Game-changing international ocean treaty comes into force. Credit: NOAA
Deep-sea corals were among the treasures found during an expedition in the North Marianas Islands in the Pacific Ocean. Source: UN News
By Pietro Bertazzi and Oliver Tanqueray
AMSTERDAN / LONDON, Feb 3 2026 (IPS)
“The ocean’s health is humanity’s health”, said UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres, in September 2025.
He was commenting after the High Seas Treaty (BBNJ) [1] finally achieved ratification, going on to call for “a swift, full implementation” from all partners. As of January 17, 2026, the treaty has come into force, meaning the time for implementation is now. What is the High Seas Treaty?
Only 1% of the high seas are currently protected. The new treaty will greatly increase safeguards, with significant implications for activities covering nearly 50% of the Earth’s surface.
The High Seas Treaty establishes, for the first time, a legal mechanism to govern activities affecting biodiversity in the areas of the ocean that lie outside the jurisdiction of any single country (ie their Exclusive Economic Zones, typically 200 miles from their coastline).
The agreement was achieved after nearly 20 years of dialogue, much of which was carried by Small Island Developing States (SIDS), Indigenous peoples and coastal communities. For them, the relationship with the ocean is most direct and the threats to it are most existential.
The entry into force of such a significant legal instrument sends a powerful message on the value of collaboration, and its importance in confronting the environmental risks facing the economy and humanity.
The agreement will change the ways that activities taking place in the High Seas – and those affecting them – will be planned, monitored, managed and reported on. This level of transparency will drive a cycle of accountability and improvement in the relationship between our economy and the natural world on which it depends.
What you need to know
The treaty’s role as an international legal mechanism will have significant effects on companies and financial institutions to respond to.
Key outcomes
1. Increased transparency on ocean-based activities
The agreement sets out monitoring and transparency requirements of countries – including Environment Impact Assessments (EIA) – alongside high seas genetic material, samples and digital sequence data, as well as a publicly accessible database to promote publicly available real economy data and data exchange.
This means that many aspects of companies’ high seas-related projects will be accessible to stakeholders.
Anticipating increased public information on environmental studies and mitigation plans, companies should prepare to report on high seas activities, such as fishing, shipping, energy infrastructure, mining and bioprospecting, as well as potential impacts of new activities such as carbon dioxide removal technologies.
Companies can also further identify opportunities through new publicly available data and recognize the halo benefits that increased coverage of marine-protected areas brings.
2. Increased expectations on corporate disclosure
New EIAs will amplify the need for standardized corporate data on marine impact – coupled with growing investor and policy focus on companies’ high seas activities, strategies and governance.
Financial institutions (FIs) and regulators will expect companies to report on how they comply with treaty obligations such as the number of high seas environmental assessments completed, presence in protected areas, and contributions to capacity building.
Asset owners will ask for metrics on exposure to high seas biodiversity risks. Governments may require reporting from firms to compile national reports and monitor compliance.
Companies should expect new jurisdictional regulations on ocean activities, as Member States take steps to implement the Agreement, via enhanced environmental rules and disclosure obligations.
For FIs, there is increased focus on integrating ocean health into Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) analysis, with risks and opportunities in blue finance and sustainable ocean industries only going to grow.
This creates a need to ensure that portfolio companies are equipped to comply with new regulations and secure relevant permissions to operate in international waters. Failure to do so creates risks to ongoing operations as well as litigation and reputational exposure.
3. Strengthened multilateral collaboration
The agreement creates legal mechanisms for area-based management tools, including Marine Protected Areas (MPAs). For disclosers and financial institutions, this means enhancing readiness to adapt to exclusions or operating conditions on shipping lanes, fishing grounds, mining sites, and cable routes. Industries will need to track MPA designations and adjust operations (for example by rerouting vessels or ceasing extraction) to remain compliant.
CDP stands ready to support the ocean
Working with companies and data users, CDP will integrate and standardize key metrics needed to implement the High Seas Treaty. This ensures that stakeholders have the reliable, comparable data needed to implement collective goals, and companies can demonstrate their leadership on ocean stewardship.
From 2026 onwards, CDP will be expanding its questionnaire to gather ocean-related data. In the first year of disclosure, we will generate insights on processes for identifying, assessing, and managing ocean-related dependencies, impacts, risks, and opportunities.
This work is being done in collaboration with our Capital Markets Signatories – many of which have already shown demand for ocean-related data – and disclosing companies, focusing on those with the most significant ocean impacts and dependencies.
High Seas, higher ambitions
There is still much to do to improve the protection of marine areas and restoration of ocean health. But the BBNJ is a significant step forward in this effort.
In a year where nature is placed on the main stage of the international agenda, companies, FIs and governments alike have an opportunity to embed ocean health into global financial systems.
Countries must also complement the agreement with a drive to protect coastal waters not part of their direct control. Many ocean-impacting activities will not be constrained by the BBNJ. Only 4.2% of fishery production, for example, takes place on the high seas[2]. This means there will be a continued role for Member States to conserve and sustainably use the biological diversity in areas within their jurisdiction.
We must build momentum behind the opportunities enabled by this historic deal – collaboration and transparency will play a vital part in turning this momentum into action.
Footnotes
Pietro Bertazzi is Chief Policy and interim Growth Officer, CDP, and Oliver Tanqueray is Head of Ocean, CDP.
Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) is a global non-profit that runs the world’s only independent environmental disclosure system for companies, capital markets, cities, states and regions to manage their environmental impacts.
IPS UN Bureau
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Credit: UN/Monicah Aturinda Kyeyune
By Thalif Deen
UNITED NATIONS, Feb 3 2026 (IPS)
A sharp cut in funding for “South-South Cooperation” (UNOSSC) has triggered a strong protest from the 134-member Group of 77 (G-77), described as the largest intergovernmental organization of developing countries within the United Nations.
The protest has been reinforced by four UN ambassadors, two of them former chairs of the G77—Colombia (1993) and South Africa (2015), along with Brazil and India.
Traditionally, the G77 has been backed by China, the world’s second largest economy, and a veto wielding member of the Security Council
A letter of protest, addressed to Alexander De Croo, Administrator, UN Development Programme (UNDP), which funds and oversees the UNOSSC, says South-South cooperation remains a central pillar of the work of the United Nations and is of particular importance to the Group of 77 and China.
The UNOSSC, established by the UN General Assembly at the initiative of the G-77, “plays a critical role in supporting, coordinating and implementing South-South and triangular cooperation initiatives and projects across the United Nations development system, including in support of the UN development agenda”.
“Against this background, the G-77 and China wish to express its serious concern regarding the significant reduction in resources proposed to be allocated by UNDP to UNOSSC under the 2026–2029 Strategic Framework,” says Ambassador Laura Dupuy Lasserre, Permanent Representative of Uruguay to the United Nations and Chair of the Group of 77, in a letter to the UNDP Administrator.
The scale of the proposed reduction is described as “substantial and, if implemented, would severely constrain the Office’s ability to effectively deliver on its mandate.”
The reduction is estimated at 46% of funds allocated by UNDP to UNOSSC under the proposed 2026-2029 Strategic Framework. And in dollar terms, the proposed allocation amounts to USD 16.6 million, down from the USD 30.7 million under the 2022-2025 Strategic Framework. (the amount actually disbursed was approximately USD 22 million).
Of particular concern, is the potential impact of these funding reductions on the management and operational capacity of Trust Funds administered by UNOSSC, including the Perez-Guerrero Trust Fund for South-South Cooperation (PGTF) and other financing mechanisms that provide critical support to developing countries.
The G77 Chair has received a demarche from the Chair of the Committee of Experts of the PGTF conveying the concerns that the ability of the PGTF to continue fulfilling its regular operations might be at stake.
“Reduced institutional capacity to manage these Trust Funds would undermine their effectiveness and would have adverse consequences for beneficiary countries that rely on these instruments to advance development priorities”, warns the letter.
The Group of 77 (and China) is of the view that consideration of the proposed Strategic Framework requires further clarification before approval and should therefore be postponed.
Furthermore, the Group underscores the importance of continued transparency and structured dialogue with Member States.
“Any proposals involving the restructuring or reconfiguration of UNOSSC should be submitted for review and approval, in line with the fact that the Office was established by a resolution of the General Assembly and therefore falls under the authority of Member States.”
“In light of the above, the Group of 77 and China respectfully requests that UNDP give due consideration to all available options to substantially increase the allocation of resources to UNOSSC.”
Such action, the letter said, would be essential to safeguard the effective implementation of the Office’s mandate, protect the integrity and functionality of Trust Fund operations, and avoid negative impacts on developing countries.
Meanwhile, the letter from the four ambassadors reads:
2. It is, therefore, with grave concern that we note the dramatic reduction (46%) of funds allocated by UNDP to UNOSSC under the proposed 2026-2029 Strategic Framework: only USD 16.6 million, down from the USD 30.7 million allocated under the 2022-2025 Strategic Framework, the amount actually disbursed having been approximately USD 22 million.
3. While we fully understand the current financial difficulties faced by the UN system as a whole, we believe that the allocation of funds proposed to South-South cooperation imposes losses that are considerably higher than the average reduction experienced by UNDP programs. In addition, given the said current difficulties, it is even more likely that, in 2026-2029, the actual disbursement could be significantly less than the original allocation.
4. In this case, UNOSSC would be left with very modest funding. It is beyond doubt that expected deep cuts in funding will negatively and profoundly impact the Office’s ability to continue providing its invaluable support to developing countries, including in trust fund management. In this particular regard, reduced capacity in UNOSSC to properly support trust funds would be detrimental to the best interests of dozens of developing countries.
5. In light of the foregoing, we kindly request that UNDP promptly consider all means at its disposal to substantially increase allocation to UNOSSC, thus allowing for the effective implementation of the Office’s mandate and avoiding damage to many developing countries.
6. A second concern relates to the proposed shift of the Office toward a more policy-oriented approach, which could aggravate the steep cut in funding mentioned above. While we fully recognize the importance of policy guidance, we strongly believe that an appropriate balance between policy and programming functions must be preserved in UNOSSC, thus ensuring that strategic orientation is underpinned by adequate programmatic capacity.
7. We trust that these considerations will be duly taken into account, acted upon and unambiguously reflected in the final version of the Strategic Framework for 2026-2029.”
IPS UN Bureau Report
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Evelis Cano, mother of political prisoner Jack Tantak Cano, pleads with the police for her son’s release outside a detention centre in Caracas, Venezuela, 20 January 2026. Credit: Gaby Oraa/Reuters via Gallo Images
By Inés M. Pousadela
MONTEVIDEO, Uruguay, Feb 2 2026 (IPS)
When US special forces seized Nicolás Maduro and his wife from the presidential residence in Caracas on 3 January, killing at least 24 Venezuelan security officers and 32 Cuban intelligence operatives in the process, many in the Venezuelan opposition briefly dared hope. They speculated that intervention might finally bring the democratic transition thwarted when Maduro entrenched himself in power after losing the July 2024 election. But within hours, those hopes were crushed. Trump announced the USA would now ‘run’ Venezuela and Vice-President Delcy Rodríguez was sworn in to replace Maduro. Venezuela’s sovereignty had been violated twice: first by an authoritarian regime that usurped the popular will, and then by an external power that deliberately violated international law.
A cynical intervention
Under Trump, the USA has abandoned any pretence of promoting democracy. Trump wrapped the intervention in the rhetoric of anti-narcotics operations while openly salivating over Venezuela’s oil reserves, rare earth deposits and investment opportunities. He repeatedly made clear that US regional hegemony is the number one priority. His contempt for Venezuelans’ right to self-determination was explicit: when asked about opposition leader María Corina Machado, Trump dismissed her as lacking ‘respect’ and ‘capacity to lead’. The message to Venezuela’s democratic movement was clear: your struggle doesn’t matter, only our interests do.
Ironically, the US intervention achieved what years of Maduro’s propaganda failed to do, giving anti-imperialist rhetoric a shot in the arm. For decades, Latin American authoritarian regimes have justified repression by pointing to the threat of US intervention, even though this was a largely historical grievance. Not anymore: Trump has handed every Latin American dictator the perfect justification for continuing authoritarian rule.
The global response has been equally revealing. The loudest defenders of national sovereignty are authoritarian powers such as China, Iran and Russia: states that routinely violate their citizens’ rights expressed their ‘solidarity with the people of Venezuela’ and positioned themselves as champions of international law. By blatantly violating a foundational principle of the post-1945 international order, Trump made the leaders of some of the world’s most repressive regimes look like the adults in the room. And across Latin America, the political conversation has now shifted dramatically: the question is no longer how to restore democracy in Venezuela, but how to prevent the next US military adventure in Latin America.
Authoritarianism continues
Meanwhile, Venezuela’s authoritarian regime remains intact. Maduro may be in a New York courtroom, but the structures that kept him in power – the corrupt military, embedded Cuban intelligence, patronage networks and the repressive apparatus – continue unchanged. Rodríguez will likely try to run down the clock, claiming Maduro could return at any moment to avoid calling elections while quietly negotiating oil deals with US companies and reasserting authoritarian control. For both Rodríguez and Trump, democracy seems like an inconvenient obstacle to resource extraction.
For Venezuelan civil society, this creates real dilemmas. As she was sworn in, Rodríguez denounced the operation that put her in charge and vowed that Venezuela would ‘never again be a colony of any empire’. She has wrapped herself in the flag, framing regime continuity as a patriotic stand against western imperialism, and can now easily paint opposition activists who have long demanded international pressure for democracy as treasonous collaborators with foreign powers. This is despite being an insider of a regime that welcomed Cuban intelligence, Iranian oil traders and Russian military advisers, and is now negotiating oil deals with the USA and crossing its own red line by promising legal changes to enable private investment.
A Venezuelan solution for Venezuela
But there may be some cracks in the regime. With Maduro gone, frictions inside the ruling party have become apparent. For instance, there have been obvious disagreements on how to handle the pressure to free Venezuela’s over 800 political prisoners. These may yield opportunities the democracy movement can exploit.
This is the time for the democratic opposition to reclaim the narrative. In the immediate aftermath of the intervention, families of political prisoners mounted vigils outside detention centres, demanding releases the government has only partially delivered. Civil society must amplify these voices, making clear that any transitional arrangement requires the dismantling of the repressive apparatus, not merely a change of faces at the top.
A broad coalition of civil society organisations has issued 10 demands that chart a path to democratic transition. They call for the immediate and unconditional release of political prisoners, the dismantling of irregular armed groups, unfettered access for human rights monitors and humanitarian aid and, crucially, a free and fair presidential election with international observers. These demands deserve international backing, not as conditions for oil contracts, but as non-negotiable requirements for any government that can claim to represent Venezuela.
Venezuela’s democratic forces can either accept marginalisation as Trump and Rodríguez carve up their country’s resources, or use this chaotic moment to advance a genuinely Venezuelan democratic agenda. That means rejecting both Maduro’s authoritarianism and Trump’s intervention, and insisting that any legitimacy Rodríguez’s government claims must come from Venezuelan voters, not US armed forces or oil contracts. Any window of opportunity may however be closing fast. The question is whether Venezuela’s democratic movement can seize it to build the country they have strived for, or whether they will remain spectators while others decide their fate.
Inés M. Pousadela is CIVICUS Head of Research and Analysis, co-director and writer for CIVICUS Lens and co-author of the State of Civil Society Report. She is also a Professor of Comparative Politics at Universidad ORT Uruguay.
For interviews or more information, please contact research@civicus.org
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A developed Africa starts with nutrition in safe hands. Credit: Busani Bafana/IPS
By Busani Bafana
BULAWAYO, Zimbabwe, Feb 2 2026 (IPS)
Hunger shadowed Mercy Lung’aho’s childhood, fueling her campaign to promote nutrition as a foundation for Africa’s development.
As lead for the Food Security, Nutrition and Health Program at the International Institute for Tropical Agriculture (IITA), this certified nutritionist and researcher, with more than 20 years of championing development, is advocating for an integrated approach combining agri-food and health systems for food and nutrition security on the continent.
In a continent where one in three children are stunted, providing nutritious food is urgent for the development of Africa. For Lungaho, nutrition research is everything.
“I want to leave a legacy of a nourished Africa,” Lung’aho says, emphasizing that at IITA, nutrition is not a buzzword but the core of its programs across Africa.
According to the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), approximately 307 million people in Africa were undernourished in 2024. Malnutrition is the lack of correct and adequate nutrients, like vitamins, proteins, and minerals, needed to stay healthy and functional. Signs of malnutrition include stunted growth, wasting and being underweight.
“Regardless of how you define it, nutrition begins with what we eat,” she says. “Health begins with what we eat. Agriculture produces what we eat and it is really important that one of the lenses that agriculture and agricultural research have is nutrition.”
Despite its vast arable land and abundant water resources, Africa is a net food importer. Africa is off the mark on SDG2 and SDG3 relating to zero hunger, health and wellbeing. Projects indicate that nearly 60% of all chronically undernourished people will be in Africa by that time. It gets worse; Africa is the only region where the number of children under five suffering from chronic malnutrition is increasing.
Mercy Lung’aho, International Institute for Tropical Agriculture’s (IITA) Food Security, Nutrition and Health Programme lead.
Excerpts:
IPS: What breakthroughs in nutrition research have you made at IITA and what has been their impact on food security?
Lung’aho: One of the things that we advocate as IITA is food safety. If food is not safe, it is not food. There are now several products that help ensure food safety, like Aflasafe, which inhibits the growth of aflatoxin (a toxin produced by fungi), and farmers use it when they plant either soybeans, groundnuts, or maize. Aflatoxin is one of the most poisonous things in our food—it stunts the growth of children and can lead to cancers like liver cancer. In my country, Kenya, we have had episodes where acute toxicity from aflatoxin has been fatal.
There is one product I am really excited about. Our breeders have also worked on provitamin A maize and it is orange in color. The grain inhibits the growth of aflatoxin. Provitamin A maize is not just to reduce vitamin A deficiency, which causes night blindness—it is also coming in as a safety measure for populations and also reduces exposure to aflatoxins in communities. With a grant from Harvest Plus, we are doing a study in northern Nigeria, where we are now assessing real-life evidence in communities that have eaten ProVitamin A maize and whose exposure to aflatoxins has been limited.
Not only do we provide nourishment to the population, but we also ensure the safety of the food system.
How does IITA integrate traditional knowledge with modern nutrition science to enhance crop quality?
Lung’aho: I think IITA is one of the few centers that value consumer research. For example, the tricot methodology (triadic comparisons of technologies) is a participatory research approach where farmers act as researchers to test and identify the most suitable agricultural technologies, such as crop varieties, for their performance under local conditions.
It involves comparing small sets of three technologies at a time in “triads” and collecting data on their farms under their normal practices. We don’t call the consumer a ‘beneficiary,’ but a core designer. We view farmers and consumers as integral members of the team, understanding that their work is a collaborative effort. We always try to understand the consumers’ perspective first before we say we have understood a problem. We ensure that their voices are heard and their opinions are included even in some of our methodologies. We then go to the farmers and inform them of our findings, compare what is available on the market with what consumers want, and ask them for their opinions. Such feedback is integrated into the research.
How do you measure the success of nutrition integration interventions in farming communities?
Lung’aho: We have globally recognized indicators for measuring impact, such as the Minimum Dietary Diversity for Women (MDD-W)—a population-level indicator of diet diversity validated for women aged 15–49 and the proportion of the population who can afford a healthy diet.
I look for evidence in the community to see if the interventions are effective, and I observe food availability in the market. Working in communities and around lunchtime, you can see women cooking, and you can see fires in homes—but you have communities where at lunchtime nobody is cooking and in the evening, families have nothing to eat.
When you go to economists, they look at impact; they prioritize the indicators—that’s what they look at.
I am very practical. I know hunger not just by name, but because I’ve slept hungry. There was no food at home and we would go to bed hungry.
For me, the presence of food in the home and in the market is evidenced by seeing children at schools during lunchtime with packed food, even if it consists of a small portion of ugali and vegetables—this indicates that we are making progress. We are moving the needle. However, the high-level evidence, which examines the SDGs and evaluates our progress, indicates that more work is needed.
How has IITA leveraged technology and data analytics to enhance nutrition outcomes in agricultural projects?
Lung’aho: In IITA, data is currency. We generate a lot of data and we have a lead for data who is very interested in making sure that that data doesn’t sit on shelves, but we are able to learn from past data and new data is talking to past data to anticipate the future.
So for that, we’re leveraging a lot of artificial intelligence and machine learning. We are using systems thinking and systems dynamics that look at the whole system rather than its elements alone.
How can systems work better? I think we are among the first institutions in the world to really ask the question of how artificial intelligence and machine learning can work better for diets and nutrition in Africa.
There is a need to standardize tools so that we are collecting the same data—not comparing apples and oranges—as well as the harmonization of tools and indicators. Countries need to create a nutrition data ecosystem. Governments will respond by saying, “You (already) have so much data. Why are you not using that?” If data cannot communicate with each other, we are left in the dark. Having that ecosystem will show countries why data is important and how they can leverage existing data and new data to move forward.
Data has to be in the forefront of what we collect to understand nutrition problems. If you want Africa to grow, nutrition is the answer, and I’m the number one advocate. This is a call to action to all African countries. We need to take nutrition seriously. In our generation, we must leave a legacy of a nourished Africa.
IPS UN Bureau Report
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President Donald Trump Joins Faith Leaders in Prayer – Credit: The White House
According to the UN, Sunday marked the start of World Interfaith Harmony Week, a time to emphasize that mutual understanding and interreligious dialogue are essential to building a culture of peace. The week was established to promote harmony among all people, regardless of their faith.
By Azza Karam
NEW YORK, Feb 2 2026 (IPS)
Several events, meetings, consultations, initiatives, etc. taking place among faith-inspired, ‘faith-based’ and a variety of other similar efforts, over the past year, in the United States especially, concern me.
Coming from a background of human rights, international development, and humanitarian service, I have witnessed the arc of ‘none’ to increasing interest by Western governments in ‘religion’ – religious engagement, religion and development, religion and foreign policy, religious freedom, religious peacebuilding, or religion and peace, and more, including even religion and agriculture. Basically, religion and everything.
Non-Western governments within Africa and Asia, including areas overlapping with what we call (variably) “the Middle East”, have long been interested, and indeed actively engaging religious leaders and religious institutions.
As many scholars, observers, and foreign policy pundits have noted, the interest of such governments has often transcended any genuine fascination with faith, towards rather obvious instrumentalization of religious leaders, religious organisations and religious groups, in support of specific political agendas (e.g., making peace with Israel, legitimacy of corrupt – and violent – politically repressive leaders and regimes, etc.).
In fact, the marriage between select religious leaders/institutions/groups and some political actors goes back to the empires we have inherited pre-Westphalian states).
I recall some stories from my time serving as a staff member at the United Nations, and in other international fora. The first story revolves around one Arab and one Indian diplomat speaking with a European counterpart, during one of several UN Strategic Learning Exchanges on Religion, Development and Diplomacy, which I coordinated and facilitated, this one in 2014.
The discussion concerned how best to “benefit” from working with religious leaders to affirm a message of certain political parties, especially, albeit not only, around elections. The Arab patted the European on the back and said, with a smile and a wink: “you are finally catching up on how to use these religious leaders – congratulations my friend”. The Indian one, looking bemused, added “Yes. And be careful”.
Another story concerns another meeting I organised – in one of the basement meeting rooms of the UN – between UN officials and a diverse array of religious actors, around peace and mediation efforts, in select African and Asian conflict settings, early 2015.
A European Christian religious leader of a renowned multi-religious organisation made an intervention to address the concerns about “instrumentalization” of religious actors, which some faith-based NGO leaders were articulating.
While some faith representatives cautioned against religious actors being used to “rubber stamp decisions already made by governments and some intergovernmental organisations” (in the room were both UN and EU officials), this particular Western Christian religious leader spoke up and said, “I am not worried about that at all, in fact, I would like to say to my secular colleagues in this room, please use us… we can certainly benefit you… we are not common civil society actors, our mission makes us exceptional”.
My last story, is from my time serving as the secretary general of an international multireligious organisation which convenes religious leaders from diverse religious institutions around “deeply held and widely shared values”.
As soon as I became a member of the UN Secretary-General’s High Level Advisory Board on Effective Multilateralism, I arranged a meeting between some of my multi-religious Board members (religious leaders), and some members of this high Level UN SG’s Advisory Board.
The idea was to nurture a quiet but candid dialogue between pollical and religious leaders, around why and how multilateralism can be significantly strengthened by multireligious engagement.
I hasten to note that multireligious engagement, if served well, can be – as I have written and persistently argued – resistant to instrumentalization of select religious actors to serve any one particular governmental agenda. The latter is a feature I warn against, and small wonder, given developments from India to the United States, from Russia to Israel, and beyond.
Once again, I heard a religious leader invite the members of the SG’s Board to “use” their (religious) wisdom because of their “exceptional” mission (presumably the godly one). This time, later reflection among members of the UN SG Board led to noting that such multireligious engagement would be inadvisable, due to a concern about “Muslims” involved in such multireligious spaces.
Fast forward to 2026, one year after an increasingly belligerent US Presidential Administration’s record, which includes relatively ‘minor’ policy decisions such as transforming the name of the Ministry of Defence to the “Ministry of War”. And not so minor human rights abuses of citizens and immigrants, and some pointing to manipulation and outright disregard of the rule of law, both at home and abroad (I hope this is polite enough wording). Of course one dares not mention support to certain genocidal regimes killing thousands in the name of self-protection.
In this environment, I listen to conversations among some of the United States’ most esteemed faith-based organisations, all with a remarkable track record of serving humanity in all corners of the world. Who, apparently, are seeking to engage this Administration “constructively”, with some praising the “unprecedented” outreach of members of this Administration in engaging, largely (some would say exclusively), with certain Christian NGOs, certain Christian religious leaders, and certain Christian faith protagonists – no doubt to further noble objectives. Apparently, this is a form of strategic engagement of/with religion.
Even though there were likely some who felt uncomfortable with aspects of this rhetoric, the studiously diplomatic silences – including my own – about challenging anything said, was noteworthy. The bottom line is, “we need access to the White House… we need more resources to do our (good) work”.
Why was I silent? Because I am the quintessential ‘other’ whose outspokenness has already earned me the loss of a sense of ‘home’ and security, many times over. This is neither excuse nor justification, rather, an acknowledgement of cowardice.
Into this Kafkaesque reality, let me ask a few questions I am battling with: what will it take to speak truth to power publicly – the way Minnesotans and Palestinians are having to do with their own regimes? Is it strategic to be silent, or such consummate diplomats, especially when we work in the name of the ‘godly’ – being such “exceptional” actors?
Conversely, is this Administration which we endeavour to be so tactful with, being silent about it’s “divine mission”? Is being “nice and essentially a kind person with their heart in the right place”, and doing godly work, a good reason to work with those who are serving regimes which ignore the rule of law in their own nation and abroad? Does faith-based diplomacy mean we either collude, remain silent, or take the struggle to the streets?
If so, what difference is faith-based diplomacy and engagement actually making to civic engagement, to honoring human rights and the rule of law, or to serving principled leadership? Or do these simply not matter since it is the self-interests of the ruling and rich few, are what matters to determine the integrity of life, planet and leadership?
Perhaps we should ponder the advice of the Indian Diplomat, given to his Western counterpart 22 years ago: how can we “be careful”?
Professor Azza Karam serves as President of Lead Integrity; and Director of the Kahane UN Program, for Occidental College’s Diplomacy and World Affairs.
IPS UN Bureau
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Dans l'édition de lundi : stratégie maritime de l'UE, démission d'un collaborateur de Fico, dossiers Epstein, centre de menaces hybrides, querelle sur le fromage chinois, pourparlers en Ukraine.
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