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African Athletes Should Be Free to Be Themselves

Africa - INTER PRESS SERVICE - Fri, 10/30/2026 - 16:34

The legendary lesbian South African runner Caster Semenya successfully contested regulations aimed at policing women’s bodies by World Athletics, ultimately winning her case at the European Court of Human Rights in 2025. Credit: Shutterstock

By External Source
DAKAR, Oct 30 2026 (IPS)

Senegal is welcoming athletes and visitors from across the globe as part of the 4th Summer Youth Olympic Games, the first-ever Olympics in Africa. Lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) African athletes, including from Senegal, have repeatedly participated in and won competitions–while advocating their rights to compete and speaking out against discrimination.

In 2024, Cindy Ngamba, an openly lesbian boxer born in Cameroon, made history at the Paris 2024 Olympics by winning the first medal for the Refugee Olympic Team.

The legendary lesbian South African runner Caster Semenya successfully contested regulations aimed at policing women’s bodies by World Athletics, ultimately winning her case at the European Court of Human Rights in 2025. Along the way, she won a total of six medals across the Olympics and World Athletics Championships and debunked arbitrary definitions of femininity and racial stereotypes faced by African athletes.

In 2020, Phuti Lekoloane founded the African Pride Games, creating a safe platform for competition regardless of one’s identity and demonstrating that sport “can drive equality, inclusion, and unity.” After coming out publicly in July 2015, he was one of Africa’s first openly gay male footballers.

The climate of hatred and persecution created by the new law puts LGBT people, including athletes, staff, and fans at the Dakar Youth Olympics, at risk of human rights abuses

Senegal’s hosting of the Youth Olympics, however, shows the need to keep fighting for the rights of LGBT people in Africa.

In March 2026, Senegal’s parliament amended its penal code, doubling to 10 years the maximum prison term for consensual same-sex conduct and criminalizing “promotion” of, or support to, LGBT people and organizations. Between February and July, hundreds of people were arrested in connection with the amendment of the penal code, according to the African Forum for the Defense of Human Rights (Rencontre Africaine pour la Défense des Droits de l’Homme, or RADDHO. Senegalese government officials have frequently used incendiary rhetoric against LGBT people.

The climate of hatred and persecution created by the new law puts LGBT people, including athletes, staff, and fans at the Dakar Youth Olympics, at risk of human rights abuses.

Senegal’s then Prime Minister Ousmane Sonko said in April 2026 that, “any athlete coming solely to practice their sport is welcome and can freely pursue their activity. However, if someone comes for reasons other than sport, the [anti-LGBT] law of the country will apply to them, as it applies to everyone.”

The Senegalese government’s hostility to LGBT rights runs contrary to the Olympic Charter, which prohibits discrimination of any kind, including based on sexual orientation. Olympic hosts are required by their contract with the International Olympic Committee (IOC) to prevent, investigate, and remedy human rights abuses related to the Games, including by engaging with affected groups.

Senegalese authorities, through the Youth Olympic Games Organising Committee, have rolled out measures to promote human rights protections, which they described as a key indicator for the success of the competition. But these protections have so far excluded the rights of LGBT people.

Several athletes have already pushed back against Senegal’s draconian law. Jérémy Clamy-Edroux, an openly gay, former professional rugby player, and Brahim Naït-Balk, an openly gay football coach, were among 29 African leaders who signed a May 2026 letter calling for the Senegalese government to open renewed dialogue on the law.

In their letter, they raised concerns about abuses faced by LGBT people and asserted that Pan-Africanism, previously embraced by Senegal’s President Bassirou Diomaye Faye himself, should advance liberation for all Africans, regardless of their sexual orientation or gender identity.

The Dakar Youth Olympics ends November 13. Before then, Senegal’s government should repeal its anti-LGBT laws and free anyone still detained under the prior amendments. Senegal should use the Youth Olympics to protect LGBT people and fully embrace Olympic values.

Vincent Sima Olé is a senior program and sport and human rights coordinator and Larissa Kojoué is an LGBT rights researcher, both at Human Rights Watch.

Categories: Africa, Union européenne

Governing Just Transitions through policy coherence: challenges and opportunities on the path towards climate-neutral, sustainable futures

Just Transitions have emerged as a central pillar of global climate policy, particularly following their formal inclusion in the Paris Agreement in 2015. Their rapid adoption at both national and international levels is notable given persistent shortcomings in global climate and sustainable development governance. However, Just Transition initiatives remain fragmented, conceptually contested, and predominantly focused on energy, and their governance has received comparatively little academic attention. At the same time, policy coherence, a governance principle concerned with maximising synergies and minimising trade-offs and extensively studied in the context of the 2030 Agenda, is widely invoked in policy discourse as essential for Just Transitions, yet its role in Just Transition governance has received little systematic attention in the literature. This dissertation therefore asks: to what extent can policy coherence enable the governance of Just Transitions, and under which conditions? Just Transitions here are understood as transitions that advance climate-neutral, sustainable futures in ways that are substantively just, with substantive justice defined as the expansion of opportunity freedoms, the reduction of inequalities across all dimensions, and the fulfilment of the 2030 Agenda’s promise to ‘leave no one behind.’ Part I (Chapters 2–3) examines the relationships between policy coherence, Just Transition, goal attainment, and inequality reduction. Drawing on survey data from 131 COP28 delegates (Chapter 2) and empirical analysis of 40 sustainable development policy processes across multiple countries (Chapter 3), the findings indicate that policy coherence is widely perceived as integral to Just Transitions and is strongly associated with multidimensional, cross-sectoral approaches that extend beyond energy. Empirical analysis further shows that higher coherence is linked to greater policy effectiveness in achieving multiple objectives. However, coherence alone does not reliably reduce inequalities and, in some cases, can exacerbate them. Part II (Chapters 4–6) examines the temporal, discursive, and political conditions under which policy coherence can enable the governance of Just Transitions. Drawing on policy document analysis and semi-structured interviews, these conditions are analysed through an in-depth case study of Germany’s energy transition, the Energiewende, a high-stakes transition context. Findings demonstrate that governing Just Transitions through policy coherence requires balancing short-, medium-, and long-term objectives, as temporal dynamics alter policy interactions and reveal trade-offs and synergies that evolve over time (Chapter 4). Moreover, policy coherence is socially and discursively constructed, with actors’ perceptions and interpretations strongly shaping whether policies and their implementation are experienced as coherent or incoherent (Chapter 5). Political inequalities in decision-making around the German coal phase-out and onshore wind phase-in further constrain coherence and can lead to slower climate mitigation outcomes (Chapter 6). Together, the findings indicate that while policy coherence may appear to be a necessary principle for the governance of Just Transitions, it is not sufficient. While widely endorsed, its ability to enable the governance of Just Transitions is context-dependent and contingent on its implications for social justice. In addition, policy coherence should not be seen as a fixed end-state, but as a dynamic and imperfect governance principle that is deeply shaped by politics and discourse.

Governing Just Transitions through policy coherence: challenges and opportunities on the path towards climate-neutral, sustainable futures

Just Transitions have emerged as a central pillar of global climate policy, particularly following their formal inclusion in the Paris Agreement in 2015. Their rapid adoption at both national and international levels is notable given persistent shortcomings in global climate and sustainable development governance. However, Just Transition initiatives remain fragmented, conceptually contested, and predominantly focused on energy, and their governance has received comparatively little academic attention. At the same time, policy coherence, a governance principle concerned with maximising synergies and minimising trade-offs and extensively studied in the context of the 2030 Agenda, is widely invoked in policy discourse as essential for Just Transitions, yet its role in Just Transition governance has received little systematic attention in the literature. This dissertation therefore asks: to what extent can policy coherence enable the governance of Just Transitions, and under which conditions? Just Transitions here are understood as transitions that advance climate-neutral, sustainable futures in ways that are substantively just, with substantive justice defined as the expansion of opportunity freedoms, the reduction of inequalities across all dimensions, and the fulfilment of the 2030 Agenda’s promise to ‘leave no one behind.’ Part I (Chapters 2–3) examines the relationships between policy coherence, Just Transition, goal attainment, and inequality reduction. Drawing on survey data from 131 COP28 delegates (Chapter 2) and empirical analysis of 40 sustainable development policy processes across multiple countries (Chapter 3), the findings indicate that policy coherence is widely perceived as integral to Just Transitions and is strongly associated with multidimensional, cross-sectoral approaches that extend beyond energy. Empirical analysis further shows that higher coherence is linked to greater policy effectiveness in achieving multiple objectives. However, coherence alone does not reliably reduce inequalities and, in some cases, can exacerbate them. Part II (Chapters 4–6) examines the temporal, discursive, and political conditions under which policy coherence can enable the governance of Just Transitions. Drawing on policy document analysis and semi-structured interviews, these conditions are analysed through an in-depth case study of Germany’s energy transition, the Energiewende, a high-stakes transition context. Findings demonstrate that governing Just Transitions through policy coherence requires balancing short-, medium-, and long-term objectives, as temporal dynamics alter policy interactions and reveal trade-offs and synergies that evolve over time (Chapter 4). Moreover, policy coherence is socially and discursively constructed, with actors’ perceptions and interpretations strongly shaping whether policies and their implementation are experienced as coherent or incoherent (Chapter 5). Political inequalities in decision-making around the German coal phase-out and onshore wind phase-in further constrain coherence and can lead to slower climate mitigation outcomes (Chapter 6). Together, the findings indicate that while policy coherence may appear to be a necessary principle for the governance of Just Transitions, it is not sufficient. While widely endorsed, its ability to enable the governance of Just Transitions is context-dependent and contingent on its implications for social justice. In addition, policy coherence should not be seen as a fixed end-state, but as a dynamic and imperfect governance principle that is deeply shaped by politics and discourse.

Governing Just Transitions through policy coherence: challenges and opportunities on the path towards climate-neutral, sustainable futures

Just Transitions have emerged as a central pillar of global climate policy, particularly following their formal inclusion in the Paris Agreement in 2015. Their rapid adoption at both national and international levels is notable given persistent shortcomings in global climate and sustainable development governance. However, Just Transition initiatives remain fragmented, conceptually contested, and predominantly focused on energy, and their governance has received comparatively little academic attention. At the same time, policy coherence, a governance principle concerned with maximising synergies and minimising trade-offs and extensively studied in the context of the 2030 Agenda, is widely invoked in policy discourse as essential for Just Transitions, yet its role in Just Transition governance has received little systematic attention in the literature. This dissertation therefore asks: to what extent can policy coherence enable the governance of Just Transitions, and under which conditions? Just Transitions here are understood as transitions that advance climate-neutral, sustainable futures in ways that are substantively just, with substantive justice defined as the expansion of opportunity freedoms, the reduction of inequalities across all dimensions, and the fulfilment of the 2030 Agenda’s promise to ‘leave no one behind.’ Part I (Chapters 2–3) examines the relationships between policy coherence, Just Transition, goal attainment, and inequality reduction. Drawing on survey data from 131 COP28 delegates (Chapter 2) and empirical analysis of 40 sustainable development policy processes across multiple countries (Chapter 3), the findings indicate that policy coherence is widely perceived as integral to Just Transitions and is strongly associated with multidimensional, cross-sectoral approaches that extend beyond energy. Empirical analysis further shows that higher coherence is linked to greater policy effectiveness in achieving multiple objectives. However, coherence alone does not reliably reduce inequalities and, in some cases, can exacerbate them. Part II (Chapters 4–6) examines the temporal, discursive, and political conditions under which policy coherence can enable the governance of Just Transitions. Drawing on policy document analysis and semi-structured interviews, these conditions are analysed through an in-depth case study of Germany’s energy transition, the Energiewende, a high-stakes transition context. Findings demonstrate that governing Just Transitions through policy coherence requires balancing short-, medium-, and long-term objectives, as temporal dynamics alter policy interactions and reveal trade-offs and synergies that evolve over time (Chapter 4). Moreover, policy coherence is socially and discursively constructed, with actors’ perceptions and interpretations strongly shaping whether policies and their implementation are experienced as coherent or incoherent (Chapter 5). Political inequalities in decision-making around the German coal phase-out and onshore wind phase-in further constrain coherence and can lead to slower climate mitigation outcomes (Chapter 6). Together, the findings indicate that while policy coherence may appear to be a necessary principle for the governance of Just Transitions, it is not sufficient. While widely endorsed, its ability to enable the governance of Just Transitions is context-dependent and contingent on its implications for social justice. In addition, policy coherence should not be seen as a fixed end-state, but as a dynamic and imperfect governance principle that is deeply shaped by politics and discourse.

Refugee athlete to make history for second time at Youth Olympics

BBC Africa - Fri, 10/30/2026 - 14:11
Yiech Pur Biel leads the first ever refugee team to take part at the Youth Olympics.
Categories: Africa, Central Europe

New Biodiversity Pledges Emerge at COP17, But Funding Gap Persists

Africa - INTER PRESS SERVICE - Fri, 10/30/2026 - 14:08

Diego Mesa, GEF CEO and chairperson, addresses media on the status of finance mobilisation at COP17. Credit: Stella Paul/IPS

By Stella Paul
YEREVAN, Armenia, Oct 30 2026 (IPS)

The second week of COP17 was dominated by discussions on biodiversity finance, with new pledges announced and donor outreach intensifying. Yet as the summit approached its close, the financing gap for implementing the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework (KMGBF) remains largely unchanged.

Prior to COP17, the first global review of progress toward the KMGBF, often called the global biodiversity review, painted an alarming picture: the commitment to mobilise USD 200 billion annually for biodiversity was still far from being achieved. The conference therefore opened amid growing pressure on governments over missed targets, corporate responsibility and Indigenous rights.

Against that backdrop, finance has become one of the most closely watched issues in the negotiations.

“We started the replenishment cycle number 9, for 2026 to 2030, and the initial contributions were announced in June in the General Assembly of the Global Environmental Facility (GEF) in Uzbekistan’s Samarkand. And those initial contributions came at USD 3.9 billion for the next four years,” said Diego Mesa, the recently appointed CEO and Chairperson of the Global Environment Facility, at a press conference.

New and Emerging Donors, Including Cities

Since the adoption of the KMGBF, a notable financing trend has emerged: cities and provinces have begun contributing directly to biodiversity finance mechanisms.

The trend started two years ago when Quebec, the Canadian province that hosted COP15 in 2022, independently donated USD 1.4 million to the GBFF.

At COP17, the trend continued. On Oct 26 – observed as Finance Day, the City of Berlin pledged EUR 50,000 (USD 56,000) to the GBFF, while Quebec announced a second contribution of CAD 1.5 million.

Collectively, national and sub-national governments pledged more than USD 60 million to the GBFF. According to GEF sources, this included contributions from Germany (EUR 50 million), Iceland (ISK 160 million) and Monaco (EUR 1.5 million).

While the expanding donor base is an encouraging sign, the world still needs an estimated USD 200 billion annually by 2030 to halt and reverse biodiversity loss under Target 19. The current pace of finance mobilisation, therefore, remains far slower than what is required.

Mesa acknowledged these concerns about the biodiversity finance gap but argued that GEF funding has a catalytic effect, attracting additional public and private investment. He noted that each dollar committed through the facility typically mobilises several more dollars from other sources, and many donor countries also provide biodiversity finance through bilateral programs outside the GEF system.

“We obviously, you know, are concerned. We’ve read the (global) review report. But what we also need to highlight is that, in addition to the funds that come through the GEF, we have to take into account what I mentioned about being able to mobilise additional funds, whether it’s, you know, a multiplier of 8 or 8.2, on average, if we take GEF 8 as a baseline or blended finance, which is about 18.5,” he said.

Astrid Schomaker, Executive Secretary of the Convention on Biological Diversity, stressed that progress remains insufficient despite some gains.

“We all know that a lot of commitments were made four years ago in Montreal (including) mobilising at least USD 200 billion a year for biodiversity from 2030, from all sources. Reduce harmful incentives by at least USD 500 billion a year and align public and private financial flows with a framework. We have seen biodiversity finance increase quite substantially, but also from very, very low levels. Some figures suggest that we would have achieved USD 19 billion in 2024. That would be close to the 2025 milestone of 20 billion. But we also know that aid budgets are a lot under pressure, so that progress is not yet secure, to say the least,” Schomaker said in an address to the delegates on the Finance Day.

“From the side of the Secretariat, we would point to three questions or priorities that we hope you can discuss at this COP and move forward on. First, bring national biodiversity strategies and action plans into national budgets. Second, reform harmful incentives. And third, make public and development finance go further,” Schomaker said.

New Coalition Targets Harmful Subsidies

While much of the discussion centred on mobilising new biodiversity finance, negotiators also stressed the need to curb environmentally harmful spending. In that context, momentum grew around efforts to reform harmful subsidies with the launch of a new coalition of countries committed to Target 18.

Known as the “Friends of Target 18”, the coalition focuses on the KMGBF target to reduce harmful incentives by at least USD 500 billion per year while scaling up positive incentives for biodiversity.

Led by Colombia and Finland, and supported by the CBD, the coalition also has backing from the International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD), the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the United Nations Development Programme’s Biodiversity Finance Initiative (UNDP BIOFIN).

“Our work here in Yerevan can influence how natural resources are used, how goods are produced and consumed, and where public and private financial resources are directed,” said Hambardzum Matevosyan, Minister of Environment of the Republic of Armenia and COP17 President.

So far, only five countries have joined the initiative. However, Marina Von Weissenberg, Senior Ministerial Adviser of Finland and co-chair of the Friends of Target 18, expressed confidence that more countries would follow.

“We don’t need to spend more to close the biodiversity funding gap, we need to spend better. Governments have a real opportunity here to reshape public spending with future generations in mind, but they can’t do it alone. International coordination is key to giving governments the confidence to lead change,” she said.

Meanwhile, GEF continues to focus not only on raising new money but also on broadening the donor base.

“This is exactly what we were doing with this pledging session, with the USD 5 million going to the GEF Trust Fund, and with the 60 million going into the GBFF. But also expanding the donor base. And that’s why we were very pleased to announce that we have a total of nine new contributors to the GEF family of funds,” Mesa said to IPS.

GEF Keeps Pledging Window Open

In an effort to attract additional support, GEF has made a significant change to its replenishment process.

Traditionally, pledging windows close when a replenishment cycle ends. Under that system, pledges for the ninth replenishment cycle would have closed earlier in June, when GEF held its Assembly in Samarkand.

This year, however, the window remains open, allowing countries to make contributions throughout the year.

“This is the first time that we kept the window open for pledging. And this is to respond to requests to be more flexible from the donor side. So, we will have, hopefully, one additional pledging session in the UNFCCC COP (COP31) next month,” Mesa told IPS.

“But we also expect additional contributions to take place in the next calendar year. So, the window will remain open,” he added.

IPS UN Bureau Report

 

 

 

 

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Excerpt:

This first part of a two-part series on biodiversity finance at CBD COP17 examines the status of finance mobilisation and new funding commitments.
Categories: Africa, Union européenne

Agenda - The Week Ahead 02 – 08 November 2026

European Parliament - Fri, 10/30/2026 - 12:03
Committee and political group meetings

Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP
Categories: Afrique, European Union

Les États-Unis condamnent un Rwandais qui a dissimulé son rôle dans un génocide pendant des décennies

BBC Afrique - Fri, 10/30/2026 - 10:40
Eric Nshimiye a été accusé d'avoir menti devant un jury pour se protéger lui-même et un autre auteur du génocide.
Categories: Afrique, Swiss News

Lula’s remontada: relief for the Amazon, no respite for Brazil

Following Lula da Silva’s remarkable electoral ‘remontada’, Brazil’s forests may sigh with relief. Lula’s re-election, with 51.8% of votes in the second ballot of Brazil’s presidential elections, averts a second Bolsonaro presidency that seemed to be looming after the first round of elections in early October. It would have threatened to dismantle environmental safeguards, weaken Indigenous territorial rights and accelerate the exploitation of the Amazon. Moreover, Flávio Bolsonaro’s alignment with Donald Trump offered little prospect for a continuation of Brazil’s international leadership for ambitious climate action. The threat was concrete, grounded in both the Bolsonaro family’s track record and Flávio’s personal campaign promises. Yet Brazil’s election was hardly a referendum on forests or climate policy. While forest protection attracts international attention, living costs, corruption and security dominate domestic concerns.

Lula’s remontada: relief for the Amazon, no respite for Brazil

Following Lula da Silva’s remarkable electoral ‘remontada’, Brazil’s forests may sigh with relief. Lula’s re-election, with 51.8% of votes in the second ballot of Brazil’s presidential elections, averts a second Bolsonaro presidency that seemed to be looming after the first round of elections in early October. It would have threatened to dismantle environmental safeguards, weaken Indigenous territorial rights and accelerate the exploitation of the Amazon. Moreover, Flávio Bolsonaro’s alignment with Donald Trump offered little prospect for a continuation of Brazil’s international leadership for ambitious climate action. The threat was concrete, grounded in both the Bolsonaro family’s track record and Flávio’s personal campaign promises. Yet Brazil’s election was hardly a referendum on forests or climate policy. While forest protection attracts international attention, living costs, corruption and security dominate domestic concerns.

Lula’s remontada: relief for the Amazon, no respite for Brazil

Following Lula da Silva’s remarkable electoral ‘remontada’, Brazil’s forests may sigh with relief. Lula’s re-election, with 51.8% of votes in the second ballot of Brazil’s presidential elections, averts a second Bolsonaro presidency that seemed to be looming after the first round of elections in early October. It would have threatened to dismantle environmental safeguards, weaken Indigenous territorial rights and accelerate the exploitation of the Amazon. Moreover, Flávio Bolsonaro’s alignment with Donald Trump offered little prospect for a continuation of Brazil’s international leadership for ambitious climate action. The threat was concrete, grounded in both the Bolsonaro family’s track record and Flávio’s personal campaign promises. Yet Brazil’s election was hardly a referendum on forests or climate policy. While forest protection attracts international attention, living costs, corruption and security dominate domestic concerns.

Planstädte sind nicht die Lösung für die rasante Urbanisierung

Planstadtprojekte werden den Ansprüchen nachhaltiger Stadtentwicklung häufig nicht gerecht, können allerdings einflussreichen Schatteninteressen dienen.

Bonn, 30. Oktober 2026. Die „Urban October“-Initiative von UN-Habitat steht in diesem Jahr unter dem Motto „Angemessener Wohnraum für alle“ und endet am Weltstädtetag (31. Oktober). Um den dringenden Bedarf an Wohnraum zu decken, erscheint der Bau von Planstädten „auf der grünen Wiese“ als attraktive Lösung. Allerdings tragen solche Projekte häufig nicht zur Bewältigung der Herausforderungen der Urbanisierung bei, dienen stattdessen aber verdeckten politischen Interessen – oft auf Kosten aktueller und zukünftiger Stadtbewohner*innen.

Im Mai 2026 bestätigten Medienberichte das Ende des Stadtvorhabens The Line. Saudi-Arabien stellte bis auf weiteres die Bauarbeiten an der 170 Kilometer langen Bandstadt bis mindestens 2030 ein. Obwohl das Projekt aufgrund seines ungewöhnlichen Ausmaßes und Designs viel internationale Aufmerksamkeit auf sich gezogen hat, ist es nur ein Beispiel für ein umfassenderes Phänomen. Weltweit verfolgen Regierungen und Investoren über 150 Planstadtprojekte, vor allem in Ländern mit niedrigem und mittlerem Einkommen. Diese Projekte basieren auf Masterplänen für bisher unbebaute Flächen. Sie beanspruchen häufig, einen Beitrag zur Lösung von Problemen wie Wohnungsnot, Verkehrsüberlastung, Umweltverschmutzung und die Anpassung an die Folgen des Klimawandels leisten zu können. Analysen deuten jedoch darauf hin, dass Planstadtprojekte diesen Versprechungen oft nicht gerecht werden, was zwei wichtige Fragen aufwirft: Warum werden Planstadtvorhaben dennoch in so großer Zahl verfolgt? Und wie sollten Entwicklungsorganisationen reagieren, wenn sie um Unterstützung für solche Projekte gebeten werden?

Die Idee, Planstädte zu errichten, ist eine Reaktion auf eine zentrale globale Herausforderung: Städtische Siedlungen wachsen in beispielloser Geschwindigkeit, insbesondere in Afrika und Asien. Zudem zeigen neue Städte wie Brasilia (Brasilien) und Abuja (Nigeria), dass solche Projekte gelingen können. In den letzten Jahren blieb jedoch eine beträchtliche Anzahl von Planstadtprojekten unvollendet, hatte mit geringer Auslastung zu kämpfen oder wurde ganz aufgegeben. Die Gründe, warum diese milliardenschweren Projekte ihre städtebaulichen Ziele oft verfehlen sind vielfältig. Fehler in der Planung, im Management und bei der Finanzierung spielen hier eine Rolle. Doch wie wir in einem neuen Policy Brief darlegen, sind Planstadtprojekte auch weiterhin attraktiv aufgrund von Schatteninteressen – versteckten politischen Absichten, die von einflussreichen Eliten verfolgt werden. Diese Interessen können zusätzlich zu oder im Gegensatz zu Zielen der Stadtentwicklung bestehen. Sofern Schatteninteressen faktisch Vorrang vor Stadtentwicklungszielen erhalten, dient dies zwar den verborgenen politischen Absichten, erhöht aber die Wahrscheinlichkeit, dass die offiziellen Stadtentwicklungsziele nicht erreicht werden.

Schatteninteressen umfassen unter anderem Bestrebungen, politische Macht durch die Stärkung klientelistischer Netzwerke zu festigen, etwa durch die Verteilung von Land oder die Vergabe von Aufträgen an gut vernetzte Baufirmen. Ägyptens neue Verwaltungshauptstadt ist ein Beispiel dafür. Die Zeitschrift The Economist beschreibt sie als staatliches Vorhaben, um Unternehmen mit engen Verbindungen zum Militär zu bestechen, was die ohnehin steigende Verschuldung und Inflation weiter in die Höhe treibt. Schatteninteressen können auch Bestrebungen umfassen, geopolitische Kontrolle über strategisch wichtige Gebiete durchzusetzen, wie im Fall von Forest City in Malaysia. Die Stadt war ein Versuch, im Rahmen der chinesischen „Belt and Road“-Initiative eine chinesische neokoloniale Enklave an einem strategisch wichtigen Standort zu errichten. Das Projekt wurde 2014 ins Leben gerufen und ist heute eine verlassene „Geisterstadt“. Darüber hinaus können Schatteninteressen auch dazu dienen, autoritäre Regime durch den Bau von vorgeblichen Ökostädten international zu legitimieren. Masdar City in Abu Dhabi wurde beispielsweise 2006 ins Leben gerufen, um das Emirat als weltweit führend im Bereich grüner Innovationen zu positionieren. Bis heute ist die Stadt kaum ausgelastet. Diese Beispiele zeigen, dass Planstadtprojekte eher nicht die Bedürfnisse von Stadtbewohner*innen erfüllen, wenn Regierungen sich dabei an Schatteninteressen statt an offiziellen Stadtentwicklungszielen orientieren.

Um auf die Herausforderungen der rasanten Urbanisierung zu reagieren, sind verschiedene Ansätze nötig, zu denen auch Planstädte gehören können. Doch die jüngsten Planstadtprojekte versprechen viel, weisen eine schlechte Erfolgsbilanz auf und werden oft durch Schatteninteressen beeinträchtigt. Solche Projekte bergen daher die Gefahr, erhebliche öffentliche und private Ressourcen zu vergeuden – und das in einer Zeit, in der Investitionen in städtische Infrastruktur dringend notwendig sind. Angesichts dieses Risikos sollten Entwicklungsorganisationen sorgfältig abwägen, ob sie Planstadtprojekte unterstützen. Idealerweise sollten solche Entscheidungen auf der Grundlage politökonomischer Analysen stattfinden, die auch mögliche Schatteninteressen berücksichtigen, sowie aufgrund der Analyse alternativer Stadtentwicklungsansätze. Dies ist insbesondere in autoritären Kontexten und in Ländern mit schwachen Institutionen wichtig, in denen Infrastrukturprojekte eher von Schatteninteressen vereinnahmt werden. Maßnahmen wie die schrittweise Modernisierung und Erweiterung bestehender städtischer Siedlungen sind in der Regel kosteneffizienter und kommen einem breiteren Spektrum von Stadtbewohner*innen zugute. Die Verwirklichung des Mottos „Angemessener Wohnraum für alle“ erfordert nicht zuletzt partizipativere Ansätze in Stadtplanung und -entwicklung, die ausdrücklich auch die mehr als eine Milliarde Menschen einbeziehen, die weltweit in informellen städtischen Siedlungen leben.

Planstädte sind nicht die Lösung für die rasante Urbanisierung

Planstadtprojekte werden den Ansprüchen nachhaltiger Stadtentwicklung häufig nicht gerecht, können allerdings einflussreichen Schatteninteressen dienen.

Bonn, 30. Oktober 2026. Die „Urban October“-Initiative von UN-Habitat steht in diesem Jahr unter dem Motto „Angemessener Wohnraum für alle“ und endet am Weltstädtetag (31. Oktober). Um den dringenden Bedarf an Wohnraum zu decken, erscheint der Bau von Planstädten „auf der grünen Wiese“ als attraktive Lösung. Allerdings tragen solche Projekte häufig nicht zur Bewältigung der Herausforderungen der Urbanisierung bei, dienen stattdessen aber verdeckten politischen Interessen – oft auf Kosten aktueller und zukünftiger Stadtbewohner*innen.

Im Mai 2026 bestätigten Medienberichte das Ende des Stadtvorhabens The Line. Saudi-Arabien stellte bis auf weiteres die Bauarbeiten an der 170 Kilometer langen Bandstadt bis mindestens 2030 ein. Obwohl das Projekt aufgrund seines ungewöhnlichen Ausmaßes und Designs viel internationale Aufmerksamkeit auf sich gezogen hat, ist es nur ein Beispiel für ein umfassenderes Phänomen. Weltweit verfolgen Regierungen und Investoren über 150 Planstadtprojekte, vor allem in Ländern mit niedrigem und mittlerem Einkommen. Diese Projekte basieren auf Masterplänen für bisher unbebaute Flächen. Sie beanspruchen häufig, einen Beitrag zur Lösung von Problemen wie Wohnungsnot, Verkehrsüberlastung, Umweltverschmutzung und die Anpassung an die Folgen des Klimawandels leisten zu können. Analysen deuten jedoch darauf hin, dass Planstadtprojekte diesen Versprechungen oft nicht gerecht werden, was zwei wichtige Fragen aufwirft: Warum werden Planstadtvorhaben dennoch in so großer Zahl verfolgt? Und wie sollten Entwicklungsorganisationen reagieren, wenn sie um Unterstützung für solche Projekte gebeten werden?

Die Idee, Planstädte zu errichten, ist eine Reaktion auf eine zentrale globale Herausforderung: Städtische Siedlungen wachsen in beispielloser Geschwindigkeit, insbesondere in Afrika und Asien. Zudem zeigen neue Städte wie Brasilia (Brasilien) und Abuja (Nigeria), dass solche Projekte gelingen können. In den letzten Jahren blieb jedoch eine beträchtliche Anzahl von Planstadtprojekten unvollendet, hatte mit geringer Auslastung zu kämpfen oder wurde ganz aufgegeben. Die Gründe, warum diese milliardenschweren Projekte ihre städtebaulichen Ziele oft verfehlen sind vielfältig. Fehler in der Planung, im Management und bei der Finanzierung spielen hier eine Rolle. Doch wie wir in einem neuen Policy Brief darlegen, sind Planstadtprojekte auch weiterhin attraktiv aufgrund von Schatteninteressen – versteckten politischen Absichten, die von einflussreichen Eliten verfolgt werden. Diese Interessen können zusätzlich zu oder im Gegensatz zu Zielen der Stadtentwicklung bestehen. Sofern Schatteninteressen faktisch Vorrang vor Stadtentwicklungszielen erhalten, dient dies zwar den verborgenen politischen Absichten, erhöht aber die Wahrscheinlichkeit, dass die offiziellen Stadtentwicklungsziele nicht erreicht werden.

Schatteninteressen umfassen unter anderem Bestrebungen, politische Macht durch die Stärkung klientelistischer Netzwerke zu festigen, etwa durch die Verteilung von Land oder die Vergabe von Aufträgen an gut vernetzte Baufirmen. Ägyptens neue Verwaltungshauptstadt ist ein Beispiel dafür. Die Zeitschrift The Economist beschreibt sie als staatliches Vorhaben, um Unternehmen mit engen Verbindungen zum Militär zu bestechen, was die ohnehin steigende Verschuldung und Inflation weiter in die Höhe treibt. Schatteninteressen können auch Bestrebungen umfassen, geopolitische Kontrolle über strategisch wichtige Gebiete durchzusetzen, wie im Fall von Forest City in Malaysia. Die Stadt war ein Versuch, im Rahmen der chinesischen „Belt and Road“-Initiative eine chinesische neokoloniale Enklave an einem strategisch wichtigen Standort zu errichten. Das Projekt wurde 2014 ins Leben gerufen und ist heute eine verlassene „Geisterstadt“. Darüber hinaus können Schatteninteressen auch dazu dienen, autoritäre Regime durch den Bau von vorgeblichen Ökostädten international zu legitimieren. Masdar City in Abu Dhabi wurde beispielsweise 2006 ins Leben gerufen, um das Emirat als weltweit führend im Bereich grüner Innovationen zu positionieren. Bis heute ist die Stadt kaum ausgelastet. Diese Beispiele zeigen, dass Planstadtprojekte eher nicht die Bedürfnisse von Stadtbewohner*innen erfüllen, wenn Regierungen sich dabei an Schatteninteressen statt an offiziellen Stadtentwicklungszielen orientieren.

Um auf die Herausforderungen der rasanten Urbanisierung zu reagieren, sind verschiedene Ansätze nötig, zu denen auch Planstädte gehören können. Doch die jüngsten Planstadtprojekte versprechen viel, weisen eine schlechte Erfolgsbilanz auf und werden oft durch Schatteninteressen beeinträchtigt. Solche Projekte bergen daher die Gefahr, erhebliche öffentliche und private Ressourcen zu vergeuden – und das in einer Zeit, in der Investitionen in städtische Infrastruktur dringend notwendig sind. Angesichts dieses Risikos sollten Entwicklungsorganisationen sorgfältig abwägen, ob sie Planstadtprojekte unterstützen. Idealerweise sollten solche Entscheidungen auf der Grundlage politökonomischer Analysen stattfinden, die auch mögliche Schatteninteressen berücksichtigen, sowie aufgrund der Analyse alternativer Stadtentwicklungsansätze. Dies ist insbesondere in autoritären Kontexten und in Ländern mit schwachen Institutionen wichtig, in denen Infrastrukturprojekte eher von Schatteninteressen vereinnahmt werden. Maßnahmen wie die schrittweise Modernisierung und Erweiterung bestehender städtischer Siedlungen sind in der Regel kosteneffizienter und kommen einem breiteren Spektrum von Stadtbewohner*innen zugute. Die Verwirklichung des Mottos „Angemessener Wohnraum für alle“ erfordert nicht zuletzt partizipativere Ansätze in Stadtplanung und -entwicklung, die ausdrücklich auch die mehr als eine Milliarde Menschen einbeziehen, die weltweit in informellen städtischen Siedlungen leben.

Planstädte sind nicht die Lösung für die rasante Urbanisierung

Planstadtprojekte werden den Ansprüchen nachhaltiger Stadtentwicklung häufig nicht gerecht, können allerdings einflussreichen Schatteninteressen dienen.

Bonn, 30. Oktober 2026. Die „Urban October“-Initiative von UN-Habitat steht in diesem Jahr unter dem Motto „Angemessener Wohnraum für alle“ und endet am Weltstädtetag (31. Oktober). Um den dringenden Bedarf an Wohnraum zu decken, erscheint der Bau von Planstädten „auf der grünen Wiese“ als attraktive Lösung. Allerdings tragen solche Projekte häufig nicht zur Bewältigung der Herausforderungen der Urbanisierung bei, dienen stattdessen aber verdeckten politischen Interessen – oft auf Kosten aktueller und zukünftiger Stadtbewohner*innen.

Im Mai 2026 bestätigten Medienberichte das Ende des Stadtvorhabens The Line. Saudi-Arabien stellte bis auf weiteres die Bauarbeiten an der 170 Kilometer langen Bandstadt bis mindestens 2030 ein. Obwohl das Projekt aufgrund seines ungewöhnlichen Ausmaßes und Designs viel internationale Aufmerksamkeit auf sich gezogen hat, ist es nur ein Beispiel für ein umfassenderes Phänomen. Weltweit verfolgen Regierungen und Investoren über 150 Planstadtprojekte, vor allem in Ländern mit niedrigem und mittlerem Einkommen. Diese Projekte basieren auf Masterplänen für bisher unbebaute Flächen. Sie beanspruchen häufig, einen Beitrag zur Lösung von Problemen wie Wohnungsnot, Verkehrsüberlastung, Umweltverschmutzung und die Anpassung an die Folgen des Klimawandels leisten zu können. Analysen deuten jedoch darauf hin, dass Planstadtprojekte diesen Versprechungen oft nicht gerecht werden, was zwei wichtige Fragen aufwirft: Warum werden Planstadtvorhaben dennoch in so großer Zahl verfolgt? Und wie sollten Entwicklungsorganisationen reagieren, wenn sie um Unterstützung für solche Projekte gebeten werden?

Die Idee, Planstädte zu errichten, ist eine Reaktion auf eine zentrale globale Herausforderung: Städtische Siedlungen wachsen in beispielloser Geschwindigkeit, insbesondere in Afrika und Asien. Zudem zeigen neue Städte wie Brasilia (Brasilien) und Abuja (Nigeria), dass solche Projekte gelingen können. In den letzten Jahren blieb jedoch eine beträchtliche Anzahl von Planstadtprojekten unvollendet, hatte mit geringer Auslastung zu kämpfen oder wurde ganz aufgegeben. Die Gründe, warum diese milliardenschweren Projekte ihre städtebaulichen Ziele oft verfehlen sind vielfältig. Fehler in der Planung, im Management und bei der Finanzierung spielen hier eine Rolle. Doch wie wir in einem neuen Policy Brief darlegen, sind Planstadtprojekte auch weiterhin attraktiv aufgrund von Schatteninteressen – versteckten politischen Absichten, die von einflussreichen Eliten verfolgt werden. Diese Interessen können zusätzlich zu oder im Gegensatz zu Zielen der Stadtentwicklung bestehen. Sofern Schatteninteressen faktisch Vorrang vor Stadtentwicklungszielen erhalten, dient dies zwar den verborgenen politischen Absichten, erhöht aber die Wahrscheinlichkeit, dass die offiziellen Stadtentwicklungsziele nicht erreicht werden.

Schatteninteressen umfassen unter anderem Bestrebungen, politische Macht durch die Stärkung klientelistischer Netzwerke zu festigen, etwa durch die Verteilung von Land oder die Vergabe von Aufträgen an gut vernetzte Baufirmen. Ägyptens neue Verwaltungshauptstadt ist ein Beispiel dafür. Die Zeitschrift The Economist beschreibt sie als staatliches Vorhaben, um Unternehmen mit engen Verbindungen zum Militär zu bestechen, was die ohnehin steigende Verschuldung und Inflation weiter in die Höhe treibt. Schatteninteressen können auch Bestrebungen umfassen, geopolitische Kontrolle über strategisch wichtige Gebiete durchzusetzen, wie im Fall von Forest City in Malaysia. Die Stadt war ein Versuch, im Rahmen der chinesischen „Belt and Road“-Initiative eine chinesische neokoloniale Enklave an einem strategisch wichtigen Standort zu errichten. Das Projekt wurde 2014 ins Leben gerufen und ist heute eine verlassene „Geisterstadt“. Darüber hinaus können Schatteninteressen auch dazu dienen, autoritäre Regime durch den Bau von vorgeblichen Ökostädten international zu legitimieren. Masdar City in Abu Dhabi wurde beispielsweise 2006 ins Leben gerufen, um das Emirat als weltweit führend im Bereich grüner Innovationen zu positionieren. Bis heute ist die Stadt kaum ausgelastet. Diese Beispiele zeigen, dass Planstadtprojekte eher nicht die Bedürfnisse von Stadtbewohner*innen erfüllen, wenn Regierungen sich dabei an Schatteninteressen statt an offiziellen Stadtentwicklungszielen orientieren.

Um auf die Herausforderungen der rasanten Urbanisierung zu reagieren, sind verschiedene Ansätze nötig, zu denen auch Planstädte gehören können. Doch die jüngsten Planstadtprojekte versprechen viel, weisen eine schlechte Erfolgsbilanz auf und werden oft durch Schatteninteressen beeinträchtigt. Solche Projekte bergen daher die Gefahr, erhebliche öffentliche und private Ressourcen zu vergeuden – und das in einer Zeit, in der Investitionen in städtische Infrastruktur dringend notwendig sind. Angesichts dieses Risikos sollten Entwicklungsorganisationen sorgfältig abwägen, ob sie Planstadtprojekte unterstützen. Idealerweise sollten solche Entscheidungen auf der Grundlage politökonomischer Analysen stattfinden, die auch mögliche Schatteninteressen berücksichtigen, sowie aufgrund der Analyse alternativer Stadtentwicklungsansätze. Dies ist insbesondere in autoritären Kontexten und in Ländern mit schwachen Institutionen wichtig, in denen Infrastrukturprojekte eher von Schatteninteressen vereinnahmt werden. Maßnahmen wie die schrittweise Modernisierung und Erweiterung bestehender städtischer Siedlungen sind in der Regel kosteneffizienter und kommen einem breiteren Spektrum von Stadtbewohner*innen zugute. Die Verwirklichung des Mottos „Angemessener Wohnraum für alle“ erfordert nicht zuletzt partizipativere Ansätze in Stadtplanung und -entwicklung, die ausdrücklich auch die mehr als eine Milliarde Menschen einbeziehen, die weltweit in informellen städtischen Siedlungen leben.

UAE’s UN Chief Candidate Faces Mounting Opposition Over Country’s Role in Sudan War

Africa - INTER PRESS SERVICE - Fri, 10/30/2026 - 09:59

Lana Nusseibeh from United Arab Emirates, candidate for the position of the next Secretary-General, briefs reporters after the informal dialogue held with the candidates for the position of the next Secretary-General. Credit: UN Photo/Eskinder Debebe

By Oritro Karim
UNITED NATIONS, Oct 30 2026 (IPS)

As the race for the next UN Secretary-General moves forward, the campaign of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) Assistant Minister for Political Affairs, Lana Nusseibeh, has faced significant pushback over the country’s involvement in the ongoing Sudanese Civil War.

Over the past three years, the conflict in Sudan has deteriorated into one of the world’s most dire humanitarian crises, marked by mass civilian displacement and casualties, rampant human rights abuses, and widespread hunger.

This month marks one year since the sharp escalation in hostilities in El Fasher following the siege by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), during which civilians were subjected to severe human rights violations and persistent obstructions to humanitarian aid, and entire communities were displaced.

Extensive data from the UN, human rights organizations, and U.S. intelligence show that the UAE has been a major supplier of weapons, vehicles, and logistical support to the RSF. In July, Democracy for the Arab World Now (DAWN MENA) urged the UN General Assembly and member states to impose an immediate arms embargo on the UAE, citing grave acts of genocide targeting non-Arab communities in Darfur.

On October 21, the UAE announced that Nusseibeh would enter the race to become the next UN Secretary-General, seeking to succeed incumbent Secretary-General António Guterres following the completion of his second term on December 31. Nusseibeh has previously dismissed claims of Emirati involvement in RSF activities as “baseless,” describing them as disinformation to “deflect responsibility and undermine international efforts to address the humanitarian crisis in Sudan.”

On October 27, a press briefing brought together international policy experts, human rights advocates, and Sudanese survivors to discuss Nusseibeh’s campaign and its potential implications for the UN’s credibility and ability to protect civilians.

Speaking at the event, Ibrahim Alduma, a native of El Fasher and Chief Programs Officer at Sudan Action Hub, shared a personal account of the civilian toll the country experienced following last year’s escalation. Alduma recounted how his family was trapped in El Fasher when hostiltiies erupted, faced with persistent telecommunications disruptions, to the point where he didn’t know if they were still alive. He also shared that his childhood friend was killed during the escalation, only to find out two days after the fact.

Alduma highlighted the U.S. government’s determination in February 2025 that the RSF had committed genocide and the following sanctions that were imposed on seven comapnies affiliated with the RSF, all of which were either based in or directly linked to the UAE.

“(Nusseibeh) is the one who was lobbying to remove UAE from the resolution of the European Parliament, and now she is running for United Nations Secretary General. So, mainly when we talk about policy, I know that the world has known everything about what happened in El Fasher, but the question is not if they’re informed or not,” Alduma said.

Kenneth Roth, former Executive Director of Human Rights Watch (HRW) and a speaker at the briefing, noted that while member states face growing pressure to elect a female Secretary-General, Nusseibeh’s late entry reflects a broader difficulty within the UN to reach a consensus. Roth described Nusseibeh’s candidacy as both “inappropriate” and “unsuitable.”

“At this stage, I think it’s really beyond dispute that the UAE was sending arms and mercenaries to the RSF. I think it’s fair to say the RSF would not have been able to be nearly as successful militarily as it was and has been without that support from the UAE,” said Roth. “After having basically put El Fasher under siege for some 500 days a year ago, it (the RSF) went in and just started slaughtering people. Another genocide, and the reason I think Lana Nusseibeh is an utterly inappropriate candidate for UN Secretary-General is that she denies this reality.”

Roth further noted that Nusseibeh’s repeated denial of the UAE’s involvement in RSF military activity is not based on factual findings, declaring that she will “destroy her credibility.” He compared her to former Secretary-General Kofi Annan, conversely describing Annan’s approach as firmly rooted in human rights and advocacy.

“We cannot afford to have the UN led by somebody who is a genocide denier, and indeed somebody who heads a government that has been aiding and abetting genocide, that is basically criminally complicit in that genocide, and she’s a lead person in covering that up,” said Roth.

Nathaniel Raymond, Executive Director of the Humanitarian Research Lab at the Yale School of Public Health, emphasized the role of Western intelligence in tracking the crisis. He highlighted that U.S. and British intelligence actively tracked and were aware of substantial levels of Emirati involvement, concluding that the UAE provided the RSF with the support needed to execute its human rights violations.

“For those of us who worked in El Fasher, we first warned El Fasher to the U.N. Security Council in a private briefing in July 2023 to see diplomats asking how we make sure this doesn’t happen again. It’s a slap in the face for the dead and for the survivors. Let’s be clear. It’s a second dehumanization of these people because it’s acting like somehow this is a murder mystery. That this is Colombo. This is murder,” said Raymond.

“The intelligence worked. The early warning worked. These people died for one reason, because their lives matter less than the diplomatic, economic, and security relationships between the U.S., the U.K., and the U.A.E. That’s it. If you think there’s somehow a bigger thing here, there isn’t. That’s why they died, because they were just less important.”

IPS UN Bureau Report

 

 

 

 

Categories: Africa, Union européenne

Afcon to return to two-year cycle after Caf U-turn

BBC Africa - Fri, 10/30/2026 - 09:39
The Africa Cup of Nations (Afcon) will return to its traditional two-year cycle after a review into December's decision to host it every four years instead.
Categories: Africa, Central Europe

How Kenyans got caught in $130m US ghost student scam

BBC Africa - Fri, 10/30/2026 - 09:32
The alleged scheme used stolen identities to claim US student aid, with Kenyans among those charged.
Categories: Africa, European Union

Three October Turning Points in Modern Security Policy (1945, 1962, 2001)

Biztonságpolitika.hu - Fri, 10/30/2026 - 08:11
Key Takeaways (Executive Summary)
  • UN Charter (October 24, 1945): Codified the prohibition of force (Article 2(4)) and institutionalized collective security alongside Great Power realpolitik via the Security Council (Chapter VII).

  • Cuban Missile Crisis (October 16–29, 1962): Highlighted the operational risks of nuclear brinkmanship, leading to the creation of the Washington–Moscow Hotline and modern decision-making models.

  • Operation Enduring Freedom (October 7, 2001): Triggered NATO’s Article 5 for the first time, introducing the „Afghan Model” of light-footprint precision warfare and long-term COIN challenges.

    1. Entry into Force of the United Nations Charter (October 24, 1945) 1.1 Structural Foundations and Legal Architecture
  • The formal entry into force of the United Nations Charter on October 24, 1945, represented a decisive structural transformation in global security governance. Following the failure of the League of Nations to prevent systemic conflict in the 1930s, the Allied powers constructed a legally binding international architecture to enforce peace and regulate state behavior. Drafted at the United Nations Conference on International Organization in San Francisco, the Charter established a centralized institutional framework centered on maintaining international peace and security.

  • The Charter’s core legal innovation lies in Article 2(4), which codified a comprehensive prohibition on the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state. This norm replaced the classical jus ad bellum framework of Westphalian sovereignty with a restricted regime where armed force is legitimate under only two specific exceptions:

    1. Individual or collective self-defense in response to an armed attack (Article 51).

    2. Explicit authorization by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) under Chapter VII.

Chapter VII provides the UNSC with sweeping coercive powers. Under Article 39, the Security Council holds the sole authority to determine threats to peace, breaches of peace, or acts of aggression. Once identified, the Council can mandate non-military sanctions (Article 41) or authorize military force (Article 42) to restore international security.

1.2 Realpolitik and Security Council Veto Dynamics

While the Charter established normative principles of sovereign equality (Article 2(1)), its structural implementation acknowledged power politics. By granting permanent membership and veto power (the P5) in the Security Council to the primary victors of World War II—the United States, Soviet Union, United Kingdom, France, and China—the Charter embedded a compromise between universal normative aspirations and Great Power realpolitik.

This design reflected the consensus that collective security could function only if Great Powers were legally shielded from enforcement actions against one another, thereby preventing direct military conflict between nuclear-capable states. However, this architectural constraint generated systemic vulnerabilities:

  • Strategic Paralysis: During the Cold War, opposing superpowers frequently utilized the veto to block UN intervention in conflicts within their spheres of influence.

  • Informal Adaptation: To bypass Security Council gridlock, the UN General Assembly adopted the Uniting for Peace resolution (Resolution 377A) in 1950, allowing recommendations for collective action when the Security Council stalled.

  • Emergence of Peacekeeping: Because Chapter VII enforcement actions were frequently stymied, the UN developed traditional „Chapter VI and a Half” peacekeeping operations—deploying neutral military observers with host-state consent to maintain ceasefires.

1.3 Strategic Communication and Contemporary Relevance

From a strategic communication perspective, the UN Charter created a permanent platform for diplomatic signaling and crisis management. The Security Council serves as a critical forum for narrative warfare, normative framing, and public diplomacy. States routinely utilize UN debates to build international legitimacy, justify military interventions, or expose the legal vulnerabilities of strategic rivals.

In contemporary security policy, the UN Charter framework faces severe stress tests, including grey-zone aggression, cyber operations, proxy warfare, and direct breaches of territorial sovereignty by P5 members. Despite these strains, the legal principles established on October 24, 1945, remain the baseline benchmark for evaluating the legitimacy of military operations worldwide.

References & Key Literature
  • Bowett, D. W. (2009). Self-defence in international law. Manchester University Press.

  • Chesterman, S. (2001). Just war or just peace? Humanitarian intervention and international law. Oxford University Press.

  • Garey, A. (2020). The United Nations and security sector reform: Policy and practice. Routledge.

  • Kelsen, H. (2000). The law of the United Nations: A critical analysis of its fundamental problems. The Lawbook Exchange.

  • Weiss, T. G., & Daws, S. (Eds.). (2018). The Oxford handbook on the United Nations (2nd ed.). Oxford University Press.

2. The Cuban Missile Crisis (October 16–29, 1962)

2.1 Escalation Dynamics and Nuclear Brinkmanship

The Cuban Missile Crisis of October 16–29, 1962, stands as the most acute nuclear confrontation in history, bringing the United States and the Soviet Union to the verge of thermonuclear exchange. The crisis began when U.S. U-2 reconnaissance aircraft confirmed the covert deployment of Soviet R-12 (SS-4) and R-14 (SS-5) medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles in Cuba.

From Moscow’s perspective, Operation Anadyr served dual strategic objectives: rectifying the nuclear imbalance created by U.S. missile deployments in Turkey and Italy, and deterring an American invasion of Cuba following the 1961 Bay of Pigs expedition. For Washington, nuclear missiles 90 miles off Florida fundamentally reduced strategic warning time and represented an unacceptable shift in the regional balance of power.

U.S. President John F. Kennedy established the Executive Committee of the National Security Council (ExComm) to evaluate response options. Kennedy selected a naval „quarantine”—a blockade intended to halt offensive military shipments while leaving diplomatic space for de-escalation without provoking an immediate Soviet retaliation against West Berlin.

2.2 Crisis Communication and Decision-Making Models

The thirteen days demonstrated the friction inherent in nuclear brinkmanship. Operational escalation regularly threatened to outpace diplomatic command and control:

  • Tactical Miscalculations: On October 27 („Black Saturday”), an American U-2 aircraft was shot down over Cuba without direct authorization from Moscow. Simultaneously, the isolated Soviet submarine B-59, subjected to non-lethal U.S. depth charges, nearly launched a nuclear-tipped torpedo due to lost communications.

  • Back-Channel Diplomacy: Public posturing at the UN Security Council was matched by secret negotiations. Key channels included informal contacts between KGB agent Aleksandr Feklisov and journalist John Scali, alongside direct high-level meetings between Attorney General Robert Kennedy and Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin.

The resolution required a complex diplomatic compromise. Premier Nikita Khrushchev agreed to publicly dismantle and withdraw Soviet offensive missiles under UN verification. In return, President Kennedy pledged publicly that the U.S. would not invade Cuba, while privately agreeing to remove U.S. Jupiter missiles from Turkey.

Strategic Dimension American Positioning Soviet Positioning Public Stance Naval Quarantine; Demand for immediate missile removal Declaration of defensive aid; Resistance to U.S. piracy Operational Action DEFCON 2; Blockade; Preparation for air strikes Covert deployment; Air defense readiness in Cuba Secret Concession Removal of Jupiter missiles from Turkey Agreement to UN inspection/verification frameworks 2.3 Theoretical and Strategic Aftermath

The crisis became the primary empirical foundation for modern strategic studies. Graham Allison demonstrated that state behavior during acute crises cannot be fully explained through a singular „Rational Actor” model (Model I), as decisions are heavily shaped by „Organizational Process” mechanics (Model II) and „Bureaucratic Politics” bargaining (Model III).

The realization that intelligence gaps and operational friction could trigger unintended nuclear war led directly to strategic adjustments:

  1. Direct Communication Channels: In 1963, Washington and Moscow established the Washington–Moscow Direct Communications Link („Hotline”) to ensure rapid crisis communication.

  2. Arms Control Regimes: The crisis catalyzed bilateral arms control, leading to the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) in 1963, the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968, and the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) in the 1970s.

References & Key Literature
  • Allison, G., & Zelikow, P. (1999). Essence of decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (2nd ed.). Longman.

  • Blight, J. G., & Welch, D. A. (1989). On the brink: Americans and Soviets reexamine the Cuban Missile Crisis. Hill and Wang.

  • Dobbs, M. (2008). One minute to midnight: Kennedy, Khrushchev, and Castro on the brink of nuclear war. Alfred A. Knopf.

  • Gaddis, J. L. (2005). The Cold War: A new history. Penguin Press.

  • Trachtenberg, M. (1991). History and strategy. Princeton University Press.

 

3. Launch of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan (October 7, 2001) 3.1 Post-9/11 Security Paradigm and Alliance Mechanics

The initiation of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) on October 7, 2001, launched the Global War on Terror (GWOT) and redefined Western alliance structures. Following the September 11 terrorist attacks by al-Qaeda, the Bush administration defined the conflict as an armed attack triggering the right of national self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter.

On September 12, 2001, NATO allies invoked Article 5 of the Washington Treaty for the first time, declaring the attacks against the U.S. to be an attack against all member states. However, the initial military campaign did not deploy under a formal NATO command structure. Seeking maximum operational autonomy, U.S. leadership adopted an „ad hoc coalition of the willing” approach, aligned with Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld’s operational doctrine that „the mission determines the coalition.”

A Three October Turning Points in Modern Security Policy (1945, 1962, 2001) bejegyzés először Biztonságpolitika-én jelent meg.

Women and Girls’ Death Toll in Armed Conflict Doubles since 2021

Africa - INTER PRESS SERVICE - Fri, 10/30/2026 - 06:55

Credit: UN Women/Samar Abu Elouf

By UN Women
NEW YORK, Oct 30 2026 (IPS)

More than 37,000 civilians were killed in conflict last year. Women and girls accounted for one in four of these deaths – double their proportion in 2021 – according to the 2026 UN Secretary-General’s report on Women, Peace, and Security, released today.

Approximately 750 million women and girls now live within 50 kilometers of an active conflict, 40 million more than in 2024, and more than at any time since 1990.

“More women and girls are trapped in wars than at any point in decades. Yet military spending keeps rising and development assistance keeps falling, even as investing in women’s leadership, conflict prevention, and peacebuilding has never been more urgent”, said UN Women Executive Director Sima Bahous.

For women and girls caught in war, the threat goes beyond bombs. Cases of conflict-related sexual violence verified by the United Nations nearly quadrupled between 2022 and 2025. War also drives women deeper into poverty and increases their unpaid care work. Around 170 million women and girls live in both conflict zones and extreme poverty, surviving on less than USD 3 a day. They account for almost 40 per cent of all women and girls living in extreme poverty globally. In conflict-affected countries, women and girls spend five times as many hours on unpaid domestic and care work as men and boys, double the global average.

These impacts are compounded by changing warfare and declining respect for international law. The increasing use of drones and long-range weapons in populated areas, including deliberate attacks on schools, markets, and hospitals – central to women’s daily lives – raises further safety concerns. Emerging AI-enabled military technologies add to these risks, particularly for women and girls already facing violence, displacement, and insecurity.

Even amid these challenges, women are working to protect communities and build peace.

“Every day, women around the world are working to end wars and build peace – protecting survivors, keeping communities together, and stopping violence before it starts. Their work is one of the best investments the world can make in peace”, continued the UN Women Executive Director.

Despite these contributions, the report shows that in 2025, women made up only five per cent of negotiators across 57 peace processes worldwide, down from seven per cent the year before.

Women’s exclusion from peace negotiations is compounded by a lack of investment in their work. Global military expenditure hit a record USD 2.9 trillion in 2025. Meanwhile, 40 per cent of women’s organizations in crisis-affected settings expect to shut down temporarily or permanently within the next year because of severe funding shortfalls. Women’s organizations are the backbone of lasting peace. They mediate local tensions, shelter the displaced, support survivors, and hold communities together. Their survival is essential to sustaining that peace.

UN Women calls for the protection of all women and girls and their rights, their meaningful participation in peace and security, and sustained investment in women-led conflict prevention and peacebuilding. We call for international law to be upheld and for an end to impunity.

IPS UN Bureau

 

 

 

 

Excerpt:

At least 25 women and girls are killed every day as civilian deaths mount, sexual violence rises, and women remain largely excluded from peace negotiations.
Categories: Africa, Union européenne

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