverty rate of 7.4 percent. If the Gini index in each country decreases by 1 percent per year, the global poverty rate could reduce to around 6.3 percent in 2030, equivalent to 89 million fewer people living in extreme poverty. Reducing each country's Gini index by 1 percent per year has a larger impact on global poverty than increasing each country's annual growth 1 percentage points above forecasts. We also study the impact of COVID-19 on poverty and find that the pandemic may have driven around 60 million people into extreme poverty in 2020. If the virus increased the Gini by 2 pecent in all countries, then more than 90 million may have been driven into extreme poverty in 2020.

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On July 23rd, IPI held an information-sharing discussion on the United Nations Security Council, the most powerful body in the UN system, among 15 ambassadors of countries who are current or recent members of the Council or primed­­ to join it next year, and a select group of experts.

The event was prompted by the English language release of the book With an Orange Tie: A Year on the Security Council by Karel van Oosterom, Permanent Representative of the Netherlands to the UN. Ambassador van Oosterom served on the Council in 2018, as part of an historic compromise under which the Netherlands shared the 2017-2018 term with Italy.

The moderator of the event was IPI Vice President Adam Lupel, who began the discussion with a tantalizing preview of the book: “It mixes political insight about relations between the elected members and the veto-wielding P5, accessible explanations of procedural arcana, and chronicles of debates about top issues like Syria and Yemen with personal anecdotes and intimate insider details such as which are the most comfortable seats around the Security Council table or when you are allowed -or not-a snack during deliberations.” Pointing out that elections to the Council had now been advanced from October to June, affording new members more preparation time, Dr. Lupel noted that the book “shares useful knowledge and experience for incoming members, to be better prepared and make the Council more effective, which is in everybody’s interest.”

Ambassador van Oosterom said his book was particularly focused on enhancing the experience of the ten elected members of the 15-member council, known as the E10, who serve two-year terms alongside the five veto-bearing permanent members, known as the P5. “The purpose of this English translation is to make the E10 stronger,” he said. “P5 members have their own archives of experiences, but for the E10, a term on the Council is a once in a lifetime event. We can all benefit from each other’s stories. Incoming members should look to current members for guidance.”

He said the E10 were too often intimidated by the P5 and shouldn’t be. “There are around 30 subsidiary organs, and in recent years, the permanent members have largely been the ones to take up the pen, and the heaviest workload of chairing the subsidiary organs has fallen to the E10. We tried to change that, but didn’t succeed.” In a comment aimed at incoming members of the Council, he counseled, “Make sure the P5 get some of this workload as they have the time to do it, and deputies are allowed to do it. This is an unfair division of labor, which leaves less time for your priorities. Don’t accept being framed as non- permanent by the P5. You’re the elected ones. Say, ‘If I’m non-permanent, then you’re non-elected.’”

Ambassador van Oosterom warned that “if a P5 member is close to an issue on the agenda, the chances of reaching an agreement are slim. There is a big difference between what they talk about and what our products are. In 2018, the Council spoke the most about Syria, but Syria figures very little in press statements. Results on the Palestine question are similarly absent.” In that connection, he added, “My biggest frustration was not being able to refer the killing of more than 500,000 people in Syria to the ICC [International Criminal Court] or a special tribunal.”

Accompanied by a slide whimsically entitled “The Hamster Syndrome,” he said the workload for Council members had tripled from 1990 to 2018, with many more meetings, resolutions, presidential and press statements, formal visits, peacekeeping operations, and subsidiary organs. “Delegations need to be sufficiently staffed; claim enough diplomats from your capitals. The agenda is overloaded—formally 69 items.” Consequently, “if you don’t have established priorities, you get lost.”

With demands this great, he said, even personal fitness becomes an issue. “Stories of working day and night and on the weekends intimidate colleagues. Be aware, plan ahead for the health and well-being of your colleagues and team.” He recalled that the Council had been traumatized by the death in April 2018 of a Council colleague, Bernard Tanoh–Boutchoue, the Permanent Representative of Côte d’Ivoire.

Ambassador van Oosterom emphasized the importance of learning the ropes ahead of time. “Procedural challenges are one of the most difficult parts of the Council, and make sure your team knows them inside and out.” If one arises and you have any doubts about it, he advised, suspend the meeting, move to a consultation room and solve it there with the assistance of an expert.

He talked light-heartedly about some of the “bizarre” unwritten rules of the Council chamber and several instances in 2018 when they had been broken. The entry of Nikki Haley, the American Permanent Representative, was blocked when she tried to enter with a cup of coffee, and a meeting was stopped because Peter Wilson, the Deputy Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom, was eating a breakfast sandwich. Other rules of the consultation rooms, like keeping the curtains closed or not shedding your jacket on warm days are moments to declare independence, he said. “You have to break these rules to own the room and let the P5 know that you are truly part of the Council. It gets very hot; take off your jacket!”

Inga Rhonda King, Permanent Representative of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines said she wanted to “debunk the many criticisms that the Council has been unable to do its work, that we have been slow to get started [during the pandemic].” She countered that in June the Council had 50 virtual meetings compared to 44 meetings the year before, that it had held 170 virtual meetings since March 24th and that the number of resolutions adopted was almost identical for the same period of time.

Kairat Umarov, Permanent Representative of Kazakhstan, conceded that the work of the Council had suffered from “polarization. The Security Council is very divided. We need to improve and overcome this through dialogue and trust. And it’s not only about building trust between the E10 and the P5, but also between the P5 themselves.”

Olof Skoog, Head of the European Union delegation to the UN and former Permanent Representative of Sweden to the UN, acknowledged the divisions on the Council and the damage they cause and said the solution should come from the E10. “That’s where building alliances is important. We are the elected members, we have a completely different view of the need to deliver during our short terms on the Council. That makes us think differently than the big countries, who can afford to have a show or use their veto to block something whereas we should always try to find solutions. The E10 need to stick together. You need to come together especially when the P5 aren’t able to deliver because they are lost in blockages. “

Geraldine Byrne Nason, Permanent Representative of Ireland to the UN, expressed appreciation for the book as her country prepares to join the Council. “It’s 20 years since Ireland was on the Council. There isn’t much of a folk memory for the procedural arcana or what works and what doesn’t. We’re thinking about the relationship between the E10 and the P5. We’re asked whether we can hope to do anything, given the P5 veto. My answer is always, ‘Yes. We’re an elected member with the legitimacy of the General Assembly behind us.’”

Odd Inge Kvalheim, Deputy Permanent Representative of Norway, another incoming country, said, “ This sharing of experiences is extremely important for us as an incoming member. We are all ears to the experiences of others. In terms of carrying the torch, there’s been a development over time in how elected members can make a difference.”

Juan Ramon de la Fuente Ramirez, Permanent Representative of Mexico, another incoming country, said he too was concerned about the “increased polarization” on the Council. ”We have the impression that existing differences seem to be more evident. The fact that it took almost 4 months to agree to the Secretary-General’s resolution to call for a global ceasefire is testimony of this.”

India is also coming onto the Council, and its Permanent Representative, T.S. Tirumurti, commented, “I got an excellent picture of the increase in the workload and how the discussions don’t correlate to the outcomes.”

Francisco Duarte Lopes, Permanent Representative of Portugal, said he wondered to what extent interventions and advice from civil society were listened to and taken into account.

Karin Landgren, Executive Director of Security Council Report, said she hoped there could be a way to cultivate stronger links between the Council and other principal UN organs like the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and the International Court of Justice (ICJ).

Loraine Sievers, co-author of The Procedure of the UN Security Council said, “One thing that becomes clear is how long it takes for the Council to evolve. There are few revolutions. Change is incremental. Sometimes elected members don’t see the seed that they planted bear fruit until long after they’ve left.”

Mansour Ayyad Sh. Al-Otaibi, Permanent Representative of Kuwait, said he had noticed “great movement” in recent years towards empowering the E10. “The E10 should be united, not against the P5, but to carry on the mandate of the Council and to make the Council more efficient and transparent.”

Richard Gowan, UN Director at the International Crisis Group, wondered if there were times when Ambassador van Oosterom had felt tensions between his EU identity and his E10 identity.

Ameirah Alhefeitii, Deputy Permanent Representative of the United Arab Emirates, asked if the role of the E10 could be “enhanced” given the diversity of the group.

Taye Atske Selassie Amde, the Permanent Representative of Ethiopia, said it was important that “New York and your capital should be on the same page and speak with one voice. Otherwise, you will be a Spanish piñata, especially for the P5.”

Both Besiana Kadare, the Permanent Representative of Albania, and Vanessa Frazier, the Permanent Representative of Malta, asked Ambassador van Oosterom if, despite all his preparation, he had been caught by surprise by anything, and he said, “I did not realize that the seats rotate after one month.”

The event concluded with reflections by Ambassador van Oosterom, who stated that the conversation had proven it was useful to share experiences that help incoming members prepare, and to do so publicly to show the world how the Council works in practice.

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In September 2017, UN Secretary-General António Guterres proposed a new management paradigm to enable the UN to confront global challenges and remain relevant in a fast-changing world. The new management paradigm would bring decision making closer to the point of delivery, empower managers, increase accountability and transparency, reduce duplicative structures and overlapping mandates, increase support for the field, and reform the planning and budgeting processes.

Eighteen months after the management reform came into effect, this paper examines the implementation of the reform and its impact on peace operations from the perspective of both UN headquarters and the field. The paper highlights the current state of the reform, identifies good practices, flags areas for possible improvement or attention, and offers forward-looking recommendations for UN headquarters, mission leaders and managers in the field, global or regional support offices, member states, and staff at large.

While the reform is still a work in progress, it has continued to gain momentum, and implementation has become more systematic. Nonetheless, the paper concludes that greater effort must be made to get input from personnel in peace operations to ensure that the reform responds to their needs and constraints. More work is also needed to fully realize the potential of the management reform and ensure that it aligns with parallel reforms underway in the UN peace and security architecture and development system.

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On July 22nd, IPI together with the governments of Ethiopia, Indonesia, Japan and the Republic of Korea is cohosting a virtual discussion on “Impact-Driven Peacekeeping Partnerships for Capacity Building and Training.”

In the context of the Secretary-General’s Action for Peacekeeping initiative (A4P), the next United Nations Peacekeeping Ministerial Conference, scheduled for April 2021 in Seoul, aims to strengthen UN peacekeeping, including by improving the performance and impact of UN operations; closing capability gaps through concrete pledges; facilitating new partnerships and strengthening existing ones; and promoting systemic changes that will improve operations.

The UN’s A4P Implementation Action Plan identifies four priority areas for training and capacity building: improving the security of peacekeepers; advancing UN-AU capacity-building of AU peace support operations; expanding triangular partnership between TCC/PCCs and member states; and supporting effective performance and accountability, including by operationalizing the light coordination mechanism to deconflict & share best practices of training programs.

This discussion, which draws on a white paper prepared by IPI, was intended to help member states plan for and prepare to make concrete, meaningful and impactful capacity building and training pledges at the 2021 Ministerial. Speakers addressed the current state and recent trends in capacity building and training, examined areas where further progress is required, and suggested priorities and recommendations on how member states, together with the UN, can move towards more impact-driven partnerships in these areas.

Opening Remarks:
H.E. Mr. Cho Hyun, Permanent Representative of the Republic of Korea to the UN
H.E. Mr. Dian Triansyah Djani, Permanent Representative of Indonesia to the UN

Speakers:
Mr. Arthur Boutellis, IPI Senior Non-Resident Adviser
Mr. Mark Pedersen, Director, Integrated Training Service, UN Department of Peace Operations
Ms. Kristina Zetterlund, Counsellor, Civilian Adviser, Permanent Mission of Sweden to the  UN
Mr. Michael L. Smith, Director, Office of Global Programs and Initiatives, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, U.S. Department of State
Mr. Fumio Yamazaki, Director, International Peace and Security Cooperation Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan
Mr. Dawit Yirga, Director, International Organizations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia

Moderator:
Dr. Namie Di Razza, IPI Senior Fellow and Head of Protection of Civilians

Monitoring and evaluation have gained importance in recent decades in development cooperation to increase evidence, and thereby aid effectiveness. However, the focus on measuring results needs to be coordinated with other strategically important aspects of the aid and development effectiveness agenda, such as adapting to local needs and harmonisation among development actors. Combining these different goals remains a challenge in the development community. Studies show that most donors have similar problems when measuring results. The quality of the collected data can oftentimes be questioned because data collection methods lack methodological rigor. The data collected and used is often of limited relevance for the project. Reporting by implementing agencies to BMZ focusses more on accountability than on using the results for learning. This discussion paper offers an in-depth analysis of the efforts undertaken by German bilateral development cooperation actors to measure results and in how far the reported data can contribute to increase the effectiveness of development cooperation. Thirteen projects by German implementing agencies GIZ and KfW were selected and analysed by means of project documents and interviews with staff. In addition, general monitoring and evaluation guidelines of German development cooperation were consulted. The results show that BMZ does not have a comprehensive results-based management system in place for planning, monitoring and evaluation in German development cooperation, which leads to quality challenges with regard to the collected data. Many projects do not have a comprehensive theory of change, use methodologically contestable indicators and are not able to demonstrate causality between their activities and the results measured. Indicators are often selected with only the limited involvement of partner countries, and there are challenges with using partner countries’ secondary data. BMZ has recently started a reform process with the aim of establishing a more comprehensive RBM system and providing additional guidance to projects on how to define indicators and measure results. The findings of this paper offer important lessons learnt and recommendations for the reform process.

Monitoring and evaluation have gained importance in recent decades in development cooperation to increase evidence, and thereby aid effectiveness. However, the focus on measuring results needs to be coordinated with other strategically important aspects of the aid and development effectiveness agenda, such as adapting to local needs and harmonisation among development actors. Combining these different goals remains a challenge in the development community. Studies show that most donors have similar problems when measuring results. The quality of the collected data can oftentimes be questioned because data collection methods lack methodological rigor. The data collected and used is often of limited relevance for the project. Reporting by implementing agencies to BMZ focusses more on accountability than on using the results for learning. This discussion paper offers an in-depth analysis of the efforts undertaken by German bilateral development cooperation actors to measure results and in how far the reported data can contribute to increase the effectiveness of development cooperation. Thirteen projects by German implementing agencies GIZ and KfW were selected and analysed by means of project documents and interviews with staff. In addition, general monitoring and evaluation guidelines of German development cooperation were consulted. The results show that BMZ does not have a comprehensive results-based management system in place for planning, monitoring and evaluation in German development cooperation, which leads to quality challenges with regard to the collected data. Many projects do not have a comprehensive theory of change, use methodologically contestable indicators and are not able to demonstrate causality between their activities and the results measured. Indicators are often selected with only the limited involvement of partner countries, and there are challenges with using partner countries’ secondary data. BMZ has recently started a reform process with the aim of establishing a more comprehensive RBM system and providing additional guidance to projects on how to define indicators and measure results. The findings of this paper offer important lessons learnt and recommendations for the reform process.

Monitoring and evaluation have gained importance in recent decades in development cooperation to increase evidence, and thereby aid effectiveness. However, the focus on measuring results needs to be coordinated with other strategically important aspects of the aid and development effectiveness agenda, such as adapting to local needs and harmonisation among development actors. Combining these different goals remains a challenge in the development community. Studies show that most donors have similar problems when measuring results. The quality of the collected data can oftentimes be questioned because data collection methods lack methodological rigor. The data collected and used is often of limited relevance for the project. Reporting by implementing agencies to BMZ focusses more on accountability than on using the results for learning. This discussion paper offers an in-depth analysis of the efforts undertaken by German bilateral development cooperation actors to measure results and in how far the reported data can contribute to increase the effectiveness of development cooperation. Thirteen projects by German implementing agencies GIZ and KfW were selected and analysed by means of project documents and interviews with staff. In addition, general monitoring and evaluation guidelines of German development cooperation were consulted. The results show that BMZ does not have a comprehensive results-based management system in place for planning, monitoring and evaluation in German development cooperation, which leads to quality challenges with regard to the collected data. Many projects do not have a comprehensive theory of change, use methodologically contestable indicators and are not able to demonstrate causality between their activities and the results measured. Indicators are often selected with only the limited involvement of partner countries, and there are challenges with using partner countries’ secondary data. BMZ has recently started a reform process with the aim of establishing a more comprehensive RBM system and providing additional guidance to projects on how to define indicators and measure results. The findings of this paper offer important lessons learnt and recommendations for the reform process.

With the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and its guiding principle “Leave no one behind”, the international community has set itself the goal of improving the living conditions of poor and marginalised groups. In many cases, these groups include migrants and refugees. A sophisticated review process has been set up to monitor the implementation of the 2030 Agenda. Here, the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) play a decisive role. Migrants and refugees were explicitly included from the outset. However, this creates additional data requirements: Data disaggregated by migratory status is necessary to capture changes in the living conditions of migrant population groups within the structured review and follow up process of the SDGs. This disaggregation allows to draw conclusions about the well-being of migrants and refugees. SDG 17.18 explicitly calls for the differentiated consideration of this population group in the SDGs, where relevant, and the necessary building up of capacities for data collection and analysis.
Census data, data from national administrative registers and sample surveys are possible data sources to achieve this objective. These data sets, however, differ in their scope and extent to which they capture different types of information. Hence, each represents only a partial reality.
Five years after the adoption of the SDGs, the balance sheet is sobering: Data disaggregated by migratory status are still lacking in most countries. As a result, there is a growing danger that existing disadvantages will become more permanent or more pronounced. In line with its overarching commitment to the implementation of the SDGs, the German government should work to ensure that migrants and refugees are systematically taken into account in the follow-up and review of the 2030 Agenda. For the remaining period until 2030 – touted as the Decade of Action and Delivery - the following recommendations are derived:
•    Harmonise migration definitions: Data collections should apply definitions and methods recommended by the UN Statistical Commission.
•    Support data collection: The personnel and financial capacities of the national statistical authorities in partner countries should be systematically strengthened.
•    Strengthen synergies: Bridges should be built between migration-specific data initiatives and thematically broader data initiatives that are closely linked to the SDG process.
•    Expand migration expertise in the SDG review process: Migration expertise should be more systematically integrated into the SDG review process than has been the case to date in order to take greater account of changes in the living conditions of migrants and refugees.

With the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and its guiding principle “Leave no one behind”, the international community has set itself the goal of improving the living conditions of poor and marginalised groups. In many cases, these groups include migrants and refugees. A sophisticated review process has been set up to monitor the implementation of the 2030 Agenda. Here, the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) play a decisive role. Migrants and refugees were explicitly included from the outset. However, this creates additional data requirements: Data disaggregated by migratory status is necessary to capture changes in the living conditions of migrant population groups within the structured review and follow up process of the SDGs. This disaggregation allows to draw conclusions about the well-being of migrants and refugees. SDG 17.18 explicitly calls for the differentiated consideration of this population group in the SDGs, where relevant, and the necessary building up of capacities for data collection and analysis.
Census data, data from national administrative registers and sample surveys are possible data sources to achieve this objective. These data sets, however, differ in their scope and extent to which they capture different types of information. Hence, each represents only a partial reality.
Five years after the adoption of the SDGs, the balance sheet is sobering: Data disaggregated by migratory status are still lacking in most countries. As a result, there is a growing danger that existing disadvantages will become more permanent or more pronounced. In line with its overarching commitment to the implementation of the SDGs, the German government should work to ensure that migrants and refugees are systematically taken into account in the follow-up and review of the 2030 Agenda. For the remaining period until 2030 – touted as the Decade of Action and Delivery - the following recommendations are derived:
•    Harmonise migration definitions: Data collections should apply definitions and methods recommended by the UN Statistical Commission.
•    Support data collection: The personnel and financial capacities of the national statistical authorities in partner countries should be systematically strengthened.
•    Strengthen synergies: Bridges should be built between migration-specific data initiatives and thematically broader data initiatives that are closely linked to the SDG process.
•    Expand migration expertise in the SDG review process: Migration expertise should be more systematically integrated into the SDG review process than has been the case to date in order to take greater account of changes in the living conditions of migrants and refugees.

With the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and its guiding principle “Leave no one behind”, the international community has set itself the goal of improving the living conditions of poor and marginalised groups. In many cases, these groups include migrants and refugees. A sophisticated review process has been set up to monitor the implementation of the 2030 Agenda. Here, the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) play a decisive role. Migrants and refugees were explicitly included from the outset. However, this creates additional data requirements: Data disaggregated by migratory status is necessary to capture changes in the living conditions of migrant population groups within the structured review and follow up process of the SDGs. This disaggregation allows to draw conclusions about the well-being of migrants and refugees. SDG 17.18 explicitly calls for the differentiated consideration of this population group in the SDGs, where relevant, and the necessary building up of capacities for data collection and analysis.
Census data, data from national administrative registers and sample surveys are possible data sources to achieve this objective. These data sets, however, differ in their scope and extent to which they capture different types of information. Hence, each represents only a partial reality.
Five years after the adoption of the SDGs, the balance sheet is sobering: Data disaggregated by migratory status are still lacking in most countries. As a result, there is a growing danger that existing disadvantages will become more permanent or more pronounced. In line with its overarching commitment to the implementation of the SDGs, the German government should work to ensure that migrants and refugees are systematically taken into account in the follow-up and review of the 2030 Agenda. For the remaining period until 2030 – touted as the Decade of Action and Delivery - the following recommendations are derived:
•    Harmonise migration definitions: Data collections should apply definitions and methods recommended by the UN Statistical Commission.
•    Support data collection: The personnel and financial capacities of the national statistical authorities in partner countries should be systematically strengthened.
•    Strengthen synergies: Bridges should be built between migration-specific data initiatives and thematically broader data initiatives that are closely linked to the SDG process.
•    Expand migration expertise in the SDG review process: Migration expertise should be more systematically integrated into the SDG review process than has been the case to date in order to take greater account of changes in the living conditions of migrants and refugees.

Die Ergebnisse des EU-Gipfels kommentiert Marcel Fratzscher, Präsident des Deutschen Instituts für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW Berlin), wie folgt:

Der EU-Gipfel war ein quälend langer Prozess – doch das bedeutet nicht, dass am Ende nichts Zählbares herausgekommen wäre. Im Gegenteil: Die Ergebnisse und Beschlüsse zu einem europäischen Wiederaufbaufonds mit einem Gesamtvolumen von 750 Milliarden Euro sind ein größerer Erfolg, als es zunächst scheint. Es handelt sich nicht bloß um Transfers und Kredite, die die von der Corona-Pandemie gerissenen wirtschaftlichen Löcher stopfen sollen. Der Wiederaufbaufonds schafft ein neues Instrument, um europäische Aufgaben gemeinsam zu bewältigen. Er ist der Startpunkt für eine Transformation in den Bereichen Klimaschutz und Digitalisierung, kann die europäische Wirtschaft neu und zukunftsfest aufstellen und besser für künftige Krisen wappnen. Das Programm könnte der Grundstein sein für eine europäische Fiskalunion, denn es gesteht erstmals explizit ein, dass fiskalische Transfers nötig sind, um Europa voranzubringen – und das dafür auch die gemeinsame Aufnahme von Schulden sinnvoll ist. Auch wenn hierzulande viele erst einmal jammern werden, ist der getroffene Kompromiss ein großer Gewinn, gerade auch für Deutschland. Gegenüber dem immer nationalistischeren Auftreten Chinas und der USA können wir unsere Interessen nur als Teil eines starken Europas wahren. Es kommt jetzt darauf an, dass Europa nicht nur auf dem Papier des Gipfeldokuments, sondern auch in der Praxis auf den Weg des Miteinanders und der Integration zurückfindet. Dann hätten Kanzlerin Merkel und Finanzminister Scholz direkt zu Beginn der deutschen EU-Ratspräsidentschaft einen großen Erfolg gelandet.

Changing defaults—the preselection that becomes effective without active choice—is becoming a prominent policy tool, after having been proven to be effective in areas as varied as retirement savings, organ donation and product customization. Yet, little is known about how default effects spill over to subsequent similar behaviors. In an online shopping scenario, we found standard default effects on the share of organically produced products in the overall selection of products. These effects did not spill over to subsequent active shopping choices. This was true for defaults that were hard and easy to change (Exp. 1, N = 90), for immediate and delayed subsequent choices (Exp. 2, N = 106) and for self-selected defaults (Exp. 3, N = 181). These findings suggest that the reach and scalability of default manipulations in policy making may be limited, but also speak against the possibility for negative spillover.

Changing defaults—the preselection that becomes effective without active choice—is becoming a prominent policy tool, after having been proven to be effective in areas as varied as retirement savings, organ donation and product customization. Yet, little is known about how default effects spill over to subsequent similar behaviors. In an online shopping scenario, we found standard default effects on the share of organically produced products in the overall selection of products. These effects did not spill over to subsequent active shopping choices. This was true for defaults that were hard and easy to change (Exp. 1, N = 90), for immediate and delayed subsequent choices (Exp. 2, N = 106) and for self-selected defaults (Exp. 3, N = 181). These findings suggest that the reach and scalability of default manipulations in policy making may be limited, but also speak against the possibility for negative spillover.

Changing defaults—the preselection that becomes effective without active choice—is becoming a prominent policy tool, after having been proven to be effective in areas as varied as retirement savings, organ donation and product customization. Yet, little is known about how default effects spill over to subsequent similar behaviors. In an online shopping scenario, we found standard default effects on the share of organically produced products in the overall selection of products. These effects did not spill over to subsequent active shopping choices. This was true for defaults that were hard and easy to change (Exp. 1, N = 90), for immediate and delayed subsequent choices (Exp. 2, N = 106) and for self-selected defaults (Exp. 3, N = 181). These findings suggest that the reach and scalability of default manipulations in policy making may be limited, but also speak against the possibility for negative spillover.

As more and more states and organizations adopt a gendered approach to international policy, trainings on how to conduct gender-based analysis and integrate gender perspectives into policies and programming have proliferated. But despite this increase in gender trainings, it remains unclear how effective they have been due to challenges related to their design, delivery, targeting, and evaluation.

After mapping the ecosystem of gender trainings in the realm of international peace and security, this issue brief unpacks each of these challenges. It concludes with a set of recommendations for improving gender trainings, suggesting that those designing gender trainings should consider the following:

• Conducting a preliminary needs assessment to adapt trainings to their audience;
• Soliciting feedback at every stage of the training, including “live” feedback during the training;
• Grounding training in local contexts and providing evidence to back up claims; and,
• Generating self-reflection by both participants and trainers during evaluations.

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