Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik / Briefing Paper

The return of Donald Trump to the White House has reignited deep uncertainty about the trajectory of global development cooperation. Long before 2025, the multilateral system was already under pressure. But Trump’s second term marks a normative rupture: the retreat of the United States not just from global leadership, but from the very principles of internationalism, multilateralism, and development solidarity it once helped to construct. In response to this new reality, EADI and the German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS) convened a diverse group of researchers to reflect on the implications of the “Trump 2.0 moment”. The result is a newly released EADI–IDOS Discussion Paper, Development and Development Policy in the Trump Era, which brings together sixteen concise contributions from scholars based across Europe, Asia, and Latin America, offering perspectives from both the Global North and South.

Green, circular buildings and their construction are essential for climate change mitigation and resource efficiency. However, the impact of a systematic shift towards green, circular buildings on employment in Sub-Saharan Africa remains unclear. Rwanda, particularly Kigali, is a relevant case due to its high urbanisation rate, pressing housing needs and political commitment to greening the economy. Currently, we do not know what types of green jobs exist in Kigali’s construction value chain or what potential they have for economic development. This paper addresses these questions using a sequential mixed-methods approach. We conducted 33 qualitative, semi-structured interviews with local experts and stakeholders. Based on these insights, we ran a survey with 546 firms across five construction value chain segments: planners/architects, material producers, material and equipment suppliers, construction/masonry firms, and firms installing energy, water, and wastewater technologies. Our analysis reveals four key findings: (1) a significant number of green jobs exist in the construction value chain, with varying degrees of greenness based on the number of environmentally-friendly practices performed (about are 5 per cent highly green and 58 per cent are partly green); (2) diverse green and circular practices are developing through both state support and grassroots initiatives; (3) greening is positively and significantly correlated with employment growth for highly green firms; and (4) greening is positively and significantly associated with improved job quality for all firms. For policy-makers, our results suggest that supporting firms in critical transition phases – those that have initiated greening but are not fully engaged – may enhance both job quantity and quality in the short to mid-term. Expanding green and circular, bio-based building practices across the construction sector requires a mix of interventions focused on cost competitiveness, skills and attitudes.

Dr Aimé Tsinda is Associate Professor, College of Science and Technology, at the University of Rwanda.
Erick Mujanama is a consultant at Equilibria Ltd., Rwanda.
Roger Mugisha is a consultant at Equilibria Ltd., Rwanda.

The global system of development cooperation is in a state of flux. In this paper we discuss how and why the very foundations of international aid and development are being shaken by geopolitical shifts, contested norms and institutional upheaval. We argue that the crisis is not a mere cyclical downturn, nor is it only about money, but rather a fundamental reordering of the global development landscape. In short, a “tipping point” – in the sense of a dramatic moment when incremental changes coalesce into a transformative shift, for better or worse – is in the offing. We ask what might come next.

Im neuen Mehrjährigen Finanzrahmen (MFR) der EU sollen Gelder für Entwicklungszusammenarbeit, humanitäre Hilfe und für EU-Beitrittskandidaten aus einem einzigen Finanzierungsinstrument kommen. Doch die Konzeption gleicht einem Jenga-Spiel, bei dem widersprüchliche Motivationen miteinander vereinbart werden sollen.

Donald Trump’s return to the US presidency marks a decisive turn towards economic nationalism, with wide-ranging implications for the Global South. This paper examines how Trump’s trade policy – characterised by high tariffs, reshoring and a retreat from multilateralism – challenges the foundations of the post-war liberal trade order. Drawing on traditions in development economics and international political economy, it explores how Trump’s agenda disrupts export-led growth strategies in developing countries and exacerbates vulnerabilities tied to global value chains. Crucially, it links this trade realignment to a parallel withdrawal from global development cooperation, reflecting a nationalist posture that undermines both aid and trade norms. The paper outlines three scenarios for how Trump’s trade strategy may affect the Global South, ranging from fragmentation and marginalisation to strategic realignment and developmental sovereignty. It concludes by arguing that Trump’s policy stance, while destabilising, also creates an opening to rethink development cooperation, not as aid-driven, but as a vehicle for structural reform, fairer trade rules and renewed institutional agency for the Global South.

Middle powers such as Mexico and Turkey have become increasingly influential in international development cooperation over the past two decades. Following the trend of a surge in populist leaders, their development cooperation has recently been combined with highly personalised, leader-centric foreign policy styles. This trend has significant implications for global development. On the one hand, they demonstrate that populist governance does not necessarily undermine international cooperation. The leaders of Mexico and Turkey contrast sharply with inward-looking populist leaders such as Donald Trump, whose approach has weakened multilateralism. On the other hand, however, the personalisation of development cooperation in general carries risks. Although these leaders frame initiatives as pragmatic and altruistic partnerships with developing countries, they often serve domestic political agendas and risk reinforcing transactional, short-term, leader-driven development policy in an era of global fragmentation.

At the United Nations (UN), as elsewhere, Donald Trump and his administration frame China as the ultimate rival. Yet, as suggested in this paper, Trump’s actions and approach vis-à-vis the UN system are set to ultimately – and unintentionally – play into Beijing’s hands. First, the withdrawal of the United States from individual UN bodies opens up concrete spaces for expanding China’s multilateral weight. Second, a more general disengagement by the United States from the UN system contributes to what Chinese sources refer to as a broader shift from a “US-centred” to a “UN-centred” world where Western hegemony is replaced by increased weight for the UN’s developing-country majority, with China as the latter’s de facto leader. Third, and despite obvious rivalries, Trump shares Xi Jinping’s disdain for more autonomous multilateral bodies and aligns with China’s more transactional approach to the UN. This does not bode well for those committed to a more substantive idea of UN multilateralism that centres on a stable international bureaucracy with a strong normative compass. For Beijing, Trump 2.0 suggests that the shift from a “US-centred” to a “UN-centred” world – where a more transactional approach to multilateralism and the increased weight of developing countries turn China into the central global player – is well underway.

The European Union (EU) has long prided itself on being a global leader in the provision of official development assistance (ODA) and has sought this status to exert influence on the global development agenda. Based on this position and legacy, as well as given its more recent political ambitions to become a more pronounced and ambitious geopolitical actor, one might expect that the closure of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) would present opportunities for the EU to step up its engagement and expand its influence. Yet the EU’s response has been both hesitant and defensive. This contribution makes two key observations in this respect. First, the EU’s self-assigned status of being a leading global ODA provider was eroding long before Trump re-entered office. Second, due to cuts and incompatible policy preferences, the EU is unwilling and unable to reposition itself in response to the gaps in funding that have resulted from the closure of USAID.

The second Trump administration has ushered in a radically altered foreign aid environment, with implications that extend far beyond the United States of America. The latter’s retreat from multilateralism and development cooperation – underpinned by hard-power motivations and populist rhetoric – has not only undermined the international standing of the United States but also disrupts the existing global development architecture. In response, other donors, particularly from the OECD Development assistance Committee (DAC), face the dual challenge of maintaining international partnerships while navigating their own domestic pressures. This paper takes stock of recent events and outlines four interconnected suggestions that focus on (1) refining DAC development cooperation approaches, (2) strengthening multilateral development institutions, (3) promoting Southern self-reliance and (4) forging alliances beyond the United States. We argue that although the decline of Western aid hegemony appears inevitable, it also presents an opportunity to reshape development cooperation along more inclusive, strategic and resilient lines.

This paper examines the ideological and policy shifts in US development cooperation under the second Trump administration, and their implications for the international development landscape and global order. It argues that recent US actions – epitomised by a 36-question survey of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the erasure of key development terms from federal documentation – signal a foundational challenge to international development cooperation norms. Five core principles underpinning an emerging “New Washington Dissensus” are identified: (1) dismantling global governance structures, (2) ideological policing through anti-“anti-Americanism”, (3) prioritising border security over traditional development goals, (4) rejecting climate and DEI (diversity, equity and inclusion) agendas and (5) demanding direct economic returns for the United States. These principles are not merely bureaucratic adjustments but represent the construction of a “nationalist conditionality regime” – a strategic reordering of aid to serve domestic political and economic priorities.

Since the beginning of US President Donald Trump’s second term in early 2025, not only US development policy but the entire international development cooperation landscape has fundamentally changed. The United States – previously by far the leading actor in global development cooperation – has rapidly withdrawn from key multilateral structures, drastically cut budgets and almost completely shut down the operations of its own development agency, the United States Agency for  International Development (USAID). This move exemplifies a deeper tectonic shift: the end of a phase of Western-dominated global cooperation and broad acceptance of rules-based collaboration, now giving way to a multipolar, power-driven and conflict-laden world order.

Constellations of State Fragility provides an empirical typology of states from a fragility perspective. It uses global data from 2005-2024 to identify typical constellations of state fragility. We conceptualize fragility as constituted of deficiencies in three dimensions: authority, capacity and legitimacy. This update to version 3.0 makes two major changes compared to version 2.0: A data update, consisting of the inclusion of data for the years 2021-2024, extending the overall period covered to 2005-2024; a modification of how the battle deaths indicator is calculated: now only battle deaths occurring in the country’s own territory are considered to increase validity; a modification of the indicator measuring school enrolment rates: we move from net to gross enrolment, due to lack of recent data for net enrolment; the replacement of the indicator measuring human rights: the ‘Human rights protection scores’ by Christopher Fariss is replaced by the ‘Physical violence index’ provided by Varieties of Democracy) due to lack of recent data for the Human rights protection scores, and minor changes for the years 2005-2020 deriving from original data updates provided by data providers. Based on these new data, new estimates of the nature of constellations of fragility. This results in the same eight typical constellations of state fragility that were identified by v2.

Since the beginning of US President Donald Trump’s second term in early 2025, not only US development policy but the entire international development cooperation landscape has fundamentally changed. The United States – previously by far the leading actor in global development cooperation – has rapidly withdrawn from key multilateral structures, drastically cut budgets and almost completely shut down the operations of its own development agency, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). This move exemplifies a deeper tectonic shift: the end of a phase of Western-dominated global cooperation and broad acceptance of rules-based collaboration, now giving way to a multipolar, power-driven and conflict-laden world order.

Andy Sumner is Professor of International Development at King’s College in London and President of the European Association of Development Research and Training Institutes.

The Compromiso de Sevilla, the outcome document of the 4th Financing for Development Conference (FfD4) highlights the importance of digital technologies for financial inclusion. It outlines three central insights – concerning financial inclusion, consumer protection and regulations, and competition rules – that provide general guidance for policy-makers with regard to digital finance. These considerations point in the right direction as they adequately reflect the fine line between maximising benefits from access to digital financial services (DFS) and mitigating negative, unintended consequences. However, they are too abstract to serve as a blueprint for governments and for regulatory and supervisory authorities on how to navigate the complexities of digital finance. This blog post aspires to translate the general commitments of FfD4 into concrete measures and policies that foster the potential of DFS for financial inclusion, address challenges for consumers, and deal with platformisation and monopolies.

We are now back from the UN Fourth International Conference on Financing for Development (FfD4), held in Sevilla. Despite the record high temperatures, over 8,000 participants – representing UN member countries, multilateral organisations, the business sector, civil society organisations, think tanks, academia and other experts – gathered and exchanged ideas and policy proposals in more than 470 side and special events. Members of the ETTG co-organised and were involved in many of these. Attention was in fact drawn to parallel discussions and the SPA (Sevilla Platform for Action) announcements, since the Summit’s conclusions, the Compromiso de Sevilla (Seville Commitment), had already been (pre)approved at UN headquarters a few days before the Summit. This happened after the withdrawal of the US from the FfD4 process – since the country’s proposal of 400 amendments to the draft conclusions was not approved. However, several bolder proposals included in previous versions of the text were substantially watered down throughout the process by both the US and other countries. This was the case, especially, with issues related to the reform of the international financial architecture (IFA), where Bretton Woods institutions play a critical role. The inaugural addresses revealed the more or less prominent role that countries and supra-national bodies have opted to play. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) recalled its mandate, with no references whatsoever to potential reforms. President von der Leyen presented the EU as the main provider of official development assistance (ODA) despite the ODA cuts announced by key member States; underlined the need for developing countries to mobilize domestic resources; and for the private sector to more actively participate in development processes, making reference once again to the EU’s Global Gateway. Iraq and Angola, on behalf of the G77 + China and the African Group respectively, underscored the importance of multilateralism, the 2030 Agenda, the burden of external debt and the risks posed by geopolitical fragmentation to international and global development.

The EU's efforts to integrate sustainability into its trade policy have met with mixed reactions, particularly from developing countries. Previously, the EU has sought to promote relevant autonomous measures and the Trade and Sustainable Development chapters in its trade agreements by offering support for implementation and compliance. However, further alignment of trade and development co-operation, known as external policy coherence, faces growing challenges as the second von der Leyen Commission has made Europe's economic security a top priority. Although this new agenda has yet to translate into tangible (trade) policy actions beyond recently adopted initial measures, the shift in focus is driving increased investment in competitiveness and securing access to critical raw materials – efforts that, at times, appear fragmented rather than co-ordinated. Whilst the EU acknowledges that partnerships, including those with countries from the Global South, are essential to strengthen its position in the growing geopolitical competition with other major economies, the increasingly complex global and regional context, coupled with shifting internal priorities, challenges the Commission's ability to balance the EU's trade and development ambitions. This commentary explores new directions for a coherent EU trade and development policy in the dynamic geopolitical landscape of 2025 and beyond.

Im vergangenen Jahr hat SPD-Chef Lars Klingbeil seine Idee zur Wiederbelebung einer Nord-Süd-Kommission vorgestellt. Andy Sumner, Stephan Klingebiel und Arief Anshory Yusuf machen einen Vorschlag, wie diese ausgestaltet werden könnte.

The study employed a large-N research design, involving data from 41 African countries across four rounds (R6–R9) of Afrobarometer surveys conducted in 2016, 2019, 2022, and 2023 respectively. Rounds 1–5 were excluded from the analysis because one of the key explanatory variables, social media usage, was only measured in Round 6 (2016) for the first time. The final list of countries for each round of the survey is contained in the Online Appendix. The research activity is part of the Megatrends Afrika project which focuses on three research areas of “Violent Actors and the Transformation of Conflict”, “Megatrends between Democratization and Autocratization” and “Global Power Shifts and Multipolarity” to analyse how global megatrends shape African states and societies. The aim of the project is to provide political decision-makers with evidence-based policy advice and to contribute to a more differentiated public debate on Africa policy.

Godfred Bonnah Nkansah is a Megatrends Afrika Research Fellow at the German Institue of Development and Sustainability (IDOS).

In recent years, Morocco has shifted from being primarily a country of transit and emigration to becoming a country of settlement. This evolution is largely driven by increased border restrictions and pushbacks, which have made migration routes to the EU less accessible. As a result, the city of Casablanca has become a hub of urban settlement instead of a transitional step in onward movement. Interviews conducted with non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and civil society organisations (CSOs) working with urban migrants and displaced people in Casablanca highlighted ways that development cooperation can have a positive impact on urban migration contexts. 
Indeed, the more hands-off approach of local authorities in Casablanca when dealing with migrant communities contrasts with the aggressive policing common in Rabat and border areas, creating space for the establishment of informal migrant organisations in host communities. These organisations have become interlocutors with official institutions, playing a critical role in re-establishing migrants’ and host communities’ trust in official institutions. 
With CSO and NGO support, communities themselves have also found ways to build inclusion and cooperation. Islamic values and Moroccan tradition of hospitality influence the provision of common goods at the household and neighbourhood level. Hosts and migrants also legally benefit from education and health services provided by governmental and non-governmental organisations; 
the challenge lies in ensuring that all parties are aware of the services available to them, in many cases regardless of their immigration status. Still, the contemporary discourse around migration and displacement in Morocco is infused with xenophobia, exclusion and racism, problems compounded by a media environment highly critical of migrants and displaced people. However, experts underlined the impact of repeated positive interactions between migrant and host communities in tempering hostile rhetoric. 
Key policy messages: 
• Health, education, and housing are universal needs for both host communities and migrants. Ensure that funded programmes are available to everyone who lives in the neighbourhood, host or migrant, and that these are common goods around which community identity can be built. 
• Communicating the history of migration in areas of arrival is critical. These histories can help international organisations contextualise their programming and make immigration and settlement part of a wider story that inclusive identity can be built around. 
• Build cooperation between city- and municipal-level organisations nationally. City-to-city cooperation can fill knowledge gaps about national migration policy and reduce duplication of efforts by CSOs and NGOs who work with migrants. 

Elise Delespesse is an independent consultant based in Bonn, Germany.

Can South Africa’s Just Energy Transition (JET) deliver environmental sustainability and socioeconomic justice, or will it falter under systemic flaws? This policy brief examines the JET’s objectives of aligning climate goals with socioeconomic stability, while addressing critical hurdles such as employment instability, the trade-off between job quality and quantity, skills mismatches, regional disparities, and inadequate social protection. Key findings reveal that renewable energy jobs, though growing in number, often lack the benefits of coal sector employment—such as job security, collective bargaining power, pension contributions, and long-term contracts. Skills development gaps further entrench inequalities, particularly in coal-dependent regions like Mpumalanga. The policy brief proposes several recommendations: a job guarantee scheme; reformed social insurance for broader coverage; scaled reskilling programmes to bridge workforce gaps; and community-led governance to ensure local empowerment.