Africa

Nach tödlichen Protesten in Minneapolis zieht Donald Trump 700 Bundesbeamte ab. Der US-Präsident spricht von einem nötigen Kurswechsel, bekräftigt aber, dass man weiterhin entschlossen gegen Kriminelle vorgehen werde.

Epstein considered approaching Mugabe about a new currency in 2015 - the latest batch of files show.

Shops and homes were torched in an attack on two villages in the western state of Kwara, a lawmaker says.

Der Bau des Bishoftu International Airports in Addis Abeba hat Anfang Januar begonnen. Er soll mit jährlich 110 Millionen Passagieren Afrikas wichtigstes Luftfahrtdrehkreuz werden. Geht die Rechnung auf?

Die Freiburger Polizei stoppte am Samstagabend in Bulle einen Influencer und seinen Kameramann. Rund hundert Jugendliche hatten sich ohne Bewilligung versammelt, um seine Live-Übertragung zu verfolgen. Ein Jugendlicher zündete Feuerwerk und wird angezeigt.

Norovirus-Alarm im olympischen Dorf in Mailand: Finnlands Eishockey-Team muss Spielerinnen isolieren und das Training absagen. Auch das Auftaktspiel gegen Kanada steht auf der Kippe.

Das SRF-Format «rec.» sorgt regelmässig für Schlagzeilen – weil es unbequeme Themen aus einem anderen Blickwinkel dokumentarisch zu beleuchten versucht. Die neueste Folge zum Thema Verschwörungstheorien sorgt für Freude bei den Zuschauern – aber auch viel Unmut.

Eine Deutsche setzte am Montag zum Telefonterror bei der Polizei an. Kein Einzelfall – auch in der Schweiz kam es schon zu ähnlichen Fällen.

The surprise move may threaten the stability of the coalition government of which the DA is a key partner.

Putzen kostet Zeit und oft auch Nerven. Genau hier setzt die Zehn-Minuten-Methode an. Entwickelt von der US-amerikanischen Haushaltsexpertin Becky Rapinchuk, ersetzt sie den wöchentlichen Grossputz durch kurze, tägliche Einheiten.

Die Immunität des AfD-Abgeordneten Jörg Dornau wurde in Sachsen aufgehoben. Ermittelt wird wegen eines Verstosses gegen das Aussenwirtschaftsgesetz. Einsatzkräfte durchsuchten am Mittwoch seine Wohn- und Geschäftsräume.

Ahmed Muharram is among several suspects arrested in a major crackdown on marijuana trafficking.

By CIVICUS
Feb 4 2026 (IPS)

 
CIVICUS discusses the situation following the US intervention in Venezuela with Guillermo Miguelena Palacios, director of the Venezuelan Progressive Institute, a think tank that promotes spaces for dialogue and democratic leadership.

Guillermo Miguelena Palacios

On 3 January, a US military intervention culminated in the arrest and extradition of President Nicolás Maduro, who had stayed in power after refusing to recognise the results of the July 2024 election, which was won by the opposition. However, power did not pass on to the elected president, Edmundo González, who remains in exile, but to Maduro’s vice-president, Delcy Rodríguez, under a pact that preserves the interests of the military leadership, ruling party and presidential family. Hopes for a restoration of democracy are fading in the face of a process that is prioritising economic and social control.

What led Donald Trump to intervene militarily in Venezuela?

The US intervention responds to a mix of economic pragmatism and the reaffirmation of a vision of absolute supremacy in the hemisphere.

First, it seeks to secure nearby stable energy sources in a context of global instability. In his statements, Trump mentioned oil and rare earth metals dozens of times. For him, Venezuela isn’t a human rights issue but a strategic asset that was under the influence of China, Iran and Russia, something unacceptable for US national security.

Second, it represents the financial elite’s interest in recovering investments lost due to expropriations carried out by the government of former president Hugo Chávez. Trump has been explicit: the USA believes Venezuela’s subsoil owes them compensation. By intervening and overseeing the transition, he’s ensuring the new administration signs agreements that give priority to US companies in the exploitation of oil fields. It’s an intervention designed to ‘bring order’ and turn Venezuela into a reliable energy partner, even if that means coexisting with a regime that has only changed its facade.

How much continuity and change is there following Maduro’s fall?

For most Venezuelans, the early hours of 3 January represented a symbolic break with historical impunity. The image of Maduro under arrest shattered the myth that the regime’s highest leaders would never pay for their actions. However, beyond the joy experienced in Venezuelan homes and in countries with a big Venezuelan diaspora, what happened was a manoeuvre to ensure the system’s survival

Chavismo is not a monolithic bloc, but a coalition of factions organised around economic interests and power networks. Broadly speaking, there are two main groups: a civilian faction and a military faction. Both manage and compete for strategic businesses, but the military is present, directly or indirectly, in most of them as coercive guarantors of the system.

The civilian faction controls areas linked to financial and political management, while the military faction secures and protects logistics chains, ports, routes and territories. Within this architecture there are various conglomerates of interests. There’s oil, an opaque business managed through parallel markets, irregular intermediation and non-transparent financial schemes. There’s drug trafficking, sustained by territorial control and institutional permissiveness. There’s the food system, which historically profited from exchange controls and the administration of hunger. And there’s illegal mining, where the military presence alongside Colombian guerrilla groups such as the National Liberation Army (ELN) is dominant and structural.

Maduro’s downfall appears to have been part of an agreement among these factions to preserve their respective businesses: they handed over the figure who could no longer guarantee them money laundering or social peace in order to regroup under a new technocratic facade that ensures they can enjoy their wealth without the pressure of international sanctions.

A revealing detail is that, while Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores, were captured, their children remain in Caracas with their businesses intact. Their son, Nicolás Maduro Guerra, continues to operate in the fishing sector and in the export of industrial waste such as aluminium and iron. This suggests the existence of a family protection pact.

We are seeing an economic transition, but by no means a democratic transition. Rodríguez has the reputation of being much more efficient and has had greater international exposure than the rest of Chavismo. She’s backed by a new business elite, young people under 45 who need to launder their capital and gain legitimacy in the global market. Their goal is to improve purchasing power and reduce hunger in order to confer respectability on the regime, while maintaining social control.

What caused the recent resurgence of the territorial conflict with Guyana?

The conflict over the territory of Essequibo is neither new nor improvised: it’s a historical dispute and Venezuela has legal and political arguments to support its claims over the territory. For decades, the two states agreed on a mechanism to contain the dispute, which involved a temporary cessation of active claims and a ban on exploiting the area’s natural resources while a negotiated solution was sought.

In this context, Chávez chose to de-escalate the conflict as part of his international strategy. To gain diplomatic support, particularly in the Caribbean, he reduced pressure on the Essequibo, and as a result several Caribbean Community countries supported Venezuela in multilateral forums such as the Organization of American States. Guyana interpreted this not as a tactical pause but as an abandonment of the claim, and decided to move forward unilaterally and grant concessions to ExxonMobil to conduct oil exploration. These operations revealed the existence of large reserves of high-quality crude oil.

The reactivation of the conflict is, therefore, a combination of legitimate historical claims and political expediency. This wasn’t simply Maduro’s nationalist outburst but an attempt to capture new revenue amid the collapse of Venezuela’s traditional oil industry.

Oil remains the linchpin of the regime’s geopolitics. Although Venezuela has the largest reserves in the world, most of it is extra-heavy crude, which is expensive to extract and process and profitable only when international prices are high. In contrast, the oil discovered off the Atlantic coast of the Essequibo is light, comparable to Saudi oil, and therefore much cheaper to produce and refine. This economic differential explains much of the regime’s renewed aggressiveness in a dispute that had been contained for years.

What’s the mining arc and what role does it play?

In addition to oil and gas, there’s another source of strategic wealth that sustains the regime. The Orinoco Mining Arc is a vast exploitation zone in southern Venezuela, rich in coltan, diamonds, gold and rare earths. The ELN operates there under the protection of the army. It’s a brutal extraction system that generates a flow of wealth in cash and precious metals that directly finances the high military hierarchy, maintaining its loyalty to the system regardless of what happens to oil revenues or the formal economy.

It is noteworthy that, despite the US intervention and the rhetoric about strategic resources, the mining arc has hardly been mentioned. We presume it was part of the negotiation so the military would not resist Maduro’s arrest. The USA appears to have chosen to secure oil in other areas of Venezuela and let the military maintain its mining revenues in the south, since intervening there would mean getting involved in guerrilla warfare in the jungle.

What’s your analysis of the announcement of the release of political prisoners?

The announcement was presented as a gesture of openness, but the so-called releases are actually simple discharges from prison. This means political prisoners are released and go home, but still have pending charges and are therefore banned from leaving Venezuela and must appear in court periodically, usually every few days. In addition, they are absolutely prohibited from speaking to the media and participating in political activities.

This reduces the political cost of keeping prisoners in cells, but maintains legal control over them. Released prisoners live under constant threat. The state reminds them and their families that their freedom is conditional and any gesture of dissent can return them to prison immediately. This is a mechanism of institutional whitewashing: it projects an image of clemency while maintaining repression through administrative means that are much more difficult to denounce before the international community.

What’s the state of social movements?

Social and trade union movements are in a state of exhaustion and deep demobilisation. After years of mass protests between 2014 and 2017 that resulted in fierce repression, people have lost faith in mobilisation as a tool for change. Increasingly, the priority has been daily survival, particularly food and security, with political struggles taking a back seat.

Authorities have been surgical in their repression of the trade union movement: they imprisoned key leaders to terrorise the rank and file and paralyse any attempt at strike action. While organisations like ours have continued to provide technical support and training in cybersecurity, activism is now a highly risky activity.

What are the prospects for a democratic transition?

I see no signs of a genuine democratic transition. The regime’s strategy seems to be to maintain for the next two years the fiction that Maduro has not definitively ceased to hold office and could return, in order to circumvent the constitutional obligation to call immediate elections, which the opposition would surely win. During those two years, which coincide with the final two years of Trump’s term, they will flood the market with imported goods and try to stabilise the currency to create some sense of wellbeing. They will surely use the Supreme Court to interpret some article of the constitution to justify that there’s no definitive presidential vacancy.

Halfway through the term, they would no longer need to call elections. Instead, they could declare Maduro’s ‘absolute vacancy’ so that Rodríguez could finish the 2025-2031 presidential term. Thus, they would try to reach the 2030 election with a renewed image and a recovered economy, on the calculation that a sense of economic wellbeing would prevail over the memory of decades of abuse. They could even enable opposition figures to simulate a fair contest, but would maintain total control of the electoral system and media.

We are concerned the international community will accept the idea of an ‘efficient authoritarianism’ that reduces hunger but maintains censorship and persecution of dissent.

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SEE ALSO
Venezuela: the democratic transition that wasn’t CIVICUS Lens 30.Jan.2025
Venezuela: ‘Each failed attempt at democratic transition reinforces the power of the authoritarian government’ CIVICUS Lens | Interview with Carlos Torrealba 25.Jan.2025
Venezuela struggles to hold on to hope CIVICUS Lens 15.Aug.2024

 

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Am vergangenen Wochenende wird eine Trainerin am Rande eines Fussballturniers in Pratteln BL attackiert. Es ist nicht der erste Gewaltakt im Schweizer Jugendfussball. Blick listet die brisantesten Fälle auf.

In der Schweiz gibt es viele Skigebiete – nur wenige schliesst man wirklich ins Herz. Blick möchte wissen, welches die besten Wintersportgebiete hierzulande sind und du entscheidest mit. Stimme bis zum 12. Februar 2026 ab und gewinne mit etwas Glück tolle Preise.

The United Nations Security Council meets on the situation in Yemen. Credit: UN Photo/Evan Schneider

By Oritro Karim
UNITED NATIONS, Feb 4 2026 (IPS)

In recent weeks, Yemen’s humanitarian crisis has sharply worsened, as escalating food insecurity and brutal clashes between armed actors have prompted United Nations (UN) officials to warn that the country is approaching a critical breaking point. Intensified violence has increasingly obstructed lifesaving humanitarian operations, while deepening economic and political instability continues to erode access to essential services. As a result, millions of Yemenis now face the growing risk of being left without the support they need to survive, with children being the hardest-hit.

Late December and early January proved to be a particularly volatile period for Yemen, with political turmoil acting as a key driver of instability, particularly in the nation’s south. Recently, the United Arab Emirates (UAE)-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC) launched major offensives across the south, seizing key provinces such as Hadramawt and al-Mahrah, prompting Saudi-backed government forces to launch a series of airstrikes to reclaim key infrastructure in cities such as Mukalla and Aden.

While a military de-escalation was achieved in the following days, humanitarian experts warn that the overall security situation remains extremely fragile without a durable political and economic solution—both of which continue to threaten national stability. According to UN experts, years of political turmoil have severely weakened the economy, driving inflation, pushing food and fuel prices further out of reach, and leaving large numbers of public sector workers with unpaid salaries.

On January 14, UN Special Envoy for Yemen Hans Grundberg briefed ambassadors on the urgent need to establish a credible, transparent, and inclusive political process. He explained that the “developments in southern Yemen highlight how quickly that fragile balance can be disrupted,” and how critical it is “to re-anchor the process in a credible political pathway”.

“Absent a comprehensive approach that addresses Yemen’s many challenges in an integrated manner, rather than in isolation, the risk of recurrent and destabilizing cycles will remain a persistent feature in the country’s trajectory,” said Grundberg.

Grundberg also underscored the importance of protecting Yemen’s economic institutions—particularly the Central Bank—from political and security conflicts, warning that even short-lived instability can trigger currency depreciation, expand fiscal deficits, and hinder urgently needed economic reforms.

According to Yemeni officials, clashes between the STC, the Houthi movement, and the Saudi-backed government have driven large-scale displacement and disrupted access to essential services for thousands of civilians. On January 19, Julien Harneis, Assistant Secretary-General and the UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator for Yemen, told reporters that humanitarian conditions are expected to deteriorate further in 2026, with an estimated 21 million people projected to require humanitarian assistance—an increase from the 19.5 million recorded last year.

This includes more than 18 million Yemenis—roughly half the population—who are projected to face acute food insecurity in February. Additionally, it is estimated that tens of thousands could fall into “catastrophic” levels of hunger and face famine-like conditions without intervention.

Yemen’s hunger crisis is projected to hit children the hardest, with roughly half of all children under five years old facing acute malnutrition. As a result of persistent funding gaps last year, only a quarter of the 8 million children targeted for nutritional support received lifesaving care. Furthermore, over 2,500 supplementary feeding programmes and outpatient therapeutic programmes were forced to close.

“The simple narrative is, children are dying and it’s going to get worse. My fear is that we won’t hear about it until the mortality and the morbidity significantly increases in this next year,” said Harneis.

Additionally, Yemeni officials underscored that recent hostilities have forced key civilian infrastructures—including schools and hospitals—to shut down or operate at limited capacity. Ramesh Rajasingham, Director of the Humanitarian Sector for the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) noted that over 450 health facilities have closed in recent months, with thousands of others at risk of losing funding. Additionally, vaccination campaigns have been hindered, facing significant challenges in accessing children in the north, leaving them highly vulnerable to preventable diseases such as measles, diphtheria, cholera, and polio.

Rajasingham also warned of tightening restrictions on aid as a result of violence. According to figures from the UN, 73 UN staff have been arbitrarily detained by Houthi de facto authorities since 2021, restricting aid operations across 70 percent of humanitarian needs across Yemen. “We know that when humanitarian organizations can operate safely, effectively and in a principled manner, and when resources are available, humanitarian assistance works. It reduces hunger, it prevents disease, and it saves lives. But when access is obstructed and funding falls away, those gains are quickly reversed,” said Rajasingham.

On January 29, the World Food Programme (WFP) announced that it is shutting down operations in northern Yemen following severe aid restrictions, harassment, and arbitrary detainment of staff from Houthi personnel. UN officials informed reporters that approximately 365 of the remaining WFP staff members in northern Yemen will lose their jobs by the end of March, as a result of insecurity and funding challenges.

In 2025, Yemen’s UN Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan was only funded at 25 percent, forcing humanitarian actors to scale back critical services, deprioritize certain populations or sectors, and halt lifesaving operations, leaving millions without aid and exposed to heightened risks.

“The unavoidable reality is that the United Nations must continue to reevaluate and reorganize our humanitarian operations on the ground in DFA-held areas of Yemen – home to around 70 per cent of humanitarian needs countrywide,” said Rajasingham, also urging the Security Council to exert pressure on the international community to bring about the release of the 73 UN staff and scale up funding as needs continue to rise.

IPS UN Bureau Report

 

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Mega-Staus im Norden, ein Toter in Hessen – das Winterwetter sorgt für Ausnahmezustand. Zahlreiche ICE-Züge fallen aus, Pendler kommen wegen Schnee und Glatteis nicht ans Ziel.

Prosthetics marketed by I-Walk at an event marking resistance to Myanmar’s military coup of five years ago. The enterprise has a waiting list of over 3,000 people. Credit: Guy Dinmore/IPS

By Guy Dinmore
MYANMAR & THAILAND, Feb 4 2026 (IPS)

Five years of conflict since the military seized power have reduced Myanmar to a failed state and taken a huge toll of lives lost and destroyed. But with all sides seeking total victory, there is no end in sight.

Levels of medieval brutality enhanced by modern technology have enabled the military junta, with help from China, to swing the fortunes of war back in its favour, often through air strikes and drone attacks on civilian targets. Torched villages are deserted.

Kyaw Thurein Win, on the anniversary of the military’s February 1, 2021, coup against the elected civilian government, watched his village of Shut Pon burning in the southern region of Tanintharyi – through satellite imagery.

“Today my village is witnessing the cruelty of the military. They set the fires and ordered that they not be stopped. This is beyond inhuman and beyond cruel. Watching this happen from afar is unbearable,” he wrote on Facebook.

While the strength of anti-regime defiance and determination is undeniable among many in Myanmar, there is also a growing realisation – especially among former combatants — that the resistance will not win this war so soon, if at all.

“It is a stalemate. Nobody can win,” said one military defector, saying that cries of total victory by both the regime and the resistance ring hollow.

A young woman who runs a safe house for former child soldiers as young as 13 says she joined the People’s Defence Forces of the resistance that sprang up against military rule in 2021. But she soon came to realise that, for her at least, war was not the answer and started taking in children forced by poverty and displacement to become fighters against the regime.

She rails against the “whatever it takes” mentality and the toll it takes.

“The civilian suffering is ignored or exploited,” she says, attending a coup anniversary event – a mix of politics and culture and foodstalls –  organised by anti-regime civilian activists in Chiang Mai, northern Thailand. She shares a picture of ‘Commando’ in uniform, armed to the teeth. He was 12 at the time.

Sayarma Suzanna, fundraising for her school in Kayin State, the Dr Thanbyah Christian Institute for displaced and local children, said she and her 97 students spent all of November hiding in the nearby forest because of air strikes.

“You have to understand that when the students don’t listen to you during lessons, it is because of their trauma,” she said, recounting how one student lost seven family members in air strikes on their village.

At a nearby stall, the manager of I-Walk displayed an array of quality prosthetic limbs made by his enterprise as affordable as possible. He has a waiting list of over 3,000 people.

Myanmar is the most landmined country in the world with the highest rate of casualties. It also ranks as the biggest producer of illicit opium and a major source of synthetic drugs. Networks of online scam centres run by criminal gangs and militia groups close to the regime have trafficked tens of thousands of people from multiple countries, scamming billions of dollars.

The UN says 5.2 million people have been displaced by conflict inside the country and across borders. Cuts by rich countries to aid budgets have had a crippling impact. Some clinics are reduced to dispensing just paracetamol.

This year’s coup anniversary coincided with the conclusion of parliamentary and regional elections tightly orchestrated by the regime over the scattered and sometimes totally isolated areas of territory it controls, which include all major cities.

The three-phase polls – endorsed by China and Russia but slammed by the UN and most democracies except notably the US – excluded the National League for Democracy, which won landslide election victories in 2015 and 2020.

NLD leader Aung San Suu Kyi has been held in prison since the coup. There is speculation that Senior General Min Aung Hlaing might move her to better conditions of house arrest after the military’s Union Solidarity and Development Party, led by former senior officers, forms a nominally civilian government in April.

The USDP is cruising towards its managed landslide victory, according to almost complete results released last week.

The UN said it had reliable reports of at least 170 civilians killed in regime attacks during the month-long election period. Other estimates put the figure considerably higher.

One airstrike in Kachin State in northern Myanmar reportedly killed 50 civilians on January 22. Long-running attempts by the Kachin Independence Army and resistance forces to capture the nearby and heavily defended Bhamo town from the military have been costly. Some analysts ask, for what gain?’

Kachin State’s second biggest town is strategically located on a trade route to China but most of its 55,000 or so inhabitants have long since fled. The military would surely respond with heavy air strikes to any occupation by the resistance.

Data gathered by ACLED, a nonprofit organisation that analyses data on political violence, indicates over 90,000 total conflict-related deaths since the coup. The military, reliant on forced conscription, has borne the brunt of casualties, but civilian deaths are estimated at over 16,000.

“The military has carried out air strikes, indiscriminately or deliberately attacking civilians in their homes, hospitals, and schools,” said Nicholas Koumjian, head of the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar, adding that there is evidence that civilians have endured atrocities amounting to crimes against humanity and war crimes since the military takeover.

The IIMM is also investigating a growing number of allegations of atrocities committed by opposition armed groups, over which the parallel National Unity Government set up by lawmakers ousted in the coup has little or no control.

Former combatants say rogue People’s Defence Forces are also extorting money from local populations and holding people to ransom.

“Myanmar remains mired in an existential crisis – measured both in human security and the state’s shrinking sovereignty as rival centres of power harden on the ground,” the Institute for Strategy and Policy – Myanmar, a think-tank, stated in its recent annual review.

“The regime is meanwhile trying to break the current stalemate by accelerating counter-offensives on three fronts: military, diplomatic and political,” it said. The military-staged elections of 2010 led to a process of political and economic reforms but this time the regime intended to impose its own terms, the think tank said.

It warned of the risk that ethnic armed groups controlling swathes of border territories with Bangladesh, India, China and Thailand would end up – not for the first time – negotiating bilateral ceasefires and “rent sharing arrangements” with the regime. These would “consolidate the power of armed elites and reinforce central control rather than advance democracy, human rights or the rule of law.”

On Sunday, a panel discussion featuring anti-regime politicians and activists hosted by Chiang Mai University reinforced the sense of an opposition fragmented along ethnic and geographical lines, even if speakers upheld the principles behind their shared goal of a democratic federal union.

There was the customary rhetoric of “taking down this junta” and “whatever it takes”, but barely a mention of the National Unity Government that is struggling to knit together these diverse forces under the umbrella of a “Federal Supreme Council”.

On the panel, Debbie Stothard, a Malaysian democracy and women’s rights activist long involved with Myanmar, said the resistance needed two more years for victory, as the generals had “bought” one more year with their sham elections.

“Hang in there. We have to keep on going for at least two more years,” she said.

But in the big cities where the regime is starting to try and foster a sense of normality against a dire economic backdrop, the mood on the street appears more of resignation than defiance.

“When we started protesting against the regime in the streets in 2021, I told my husband we would defeat the military in three months,” an elderly Chin activist told IPS in Yangon, the former capital. “He replied it would take five years. Now I am afraid it will take another five years,” she said.

IPS UN Bureau Report

 

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