« Une décision sera prise très prochainement », a déclaré Trump dans un message publié sur les réseaux sociaux
The post Les États-Unis pourraient réduire leurs effectifs militaires en Allemagne appeared first on Euractiv FR.
L’Algérie a réaffirmé, ce mercredi 29 avril, sa pleine adhésion à l’OPEP et à l’OPEP+. Dans un communiqué publié par le ministère des Hydrocarbures, Alger […]
L’article OPEP : après la décision surprise des Émirats, Alger rappelle les fondamentaux est apparu en premier sur .
Ino Afentouli, Senior Policy Adviser and Head of the Geopolitics and Diplomacy Observatory, ELIAMEP
Against a grim international backdrop and the uncertainty exacerbated by the ongoing conflict in the Middle East—with no end in sight—and the conflict in Ukraine, which remains, lest we forget, a European conflict, Macron’s visit to Athens and the renewal of the Greek-French strategic partnership agreement can only be assessed positively.
Nonetheless, now that our long-standing bilateral relationship has been reaffirmed, we need to strengthen it further. The agreement provides for enhanced cooperation in key areas including defence, security, technology and innovation.
For Greece, however, the cornerstone of the strategic partnership is the protective shield France could provide in the event of a threat against Greece from a third country. This provision is reciprocal, but the disparity in power between the two countries makes it less likely that our country will have to come to France’s defence. That said, one should not underestimate the fact that the mutual defence provision adds to the existing obligations arising from the two countries’ membership of both NATO and the EU under, respectively, Article 5 (NATO) and Article 42.7 (TEU). The agreement therefore strengthens the convergence between the two countries within these organisations, and should not therefore be interpreted as a purely bilateral arrangement. This is significant, as both organisations have entered a transformative phase regarding their internal balance of power, given the stated intention of the US to reduce its presence on the European continent.
France in turn is playing a leading role—with Germany—in two processes we believe will proceed in parallel: the creation of a European pillar within NATO, and the gradual construction of a European defence. If these processes unfold smoothly—with a ‘amicable divorce’ from the US leading to a gradual decoupling from its responsibility for European defence—it is realistic to expect that, in the foreseeable future, European countries will be able to defend their territory with their own forces. It is equally realistic to predict that the US will not leave Europe without a nuclear umbrella, as this would heighten the threat from non-European nuclear powers. On this front, too, France recently took the bold initiative of extending its own nuclear deterrent to eight additional European countries, including Greece. The Greek-French agreement is therefore fully aligned with the European framework, making it highly beneficial for our country. To deepen this partnership further, Greece could look to the example of Franco-German cooperation, which, based on the Élysée Treaty (1963), provided the driving force for European integration. Since we
find ourselves at a decisive moment for Europe’s future, participating in enhanced cooperation arrangements will serve to amplify the influence of a small country like Greece.
Sophia Clément Mavroudis, Senior Research Fellow, ELIAMEP
For France, the Franco-Greek Agreement represents both a prototype and a blueprint for the ongoing construction of European defence at a political, industrial and geopolitical level. A new model founded upon concrete cooperation between willing states. This innovation places Greek-French cooperation at the heart of the laboratory for European strategic autonomy, and does so in the geostrategically unstable context of the Eastern Mediterranean.
France is seeking to reclaim European strategic leadership from Germany, reaffirming its self-identification as a ‘framework nation’ in European defence. It serves as a guarantor of European security through its industrial and military clout—a force multiplier that decuples its strategic impact. This agreement also serves as a foundation of the European defence architecture emerging within the framework of NATO’s European pillar, to which it is now clearly complementary. This occurs against the backdrop of growing doubt regarding US support in the event of a conflict in Europe, given Washington’s gradual withdrawal and reassessment of its priorities—namely Asia, the management of multiple theatres, and procurement shortfalls.
Greece is part of the European core and the recipient of reliable security guarantees. It is becoming a leading strategic partner, a steadfast and trusted ally, and a European bulwark in the Eastern Mediterranean capable of playing a key defensive role in the region as a politically stable and militarily capable ally.
The meeting demonstrated that France has made an explicit political and military commitment to support Greece politically, diplomatically and militarily in the event of tensions or outright conflict.
The immediate assistance clause provides for immediate bilateral engagement, a targeted strategic partnership, clear political intent, and a credible deterrent effect. This makes it more robust politically and militarily than both the TEU’s Article 42.7—which is legally strong, but operationally weak—and NATO’s Article 5, which is formidable but politically constrained, lacking military immediacy and being both dependent on the US and inapplicable in disputes between two member nations. It acts as a powerful political deterrent, reducing the political ambiguity which the EU and NATO ‘intentionally’ retain—a factor of particular concern to Greece.
The advanced nuclear deterrence proposed by France to eight countries that have requested it does not constitute an official extension of the French nuclear umbrella; rather, it is a political and strategic tool that lends credibility to the bilateral guarantee. As well as serving as a political demonstration of French deterrence, it ensures that Greek security is incorporated into French strategic calculations. It is of crucial strategic importance to Greece that France has made it clear that any destabilisation of Greece would undermine French strategic interests. This deterrence is both diplomatic and military in nature, involving the deployment of conventional forces within the participating countries (frigates, Rafale fighter jets). Greece is thus transitioning from a traditionally conventional national deterrence strategy to a model of indirect, extended deterrence within the French strategic umbrella.
For France, the industrial cooperation foreseen by the agreement supports the development of a European defence ecosystem with an explicit European preference, and thus represents a significant opportunity for its own national defence industry. For Greece, the agreement consolidates bilateral industrial cooperation and will bolster the Greek defence industrial base—on the proviso that strict oversight is maintained over requirements and procurement. It also supports the co-production, development and strengthening of a future sustainable domestic defence industry that will have an economic, political and social impact.
Finally, for Greece, the agreement represents a strong European political guarantee with a long-term structural rationale. Which is why France would expect Greece to manage, and perhaps in future strike a balance between, its multiple alliances with third countries:
– With the US, the complementarity of defence systems within the framework of NATO’s European core and the priority of Europe’s strategic autonomy.
-With Israel, the management of potential future tensions arising from military decisions, as well as the further integration of air defence systems and the interoperability of weapon systems.
Le Premier Lord de la Marine, Gwyn Jenkins, affirme que la Force expéditionnaire conjointe doit évoluer vers un « partenariat des marines du Nord » plus intégré
The post Le Royaume-Uni dévoile un projet d’alliance navale nordique de dix pays pour contrer la menace maritime russe appeared first on Euractiv FR.
Les tensions diplomatiques entre Paris et Alger sont de nouveau sous les projecteurs après les propos d’Emmanuel Macron sur les « mabouls », une sortie qui alimente […]
L’article “Les mabouls savent compter” : Sarah Knafo brandit sa facture controversée à 9 milliards sur l’Algérie est apparu en premier sur .
Le commissaire européen au développement prendra la parole lors de la conférence à laquelle participera l'envoyé américain
The post L’émissaire de Trump s’invite lui-même à la conférence du Groenland appeared first on Euractiv FR.
The UN report has highlighted water as the most immediate and severe casualty of this global transition. Mining operations require vast quantities of water and often contaminate local sources. Credit: UNU-INWEH
By Umar Manzoor Shah
SRINAGAR, India, Apr 30 2026 (IPS)
A newly released United Nations report has raised urgent concerns that the world’s push toward clean energy and digital technologies is driving a hidden crisis in some of the planet’s most vulnerable regions, where mining for critical minerals is depleting water supplies, damaging health, and deepening inequality.
The report, Critical Minerals, Water Insecurity and Injustice, released by the United Nations University Institute for Water, Environment and Health (UNU-INWEH), warns that the race for minerals essential to electric vehicles, renewable energy, and artificial intelligence could replicate the injustices of the fossil fuel era.
Demand for these minerals is expected to surge dramatically in the coming decades. According to the report, global demand could quadruple by 2050, with lithium, cobalt, and graphite seeing increases of up to 500 percent. These materials are indispensable for batteries, solar panels, and digital infrastructure.
Prof. Kaveh Madani, UNU-INWEH Director who led the investigation team, says the world lacks an enforceable governance model for critical minerals. Credit: UNU-INWEH
Prof. Kaveh Madani, UNU-INWEH Director who led the investigation team, told IPS News in an exclusive interview that the world is lacking an enforceable governance model for critical minerals.
He said that without binding international agreements, laws, and policies, environmental and health costs—especially water depletion and pollution—are pushed onto mining regions, leaving affected communities without effective accountability or recourse.
“The climate, energy, sustainability, and the so-called “green” policies are narrowly carbon-centric. Demand projections are driven by decarbonisation targets, but water security, health and WASH impacts are not hard constraints in transition planning. As a result, mineral extraction expands even in highly water-stressed regions,” Madani said.
He added that the trade and industrial policies reinforce structural asymmetries and that high-income economies retain control over refining, manufacturing, finance, and intellectual property, while mineral-rich countries are locked into raw extraction with weak benefit-sharing. “Together, these failures reproduce inequality rather than delivering a just transition,” Madani told IPS.
Communities in mining zones are increasingly described as “sacrifice zones”, areas where environmental degradation and human suffering are accepted as the cost of global progress. Credit: UNU-INWEH
The report has further highlighted water as the most immediate and severe casualty of this global transition. Mining operations require vast quantities of water and often contaminate local sources.
Producing just one tonne of lithium requires nearly 1.9 million litres of water. In 2024 alone, global lithium production consumed an estimated 456 billion litres, an amount equivalent to the annual domestic water needs of about 62 million people in sub-Saharan Africa.
In Chile’s Salar de Atacama, one of the world’s richest lithium reserves, mining accounts for up to 65 percent of regional water use, intensifying shortages for local communities and farmers.
Across the so-called Lithium Triangle, spanning Argentina, Bolivia, and Chile, groundwater levels are falling. The report cites evidence of declining water tables and disrupted ecosystems as brine extraction alters underground water systems.
“Everyone needs money. But everyone also needs the basics, like water,” a resident in Bolivia’s Uyuni region is quoted as saying in the report.
Cases of Birth Defects, Miscarriages, and Chronic Illnesses
Toxic chemicals and heavy metals released during extraction often seep into rivers, soil, and groundwater.
The report documents widespread pollution in mining regions such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where cobalt extraction is concentrated. In some areas, rivers have turned highly acidic, with pH levels below 4.5, rendering water unsafe for drinking and agriculture.
Health impacts are severe. In communities near mining sites, 72 percent of respondents reported skin diseases, while more than half of women reported gynaecological problems. Prolonged exposure to contaminated water has also been linked to cases of birth defects, miscarriages, and chronic illnesses.
Children are particularly vulnerable. Studies cited in the report show higher rates of congenital abnormalities in areas close to mining activity, along with increased risks of developmental disorders.
“These are not isolated cases. They reflect systemic health disparities driven by environmental exposure,” reads the report.
Who Benefits and Who Pays?
Beyond health, water scarcity and pollution are undermining traditional livelihoods. Farming, fishing, and livestock rearing are becoming increasingly difficult in mining regions.
In Bolivia, lithium extraction has reduced water availability for quinoa farming, a staple crop. In parts of Africa, declining fish populations have resulted from river contamination, which has cut off a key source of food and income.
In some cases, mining operations displace entire communities. Indigenous populations, whose lands often contain mineral reserves, are among the hardest hit.
The report estimates that more than half of critical mineral projects are located on or near Indigenous territories .
A main finding of the report is the imbalance between who benefits and who pays the price.
While extraction largely occurs in the Global South, the economic and technological gains are concentrated in wealthier nations. Countries rich in minerals often lack the infrastructure and capacity to process them, limiting their role to low-value extraction.
In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which produces over 60 percent of the world’s cobalt, more than 70 percent of the population lives on less than $2.15 a day.
Meanwhile, the profits flow to multinational corporations and industrial economies that dominate refining and manufacturing.
The report describes this dynamic as a “structural sustainability paradox,” where the environmental benefits enjoyed in developed countries are effectively subsidised by ecological and social harm in poorer regions.
Experts warn that the current trajectory could repeat patterns seen in the fossil fuel industry.
“The clean energy transition is not automatic. Without deliberate policy intervention, it can reproduce extractive colonialism under a new label,” the report states.
Communities in mining zones are increasingly being described as “sacrifice zones”, areas where environmental degradation and human suffering are accepted as the cost of global progress.
The report has recommended stronger international regulations, mandatory environmental standards, and greater transparency in supply chains. It also urges investment in recycling and circular economy models to reduce reliance on new mining, as well as the adoption of technologies that use less water.
Crucially, it emphasises the need to include local communities in decision-making and ensure they benefit from resource extraction. “Achieving climate goals must not come at the expense of those least equipped to bear the costs,” the report reads.
Dr Abraham Nunbogu, UNU-INWEH scientist and the report’s lead author, says legally allocating a share of mineral revenues to water infrastructure, health systems, skills training, and downstream industrial capacity is crucial. Credit: UNU-INWEH
Strategic Policy Needed
Dr Abraham Nunbogu, a UNU-INWEH scientist and the report’s lead author, told Inter Press Service that a practical step to move up the value chain and keep more economic benefits is a strategic industrial policy: using export conditions, licensing, or joint-venture requirements to promote local refining, processing, and manufacturing.
“Second, benefit-sharing and reinvestment mandates: legally allocating a share of mineral revenues to water infrastructure, health systems, skills training, and downstream industrial capacity. Third, regional value-chain cooperation: pooling resources across neighbouring countries to achieve economies of scale in processing and manufacturing that individual countries cannot reach alone,” Nunbogu said.
He added that the final step would be to address power imbalances by linking mineral access to ethical sourcing standards and technology transfer obligations in trade agreements.
IPS UN Bureau Report
Follow @IPSNewsUNBureau
Április zárásaként két korábbi írásomat ajánlom az olvasónak. Mindkettő líbiai vonatkozású, az egyik 40 éve zajlott, a másik 15 esztendeje.
Az előbbi az Egyesült Államok légiereje és haditengerészet által 1986. április 15-én végrehajtott Eldorado Canyon művelet.
A másik, időben közelebbi, a svéd légierő részvétele a Unified Protector műveletben 2011 áprilisa és októbere között, Karakal művelet elnevezéssel.
…
La première simulation du fonctionnement concret de l'article 42, paragraphe 7, du traité de Lisbonne devrait avoir lieu la semaine prochaine
The post Discussions sur la clause d’assistance mutuelle de l’UE : les capitales européennes craignent de braquer Trump appeared first on Euractiv FR.
Payments for Environmental Services (PES) have gained widespread popularity as a conservation strategy, promoted as a ‘win-win’ solution benefitting nature, local communities and economic development simultaneously. This chapter challenges the ideal vision of PES by examining common issues in watershed programmes, particularly in Latin America. Despite their theoretical appeal, PES schemes face fundamental challenges that undermine their promised benefits. Complex ecological systems resist the simplified economic models underlying PES, making accurate measurement and valuation of ecosystem services problematic. Power asymmetries enable wealthy downstream users to impose restrictions on marginalised upstream communities, perpetuating historical inequality rather than alleviating poverty. PES can also produce unintended environmental consequences through leakage, counterproductive incentives and erosion of intrinsic conservation motivations. Rather than offering a panacea, PES usually functions as a politically charged mechanism, consolidating resource control among powerful actors while deflecting environmental responsibility onto vulnerable communities, thus raises serious questions about its fairness and effectiveness.