This paper investigates the impact of aid for trade (AfT) targeted at trade policies on the participation of recipient countries in global value chains (GVCs), and how this impact varies with their prevailing political regimes. In democratic countries, the need for the authorities to account for the interests of various stakeholders (e.g., lobbies, trade unions) can compromise the allocation, use, and effectiveness of AfT. In contrast, less democratic regimes are typically more insulated from political pressures, which may lead to more effective outcomes of aid. At the same time, integration into some complex GVCs requires efficient and democratic institutions, to which these products are sensitive. Employing a sample of 110 countries and data covering 2002-2018, we control for standard determinants of GVC participation, while examining the effect of AfT and the moderating role of the political regime in place. Our estimation addresses the endogeneity of aid through an appropriate instrumentation strategy. Our results suggest that the effect of AfT is mostly positive in autocratic regimes, indicating more effective trade policy reforms. When we account for regional disparities, we find evidence that AfT for trade policy is also impactful in some democratic regimes. This might suggest that the efficacy of AfT is not strictly regime-dependent, but hinges on the government’s commitment to carry out significant reforms leading to greater participation in the global economy.
This paper investigates the impact of aid for trade (AfT) targeted at trade policies on the participation of recipient countries in global value chains (GVCs), and how this impact varies with their prevailing political regimes. In democratic countries, the need for the authorities to account for the interests of various stakeholders (e.g., lobbies, trade unions) can compromise the allocation, use, and effectiveness of AfT. In contrast, less democratic regimes are typically more insulated from political pressures, which may lead to more effective outcomes of aid. At the same time, integration into some complex GVCs requires efficient and democratic institutions, to which these products are sensitive. Employing a sample of 110 countries and data covering 2002-2018, we control for standard determinants of GVC participation, while examining the effect of AfT and the moderating role of the political regime in place. Our estimation addresses the endogeneity of aid through an appropriate instrumentation strategy. Our results suggest that the effect of AfT is mostly positive in autocratic regimes, indicating more effective trade policy reforms. When we account for regional disparities, we find evidence that AfT for trade policy is also impactful in some democratic regimes. This might suggest that the efficacy of AfT is not strictly regime-dependent, but hinges on the government’s commitment to carry out significant reforms leading to greater participation in the global economy.
This paper investigates the impact of aid for trade (AfT) targeted at trade policies on the participation of recipient countries in global value chains (GVCs), and how this impact varies with their prevailing political regimes. In democratic countries, the need for the authorities to account for the interests of various stakeholders (e.g., lobbies, trade unions) can compromise the allocation, use, and effectiveness of AfT. In contrast, less democratic regimes are typically more insulated from political pressures, which may lead to more effective outcomes of aid. At the same time, integration into some complex GVCs requires efficient and democratic institutions, to which these products are sensitive. Employing a sample of 110 countries and data covering 2002-2018, we control for standard determinants of GVC participation, while examining the effect of AfT and the moderating role of the political regime in place. Our estimation addresses the endogeneity of aid through an appropriate instrumentation strategy. Our results suggest that the effect of AfT is mostly positive in autocratic regimes, indicating more effective trade policy reforms. When we account for regional disparities, we find evidence that AfT for trade policy is also impactful in some democratic regimes. This might suggest that the efficacy of AfT is not strictly regime-dependent, but hinges on the government’s commitment to carry out significant reforms leading to greater participation in the global economy.
Many colonies in Africa attained independence through negotiated settlements. However, several others engaged in armed liberation struggles, for example, Kenya, Namibia, South Africa, Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), and the Portuguese colonies of Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau, Mozambique, and São Tomé and Príncipe. Newly independent states provided liberation movements with bases on their territories and political, military, intellectual, ideological, material, and moral support. In West Africa, Ghana’s first president, Kwame Nkrumah, a notable pan-Africanist, declared in his Independence Day speech in 1957, “Our independence is meaningless unless it is linked up with the total liberation of the African continent.” In East Africa, Julius Nyerere and Jomo Kenyatta, the first presidents of independent Tanzania and Kenya respectively, showed similar commitment to Pan-Africanism and anticolonialism by hosting refugees fleeing armed struggles in Southern Africa. Tanzania hosted the Organization of African Unity Liberation Committee supported anticolonial resistance and liberation movements. President Nyerere supported them for “challenging injustices of empire and apartheid” and declared, “I train freedom fighters”. He encouraged Tanzanians living around liberation movement camps to welcome these movements and their freedom fighters and also protect them from agents of colonial governments. Support also came from many other countries on the continent including Nigeria, Ethiopia, and Algeria. The latter provided sanctuary to representatives of liberation movements such as Nelson Mandela of the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa.
Many colonies in Africa attained independence through negotiated settlements. However, several others engaged in armed liberation struggles, for example, Kenya, Namibia, South Africa, Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), and the Portuguese colonies of Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau, Mozambique, and São Tomé and Príncipe. Newly independent states provided liberation movements with bases on their territories and political, military, intellectual, ideological, material, and moral support. In West Africa, Ghana’s first president, Kwame Nkrumah, a notable pan-Africanist, declared in his Independence Day speech in 1957, “Our independence is meaningless unless it is linked up with the total liberation of the African continent.” In East Africa, Julius Nyerere and Jomo Kenyatta, the first presidents of independent Tanzania and Kenya respectively, showed similar commitment to Pan-Africanism and anticolonialism by hosting refugees fleeing armed struggles in Southern Africa. Tanzania hosted the Organization of African Unity Liberation Committee supported anticolonial resistance and liberation movements. President Nyerere supported them for “challenging injustices of empire and apartheid” and declared, “I train freedom fighters”. He encouraged Tanzanians living around liberation movement camps to welcome these movements and their freedom fighters and also protect them from agents of colonial governments. Support also came from many other countries on the continent including Nigeria, Ethiopia, and Algeria. The latter provided sanctuary to representatives of liberation movements such as Nelson Mandela of the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa.
Many colonies in Africa attained independence through negotiated settlements. However, several others engaged in armed liberation struggles, for example, Kenya, Namibia, South Africa, Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), and the Portuguese colonies of Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau, Mozambique, and São Tomé and Príncipe. Newly independent states provided liberation movements with bases on their territories and political, military, intellectual, ideological, material, and moral support. In West Africa, Ghana’s first president, Kwame Nkrumah, a notable pan-Africanist, declared in his Independence Day speech in 1957, “Our independence is meaningless unless it is linked up with the total liberation of the African continent.” In East Africa, Julius Nyerere and Jomo Kenyatta, the first presidents of independent Tanzania and Kenya respectively, showed similar commitment to Pan-Africanism and anticolonialism by hosting refugees fleeing armed struggles in Southern Africa. Tanzania hosted the Organization of African Unity Liberation Committee supported anticolonial resistance and liberation movements. President Nyerere supported them for “challenging injustices of empire and apartheid” and declared, “I train freedom fighters”. He encouraged Tanzanians living around liberation movement camps to welcome these movements and their freedom fighters and also protect them from agents of colonial governments. Support also came from many other countries on the continent including Nigeria, Ethiopia, and Algeria. The latter provided sanctuary to representatives of liberation movements such as Nelson Mandela of the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa.
Adapting to climate impacts is more critical than ever. Average global temperatures surpassed the 1.5°C threshold in 2024, and the ten worst climate-related disasters of 2025 caused over $120 billion in insured losses alone. Yet just as adaptation becomes more urgent, climate has slipped down the global agenda, leaving the developing countries most exposed to climate impacts—and least responsible for them—to adapt with shrinking international support.
This issue brief gives an overview of the history and current state of adaptation finance and examines how it overlaps with development finance and with loss and damage. It sets the goals agreed at COP29 and COP30 against estimated adaptation needs of $310 to $365 billion per year by 2035 and explains why, for many small island developing states and least developed countries, the form finance takes—grant-based and directly accessible—matters as much as the amount.
The brief argues that adaptation, sustainable development, and loss and damage should complement one another rather than compete for scarce, siloed funding. It makes the case for strict criteria on what counts as climate finance rather than the automatic separation of climate and development projects, and for multilateral climate finance to grow, grant-based funding to expand, and climate resilience to be mainstreamed across all development efforts. This will ensure the international system is ready to deliver when political will to tackle climate change returns.
The post Synergies and Challenges in Financing Adaptation, Sustainable Development, and Loss and Damage appeared first on International Peace Institute.
ELIAMEP’s analysts assess the latest developments and examine possible scenarios for the future of Iran–US relations, as well as their implications for the Middle East and international security.
Read it here (in Greek).
Das Bundeskabinett will heute Änderungen am Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz (EEG) auf den Weg bringen. Dazu folgt eine Einordnung von Claudia Kemfert, Leiterin der Abteilung Energie, Verkehr, Umwelt im DIW Berlin:
Die stärkere Ausrichtung auf Systemintegration, Speicher und Flexibilität ist grundsätzlich richtig. Positiv ist auch, dass beim Netzanschlusspaket gegenüber den ersten Plänen nachgebessert wurde. Dennoch bleibt problematisch, dass die Folgen unzureichender Netze zunehmend auf die Betreiber erneuerbarer Anlagen verlagert werden. Eine entschädigungsfreie Abregelung von bis zu 20 Prozent ist ein erheblicher Eingriff und kann Investitionen verteuern. Regionale Steuerung darf den dezentralen Netzausbau nicht ersetzen. Netzbetreiber müssen verbindlich zu schneller Optimierung, Digitalisierung und Ausbau verpflichtet werden.
Die Einigung auf die EEG-Novelle und das Netzanschlusspaket enthält wichtige Fortschritte: zusätzliche zwölf Gigawatt Windenergie an Land, stärkere Anreize für Speicher, eine höhere Beteiligung der Kommunen und gegenüber den ursprünglichen Plänen begrenztere Regeln zur entschädigungsfreien Abregelung. Positiv sind auch die Übergangsregelungen für kleine Photovoltaikanlagen. Damit wird ein wichtiger Schritt getan, um den Ausbau der Erneuerbaren ab 2027 rechtssicher fortzuführen.
Allerdings stimmt bei der EEG-Novelle die Reihenfolge noch nicht. Mehr Marktintegration kann sinnvoll sein, aber dafür müssen Smart Meter, digitale Infrastruktur, Speicher und bezahlbare Direktvermarktungsangebote vorhanden sein. Werden Einspeisevergütungen zurückgefahren, bevor diese Voraussetzungen flächendeckend geschaffen sind, droht vor allem bei kleiner Dach-Photovoltaik und Bürgerenergie ein Investitionsdämpfer. Entscheidend ist jetzt, Planungssicherheit über 2026 hinaus zu schaffen und Erneuerbaren-Ausbau, Netze, Speicher, Digitalisierung und Flexibilität konsequent gemeinsam voranzubringen.
Systemintegration ja, Investitionsbremse nein. Wer Erneuerbare stärker in den Markt schicken will, muss zuerst Netze, Smart Meter, Speicher und Flexibilität bereitstellen. Sonst werden Versäumnisse im Stromsystem auf diejenigen abgewälzt, die die Energiewende tragen. Kritisch bleibt, dass die Bundesregierung die Ursachen der Netzengpässe nicht konsequent beseitigt, sondern einen Teil der Risiken auf Investoren erneuerbarer Energien verlagert. Wer Investitionen in Wind- und Solarenergie durch neue Unsicherheiten erschwert, gefährdet den Ausbau ausgerechnet der Technologien, die für ein klimaneutrales, bezahlbares und sicheres Energiesystem gebraucht werden. Es ist ein Fehler, die Defizite bei Netzen, Digitalisierung und Flexibilität den Erneuerbaren anzulasten. Die Energiewende scheitert nicht an zu viel Wind- und Solarenergie, sondern an einem Stromsystem, das zu langsam modernisiert wird.