Zum Auslaufen des Tankrabatts äußert sich Tomaso Duso, Leiter der Abteilung Unternehmen und Märkte im DIW Berlin und Vorsitzender der Monopolkommission, wie folgt:
Der Tankrabatt geht zu Ende, und die Bilanz fällt gemischt aus. Bis Mitte Juni wurde die Steuersenkung zum großen Teil, aber nicht vollständig weitergegeben – nach den Schätzungen der Monopolkommission zu etwa 85 bis 90 Prozent. In der vergangenen Woche jedoch zogen die Preise bereits spürbar an, und die Weitergaberate fiel unter 50 Prozent. Das ist ökonomisch besonders problematisch, weil gerade in diesen Tagen viele Verbraucher*innen noch einmal vollgetankt haben. Die Mehrbelastung traf also einen großen Teil des Absatzes. Und auch nach Auslaufen des Tankrabatts sind die Preise heute um 12 Uhr wieder sprunghaft und kräftig gestiegen – bei einzelnen Kraftstoffsorten um mehr als zehn Cent pro Liter.
Für mich bestätigt das vor allem eines: Das eigentliche Problem sitzt nicht an der Tankstelle, sondern auf den vorgelagerten Stufen bei Raffinerien und Großhandel. Ein befristeter Rabatt ändert daran nichts: Er verschiebt nur, wann und bei wem das Geld landet.
Am Ende bleibt festzuhalten: Der Tankrabatt war eine teure und sozial unausgewogene Maßnahme. Ein Teil davon – nach Schätzungen der Monopolkommission 100 bis 200 Millionen Euro, nach dieser Woche möglicherweise sogar mehr – ist bei der Mineralölindustrie hängengeblieben. Zudem haben Vielfahrer*innen am stärksten profitiert, die überproportional zu den einkommensstärkeren Haushalten zählen. In einer Knappheitssituation hat er außerdem die falschen Anreize gesetzt. Der Tankrabatt war damit von Anfang an das falsche Instrument – und es ist richtig, ihn auslaufen zu lassen.
How do grievances turn into collective action? This article examines how citizens' expectations in social contracts lead them to embark on street protests. It draws on original, nationally representative telephone surveys in Tunisia and Lebanon and unpacks popular preferences about the states' obligations to deliver social service provision, protection, and political participation. We measure empirically whether participation in protest can be explained predominantly by people's grievances with their states' social contract obligations or the position of people in society. Findings reveal intriguing differences between the two countries but also among social groups within societies. We find that socially privileged people are more likely to take to the streets in pursuit of their demands, lending support to theories that identify society's middle classes as drivers of protest action. We believe that the article's findings will have significant implications for studies of contentious state-society relations in the MENA region and beyond.
How do grievances turn into collective action? This article examines how citizens' expectations in social contracts lead them to embark on street protests. It draws on original, nationally representative telephone surveys in Tunisia and Lebanon and unpacks popular preferences about the states' obligations to deliver social service provision, protection, and political participation. We measure empirically whether participation in protest can be explained predominantly by people's grievances with their states' social contract obligations or the position of people in society. Findings reveal intriguing differences between the two countries but also among social groups within societies. We find that socially privileged people are more likely to take to the streets in pursuit of their demands, lending support to theories that identify society's middle classes as drivers of protest action. We believe that the article's findings will have significant implications for studies of contentious state-society relations in the MENA region and beyond.
How do grievances turn into collective action? This article examines how citizens' expectations in social contracts lead them to embark on street protests. It draws on original, nationally representative telephone surveys in Tunisia and Lebanon and unpacks popular preferences about the states' obligations to deliver social service provision, protection, and political participation. We measure empirically whether participation in protest can be explained predominantly by people's grievances with their states' social contract obligations or the position of people in society. Findings reveal intriguing differences between the two countries but also among social groups within societies. We find that socially privileged people are more likely to take to the streets in pursuit of their demands, lending support to theories that identify society's middle classes as drivers of protest action. We believe that the article's findings will have significant implications for studies of contentious state-society relations in the MENA region and beyond.
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In partnership with the Elsie Initiative for Women in Peace Operations, IPI cohosted a public policy forum on “Gender Responsiveness and Women’s Participation in UN Peace Operations: New Research and Policy Implications” on June 30th.
Since 2019, IPI has analyzed and evaluated the challenges and successes in advancing uniformed women’s meaningful participation in peacekeeping operations as part of its partnership with the Government of Canada’s Elsie Initiative for Women in Peace Operations. The most recent phase of IPI’s research has covered topics including gender bias within peacekeeping operations, taboos and stigmas faced by uniformed women, the role of military gender advisers, and how to deliver on gender responsiveness. As the culmination of this phase of the research partnership, IPI will launch four reports on these aspects of uniformed women’s participation in peacekeeping operations.
Speakers presented key findings from this research and steps for ensuring the meaningful participation of uniformed women in peacekeeping operations. The policy forum provided a dedicated space for building momentum on these topics as we reflect on past successes and challenges and look to the future of UN peacekeeping operations.
Opening Remarks:
Isaac Caverhill, Second Secretary, Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations
Speakers:
Vandana Sharma, Co-Founder, Equality Insights Lab
Anna Mensah Medi, Senior Lecturer at the Faculty of Academic Affairs and Research (FAAR), Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC)
Emmaculate Asige Liaga, Researcher in the Training for Peace (TFP) Project, Institute for Security Studies (ISS) (virtual)
Angela Fitzsimons, Counsellor, Military Adviser and Police Adviser, Permanent Mission of New Zealand to the United Nations
Closing Remarks:
Pamela Bradshaw, Defence Attaché and Military Advisor, Permanent Mission of Australia to the United Nations
Moderator:
Phoebe Donnelly, Senior Fellow and Head of WPS Program, International Peace Institute
The post Gender Responsiveness and Women’s Participation in UN Peace Operations: New Research and Policy Implications appeared first on International Peace Institute.
Smart farming enables farmers to produce more with fewer resources, make better decisions under uncertainty, and reduce agriculture's environmental footprint. Credit: FAO
By Beth Bechdol
ROME, Jun 30 2026 (IPS)
Farmers today are producing food under pressures that would have been unimaginable to previous generations. Input costs are rising and supply chains are unreliable. Water is scarcer. Weather is less predictable. And for a growing number of farmers — in Sudan, in Ukraine, in Myanmar, in Gaza — the challenge is producing food at all, in the middle of active conflict. These are not marginal conditions. They describe the reality facing hundreds of millions of people who grow the food the world depends on.
Smart farming — using data, digital tools, and precision technologies to make better decisions, use fewer inputs, and get more from every hectare — is not a luxury response to these pressures. It is increasingly a practical and necessary one. It helps farmers know when to plant, where fertilizer will generate the greatest return, how much water a crop actually needs, where pests are likely to emerge, and which risks are developing before they become crises.
Three agricultural revolutions got us here. The first gave humanity settled agriculture. The second transformed land use and productivity through new methods and early machinery. The third — the Green Revolution — combined improved seeds, fertilizers, and modern practice to feed a rapidly growing world. Each solved the defining challenge of its era … producing enough.
Smart farming — using data, digital tools, and precision technologies to make better decisions, use fewer inputs, and get more from every hectare — is not a luxury response to these pressures. It is increasingly a practical and necessary one
The fourth revolution faces a fundamentally different challenge. It is no longer simply about producing more food. It is about producing more with fewer and less reliable inputs, under greater uncertainty, on land under increasing stress, and while reducing agriculture’s environmental footprint.
The tools that drove the Green Revolution were extraordinary, but they are not infinitely scalable. Synthetic fertilizers depend on energy-intensive production and supply chains that have proven fragile. Aquifers in key agricultural regions are being drawn down faster than they recharge. The yield gains from conventional intensification are flattening. There is no endless supply of cheap water, cheap fertilizer, or cheap fuel to sustain food production the way we have for the past half-century.
Smart farming is how we meet this new challenge. It enables farmers to produce more with fewer resources, make better decisions under uncertainty, and reduce agriculture’s environmental footprint. It is not a vision for the future. It is already happening.
FAO’s own operational programmes demonstrate what is already possible. Our Desert Locust early warning system uses satellite imagery, weather data, and field intelligence to forecast outbreaks before they reach crops, giving governments time to act rather than simply respond. The SoilFER programme is turning faster, more affordable soil mapping into actionable fertilizer recommendations for farmers in Central America and sub-Saharan Africa. The Hand-in-Hand Initiative combines geospatial, market, and socioeconomic data so governments and investors can direct agricultural investment where it will have the greatest return. These are not pilots. They are operational programmes with measurable outcomes — and they include AI-driven tools that forecast pest and disease pressure, analyze crop stress, and help governments make better decisions faster than was previously possible.
My own family’s seven-generation grain farm in rural Indiana today uses GPS-guided equipment, variable-rate fertilizer applications based on soil sampling, yield mapping, and real-time weather tools to make planting and harvesting decisions. The technology works. The question is who has access to it.
That is the central challenge. The benefits of smart farming currently concentrate among producers who already have the resources, connectivity, and institutional support to adopt new tools. Smallholder farmers — who produce a third of the world’s food — are too often last in line. Women farmers and young producers face additional barriers to technology and financing, which means the whole system underperforms when they are excluded.
At FAO’s Global Conference on Smart Farming in Rome from 1 to 3 July, the commitments required are specific and clear. Governments need to modernize regulatory environments and invest in the digital infrastructure agriculture depends on. Development banks should finance data systems and precision agriculture as essential infrastructure rather than optional innovation. Private companies need business models that reach smallholders, not only large commercial farms. And organizations like FAO must ensure that technical knowledge becomes practical solutions farmers can actually us e.
The fourth agricultural revolution is already underway. What remains to be decided is whether its benefits reach the farmers who need them most — or whether the gap between what is possible and what is accessible becomes permanent.
Beth Bechdol is Deputy Director-General, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
EU enlargement in the Western Balkans is strategically important. However, anyone who wants to accelerate the accession process must not treat democracy and the rule of law as secondary issues.
EU enlargement in the Western Balkans is strategically important. However, anyone who wants to accelerate the accession process must not treat democracy and the rule of law as secondary issues.
EU enlargement in the Western Balkans is strategically important. However, anyone who wants to accelerate the accession process must not treat democracy and the rule of law as secondary issues.
This article investigates the evolving role of rural women in Moroccan oases, focusing on how environmental change, particularly water scarcity, impacts their position within the social contract. Employing a conceptual framework that combines social contract theory with environmental justice perspectives, the study examines women’s access to protection, provision, participation, and recognition. Field research in the Drâa-Tafilalt region reveals that while women face structural marginalization and vulnerability, they are also active agents of change. The rise of women’s cooperatives, often centred around agricultural products but expanding to empowering developmental activities, demonstrates their capacity for innovation and adaptation. However, water scarcity threatens present achievements. The study highlights the interconnectedness of environmental degradation, gender relations, and state-society dynamics, emphasizing the need for policies that recognize gender-specific needs and contributions in the context of climate change.
This article investigates the evolving role of rural women in Moroccan oases, focusing on how environmental change, particularly water scarcity, impacts their position within the social contract. Employing a conceptual framework that combines social contract theory with environmental justice perspectives, the study examines women’s access to protection, provision, participation, and recognition. Field research in the Drâa-Tafilalt region reveals that while women face structural marginalization and vulnerability, they are also active agents of change. The rise of women’s cooperatives, often centred around agricultural products but expanding to empowering developmental activities, demonstrates their capacity for innovation and adaptation. However, water scarcity threatens present achievements. The study highlights the interconnectedness of environmental degradation, gender relations, and state-society dynamics, emphasizing the need for policies that recognize gender-specific needs and contributions in the context of climate change.
This article investigates the evolving role of rural women in Moroccan oases, focusing on how environmental change, particularly water scarcity, impacts their position within the social contract. Employing a conceptual framework that combines social contract theory with environmental justice perspectives, the study examines women’s access to protection, provision, participation, and recognition. Field research in the Drâa-Tafilalt region reveals that while women face structural marginalization and vulnerability, they are also active agents of change. The rise of women’s cooperatives, often centred around agricultural products but expanding to empowering developmental activities, demonstrates their capacity for innovation and adaptation. However, water scarcity threatens present achievements. The study highlights the interconnectedness of environmental degradation, gender relations, and state-society dynamics, emphasizing the need for policies that recognize gender-specific needs and contributions in the context of climate change.