European Parliamentary Research Service Blog

Written by Beatrix Immenkamp.

Hate speech and hate crime can destroy lives, harm people and property, threaten individual rights, terrify communities, reduce trust between members of society, create and amplify tensions between social groups, disturb public peace and order, and endanger peaceful coexistence. Hate speech distorts public debate and, at its worst, leads to an abuse of rights that endangers the rule of law.

Hate speech and hate crime are incompatible with the EU’s common values and fundamental rights, as enshrined in EU Treaties and in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. EU law currently criminalises hate speech and hate crime, but only if it is related to a limited set of characteristics, namely race, colour, religion, descent or national or ethnic origin. The European Commission, with the support of the European Parliament, would like to widen the scope of the prohibition to include other protected characteristics, such as gender, sexual orientation, age and disability.

In December 2021, the Commission proposed to the Council and the Parliament to extend the list of EU crimes under Article 83(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to hate speech and hate crime. With this initiative, the Commission hopes to address Member States’ divergent and fragmented approaches to hate speech and hate crime and to guarantee consistent protection of victims across the EU.

In this context, it is important to understand how Member States currently criminalise hate speech and hate crime. This briefing therefore provides an overview of relevant legal provisions in selected EU countries. There are significant differences between Member States, strengthening the argument in favour of harmonising legislation across the EU.

This briefing is to be read in conjunction with the briefing ‘Hate speech and hate crime: Time to act?‘, published in September 2024.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Criminalisation of hate speech and hate crime in selected EU countries‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Gilles Pittoors.

This is the second in a series of briefings looking into the role of the European Parliament in the development of European citizenship, ranging from the 1972 Paris Summit to the 2003 Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe. The present briefing focuses on the period from the 1984 Fontainebleau Summit to the 1992 Maastricht Treaty. This was a pivotal period that shaped the concept of European citizenship as it is understood today.

This briefing delves into the critical role played by the European Parliament in shaping the discourse on European citizenship during this time. Building on its earlier work with the 1984 Draft Treaty on European Union, the Parliament sought to elevate European citizenship from a set of market-oriented rights to a cornerstone of a democratic European community. Despite facing resistance, particularly in maintaining the status quo of citizenship as an extension of national rights, Parliament, with the support of key allies such as the European Commission under Jacques Delors and the Spanish government, succeeded in securing the legal establishment of European citizenship in the Maastricht Treaty.

This period marked a significant discursive shift, recognising citizenship as more than just a by-product of the internal market, but as a foundational element of the European Union’s identity and legitimacy.

Read the complete briefing on ‘The European Parliament and the development of European citizenship: From Fontainebleau to Maastricht (1984-1992)‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Enrico D’Ambrogio.

Over the past 20 years, new Asian players have emerged in the competition for space. Until the end of the 20th century, Japan – the only Asian country admitted to the International Space Station – played a leading role in the region. However, the beginning of the 21st century has seen the rise of other countries’ space capabilities, fuelling a new space race.

China has made sizeable progress, outpacing Russia as the main competitor to the United States. Beijing aims to be the world’s leading space power by the mid-2040s and has integrated its space activities in the army structure. China is planning to build a permanent research station on the lunar south pole and a solar power station in space. China and Russia are increasingly teaming up in space projects. India has showed the capability to perform low-cost missions, including the successful landing on the Moon in August 2023, making it the fourth country to achieve this. South Korea has a relatively recent space history, but aims to rank among the world’s top five space powers by 2045. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia have revealed ambitious space policies; the UAE aims to establish the first inhabitable human settlement on Mars by 2117.

Meanwhile, despite the narrative of a shared vision for humanity in space, China is accumulating major counter-space capabilities, including that of seizing control of a satellite, rendering it ineffective. The Chinese army has meanwhile designated outer space as a warfighting domain. There is also concern around the claimed pacific purpose of Iran’s space programme, potentially supporting its intercontinental ballistic missile capacities. North Korea is also developing a space programme.

The European Union (EU) economy, society and security are increasingly reliant on space services. The April 2021 Space Regulation established the EU space programme and the EU Agency for the Space Programme. The EU’s space strategy for security and defence was adopted in March 2023.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Asia’s skyrocketing space race:A competition for peace?‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Key space-related figures for selected countries

Written by Anne Altmayer.

All Member States bordering the Mediterranean and the Black Sea, together with the European Union, participate in the management of fisheries in this area, in cooperation with several third countries, in the framework of the General Fisheries Commission for the Mediterranean (GFCM). As a contracting party to the GFCM, the EU is bound to adopt its decisions. The European Commission has therefore proposed to transpose a number of recently adopted GFCM measures into EU law.

Background

Fishing in areas beyond national jurisdiction is subject to cooperation among the countries that have fishing interests in those areas, in the framework of regional fisheries management organisations (RFMOs). Some RFMOs have broad mandates to manage various fisheries resources in a specific geographical area, while others focus on the management of highly migratory species (particularly tunas). The two RFMOs covering the Mediterranean and the Black Sea region are the GFCM and the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT).

The General Fisheries Commission for the Mediterranean

The GFCM was established in 1949 under the auspices of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO). The GFCM’s area of application, covering the Mediterranean, the Black Sea and their connecting waters, is subdivided into 30 geographical sub-areas (see Figure 1). The organisation has the authority to adopt compulsory decisions (‘recommendations’) in its area of competence.

1: Northern Alboran Sea
2: Alboran Island
3: Southern Alboran Sea
4: Algeria
5: Balearic Islands
6: Northern Spain
7: Gulf of Lion
8: Corsica
9: Ligurian Sea and North Tyrrhenian Sea
10: Southern and Central Tyrrhenian Sea
11.1: Western Sardinia
11.2: Eastern Sardinia
12: Northern Tunisia
13: Gulf of Hammamet
14: Gulf of Gabes
15: Malta16: Southern Sicily
17: Northern Adriatic Sea
18: Southern Adriatic Sea
19: Western Ionian Sea
20: Eastern Ionian Sea
21: Southern Ionian Sea
22: Aegean Sea
23: Crete
24: Northern Levant Sea
25: Cyprus
26: Southern Levant Sea
27: Eastern Levant Sea
28: Marmara Sea
29: Black Sea
30: Sea of Azov Figure 1 – GFCM area of application and geographical sub-areas (GSA)

Since its adoption, the GFCM Agreement has been amended several times. It currently comprises 23 contracting parties: 19 Mediterranean states, three Black Sea states and the European Union. The member countries include almost all coastal states, among them all 10 EU Member States around the area of application (Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, France, Greece, Italy, Malta, Romania, Slovenia and Spain). There are also six cooperating non-contracting parties (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Jordan, Moldova, Saudi Arabia and Ukraine).

The main objectives of the GFCM are to promote the conservation, rational management and best utilisation of living marine resources, as well as the sustainable development of aquaculture. The decisions taken by the GFCM aim at the recovery of fish stocks and the protection of vulnerable habitats in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea.

In particular, the GFCM establishes multiannual management plans aimed at sustainable exploitation of fishery resources. The current plans cover the European eel, the dolphinfish and the red coral in the Mediterranean; small pelagic and demersal fisheries in the Adriatic Sea; blackspot seabream in the Alboran Sea; Black Sea turbot; deep-water red shrimp in the eastern-central Mediterranean; and European hake and deep-water rose shrimp in the Strait of Sicily. The GFCM also establishes fisheries restricted areas, in which specific fishing activities are restricted or banned in order to protect specific stocks, habitats and deep-sea ecosystems. As a GFCM member, the EU is very active in initiating new decisions, and plays a critical role in fisheries governance in the region.

The GFCM implements its policy and activities through a secretariat based at its headquarters in Rome.

European Commission proposal

As a contracting party to the GFCM, the EU is bound by the measures adopted by this organisation and must enact them into EU law, to ensure their uniform and effective application across the EU. The current proposal would implement into EU law GFCM measures adopted in 2021 and 2022. To this end, it will amend Regulation 2023/2124, which brings together the original Regulation 1343/2011 with its 2015 and 2019 amendments. The Commission proposal marks the fifth implementation of GFCM recommendations into a dedicated regulation.

New GFCM measures and the proposal

The measures proposed by the Commission can be divided into conservation and control measures aimed at sustainable exploitation of marine species, and measures aimed at reducing the impact of fishing activities on vulnerable marine ecosystems and non-target species.

The measures on the sustainable exploitation of fish species comprise, in particular:

• the prohibition of recreational eel fisheries (Article 12);
• management measures for giant red shrimp and blue and red shrimp fishing, including spatial/temporal restrictions in the Levant Sea, the Ionian Sea and the Strait of Sicily (Articles 14-37);
• precautionary closure of red coral fisheries when a trigger catch level is reached (Article 44);
• management measures for demersal fisheries for European hake and deep-water rose shrimp in the Strait of Sicily and the Adriatic Sea, including spatial/temporal restrictions in the Strait of Sicily (Articles 57-72);
• management measures for small pelagic fisheries (anchovy and sardine), including closures in the Adriatic Sea, and for European sprat in the Black Sea (Articles 73-75g);
• management measures for blackspot seabream fisheries in the Alboran Sea, including spatial/temporal closures (Articles 76-80);
• management measures for common dolphinfish fisheries (Articles 81-88);
• introduction of a catch certificate for turbot from the Black Sea (Article 94a);
• management measures for piked dogfish fisheries in the Black Sea (Articles 96a-96e).

To mitigate the impact of fishing activities, the proposal envisages, in particular:

• protection measures for elasmobranch species (Article 98) as well as seabirds, sea turtles and cetaceans (Articles 102-105);
• the establishment of minimum standards for all fisheries restricted areas (Article 106a-d).

Furthermore, a new section on transhipments is introduced (Articles 120a-120k), as well as further measures addressing IUU fishing (Article 130).

Read this ‘At a glance’ note on ‘Fisheries management measures in the Mediterranean: Transposition into EU law‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Bruno Bilquin.

Military operations and missions, and civilian missions, are an essential component of the EU’s common foreign and security policy (CFSP) and, in particular, of its common security and defence policy (CSDP). In an extremely volatile security and geopolitical environment, both at its eastern and southern borders and further afield, the EU has always sought, when launching its operations and missions abroad, to help countries and regions in crisis to restore peace, security and development. This is in the interests of their own citizens and residents as well as those of their neighbours, and is also in conformity with EU values and interests.

There are currently 23 CFSP missions and operations ongoing, one of which was launched by the Council 20 years ago. Half of the military operations and missions (5 out of 10), and a quarter of the civilian missions (4 out of 16) were launched during the European Parliament’s ninth term (2019‑2024). The Council also launched a new hybrid type of civilian-military mission during this period, the EU security and defence initiative for countries in the Gulf of Guinea – to address the effective or potential withdrawal of EU operations and missions from Niger and Mali.

The funding of missions and operations, and selection of leaders, differs between military operations and missions and civilian missions. Military operations with an ‘executive’ mandate allowing the use of force are in a separate category from military training missions whose mandate is not executive. The Treaty ban on using the EU budget to fund CFSP and CSDP activities having security or defence implications has meanwhile resulted in a highly complex funding architecture for these EU operations and missions.

Operation and mission staff include international staff from participating Member States and some non-EU States, in addition to local staff from the deployment countries. Women are notably absent in the highest command positions of the military operations and missions, and very few have been appointed as heads of civilian missions.

Read the complete briefing on ‘EU missions and operations abroad‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Map showing EU military operations and missions, and civilian missions

by Dorian Filote with Adam Furman

Christian Ehler (EPP, Germany) was re-elected as Chair of the STOA Panel, continuing his leadership from the previous term. Joining him in key roles are Lina Gálvez (S&D, Spain) as First Vice-Chair and Ivars Ijabs (Renew, Latvia) as Second Vice-Chair.

During the meeting, EP Vice-President  Victor Negrescu (Romania, S&D) responsible for STOA, emphasised the Panel’s pivotal role in providing Members with independent, expert assessment of scientific and technological developments and the importance of STOA as a platform for fostering dialogue between European policymakers, the scientific and technological communities, and citizens. He stated ‘The Panel for the Future of Science and Technology is a key instrument for the European Parliament to analyse, predict, anticipate and plan issues related to the future of science and technology. We have together a lot of work in front of us in trying to highlight the key role that this structure has for policy-making but also for enabling us to better understand the changes that are currently happening in the world and, in the same time, be able to adapt and regulate accordingly. Europe has been and can continue to be a leader in science and technology and I believe this panel will allow us to highlight this aspect’.

Newly re-elected STOA Chair Christian Ehler, noted ‘Foresight and science advice for policy is more important than ever because we are regulating several transitions at the same time, remaking our markets and societies. Having the STOA Panel, where we can take a forward-looking approach and learn together based on scientific advice, is crucial in such a time. Furthermore, as we have shown in the last term, STOA is the best place for a depoliticised debate on the state of Academic Freedom in Europe. The STOA Panel helps the Parliament to protect this fundamental value of the Union’.    

As members of the STOA Bureau, the four panel chairs work closely with the other 23 STOA Panel members to further its mission of providing independent expert assessment of scientific and technological developments. They evaluate the impact of these developments and help identify the best policy options. Their efforts focus on issues with significant implications for individual and societal progress, ensuring that science and technology contribute to the wellbeing and benefit of society.

A short look back: STOA’s key achievements in the previous term

During the previous legislative term, STOA accomplished several key milestones. One of the central focuses was artificial intelligence (AI) and disruptive technologies. STOA explored the impact of AI on sectors such as healthcare, digital governance, privacy and security. The panel played a crucial role in shaping the European Union’s AI regulation, particularly with the development of the AI Act. STOA also addressed the ethical, legal, and societal implications of AI, organising workshops and producing studies on topics like the Digital Markets Act and Digital Services Act, which supported the EU’s digital transition.

Another priority area was the Green Deal, where STOA contributed policy debates on environmental sustainability through studies on hydrogen, genome editing, and decarbonising industry. The panel organised workshops on energy transition and sustainable finance, supporting the EU’s climate goals. Additionally, STOA focused on quality of life by exploring advancements in healthcare, such as digital health, 5G technology, and rare disease treatments, with the aim of improving public health strategies and resilience.

In 2022, STOA launched the European Parliament Forum for Academic Freedom to promote and protect academic freedom across the EU. Through studies and conferences, STOA fostered meaningful discussions on safeguarding academic rights and identified emerging challenges.

STOA also addressed disinformation and science communication, organising events and studies to promote trust in science, particularly during the COVID‑19 pandemic. The full rollout of the European Science-Media Hub (ESMH) was another significant achievement, serving as a key platform for effective communication between scientists, policymakers, and the media. The ESMH organised workshops, media briefings, and events including a summer schools for journalists to strengthen science communication across the EU.

As STOA embarks on the 10th parliamentary term with new leadership, its role as a key advisory panel to the European Parliament is more important than ever. By providing independent scientific and technological assessments, STOA will continue to shape European policy and provide a platform for long-term strategic thinking. Looking ahead, STOA remains committed to ensuring that science and technology serve European citizens, addressing critical challenges facing the EU and fostering progress for everyone’s benefit.

Follow us online:

STOA website: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/stoa/en/home/highlights

ESMH website: https://sciencemediahub.eu/

LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/company/ep-stoa/posts/

YouTube: @MySTOA

X: @EP_ScienceTech

Written by Silvia Kotanidis.

The hearings of the Commissioners-designate before the European Parliament’s committees are scheduled to take place between 4 and 12 November 2024. Depending on the results of the hearings, the plenary vote on the entire Commission is likely to take place during the November plenary session (25-28 November) or the December session in Strasbourg. Before such a vote, President-elect Ursula von der Leyen will present the full college and its programme. Considering that the incumbent Commission was appointed until 31 October 2024, it is already certain that the new Commission will not be able to enter into office by the time the mandate of the current one ends. The outgoing Commission will thus remain in office until the formal appointment of its replacement, although questions arise as to its powers in that period.

Background

Following the election by Parliament of Ursula von der Leyen as President-elect of the Commission, her next step was to announce, after a decision taken in common accord with the Council under Article 17(7) TEU, the names and portfolios of the Commissioners-designate. They have to undergo public hearings before the committees responsible for their portfolios, prior to Parliament’s vote of consent (a majority of the votes cast) on the President-elect and the Commissioners-designate (including the Vice-President appointed by the Council as High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy) as a body. Ultimately, following that consent, the Commission is appointed by the European Council, acting by qualified majority (Article 17(7) TEU).

The confirmation hearings to which Commissioners-designate are subject are not required by the Treaties, but have long existed in a practice which has been codified in Parliament’s Rules of Procedure (Rule 129 and Annex VII). For the tenth legislative term, the Conference of Presidents decided that the hearings would be held between 4 and 12 November 2024, which means that the vote on the Commission as a body could take place during Parliament’s plenary session of 25-29 November.

This scrutiny of the candidates implies that the steps and timetable may need to be adjusted. Before the confirmation hearings start, the Committee on Legal Affairs scrutinised the candidates’ declarations of interests (Article 3 of Annex VII). The confirmation hearings are organised by the Conference of Presidents and aim to establish whether the candidate is suitable to be a member of the Commission and is fit for the assigned portfolio. The confirmation hearings, which are regulated in detail by Article 4 and 5 of Annex VII, conclude with an evaluation of the Commissioner-designate by the Chair and the coordinators of the committee(s) concerned, leading to the approval or rejection of the candidate.

Once the hearing process is completed, the President-elect and the Commissioners-designate appear before Parliament to present the Commission programme and for a vote on the entire College of Commissioners. The new Commission requires approval by Parliament by a majority of the votes cast, by roll-call vote (Article 6 of Annex VII). A decision of the European Council appoints the new Commission and the mandate of the new Commission starts from the date indicated in that decision.

The notion of a ‘caretaker’ Commission

Considering that the mandate of the current Commission ends on 31 October 2024, according to the European Council decision of 27 November 2019, it is now certain that, with the schedule of confirmation hearings starting only on 4 November 2024, the new Commission will not be able to take up its functions by the time the current one ends its mandate. This gives rise to the following questions: What are the consequences if the Commission is delayed in taking office? What limits are there, if any, on the exercise of the Commission President’s functions, and those of the College, and under what rules?

The Treaties do not explicitly take into account a possible delay in the Commission taking office. Neither Article 17 TEU, setting out the term of office and the details of the procedure leading to the Commission’s election, nor any other provisions in the Treaties provide for this situation, although similar events have occurred more than once in the past (see below).

Article 246(6) TFEU, however, deals with a comparable situation, according to which, when all members of the Commission submit their resignation collectively, they are to remain in office and continue to deal with current business until they are replaced, for the remainder of their term of office. This provision embodies the principle, quite widespread in the life of both EU and national institutions, of institutional continuity. The Treaties do not define the powers of the ‘prolonged’ Commission, but some experts argue that the Commission must act as a ‘caretaker administration’ not only when it resigns collectively as a College but also when, as in this case, the new Commission does not take office immediately after the previous College’s term of office expires.

In this context, ‘current business’ would include all daily, routine business as well as all acts that cannot be postponed to the next College. Against this background, the adoption of new legislative proposals would seem to be excluded, except for emergency reasons. Some limited case law has helped to frame the scope of the Commission’s room for manoeuvre when the notion of ‘current business’ comes into play.

In 2003, the question arose in the case of Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Commission (Joined Cases T-228/99 and T-233/99) as to whether a State aid decision issued by a resigning Commission was lawful. On that occasion, the Court affirmed that the adoption of a State aid decision by the Commission after its collective resignation did fall within the scope of a caretaker administration, insofar as it did not constitute a new political initiative and the supervisory function of the Commission constituted part of the fulfilment ofan ‘essential task of the Community’. In this sense, the Court considered that the Commission had not exceeded the powers entrusted to a ‘caretaker administrator’ but had ‘confined itself to applying to that case a legal scheme of long-established rules and principles’.

In another case, from 2012, European Parliament v Council (C‑130/10), the Court argued that the same reasoning could be applicable ‘a fortiori in circumstances in which a pre-existing proposal remained pending’. In fact, in that specific case, the Barroso I Commission formally amended one of its own proposals – which was then adopted as Regulation 1286/2009 – in respect of its legal basis, to take account of the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. This decision was taken at a time when the Barroso I Commission’s term of office had ended, but the new Commission had not yet formally entered into office. The Court also ruled in this case that such a ‘step was essential if the Union legislature was to continue with the pending procedure after the Treaty of Lisbon entered into force’. However, the Court did not provide additional clarifications on what should be considered as ‘essential’.

A look back

The current situation is not an extraordinary one. The first von der Leyen Commission started its mandate on 1 December 2019, according to the specific European Council decision, while the Juncker Commission’s mandate ended on 31 October 2019, one month before the start of the next mandate.

The Prodi Commission was appointed for a term running until 22 January 2005, although, in accordance with Article 45 of the Act concerning the 2004 enlargement, it ended earlier (on 31 October 2004). The Barroso I Commission should, therefore, have started on 1 November 2004. However, due to uncertainties as to whether Parliament would support three of the Commissioners-designate initially put forward by Barroso, Parliament’s vote was postponed from 27 October to 18 November 2004. After its election by Parliament, the Barroso I Commission (with two of those three candidates replaced, and the third taking a different portfolio to that originally proposed) took office on 22 November 2004, three weeks after the statutory date.

Likewise, the Barroso II Commission took office a few months later than the statutory date, starting work on 10 February 2010 instead of 1 November 2009, due to the delayed ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, which was completed only in November 2009; the election of the Barroso II Commission fell under the rules of the new Treaty. On that occasion, the Commission spokesperson, Johannes Laitenberger, declared that the Commission’s mandate was extended ‘based on the principle of institutional continuity’ so that the Commission could work in a ‘caretaker capacity’.

This is an update of an ‘At a glance’ note written in 2019, by Micaela del Monte and Silvia Kotanidis.

Read this ‘At a glance’ note on ‘The Commission as ‘caretaker administration’‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Enrico D’Ambrogio.

Shortly after having been elected Japan’s Prime Minister in September 2024, Ishiba Shigeru called elections to the house of representatives (the lower house) to be held on 27 October. The vote will follow an intensive 12-day electoral campaign, against a backdrop of scandals involving members of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), rising consumer prices, staple food shortages and security concerns over regional tensions. While this may weaken the LDP’s majority, a divided opposition might find it hard to take over the reins, held by the LDP almost uninterruptedly since its foundation in 1955.

Under the leadership of Ishiba’s predecessor, Kishida Fumio, a former foreign affairs minister, Japan continued to place itself as a key player in international diplomacy, with a renewed emphasis on multilateralism. This gained Ishiba the praise and respect of United States (US) President Joe Biden, in particular for successfully adopting major changes to Japan’s defence policy, maintaining global attention on Ukraine and exerting pressure on Russia while holding the G7 presidency, and contributing to a new era in the Japan-South Korea-US relationship. On the domestic front, however, the Kishida administration was unable to deliver the changes promised.

The European Union (EU) and Japan have been strategic partners since 2003. Bilateral relations are based on two milestone agreements signed in July 2018: the Economic Partnership Agreement and the Strategic Partnership Agreement. EU-Japan cooperation includes a Green Alliance, a Connectivity Partnership and a Digital Partnership. The two parties have also been deepening their cooperation on security and defence. The European Parliament has previously emphasised the EU’s interest in deepening and broadening the EU-Japan partnership, not only bilaterally but also in multilateral contexts.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Japan towards 2024 general elections‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Clare Ferguson and Katarzyna Sochacka.

A key moment during the October II session was the debate on managing migration in an effective and holistic way through fostering returns, based on a Commission statement following up the previous week’s European Council conclusions. International topics also took up much of the agenda, with Members debating Commission statements on war crimes committed by Russia, EU action against Russian shadow fleets and ensuring full enforcement of sanctions, and protection of European journalists reporting on Russia’s war against Ukraine. Moreover, they debated the situation in Azerbaijan, and in Tunisia, the need for a ceasefire in Lebanon, China’s military provocation around Taiwan, and state-sponsored terrorism by Iran in light of recent attacks in Europe.

Members also debated a number of Commission statements, inter alia on a stronger Europe for safer products to better protect consumers and tackle unfair competition, tackling the steel crisis, foreign interference and hybrid attacks, closing the EU skills gap, the abuse of new technologies to manipulate and radicalise young people through hate speech and antidemocratic discourse, the need to strengthen rail travel and the railway sector in Europe, and persistent threats to marine protected areas in the EU and benefits for coastal communities. Members also discussed the findings of the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women on Poland’s abortion law, and the lack of progress in restoring the rule of law in Malta, seven years on from the assassination of Daphne Caruana Galizia.

The Court of Auditors’ 2023 annual report was presented, in the presence of Tony Murphy, President of the Court. Finally, Members heard an address by Enrico Letta, presenting his report ‘Much More Than a Market’, which was followed by a debate on a Parliament statement on empowering the Single Market to deliver a sustainable future and prosperity for all EU citizens.

Macro-financial assistance to Ukraine

As Russia’s aggression against Ukraine continues, so does Parliament’s staunch support for Ukraine in its fight for freedom and democracy. Members held a debate and adopted the proposal on speedy implementation of macro-financial assistance under the new Ukraine Loan Cooperation Mechanism as recommended by the Committee on International Trade (INTA) pointing at the same time to the lack of clarity on the EU budget’s liability. The EU is now set to provide some €35 billion in macro-financial assistance to Ukraine as part of a total €45 billion in G7 loan support.

EU general budget for 2025

Members debated and adopted a set of amendments from the Committee on Budgets (BUDG) largely reversing the Council’s position on the draft budget for 2025. The committee proposed to increase investment in areas that will improve people’s lives, and boost competitiveness and sustainability. The amendments would set 2025 commitments at almost €201 billion and payments at €153.5 billion. This vote sets Parliament’s position for the forthcoming interinstitutional negotiations.

Discharge for the 2022 European Council and Council budget

Following Parliament’s postponement in April of the decision on granting discharge for the 2022 European Council and Council budget, Members finally refused discharge, as they have done for the two institutions each financial year since 2009. Although the Committee on Budgetary Control (CONT) has re-examined the situation, it remains critical of the Council’s lack of transparency. The committee also suggests that the six-monthly Council presidencies avoid corporate sponsorship.

Draft amending budget No 2/2024

Members adopted Draft Amending Budget No 2/2024, which enters the €632.6 million 2023 budget surplus as revenue in the 2024 budget. This leads to a corresponding reduction in Member States’ gross national income (GNI) contributions. BUDG notes the surplus is considerably lower than in 2022, thanks to improved budgetary forecasting and management.

Single European Sky

Better implementing the Single European Sky should make flights more efficient and environmentally friendly, and following lengthy negotiations the Council and Parliament reached a provisional agreement in March on proposed revisions to the rules. The objective is to frame performance plans with binding targets and incentives, and set up a Performance Review Body to ensure their implementation. The revision also stipulates that the Commission carry out a study to help define how charges levied on airspace could encourage more environmentally friendly flights. Members adopted the agreed text at second reading, following its adoption by the Council in September.

Guidelines for the employment policies of the Member States

Under the EU Treaties, EU countries must reflect EU employment guidelines in their employment policies and reform programmes. Parliament is consulted on the annual employment guidelines prepared by the Council. Members approved the draft employment guidelines following the report from Parliament’s Employment and Social Affairs Committee (EMPL). The EMPL committee recommends a greater focus on social rights, minimum wages and the right to disconnect.

Closing the EU skills gap

Boosting EU competitiveness is a top EU priority – and reskilling and upskilling the EU labour force is a vital element. Members held a debate on how to close the skills gap, following a Commission statement on the matter. The recent Draghi report also underlined weak educational performance, a shrinking active labour population, limited adult learning, low labour mobility and poor working conditions as factors contributing to the EU lagging behind, noting that skills shortages are a pressing issue for 54 % of EU businesses.

Role of cities and regions in the EU

For many citizens, their closest contact with the EU is through cohesion policy measures in their city or region. Members held a debate on a Commission statement on the important role of EU cities and regions for green, social and prosperous development. Parliament has previously insisted that cohesion policy remain the main investment instrument for reducing disparity, ensuring economic, social and territorial cohesion.

A stronger Europe for safer products to better protect consumers and tackle unfair competition

Parliament debated a statement from the Commission on boosting measures to counter unfair competition and ensure product safety, particularly that of products imported from outside the EU, and especially those for sale on online marketplaces. With around 75 % of hazardous products for sale on the single market coming from outside the EU, stronger consumer protection is needed to ensure the goods we buy are safe. Parliament has previously called for greater scrutiny of online marketplaces and better information for consumers about the hazards of non-compliant, and often cheaper, products.

Question time with the Commission: Situation of animal health in Europe

Stella Kyriakides (Commissioner for Health and Food Safety) answered Members’ questions regarding EU policy on animal health. Members are particularly interested in proposals to prevent and prepare for possible future agricultural health crises, which have multiplied in recent years. Parliament has previously called for the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control to analyse how social, economic, climatic and environmental risk factors drive disease transmission.

Corrigenda

Following committee approval of corrigenda on a further 9 legislative files voted in plenary before the end of last term, these were announced and approved by the plenary, under Rule 251 of the Rules of Procedure.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘Plenary round-up – October II 2024‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

The European Parliament regularly receives enquiries from citizens about what the EU is doing to promote mental health.

Mental health is a significant economic, social and public health concern throughout the European Union (EU). The COVID-19 pandemic and the cost of living crisis have affected everyone’s mental well-being, leading to increased stress, anxiety and depression. Vulnerable populations were particularly impacted.

Under the EU treaties, health is primarily a responsibility of member countries. The European Union has a coordinating and supporting role, in particular as regards prevention, education and cross-border aspects.

Mental health in the EU

Events like the COVID-19 pandemic, Russia’s aggression in Ukraine, the climate crisis, and other societal and economic hardships have worsened mental health in Europe. Before the pandemic, one in six EU residents experienced mental health issues. In 2023, 46% of respondents in a Eurobarometer survey indicated they had experienced mental health issues (such as feeling depressed or anxious) in the past twelve months.

Policies and services addressing mental health are the responsibility of individual EU countries. However, the EU is taking action on mental health. The EU introduced initiatives and allocated €1.23 billion in funding to be spent between 2021 and 2027 to finance activities that directly or indirectly promote mental health. The most of the funding, €765 million, goes to research and innovation projects related to mental health.

The European Union’s action on mental health focuses on three guiding principles:

• Prevention: Ensuring adequate and effective prevention measures.
• Treatment: Facilitating access to high-quality and affordable mental healthcare.
• Reintegration: Supporting individuals to reintegrate into society after recovery.

European Parliament position

The European Parliament has consistently supported improved mental health and its integration into EU policymaking.

In a December 2023 resolution, Parliament highlighted that everyone can face different mental stressors and risk factors at different phases of their lives. The European Parliament recognised the importance of understanding the various determinants of mental health. It underlined that it is crucial to integrate mental health across policies in order to prevent and mitigate the impact on individuals and communities.

In a July 2022 resolution, Parliament highlighted that 64% of young people aged 18 to 34 were at risk of depression in 2021 due to employment challenges, limited educational prospects, loneliness and social isolation.

In a September 2022 resolution, Parliament urged the Commission to establish a European Year of Mental Health and to create a comprehensive plan for safeguarding mental well-being in education.

In an earlier resolution of July 2020, the European Parliament addressed mental health as part of the EU’s post-pandemic public health strategy. Parliament emphasised the need for an EU action plan that considers both biomedical and psychosocial factors related to mental health.

Further information

• Mental health in the EU, Briefing, European Parliamentary Research Service, 2023
• Minimum health and safety requirements for the protection of mental health in the workplace, Study, Policy Department for Economic, Scientific and Quality of Life Policies, European Parliament, 2023
• How are we coping with the pandemic? Mental health and resilience amid the Covid-19 pandemic in the EU, Study, European Parliamentary Research Service, 2022
• Mental health and the pandemic, Briefing, European Parliament Research Service, 2021
• Psychosocial risks and mental health at work, European Agency for Safety and Health at Work

Keep sending your questions to the Citizens’ Enquiries Unit (Ask EP)! We reply in the EU language that you use to write to us.

Written by Ralf Drachenberg and Rebecca Torpey.

The last formal European Council meeting under the presidency of Charles Michel had an exceptionally full agenda, covered in only a day. The most prominent topic was migration, with EU leaders agreeing on comprehensive conclusions, marking a shift in the European Council’s approach to the issue. Strong emphasis was put on fighting the instrumentalisation of migrants and on increasing returns. Other core agenda points were Ukraine, with President Volodymyr Zelenskyy presenting his ‘victory plan’, and the Middle East, with EU leaders expressing their deep concern about the military escalation in the region and calling on all actors to show restraint and abide by international law. The meeting’s conclusions also address competitiveness, the rules based-international order, hybrid threats, energy prices, COP29 and COP16, fighting discrimination, and the situations in Moldova, Georgia, Sudan, Venezuela, Morocco and Haiti.

General

The European Council meeting was preceded on 16 October by the first EU-Gulf Cooperation Council summit. The summit’s theme was ‘Strategic partnership for peace and prosperity’, with discussions covering trade, energy, climate change, connectivity, and international conflicts. This was the first European Council meeting for Estonian Prime Minister Kristen Michal and Dutch Prime Minister Dick Schoof.

European Council meeting Ukraine

President Zelenskyy attended the European Council meeting in person to present his victory plan, which EU leaders did not endorse as such. The plan has five main points: (i) extending to Ukraine an invitation to join NATO; (ii) strengthening its defence capabilities against Russia; (iii) adopting a comprehensive non-nuclear strategic deterrence package; (iv) protecting Ukraine’s critical natural resources and joint use of their economic potential; and (v) replacing some American soldiers in Europe with Ukrainian soldiers, as compensation for the support provided and a return on investment in Ukraine’s victory.

The European Council reiterated previous conclusions: (i) condemning Russia’s war against Ukraine, which constitutes a manifest violation of the UN Charter; (ii) expressing unwavering commitment to Ukraine; (iii) promoting broad international support for peace based on Ukraine’s peace plan; (iv) opposing Russia’s weaponisation of food; (v) pushing for an extended mandate for the EU Military Assistance Mission; (vi) condemning Russian attacks against civilian and critical infrastructure; (vii) supporting efforts to ensure Ukraine’s energy security; viii) stressing that any action impeding the safety of nuclear facilities was unacceptable; (ix) calling for more measures to counter circumvention of sanctions; (x) underlining firm support for Ukraine’s repair, recovery and reconstruction – with the next Ukraine Recovery Conference in 2025; (xi) supporting Ukraine in its reforms as part of its European path; (xii) committing to providing help for persons displaced by the war, including through financial assistance to Member States; (xiii) condemning third-country support for Russia, pointing to ‘significant restrictive measures’ taken against Iran (in his address, Zelenskyy noted that China was also helping Russia, and that North Korea had army officers deployed on occupied Ukrainian territory); and xiv) welcoming the agreement on the use of profits from frozen Russian assets, while continuing to address all relevant legal and financial aspects.

In addition, EU leaders called: on the Council to swiftly adopt an updated mandate for the EU Military Assistance Mission, and quickly finalise work on assistance measures to incentivise the delivery of military support via the European Peace Facility; for military support and its delivery, notably of air defence systems, ammunition and missiles, to be swiftly increased (before the summit, Denmark, the Netherlands and Czechia released a joint statement that they would continue to deliver ammunition to Ukraine); and for concrete action to further integrate Ukraine’s energy system with the EU’s. They also expressed particular concern over reports that Russian forces had violated international law by executing Ukrainian prisoners of war.

Regarding support for Ukraine’s current and future military, budget and reconstruction needs, the European Council underlined the ‘importance of living up to the commitment made at the G7 Apulia Summit to provide, together with G7 partners, €45 billion (US$50 billion)’ for Ukraine. While Hungary confirmed it would block plans aimed at changing the EU sanctions regime before the US elections, a change required by G7 partners to agree to a joint loan (to be repaid using the profits from frozen Russian assets), a recent agreement in the Council on the Commission loan proposal for exceptional micro-financial assistance of €35 billion was ratified by Parliament in plenary on 22 October.

Main message of EP President Roberta Metsola: We support President Zelenskyy’s peace formula and victory plan as the way forward, and those who tried to destroy Ukraine will pay to rebuild it.

Middle East

The European Council, ‘alarmed by the dramatic military escalation in the Middle East’ and the ‘dangerous cycle of attacks and retaliation’, adopted extensive conclusions on the Middle East, focusing on four broad aspects: (i) the situation in Lebanon; (ii) the situation in Gaza; (iii) destabilising actions by other actors in the region; and (iv) the United Nations Relief Works Agency (UNRWA).

On Lebanon, it deplored the ‘unacceptable number of civilian casualties’, the forced displacements following military operations against Hezbollah, and the persistent use of military force, while stressing that Hezbollah’s rocket attacks must stop. The European Council called ‘for an immediate ceasefire across the Blue Line’ and for a ‘symmetrical and full implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1701′. It also emphasised that the EU would continue to support those affected by the humanitarian crisis in Lebanon, calling on partners to do the same. Moreover, EU leaders condemned the Israeli attacks on UN peacekeepers in Lebanon, described as ‘a grave violation of international law’. In addition, France, Italy, Germany and the UK issued a joint statement condemning the attacks.

Condemning again – one year on – ‘in the strongest possible terms’, Hamas’s brutal terrorist attack on Israel on 7 October 2023, the European Council called for an immediate ceasefire in Gaza, the unconditional release of all hostages, urgent access for humanitarian aid, and a lasting end to hostilities, in line with UN Security Council Resolution 2735. EU leaders deplored the unacceptable number of civilian casualties in Gaza and the West Bank (reportedly over 42 000) as well as the ‘catastrophic levels of hunger and imminent risk of famine’ in Gaza. They also condemned the further escalation in the West Bank, with increased settler violence, the expansion of illegal settlements and Israel’s military operation. The Council was requested to take work forward on measures against extremist settlers. EU leaders committed to actively working on a revival of the peace process based on the two-state solution, and the organisation of a peace conference as soon as possible.

The European Council condemned Iran’s attacks on Israel on 1 October 2024, and its destabilising actions throughout the region through terrorist groups such as the Houthis, Hezbollah and Hamas. It reiterated Israel’s right to defend itself, while stressing the need for all parties to respect international humanitarian law. Moreover, emphasising the contribution of EUNAVFOR ASPIDES to maritime security, EU leaders called on the Houthis to stop their attacks on ships in the Red Sea. 

Lastly, the European Council confirmed its resolute support for the UN Secretary-General. It stressed the essential humanitarian role of the UN and UNRWA in the Occupied Territories since 1949, and denounced obstruction attempts, such as a draft Israeli law to limit UNRWA operations.

Competitiveness and the European Semester

As expected, EU leaders reviewed progress made on the new European competitiveness deal, building on the April and June conclusions. Both Enrico Letta’s ‘Much more than a market‘ and Mario Draghi’s ‘The future of European competitiveness – A competitiveness strategy for Europe‘ reports fed into the discussions, which were kept short due to more pressing foreign policy issues. The conclusions called for work on the challenges identified in the two reports to be taken forward, noting its ‘urgency’. Competitiveness will be a central topic at the EU leaders’ informal meeting in Budapest on 8 November 2024, at which Hungary hopes a ‘Budapest declaration’ will be adopted. Furthermore, the integrated country-specific recommendations were endorsed by the European Council, thus concluding the 2024 European Semester.

Migration

The European Council held an in-depth discussion on migration. While topics such as better control of the EU’s external borders, increased returns and the instrumentalisation of migrants for political purposes have been discussed numerous times in the past, the overall context has been changing recently. Suggestions such as return hubs were highly controversial not so long ago; in recent months, however, a number of EU Member States have called for stricter measures to increase returns. As shown in the Spring 2024 Eurobarometer survey, this is also a result of European citizens’ demands, for whom migration is the second highest concern. While EU leaders disagree on a number of aspects of the ‘comprehensive approach to migration‘, all acknowledge the salience of the topic, migration being seen as a European challenge, requiring a European response. European Council President Charles Michel described the EU leaders’ discussion as detailed and qualitative, with converging views on the external dimension. Six aspects dominated the discussion.

Returns: One aspect on which all EU leaders seem to agree is the need to increase the effective return rate of third-country nationals whose asylum applications have been rejected, which lies at only 20 %. The need for stronger return policies was also stressed in Michel’s invitation letter. In her political priorities, Commission President-elect Ursula von der Leyen announced a new legislative proposal on this issue, one which EU leaders invite her to submit ‘as a matter of urgency’ and which is expected soon. The need for new legislation for more effective returns was also stressed in a non-paper by Austria and the Netherlands and supported by Croatia, Czechia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Norway, Slovakia, Sweden and Switzerland.

Cooperation with countries of origin and transit: EU leaders called for enhanced cooperation with countries of origin to address root causes of migration and fight trafficking and smuggling through mutually beneficial partnerships, including visa policy alignment by neighbouring countries. Von der Leyen reported that the existing partnerships with countries neighbouring the EU were working.

Instrumentalisation of migration: Following Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk‘s recently announced temporary suspension of the right to asylum – justified by security concerns linked to the high number of irregular migrants coming via Belarus, many EU leaders expressed understanding or support for Tusk’s position. They highlighted Poland’s special situation in the context both of the Ukraine war and Europe’s security. The conclusions express this ‘solidarity with Poland and Member States facing these challenges’, stating that ‘exceptional situations require appropriate measures’. Von der Leyen clarified that the decision was legally justifiable if ‘temporary and proportionate’.

Opt-outs: Hungary and the Netherlands even want to go beyond temporary and exceptional measures, signalling their wish to opt out of the EU’s asylum and migration policies.

Accelerating implementation: Meanwhile, Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez highlighted the positive impact of migration on economic development. He also proposed to bring forward the entry into force of the European Pact on Migration and Asylum, an idea supported by France, Germany, Ireland and the Commission President. In contrast, Tusk indicated that that he did not intend to implement the Pact, which is not mentioned at all in the European Council conclusions. The conclusions only stress the importance of implementing and applying EU legislation.

Innovative measures: In June 2023, the use of ‘innovative measures‘, referring notably to the use of disembarkation centres (i.e. centres outside the EU for a first screening of asylum applications), was heavily debated. Supported by Denmark and Austria at the time, the proposal was strongly rejected by other Member States such as Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. Now this terminology seems to be being used more broadly, with the 10 October JHA Council tasking experts to explore ‘innovative ideas related to returns’. Along the same lines, EU leaders called for ‘new ways to prevent and counter irregular migration [to] be considered, in line with EU and international law’.

Numerous leaders, such as Dick Schoof and Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis, have stressed the need to focus on innovative solutions, including regional hubs. This shift is reflected in the Commission approach, with von der Leyen referring in a letter to EU leaders to ‘designing innovative ways to counter illegal migration’, and indicating her willingness ‘to explore possible ways forward as regards the idea of developing return hubs outside the EU’. The first Italian ‘migrant detention centres’ in Albania were declared operational, but the first migrants have now been returned to Italy following a court ruling. A group of 11 like-minded EU leaders met with von der Leyen to discuss ‘innovative solutions’ to tackling irregular migration, and agreed to meet again ahead of the next meeting. Notable critics of migration hubs include Sánchez, Irish Taoiseach Simon Harris and Belgian Prime Minister Alexander De Croo, the latter arguing that ‘history shows that these solutions lead nowhere’. EU leaders will most likely revert to these topics at their 19-21 December meeting.

Main message of the EP President: Roberta Metsola called for swift implementation of the EU Pact on Migration and an urgent increase in the return rate of failed asylum-seekers, President von der Leyen’s letter being a good start for the discussions between the EU institutions.

Other items

The UN system: EU leaders reiterated their commitment to multilateralism and the rules-based international order with the UN at its core, thereby welcoming the Pact for the Future.

Morocco: EU leaders reiterated the main points of the Commission statement following the Court of Justice of the EU’s recent judgment relating to EU-Morocco agreements.

Moldova: EU leaders expressed their steadfast support for Moldova’s EU path. They condemned Russia’s attempts to undermine the coming weekend’s democratic elections and welcomed sanctions adopted against those trying to destabilise Moldova.

Georgia: EU leaders reiterated their concerns regarding actions by the government jeopardising Georgia’s European path. They stressed the importance of free media and their hope that the upcoming parliamentary elections would be free and fair.

Read this briefing on ‘Outcome of the European Council meeting of 17 October 2024‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Anna Caprile.

Georgia will hold parliamentary elections on 26 October 2024, for the first time under a fully proportional election system. The results of this vote will be highly consequential, potentially determining Georgia’s EU and North-Atlantic integration trajectory for years to come.

The election campaign environment has become increasingly tense and polarised. The party in government since 2012, Georgian Dream, led by party founder and billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili, has described the elections as a choice between ‘peace and war’. Meanwhile, the opposition has framed them as a choice between the democratic West and authoritarian Russia. Opinion polls give contradictory results, but those considered more reliable forecast that none of the parties will be able to form a government on its own and that a coalition will be necessary.

Georgia was granted EU candidate status on 14 December 2023, on the condition that the country made progress in nine key areas. Since then, however, the ruling party has introduced a number of legislative acts considered contrary to EU values and obstructing the continuation of accession negotiations. Recent amendments to Georgia’s electoral laws have been criticised by both international and local organisations. In the coming weeks, the Commission is expected to adopt the 2024 enlargement package, assessing progress made by candidate countries, including Georgia.

The elections will be monitored closely by domestic and international observers, including a long‑term election observation mission from the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), joined by a delegation of Members of the European Parliament.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Georgia at a crossroads: October 2024 parliamentary elections‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Marc Jütten.

Since Russia started its war of aggression against Ukraine by illegally annexing the Crimean peninsula, it has been seeking to foster relations with countries in the Global South that are not firmly aligned with the Western world. In 2023, a change in Russia’s foreign policy of 2016 placed a greater emphasis on Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) and Africa, where the Kremlin has been building influence since the Soviet era. Russia’s strategic goal is to counter the United States presence in the neighbourhood and to ensure that Latin America and the Caribbean remain geopolitically neutral. Russia is also pursuing the goal of building a new multipolar world order.

Russia’s longstanding political and security partners in LAC are Cuba, Nicaragua and Venezuela, each under an authoritarian regime. Russia is also trying to strengthen its political ties with other LAC countries such as Bolivia, Brazil and El Salvador. With all LAC countries, Russia works through bilateral agreements and intergovernmental forums, in particular BRICS and the G20.

From an economic perspective, Russia’s footprint in the region is very limited: its trade with LAC countries accounts for a mere 2 % of its global trade. Nevertheless, Russia has gained political leverage through its economic ties, especially due to key LAC countries’ reliance on Russian fertilisers and diesel.

In addition to political and economic relations, Russia has signed several military cooperation agreements with Latin American countries over the past two decades. Currently, military cooperation is primarily limited to Cuba, Nicaragua and Venezuela. Russian arms sales to the region have steadily declined since Russia’s invasion of Crimea and are now insignificant. Alongside political, economic and military ties, Russia employs disinformation campaigns to undermine liberal democracies and promote Russian propaganda narratives.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Russia’s strategy for Latin America: Strengthening ties in the light of the 16th BRICS Summit in Kazan (Russia)‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Colin Murphy.

Money laundering is how criminals convert the proceeds of crime into what appear to be legitimate earnings. Criminals are employing ever-more sophisticated methods, including digital and emerging crypto-currencies, to disguise the source of their money.

The impact on society of criminality is difficult to understate. It has a significantly negative effect across the socio economic spectrum. Likewise, money laundering – a vital cog in criminal enterprise – has the potential to impact on the stability of the financial infrastructure of states.

The EU and the wider international community recognises the importance of robust measures to tackle the issue of money laundering and have taken significant steps to address money laundering and also terrorist financing, which employs similar methods. The first EU anti-money laundering directive was adopted more than 30 years ago. Since then the EU has continued to develop its response to both anti-money laundering and terrorist financing threats. In addition to addressing inconsistencies in the application of rules across the EU, the level and nature of risks have changed with evolving technology and innovation.

The European Union has adopted an ambitious anti-money laundering package to protect EU citizens and to strengthen its financial system against organised crime and terrorists. This package will extensively harmonise procedures and close loopholes in anti-money laundering measures. The establishment of the Authority for Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism (AMLA) in Frankfurt, centralising oversight, brings a new dimension to the fight against money laundering. It will tackle newly emerging threats, and reinforce cross border cooperation and a more harmonised approach.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Understanding the EU’s response to money laundering: New EU anti-money laundering package‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Bruno Bilquin.

Two and a half years after Russia began its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, EU military aid under the European Peace Facility (EPF) is still falling behind, with fresh money needed despite the increased EPF budget reserved for Ukraine. The new plan set in place by the EU and its G7 partners to use windfall profits from frozen Russian assets only began to provide military and reconstruction support for Ukraine with the first payment on 26 July 2024. The EU will use the EPF to channel its military aid under this recent EU-G7 plan, amid persisting legal and (geo)political uncertainties.

New EPF financial ceiling and creation of the Ukraine Assistance Fund

On 18 March 2024, the Council increased the EPF’s financial ceiling by €5 billion in current prices and secured this top-up for military support to Ukraine, by establishing a dedicated Ukraine Assistance Fund (UAF) within the EPF, under Decision (CFSP) 2024/890, amending Council Decision (2021/509) establishing the EPF. The UAF focuses on increased joint procurement from the European defence industry, including Norway. Exceptionally, military products from elsewhere will be permitted, as sourcing kit without US components for instance can be problematic. Reimbursement of Member State donations will be limited after a transition period. The EPF’s global ceiling now totals over €17 billion in current prices for 2021‑2027, including €11.647 billion approved for Ukraine. Of this, €6.147 billion was mobilised so far (€3.770 billion for the first seven regular assistance measures of at least €0.5 billion each, plus €0.377 billion for the common costs of the EU military mission for Ukraine, plus €2 billion for the Ukraine ammunition plan). Some €5.5 billion remains blocked (around €0.5 billion for the eighth regular assistance measure, plus €5 billion for the UAF).

New plan to integrate windfall profits from frozen Russian assets into the EPF

On 12 February 2024, the Council adopted two regulations (EU 2024/576 and EU 2024/577) concerning restrictive measures (sanctions) in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine, and amending former regulations. Regulation 2024/576 clarifies central securities depositories’ obligations when holding Central Bank of Russia assets and reserves with a total value exceeding €1 million, which are frozen due to EU sanctions. Central securities depositories must apply specific rules: set aside extraordinary cash balances accumulating due to EU sanctions alone; they cannot dispose of any ensuing net profits; and must report such profits to the European Commission. Only Euroclear Belgium falls within the scope of the regulation, while Luxembourg hosts the remainder of the Russian financial assets frozen in the EU.

On 21 May 2024, the Council gave the go-ahead for use of extraordinary revenues from frozen Russian assets to support Ukraine’s self-defence through the EPF (90 % of these profits), and for Ukraine’s reconstruction through the EU budget (10 %). The Council press release also notes the adoption of the corresponding ‘set of legal acts’ on the same day.

According to HR/VP Josep Borrell, the 24 June 2024 Foreign Affairs Council agreed on a legal framework for allocating ‘windfall profits’ from immobilised Russian assets to the EPF. However, one country continued ‘blocking the use of about €6 billion’ from the EPF (i.e. €5 billion from the UAF, plus about €1 billion to be reimbursed to Member States for their military assistance to Ukraine, including €500 million to Poland), by vetoing the set of seven legal acts intended to unblock the EPF. However, the HR/VP noted, as that country ‘did not participate in the [21 May] decision to use [the profits of] these assets, it has not the right to participate in deciding to which purpose they are allocated’. The HR/VP added these profits would be allocated to air defence, ammunition and supporting Ukraine’s [defence] industry; €1.4 billion would be available in July 2024, and another €1 billion by the end of 2024. The HR/VP added the issue would be dealt with speedily and discussed at the 27‑28 June 2024 European Council. Arguably, as these profits are primarily sourced from Russian assets, and do not originate from the EU budget or Member States (as the EPF does), a Member State cannot oppose their use to support Ukraine if a qualified majority (required by Article 215 TFEU for the EU sanctions regime) of Member States so decides.

In its 27 June 2024 conclusions, the European Council declared it: ‘looks forward to the first disbursement this summer; invites the Commission, the HR/VP and the Council to take work forward, while addressing all relevant legal and financial aspects, in order to provide additional funding for Ukraine by the end of the year in the form of loans serviced and repaid by future flows of the extraordinary revenues with a view to reaching approximately €50 billion together with G7 partners as discussed at the Apulia Summit, to support Ukraine’s current and future military, budget and reconstruction needs. (…) Russia’s assets should remain immobilised until Russia ceases its war of aggression against Ukraine and compensates it for the damage caused by this war’. At the Apulia Summit in Italy on 14 June 2024, the G7 decided ‘to make available approximately US$50 billion leveraging the extraordinary revenues of the immobilised Russian sovereign assets (…) stepping up [its] collective efforts to disarm and defund Russia’s military industrial complex’. This new plan seeks to provide Ukraine with a US$50 billion syndicated loan, repaid using revenue from frozen Russian assets, a loan the US would issue with Ukraine and G7 members by end-2024. This further illustrates the close EU/G7cooperation on sanctions implementation.

On 22 July 2024, the conclusions of the Foreign Affairs Council insist that EU support under the EPF is unblocked and explain the HR/VP’s update on progress towards the first transfer of €1.4 billion of windfall profits from frozen Russian assets, expected at the beginning of August 2024.

Having requested Euroclear make the required financial contribution, the Commission received the first transfer (‘instalment’) of €1.5 billion of revenue from immobilised Russian assets for Ukraine on 23 July 2024. In its Questions & Answers document of 26 July, the Commission confirmed the 90 %/10 % split in the financial contribution to the EPF for military assistance and the Ukraine Facility. This €50 billion instrument funded through the EU budget (€17 billion in grants and €33 billion in loans), was established by Regulation (EU)2024/792 of the European Parliament and the Council of 29 February 2024, to support Ukraine’s reconstruction. The Commission noted the next call to Euroclear should take place in March 2025. The Commission announced that the EU made the first payment of €1.5 billion to Ukraine on 26 July 2024, channelling the funding to Ukraine through the EPF and the Ukraine Facility.

The CEO of Euroclear Belgium is opposed to seizure of frozen Russian assets (the capital), as initially requested by the US. It is feared that major investors would shun Europe as a result, fearing their assets could be ‘confiscated’, with considerable impact not only on Euroclear, but due to its systemic importance and size, on the global financial markets. Analysts from think tanks such as Chatham House or Bruegel also warn against the legal uncertainty and/or the risk of far-reaching financial market costs of asset confiscation. Chatham House analyst Creon Butler advises maintaining the status quo, ‘including the threat of confiscation as a last resort, reserving the treatment of frozen assets for maximum effect in support of Ukraine when negotiations to end the war eventually begin’. The European Central Bank is against asset confiscation on rule-of-law grounds.

In his press remarks after the 22 July 2024 Foreign Affairs Council, the HR/VP stated that most Member States insist on unblocking the payment due under the EPF for military support for Ukraine. This was in reference to the Member State blocking the use of the EPF for Ukraine, the EPF-lodged €5 billion UAF, and the eighth regular tranche of €500 million (the seventh dating from February 2023).

In its resolution of 17 July 2024 on the need for continuous EU support for Ukraine, the European Parliament regretted Hungary’s abuses of its veto power in the Council ‘to prevent essential aid from being granted to Ukraine’ and urged Hungary to lift its blockade of the EPF for Ukraine, ‘including the agreed reimbursement’ to Member States for the military aid they have delivered. It also condemned Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s July 2024 visit to the Russian Federation, deeming it ‘a blatant violation of the EU’s Treaties, including the principle of sincere cooperation’, a violation that ‘should be met with repercussions for Hungary’.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘Ukraine, the European Peace Facility and additional financing‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Gisela Grieger (1st edition).

On 24 January 2024, the European Commission published a legislative proposal under the ordinary legislative procedure for a new regulation on the screening of foreign investments in the Union. It seeks to revise and repeal Regulation (EU) 2019/452 establishing a framework for the screening of foreign direct investments into the Union.

Parliament’s committee on international trade is expected to be in the lead to draft a report with contributing opinions from other committees; once adopted by the plenary, this will serve as Parliament’s position for the trilogue negotiations with the Council based on the position of the EU Member States. Once a common position is achieved, Parliament and the Council will adopt it separately, after which the new regulation can enter into force.

Regulation (EU) 2019/452 was adopted in March 2019 and has been applied since October 2020. It has struck a delicate balance between the EU’s strong belief in the benefits of open markets for its economic prosperity, and the acknowledgment of risks that may be associated with some foreign direct investment (FDI) in terms of security or public order. The Commission’s evaluation of the 2019 FDI screening regulation’s operation has revealed that the significant substantive and procedural discrepancies between national FDI screening mechanisms have undermined the effectiveness and efficiency of the legal instrument. It has therefore proposed a revision of the EU framework to enhance regulatory convergence.

Complete version

• September 2024: Screening of foreign investments in the Union (1st edition)

Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the screening of foreign investments in the Union and repealing Regulation (EU) 2019/452 of the European Parliament and of the CouncilCommittee responsible:International trade (INTA)COM(2024) 23
24 January 2024Rapporteur:To be determined2024/0017(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:To be determinedOrdinary legislative
procedure (COD)
(Parliament and Council
on equal footing –
formerly ‘co-decision’)Next steps expected: Draft report Member States with/without an FDI screening mechanism in place, as of August 2024

Written by Gisela Grieger.

Mongolia is a geographically remote and resource-rich country with a peculiar location in northeast Asia. An ‘oasis of democracy’, it is sandwiched between its two expansionist authoritarian neighbours, China and Russia. This has required it to walk a delicate geopolitical tightrope of non‑alignment and a ‘third neighbour’ foreign policy to preserve its sovereignty and independence. During the past 35 years of bilateral diplomatic relations Mongolia has not been particularly high on the EU’s foreign policy agenda, with only a handful of EU Member States having an embassy there.

Since the 1990s, Mongolia has nonetheless benefited from EU development cooperation programmes aimed at supporting its sustainable economic and democratic development and from EU disaster relief for the increasingly harsh socioeconomic implications of its exposure to climate change. Classified as a lower-middle income country, Mongolia has also been a beneficiary of unilateral preferential access to the EU market, first under the generalised scheme of preferences (GSP) and later under the GSP+ scheme, and has been able to draw on additional EU funding programmes to bolster the diversification of its trade towards non-mining products.

Currently, an EU-Mongolia agreement on geographical indications is under negotiation with the same objective. The EU-Mongolia political and cooperation agreement (PCA), which entered into force in 2017, has significantly broadened the scope for bilateral, regional and international cooperation to policy areas that were previously not covered by the 1993 trade and economic cooperation agreement. Joint Committee meetings under the PCA have taken place regularly, with strands on political dialogue, human rights, trade and investment, and development cooperation.

EU reliance on resilient supply chains for critical raw materials (CRMs) to implement its green and digital transitions and Mongolian efforts to sustainably diversify its economic relations could draw the two partners closer. As the scramble for CRMs is in full swing and major CRM-importing countries have designed economic de-risking policies to find alternatives to China’s current quasi export monopoly on processed CRMs such as rare earths, the EU and Mongolia could enter into a CRM partnership, despite the geographical and geopolitical constraints and concerns that may arise over the environment and the investment climate owing to increased sourcing of CRMs from Mongolia.

Read the complete briefing on ‘EU-Mongolia relations: Possible critical raw materials partnership‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Mongolia’s top trade partners, trade in goods, 2023 Figure 2 – Main EU imports from Mongolia, 2023 Main EU exports to Mongolia, 2023

Written by Sidonia Mazur.

Pilot projects and preparatory actions (PPs and PAs) are tools in the EU budget designed to test new policy initiatives or prepare the ground for the adoption of future programmes. PPs and PAs give Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) the possibility to initiate innovative policies and fund them before a legal act has been adopted. The financing of both new PPs and PAs and those continued from previous years must be included in the EU budget under the annual budgetary procedure.

What are PPs and PAs?

PPs and PAs are covered by Article 58(2) of the EU’s Financial Regulation, which states that ‘pilot projects of an experimental nature’ are meant to test ‘the feasibility of an action and its usefulness’. Preparatory actions, meanwhile, are designed to ‘prepare proposals with a view to the adoption of future actions’.

PPs and PAs are an exception to the rule that appropriations may be entered in the EU budget only if a legal act has been adopted authorising the expenditure in question: PPs and PAs cannot be used for expenditure for which a legal basis already exists. Therefore, PPs and PAs are an attractive way for MEPs to transform their political ideas into future EU policies and programmes without waiting for legal initiatives from the European Commission. The European Parliament is not the only institution that has the right to propose PPs and PAs. The Council and the Commission can also put forward PPs and PAs, but very rarely do so.

How much money is available for PPs and PAs?

The total amount of appropriations in any budgetary year cannot exceed €40 million for pilot projects, and €100 million for preparatory actions. This means that the total maximum annual allocation for PPs and PAs combined is €140 million. However, the total amount of appropriations actually committed for new preparatory actions must not exceed €50 million. The EU can make a budgetary commitment for a pilot project for no more than 2 consecutive financial years. Budgets for a preparatory action, which often follows a pilot project, are limited to a maximum of 3 years.

Moreover, allocations for PPs and PAs must fit under the annual ceiling in commitments per heading set under the multiannual financial framework for each budgetary year. If a preparatory action is successful, a legal basis for that action could be prepared with a view to the new policy in future functioning under its own legal basis. Moreover, the lessons learnt from the implementation of a PP or a PA might result in the modification of an existing legal basis.

How are PPs and PAs adopted in the EU’s annual budgetary procedure?

The Parliament’s general budget rapporteur presents, in agreement with the other political groups’ shadow rapporteurs on the general budget, a compromise package of PPs and PAs, which the Committee on Budgets (BUDG) usually votes on as a block amendment. The compromise package is based on Parliament’s priorities, as set in Parliament’s general guidelines for the preparation of the budget for the following year. Under Rule 96 of Parliament’s Rules of Procedure (RoP), Parliament gives particular priority to PPs and PAs originating from its legislative initiative reports in accordance with Article 225 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU) and Rule 47 of the RoP. During the budgetary negotiations with the Council, individual PP and PA budgetary allocations can still change.

A parallel EPRS briefing on the EU’s annual budgetary procedure explains the steps, deadlines and actors involved in the annual budget-making exercise in the European Parliament.

Pre-assessment by the European Commission

In line with the Interinstitutional Agreement on budgetary discipline, cooperation in budgetary matters and sound financial management, MEPs and the Council must propose pilot projects and preparatory actions to the Commission for pre-assessment before the July interinstitutional negotiations (trilogues) between the Council, the Commission and the Parliament. Following the ‘Parliament 2024’ reform, the committee responsible for budgetary issues must send proposed PPs and PAs to the Commission only when those proposals have the support of a committee, a political group or Members reaching at least the low threshold (one 20th of Parliament’s component Members). The proposals are collected by the BUDG committee secretariat. Pre-assessments are mandatory under Rule 96 of the RoP. Pre-assessment participation is possible exclusively through a dedicated electronic form (downloadable from the BUDG eCommittee website) and limited to the Commission’s three working languages (English, French and German). According to Rule 96 of the RoP, PPs and PAs linked to Parliament’s legislative initiative reports in accordance with Article 225 TFEU and Rule 47 of the RoP are sent for information to the Commission and given priority during the vote.

The Commission evaluates the proposals using the following grading.

• Category A: PP/PA could be implemented as suggested by the European Parliament.
• Category B: PP/PA might under certain conditions be fully or partially implementable, but the project would need to be re-designed, or more information might be needed.
• Category C: PP/PA is fully covered by an existing legal base, or the ideas are otherwise being addressed.
• Category D: PP/PA cannot be implemented, or similar actions have already been carried out in the past.

Authors of PPs and PAs can use the feedback from the Commission to improve the design of their PP or PA proposal further and ask for re-assessment over the summer. Parliament’s budget rapporteur intends to include in the compromise package only those PPs or PAs that the Commission assessed as category A or B, as well as those PPs and PAs Parliament considered essential. All PP and PA proposals submitted for pre‑assessment, as well as those re-assessed, must also be tabled as budgetary amendments by the deadline set in the respective specialised committee or in BUDG.

Preliminary PP/PA adoption calendar in the EU’s annual budgetary procedure (2025 budget)19 March 2024Deadline for tabling PP/PA proposals for pre-assessment (first round)19 June 2024Publication of 2025 draft budget and European Commission Working document IV14 June 2024First round of PP/PA proposal pre-assessment completed by the Commission28 June 2024Deadline for contacting the Commission to seek re-assessment of first-round proposals25 July 2024 – 17.00Deadline for submitting PP/PA proposals for the second round of pre‑assessment (for newly elected MEPs)Early September 2024Second round of PP/PA proposal pre-assessment completed by the Commission5 September 2024 – 12 noonDeadline for tabling budgetary amendments (committees and MEPs)12 September 2024 – 12 noonDeadline for tabling budgetary amendments (political groups)7 October 2024 (Strasbourg)BUDG committee vote on budgetary amendmentsOctober II plenary (21‑24 October 2024)Adoption of Parliament’s readingNovember II plenary (25‑28 November 2024)Plenary vote and adoption of the budget

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘Pilot projects and preparatory actions in the annual EU budgetary procedure‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Sidonia Mazur.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Pilot projects and preparatory actions in the annual EU budgetary procedure‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Issam Hallak.

Digital finance can broadly be defined as financial services and instruments that use or are based on new information and communication technologies (ICT). A wide range of segments of the financial system are therefore concerned, from digital payment services to the new market infrastructures of crypto-assets using distributed ledger technologies (DLT). Policymakers expect digital finance to benefit the financial system – for example, in terms of transaction and settlement costs, as well as financial inclusion. However, digital finance also poses new risks, especially for financial stability and the protection of citizens.

The idea behind the EU regulatory approach is that by providing a sound regulatory framework, homogenous throughout the EU, these risks can be monitored and controlled, while also favouring the desired innovation. To that end, the European Commission, together with the European supervisory authorities and the European Central Bank, conduct regular reviews of the EU regulatory framework and check its ability to face these risks and the potential needs for intervention. In 2020, the Commission tabled a major digital finance strategy to provide a sound, EU-level regulatory and supervisory framework in a number of digital finance domains.

The EU has already adopted new laws resulting from this initiative. The Regulation on Markets in Crypto-assets is establishing a new legal environment for DLT-based ‘coins’ with a stable value (‘stablecoins’); another regulation will provide a framework for the monitoring and control of digital operational resilience for the financial sector. More legislative procedures are ongoing in the fields of open finance and the digital euro. New directions are being suggested, such as the establishment of a ‘unified ledger’, to smoothen transfers between instruments using different DLT market infrastructure.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Digital finance legislation: Overview and state of play‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.