Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

This study takes a critical look at Franco-German relations in the field of international cooperation along the entire humanitarian-development-peace (HDP) spectrum to better gauge the usefulness of bilateral collaborative action in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Both the corresponding potential – for example in the current Syrian transition – as well as existing coordination formats are of interest to the inquiry. The latter are examined in more detail against the background of German and French activities in Libya and Iraq. In this context, the analysis also considers the HDP nexus as an instrument of cooperation, which offers ideal conditions for application in fragile, conflict-prone (Libya) or war-torn countries (Iraq) due to their complex needs. The paper concludes with a series of recommendations for initiating or strengthening Franco-German cooperation in fragile states of the MENA region in the fields of humanitarian aid, development policy, and peacebuilding measures.
The study is divided into three thematic sections, the first of which examines bilateral relations between Paris and Berlin, with a focus on the phase following the signing of the Aachen Agreement in 2019. The analysis of national and international framework conditions for and against international cooperation is also part of this section, taking into account the effects of the Trump 2.0 administration. In the second part, the foreign and development policy approaches of both countries are analysed with a focus on their Middle East policies. Here, convergences and divergent approaches are of special interest, allowing conclusions to be drawn about the ability and willingness to cooperate. The third section is devoted to a synthesis of the operationalisation of activities within the HDP spectrum, with Libya and Iraq as country examples, as well as additional considerations relating to Syria.
On the one hand, this approach enables one to identify structural factors that either hinder or promote bilateral Franco-German cooperation in the international context. On the other hand, sufficient space is also given to current developments in order to be able to categorise trends and contextual factors which have a reinforcing or weakening effect on cooperation drivers. The Discussion Paper concludes with a recapitulation of the findings, and derives actionable recommendations for strengthening cooperation between Paris and Berlin in the crisis-ridden MENA region on the basis of HDP coordination.

This study takes a critical look at Franco-German relations in the field of international cooperation along the entire humanitarian-development-peace (HDP) spectrum to better gauge the usefulness of bilateral collaborative action in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Both the corresponding potential – for example in the current Syrian transition – as well as existing coordination formats are of interest to the inquiry. The latter are examined in more detail against the background of German and French activities in Libya and Iraq. In this context, the analysis also considers the HDP nexus as an instrument of cooperation, which offers ideal conditions for application in fragile, conflict-prone (Libya) or war-torn countries (Iraq) due to their complex needs. The paper concludes with a series of recommendations for initiating or strengthening Franco-German cooperation in fragile states of the MENA region in the fields of humanitarian aid, development policy, and peacebuilding measures.
The study is divided into three thematic sections, the first of which examines bilateral relations between Paris and Berlin, with a focus on the phase following the signing of the Aachen Agreement in 2019. The analysis of national and international framework conditions for and against international cooperation is also part of this section, taking into account the effects of the Trump 2.0 administration. In the second part, the foreign and development policy approaches of both countries are analysed with a focus on their Middle East policies. Here, convergences and divergent approaches are of special interest, allowing conclusions to be drawn about the ability and willingness to cooperate. The third section is devoted to a synthesis of the operationalisation of activities within the HDP spectrum, with Libya and Iraq as country examples, as well as additional considerations relating to Syria.
On the one hand, this approach enables one to identify structural factors that either hinder or promote bilateral Franco-German cooperation in the international context. On the other hand, sufficient space is also given to current developments in order to be able to categorise trends and contextual factors which have a reinforcing or weakening effect on cooperation drivers. The Discussion Paper concludes with a recapitulation of the findings, and derives actionable recommendations for strengthening cooperation between Paris and Berlin in the crisis-ridden MENA region on the basis of HDP coordination.

Promoting female employment remains a pressing challenge in many low- and middle-income countries. Despite ongoing efforts, too few women participate in the labour force – particularly in regions such as the Middle East and South Asia – and too many remain locked out of more decent wage employment – especially in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Promoting women’s employment is not just about fairness; it is essential for inclusive and sustainable development. Women’s economic participation matters for four reasons: it fosters growth and reduces poverty by increasing household income, it enhances women’s autonomy in the household, it promotes equity and cohesion in societies, and it strengthens the resilience of households to shocks by diversifying income sources. Recent research has deepened under­standing of both the barriers and enablers of gender equality in labour markets, offering useful guidance for development cooperation.

Building on empirical research by IDOS, this policy brief highlights that development cooperation can take three key approaches to promote female employment:

• Address foundational barriers: Development cooperation can work with local partners to remove the root barriers holding women back. This includes addressing restrictive gender norms in ways that respect cultural contexts, e.g. by investing in community-based care solutions (as successfully practised in several African cases) or better access to services and mobility. Projects should not only target women individually but also address constraints within households and communities and engage broader society. They must also challenge gendered labour market structures that limit women’s paths into wage work.
• Strengthen gender equality on the opera­tional level: The green and digital transitions offer new employ­ment opportunities – but women risk being left behind. Development cooperation can help to ensure that women benefit from these shifts. In cooperation with national governments, it can embed gender targets into economic reforms, incentivise companies to adopt inclusive hiring practices and to implement flexible work time arrangements (such as in Jordan), and fund training for women to reskill and motivate them for these fields.
• Create an enabling policy mix: Employment-focused reforms succeed when they connect with broader policy frameworks. Aligning employment initiatives with social policies – such as childcare support or public works – can boost women’s ability to work. At the same time, gender-sensitive approaches in areas like transport, finance and infrastructure can help overcome structural disadvantages that affect women at different stages of life.

In recent years, development cooperation has shifted from measures to support gender mainstreaming towards gender-transformative approaches that aim to reduce structural barriers. Recent funding cuts and public opinion that is becoming more critical of diversity and equity measures, mean that development cooperation must build on its experience to enable women to grasp economic opportunities and live a dignified life.

 

Promoting female employment remains a pressing challenge in many low- and middle-income countries. Despite ongoing efforts, too few women participate in the labour force – particularly in regions such as the Middle East and South Asia – and too many remain locked out of more decent wage employment – especially in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Promoting women’s employment is not just about fairness; it is essential for inclusive and sustainable development. Women’s economic participation matters for four reasons: it fosters growth and reduces poverty by increasing household income, it enhances women’s autonomy in the household, it promotes equity and cohesion in societies, and it strengthens the resilience of households to shocks by diversifying income sources. Recent research has deepened under­standing of both the barriers and enablers of gender equality in labour markets, offering useful guidance for development cooperation.

Building on empirical research by IDOS, this policy brief highlights that development cooperation can take three key approaches to promote female employment:

• Address foundational barriers: Development cooperation can work with local partners to remove the root barriers holding women back. This includes addressing restrictive gender norms in ways that respect cultural contexts, e.g. by investing in community-based care solutions (as successfully practised in several African cases) or better access to services and mobility. Projects should not only target women individually but also address constraints within households and communities and engage broader society. They must also challenge gendered labour market structures that limit women’s paths into wage work.
• Strengthen gender equality on the opera­tional level: The green and digital transitions offer new employ­ment opportunities – but women risk being left behind. Development cooperation can help to ensure that women benefit from these shifts. In cooperation with national governments, it can embed gender targets into economic reforms, incentivise companies to adopt inclusive hiring practices and to implement flexible work time arrangements (such as in Jordan), and fund training for women to reskill and motivate them for these fields.
• Create an enabling policy mix: Employment-focused reforms succeed when they connect with broader policy frameworks. Aligning employment initiatives with social policies – such as childcare support or public works – can boost women’s ability to work. At the same time, gender-sensitive approaches in areas like transport, finance and infrastructure can help overcome structural disadvantages that affect women at different stages of life.

In recent years, development cooperation has shifted from measures to support gender mainstreaming towards gender-transformative approaches that aim to reduce structural barriers. Recent funding cuts and public opinion that is becoming more critical of diversity and equity measures, mean that development cooperation must build on its experience to enable women to grasp economic opportunities and live a dignified life.

 

Promoting female employment remains a pressing challenge in many low- and middle-income countries. Despite ongoing efforts, too few women participate in the labour force – particularly in regions such as the Middle East and South Asia – and too many remain locked out of more decent wage employment – especially in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Promoting women’s employment is not just about fairness; it is essential for inclusive and sustainable development. Women’s economic participation matters for four reasons: it fosters growth and reduces poverty by increasing household income, it enhances women’s autonomy in the household, it promotes equity and cohesion in societies, and it strengthens the resilience of households to shocks by diversifying income sources. Recent research has deepened under­standing of both the barriers and enablers of gender equality in labour markets, offering useful guidance for development cooperation.

Building on empirical research by IDOS, this policy brief highlights that development cooperation can take three key approaches to promote female employment:

• Address foundational barriers: Development cooperation can work with local partners to remove the root barriers holding women back. This includes addressing restrictive gender norms in ways that respect cultural contexts, e.g. by investing in community-based care solutions (as successfully practised in several African cases) or better access to services and mobility. Projects should not only target women individually but also address constraints within households and communities and engage broader society. They must also challenge gendered labour market structures that limit women’s paths into wage work.
• Strengthen gender equality on the opera­tional level: The green and digital transitions offer new employ­ment opportunities – but women risk being left behind. Development cooperation can help to ensure that women benefit from these shifts. In cooperation with national governments, it can embed gender targets into economic reforms, incentivise companies to adopt inclusive hiring practices and to implement flexible work time arrangements (such as in Jordan), and fund training for women to reskill and motivate them for these fields.
• Create an enabling policy mix: Employment-focused reforms succeed when they connect with broader policy frameworks. Aligning employment initiatives with social policies – such as childcare support or public works – can boost women’s ability to work. At the same time, gender-sensitive approaches in areas like transport, finance and infrastructure can help overcome structural disadvantages that affect women at different stages of life.

In recent years, development cooperation has shifted from measures to support gender mainstreaming towards gender-transformative approaches that aim to reduce structural barriers. Recent funding cuts and public opinion that is becoming more critical of diversity and equity measures, mean that development cooperation must build on its experience to enable women to grasp economic opportunities and live a dignified life.

 

Event Video 
Photos

jQuery(document).ready(function($){$("#isloaderfor-wfhkgk").fadeOut(300, function () { $(".pagwrap-wfhkgk").fadeIn(300);});});

On September 23rd, IPI and the Government of Estonia, in partnership with the 1 for 8 Billion, the United Nations Association of the UK (UNA-UK), and CIVICUS, cohosted a public policy forum at the United Nations on the process of selecting the next UN secretary-general: the global diplomat and civil servant for the world’s peoples.

The event focused on recommendations to create a more transparent, inclusive, and equitable selection process for the position of UN secretary-general and ideas for how different sectors can work collaboratively to encourage and ensure the realization of this goal. The discussion also explored the increasing role of the General Assembly in the secretary-general’s election process. The event highlighted how this critical appointment can be a transformative and reinvigorating opportunity for the UN and for multilateralism as the world faces intersecting and accelerating global challenges.

Speakers:
H.E. Arnoldo André Tinoco, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Costa Rica
H.E. Jeppe Tranholm-Mikkelsen, Permanent Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Denmark
H.E. Oana-Silvia Țoiu, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Romania
H.E. Gro Harlem Brundtland, Member of The Elders; former Prime Minister of Norway and Director-General of the WHO
Maria Noel Leoni, Representative of the 1 for 8 Billion Campaign; Co-founder and Campaign Director of GQUAL; and Deputy Executive Director for the Center for Justice and International Law (CEJIL)
Thant Myint-U, Visiting Fellow at Trinity College, Cambridge; the Chairman of U Thant House; Founder and Chairman of the Yangon Heritage Trust; and author of the book, Peacemaker: U Thant and the Forgotten Quest for a Just World

Closing Remarks:
H.E. Alar Karis, President of Estonia

Moderator:
Jeffrey Feltman, Non-Resident Adviser, International Peace Institute

The post A New Vision for Global Leadership: Selecting the Next UN Secretary-General appeared first on International Peace Institute.

The Security Action for Europe (SAFE) Programme is the new EU financial instrument designed to allow EU Member States to speed up their defence readiness by enabling urgent and significant investments in support of the European defence industry, with a focus on filling critical gaps in capabilities and equipment. It is the first pillar of the ReArm Europe Plan/Readiness 2030 strategic plan that aims to unlock €800 billion in defence spending across the EU.[1]

SAFE will provide up to €150 billion in competitive long-maturity loans to Member States that request financial assistance for investments in defence capabilities. These loans will finance urgent and large-scale procurement processes, ensuring that Europe’s defence industry can deliver the requisite equipment.

The features expected of the submitted proposals

The proposals should be:

• Relevant to the defence capabilities of Member States and the EU (e.g. border protection, countering hybrid threats, protecting critical infrastructure, countering cyber warfare, etc.)
• For urgent, large-scale procurement efforts, not small projects
• Involve at least two Member States in a common procurement procedure
• However, requests from individual Member States can also be approved, but only if they are linked to an urgent need and broader geopolitical realities; the proposal must also be submitted on the basis of the timely procurement and delivery of critical assets[2] (for example, the need to procure drones to counter migration movements along routes experiencing a significant increase in traffic, or systems to protect critical infrastructure from potential terrorist threats linked to the situation in the Middle East, could be supported). This is a temporary exception with an initial duration of one year.
• In addition, no more than 35% of the cost of the products’ manufacturing components can originate from outside the EU, EEA-EFTA, or Ukraine, while the countries of origin must meet the conditions set out in the Programme Regulations.

What will SAFE fund?

Category 1:

• Ammunition and missiles
• Artillery systems, including deep-precision strike capabilities
• Ground combat capabilities and their support systems, including soldier equipment and infantry weapons
• Small drones (NATO 1 class[3]) and related anti-drone systems
• Systems and equipment for critical infrastructure protection
• Cyber defence and cyber security systems
• Military mobility, including counter-mobility

Category 2:

• Air and missile defence systems
• Maritime surface and underwater capabilities
• Drones other than small drones (NATO-2 and NATO-3 class) and related anti-drone systems
• Strategic enablers such as, but not limited to, strategic airlift, air-to-air refuelling, C4ISTAR systems (Command, Communications, Information, Control, etc.), as well as space assets and services
• Space asset protection systems
• Artificial intelligence and electronic warfare systems

Countries that have expressed an interest in participating in SAFE and a Timeline for the Next Steps

By 29 July 2025, when the Programme’s first key deadline expired, 19 Member States had expressed an interest in accessing loans through the SAFE mechanism, with potential defence purchases of at least €127 billion.

The Member States in question are Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia and Spain.

The following resources have been tentatively allocated to the Member States as follows:

Member-State Allocation of Resources (€) Belgium 8,340,027,698 Bulgaria 3,261,700,000 Croatia 1,700,000,000 Cyprus 1,181,503,924 Czech Republic 2,060,000,000 Denmark 46,796,822 Estonia 2,660,932,171 Finland 1,000,000,000 France 16,216,720,524 Greece 787,669,283 Hungary 16,216,720,524 Italy 14,900,000,000 Latvia 5,680,431,322 Lithuania 6,375,487,840 Poland 43,734,100,805 Portugal 5,841,179,332 Romania 16,680,055,394 Slovakia 2,316,674,361 Spain 1,000,000,000

 

30 November 2025 Submission of National Defence Investment Plans

January 2026 Adoption of Council Implementing Decisions

February 2026: Negotiation of loan agreements and operational arrangements, triggering pre-financing.

In search of a European strategic culture and interoperability: Behind the Lines

1. The Programme is part of the EU’s overall strategy on the indivisibility of external and internal security—a strategy which informs every strategic and institutional document it produces in relation to internal and foreign policy. SAFE follows in the wake of the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East, but also the intensification of hybrid threats. It is therefore to be expected that it bears the imprint of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as well Moscow’s hybrid attacks against Ukraine and its hybrid operations against EU Member States. Apart from blurring the lines between war and peace—which is a key characteristic of hybrid threats in general—, the specific threat posed by Russia highlights the extent to which internal security is now significantly threatened by a malicious external actor, which can also be a state. This constitutes a further significant change in the recognition and assessment of threats.
2. The main threats that can be addressed through projects submitted to SAFE for funding extend beyond military attack by a hostile nation to include hybrid threats, cyber-attacks, the weaponization of migration and mass border breaches, terrorist attacks, malicious acts, and the sabotaging of critical infrastructure. Which is to say, precisely those threats that are stressed in the broader strategic and political philosophy underpinning the new EU defence policy, mainly via the White Paper on European Defence Preparedness 2030.
3. This works in tandem with the EU Preparedness Union Strategy, which sets out an integrated approach to every threat to the Union’s preparedness for conflict, anthropogenic and natural disasters and crises, the White Paper on European Defence Preparedness 2030, and the Internal Security Strategy: Protecting the EU.
4. SAFE emphasizes investment in the protection and resilience of critical infrastructure/entities, cyberspace, borders, transport, supply chains, information and communication technologies, as well as space investments, technologies and facilities. It is worth noting that most Member States are in the process of transposing the Directive on the Resilience of Critical Entities into national law and developing related strategies.
5. SAFE is a Programme that can further enhance interoperability between the armed and security forces, as well as dual use in the defence / security / civil protection sectors in line with the framework put in place by the EU Preparedness Union Strategy to prevent and react to emerging threats and crises—in particular those in the areas of hybrid threats, border protection, the resilience of critical infrastructure, and cyber security.
6. It can act as a bottom-up catalyst for the emergence of a European strategic culture in both threat identification and investment planning; for the creation of collaborative economies of scale; and for the increased interoperability of assets and systems on the basis of a common European defence capability. This procedure has been followed in other cases where there were difficulties reaching an agreement at the Council level—for example, in the prevention of radicalization. However, there is always the risk that the absence of a statutory coordinating body could lead to fragmented proposals that simply reproduce the various strategic cultures and assessments of risk. Let’s hope that this time, the glass is half-full.

 

[1] For details on SAFE, see the relevant EXPLAINER by S. Blavoukas and P. Politis-Lamprou at https://www.eliamep.gr/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/EXPLAINER-4-EL.pdf. More generally, on the European Defence Fund and the EU Defence Industrial Ecosystem, see S. Blavoukos; P. Politis-Lamprou and G. Matsoukas at https://www.eliamep.gr/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/Policy-paper-182-Blavoukos-Politis-Matsoukas-FINAL-EL.pdf

[2] https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/safe-security-action-europe_en

[3] The classification is based on their weight and the altitude they can reach under normal conditions. Specifically, they are:
Class I: small>20 kg; mini 2-20 kg, micro<2kg
Class II: 150-600 kg (regular)
Class III: >600 kg with three subcategories (strike, HALE, MALE).
On the categories, and more generally on NATO’s approach to unmanned aerial vehicles, see Joint Air Power Competence Centre https://www.japcc.org/

The Transatlantic Periscope is an interactive, multimedia tool that brings together expert commentary, high-quality media coverage, official policy documents, quantitative data, social media posts, and gray literature. It will provide on a monthly basis a summary of the most important news concerning the Greek-US relations, as reflected in the media. Below you will find an overview for August 2025.

On August 4, 2025, the Greek Minister of Environment and Energy, Stavros Papastavrou, met with the new Chargé d’Affaires at the US Embassy in Athens, Josh Huck, to discuss energy cooperation between Greece and the US and electricity interconnection projects in the Eastern Mediterranean. Papastavrou said that the discussion focused on energy cooperation, the South-North Vertical Gas Corridor, the utilization of infrastructure for American LNG in Revithoussa and Alexandroupolis, and the keen interest in electricity interconnection projects in the Eastern Mediterranean.

On the same day, a statement released by the American Hellenic Chamber of Commerce on the recent EU-US Trade Deal noted that the deal may present important opportunities for Greece. As it is specifically noted in the statement: “As a member of both the EU and NATO, and as a growing logistics, energy, and digital hub in Southeastern Europe, Greece stands to benefit significantly from the strengthening of transatlantic trade ties. In fact, improved market access, increased regulatory coordination, and the prospect of expanded zero-for-zero tariff arrangements can translate into tangible results for Greek exporters, investors, and technology-driven sectors”.

Secretary of State Marco Rubio held a call with Prime Minister of Greece Kyriakos Mitsotakis on August 8 regarding the strategic importance of US–Greece energy cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean. During the call, Secretary Rubio reaffirmed the continued strength of the United States’ bilateral relationship with Greece and its role as a key NATO Ally.

At the same time, Greece and the United States are in talks to revise their Mutual Defense Cooperation Agreement (MDCA), a move that could see the establishment of two new bases for US forces in mainland Greece and a significant expansion of the American military footprint in the country. The ongoing negotiations are also focused on upgrading existing facilities. The US will remain in the strategic northeastern port of Alexandroupoli and is set to spend $42 million to upgrade its naval base at Souda Bay in Crete. According to officials, the two new locations being considered for US forces are the Petrochori firing range in the western Peloponnese and the Dalipis Army Base near Thessaloniki.

More at: https://transatlanticperiscope.org/relationship/GR#

Wer etwas werden will, hat in Deutschland auffällig schlechte Aussichten. Das ist ungerecht, bremst die Wirtschaft und gefährdet die Demokratie. Das muss sich ändern. , Chancengleichheit bildet das Fundament der sozialen Marktwirtschaft und sichert die Freiheit unserer Gesellschaft. Und dennoch bleiben wir gerade in Deutschland weit hinter diesem Anspruch zurück. Wer heute jung ist, wächst in einem Land auf, das im internationalen Vergleich auffallend wenig ...

Clashes over powers, price criteria and solidarity are shaping the EU’s push to secure essential medicines

No one is happy about plans for a corporate tax, one EU diplomat said

Photos

jQuery(document).ready(function($){$("#isloaderfor-jsicxt").fadeOut(300, function () { $(".pagwrap-jsicxt").fadeIn(300);});});

On Sunday, September 21, 2025, IPI held its twentieth annual Ministerial Working Dinner on the Middle East in its Trygve Lie Center for Peace, Security, and Development. The dinner drew the participation of foreign ministers and other high-level representatives.

The event was chaired by IPI President Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein and co-hosted by Qatar and the European Union, represented respectively by Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al-Thani, Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Qatar, and Kaja Kallas, High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the European Commission.

Participants had a frank discussion, off the record, on regional issues held under the Chatham House Rule.

Attendees included Badr Ahmed Mohamed Abdelatty, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Arab Republic of Egypt; Jasem Mohamed AlBudaiwi, Secretary General of the Gulf Cooperation Council; Sheikh Abdulaziz Al-Hinai, Ambassador-at-Large, Sultanate of Oman; Mohammed bin Abdulaziz Al-Khulaifi, Minister of State of the State of Qatar; Prince Faisal bin Farhan Al-Saud, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia; Abdullah Ali Al-Yahya, Foreign Minister of the State of Kuwait; Abdullatif bin Rashid Al Zayani, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Bahrain; Anita Anand, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Canada; Xavier Bettel, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs and European Affairs of Luxembourg; Ignazio Cassis, Head of the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs of the Swiss Confederation; Espen Barth Eide, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Norway; Hakan Fidan, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Türkiye; Ahmed Aboul Gheit, Secretary General of the League of Arab States; Simon Harris, T.D., Tánaiste (Deputy Prime Minister) and Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade; and Minister for Defence of Ireland; Fuad Mohammad Hussein, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Iraq; Diego Martínez Belío, Deputy Foreign Minister and State Secretary for Foreign and Global Affairs, Spain; Beate Meinl-Reisinger, Federal Minister for European and International Affairs of the Republic of Austria; Sabine Monauni, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, Environment, and Culture of the Principality of Liechtenstein; Youssef Raggi, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Emigrants of Lebanon; Lars Løkke Rasmussen, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Denmark; Ayman Safadi, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs and Expatriates of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan; Mr. Sugiono, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Indonesia; David van Weel, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of the Netherlands.

Also present were Ivonne Baki, Member of the Board of Directors, IPI; Ian Bremmer, President of Eurasia Group; Helen Clark, President of Chatham House; Rosemary A. DiCarlo, United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, UN DPPA; Comfort Ero, President & CEO of International Crisis Group; Jeffrey Feltman, John C. Whitehead Visiting Fellow in International Diplomacy in the Foreign Policy program, Brookings Institute; Mr. Tom Fletcher, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, UN OCHA;   Anwar Gargash, Senior Diplomatic Advisor to the President of the United Arab Emirates; Philippe Lazzarini, Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, UN RWA; Miguel Moratinos, High Representative for the United Nations Alliance of Civilizations; Amr Moussa, Former Secretary General of the League of Arab States and member of IPI’s International Advisory Council; Binaifer Nowrojee, President of the Open Society Foundations; Mary Robinson, Former President of Ireland, former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, and Member of The Elders; Dahlia Scheindlin, Policy Fellow, Century International; Juan Manual Santos, Chair of The Elders, former President of Colombia, and Nobel Peace Laureate; Alex Soros, Chair of the Open Society Foundations; Mirjana Spoljaric Egger, President of the International Committee of the Red Cross.

The post IPI Hosts Foreign Ministers, Officials at 20th Annual Middle East Dinner appeared first on International Peace Institute.

One influential actor that has been largely overlooked in European debates on China as a ‘systemic rival’ is the Chinese Communist Party’s International Department (CCP-ID). Building on a comprehensive dataset that allows us to trace China’s international party cooperation since the early 2000s, we not only investigate the CCP-ID’s networking activities across Europe but also zoom in on the CCP-ID’s engagement in the Czech Republic, Germany, and the UK. The main purpose of the CCP-ID is to foster elite networks and to build personal relationships. By identifying and mobilising individuals who will ‘speak in favour of China’ in domestic political debates within Europe or who publicly endorse China’s positions in Chinese media, the CCP-ID seeks to provide the CCP with external legitimacy. It is the great flexibility in the CCP’s strategies and instruments and the many faces of its activities that make it a potent player in Sino-European relations to which policymakers and academics alike should pay more attention.

One influential actor that has been largely overlooked in European debates on China as a ‘systemic rival’ is the Chinese Communist Party’s International Department (CCP-ID). Building on a comprehensive dataset that allows us to trace China’s international party cooperation since the early 2000s, we not only investigate the CCP-ID’s networking activities across Europe but also zoom in on the CCP-ID’s engagement in the Czech Republic, Germany, and the UK. The main purpose of the CCP-ID is to foster elite networks and to build personal relationships. By identifying and mobilising individuals who will ‘speak in favour of China’ in domestic political debates within Europe or who publicly endorse China’s positions in Chinese media, the CCP-ID seeks to provide the CCP with external legitimacy. It is the great flexibility in the CCP’s strategies and instruments and the many faces of its activities that make it a potent player in Sino-European relations to which policymakers and academics alike should pay more attention.

One influential actor that has been largely overlooked in European debates on China as a ‘systemic rival’ is the Chinese Communist Party’s International Department (CCP-ID). Building on a comprehensive dataset that allows us to trace China’s international party cooperation since the early 2000s, we not only investigate the CCP-ID’s networking activities across Europe but also zoom in on the CCP-ID’s engagement in the Czech Republic, Germany, and the UK. The main purpose of the CCP-ID is to foster elite networks and to build personal relationships. By identifying and mobilising individuals who will ‘speak in favour of China’ in domestic political debates within Europe or who publicly endorse China’s positions in Chinese media, the CCP-ID seeks to provide the CCP with external legitimacy. It is the great flexibility in the CCP’s strategies and instruments and the many faces of its activities that make it a potent player in Sino-European relations to which policymakers and academics alike should pay more attention.

Le Ministère du Tourisme, de la Culture et des Arts, à travers l'Agence de Développement des Arts et de la Clture (ADAC) a rendu public la liste des auteurs présélectionnés pour le prestigieux "Prix Jean Pliya de la fiction littéraire". C'est dans le cadre de la 7e édition du concours national de littéraire dénommé "Grand Prix Littéraire du Bénin".

Six (06) œuvres ont été sélectionnées pour le Prix Jean Pliya de la fiction littéraire. Il s'agit de :

– DANS LES CORDES DU DESTIN, (Roman) de Josiane D. GOVOEI, Ed. Fous Sans Frontières

– ILLUSION DERMIQUE, (Nouvelle) de Sophie ADONON, Ed. Bénin livres

JOBALA GANG, (Nouvelle) de Destin AKPO, Ed. Savane du continent

REPRÉSAILLES ÉCARLATES, (Polar) de Lionel DADELE, Ed. Essaim Plumes

YÊ-NU, (Polar) de Claude BALOGOUN, Ed. Légendes

Le Grand Prix Littéraire du Bénin est une compétition nationale annuelle qui sacre à chaque édition, les œuvres littéraires écrites en français par des auteurs de nationalité béninoise.
Pour cette édition les prix à décerner sont : le Prix Jean PLIYA de la fiction littéraire ; Prix Paul HAZOUME de l'essai ; le Prix Jérôme CARLOS de la Chronique littéraire et le Prix de l'Éditeur.

L'équipe de Dadjè FC, champion en titre du Bénin et Al Ahli SC de Tripoli (Libye) se sont neutralisés ce vendredi 19 septembre 2025, par un score nul et vierge de zéro but partout lors du match aller du premier tour préliminaire de la Ligue des Champions de la Confédération africaine de football.

Belle entame pour Dadjè FC, qui tient en échec Al Ahli SC de Tripoli en match aller du premier tour préliminaire de la Ligue des Champions de la CAF. Au stade de Kégué à Lomé ce vendredi 19 septembre 2025, les deux équipes se sont séparées dos à dos sur un score nul et vierge de zéro but partout. Le club d'Aplahoué a affiché au cours de la rencontre, une solidité défensive remarquable qui a permis d'enrayer les velléités de l'équipe adverse. Toutefois, quelques assauts des Béninois sur le camp de Al Ahli SC de Tripoli aurait pu faire mouche, mais faute d'efficacité, les joueurs béninois sont passé à côté des but libyens.
Le match retour est prévu pour le 28 septembre prochain à Tripoli à 19h, heure de Cotonou. Une victoire permettra à l'équipe de Dadjè FC de passer au second tour de cette compétition.

F. A. A.

Informés du cambriolage d'un domicile à Togba, dans la commune d'Abomey-Calavi, la Police républicaine a ouvert une enquête qui a conduit à l'interpellation de deux suspects ; l'un à Dodja, arrondissement de Togba, et le second à Glo-Djibé.

Deux présumés cambrioleurs arrêtés à Togba, dans la commune d'Abomey-Calavi. Les mis en cause selon la Police, ont été interpellés ce jeudi 18 septembre 2025. Lors de leur transfert au poste, malgré la paire de menottes qui les maintenait, ils ont tenté de fuir. Mais leur tentative de fuite a été aussitôt enrayée par les hommes en uniforme.
Dans ses investigations, la Police a pu localiser la maison cambriolée à Koinvié, arrondissement de Togba. Une équipe du commissariat de Togba appuyée par les éléments du commissariat de Ouèdo s'est transportée sur les lieux pour les constater les faits. La victime absente sur les lieux, et ignorant de ce que son domicile a été cambriolé, est invitée à se présenter à la Police. « A son arrivée, elle a constaté que sa porte a été défoncée en son absence et tous ses effets ont été emportés de même qu'une convention de vente de la parcelle », renseigne la Police à travers une publication sur ses canaux digitaux.
L'enquête ouverte se poursuit aux fins de retrouver les éventuels complices et receleurs.

F. A. A.

La Chambre de Commerce et d'Industrie du Bénin (CCI Bénin) a organisé, vendredi 19 septembre 2025 à Cotonou, une « Journée pays Afrique du Sud », placée sous le signe des opportunités d'affaires et de la coopération économique.

La « Journée pays Afrique du Sud » est une « occasion de renforcer la coopération économique et de bâtir des partenariats durables », a fait savoir Joëlle VIDEHOUENOU, chargée de mission du Secrétaire Général de la Chambre de Commerce et d'Industrie du Bénin (CCI Bénin). Ces rencontres qui se dérouleront au cours de l'année 2025 visent à « faire découvrir aux opérateurs économiques béninois davantage d'opportunités d'affaires, avec une attention particulière aux pays africains ».

Linda MASSO, chargé d'affaires à l'Ambassade d'Afrique du Sud, a rappelé que les relations bilatérales sont « florissantes », notamment depuis la création en 2015 de la Commission Mixte de Commerce et de l'Investissement. Il a souligné que lors du Forum d'investissement de mai 2025, « quatre entreprises sud-africaines ont décidé de s'implanter au Bénin » et que « trois mégaprojets sont déjà en cours ».

Pour le diplomate, « l'Afrique du Sud est une économie florissante et une porte d'entrée vers l'Afrique australe ». Dans le cadre d'une présentation sur les opportunités en Afrique du Sud, le chargé d'affaires a mis en avant des infrastructures modernes et un « climat d'investissement favorable ». Il a invité les opérateurs économiques béninois à explorer les secteurs des mines, de l'Energie, Agroalimentaire, l'Elevage, la Cosmétique, Ferroviaire, Pharmaceutique, etc.

Les « mesures incitatives » offertes aux investisseurs ainsi que les Zones économiques spéciales, plus d'une dizaine, ont été présentées aux participants.

Des entrepreneurs béninois réceptifs

Pour Joël Clémence ADOUNGBE, entrepreneure dans la construction, cette journée est « une belle opportunité de découvrir de nouveaux marchés ».

Aurel ZIBO, directeur financier, dit avoir trouvé des pistes concrètes dans l'agriculture, l'agroalimentaire, la cosmétique notamment en la « bourse de Johannesburg ».
M. M.

La Chambre de Commerce et d'Industrie du Bénin (CCI Bénin) a tenu, ce vendredi 19 septembre 2025, sa 2ème session ordinaire de l'Assemblée Consulaire, consacrée à l'examen et à l'adoption du budget 2026 de l'institution.

Les élus consulaires ont examiné et adopté le projet de budget de la CCI Bénin pour l'exercice 2026, premier budget de la mandature 2025-2030. « Plus qu'un exercice financier », cette session marque, selon le président Arnauld Akakpo, la mise en œuvre de la « vision stratégique » de la CCI Bénin et l'« acte fondateur de nouvelles dynamiques » pour l'institution consulaire.

Le président de la CCI Bénin s'est réjoui de la présence du représentant de la ministre de l'industrie et du commerce au lancement des travaux. C'est la preuve que le gouvernement est à l'écoute du secteur privé, a-t-il indiqué.

Le projet de budget 2026 s'articule autour de cinq programmes majeurs, couvrant à la fois l'investissement et le fonctionnement institutionnel. Il vise à repositionner la CCI Bénin « comme une institution moderne et efficace ». « Les défis sont nombreux : compétitivité, financement, transformation industrielle, intégration régionale et continentale. Nous devons être audacieux et proposer des solutions concrètes pour nos entreprises », a exhorté Arnauld Akakpo.

Au nom de la ministre Shadiya Alimatou Assouman, son représentant, Is Deen Bouraïma, a insisté sur l'importance du vote. « Cette session n'est pas une simple formalité. Elle constitue un acte fort de gouvernance consulaire qui engage la trajectoire de votre mandature », a-t-il déclaré.

Le représentant du gouvernement a salué « la cohérence entre le budget 2026 et le plan stratégique 2025-2030 », soulignant qu'il s'inscrit dans les priorités nationales de transformation structurelle, de promotion de l'investissement privé et de développement industriel. Il a invité les élus consulaires à « aborder le budget avec lucidité, rigueur et ambition ».

Les travaux de la 2ème session ordinaire de l'Assemblée Consulaire se sont déroulés avec la participation de la ministre de l'industrie et du commerce. Shadiya Alimatou Assouman a fait des amendements au cours de la session. Le projet de budget 2026 a été voté avec l'intégration de ces amendements par 63 élus présents sur 69.

Ce budget s'inscrit dans la poursuite de l'optimisation des recettes et du renforcement opérationnel des missions de la CCI Bénin. Il est équilibré en emplois et ressources, avec un montant d'un peu plus de 6 milliards de FCFA.
M. M.