After World War II, countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) started from low levels of socioeconomic development. Especially health indicators were worse than in most other world regions. This changed drastically when MENA countries became independent and started to invest into the social protection of citizens against health risks. They built up powerful social health insurance schemes, and today, many of their health indicators are almost on the same level as in Europe or North America. During the 1980s and 1990, however, most MENA governments reduced healthcare spending again as an element of structural adjustment programs, and focused increasingly on health services that are particularly important for the urban upper and middle classes, their main allies in society, but not so much for the poor. Therefore, MENA health systems suffer again from significant deficits regarding fairness, efficiency, and effectiveness. Financial, legal, and geographical obstacles restrict access for large parts of the population. The coexistence of multiple social protection schemes for different population groups reflects and intensifies already existing social inequalities. Deficits in quality and tidiness and the prevalence of informal fees charged for “good” treatment reduce further the value of public health services. Efficiency suffers from irrational prioritizations in fund allocation and from a lack of customer orientation. And the effects of MENA health systems, although not really bad, could still be better, which has become more than obvious during the recent COVID-19 pandemic.
After World War II, countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) started from low levels of socioeconomic development. Especially health indicators were worse than in most other world regions. This changed drastically when MENA countries became independent and started to invest into the social protection of citizens against health risks. They built up powerful social health insurance schemes, and today, many of their health indicators are almost on the same level as in Europe or North America. During the 1980s and 1990, however, most MENA governments reduced healthcare spending again as an element of structural adjustment programs, and focused increasingly on health services that are particularly important for the urban upper and middle classes, their main allies in society, but not so much for the poor. Therefore, MENA health systems suffer again from significant deficits regarding fairness, efficiency, and effectiveness. Financial, legal, and geographical obstacles restrict access for large parts of the population. The coexistence of multiple social protection schemes for different population groups reflects and intensifies already existing social inequalities. Deficits in quality and tidiness and the prevalence of informal fees charged for “good” treatment reduce further the value of public health services. Efficiency suffers from irrational prioritizations in fund allocation and from a lack of customer orientation. And the effects of MENA health systems, although not really bad, could still be better, which has become more than obvious during the recent COVID-19 pandemic.
After World War II, countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) started from low levels of socioeconomic development. Especially health indicators were worse than in most other world regions. This changed drastically when MENA countries became independent and started to invest into the social protection of citizens against health risks. They built up powerful social health insurance schemes, and today, many of their health indicators are almost on the same level as in Europe or North America. During the 1980s and 1990, however, most MENA governments reduced healthcare spending again as an element of structural adjustment programs, and focused increasingly on health services that are particularly important for the urban upper and middle classes, their main allies in society, but not so much for the poor. Therefore, MENA health systems suffer again from significant deficits regarding fairness, efficiency, and effectiveness. Financial, legal, and geographical obstacles restrict access for large parts of the population. The coexistence of multiple social protection schemes for different population groups reflects and intensifies already existing social inequalities. Deficits in quality and tidiness and the prevalence of informal fees charged for “good” treatment reduce further the value of public health services. Efficiency suffers from irrational prioritizations in fund allocation and from a lack of customer orientation. And the effects of MENA health systems, although not really bad, could still be better, which has become more than obvious during the recent COVID-19 pandemic.
Male employees were working in a paper factory in Thimpu, Bhutan. Accession to WTO will enhance business opportunities for local SMEs. Credit: Unsplash/Bradford Zak
By Jing Huang, Mikiko Tanaka and Rajan Ratna
THIMPU, Bhutan, Jun 2 2026 (IPS)
Bhutan’s decision to restart its accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) comes at an important junction. Since graduating from Least Developed Country (LDC) status in 2023, the country is entering a new phase of development, which requires stronger competitiveness, deeper global engagement and greater economic resilience.
Yet Bhutan’s experience is not only about joining a global institution. It also offers an important lesson on why South-South cooperation matters in an increasingly uncertain world.
Global trade today is becoming more fragmented and unpredictable. Geopolitical tensions, supply chain disruptions and shifting trade alliances are reshaping the engagement of countries with the global economy. For small developing economies, the challenge is particularly complex.
Accessing international markets is no longer only about expanding exports, it is also about navigating changing rules, building institutional readiness and strengthening resilience against external shocks.
Based on this, the decision to restart the WTO accession from Bhutan is particularly significant. After years of standstill, Bhutan has resumed discussions on the terms of accession under the WTO Working Party process.
For a small economy transitioning beyond LDC status, WTO accession represents an opportunity to strengthen long-term economic foundations, improve investor confidence and integrate more effectively into regional and global markets.
However, the WTO accession is never easy, particularly for small economies with limited institutional capacity. Negotiating accession requires the readiness of the domestic market and industry, but also government capacities to navigate highly technical issues and in-house analysis for self and competitors’ assessments, from market access commitments and regulatory reforms to notification obligations and legal frameworks.
Officials must understand not only the rules themselves but also the practical implications of commitments that will shape national economic policy for years to come.
For many developing countries, the most useful policy lessons often come from peers facing similar realities. Countries across the Global South frequently operate under comparable constraints: limited institutional resources, competing development priorities and the need to balance openness with domestic policy space.
In these contexts, learning from neighbouring and comparable economies can often be more practical and relatable than relying solely on textbook models or distant examples. Bhutan’s WTO preparations offer a good example of the approach can work in practice.
In response to a request from the Royal Government of Bhutan, the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) through its Subregional Office for South and South-West Asia, partnered with Indian think tanks to support Bhutanese officials as they prepare for WTO accession.
Rather than focusing solely on theoretical understanding, the initiative emphasized practical learning, negotiation experiences and peer exchanges with experts and former trade negotiators who had worked directly on WTO processes.
The approach responded directly to Bhutan’s needs. Officials serving on Bhutan’s WTO Negotiating Team and Technical Working Groups were able to deepen their understanding of complex accession issues, including market access negotiations, institutional reforms, scheduling commitments and post-accession obligations. More importantly, they engaged directly with practitioners who understood the realities of policymaking and negotiations in developing country settings.
Peer learning also brought an important practical pillar. Discussions moved beyond legal provisions and technical terminology to focus on real experiences what challenges emerge during accession, how governments navigate difficult trade-offs and what institutional arrangements work in practice.
Exchanges on economic diversification, including lessons related to Special Economic Zones (SEZs), also offered useful reflections for Bhutan as it considers pathways to sustainable economic growth.
At a time when multilateralism faces growing pressures and geopolitical divisions increasingly influence trade relations, regional cooperation and peer learning are becoming more important. Small and developing economies often face similar structural constraints and often attempt to navigate major transitions in isolation.
Trusted regional partnerships can help countries access practical expertise, reduce learning costs and build confidence in undertaking complex reforms.
Bhutan’s WTO journey reminds us that successful South-South cooperation is not simply about technical assistance or transferring knowledge. It works best when countries define their own priorities, partnerships respond to genuine demand and peers contribute practical experiences with humility and mutual respect.
As Bhutan moves forward in its WTO accession process, its experience offers an important lesson for the wider region. In a fragmented and uncertain global economy, developing countries are often strongest when they learn from one another.
South-South cooperation may not remove every challenge, but it can help countries navigate difficult transitions with greater confidence, stronger institutions and more practical solutions.
Jing Huang is Economic Affairs Officer, ESCAP Subregional Office for South and South-West Asia; Mikiko Tanaka is Head of ESCAP Subregional Office for South and South-West Asia & Rajan Ratna is Coordinator, DAKSHIN-Global South Centre of Excellence.
IPS UN Bureau
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A kétezres évek közepén, elsősorban a nemzeti légitársaságnál uralkodó hangulat miatt már a fiatalabb, kisebb tapasztalattal rendelkező pilótageneráció is szétnézett a nagyvilágban, előrelépési lehetőség után kutatva. Hasonlóképpen gondolkodott Szentgyörgyi Dezső is, aki 2001 óta repült a Malév Boeing 737-es első tisztjeként. A lehetőségek között felbukkant a magyar pilóták által akkor már jól ismert Tajvan és a Boeing 747-es. Szentgyörgyi Dezső történetének második része következik.
Milyen élményt jelentettek számodra a hosszú távú útvonalak?
- Az amerikai gyakorló útvonal lényege a Csendes-óceán északi részének átrepülése volt, aztán már mindegy volt, hogy Vancouverbe vagy Los Angelesbe érkezel. Jót tett az egómnak, amikor harminc évesen, első tisztként először megérkezem Los Angelesbe egy Boeing 747-essel. Akkor én azt is elhittem, hogy a vízen is tudok járni. Los Angeles olyan, hogy két mérföldenként jönnek a gépek, egy Jumbo, egy 737-es, egy Airbus. Az amerikai irányítót nem úgy kell elképzelni, mint az európait, hogy szabvány kifejezésekkel dolgozik, hanem beszélget veled, és közben rágógumizik. Nekem például azt mondta, hogy a „második gurulóút és át a hídon”. Ott ment a gurulóút és alatta az autópálya, én meg életemben először voltam ott, de ő már nem foglalkozott tovább velem, mondta az engedélyt a következőnek. Amikor egyszer valamit nem értettem az időjárásban és rákérdeztem, hogy volna kedves és segítene nekem, a válasza az volt, hogy az nem az ő dolga.
Monika Stankiewicz, Executive Secretary of the Minamata Convention on Mercury, at the 71st GEF Council Meeting. Credit: Stella Paul/IPS
By Stella Paul
SAMARKAND, Uzbekistan, Jun 2 2026 (IPS)
On day 2 of the Global Environment Facility’s 71st Council Meeting, which focused on process and procedure, a clear message emerged: global environmental governance cannot afford fragmentation.
With six major multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) under its financial mechanism – the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the UN Convention on Biological Diversity (UNCBD), the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs), the Minamata Convention on Mercury, the UN Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD), and the emerging Agreement on Marine Biological Diversity of Areas beyond National Jurisdiction – the GEF sits at the centre of a complex reporting architecture.
For many convention secretariats, reporting requirements have become increasingly difficult for countries, constrained by limited staffing and multilayered requirements. Calls for greater synergies, including simpler processes across conventions, have taken on new urgency.
“This is the year of three COPs – a great opportunity for us to create synergies,” said Asad Naqvi, representing the CBD, setting the tone for discussions.
A System Under Strain
Across conventions, similar challenges surfaced: fragmented reporting, misaligned data requirements, and duplication, especially for smaller secretariats and developing countries.
Monika Stankiewicz, Executive Secretary of the Minamata Convention on Mercury, highlighted the gap between global commitments and local realities while acknowledging GEF’s progress in integrating Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities (IPLCs). She pointed to artisanal and small-scale gold mining – one of the largest sources of mercury emissions – that often occurs in indigenous territories. Yet many affected communities remain unaware of how the issue is addressed under the convention. Without meaningful engagement, broader goals such as biodiversity conservation become difficult to achieve.
“If Indigenous Peoples are not adequately engaged in combating mercury pollution, even biodiversity goals will fall short,” she warned, calling for stronger integration across conventions.
Delegates at the 71st GEF Council Meeting debated how to remove fragmentation in the management of funding across six major multilateral environmental agreements. Stella Paul/IPS
The ‘Minefield’ of Reporting
The complexity of reporting was underscored by Dr Rolph Payet, Executive Secretary of the Basel, Rotterdam and Stockholm (BRS) Conventions. Despite efforts to build synergies within the chemicals and waste cluster, reporting remains what he described as a “minefield”.
“We have one convention where reporting has started and others where reporting formats have changed; some stakeholders still prefer paper-based systems, while others want digital platforms – and they do not always share data,” Payet explained.
The result is a system that remains difficult for countries to navigate. Still, Payet struck a cautiously optimistic note, pointing to ongoing efforts to harmonise compliance mechanisms and streamline data collection.
“This is not something we should run away from,” he said. “We have a unique opportunity to bring our heads together and find ways to make reporting easier, more effective, and more useful for measuring impact.”
From Silos to Systems
For Naqvi and others, synergies go beyond administrative efficiency; they are essential for addressing interconnected global crises.
Synergies are not just about efficiency but addressing interconnected crises, says Naqvi. The Global Biodiversity Framework (GBF) is often viewed as a conservation blueprint.
“All these challenges – climate, biodiversity, land degradation, pollution – are interconnected,” he said. “The global financial landscape does not allow us to continue with siloed projects.”
He urged the GEF to leverage its role as a financial mechanism for multiple conventions to deepen integration. Existing coordination platforms, such as the Joint Liaison Group among the three Rio Conventions, could be expanded to include chemicals, waste, and emerging issues.
Equally important, he added, is shifting the focus from outputs to systemic change – understanding and addressing the economic drivers behind environmental degradation.
“We must not only fight the flames but also turn off the tap that fuels the fire,” Naqvi said.
Financing the Transition
Across conventions, the scale of investment required far exceeds available grant resources, creating an urgent need for innovative financing.
Stankiewicz highlighted the funding gap for mercury pollution and hazardous chemicals, noting that grants alone are insufficient. She pointed to blended finance – combining public, private, and sovereign capital – as a key pathway.
“Grants can catalyse,” she said. “They can crowd in larger investments and unlock development opportunities while addressing environmental challenges.”
According to her, emerging examples reflect this approach. For example, the GEF-supported PCB animation project not only reports on the destruction of Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs) but also on co-benefits such as emissions reduced through energy efficiency.
“That will be integration in practice. And I hope the implementation agencies will also join us on this important job,” Stankiewicz said.
Land, Drought, and Resilience
From the UNCCD perspective, synergies closely link to scaling investment and building resilience, particularly in vulnerable regions.
Cathrine Mutambirwa, Programme Coordinator at the UNCCD’s Global Mechanism, stressed the need to mobilise private capital and expand blended finance models beyond pilot initiatives. This is especially critical in drylands and drought-prone regions where financing remains limited.
She welcomed the proposed integrated programmes on drought and land restoration under GEF-9 as a timely response to country needs.
“These are precisely the kinds of cross-sectoral approaches that affected countries are asking for,” she said.
Mutambirwa also highlighted partnerships with multilateral development banks and regional institutions, showing how coordinated financing can bring together resources – including GEF, climate funds, and development banks – into cohesive programmes.
Speakers also stressed that integration must be inclusive, placing Indigenous Peoples, women, youth, and vulnerable communities at the centre and supported by accessible information and simplified systems.
“There has been too much fragmentation,” Naqvi of UNCBD acknowledged. “We need to ensure that our processes work for those who are custodians of biodiversity and natural resources.”
A Pivotal Moment
The Eighth GEF Assembly comes at a critical time. With multiple COPs scheduled in the same year and the GEF entering its ninth replenishment cycle (GEF-9), there is a rare alignment of political attention, financing, and institutional momentum.
Speakers were clear: this moment must not be missed.
Greater synergies in reporting, financing, and programme design are essential to reduce burdens and improve their impact.
If implemented effectively, such integration could transform global environmental governance from parallel efforts into a coherent system capable of addressing the world’s most pressing challenges.
As Naqvi put it, the opportunity is clear: to move beyond fragmentation and build a system where sustainability is not just a goal but a pathway to inclusive and resilient development.
The speakers revealed that UN agencies and conventions were cutting operational costs – through reduced travel and the use of technologies like AI. At such a time, they are expected to push for simpler reporting systems that align with tighter budgets, smaller teams, and growing workloads. It will be telling to see how the GEF-9 cycle reflects these constraints in both design and implementation.
Note: The Eighth Global Environment Facility Assembly is underway until June 6, 2026, in Samarkand, Uzbekistan.
This feature is published with the support of the GEF. IPS is solely responsible for the editorial content, and it does not necessarily reflect the views of the GEF.
IPS UN Bureau Report
Follow @IPSNewsUNBureau
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La ligne de chemin de fer à grande vitesse entre Belgrade et Budapest, qui devait entrer en opération en février, n'est toujours pas opérationnelle pour les passagers. Une avarie de plus pour ce projet sous pavillon chinois au coût exorbitant.
- Articles / Serbie, Courrier des Balkans, Relations régionales, EconomieA hospital in Kabul. Afghanistan faces an already dire shortage of female doctors as women medical graduates remain barred from taking the final exam required to practice medicine. Credti: Learning Together.
By External Source
KABUL, Jun 1 2026 (IPS)
While Afghanistan faces a serious shortage of female doctors, the country’s Islamist regime has placed restrictions on female students from graduating, further exacerbating the situation. Female medical graduates are barred from writing their final exams, which provide them with the professional qualification to practice as medical doctors.
Nilab (name changed) from Afghanistan, graduated as a doctor three years ago from Al-Birun University in Parwan province. She has not been able to practice her profession because the Taliban have banned women from taking the final medical exam.
The final exam is an assessment that aims to measure the competence of medical graduates. It is conducted after seven years of study. Once the exam is passed, the graduate is granted a license to practice medicine. Those who have received the license can also apply for specialization training at teaching hospitals.
“If a doctor does not pass the required final exam, the situation is the same as if they were a student who had just finished high school. When applying for a job at any health center, the first question is: ‘Have you taken the final exam?’ Without it, you cannot work in any hospital, not even as a nurse,” says Nilab.
The final exam was last held for women in 2021. Since then, only men have been allowed to take the exam. The situation is exacerbating Afghanistan’s already dire shortage of female doctors
“I studied for 19 years. Of that time, I lived in a dormitory in another province for seven years, far from my family. It was a difficult time. In the final stage, only one exam, the final exam, has stopped all my progress. Now my future has been taken away from me.”
The final exam was last held for women in 2021. Since then, only men have been allowed to take the exam. The situation is exacerbating Afghanistan’s already dire shortage of female doctors.
Nilab lives with her mother in Kabul, and her family has seven siblings: four girls and three boys.
Two of her sisters and two brothers have also graduated from university, but their futures are uncertain.
Her younger sister scored one of the highest in the national university entrance exam and was accepted to study medicine, but she was unable to complete her studies. Another of Nilab’s brothers graduated in Russian literature but is unemployed.
The family’s only income comes from her mother and one of her siblings, a doctor named Khalida (name changed), who both work as teachers for primary school girls in a public school. With their meager salaries, they shoulder the financial burden of the entire family.
Nilab has tried to earn a living through other means. Until recently, women were allowed to study in non-university health schools.
“Despite all the challenges, I worked as a teacher in a two-year medical school. However, in January 2025, I also lost that opportunity when the Taliban closed medical schools,” Nilab says.
The years of education wasted have caused her a heavy psychological burden, stress and anxiety.
“We have seen how many young women have taken their lives in recent years. Young women’s trust in government, justice and human rights has plummeted to zero. When women’s voices are silenced and they remain imprisoned within us, it becomes unbearable pain. The pain wears us down, it becomes an unhealing wound,” she describes.
The Taliban’s decision has affected all female final-year medical students who completed their studies in 2022 and beyond. There is now a shortage of women in internal medicine, dentistry, surgery, cardiology, and even obstetrics and gynecology.
Khalida graduated from a private medical university in Kabul in 2022.
A street in Kabul, where restrictions on women’s education and employment are deepening Afghanistan’s health crisis. Credit: Learning Together.
“Our lives have been completely destroyed by not being able to take the final exam. The future we once dreamed of is gone. We worked hard for this future, which included 12 years of school, a year of preparing for the university entrance exam, and seven years at the university, but all that work has now been lost.”
After graduating, Khalida worked for a while in a few private hospitals without pay to gain experience in the field. At the same time, she specialized in ultrasound examinations. However, the final exam or the exam required for specialization was not organized, and she was eventually forced to stay home.
Sometimes, female doctors are forced to do jobs that are not in line with their training and are very poorly paid.
“I also worked for a while in a hospital distributing nutritional supplements to malnourished patients. However, this is a job that even a high school graduate can do. We are doctors who studied medicine for seven years, and we should serve women in the fields related to our profession.”
Khalida is currently studying English outside of university, hoping to pass the national English proficiency test so that she can get a scholarship and continue her studies abroad. She says that 19 years of studying in Afghanistan have not allowed her to alleviate the suffering of others or herself. She still depends on her family’s financial support. Without it, she fears that she will be forced to stay inside the four walls of her home.
As a result of the Taliban’s numerous restrictions on women, many have lost interest in their own lives. Some have lost faith in marriage, while others have been forced into marriage.
“I am single and have no desire to get married in Afghanistan under the current circumstances. I do not want to allow society to have a new generation that is even more unhappy than my own,” says Khalida.
UN experts have warned that restrictions on women’s education and employment in Afghanistan are deepening the country’s health crisis, particularly by reducing the number of female doctors and other female health professionals who could treat women.
“We female doctors are unable to serve the women of our society despite our years of education. Instead, we have become a burden on our families. There is nothing more difficult for an educated woman than this. We suffer simply because we are women living under Taliban rule,” says Khalida.
Excerpt:
The author is an Afghanistan-based female journalist, trained with Finnish support before the Taliban take-over. Her identity is withheld for security reasonsWritten by Clare Ferguson with Áine Feeney.
Parliament has been engaging in preparatory work on the 28th regime, debating and adopting a legislative-initiative report from the Committee on Legal Affairs (JURI) during the January 2026 plenary session. The JURI report recommended allowing national limited liability companies to register as ‘Societas Europaea Unificata (S.EU) to allow automatic recognition in all Member States. However, the report also recommended implementing safeguards to ensure that the regime does not undermine labour and social laws.
The Commission’s March 2026 proposal for a regulation establishing the 28th regime corporate legal framework would allow for quick, digital registration that is automatically valid across the EU. It would also provide for a single tax treatment of employee remuneration and a framework for winding up companies. While Parliament’s resolution supports the approach, it remains cautious about the proposal’s chances of success.
Overall, the objectives of the 28th regime as defined by the Commission and the Parliament are well aligned, as both institutions believe the regime should support the EU’s competitiveness, harmonise the single market and modernise the business environment. However, there are some key differences; EPRS conducted a comparative assessment of the Commission’s proposal for a 28th regime corporate legal framework and Parliament’s legislative-initiative resolution, identifying limitations in six areas of the Commission’s proposal, which include:
The EPRS assessment found that the Commission proposal could have an impact on the generation of European added value, with particular reference to three of the identified shortcomings. Firstly, the scope of eligible companies is broad, without ensuring a clear and consistent definition. Secondly, the proposed ‘dual-track’ system could vary across Member States, reducing legal certainty for investors and restricting possibilities for cross-border scale-up of innovative companies. Finally, there is a lack of measures to establish a specialised dispute resolution mechanism.
Ultimately, the Commission proposal focuses on company law and operations while Parliament takes a broader view, considering the need to support the entire ecosystem around innovative companies, including labour law, investment, and cross-border scale up.
The 28th regime is a key measure in the European Commission’s 2025 competitiveness compass; an economic framework which aims to close the innovation gap, decarbonise the economy and reduce foreign dependencies. The need for such a comprehensive legal framework was highlighted by the 2024 Letta and Draghi reports. Its objective is to create a uniform set of rules for companies applicable across the EU, simplifying the legal framework to facilitate the competitiveness of businesses and start-ups operating in the single market.
The Commission envisages that it should be possible to establish a company under the 28th regime within 48 hours, which EPRS predicts could lead to an increase in venture capital invested in European companies of about €445 billion, thus supporting the potential of European start-ups to grow and scale-up in Europe.
Links to EPRS publications: