European Parliamentary Research Service Blog

Written by Clare Ferguson with Olga Dunderberg.

The agenda for the European Parliament’s June 2025 plenary session has a strong focus on the rule of law and advances several important files through the legislative procedure. The Commission will make statements on the following week’s NATO summit, and on the recently adopted European Oceans Pact. His Majesty King Abdullah II, King of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, is scheduled to address Parliament in a formal sitting on Tuesday morning.

The main investment tool underpinning the EU’s Next Generation EU (NGEU) response to COVID‑19, the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF), finances reform and investment in EU countries. Members are due to discuss a joint report from the Committees on Budgets (BUDG) and Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) on Tuesday, which looks at how the RRF has been implemented to date. The report acknowledges the RRF’s stabilising effect and notes that the Member States even exceeded their green and digital targets. However, implementation delays are a key concern, particularly in the impact on repaying the NGEU debt. To boost transparency and traceability, the report calls for improved data on the use of RRF funding, and greater Parliament involvement in ensuring scrutiny and accountability.

Today’s criminal law rules on child sexual abuse and exploitation are no longer fit for purpose. Members are therefore set to debate the European Commission’s proposed directive on combating child sexual abuse on Tuesday morning. A report from the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) on the proposal urges increased maximum penalties for such offences, including recruiting children for prostitution or possessing or distributing child sexual abuse material and proposes to remove limitation periods so that victims can claim compensation indefinitely. The committee also calls to criminalise the use of artificial intelligence systems for child sexual abuse. The vote on the report will set Parliament’s negotiating mandate on the legislative proposal.

On Tuesday afternoon, Members are to debate a resolution drafted by the LIBE committee on the Commission’s fifth annual rule of law report, which looks at the state of the rule of law in all Member States plus four candidate countries. The LIBE report on the Commission’s work highlights gaps on prison conditions and the quality of administrative justice. It also regrets that some non-governmental organisations face restrictions, and urges all Member States to support media freedom and implement the Anti-SLAPP Directive and Parliament’s PEGA inquiry committee recommendations. The report highlights the continued need for EU governments to act on LGBTIQ rights, anti-Semitism, islamophobia and equality and non-discrimination for third-country nationals legally residing in the EU.

Turning to future EU enlargement on Tuesday afternoon, Members are expected to debate reports from the Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET) on the Commission’s 2023 and 2024 reports on EU accession prospects for Montenegro and Moldova. Montenegro’s EU accession negotiations began in 2012, and AFET’s report welcomes the country’s ambitious plan to join the EU in 2028, recognising its commitment to EU accession and confirming Parliament’s full support for future EU membership. To ensure progress however, the report emphasises the need for political stability and the effective implementation of adopted reforms. While the report underlines Montenegro‘s full alignment with EU common foreign and security policy, it also outlines malign foreign interference, destabilisation efforts, hybrid threats and disinformation campaigns as central concerns. Also facing significant challenges, not least the impact of Russia’s ongoing war against Ukraine and interference in Moldova’s democratic processes, AFET’s report on Moldova underlines the need for authorities to deal with fundamental issues such as money laundering and corruption, and calls for EU support for justice reform. While Moldova‘s EU accession negotiations began more recently, in 2024, the AFET report nevertheless emphasises the country’s steady progress on its reforms.

Home to a quarter of Europe’s population and occupying a majority of the EU’s territory, rural areas face economic, social, demographic and structural challenges that affect their economic growth and development. On Monday evening, Members are scheduled to debate an own-initiative report from the Committee on Regional Development (REGI) on strengthening rural areas through cohesion policy. The REGI report underlines the demographic and structural challenges facing these regions, vital for food and water supplies. The REGI report emphasises the need for investment in transport, digital connectivity, agriculture, tourism and essential public services. It underlines that young people, and women in particular, need more support to thrive in rural areas, through a decentralised and place-based cohesion policy with simplified access to funding. The committee urges the Commission to prepare a new rural strategy and to secure sufficient EU funding for rural areas.

Finally, on Thursday, Members are due to pose oral questions to the Commission on the United Kingdom’s planned accession to the 2019 Hague Judgments Convention. Parliament welcomes the UK’s accession, recognising its benefit for citizens and companies alike by ‘simplifying the recognition and enforcement of judgements in civil and commercial matters’. Members are also expected to vote on a resolution, which is likely to remind the Commission of its obligation to respect Parliament’s right to be involved in the procedure.

Further reading

• European Parliament Plenary Session June 2025 – agenda
• Strengthening rural areas in the EU through cohesion policy
• Revision of the Child Sexual Abuse Directive
• Implementation report on the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF)
• 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Montenegro
• 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Moldova
• Commission’s fifth rule of law report
• The United Kingdom’s accession to the Hague Judgments Convention

Written by Dessislava Yougova.

The European Union is currently legally bound to reach climate neutrality by 2050 and has agreed on targets and legislation to reduce net greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by at least 55 % by 2030 compared with 1990 levels. The EU raised its’ ambitions after Parliament declared a climate emergency in 2019 and asked the European Commission to align the EU’s climate legislation with the Paris Agreement’s goal of limiting global warming to 1.5°C. Having become the world’s fastest-warming continent, Europe is now facing increasing and stronger climate-related hazards, including heatwaves, prolonged droughts, extreme flooding, and rising sea levels. However, there is scope to significantly reduce climate risks by applying existing EU and national policies and action that rapidly reduce emissions and prepare countries to adapt to the impacts of a changing climate.

The European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) launched a series of briefings in 2024, based on statistical data, to take stock of each Member State’s progress towards climate neutrality and the EU-wide and national targets set in the ‘fit for 55’ package. Building on national energy and climate plans and using additional sources, the briefings provide an overview of a Member State’s current situation with regard to GHG emissions and removals and its energy system, national objectives and targets, as well as existing and planned measures to deliver on national commitments.

European countries’ energy mix and renewable energy share in final energy consumption are of particular interest, as reducing energy-related emissions by phasing out fossil fuels and transitioning to renewables and energy efficiency is the way to achieve the EU’s climate neutrality objective. Member States are therefore required to contribute to the EU-wide target of a 42.5 % share of renewable energy sources by 2030. However, for several Member States, decarbonising the energy system remains the most challenging issue.

The overview of sectoral challenges and strategies reveals limited progress in most countries in addressing emissions from transport, buildings, waste and agriculture. As EU legislation sets binding national targets for reducing emissions from these sectors, Member States would need to implement additional national measures, particularly in the transport, buildings and industry sectors.

The EU land use, land-use change and forestry sector, which plays an important role as a carbon sink thanks to forests’ capacities to absorb carbon from the atmosphere, is also subject to national targets set by EU legislation. However, Member States’ latest projections show that the EU is likely to miss its collective 2030 target in this sector.

In addition, the EPRS briefings give an overview of each Member State’s climate and energy strategy and climate action governance, as well as the latest policy developments, using available country information. They also shed light on the climate-related spending under the national recovery and resilience plans, as Member States are required to invest at least 37 % of EU Recovery and Resilience Facility Funds on climate objectives.

Written by Carmen-Cristina Cîrlig.

On 20 May 2025, the European Union (EU) High Representative/Vice-President of the Commission (HR/VP) announced the launch of a review of Article 2 of the EU-Israel Association Agreement. The review will assess Israel’s compliance with human rights and democratic principles, which is an essential element of the agreement. This is the first step in a procedure that could eventually lead to the suspension of the agreement.

The EU-Israel Association Agreement

The Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an association between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the State of Israel, of the other part (EU-Israel AA), provisionally applied since 1996 and in force since 2000, provides the framework for political and economic cooperation between the EU and Israel. It includes provisions on regular political dialogue, and establishes a free trade area between the parties, including the progressive liberalisation of the provision of services, of capital movements and of public procurement. It also includes rules on fair competition and the protection of intellectual property. Furthermore, under the AA, the parties commit to strengthening their cooperation in various economic sectors, in research and technology, and in audiovisual, cultural and social matters. The agreement sets up governing bodies, most importantly an Association Council, made up of representatives of the Council of the EU and the Commission, on the one side, and Israel on the other, meeting at ministerial level and having the power to take decisions binding on the parties and to make recommendations, as well as an Association Committee meeting at officials’ level.

The EU-Israel action plan, adopted in 2005 and extended several times by the Association Council, implements the Association Agreement. On 26 March 2025, the Commission issued a proposal for a Council decision on the extension of the action plan, which expired in January 2025.

Reviewing Israel’s compliance with Article 2 of the Association Agreement

Respect for human rights and democratic principles constitutes an essential element of the EU-Israel AA, Article 2 of which states: ‘Relations between the Parties, as well as all the provisions of the Agreement itself, shall be based on respect for human rights and democratic principles, which guides their internal and international policy and constitutes an essential element of this Agreement.’ This is a standard human rights clause reflecting the EU’s longstanding poli cy on human rights conditionality in its external policy. The violation of the human rights (or essential elements) clause by one party to the agreement enables the other to take ‘appropriate measures’, including ultimately the suspension of the agreement. However, the human rights clause does not contain any explicit provisions about the grounds for its activation, leaving the Parties with a wide margin for interpretation.

On 20 May 2025, Kaja Kallas said there was ‘a strong majority in favour of [the] review of Article 2 of our Association Agreement with Israel. So, we will launch this exercise and, in the meantime, it is up to Israel to unblock the humanitarian aid.’ The formal request to review Israel’s compliance with Article 2 (backed by 17 EU Member States) was made by the Netherlands, citing Israel’s blockade of humanitarian aid deliveries to the Gaza Strip and the proposed new system for aid distribution as seemingly being incompatible with international humanitarian law and principles. Pending the review, the Netherlands will withhold its approval of the extension of the EU-Israel Action Plan.

The review is being led by the European External Action Service, possibly with the Commission’s participation, but its timeline is undefined. Reports point to the next meeting of the Foreign Affairs Council on 23 June 2025 as an opportunity to present the review to Member States.

Should the review conclude that Israel has breached Article 2, the likely outcome would be a Commission and/or HR/VP proposal to the Council to open consultations with Israel on the matter, in accordance with Article 79 of the EU-Israel AA (the non-execution clause) which sets out the provisions applicable in case a party fails to fulfil obligations under the agreement, including in relation to human rights.

Article 79 of the EU-Israel Association Agreement
1. The Parties shall take any general or specific measures required to fulfil their obligations under the Agreement. They shall see to it that the objectives set out in the Agreement are attained.
2. If either Party considers that the other Party has failed to fulfil an obligation under the Agreement, it may take appropriate measures. Before so doing, except in cases of special urgency, it shall supply the Association Council with all relevant information required for a thorough examination of the situation with a view to seeking a solution acceptable to the Parties. In the selection of measures, priority shall be given to those which least disturb the functioning of the Agreement.

Article 79 outlines a gradual procedure whereby the alleged breach must first be discussed within the Association Council, in order to find an acceptable solution (i.e. consultations). If a solution is not found, then the aggrieved party may take appropriate measures – for the EU, these would be reflected in a Council decision. Moreover, preference should be given to those measures that would least disturb the functioning of the agreement, thus making suspension a measure of last resort. Nevertheless, Article 79 provides that, in cases of special urgency, appropriate measures may be adopted immediately without prior submission of the matter to the Association Council. Appropriate measures, including suspension, may be subject to the dispute settlement provisions in the agreement (Article 75 of the EU-Israel AA). According to the Commission, this would not prevent suspension.

Suspension of the EU-Israel Association Agreement or other ‘appropriate measures’?

The suspension by the EU of an international agreement is governed by Article 218(9) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), which states that the Council, on a proposal from the Commission or the HR/VP (depending on the areas covered by the agreement), shall adopt a decision suspending application of an agreement. According to Article 218(8) TFEU, the Council ‘shall act unanimously … for association agreements’. Article 218(9) TFEU also applies to ‘establishing the positions to be adopted on the Union’s behalf in a body set up by an agreement’ regarding the adoption of ‘acts having legal effects’. The unanimity requirement would make full suspension of the EU-Israel AA challenging. However, the EU could decide to halt cooperation in specific areas, for example by suspending the free trade area, excluding Israel from research funding programmes (Horizon) or suspending the political dialogue with Israel. Depending on the measures considered, the Council would have to act by unanimity (e.g. suspension of political dialogue) or qualified majority (e.g. trade, research cooperation).

Precedents

The EU has so far invoked the human rights clause of an international agreement only under the Cotonou Partnership Agreement. Article 96 of that agreement (detailing the procedure for opening consultations and adopting appropriate measures) has been applied about 17 times since 2000, following violent government overthrows, election irregularities or human rights violations. While, in some of these cases, EU action did not go beyond opening consultations, in others the EU took appropriate measures, such as cutting development aid and suppressing some forms of cooperation. There is no case to date where the EU has activated the non-execution clause leading to the suspension or termination of the agreement on grounds of the ‘essential elements’ clause being breached. In 2011, the EU partially suspended the application of the 1977 Cooperation Agreement with Syria, invoking the United Nations Charter, as that agreement did not contain a human rights clause.

The European Parliament’s role

Parliament would have to be informed if a proposal were made for a Council decision to suspend fully or partially the EU-Israel AA, in accordance with Article 218(10) TFEU. Parliament’s Framework Agreement with the Commission confirms that Parliament has to be fully and immediately informed of decisions concerning the suspension of agreements and EU positions in a body set up by an agreement (e.g. Association Council). Such decisions are adopted in accordance with the procedure in Article 218(9) TFEU. The Commission also undertakes to ‘inform the Council and Parliament simultaneously and in due time of its intention to propose to the Council the suspension of an international agreement and of the reasons therefor’. In such cases, Parliament may organise a debate and invite the Commission, the HR/VP or the Council to give statements; it may also issue recommendations (Rule 118 of its Rules of Procedure).

Read this ‘at a glance note’ on ‘Review of the EU-Israel Association Agreement‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Jakub Przetacznik.

Ukraine was granted EU candidate status in June 2022. Accession negotiations were opened in June 2024. While bilateral screening meetings of three thematic clusters have been completed, negotiations proper have not yet started, pending unanimous agreement of EU Member States. The European Parliament is calling for the timely organisation of subsequent intergovernmental conferences.

EU–Ukraine relations

In 2014, the EU and Ukraine signed an association agreement and established a deep and comprehensive free trade area, thereby strengthening bilateral political and trade relations. Since Russia began its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the EU and its Member States have made available almost €147 billion in financial, economic, humanitarian and military support for Ukraine, and have welcomed 4.3 million refugees. The EU has underlined ‘its unwavering commitment to help Ukraine exercise its inherent right of self-defence against the Russian aggression and to build a peaceful, democratic and prosperous future’. The EU’s objective is ‘to support Ukraine to reach a comprehensive, just and lasting peace based on the principles of the UN Charter and international law’. In addition, the EU has stressed its readiness to play its full part in supporting the forthcoming steps in the process. Currently, the main priority is a full and unconditional ceasefire. To put pressure on Russia, which is escalating its attacks instead of negotiating in earnest, the EU on 20 May 2025 approved the 17th package of sanctions, and is preparing an 18th package.

EU accession process

Ukraine, which formally requested to join the EU after Russia began its full-scale invasion in February 2022, was granted candidate country status in June 2022. In December 2023, EU Member States agreed to open accession negotiations, as Ukraine met previously set preconditions. The first intergovernmental conference – or ‘accession conference’, marking the formal opening of accession negotiations – took place in Luxembourg on 25 June 2024. The EU and Ukraine have completed screening meetings for three thematic negotiating clusters:

• Cluster 1 (Fundamentals of the accession process)
• Cluster 2 (Internal market)
• Cluster 6 (External relations).

Bilateral screening allows candidate countries to familiarise themselves with the body of EU legislation (acquis), and present the state of their preparations to adopt and implement it. According to the European Commission, Ukraine is ready to open negotiations on Cluster 1 – a precondition to opening any other negotiating cluster. However, due to the lack of the required unanimity in the Council, accession negotiations proper have not yet started on any cluster. Screening meetings on the remaining clusters are continuing, with the aim of completing them, and opening negotiations, for all clusters by the end of 2025. Ukraine has underlined its commitment to implementing all opening benchmarks once requested by the EU.

European Parliament position

The European Parliament has adopted several resolutions supporting Ukraine and condemning Russia’s illegal, unprovoked and unjustifiable war of aggression against the country. Its resolution of 12 March 2025 on continuing the unwavering EU support for Ukraine, after three years of Russia’s war of aggression, underlines that Ukraine’s EU integration is a strategic priority. In its resolution of 2 April 2025 on the implementation of the common foreign and security policy – annual report 2024, Parliament calls for the acceleration of the screening process and the timely organisation of the subsequent intergovernmental conferences.

Read this ‘at a glance note’ on ‘Ukraine’s future in the EU‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Ivana Katsarova.

World Health Organization data reveal that unsafe food containing harmful bacteria, viruses, parasites or chemical substances can cause more than 200 different diseases, ranging from diarrhoea to cancers. In the EU, national authorities are responsible for conducting official controls along the agri-food chain, while the European Commission oversees the implementation and enforcement of EU legislation on food and feed safety.

Read this ‘at a glance note’ on ‘World Food Safety Day: Prevent, detect and manage foodborne risks‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Maria Niestadt.

The EU launched digital partnerships with several Asian countries and Canada in 2022 and 2023, to promote human-centric, responsible, sustainable and inclusive technology governance. These partnerships help the EU to address vulnerabilities like foreign technology dependence and cybersecurity threats, aligning with its Indo-Pacific cooperation strategy. The EU and the partner countries usually meet once a year at ministerial level to discuss topics of mutual interest.

Context

The EU’s digital partnerships with like-minded countries across the globe establish a comprehensive framework for bilateral cooperation on digital issues. They are one of the responses to the EU’s dependence on foreign technologies, and growing tensions with certain countries. By collaborating with technologically advanced countries, the EU can reduce its dependence on any single country for critical technologies. The partnerships enable the EU to promote a vision of digital transformation that protects fundamental rights like privacy, accountability, transparency and inclusivity. They also support progress in areas such as AI and quantum technologies, enhancing both sides’ competitive position. Besides Asian countries and Canada, the EU has collaborated with other countries, some of them not necessarily like-minded. These other forms of cooperation differ in name, scope and structure from digital partnerships. For example, with the United States and India, the EU has cooperated through the Trade and Technology Council, a broader and more prominent form of cooperation. The cooperation with China has been more ad hoc, through a ‘digital dialogue’, with signed action plans on areas like online product safety.

Digital partnership with Japan

The EU signed its first digital partnership with Japan in May 2022. Annual meetings at the Digital Partnership Council track progress and set further cooperation goals. In July 2023, the parties signed a memorandum of cooperation on submarine cables. The latter seeks, for example, to develop submarine cable connectivity via the Arctic. The EU also signed with Japan – a leading semiconductor manufacturing country – a memorandum of cooperation on semiconductors, fostering skills development and supply chain resilience. The EU and Japan collaborate on AI, HPC, quantum computing, cybersecurity and 5G, with reciprocal access to supercomputers. As mentioned during the Panel for the Future of Science and Technology (STOA) meeting on 8 April 2025, the EU and Japan are negotiating an association agreement to associate Japan to Horizon Europe, the EU’s research and innovation funding programme. In April 2024, the EU and Japan signed a memorandum of cooperation on digital identities and trust services, aiming to pave the way for mutual recognition. During the latest Digital Partnership Council meeting in May 2025, the EU and Japan announced the ‘6G MIRAI-HARMONY’ joint research project, which uses advanced machine intelligence to enhance the network components that manage how devices connect to mobile internet services. The parties also recalled that, in July 2024, the EU-Japan agreement on data flows entered into force.

Digital partnership with the Republic of Korea

In November 2022, shortly after the EU signed its digital partnership with Japan, the EU launched the digital partnership with the Republic of Korea, another major semiconductor manufacturing country. The first Digital Partnership Council with Korea took place in June 2023, with the parties agreeing to cooperate in areas such as semiconductors, HPC, quantum technology, 5G and beyond, the platform economy, AI and cybersecurity. During the second Digital Partnership Council in March 2024, they added new areas of cooperation such as network connectivity, and concluded negotiations on associating Korea to Horizon Europe. The parties agreed to collaborate on research and innovation in the field of semiconductors and quantum technologies and, in July 2024, announced their joint support for four research projects in semiconductors. Each year, the EU and Korea organise a South-Korea-EU Semiconductor Researchers Forum; they have also decided to facilitate researchers’ access to each other’s HPC infrastructure.

In March 2025, the EU and the Republic of Korea concluded negotiations on a digital trade agreement. The agreement coordinates their approaches to privacy, data flows and digital trade; it still needs to be signed to enter into force. The sides committed not to adopt or maintain measures that prohibit or restrict cross-border transfer of data. An example of such a measure could be a requirement to store or process data within its borders or making cross-border transfer of data contingent upon using the country’s own computer systems or networks. The EU and Korea also encourage the use of electronic documents and signatures, recognising their legal effect and validity. Consumers will benefit from the requirement to limit unsolicited commercial electronic messages.

Digital partnership with Singapore

In February 2023, the EU signed the digital partnership and non-binding digital trade principles with Singapore. The parties agreed to cooperate in areas such as AI, 5G and beyond, digital connectivity, semiconductors, trusted data flows, cybersecurity, online platforms, digital identity, digital trade, and digital skills. They committed to provide online safety for consumers and ensure that they would not receive commercial electronic messages without the ability to consent to such messaging. They also committed to paperless trading and allowing electronic signatures and authentication documentation to have equivalent legal force to paper-based documents. Similarly to other digital partnerships, the EU and Singapore meet annually in a Digital Partnership Council.

In July 2024, the EU and Singapore concluded negotiations on a digital trade agreement, the first EU agreement of its kind, complementing the EU-Singapore Free Trade Agreement of 2019 and digital trade principles of 2023. The EU and Singapore signed the agreement in May 2025, but it still needs to be ratified by both parties. The digital trade agreement facilitates cross-border data flows by prohibiting unjustified data localisation requirements, similar to the digital trade agreement with the Republic of Korea. The agreement also permanently bans customs duties on electronic transmissions between the parties and protects consumers against unfair marketing practices and direct marketing communications (spam).

Digital partnership with Canada

The EU’s digital partnership with Canada was launched in November 2023 and focuses on areas such as AI, connectivity, digital identity, semiconductors, online platforms, cybersecurity, quantum technologies and digital skills. Both sides share an inclusive, human-centric vision of the digital economy and society, that respects democratic values and fundamental rights, and face similar challenges such as a digital skills gap. The EU and Canada meet annually at ministerial level in the Digital Partnership Council. The parties have collaborated to harmonise their regulatory approaches to AI and Canada participated in the development of the EU’s AI code of practice. They have also both signed the Council of Europe’s framework convention on AI and human rights, democracy and the rule of law. More recently, the EU and Canada have cooperated to secure undersea cables, by endorsing, in September 2024, the New York joint statement on the security and resilience of undersea cables in a globally digitalised world. On 25 February 2025, the EU and Canada held a joint workshop on digital credentials, identity and trust services. The parties explored their systems’ interoperability, with Canada creating platforms for single sign-on to government services, and the EU using eIDAS for secure digital identification and authentication across Member States. 

Stakeholders’ views

In general, EU business organisations have welcomed digital partnerships, in particular digital trade agreements. For example, the European Chamber of Commerce in Korea welcomed the conclusion of EU-Korea digital trade agreement negotiations. The chamber of commerce appreciates that the agreement provides legal certainty for businesses, and helps to increase consumer trust. Digital and consumer rights organisations, such as BEUC and EDRi, are concerned at how digital trade agreements impact the privacy and rights of workers and consumers. The European Data Protection Supervisor has suggested amending the digital trade agreement with Singapore to clarify that each party can adopt and uphold the safeguards it considers necessary to protect personal data and privacy.

Read this ‘at a glance note’ on ‘The EU’s digital partnerships‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Sebastian Clapp.

Military drones have become a defining feature of modern warfare, as seen in Ukraine where they have caused more casualties than any other weapon. Their widespread use spans reconnaissance, strikes, logistics and naval operations, with both state and non-state players increasingly relying on unmanned systems.

The European Union (EU) has prioritised drone development and countermeasures, funding and coordinating research and capability development through the European Defence Fund and Permanent Structured Cooperation. EU leaders have committed to strengthening the defence industry and made major investments in drone production, innovation, and interoperability. The EU is also fostering synergies between the civilian and the defence sectors, addressing strategic dependencies and collaborating with NATO. Furthermore, the European Defence Agency is advancing unmanned aerial system technology through joint projects and its innovation hub.

Meanwhile, drone regulation remains fragmented: civilian drones are subject to comprehensive EU rules, while military drone use falls under international law. Legal concerns persist, especially regarding proportionality, accountability and lethal autonomous weapons (LAWS). The European Parliament has called for transparency, adherence to international law and a ban on LAWS, while supporting defence innovation and proposing an EU drone package to stimulate joint procurement and industry participation, particularly from Ukraine. EU lawmakers continue to stress the need for ethical guardrails, robust export controls and a coherent regulatory framework that balances innovation with international legal obligations. The Parliament also emphasises the importance of meaningful human control over all lethal decisions and insists that military artificial intelligence include strong accountability mechanisms.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Military drone systems in the EU and global context: Types, capabilities and regulatory frameworks‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Citizens are calling on the European Parliament to address the export of pesticides that are banned in the EU. Many citizens have written to the President of the European Parliament on this subject since May 2025, asking her to advocate for legislative measures to prohibit their production and export entirely.

We replied to citizens who took the time to write to the President:

Main elements of our reply

The European Parliament has repeatedly called on the European Commission to take action to prohibit the export from the EU of hazardous substances banned in the EU.

In a resolution from 2021, Parliament called for the EU to stop all exports of pesticides banned in the EU, in line with the EU’s commitments to policy coherence for development, the Green Deal, the ‘do no harm’ principle and the Rotterdam Convention. In another 2021 resolution, Parliament stressed that the EU should support developing countries to help them reduce the imprudent use of pesticides and promote other methods to protect plants and fishery resources.

In 2024, the European Parliament rejected two Commission proposals to allow higher pesticides levels in imported food. Parliament stressed that allowing higher maximum residue levels for imports would jeopardise citizens’ health, both in Europe and in the producing countries.

In 2023, the European Parliament held a debate on the sustainable use of pesticides. You can watch the video of the debate on the Parliament multimedia website. The transcription is also available (in the language of the speaker).

Background

Citizens often send messages to the President of the European Parliament expressing their views and/or requesting action. The Citizens’ Enquiries Unit (AskEP) within the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) replies to these messages, which may sometimes be identical as part of wider public campaigns.

Written by Polona Car and Beatrix Immenkamp.

Differences between the United States (US) and the European Union (EU) over the regulation of online platforms have taken on a new dimension under the Trump administration. Senior members of the US administration have strongly criticised the EU for ‘limiting free speech’ and have called the EU’s content moderation law ‘incompatible with America’s free speech tradition’. Much of the debate is informed by misconceptions and misunderstandings.

The differences between the US and EU hate speech regimes are striking, largely for historical reasons. The First Amendment to the US Constitution provides almost absolute protection to freedom of expression. By contrast, European and EU law curtails the right to freedom of expression. Article 10 of the European Convention of Human Rights, which applies to all EU Member States, states that freedom of expressions ‘carries with it duties and responsibilities’. In a democratic society, restrictions may be imposed in the interest, among others, ‘of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others’. EU legislation criminalises hate speech that publicly incites to violence or hatred and targets a set of protected characteristics: race, colour, religion, descent or national or ethnic origin. Even though legislation in EU Member States varies widely, many have extended protection from hate speech to additional characteristics.

In light of the exponential growth of the internet and the use of social media, the debate about hate speech has essentially become about regulating social media companies. The focus has been on the question of whether and to what extent service providers are responsible for removing hate speech published on social media platforms. The US has opted not to impose any obligation on social media companies to remove content created by third parties, merely granting them the right to restrict access to certain material deemed to be ‘obscene’ or ‘otherwise objectionable’. By contrast, the EU has adopted regulation that obliges companies to remove offensive content created by third parties, including hate speech, once it is brought to their attention. Social media companies also self-regulate, by adopting community guidelines that allow users to flag hate speech and ask for its removal.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Hate speech: Comparing the US and EU approaches‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Citizens often turn to the European Parliament to ask how the European Union deals with combating poverty and social exclusion

In 2023, according to Eurostat, around 20 % of the European Union (EU) population, and 25 % of children in the EU, were at risk of poverty or social exclusion. Although fighting poverty and social exclusion are among the EU’s specific objectives, social policy is primarily a responsibility of EU countries. The European Union only plays a coordinating and supporting role.

In 2017, the European Parliament, the Council and the European Commission announced the European Pillar of Social Rights, a strategy to move towards a strong, social Europe that is fair and inclusive. Under the Pillar’s 2021 action plan, the EU wants to reduce the number of people at risk of poverty or social exclusion by at least 15 million by 2030.

EU funds to fight poverty and social exclusion European Social Fund Plus (ESF+)

The European Social Fund Plus (ESF+) for 2021 to 2027 has a €142 billion to support the EU’s employment, social, education and skills policies.

EU countries must dedicate at least 25 % of ESF+ funding to social inclusion: supporting people at risk of poverty, non-EU citizens and marginalised communities, such as Roma people. The ESF+ also aims to improve access to essential services, including housing and healthcare, and to combat social exclusion, particularly of children.

In March 2025, the European Parliament adopted a resolution on the post-2027 ESF+:

• calling for increased ESF+ funding to strengthen the EU’s social policies;
• emphasising the need to reinforce the ESF+ to support vulnerable people, invest in skills, combat poverty, and boost social investment and entrepreneurship;
• warning against splitting or merging the ESF+ with other funds, as this could weaken its ability to achieve its objectives and those of the European Pillar of Social Rights.

Other EU funds

To mitigate the economic and social impact of the coronavirus pandemic, the EU set up the temporary Recovery and Resilience Facility until 2026. Two of the six pillars set out in the instrument contribute to tackling poverty and social exclusion: the pillar on social and territorial cohesion and the pillar on policies for the next generation, children and youth.

Since the beginning of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the EU has adopted swift changes to its funds to assist EU countries in welcoming people fleeing Ukraine and in supporting their integration. In October 2022, the EU adopted a law to allow for the provision of immediate assistance to displaced persons, including those fleeing conflict, through rapid access to healthcare and other essential services.

Minimum wages

In 2022, the EU adopted rules on adequate minimum wages across the European Union. They seek to establish a framework for EU countries to ensure that workers receive a fair minimum wage that provides a decent standard of living. However, these rules do not oblige EU countries to introduce minimum wages by law, nor do they set a common minimum wage level across the EU. The EU countries had until 2024 to take measures to:

• adopt national strategies for setting and updating minimum wages, where minimum wages are set by law, that take into account factors like purchasing power, cost of living, and collective bargaining coverage;
• promote collective bargaining on wages;
• improve monitoring and enforcement of minimum wage protection.

European Parliament’s position

The European Parliament has consistently expressed its strong commitment to combating poverty and social exclusion across Europe.

Women’s poverty: In a 2022 resolution, the European Parliament stressed that women are disproportionately, and often involuntarily, employed in precarious work. It underlined the crucial role of high-quality public services in combating women’s poverty. It also urged the EU and its member countries to take gender into account when defining policies to address homelessness. 

Children’s rights: In a 2021 resolution, the European Parliament asked EU countries to establish national strategies for tackling child poverty and social exclusion.

In-work poverty: In a 2021 resolution, Parliament recalled that preventing and tackling in-work poverty must be part of the overall goal to eradicate poverty in the EU.

Roma inclusion: In October 2022, Parliament addressed the need to tackle antigypsyism in all areas of society through effective legislative and policy measures. It called to increase Roma participation, especially from under-represented groups, when creating and implementing these measures.

Decent and affordable housing for all: In a 2021 resolution, the European Parliament called on the Commission and EU countries to make sure that the right to adequate housing is recognised as a fundamental human right that is legally guaranteed. It also called on them to ensure that public money is not used to support housing projects that might lead to segregation or social exclusion. In a 2020 resolution on homelessness in the EU, Parliament stressed that access to emergency shelters should only be temporary and is not an alternative to structural solutions such as prevention and the provision of adequate housing and social support.

In 2025, Parliament set up a special committee on the housing crisis in the EU. The committee will investigate the root causes of the housing crisis and propose practical solutions at European level.

Energy poverty: In October 2022, Parliament urged EU countries to ensure people could afford to heat their homes and to avoid evictions of vulnerable households unable to pay their energy bills. It highlighted that many people were already in vulnerable situations before the crisis, and warned that inflation could make the situation unbearable for low-income households, with the middle class also being increasingly affected.

Further information

• A coordinated EU approach to housing, Briefing, European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS), January 2025
• EU contribution to the fight against child poverty, At a glance, European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS), October 2024
• Roma in 10 European Countries – Main results, Report, EU Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA), October 2022
• The fight against poverty, social exclusion and discrimination, Fact Sheet on the European Union, European Parliament, August 2022
• European Social Fund Plus (2021-2027), At a glance, European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS), June 2021
• Social protection and social inclusion, European Commission

Keep sending your questions to the Citizens’ Enquiries Unit (Ask EP)! We reply in the EU language that you use to write to us.

Written by Marc Jütten.

After a political lull of almost a decade, the European Union (EU) and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) relaunched their strategic partnership in Buenos Aires, Argentina, on 27 October 2022. The 2022-2023 bi-regional roadmap, together with the EU’s joint communication of 7 June 2023 on a new agenda for Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), prepared the ground for the successful third EU–CELAC summit that took place in Brussels on 17 and 18 July 2023 under the Spanish Presidency of the Council.

Two years later, the partners are preparing for the next EU–CELAC summit, due to take place in Santa Marta, Colombia, on 9 and 10 November 2025. This leaders’ meeting is deemed crucial for the EU to deepen its commitment to LAC and advance the strategic partnership.

From the EU’s perspective, the Latin American region is key – not only politically, given the recent geopolitical challenges, and economically, because of its great potential as a market for industrial products, but also as a stable supplier of renewable energy sources and critical minerals such as lithium and copper that are crucial for the transformation of the global economy.

Geopolitical developments have made it all the more urgent to intensify relations between the EU and CELAC: China has become a dominant player in LAC and is today a strong competitor for the EU and the United States (US). The US policy approach towards LAC under President Donald Trump is strained; this could be an opportunity for the EU to present itself as a reliable partner to the region. The promotion of inclusive and, in particular, mutually beneficial agreements on trade and on raw materials could be an advantage for the EU over its competitors.

The summit in Santa Marta provides a chance to elevate the EU–CELAC relationship to the next level. The main tasks will include deepening and concretising the bi-regional relations on issues such as trade and investment and the green and digital transitions, and further strengthening cooperation on other issues such as the fight against organised crime.

A litmus test for the strategic partnership will also be whether the partners manage to finalise the two key pending international agreements with Mexico and Mercosur respectively.

Read the complete briefing on ‘EU–CELAC relations ahead of the 2025 summit‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Costica Dumbrava.

The development of the Schengen area is one of the major achievements of European integration. The removal of checks on persons at the Schengen states’ internal borders greatly facilitates the exercise of the EU freedoms of movement, which brings significant social and economic benefits.

The Schengen area has come under increased stress in the past decade, owing to multiple challenges relating to increased migration into the EU, threats to internal security and the COVID‑19 pandemic. In response to these challenges, many Schengen states decided to reintroduce checks at some or all of their internal borders. Despite the prescribed temporary nature of such measures, several Schengen states have prolonged these checks for years on end. The number of Schengen states with checks at internal borders reached its peak (18 states) during the first wave of the pandemic. In May 2025, 11 Schengen states had checks at internal borders owing to serious threats related to irregular migration and/or internal security.

The Schengen area has expanded gradually in the past three decades and is now composed of 29 countries. In January 2025, Bulgaria and Romania were the latest two countries to fully join the Schengen area, 18 years after their accession to the EU. Cyprus is also legally bound to join the Schengen area, but the evaluation procedure for its full accession is still ongoing.

This briefing presents key recent figures and developments in the Schengen area, focusing on the Schengen states’ measures to reintroduce checks at internal borders, and on the current situation regarding the completion of the Schengen area. This is an update of a briefing originally published in December 2023.

Read the complete briefing on ‘State of the Schengen area‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Timeline of Schengen enlargement Cumulative period of checks at Schengen states’ internal borders over the 2006-2025 period (in days) Number of Schengen states with checks at their internal borders (2014-2025)

Written by Saša Butorac.

The modernisation and expansion of electricity grids lies at the heart of the EU’s energy transition and decarbonisation efforts. In the context of the rising share of electricity in final energy consumption, there is increasing demand for grid upgrades to accommodate the new generation capacity and to adapt, in particular, to the intermittent nature of renewable energy sources. Key concerns include ageing infrastructure, investment shortfalls, and regulatory complexities that hinder rapid modernisation of grids and efficient integration of decentralised energy production. Interconnectivity between EU Member States is important to ensure energy security and reliability: the integration of European electricity markets benefits consumers by up to €34 billion every year.

To meet the challenge posed by electricity infrastructure modernisation, various innovative solutions, including the adoption of smart grids, digitalisation, and grid enhancement technologies, should be considered. In addition, ways of increasing private and public sector financing should be explored to meet the challenge of the massive investments that are needed in this sector in the coming decades; methodologies and scenarios for anticipating future needs constitute an essential element in ensuring a cost-effective approach to the development of grids. Globally, electricity grids will need to increase by more than 20 % in length by 2030 to meet energy and climate pledges in time and in full, which requires annual average investment in grids to rise to US$600 billion from around US$300 billion today, according to the International Energy Agency.

Concerning supply chain risks, the need for resilient and effective grid manufacturing supply chains is recognised by the Net-Zero Industry Act, which designates grid technologies as strategic net-zero technologies. Recognising the critical importance of grids for the EU energy union and economy as a whole, the European Commission came forward with an EU action plan for grids in November 2023, while a new European grids package is expected in the coming months. Parliament’s Committee on Industry, Research and Energy adopted an own-initiative report on the subject on 13 May 2025.

Read the complete briefing on ‘EU electricity grids‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Suzana Elena Anghel.

Following a request from the European Council in June 2024, the European Commission and the High Representative are due to adopt a joint communication on the EU strategic approach to the Black Sea region on 28 May 2025. This new initiative aims to:

• offer a political vision regarding the Black Sea, based on an overview of the challenging security situation in the region following Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine;
• re-confirm the EU’s strategic interest in the Black Sea as well as its intention to continue to engage with like-minded partners in/from the region on a bilateral and/or regional level;
• present a ‘strategic approach’ and not a ‘strategy’, displaying a lower level of ambition, which may represent a missed opportunity for the European Union to establish itself as a regional key player;
• build on the experience and achievements of the Black Sea Synergy, a 2007 EU initiative aimed at promoting, on a voluntary basis, cooperation in/with the Black Sea region;
• build coherence between the different EU polices and the Union’s offer to the region;
• re-confirm and re-cluster existing fields of cooperation in line with the Commission’s priorities, giving precedence to security, connectivity and preparedness;
• complement other EU initiatives relevant for the region, e.g. the Eastern Partnership and regional cooperation on the Danube River.

The initiative is not expected to:

• benefit from dedicated funding; it will rely on other EU policies and instruments;
• precede an action plan with clear-cut implementation objectives; implementation will be difficult to assess and monitor.

Read the complete briefing on ‘EU strategic approach to the Black Sea region‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Martina Prpic.

Trafficking in human beings is a serious crime and a violation of human rights. When it happens to children, it disrupts their childhood and exposes them to horrific exploitation and abuse, and a precarious future. Even though the true number of victims of human trafficking is not known, recent data reveal that the number of child victims has been on the increase. Awareness of children as victims of human trafficking has increased as well.

Just like adult victims, child victims can be trafficked for sexual exploitation, forced labour, forced criminality or organ removal. Recently, the EU has officially recognised new forms of exploitation, including surrogacy, forced marriage and illegal adoption. There are geographical differences in the recruitment of victims, with the vast majority of child victims originating from northern, southern and western Europe being girls (82.9 %) and 55.1 % of child victims from Africa and 77.6 % of child victims from southern Asia being boys. Female child victims are more likely to report sexual exploitation, while male child victims are more likely to be exploited through child labour. Forced criminality in the EU, although comparatively lower as a share of the total number of victims, is steadily increasing, with boys of migration background being the main targets.

The EU’s anti-trafficking legislation was amended last year, resulting in legislation that identifies children as especially vulnerable to trafficking. The amendments also expanded the list of forms of exploitation to include those that particularly affect children and emphasised the importance of a victim-centred approach and prevention. Member States are therefore asked, inter alia, to promote and provide regular and specialised training for professionals who are likely to come into contact with such children. Another relevant directive, on victims’ rights, is currently being revised to provide even more rights to victims, including child victims. The existing directive already prioritises the best interests of children when applying its provisions.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Trafficking in children‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Clare Ferguson and Katarzyna Sochacka.

The second May plenary session in 2025 opened with Nataša Pirc Musar, President of the Republic of Slovenia, addressing Parliament in a formal sitting. Following her call for European solidarity, Members then debated the EU’s response to the Israeli government’s plan to seize the Gaza Strip, the urgent need for humanitarian support and for all hostages to be freed. Members also debated the Hungarian government’s drift to Russia-style repression, including threats to freedom of expression and democratic participation, and approved new tariffs on agricultural goods from Russia and Belarus. Members also debated and voted on a report on the Committee on Petitions’ activities in 2023.

Simplifying and strengthening CBAM

Tackling climate change remains an urgent priority and the EU has set stringent rules on greenhouse gas emissions. As the rules make carbon-intensive activities more costly, this leads to a risk that some companies try to increase their profits by moving their carbon-heavy activity outside the EU. To level the playing field for businesses, the EU carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM) ensures prices fairly reflect the carbon emitted during production of imported goods such as cement, iron and steel, aluminium, fertilisers and electricity. Before it comes into full operation in 2026, the European Commission is proposing to simplify CBAM. Members debated and adopted a report from Parliament’s Committee on the Environment, Climate and Food Safety that largely endorses the Commission proposal to simplify and strengthen CBAM, pending clarifications on electricity generation and embedded emissions. The report sets Parliament’s position for negotiations with the Council on the proposal.

Single market strategy

Continued single market fragmentation constrains EU companies’ ability to compete internationally, and many of the issues remain the same as they were 20 years ago. Members debated the Commission’s newly adopted strategy to bring new impetus to the single market. While reaffirming Parliament’s role in the process, Parliament has emphasised that Member States must implement and enforce existing single market legislation. It also demanded renewed commitment from Member States and other EU institutions to strengthen and further develop the single market, particularly in the services, digital and energy sectors.

Choose Europe for science

Academic freedom is increasingly under attack in many parts of the world. Following Council and Commission statements on attracting scientists, researchers and academics to Europe, particularly to contribute to the development of new, cutting-edge technologies, Members held a debate on the Commission’s ‘Choose Europe for Science‘ initiative. Parliament already called for increased Horizon Europe funding for researchers in its resolution on the 2026 budget guidelines.

Russian energy phase-out, Nord Stream and EU energy sovereignty

Following Council and Commission statements on ending Europe’s dependency on Russian energy by phasing out imports, Members debated plans to increase the EU’s energy sovereignty. The Commission’s recent roadmap – addressing the security and economic risks of continued reliance on Russian energy – is expected to provide an answer to Parliament’s repeated calls for measures to provide alternatives to imported Russian energy, to abandon Nord Stream 1 and 2, and to secure a reliable supply of medical radioisotopes.

Improving mental health at work

Members debated EU initiatives to improve mental health at work. Mental health issues have a considerable impact on society and the economy, and Parliament strongly supports the promotion of good mental health and its inclusion in EU policymaking. Parliament has called for an EU strategy for mental health and legislation on the use of artificial intelligence at work. Parliament also urged the Commission to propose minimum requirements for telework; legislation on psychosocial risks and wellbeing at work; and a ‘long-term, comprehensive and integrated European mental health strategy’.

Opening of trilogue negotiations

One decision to enter into interinstitutional negotiations, was announced, from the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee (ECON) on a proposal for a regulation on securities settlement in the EU and central securities depositories (CSDs): shorter settlement cycle in the Union.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘Plenary round-up – May II 2025‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Carmen-Cristina Cîrlig.

Since April 2025, the United States (US) and Iran have been engaging in talks over a new nuclear deal. The current multilateral agreement limiting Iran’s nuclear programme is considered defunct by most analysts, after the US withdrew in 2018 and Iran started breaching its provisions as of 2019.

Background

Iran has been under multilateral sanctions for its nuclear proliferation activities since 2006. On 14 July 2015, Iran and the E3/EU+3 (or P5+1) – China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom (UK) and the US, with the EU High Representative – concluded the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), an agreement endorsed by the UN Security Council (UNSC), to limit Iran’s nuclear programme in exchange for sanctions relief. The JCPOA caps at 3.67 % Iran’s uranium enrichment (the weapons-grade threshold is 90 %), and at 300 kg its stockpile of enriched uranium; limits the number of Iran’s centrifuges and its nuclear R&D programme; and allows extensive monitoring by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Iran also committed never to seek, develop or acquire nuclear weapons. In exchange, the UNSC gradually lifted its sanctions against Iran, while the EU and US ceased to apply some of their own. In 2018, President Donald Trump withdrew the US from the JCPOA, re-imposed all lifted sanctions and applied new ones, as part of a ‘maximum pressure‘ campaign against Iran. The EU remains bound by the deal, but maintains proliferation-related sanctions, alongside non-nuclear related ones. Although still party to the agreement, Iran started exceeding JCPOA limits in 2019, and fully stopped implementing its nuclear-related commitments in 2021. Iran currently has a 275 kg stockpile of uranium enriched to 60 %. In October 2025, UNSC sanctions are set to expire, unless the JCPOA ‘snapback mechanism‘ to re-impose them is triggered.

Recent US-Iran diplomatic re-engagement

In a March 2025 letter to Iran’s Supreme Leader, President Trump reportedly set a two-month deadline to reach a nuclear deal, threatening Iran with (military) consequences otherwise. After an initial harsh reaction from Ayatollah Khamenei, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian left open the ‘path for indirect negotiations’. The first round of US-Iran talks took place on 12 April 2025; a fourth concluded on 11 May 2025. The Oman-mediated talks (the highest level since 2018) are indirect, although reports mention some direct exchanges between US and Iranian negotiators. The former Biden US administration sought to revive the JCPOA, but indirect talks with Iran stalled in the summer of 2022. A year later, secret indirect discussions aimed for an ‘informal’ pact to prevent further escalation between the US and Iran.

The US objectives in the talks are surrounded by some uncertainty. President Trump initially stated the objective of preventing Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons. The US position then shifted, with Trump stating the goal of ‘full dismantlement’ of Iran’s nuclear programme, while likely accepting a civilian nuclear programme. The US Secretary of State has called for a complete halt to uranium enrichment (with a potential Iranian civilian programme based on imported enriched uranium), to its production of long-range missiles and to its support for terrorist groups and the Houthis. However, other administration voices suggest that the US agree to some uranium enrichment in order to get a deal and avoid a military strike that could lead to war. Iranian officials have condemned the ‘contradictory and conflicting’ US positions. Stressing its right to maintain a ‘complete nuclear fuel cycle’, as a signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, Iran has rejected the prospect of dismantling its nuclear programme and renouncing uranium enrichment, but would discuss concerns regarding ‘potential militarisation’. Iran has also rejected any discussion of its defence and missile capabilities, but suggested it would not build a nuclear-capable missile. At the same time, Iran has framed a deal as a win-win for both sides, inviting the US to invest in its nuclear energy programme.

Signs of progress …

Iranian officials have described as ‘very serious and productive’ the current discussions covering technical issues, such as the monitoring of Iran’s nuclear facilities and what would happen to its stockpiles of highly enriched uranium. Iran aims to secure the effective lifting of sanctions and ironclad guarantees from the US that it would not renege on a potential deal. The IAEA has pressed for a role in the talks, as the agency would be required to verify implementation of any agreement. Initial reports indicated that US negotiators suggested capping Iran’s uranium enrichment at a low level needed to produce fuel for energy, as well as monitoring, just as Iranian officials indicated willingness to have a 3.67 % limit, as set by the JCPOA. A senior adviser to Khamenei stated that Iran, in exchange for lifting all sanctions, was prepared to sign a deal that allows it to enrich only to the lower levels needed for civilian uses and requires it to give up its stockpiles of highly enriched uranium, with inspectors verifying compliance. Iran also reportedly floated the idea of selling enriched uranium to the US. After the fourth round of talks, the President Trump hinted that the parties were close to a deal, which would seemingly include zero uranium enrichment for up to three years to build trust, after which Iran would be allowed to enrich at civilian levels (likely the 3.67 % limit set by the JCPOA). In the meantime, Russia could provide Iran with uranium for its civil nuclear programme. Nevertheless, reports point to continued disagreements over the issue of zero uranium enrichment, and over the timing and location of the transfer of Iran’s highly enriched uranium stockpile.

… albeit fragile

Besides their respective red lines in the talks, the high level of distrust between the US and Iran and a potential escalation in the region may prevent them reaching a deal. To build pressure on Iran, the US has increased its military deployments to the Middle East and stepped up the enforcement of sanctions. Moreover, President Trump may fail to deter, or may even consider supporting, an Israeli (or even a joint Israeli-US) strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities. In turn, Iran has threatened ‘a strong reciprocal blow’ in the event of a US military attack, including against the tens of thousands of American troops stationed at bases across the region or against Israeli troops – threats reiterated recently as it unveiled a new solid-fuelled medium-range ballistic missile. Iran has also stated that the US would be held responsible for any Israeli attacks on Iranian soil, and has condemned the US for expanding its sanctions campaign against Iran’s trade partners, notably China. At the same time, Iran has continued purportedly to foment instability in the region, through support to the Houthis and backing acts of sabotage in Jordan, a steadfast US ally.

Role of regional players

Israel regards any emerging deal with strong concern, particularly if it will not fully remove Iran’s capacity to enrich uranium. Emboldened by recent military successes against Iranian proxies, such as Hezbollah and Hamas, and the demise of Syria’s Bashar al-Assad, Israel continues to push for targeted strikes against Iran’s nuclear facilities. Conversely, the Gulf States, already on a course of rapprochement with Iran, are supportive of a nuclear deal, unlike in 2015. For them, a US-Iran compromise on the nuclear issue is necessary for Middle East stability and for achieving their economic visions. China and Russia have also expressed support for the talks. Moscow advocates a fair US-Iran deal, insisting on Iran’s legitimate right to develop its own civil nuclear energy programme. Russia has even offered to mediate the talks and to store Iranian enriched uranium. China, increasingly targeted by US sanctions over the purchase of Iranian crude oil, has backed Iran in the talks, also arguing in favour of respecting Iran’s right to use nuclear energy peacefully. After China-Russia-Iran trilateral discussions, the Chinese Foreign Ministry in March 2025 issued a five-point proposition on the Iranian nuclear issue, which states that the JCPOA framework should remain the basis for new consensus, and cautions against initiating the snapback mechanism.

European Union

EU-Iran relations have been at a low since 2022. However, the EU has a lot to lose from escalation in the Middle East and the collapse of nuclear diplomacy, and has called on Iran repeatedly to respect its commitments under the JCPOA. In November 2024, the E3 and the US censured Iran at the IAEA for lack of cooperation with the agency. Iran and the E3 then held several rounds of nuclear talks, most recently on 16 May 2025. While the EU is de facto excluded from current US-Iran talks, the EU High Representative hailed the talks as a ‘step in the right direction because we do not want Iran to develop a nuclear weapon’, stressing the importance of a unified approach with the US on the matter. In late April, France, Germany and the UK announced they would trigger the snapback mechanism by August if talks with the US fail to reach an accord; they have rejected any military option.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘Recent US-Iran talks on a new nuclear deal‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Maria Margarita Mentzelopoulou.

Between 2021 and 2023, at least 51 433 unaccompanied minors were reported as missing across Europe, averaging nearly 47 children a day. Over 18 000 migrant and refugee children were reported as missing across Europe between 2018 and 2020. It is feared that many of these children may have been exploited and abused for sexual or labour purposes. The European Parliament has repeatedly stressed the need to address this issue.

Background

The number of migrant children has been growing, both globally and in the European Union (EU). According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), around 40 % of the world’s displaced people are children. Lost in Europe, an investigative journalism project, has reported that 51 433 migrant children have disappeared after arriving in European countries between 2021 and 2023. This investigation builds on research published in 2021, showing that more than 18 000 migrant and refugee children went missing in Europe between 2018 and 2020. Overall, the reasons for children’s disappearance include: poor reception conditions; lack of child-friendly information; inefficient family reunification and guardian-appointment procedures; fear of detention or deportation; the desire to join family or friends in another country; and violence and abuse, including illegal adoption and trafficking.

EU Member States do not have a common definition for the concepts and terminologies related to the rights and protection of children. For instance, there is no consensus on how to define a ‘missing child’. According to Missing Children Europe, migrant children are considered missing ‘when they are registered with state authorities and go missing from the reception/accommodation centres provided for them’. While most missing migrant children are understood to be unaccompanied minors (UAMs), separated children and children that were travelling with family are also included in this group.

In 2023, 170 children lost in migration were never found. According to the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA), the issue of UAMs going missing from first reception facilities is a significant concern in many EU Member States. However, regular data collection and sharing is fragmented, making it difficult to fully grasp the picture; a single contact point would arguably facilitate finding information about such children at a cross-national level. In fact, registration is particularly relevant in the case of children, as it lessens the risk of them going missing while also helping families reunite. For instance, reports by EU police forces warn about the exploitation and trafficking of African children by organised crime groups, such as drug trafficking networks, mainly based in western Europe.

European action to protect children in migration

In recent years, the EU has adopted a set of policies on children in migration. Under EU law, the European Commission has launched a hotline number (116000) for missing children, including UAMs of third-country origin, which is now active in 32 countries. The enforced disappearance of children is addressed under Article 8 of the European Charter of Human Rights (ECHR). In a communication from 2017, the Commission laid out a list of priority actions aimed at contributing to the protection of children in migration. Moreover, in its 2020 communication on a new pact on migration and asylum, the Commission stressed that ‘the reform of EU rules on asylum and return is an opportunity to strengthen safeguards and protection standards under EU law for migrant children’. It furthermore identified children’s rights as a priority that is part of a broader range of initiatives, such as those set out in the 2020 action plan on integration and inclusion 2021-2027 and the 2021 EU strategy on voluntary return and reintegration.

The 2021 EU strategy on the rights of the child stressed the vulnerability of migrant children, who are often deeply traumatised by what they have had to endure in their country of origin or on a migratory route. The strategy notes that migrant children are more likely to be victims of abuse and violence, and that the risk of going missing increases ‘when children travel unaccompanied or are obliged to share overcrowded facilities with adult strangers’. The pact on migration and asylum, adopted in 2024, introduced several provisions regarding children and UAMs with the goal of protecting them and preventing the risk of them going missing or falling victim to criminal networks. For instance, the Eurodac Regulation calls for the collection of biometric data from children to be able to identify them, while introducing additional safeguards for minors who will be registered under it. Recital 42 of the Reception Conditions Directive calls for the early appointment of representatives for UAMs, and Recital 23 of the Anti-Trafficking Directive touches upon the exploitation of children by criminal groups. In 2020, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) called on EU Member States to do ‘whatever is necessary and required in the best interests of the child’ to prevent the disappearance of child refugees and migrants globally. In April 2025, PACE organised the parliamentary conference on ‘Envisioning effective public policy to prevent and address cases of missing migrants’ as a follow-up to PACE Resolution 2569 on missing migrants, refugees, and asylum-seekers. Additionally, a toolkit for parliamentarians to take action on this issue will be released by the end of 2025.

In focus: The situation of missing Ukrainian children
More than half of Ukraine’s children are believed to have been displaced as a result of the war. Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the non-governmental organisation (NGO) Magnolia has recorded more than 2 100 children as kidnapped, abducted, forcibly disappeared or simply missing inside Ukraine. Similarly, NGOs and public authorities have been warning about the risk of violence and trafficking facing children outside Ukraine, stressing the importance of proper registration, and there have been reports of children disappearing after arriving in EU countries from Ukraine. The Council of Europe’s group of experts on action against trafficking in human beings (GRETA) has also warned of the danger faced by people fleeing Ukraine of falling victim to human trafficking and exploitation. In March 2022, the Commission presented a 10-point plan for stronger EU coordination on welcoming people fleeing the war, with a focus on strengthening children’s protection. The plan includes: ‘standard operating procedures and uniform guidance for the reception and support of children; specific procedures for the transfer of UAMs’; and measures on recording and exchanging of information. The plan also supports the development of an anti-trafficking plan and the ‘Safe Homes’ initiative. Finally, the Bring Kids Back UA action plan unites the efforts of Ukrainian government agencies, partner countries and international organisations aiming to trace and bring back home the forcefully deported children of Ukraine.

European Parliament position

The need to tackle the disappearance of migrant children has been highlighted in several Parliament resolutions. In a November 2014 resolution, Parliament stressed that many UAMs had disappeared or absconded after arriving in the EU, and called for full respect of migrant children’s rights across the EU. In two December 2016 resolutions, Parliament urged the Commission to take preventive measures against the disappearance of UAMs and to develop a strategy for that purpose and for locating missing children. Parliament also recommended reinforcing the existing tools for finding missing children. In May 2018, Parliament called on the Member States to place all children and families with children in non-custodial, community-based accommodation while processing their immigration status. It also stressed the need to host UAMs in separate facilities from adults to prevent any risk of violence or sexual abuse. In November 2019, Parliament called on the Member States to improve the situation of children in migration and reiterated the significance of child protection as a fundamental principle for the EU.

In March 2021, Parliament underscored that the EU strategy on the rights of the child needed to include measures to improve the situation of children in migration and safeguard their interests throughout every stage of asylum procedures. In April 2022, Parliament adopted a resolution on the protection of children and young people fleeing the war in Ukraine. Most recently, Parliament also raised concerns about the risk of Ukrainian children falling victim to human trafficking. In April 2024, the Committee on Legal Affairs (JURI) and the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) conducted a joint exchange of views on the feasibility of establishing a European centre for missing persons, including children. Additionally, ‘Lost in Europe’ was awarded the 2024 Daphne Caruana Galizia Prize for Journalism for its investigation into the disappearance of unaccompanied child migrants. Finally, the European Parliament’s Vice-President, Ewa Kopacz, who is also Parliament’s Coordinator on Children’s Rights, collaborates with various organisations working on the issue of missing children, such as the Amber Alert Foundation and Missing Children Europe, and consistently expresses concerns over forcibly displaced Ukrainian children.

This updates an ‘At a glance’ note by Maria-Margarita Mentzelopoulou published in May 2023.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘Disappearance of migrant children in the EU‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Marketa Pape.

The recent cost-of-living crisis has exacerbated a longstanding problem with housing affordability in the EU. Higher building costs and mortgage rates, together with a related decrease in housing construction, have made access to home ownership more difficult. At the same time, investors use housing as a vehicle for investment. Growing numbers of people are struggling to access affordable housing, whether to rent or to buy, particularly in cities. Across Europe, homelessness is rising.

In addition, many residential buildings need to be made energy-efficient and decarbonised in order to achieve the EU’s energy and climate goals, lower energy consumption and reduce energy bills.

While the EU has no direct competence in the area of housing and only a limited scope of action to address social issues, it provides relevant guidance and funding, and has carried out several initiatives to support housing. Furthermore, certain EU rules have a indirect impact on housing provision, starting with the Energy Performance of Buildings Directive. In parallel, many sources of EU funding are available for various housing-related purposes in the current financing period.

In the run-up to the 2024 European elections, the lack of adequate and affordable housing, and the need to address it at EU level, emerged as a concern across the whole of the EU and the entire political spectrum. The new European Commission) is giving housing policy visibility and weight by proposing a coordinated approach. For the first time, housing has become a distinct part of a commissioner’s portfolio. Dan Jørgensen, the new Commissioner for Energy and Housing, is responsible for dealing with several complex issues relating to housing.

In 2024, the spotlight was on affordable housing, while 2025 is seeing a scaling-up of housing-related policy developments across the EU institutions, including discussions, consultations and funding initiatives.

This updates a briefing published in January 2025.

Read the complete brifeing on ‘A coordinated EU approach to housing‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Marie Lecerf.

Menstrual poverty, defined as insufficient access to menstrual hygiene products and facilities, affects an estimated 10 % of the half of the EU population who menstruate, with a higher prevalence among people with a low income, refugees, young people, and people with disabilities. Studies from Belgium, France, Germany, and Spain highlight the economic burden menstruation imposes, particularly on vulnerable persons. The COVID‑19 pandemic exacerbated this issue by disrupting supply chains and intensifying financial strains.

To address menstrual poverty, the European Union has facilitated access to menstrual hygiene products primarily through fiscal reform. The revision of the EU VAT Directive introduced greater flexibility for Member States to apply reduced or zero VAT rates to female sanitary products, shifting their classification from luxury to essential goods. Practices remain quite divergent, with some Member States, such as Ireland, Cyprus and Malta, adopting a zero rate, while others, such as Hungary, Sweden and Denmark, maintain standard rates.

EU funding programmes such as Erasmus+ and ESF+ have indirectly supported menstrual health initiatives through education, social inclusion, and material assistance projects. Partnerships with non-governmental organisations, such as the Red Cross, have helped distribute products to marginalised groups. Likewise, numerous local initiatives in Member States increasingly provide free menstrual products in schools, universities, and public spaces.

The European Parliament recognises menstrual poverty as a gender equality issue and calls for greater access to free menstrual products. Members continue to urge Member States and the European Commission to introduce concrete initiatives to combat period poverty.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Addressing menstrual poverty in the EU‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.