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WARSAW, 6 August 2016 – Michael Georg Link, Director of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), today criticized the call by the Prosecutor General of Tajikistan for the reintroduction of the death penalty, and expressed concern over recent discussions related to removing the bans on capital punishment in some other OSCE participating States.

“Countries in the OSCE have committed themselves to consider the complete abolition of capital punishment, not to reconsider that abolition,” the ODIHR Director said. “Yesterday’s call by the Prosecutor General in Tajikistan for the reintroduction of capital punishment in that country is completely out of place in a region where most of the countries recognize the inherently cruel, inhuman and degrading nature of a punishment that fails to act as a deterrent and makes any miscarriage of justice irreversible.”

Tajikistan’s Prosecutor-General, Yusuf Rahmon, told a press conference yesterday that perpetrators of premeditated murder, terrorists and traitors must be punished by death. His words followed similar statements by other leaders, among them President Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey and President Viktor Orban of Hungary, suggesting that the reinstitution of the death penalty should be opened for discussion.

Tajikistan suspended the application of the death penalty in 2004, while Turkey and Hungary completely abolished capital punishment, in 2004 and 1990, respectively.

“Rather than reversing its course, it is my hope that Tajikistan will take further steps toward the complete abolition of the death penalty,” he said. “It is also my hope that Turkey, remains with the vast majority of the OSCE participating States and will continue to  act as a strong advocate for the global abolition, as it has in recent years.”

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KYIV, 5 AUGUST 2016 –OSCE Special Representative and Co-ordinator for Combating Trafficking in Human Beings, Madina Jarbussynova, on Friday concluded an official visit to Ukraine aimed at raising awareness of human trafficking and the risks encountered by the most vulnerable groups as a consequence of the current crisis.

During her five-day visit, she met with representatives of the Donetsk Oblast state administration and female Internally Displaced People (IDPs) in Kramatorsk. Ambassador Jarbussynova also travelled to Kharkiv to talk to relevant civil society representatives about the situation on the ground, how to prevent the expansion of the conflict-driven human trafficking phenomenon, and to evaluate existing mechanisms of identifying, referring and assisting victims of trafficking in human beings.

“More than one-and-a-half million citizens have been displaced – a vast number that demands a comprehensive response,” Jarbussynova said. “This vulnerable group can easily find itself in situations where human trafficking may occur.”

In Kyiv, the OSCE Special Representative met with Ukrainian authorities to discuss progress in anti-trafficking measures and review future plans.

“The Government of Ukraine has recently demonstrated a high level of commitment to addressing human trafficking, particularly in enhancing its victim identification efforts and in filing cases to relevant courts”, said Jarbussynova.

At the same time, she noted that there are still considerable gaps in the National Referral Mechanism for victims, and that long-term, sustainable measures should be sought.

The Special Representative travels regularly to Ukraine, engaging with high-level authorities and holding training sessions together with the Special Monitoring Mission and the OSCE Project Co-ordinator to strengthen the capacity of the Ukrainian institutions and OSCE monitors to spot human trafficking trends and to report on alleged cases.

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This report is for media and the general public.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region compared to the day before including more than 520 explosions. In Luhansk region the SMM noted a decrease in recorded ceasefire violations compared to the previous day. On the night of 4 August, the SMM heard single shots of small-arms fire in close proximity to  its base in Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov). The SMM analysed craters in Zaitseve, Luhanske and Novozvanivka. It observed weapons in violation of the withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line, and noted the absence of numerous weapons from permanent storage sites in government-controlled areas. The SMM followed up on reports of water and power supply cuts in areas of Avdiivka and Yasynuvata due to shelling. It faced four freedom-of-movement restrictions – two in government-controlled areas and two in areas not controlled by the Government.

The SMM noted a higher number of ceasefire violations[1] recorded in Donetsk region compared to the previous reporting period, including more than 520 explosions.

On the evening of 3 August, while in Donetsk city centre, the SMM heard 48 undetermined explosions 8-15km north-west of its position.

On the same night, whilst in “DPR”-controlled Horlivka (39km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 104 undetermined explosions 7-10km north, and 12 explosions assessed as outgoing armoured personnel carrier (BMP-1, 73mm) cannon fire 5-8km north of its position.

The SMM camera in Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol) between 21:35 and 22:31 of 3 August, facing north-east, recorded 63 undetermined explosions and 30 bursts in the following sequence: five bursts of undetermined tracer fire and 25 bursts of direct tracer fire from east to west, north to south, south to north, north-west to northeast, north-east to north-west, east to north-west, north-east to west, south-east to north-west.

The following day, positioned at the “DPR”-controlled Donetsk central railway station (6km north-west of the city centre), the SMM heard 236 undetermined explosions all at locations 3-10km ranging from north-west to north-east of its position. The most intense violence was noted between 08:14 and 08:42, when the SMM recorded 100 undetermined explosions 4-6km north-north-east of its position. 

Positioned in “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 25 undetermined explosions and 13 outgoing explosions assessed as caused by automatic-grenade-launcher fire 1-7km west-south-west, west, west-north-west, north, north-north-east and north-east of its position. Positioned in government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk), the SMM heard 14 undetermined explosions 3-5km east and south-east of its position.

In Luhansk region the SMM noted a decrease in recorded ceasefire violations compared to the previous day, with no ceasefire violations recorded during the night of 3 August. Whilst in government-controlled Trokhizbenka (33km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 32 undetermined explosions 5-6km south of its position. While positioned 1.5km north-west of “LPR”-controlled Hannivka (58km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard, within a half-hour period, more than 100 bursts of small-arms fire 1.5km east-south-east of its position – the location of a known shooting range – and assessed them as live-fire exercise – within the security zone – in violation of the ceasefire and of the Trilateral Contact Group decision on the prohibition of live-fire exercises within the security zone. Subsequently, while in the vicinity of a shooting range, the SMM saw five armed “LPR” members wearing ski masks with sniper rifles.

At 21:45 on 4 August, the SMM while at its base in “LPR”-controlled Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, 50km west of Luhansk), heard 16 single shots of small-arms (pistol) fire at an undetermined location 100-150m away from the base. The SMM informed the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) and armed “LPR” members controlling area.

The SMM conducted crater analysis. In “DPR”-controlled parts of Zaitseve (50km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM saw a fresh crater in a field 60m away from a house and assessed it as caused by a mortar (82 or 120mm) round fired from a north-westerly direction. Residents told the SMM that shelling had occurred during the night of 2-3 August. Across the street, the SMM also saw a completely burnt and destroyed house and two neighbouring houses with minor damage. No casualties were reported.

In government-controlled Luhanske (59km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM saw four relatively fresh craters  with fragments of 120mm mortar rounds and 122mm artillery rounds in a garden of an inhabited house. The SMM was unable to determine the direction of fire due to contaminated craters after the recent heavy storms.

In government-controlled Novozvanivka (70km west of Luhansk), the SMM saw four craters near an inhabited house and assessed two of them as caused by 82mm mortar and the other two as caused by 122m artillery rounds, all fired from an easterly direction. Two residents told the SMM that shelling had taken place during the night time two days prior.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, in implementation of the Package of Measures and its Addendum, as well as the Minsk Memorandum.

In violation of the respective withdrawal line, the SMM observed in government-controlled areas: five self-propelled howitzers (2S1Gvozdika, 122mm) in Tarasivka (43km north-west of Donetsk); four self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya, 152 mm) in a military compound in Donske (57km south of Donetsk); one radio-guided anti-tank system (9K114 Shturm, 134mm) mounted on a stationary armoured tracked vehicle (MT- LB) in Novozvanivka (70km west of Luhansk). Aerial surveillance imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence on 3 August of 12 tanks together with other hardware including 19 armoured vehicles and 44 military-type trucks in an industrial complex in “DPR”-controlled Budonivskyi district of Donetsk city.

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage does not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification. In a government-controlled area beyond the respective withdrawal lines the SMM saw six towed howitzers (2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm), while it noted as missing six towed howitzers (2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm) as first observed on 8 July. The SMM also observed that two areas continued to be abandoned, as they have been since 3 July, with 12 towed howitzers (D-30, 12mm) and six Addendum-regulated mortars (2B11, 120mm) missing.

The SMM revisited permanent storage sites, whose locations corresponded with the withdrawal lines. At Ukrainian Armed Forces sites, the SMM noted that 22 tanks (T-64) and seven mortars (five 2B9M, 82mm; and two BM-38, 82mm) remained missing. In addition, the SMM also observed missing for the first time 36 tanks (T-64) and seven mortars (BM-37, 82mm). The SMM noted that one of those sites continues to be abandoned and another site has been newly abandoned.

The SMM observed the presence of armoured combat vehicles (ACV) and anti-aircraft weapons in the security zone. In government-controlled areas the SMM saw: one anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) near Lomakyne (15km north-east of Mariupol); one light-armoured vehicle (Kraz Cougar) mounted with a heavy machine-gun heading north near Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk). In “LPR”-controlled areas, the SMM saw: one anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) at an “LPR” checkpoint south-east of Shchastia across the contact line; one infantry fighting vehicle (BTR) heading north near Kalynove (60km west of Luhansk). Aerial surveillance imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence on 3 August of 33 armoured vehicles and 169 military-type trucks in “DPR”-controlled Donetsk city, in addition to aforementioned present in the same compound as the tanks (see above).

The SMM followed up on reports about cuts to water and power supply in areas of Avdiivka and Yasynuvata due to shelling. In Avdiivka, the Ukrainian Armed Forces officer at the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) told the SMM that at around 23:00 on 3 August, water and power supply to the town had been interrupted as shelling had caused damage to power transmission lines and to the Donetsk water filtration station located between Avdiivka and Yasynuvata. At Yasynuvata railway station, an employee (a woman in her thirties), stated that at approximately 04:00 of the day the water supply had been interrupted affecting large parts of the town. She added that most residents currently used water from private wells and bottled water.

The SMM continued to follow up on the incident of 2 August when SMM monitors were threatened at gunpoint at a known Ukrainian Armed Forces position on the road from government-controlled Lopaskyne to Lobacheve (24 and 17km north-west of Luhansk, respectively) (see: SMM Spot Report, 3 August 2016). At the JCCC in government-controlled Soledar (79km north of Donetsk), the Ukrainian Armed Forces chief-of-staff told the SMM that the perpetrators had been identified. The SMM also requested the meeting with a senior “DPR” member to follow up on the incident of 29 July when SMM monitors were threatened at gunpoint by aggressive armed “DPR” members near Lukove (72km south of Donetsk) (see: SMM Spot Report, 30 July 2016). He subsequently  refused  the request.*

The SMM observed the presence of explosive remnants of war (ERW) in “DPR”-controlled Debaltseve (58km north-east of Donetsk). The SMM for the first time saw a tailfin of a multiple-launch rocket system (BM-27 Uragan, 220mm) stuck in soil 30m away from an inhabited house and some 50 rusty shells of 82mm mortars (without fuses) scattered in a nearby field.

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to essential infrastructure. Positioned on both sides of the contact line, the SMM monitored the cleaning and widening of canals that provide water to the Shchastia power plant, repair works to the Mykhailivka-Lysychansk high power line near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km north-west of Luhansk), repair works to gas pipelines in areas between “LPR”-controlled Slovianoserbsk and Pryshyb (28 and 34km north-west of Luhansk, respectively).

The SMM continued to observe queues at entry-exit checkpoints along the contact line. In the morning, at a checkpoint in “DPR”-controlled Olenivka (23km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM observed 132 cars waiting in a queue to cross into government-controlled areas and six cars in the opposite direction. A man in his forties told the SMM that he had been waiting for four hours since 06:00. A man in his early thirties with his wife and 8-year-old son stated that they were travelling to receive medical treatment for his son in government-controlled areas, expressing his concern as his son should not stay in the sun for a long time.  

*Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to the fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring is restrained by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines and unexploded ordnance, and by restrictions of its freedom of movement and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations.

Denial of access:

• In government-controlled Hranitne (25km north of Mariupol), armed Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel did not allow the SMM to enter a military compound. The JCCC was informed.
• Armed Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel denied the SMM access to a military compound in government-controlled Myrne (40km north-east of Mariupol), citing orders from their superior. The JCCC was informed. 
• A senior “DPR” member refused to meet with SMM, when it attempted to follow up on the incident 29 July near Lukove.

Conditional access:

• Armed “LPR” members at a checkpoint immediately south of the bridge at Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north of Luhansk) allowed the SMM to proceed only after taking the names and ID card numbers of SMM monitors.

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

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MOSCOW, 5 August 2016 – On the occasion of the formal opening of the election observation mission (EOM) deployed by the OSCE's Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) to observe the 18 September State Duma elections in the Russian Federation, the mission will hold a press conference in Moscow on Monday, 8 August 2016.

Jan Petersen, the head of the OSCE/ODIHR election observation mission, will introduce the role of the EOM and its upcoming activities.

Journalists are invited to attend the press conference at 15:00, Monday, 8 August, at Interfax, 1-ya Tverskaya-Yamskaya ul., 2 Moscow, 127006.

For further information, please contact Inta Lase OSCE/ODIHR EOM Media Analyst, at +79166214710 (mobile) or Inta.Lase@odihr.ru

or

Thomas Rymer, OSCE/ODIHR Spokesperson, at +48 609 522 266 (Warsaw mobile) or at thomas.rymer@odihr.pl.

 

 

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257951 Communication and Media Relations Section

Representatives of relevant ministries and other state agencies of Belarus, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan responsible for implementing provisions of UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540 on preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction met at an OSCE-supported peer review meeting in Minsk from 2 and 5 August 2016, to discuss progress in their work.

Experts from the OSCE Conflict Prevention Centre, the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs and the UN Security Council’s 1540 Committee also attended the meeting, which was hosted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Belarus, and is the second event of its kind to be held in the OSCE region and in the world, and the first to be held in trilateral format.

Opening the event, Deputy Foreign Minister of Belarus Valentin Rybakov said that the issues of non-proliferation are among his country’s priorities in the area of international security.

He noted that Belarus was the first state of the former Soviet Union to voluntarily refuse the opportunity to possess weapons of mass destruction, and that the withdrawal of such weapons from the country’s territory was completed in 1996. Rybakov added that his country also initiated the adoption of the UN General Assembly resolution on prohibiting the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons.

Adriana Volenikova of the  OSCE Conflict Prevention Centre said regional co-operation on UNSCR 1540-related issues has become one of the most efficient means in bolstering national implementation and enhancing an open dialogue between countries that face similar challenges and benefit from close interaction in related areas.

The three States will work on a joint report on implementation and later submit it to the UNSC 1540 Committee and the UN Security Council.

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DUSHANBE, 5 August 2016 – Twenty officers  of the Tajik Border Troops, ranked between warrant officer and major, mainly coming from border detachments  on the Afghan and Tajik border, successfully completed a four-week course today on patrolling and leadership at the Gissar Training Centre in Dushanbe.

The course, organized by the OSCE Office in Tajikistan, focused on enhancing participants’ knowledge of conducting observation missions using topographical maps, satellite imagery and other tools. They also learned about reporting and analysis, repelling methods, communications and tactical movement.

Uniforms and common tactical equipment were given to each participant. Separate medical lessons were delivered by trainers from the United States Embassy in Tajikistan. The sessions on gender mainstreaming and demining awareness were delivered by experts of the OSCE Office. Two officers of the Tajik Border Troops, who previously passed the course, also supported the OSCE in delivering the lessons.

OSCE Office in Tajikistan Counter-terrorism and Police issues Adviser Wolfgang Nikolaus, congratulated the officers on completing the course and said: “The OSCE continues supporting efforts to enhance the capacity of Tajik Border Troops Staff by providing such high-quality training courses."

The course is the eighth to be held under the third phase of the Patrol Programming and Leadership Project. The Project aims to increase the capacities of Tajik border staff in detection and interdiction of illegal cross-border movements.

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This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM noted a similar number of ceasefire violations recorded in Donetsk region compared to the day before. In Luhansk region the SMM noted an increase in recorded ceasefire violations compared to the previous day, with many concentrated around government-controlled Stanytsia Luhanska and Trokhizbenka. The SMM analysed craters in Stanytsia Luhanska, Pobeda and Hnutove. It observed the presence of armoured combat vehicles and anti-tank missiles in the security zone. The SMM followed up on reports of civilian and military casualties. The SMM continued to observe queues at entry-exit checkpoints along the contact line. It monitored border areas not controlled by the Government and encountered one restriction. It faced another freedom-of-movement restriction, also in an area not controlled by the Government*.

The SMM noted a similar number of ceasefire violations recorded in Donetsk region compared to the previous reporting period.[1]

On the evening of 2 August, while in Donetsk city centre the SMM heard 22 undetermined explosions 7-10km north-west of its position.

Whilst in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard in the late evening of 2 August explosions assessed as 20 artillery impacts (122mm), eight mortar impacts (120mm) and  seven mortar impacts (82mm) 2km south- east its position; and 23 explosions assessed as outgoing artillery rounds (122mm) 3km south of its position.

Whilst in “DPR”-controlled Horlivka (39km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard seven explosions assessed as outgoing recoilless-gun fire (SPG-9, 73mm) 0.7-1.5km north of its position and ten explosions assessed as outgoing mortar fire (82mm), 1-10km north of its position.

On 3 August, positioned during the day in “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk city) the SMM heard 56 undetermined explosions 3-5km west, north-west and west-south-west of its position.

Positioned during the day in government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk city) the SMM heard 49 undetermined explosions 4-5km south-east, south-south-east and south of its position.

Whilst in “DPR”-controlled Debaltseve (58km north-east of Donetsk) throughout the day, the SMM heard five single undetermined explosions 6-12km ranging from north-north-west to south-west of its position.

The SMM noted an increase in the number of ceasefire violations recorded in Luhansk region compared to the day before, with the majority taking place in government-controlled Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk) and government-controlled Trokhizbenka (33km north-west of Luhansk). While in Stanytsia Luhanska in the late evening of 2 August, the SMM heard during a two hour period 48 undetermined explosions 3-5km south and south-south-west of its position; 14 explosions assessed as outgoing 73mm recoilless-gun (SPG-9) fire and 14 impacts of 73mm SPG-9 rounds, 17 rounds of outgoing automatic-grenade-launcher fire (AGS-17) and 17 AGS-17 impacts, and intensive small-arms  and heavy machine gun-fire 3.5-4km south of its position.

On 3 August in the morning while positioned in Trokhizbenka, the SMM heard 81 undetermined explosions 5-6km south of its position. In Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk) throughout the day, the SMM heard ten undetermined explosions within a  40 minute period in the morning, 5km south of its position.

The SMM conducted crater analysis and followed up on reports of civilian and military casualties. At the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, approximately four metres south of the Ukrainian Armed Forces position closest to the bridge, the SMM observed a crater containing pieces of shrapnel which it assessed as caused by 82mm mortar rounds fired from an undetermined direction. Near the same location the SMM observed three fresh craters assessed as caused by grenade launcher (AGS-17) rounds fired from an undetermined direction. The SMM observed 25m south of the “LPR” forward position at the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, grenade launcher shrapnel lying on the ground. At the “LPR” checkpoint south of the bridge the SMM saw grenade launcher shrapnel lying on the ground approximately 15-20 metres north of the checkpoint. No craters were observed in either location.

The SMM observed four fresh craters at a farm in government-controlled Pobeda (27km west of Donetsk). Due to security concerns the SMM could not conduct crater analysis. The SMM saw from a distance that the craters were in soft ground and contained fragments of 125mm shells. The SMM saw that one shell had hit a concrete fence facing a southerly direction, while another shell had hit a pigsty. The director of the farm told the SMM that shelling had occurred on 2 August.

In government-controlled Hnutove (20km north-east of Mariupol) the SMM observed damage to a fence surrounding a house and damage to the roof of the house. The SMM saw shattered windows and shrapnel damage on the house’s wall facing a southerly direction. The SMM did not observe any crater.

In Stanytsia Luhanska medical personnel of the emergency department at the hospital confirmed to the SMM that two wounded Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers had been hospitalized on 2 August. Both soldiers had surgery at the hospital and one of them had been transferred on 3 August to a military hospital.  

At the hospital in “LPR”-controlled Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, 50km west of Luhansk), the SMM followed up on the condition of the two civilians (a woman and a man) injured during the shelling in the night of 1-2 August (see SMM Daily Report, 3 August 2016). The medical personnel told the SMM that both patients were in critical condition. According to medical personnel, the female patient was still in the recovery unit, while the other had been transferred to Luhansk hospital for further treatment.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, in implementation of the Package of Measures and its Addendum, as well as the Minsk Memorandum.

An SMM unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted three self-propelled howitzers (2S1) and one tank (T-72) in government-controlled Kirove (44km north-east of Donetsk), in violation of the respective withdrawal lines.

Beyond the respective withdrawal lines, but outside assigned areas, the SMM observed: 15 towed howitzers (2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm) in government-controlled Khlibodarivka (65km south-west of Donetsk); and ten stationary tanks (T-64) at the training area near “LPR”-controlled Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk). Aerial surveillance imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence on 31 July of the 26 towed artillery pieces and 35 tanks together with other hardware including 96 armoured vehicles, 80 military-style trucks and 14 trailers near “LPR”-controlled Buhaivka (37km south-west of Luhansk).

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage does not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification. In a “DPR”-controlled area beyond the respective withdrawal lines the SMM saw 16 mortars (PM-38, 120mm), 15 towed howitzers (D30, 122mm), could not account for two towed howitzers (D30, 120mm) and noted five additional such heavy weapons .

The SMM revisited permanent storage sites, whose locations corresponded with the withdrawal lines. At a Ukrainian Armed Forces site, the SMM noted that 40 tanks (T-64), seven anti-tank guns (five D-44, 85mm and two D-48, 85mm) and nine mortars (2B9 Vasilek, 82mm) remained missing  (first eight observed missing on 19 April, the last on 29 June 2016).

At a “DPR”-controlled site whose location corresponded with the withdrawal lines, the SMM observed that all weapons previously verified as withdrawn to the site were present.

The SMM observed the presence of armoured combat vehicles (ACV) and anti-tank missiles in the security zone. In government-controlled areas the SMM saw: two infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs, BMP-1) and two armoured personnel carriers, one of which had six anti-tank missiles mounted on its roof near Avdiivka (17km north-west of Donetsk); and at the northern outskirts of Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk) the SMM saw an IFV (BMP-2), travelling north and one IFV (BMP-2) travelling towards the bridge.

In addition, an SMM UAV spotted one IFV (BMP) in government-controlled Kirove (44km north-east of Donetsk).

The SMM followed up on the incident on 2 August when SMM monitors were stopped at a known Ukrainian Armed Forces position on the road from Lopaskyne (government-controlled, 24km north-west of Luhansk) to Lobacheve (government-controlled, 17km north-west of Luhansk (see SMM Spot Report, 3 August 2016). At the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) in government-controlled Soledar (79km north of Donetsk), the Ukrainian Armed Forces chief-of-staff told the SMM that an investigation was currently on-going and that findings should be soon presented.

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to essential infrastructure. Positioned on both sides of the contact line, the SMM monitored the cleaning of canals that provide water to the Shchastia power plant and repair works to the Mykhailivka-Lysychansk high power line near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km north-west of Luhansk).

The SMM continued to observe queues at entry-exit checkpoints along the contact line. At the Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint at the H15 highway near Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM observed in the morning about 500 pedestrians and 145 civilian vehicles waiting to exit government-controlled areas. The SMM observed that the queue moved approximately 30 meters every 10-20 minutes. The SMM saw that three drivers alighted from their cars and walked towards the checkpoint. At this stage there were about 10—15 vehicles in front of them. They returned after 15 minutes and then drove their cars directly to the checkpoint surpassing the cars in front of them. The SMM spoke separately to several passengers and bus drivers who said that they have heard about bribery taking place at the checkpoints, but could not give concrete examples. At the first Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint north of the bridge at Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM observed in the morning approximately 200 pedestrians (mostly elderly people) waiting to proceed towards areas not controlled by the Government. The SMM observed that the elderly people in the queue were suffering from the heat. In the afternoon within 40 minute period the SMM saw 104 pedestrians leaving government-controlled areas and 84 pedestrians entering government-controlled areas.

The SMM monitored two border areas not controlled by the Government and was prevented from doing so by armed “LPR” members in Makariv Yar (formerly Parkhomenko, 28km east of Luhansk).* At the Marynivka border crossing point (78km east of Donetsk), the SMM observed 45 civilian cars (the majority with Ukrainian license plates and one with a “Novorossiya” sticker partially covering the plate) and two covered commercial trucks (also Ukrainian license plates) lined-up in a queue waiting to exit Ukraine.

*Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to the fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring is restrained by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines and unexploded ordnance, and by restrictions of its freedom of movement and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations.

Denial of access:

•  At the border crossing point near “LPR”-controlled Makariv Yar an armed “LPR” member told the SMM to leave the area and checked ID cards of the SMM monitors. The JCCC was informed.

Conditional access:

• Armed “LPR” members at a checkpoint immediately south of the bridge at Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north of Luhansk) allowed the SMM to proceed only after taking the names and ID card numbers of SMM monitors. 

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

Related Stories

• Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30, 2 August 2016
• Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30, 1 August 2016
• Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30, 31 July 2016

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM noted a decrease in the number of ceasefire violations recorded in Donetsk region compared to the day before. In Luhansk the SMM noted an increase in recorded ceasefire violations on the day before, with many concentrated around “LPR”-controlled Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov). A peaceful protest was held outside the SMM’s base in Kadiivka. Later, at the same location, the SMM heard bursts of small-arms fire in the vicinity of their base and saw an individual running from the area. An armed man at a known Ukrainian Armed Forces position threatened the SMM at gunpoint in Lobacheve. The SMM analysed craters on both sides of the contact line. It observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines. “LPR” members prevented the SMM from monitoring in border areas.

The SMM noted a decrease in the number of ceasefire violations recorded in Donetsk region compared to the day before[1].

On the evening of 1 August, while in government-controlled Mariupol, the SMM heard eight undetermined explosions at an unknown distance east and east-north-east of its position. On the same evening, the SMM camera in Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol) recorded fighting in the following sequence: five explosions (impacts) north-east, and fifty bursts of tracer fire from east in an unknown direction; four bursts of tracer fire from south-east to north-west; four undetermined explosions; 12 bursts of tracer fire from east to north and 34 air bursts from south-east to north-west.

While in “DPR”-controlled Donetsk city centre in the early morning hours of 2 August, the SMM heard 67 undetermined explosions 5-15km north and north-west of its position.

Positioned in “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk city) the SMM heard 21 undetermined explosions 2-5km west and north-west of its position. Later, positioned at the Yasynuvata railway station the SMM heard six undetermined explosions 4-6km north-west.

Positioned in government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk city) the SMM heard

16 undetermined explosions and two explosions of automatic grenade launcher fire 3-4km ranging from south-east to south-west.

Positioned in government-controlled Mykolaivka (57km north of Donetsk) the SMM heard 22 mortar impacts (120mm), 30 mortar impacts (82mm) and 50 automatic grenade launcher impacts 5km south-east.

Positioned in government-controlled Marinka (23km south-west of Donetsk) on the evening of 2 August, the SMM heard 23 undetermined explosions, 14 airbursts from an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) and multiple bursts of small-arms and heavy machine gun-fire 1-2km north.

The SMM noted an increase in the number of ceasefire violations recorded in Luhansk region compared to the day before, with the majority taking place in “LPR”-controlled Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, 50km west of Luhansk). While in Kadiivka in the early morning of 2 August, the SMM heard 91 explosions, some of them assessed as impacts and some as outgoing rounds, 32 of which were in areas 5-10km north-north-west and 59 in areas 5-10km west and south-west. For an hour during this period of shelling, the electricity supply to the city was cut.

At 20:34 on 2 August, the SMM, positioned in one forward patrol base in Kadiivka, heard three bursts of small-arms fire 50-100m north of its location. At 20:45, while positioned at another patrol base, the SMM heard 4-5 bursts from an automatic rifle fired in the air 10-15m away, just beyond the perimeter fence. In the darkness the SMM observed a person running from the area. The SMM informed the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) and armed “LPR” members controlling the area.

In government-controlled parts of Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) while monitoring adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works, the SMM heard a mortar impact (possibly 82mm) and saw smoke rising approximately 1.5km east of its position. A short time later the SMM heard a further two mortar impacts approximately 1km east. Approximately an hour later the SMM heard six undetermined explosions 3-4km north and north-east of its position.

The SMM followed up on recorded ceasefire violations and conducted crater analysis. In “LPR”-controlled Kadiivka, the SMM observed craters at two locations. In Oleha Koshevoho  Street in a residential area in the south of the town the SMM analysed a fresh crater and assessed that it was caused by artillery (calibre unknown) fired from a westerly direction. A woman told the SMM that children had taken remnants of a shell from the crater. The SMM observed damage to adjacent houses, including shattered windows and shrapnel-damaged walls. Two residents (a 60 year-old man and a 70 year-old woman) said that the shelling, which had begun at about 01:30, had critically wounded a 50 year-old man who was taken to hospital.

At a second impact area in a residential area in the north of Kadiivka the SMM observed shell damage and analysed craters. The SMM observed a crater in the yard of a house, which it assessed to have been caused by artillery or rocket fired from a north-westerly direction. The SMM observed damage to the exterior walls of the house, broken windows and saw that the interior ceiling was damaged by shelling. A second crater was analysed in this area, and was assessed to have been caused by artillery or rocket fired from a westerly direction. A tree had sustained a direct hit from a shell. According to Russian Federation officers at the JCCC who were present, armed men had visited these impact sites and removed pieces of shrapnel. Nevertheless, the SMM observed pieces of shrapnel at these sites that indicated the use of artillery or rockets. Residents told the SMM that two women (70 and 79 years-old) were injured in the shelling and that both were hospitalized in Kadiivka, with one of them subsequently moved to Luhansk for further treatment.

On 1 August, near the government-controlled Maiorsk checkpoint (45km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM saw damage to checkpoint barriers and nearby trees. The SMM analysed a fresh crater and assessed it to have been caused by multiple-launch rocket systems (122mm, Grad) fired from a south-south-westerly direction. A Ukrainian Armed Forces soldier at the checkpoint nearby told the SMM that heavy shelling had taken place on the night of 31 July.

An armed man at a known Ukrainian Armed Forces position stopped two SMM vehicles in government-controlled areas travelling east on the road from Lopaskyne (government-controlled, 24km north-west of Luhansk) to Lobacheve (government-controlled, 17km north-west of Luhansk). The armed man, wearing military-style clothing with no marking, threatened at gunpoint one of the SMM monitors and said in Russian, “Stop. You are not going anywhere”. Later, four armed men arrived, some in military-style clothing and appearing to be intoxicated, carrying assault rifles (AK-74).  After 15 minutes the SMM was allowed to leave the area and proceed to Lobacheve (See SMM Spot Report, 3 August 2016).

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, in implementation of the Package of Measures and its Addendum, as well as the Minsk Memorandum.

In violation of the respective withdrawal lines the SMM observed 15 anti-tank guns (MT-12, Rapira 100mm) in “DPR”-controlled Zelene (28km east of Donetsk).

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage does not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification. In a government-controlled area beyond the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM saw 18 towed howitzers (D-20, 152mm). In another government-controlled area the SMM saw 17 anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) but could not account for one. When the SMM asked a Ukrainian Armed Forces soldier why one anti-tank gun had black soot on its muzzle break he said it was because it had recently been used in training exercises. One government-controlled area continued to be abandoned, as it has been since 19 December 2015, with all 12 mortars (2S12 Sani, 120mm) missing. The SMM observed that one area continued to be abandoned, as it has been for since 12 July 2015, with all six self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) missing.

The SMM revisited permanent storage sites, whose locations corresponded with the withdrawal lines. At one site in “DPR”-controlled areas the SMM observed that two tanks (T-64) were missing for the first time and other weapons had been added. Tank ammunition was seen stored next to tanks.

The SMM observed the presence of armoured combat vehicles (ACV) and anti-aircraft weapons in the security zone: two armoured personnel carriers (BTR-60) and two armoured reconnaissance vehicles (BRDM) near government-controlled Popasna (69km west of Luhansk). In “LPR”-controlled Kadiivka, the SMM observed an armoured tracked vehicle (MT-LB) travelling west in the direction of the contact line in a convoy of 20 military-type vehicles, one of which the SMM observed to be carrying approximately 125 anti-tank mines.

The SMM observed new mine hazard signs. Between Zolote (60km north-west of Luhansk) and “LPR”-controlled Pervomaisk (58km west of Luhansk) the SMM observed two new mine hazard signs on the sides of the road in the area of the proposed disengagement area.

The SMM requested that “DPR” members and officers at the JCCC follow-up the incident on 29 July when SMM monitors were threatened at gunpoint by aggressive armed “DPR” members near Lukove (72km south of Donetsk) (See SMM Spot Report, 30 July). In Lukove, the SMM met with “DPR” members, including from the “ministry of defence”. A “DPR” member who had threatened the SMM, apologised. “DPR” members told the SMM that an investigation is planned. The SMM await the response of “DPR” members to the violation.

During the afternoon of 2 August a group approximately 30 protestors (mainly young people) gathered in front of the SMM base in Kadiivka, some carrying signs with slogans such as, “OSCE is blind”. Local “police” was present. The protestors dispersed peacefully after an hour. At the same time in another part of Kadiivka, a stone was thrown at an SMM vehicle, causing no damage.

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to essential infrastructure. Positioned on both sides of the contact line, the SMM monitored the cleaning of canals that provide water to the Shchastia power plant and repair works to the Mykhailivka-Lysychansk high power line near Zolote. Following explosions in the area of Zolote the SMM left the area due to security concerns.

The SMM attempted to monitor border areas not controlled by the Government but was prevented from doing so by armed “LPR” members who stopped the SMM near Diakove (70km south-west of Luhansk).*

*Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to the fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring is restrained by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines and unexploded ordnance, and by restrictions of its freedom of movement and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations.

Denial of access:

• Armed “DPR” members prevented the SMM from travelling through a checkpoint towards the west of Debaltseve (58km north-east of Donetsk). The JCCC was informed.
• A Russian Federation Armed Forces officer at the JCCC office in Yasynuvata denied the SMM access to the roof of the building to conduct ceasefire monitoring, citing security concerns. He refused to share his ceasefire violation log with the SMM.
• On 1 August, water company officials refused to meet the SMM in “LPR”-controlled Sorokyne (formerly Krasnodon, 43km south-east of Luhansk), claiming that the SMM needed permission from the “municipality” to hold such a meeting.
• On 1 August, in Sorokyne, the “director” of the cultural centre and the “deputy head” of the “culture department” in the town asked for the SMM’s patrol plan and to produce some sort of “registration” from “LPR” members in order to have a meeting. The SMM refused and left.
• Two armed “LPR” members stopped the SMM near Diakove and asked for a signed and stamped patrol plan in the Russian language. The SMM informed the JCCC. After 40 minutes of waiting the SMM left, and were unable to travel to their planned destination, “LPR”-controlled Leonove (formerly Chervonyi Zhovten, 82km south of Luhansk). The JCCC was informed.

Conditional access:

• Armed “DPR” members allowed the SMM to proceed through a checkpoint near “DPR”-controlled Debaltseve after checking the trunk of SMM vehicles.
• An armed “LPR” member at a checkpoint immediately south of the bridge at Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north of Luhansk) allowed the SMM to proceed only after taking the names of SMM monitors.

[1]Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

Related Stories

• Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30, 1 August 2016
• Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30, 31 July 2016
• Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30, 29 July 2016

Why Trump? – Possible reasons why the Hungarian Prime Minister supports the Republican candidate CEID - Centre for Euro-Atlantic Integration and Democracy

By Dániel Bartha, Botond Feledy and Zoltán Fehér | Download

The Annual Bálványos Summer University and Students’ Camp in Baile Tusnad, Romania, have gained fame in the broader region in the recent years. The week-long political festival held annually since 1990 is one of the most important national political workshops of the Hungarian conservative parties Throughout the years Bálványos has become the biggest public forum of Hungary’s dialogue with its ethnic Hungarian minority.

Every festival has its headliner, and in case of Bálványos it is Prime Minister Viktor Orbán. The Hungarian Prime Minister understood well the nature of summer gatherings and has capitalized on the opportunity to introduce truly controversial issues not only into the Hungarian political discussions but at an international level as well.

For the broader international public Bálványos hit the news in 2014, when Orbán spoke about the success of illiberal states and portrayed them as a positive example for Hungary.

Currently the most important issue on the Hungarian political agenda is the referendum on EU refugee resettlement quotas on the 2nd of October. The government invests a lot in setting the tone of the public discourse, by massively campaigning through the state-controlled public and government friendly private media channels.

In this context, it was absolutely not surprising that Orbán’s latest speech at Tusnád portrayed the European Union as the complete failure of the bureaucrats in Brussels and Berlin. According to Orbán: “We have to make it clear that our problem is not in Mecca, but in Brussels. The bureaucrats in Brussels are an obstacle for us, not Islam.” He stated again that there is a clear link between terrorism and the recent migration crisis. Moreover, he managed to surprise the audience by pledging support to Donald Trump. The anti-terrorism proposals of U.S. Republican presidential candidate makes him the better option for Europe and Hungary, he said.

What is truly behind Orbán’s support to Trump? We have asked Hungarian experts about the possible motivations.

Botond Feledy, Senior Fellow of CEID highlighted that the current endorsement of Trump fit well into the longer line of Orbán’s critical attitude towards the West. Just as much as with illiberal democracies, Orbán is keen on collecting allies in criticizing the liberal Western establishment. He has expressed several times his mistrust against Brussels. The fall of 2014 brought serious diplomatic tensions between the USA and Hungary. Orbán has also argued against the sanctions on Russia, recently renewed by the European Council. Though he has never been in the position to use a veto, the Hungarian government is one of the closest to Moscow in the region, despite the very narrow Hungarian leverage in bilateral Hungarian-Russian relations. Trump’s (so far oral) support for the authoritarian Russia and its leader, his permanent anti-Washington outbreaks and strong anti-immigration stance are all shared by the Hungarian Prime Minister.

The curious new twist in his recent Tusnád speech raises questions about his view on NATO. As Donald Trump just made his infamous remarks about not willing to go to war against Russia according to article V of the treaty, if the Baltic states’ sovereignty was violated, Orbán’s endorsement has arrived in a very sensitive moment among NATO members. Even more curiously, Hungary has been a good NATO ally so far, taking part in air patrolling in Baltic skies, being present in Afghanistan and even contributing a training mission to Iraq in the Coalition of the Willing. Should the Hungarian government embark on prolonged NATO criticism, together with Trump, it would put Budapest into a new and extremely dangerous position.

Daniel Bartha, Director of CEID added that although it was hard to predict any consistent US foreign policy based on the Trump campaign, the majority of Fidesz supporters showed little sympathy towards either of the US Presidential candidates. He believes that we could evaluate Orbán’s decision through two different points of view.

First, an important domestic policy element is to use Trump’s position on Islam fundamentalism, migration and international terrorism as a justification and support for the referendum on the resettlement quotas. The referendum intends to strengthen the support of Fidesz, even though there is a high risk that participation will remain under the threshold, and the vote will be invalid. So far the anti-migrant policy brought a major success that not only stopped the further decrease of support of the governing parties, but even changed the trends.

Second, the bilateral relations between the Obama-administration and the Orbán government have seriously worsened in the last two years. The increasing antagonism to liberal values linked the policies of democrats with George Soros and democracy promotion. Positions of Presidential candidate Hillary Clinton vis-a-vis Hungary were often voiced through Victoria Nuland, one of the most critical representatives, pinpointing to the „undemocratic” developments in Hungary. Clinton herself already criticized the first Orbán government’s policies on religious groups and media freedom during her 2011 visit in Budapest.  There is little hope, that the Orbán government could secure support from any potential member of the future Clinton administration.  By supporting Trump, Orbán can make a pre-emptive strike to counter future critical voices. In case of a Trump Presidency. Orbán hopes for an improved partnership for the early support, while in case of a Clinton Presidency he can respond to the possible critical voices, as they would be solely a political revenge.

Zoltán Fehér, a Boston-based foreign policy analyst underlined: it is an unusual step diplomatically, however, there is no surprise in Prime Minister Orbán’s endorsement of Donald Trump. The two politicians share a similar brand of populism-nativism, a strong anti-immigration stance and an alignment with Russian President Vladimir Putin. In the past year, both have placed immigration the highest on their political agendas, rallying their respective countries’ voters against “the current failed immigration policy”(of the US/EU, respectively) and the threat posed by illegal immigration (Orbán refers to the Syrian refugees as “illegal immigrants”).

In the context of the U.S. presidential elections, Prime Minister Orbán is playing a low-stake game right now. His relationship with the Obama administration and the Clinton camp has been strained in recent years and he has received significant criticism from those circles. He risks nothing vis-à-vis Clinton by endorsing Trump. On the other hand, he has much to gain if Trump is to get elected. He clearly hopes to achieve an improved relationship with the U.S. by endorsing the Republican nominee so early in the process.

Finally, it is important not to underestimate the domestic effects of such an endorsement. Orbán is known to play mostly to his domestic audience. Endorsing Trump would enable the Hungarian leadership to say that they are not alone in harshly opposing immigration – even the frontrunner in the American presidential race runs on a similar agenda. This, they are likely to hope, will strengthen their argumentation and possibly their support for the October 2 anti-immigration referendum in Hungary.

Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the publisher. © CEID, 2016

http://www.ceid.hu/why-trump-possible-reasons-why-the-hungarian-prime-minister-supports-the-republican-candidate/

Why Trump? – Possible reasons why the Hungarian Prime Minister supports the Republican candidate CEID - Centre for Euro-Atlantic Integration and Democracy

By Dániel Bartha, Botond Feledy and Zoltán Fehér | Download

The Annual Bálványos Summer University and Students’ Camp in Baile Tusnad, Romania, have gained fame in the broader region in the recent years. The week-long political festival held annually since 1990 is one of the most important national political workshops of the Hungarian conservative parties Throughout the years Bálványos has become the biggest public forum of Hungary’s dialogue with its ethnic Hungarian minority.

Every festival has its headliner, and in case of Bálványos it is Prime Minister Viktor Orbán. The Hungarian Prime Minister understood well the nature of summer gatherings and has capitalized on the opportunity to introduce truly controversial issues not only into the Hungarian political discussions but at an international level as well.

For the broader international public Bálványos hit the news in 2014, when Orbán spoke about the success of illiberal states and portrayed them as a positive example for Hungary.

Currently the most important issue on the Hungarian political agenda is the referendum on EU refugee resettlement quotas on the 2nd of October. The government invests a lot in setting the tone of the public discourse, by massively campaigning through the state-controlled public and government friendly private media channels.

In this context, it was absolutely not surprising that Orbán’s latest speech at Tusnád portrayed the European Union as the complete failure of the bureaucrats in Brussels and Berlin. According to Orbán: “We have to make it clear that our problem is not in Mecca, but in Brussels. The bureaucrats in Brussels are an obstacle for us, not Islam.” He stated again that there is a clear link between terrorism and the recent migration crisis. Moreover, he managed to surprise the audience by pledging support to Donald Trump. The anti-terrorism proposals of U.S. Republican presidential candidate makes him the better option for Europe and Hungary, he said.

What is truly behind Orbán’s support to Trump? We have asked Hungarian experts about the possible motivations.

Botond Feledy, Senior Fellow of CEID highlighted that the current endorsement of Trump fit well into the longer line of Orbán’s critical attitude towards the West. Just as much as with illiberal democracies, Orbán is keen on collecting allies in criticizing the liberal Western establishment. He has expressed several times his mistrust against Brussels. The fall of 2014 brought serious diplomatic tensions between the USA and Hungary. Orbán has also argued against the sanctions on Russia, recently renewed by the European Council. Though he has never been in the position to use a veto, the Hungarian government is one of the closest to Moscow in the region, despite the very narrow Hungarian leverage in bilateral Hungarian-Russian relations. Trump’s (so far oral) support for the authoritarian Russia and its leader, his permanent anti-Washington outbreaks and strong anti-immigration stance are all shared by the Hungarian Prime Minister.

The curious new twist in his recent Tusnád speech raises questions about his view on NATO. As Donald Trump just made his infamous remarks about not willing to go to war against Russia according to article V of the treaty, if the Baltic states’ sovereignty was violated, Orbán’s endorsement has arrived in a very sensitive moment among NATO members. Even more curiously, Hungary has been a good NATO ally so far, taking part in air patrolling in Baltic skies, being present in Afghanistan and even contributing a training mission to Iraq in the Coalition of the Willing. Should the Hungarian government embark on prolonged NATO criticism, together with Trump, it would put Budapest into a new and extremely dangerous position.

Daniel Bartha, Director of CEID added that although it was hard to predict any consistent US foreign policy based on the Trump campaign, the majority of Fidesz supporters showed little sympathy towards either of the US Presidential candidates. He believes that we could evaluate Orbán’s decision through two different points of view.

First, an important domestic policy element is to use Trump’s position on Islam fundamentalism, migration and international terrorism as a justification and support for the referendum on the resettlement quotas. The referendum intends to strengthen the support of Fidesz, even though there is a high risk that participation will remain under the threshold, and the vote will be invalid. So far the anti-migrant policy brought a major success that not only stopped the further decrease of support of the governing parties, but even changed the trends.

Second, the bilateral relations between the Obama-administration and the Orbán government have seriously worsened in the last two years. The increasing antagonism to liberal values linked the policies of democrats with George Soros and democracy promotion. Positions of Presidential candidate Hillary Clinton vis-a-vis Hungary were often voiced through Victoria Nuland, one of the most critical representatives, pinpointing to the „undemocratic” developments in Hungary. Clinton herself already criticized the first Orbán government’s policies on religious groups and media freedom during her 2011 visit in Budapest.  There is little hope, that the Orbán government could secure support from any potential member of the future Clinton administration.  By supporting Trump, Orbán can make a pre-emptive strike to counter future critical voices. In case of a Trump Presidency. Orbán hopes for an improved partnership for the early support, while in case of a Clinton Presidency he can respond to the possible critical voices, as they would be solely a political revenge.

Zoltán Fehér, a Boston-based foreign policy analyst underlined: it is an unusual step diplomatically, however, there is no surprise in Prime Minister Orbán’s endorsement of Donald Trump. The two politicians share a similar brand of populism-nativism, a strong anti-immigration stance and an alignment with Russian President Vladimir Putin. In the past year, both have placed immigration the highest on their political agendas, rallying their respective countries’ voters against “the current failed immigration policy”(of the US/EU, respectively) and the threat posed by illegal immigration (Orbán refers to the Syrian refugees as “illegal immigrants”).

In the context of the U.S. presidential elections, Prime Minister Orbán is playing a low-stake game right now. His relationship with the Obama administration and the Clinton camp has been strained in recent years and he has received significant criticism from those circles. He risks nothing vis-à-vis Clinton by endorsing Trump. On the other hand, he has much to gain if Trump is to get elected. He clearly hopes to achieve an improved relationship with the U.S. by endorsing the Republican nominee so early in the process.

Finally, it is important not to underestimate the domestic effects of such an endorsement. Orbán is known to play mostly to his domestic audience. Endorsing Trump would enable the Hungarian leadership to say that they are not alone in harshly opposing immigration – even the frontrunner in the American presidential race runs on a similar agenda. This, they are likely to hope, will strengthen their argumentation and possibly their support for the October 2 anti-immigration referendum in Hungary.

Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the publisher. © CEID, 2016

http://www.ceid.hu/why-trump-possible-reasons-why-the-hungarian-prime-minister-supports-the-republican-candidate/

Zord Gábornak van egy nagyon jó cikke a mai Magyar Nemzetben a térségben zajló amerikai hadgyakorlatokról. Nála jobban kevesen látják át az Európában, vagy csak szűkebb Közép-Kelet Európai régiónkban folyó légierős eseményeket, fejleményeket, fejlesztéseket.

Most is sok érdekeset ír, de ami miatt írok az ez a rész:
A szlovákiai Szliács légibázisán az indianai légi nemzeti gárda A–10 típusú csatarepülőgépei állomásoznak közel egy hónapon át, Pápán F–16-osok a coloradói gárdától. Amellett, hogy az adott ország légterében is repülnek, s a vendéglátók légi és földi erőivel is együttműködnek, átrepülnek a szomszédos országokba, ami az ilyen amerikai gyakorlatoknak új, eddig ritkán látott sajátossága. Mi több, közben szárazföldi erőik is jelen vannak, mint például a bakonyi lőtereken az 5–7. páncélos felderítő zászlóalj több tucatnyi Bradley lánctalpas járművel, melyeket a tavasztól őszig zajló térségi manőverek idejére az előretolt németországi raktárakból aktiváltak.

Miközben a vadászgépek jöttek-mentek – a tegnapi sajtónap keretében két A–10-es és egy szlovén PC–9-es ideiglenesen Pápára repült át, két F–16-os pedig Szliácsra –, addig a Zólyom és Besztercebánya közötti festői völgyben fekvő bázison megjelent egy szintén gárdista C–130-as szállítógép is, mely a zivataros idővel dacolva több körben szlovák ejtőernyősöket ugratott a közeli gyakorlótérre. A „pápai” F–16-osok a minap a szlovéniai előretolt NATO-légibázison, Cerklje ob Krkiben, és a poceki lőtéren is felbukkantak. 

A félkövérrel még ki is emeltem, mi az a mondat, ami érdekes, ami újdonság, és ami egyből kiszúrta Gábor szemét. Mi ennek az új fejleménynek az oka?

A 2014-es walesi NATO csúcson sok mindenről döntött a szövetség, hogy a katonai szervezet hatékonyabb, gyorsabban reagálni képes legyen. Ezeknek a döntéseknek a legtöbbje beért a varsói NATO csúcsra és sok visszhangot kapott (épp a napokban írtam erről). Van egy olyan eleme is - amennyire nekem sikerült ezt dekódolni - ami sajtónyilvánosságot szintén kapott, csak figyelmet nem, vagy keveset.

A hatékonyság, az egyes hadsereg közötti interoperabilitás javítása kapcsán világosság vált, hogy egyelőre az is gondot okoz, ha egy hadgyakorlat, de egy éles helyzetben el kell jutni az egyik országból a másikba. A levegőben ez természetes, napi gyakorlat, kidolgozott eljárása van, ott nem gond. De mi van akkor, ha egy gépesített zászlóaljnak el kell jutnia Németországból Észtországba vagy Romániába? Keréken vagy vasúton?

Millió láthatatlan probléma van ilyenkor, én sem látom őket, csak tippelek. Ki ad engedélyt a belépésre? Kell politikai jóváhagyás a kormánytól vagy a parlamenttől? A határőrség a rendőrséghez tartozik, ki engedi be a konvojt? Hol tankol egy Stryker lövészpáncélos Magyarországon áthaladva? Visznek a katonák magukkal útlevelet? Van rendszáma a Strykereknek? Megfelelnek a magyar KRESZ szabályainak és a nem tudom milyen hatóság elvárásainak (nem lehet akármilyen járművel csak úgy bejönni Magyarországra)? Ja és ezt mind angolul kell lepapírozni?

2014 óta legalább két ilyen gyakorlatra emlékszem, az egyiknek Dragon Ride volt a neve. Akkor az "üzenet" kb ez volt, amit a hírrel eladtak nekünk: "The road march was intended to demonstrate solidarity and support for Central and Eastern European NATO allies in response to Russia’s actions in Ukraine," Nekem sem esett le, amíg aztán egy cikkben nem olvastam a fenti célokról is.

A kulcs ugyanis a sebesség. Milyen gyorsan ér oda a NATO erő a keleti határra ha gond lenne. Annyi minden lassíthat egy beavatkozást: elsősorban a politikusok döntésképtelensége, időjárás, bürokratikus akadályok. Legalább az legyen megoldva, kidolgozva, amit lehet előre tervezni.

Pár hete olvastam a Foreign Affairsben lamentálni valakit egy military schengen zóna létrehozása kapcsán. Wow, mi ez? Rákerestem, és kiderült, hogy ez már 2015 novemberében elhangzott Ben Hodges tábornok, az U.S. Army Europe parancsnoka szájából.

Akkor vagy egy más alkalommal ezt mondta Hodges: “I was probably naïve,” admits Lieutenant General Ben Hodges, the commander of the U.S. Army in Europe. “I assumed that because these were NATO and EU countries we’d just be able to move troops. But ministries of defense are not responsible for borders.”

Itt értettem meg, hogy miről szólnak vagy szóltak még ezek a több ezer kilométeres felvonulások. A háttérben kénytelen voltak a résztvevő országok elvégezni a papírmunkát és most már mindenki okosabb, hogy mi történne, ha élesben kerülne sor egy ilyen menetre.

Visszatérve Gábor cikkéhez és amit ő ott kiszúrt. A megnövekedett, országokon átívelő gyakorlat szerintem ugyanebbe passzol bele. Mennyire élethű egy olyan NATO gyakorlat, ahol nem lehet átrepülni a szomszédos NATO ország légterébe a gyakorlat során? Mennyire modellez ez háborús szituációt, ahol a NATO döntött a közös védekezésről, és a támadó fél (oroszok) behatoltak az egyik országba?

Innentől a dolog már szubjektív. Szerintem a NATO és az amerikaiak csak azt gyakorolják, ami a hiteles, valósághű elrettentéshez kell. Régen azért bírálták a NATO-t, mert csak a terepasztal felett tartottak vezetési gyakorlatot, gyufásdobozokat tologatva. Ma azért mert élethűen akarják csinálni?

Szubjektív az is, hogy ezt Oroszország fenyegetésének tartjuk vagy sem. Az oroszok nyilván annak tartják, mert az ellenség védelmi képességeinek az erősítése is őket gyengíti.

De hogy egy ilyen gyakorlati oroszellenes lenne-e ettől, na ez az amiben Gáborral nem szoktunk egyetérteni :)

Frissítés: Tegnap beszélgettünk Gáborral, erről a posztról is, és mondta, hogy ezt a katonai Schengen-t megírta ő is anno. Most rákerestem, és lám itt is van: Ami Magyarországot illeti, míg eredetileg az áthaladás engedélyezése, szervezése a szövetségi átlagnál pár nappal több időt vett igénybe, mára már megfelel az új elvárásoknak.

Publicités Classé dans:Terrorisme, Uncategorized

2016. július 22-én a Hír TV "Magyarország élőben" című műsorában beszélgettem Szöllősi Györgyivel a török puccskísérletről és az azt követő tisztogatásokról, valamint az amerikai Republikánus Párt konvenciójáról és Trump elnökjelöltté választásáról.

http://hirtv.hu/videok/159287

 

2016. július 22-én a Hír TV "Magyarország élőben" című műsorában beszélgettem Szöllősi Györgyivel a török puccskísérletről és az azt követő tisztogatásokról, valamint az amerikai Republikánus Párt konvenciójáról és Trump elnökjelöltté választásáról.

http://hirtv.hu/videok/159287

 

A varsói NATO csúcs más lassan egy hónapja volt, úgyhogy most igazából itt az esemény kapcsán született írásaimat foglalom össze, + még ami megjelent magyarul.

A 24.hu-nak írtam egy cikket a csúcs előtt, a magyar csomag részleteiről. Mivel vettük ki a részünk a közös erőfeszítésekből. Mit viszünk Varsóba? A NATO-csúcs és Magyarország.

Néhány részlet:
Azt nem lehet elégszer hangsúlyozni, hogy a NATO-ban konszenzussal születik minden döntés, ezért a szervezet nem tud a tagokra „kényszeríteni” semmit. A döntések Magyarország döntései is, amiket a kormány úgy vállalt, hogy felmérte előtte, hogy képes lesz-e betartani. A „játék”, a diplomácia szerepe inkább ott ütközött ki, és ez volt fontos Magyarországnak, hogy a NATO döntései magyar szempontból kiegyensúlyozottak legyenek a keleti és déli szárny erőfeszítései között. Az ország sajátos földrajzi helyzete miatt egyszerre tartjuk fontosnak a menekült és migrációs hullám kezelésében való szerepvállalást, és a balti, de különösen a lengyel barátságra való tekintettel a keleti szárnyon való aktív szerepvállalást.

Ezeknek megfelelően 2014 és 2016 között a Magyar Honvédség élete igencsak leterhelt és mozgalmas volt. Szemben a korábbi évekkel, egymást érték a nemzetközi hadgyakorlatok, amelyre kiutaztak a katonák, és rendszeresek volt a Magyarországon tartott hadgyakorlatok, amelyek általában amerikai, esetleg cseh, lengyel és szlovák katonákkal közösen kerültek végrehajtásra. A magyar gyakorlóterekre látogató modern amerikai repülőgépek és harcjárművek, vagy a lengyel és baltikumi bázisokon megjelenő katonák ugyanazokat a célokat szolgálták: katonai szinten javítani annak képességét, hogy – leegyszerűsítve – idegen katonák megismerjék egymást és ugyanazt értsék a parancsnokon. Politikai szinten pedig a szolidaritás kimutatását. Ez itthonról lényegtelennek látszik, de az észt, litván vagy lengyel partnerek számára nem az.

A honvédség aktív szerepet vállal az ún. előretolt vezetésirányítási törzselemek működésében (NFIU). Ezeket a NATO keleti tagállamaiban hozzák létre (Magyarországon is lesz egy 2017-től) azzal a feladattal, hogy támogassák, koordinálják az adott ország haderejét, ha a NATO szövetségeseik megjelennének az országban (ez igazi logisztikai kihívást jelent mindig, megnövekedett, légi, vasúti gépjárműforgalommal). Mivel a 40 fős NFIU-k fele részben nem nemzetközi stábbal dolgoznak, ezért Magyarország is küld tiszteket Lengyelországba és a Baltikumba.

Ezt a cikket a csúcs után írtam, az eredényekről: Elrettentés és párbeszéd: eredmények a varsói NATO-csúcs után
Mint a cím is mutatja, azt próbáltam hangsúlyozni, hogy a bár a média narratívája az orosz fenyegetésről szólt, azért itt másról és többről volt szó. A NATO és a tagállamok is látják, hogy nem lehet és nem kell csak eszkalálni és a párbeszéd lehetőségét továbbra is nyitvatartották. Néhány részlet:
A végére marad a legnehezebb falat, az orosz fenyegetés kezelése. Az állami vezetők jóváhagytak egy új rotációs erők telepítését (rotációs, mert nem állandó jelleggel vannak ott, hanem hat-kilenc havonta cserélődnek) a három balti államba és Lengyelországba. Ezek az egyenként kb. 1000 fős erők mindegyike többnemzeti lesz, a Litvániába települő egységben például német, francia, portugál, norvég, belga, holland és luxemburgi katonák. Ezt a lépést, hogy NATO tagországok majdnem állandó jelleggel telepítenek erőket egy másik NATO országba, nevezhetjük forradalminak is, hiszem a hidegháború óta nem volt rá példa. Megállítani nem tudnának egy orosz támadást, de fontos szolidaritást mutatnak.

Ilyen előzmények után gyűltek össze a tagországok (és a külön meghívott partnerországok) állam- és kormányfői a lengyel fővárosban. A napirend feszített volt, egyik találkozó váltotta a másikat, amelyek így más ránézésre is kijelölték a prioritásokat. Külön találkozót kapott Afganisztán, Grúzia és Ukrajna, ezek azok az országok ahol a NATO-nak stratégiai érdekei vannak. A szövetség folytatja Afganisztán támogatását a kiképző misszióval és a biztonsági erők pénzügyi támogatásával, illetve nem csökkenti az erőit (ez tervbe volt véve). Grúziával erősítik az együttműködést de nincs szó a tagsági folyamat felgyorsításáról (gesztus Oroszországnak?), Ukrajna kapcsán a tagság semmilyen formában nem került szóba, de a NATO támogatja Kijevet a biztonsági szektor reformjában és a háborús állapotok kezelésében.

Mivel a NATO-nak a három baltikumi ország is tagja, a térképre ránézve bárki számára világossá válhat, hogy ezeknek az országoknak a megvédése igencsak problémás. Korábban nagy port vert fel egy amerikai elemzés, amely kimutatta, hogy a térség egy orosz támadásnak kb. 72 óráig tudna ellenállni. Ha összerakjuk ezt a két tényt, világosság válik, hogy a NATO lépéskényszerben volt (és van): olyan NATO erőkre van szükség, amelyeket gyorsan lehet mobilizálni és telepíteni. Így jött létre a magyarul kicsit sután hangzó Nagyon Magas Készültségű Műveleti Erő, egy kb. 5000 fős csoportosítás, amelynek egy része 48 órán belül mozgósítható. Ez a csoportosítás a korábban is létező, most mintegy 40 ezer fősre felemelt NATO Készenléti Erőknek a részét fogja képezni. Bár nagyon komolyan hangzik, egy ilyen katonai egység létezése valójában a 28 NATO tagállam által felajánlott, 28 országban szétszórtan elhelyezkedő kisebb nagyobb katonai egységek összességéről van szó.

A készenlétben levő erők mellett – Lengyelország és balti államok sürgetésére – valamiféle katonai jelenlétre is szükség volt a Baltikumban. Ebben nagy vita volt, mert sok tagország azt gondolta, hogy ez fölöslegesen idegesítheti Oroszországot, miközben valódi védelmi képességet nem tud adni. A négy országnak azonban fontos volt a megerősítés, az elrettentés terén, hogy legyen valamilyen NATO jelenlét az országukban.

Ezek mellett írtam az Élet és Irodalomba is egy cikket, amely fizetős így nem linkelem be.

Ezek mellett a Külügyi és Külgazdasági Intézetben kollégákkal írtunk egy részletesebb elemzés a NATO csúcs előtt. Az volt a könnyű, hogy sok újdonság nem volt a csúcson, mert előtte már szinte minden bejelentettek. Úton Varsóba - Amerikai és NATO-erőfeszítések a közös biztonság érdekében.

Mellettünk még az SVKI is kijött egy nagyon jó anyaggal. Egy csomó olyan részletkérdéssel foglalkoztam, amivel nekem, nekünk nem volt lehetőségünk helyhiány miatt. Etl Alex az USA erőfeszítéseit szedte össze ebben: With the Image of Deterrence: Operation Atlantic Resolve

Tálas Péter pedig a NATO csúcs záródokumentumát foglalta össze magyarul (még soha ilyen hosszú és részletes nem volt a záródokumentum): A varsói NATO-csúcs legfontosabb döntéseiről

Mellettük még Szenes Zoltán írt a csúcs előtt egy kisebb előretekintést, ő szintén más dolgokat emelt ki, mint mi: A varsói NATO csúcs elé

Szemben az elmúlt évek gyakorlatával, a következő NATO csúcs jövőre, egy év múlva lesz. Ismét lesz majd munka :) A NATO most beállt egy új fordulatsebességre, jövőre finomhangolják majd. A hadgyakorlatok most már megnövelt számmal pörögnek, szerdán talán látni is fogok egyet.

Néhány pontban szeretném összefoglalni, amit érdemes tudni az amerikai Republikánus Párt konvenciójáról és Trump elnökjelöltté választásáról, amelyek uralták az amerikai közéletet az elmúlt hét folyamán.

1. Az eddigi konvenciókhoz képest újdonság, hogy a Republikánus Párt nagyágyúi távolmaradtak az eseménytől, ezért Trump helyettük saját családtagjait sorakoztatta fel maga mellett, akik így fontos szerepet játszottak a Konvención.
   
   
2. Felesége, Melania Trump ugyan plágium-botrányba keveredett, mivel hamar kiderült, hogy beszéde nagy részét Michelle Obamának férje mellett 2008-ban elmondott beszédéből emelték át. Érdemes megnézni Melania Trump és Michelle Obama beszédeinek összehasonlítását, ez alapján nem kétséges a plágium:
   http://edition.cnn.com/2016/07/19/politics/melania-trump-michelle-obama-speech/index.html
   
   Egy kiváló paródia Stephen Colbert-től ugyanerről:
   

2. Sikeresebben szerepelt azonban Trumpék lánya, Ivanka, akinek a nők egyenjogúságát középpontba állító kortesbeszéde a fiatal nőt azonnal sztárrá emelte a tömegkommunikációban:
   http://edition.cnn.com/2016/07/21/politics/ivanka-trump-republican-convention-speech/index.html
   

3. Trump nagy riválisának, Ted Cruz texasi szenátornak a beszéde is komoly figyelmet keltett: mivel nem biztosította támogatásáról Trumpot, az utóbbi hívei kifütyülték. Több elemző szerint a konvención való hűvös fogadtatással Cruz 2020-as indulásának esélyei elszálltak.
   How Poker Theory Explains Ted Cruz's Convention Speech
   

4. Újdonság volt a konvención az amerikai meleg és leszbikus közösség megszólítása is. A felvezető szónokok között megszólalt Peter Thiel milliárdos üzletember, aki elmondta: büszke arra, hogy meleg és arra is, hogy republikánus. Donald Trump pedig megismételte az orlandói terrortámadást követően tett kijelentését: meg fogja védeni az amerikai meleg közösséget ettől az idegen ideológia által inspirált erőszaktól.
   'I Am Proud To Be Gay,' Tech Investor Peter Thiel Tells GOP Convention
   
   
5. Trump az elnökjelölést elfogadó beszédében, amely rekord hosszúságú, 75 perces volt, rendkívül sötét tónusokkal festette le Amerika jelenlegi gazdasági és biztonsági helyzetét, s mindezért Obama elnököt és riválisát, Hillary Clinton demokrata elnökaspiránst okolta.
   
   A beszéd hemzsegett a féligazságoktól vagy hamis állításoktól, az NPR ízekre is szedte azt:
   Fact Checking Donald Trump's Speech To The Republican Convention
   
   
6. A konvenció tehát a várakozásoknak megfelelően sok botránnyal és meglehetősen kaotikusan zajlott le, de végül Trump egyértelmű jelöltté választásával végződött.
   http://edition.cnn.com/2016/07/22/politics/republican-convention-takeaways/

Néhány pontban szeretném összefoglalni, amit érdemes tudni az amerikai Republikánus Párt konvenciójáról és Trump elnökjelöltté választásáról, amelyek uralták az amerikai közéletet az elmúlt hét folyamán.

1. Az eddigi konvenciókhoz képest újdonság, hogy a Republikánus Párt nagyágyúi távolmaradtak az eseménytől, ezért Trump helyettük saját családtagjait sorakoztatta fel maga mellett, akik így fontos szerepet játszottak a Konvención.
   
   
2. Felesége, Melania Trump ugyan plágium-botrányba keveredett, mivel hamar kiderült, hogy beszéde nagy részét Michelle Obamának férje mellett 2008-ban elmondott beszédéből emelték át. Érdemes megnézni Melania Trump és Michelle Obama beszédeinek összehasonlítását, ez alapján nem kétséges a plágium:
   http://edition.cnn.com/2016/07/19/politics/melania-trump-michelle-obama-speech/index.html
   
   Egy kiváló paródia Stephen Colbert-től ugyanerről:
   

2. Sikeresebben szerepelt azonban Trumpék lánya, Ivanka, akinek a nők egyenjogúságát középpontba állító kortesbeszéde a fiatal nőt azonnal sztárrá emelte a tömegkommunikációban:
   http://edition.cnn.com/2016/07/21/politics/ivanka-trump-republican-convention-speech/index.html
   

3. Trump nagy riválisának, Ted Cruz texasi szenátornak a beszéde is komoly figyelmet keltett: mivel nem biztosította támogatásáról Trumpot, az utóbbi hívei kifütyülték. Több elemző szerint a konvención való hűvös fogadtatással Cruz 2020-as indulásának esélyei elszálltak.
   How Poker Theory Explains Ted Cruz's Convention Speech
   

4. Újdonság volt a konvención az amerikai meleg és leszbikus közösség megszólítása is. A felvezető szónokok között megszólalt Peter Thiel milliárdos üzletember, aki elmondta: büszke arra, hogy meleg és arra is, hogy republikánus. Donald Trump pedig megismételte az orlandói terrortámadást követően tett kijelentését: meg fogja védeni az amerikai meleg közösséget ettől az idegen ideológia által inspirált erőszaktól.
   'I Am Proud To Be Gay,' Tech Investor Peter Thiel Tells GOP Convention
   
   
5. Trump az elnökjelölést elfogadó beszédében, amely rekord hosszúságú, 75 perces volt, rendkívül sötét tónusokkal festette le Amerika jelenlegi gazdasági és biztonsági helyzetét, s mindezért Obama elnököt és riválisát, Hillary Clinton demokrata elnökaspiránst okolta.
   
   A beszéd hemzsegett a féligazságoktól vagy hamis állításoktól, az NPR ízekre is szedte azt:
   Fact Checking Donald Trump's Speech To The Republican Convention
   
   
6. A konvenció tehát a várakozásoknak megfelelően sok botránnyal és meglehetősen kaotikusan zajlott le, de végül Trump egyértelmű jelöltté választásával végződött.
   http://edition.cnn.com/2016/07/22/politics/republican-convention-takeaways/

2016. július 21-én az ATV "Start" című reggeli műsorában beszélgettem Mészáros Antóniával a puccskísérletről és annak a török-amerikai kapcsolatokra gyakorolt hatásairól.

http://www.atv.hu/videok/video-20160721-oriasi-tisztogatasok-torokorszagban