European Parliamentary Research Service Blog

Written by Andres Garcia Higuera with Adam Furman.

Europe could gain competitive edge by supporting the development of new hardware for artificial intelligence (AI). Current state-of-the-art hardware is not optimised for machine learning, and both academic and private sector research is already leading to new designs. At the same time, the need for more time- and energy-efficient machine-learning hardware is increasing as more consumers and companies want access to machine-learning applications. The European Union (EU) has the opportunity to leverage its strong regulatory framework for AI products as a mark of trust and safety, while also investing to support the next generation of hardware, opening up a new market for Europe’s high tech industry. What would happen if the EU formulated a cohesive plan to support these technologies through both research and economic policy?

Artificial intelligence and machine learning require large amounts of computing power. Training a new application and using that application to generate responses to user queries are tasks that are already performed by dedicated hardware – GPUs (graphics processing units). These specialised computer chips are fast and efficient at processing and displaying images and videos, but also faster than regular processors at machine-learning tasks.

Though graphics card manufacturers have pivoted towards AI as the   primary use of their devices, demand for GPUs has already caused shortages. At the same time, energy usage by GPUs used for machine learning is becoming a concern. Recently, Microsoft announced plans to restart a nuclear power plant just to power AI data centres. Industry leaders have stated that they expect a shift away from GPUs within 5 to 10 years, and major technology companies have already developed custom chips to execute some AI-related functions, citing the limitations of GPUs as reason.

The economic incentives to develop new hardware are strong, and Europe is in a unique position to take competitive advantage of the developing market. With the AI Act in place, there is a regulatory standard in the EU that would lend European AI technologies a mark of safety and privacy that is not currently perceived elsewhere. While the AI hardware sector is currently focused around non-European companies such as NVIDIA and AMD, a new market niche is opening: Europe could promote the development of new, specifically designed non-GPU hardware and gain market share through policy and investment.

Potential impacts and developments

The scientific community has taken note of the potential to improve the performance and energy efficiency of machine learning by developing new purpose-built hardware. Because machine learning usually consists of ‘artificial neural networks’ – code that mimics the interconnection and firing of synapses in the brain – the emerging field is called neuromorphic computing. Defined in a 2022 issue of Nature Computational Science as ‘computers whose structure and function are inspired by brains and that are composed of neurons and synapses’, research in this area includes both entirely new types of computers and direct replacements for GPUs in the form of chips dedicated to machine-learning functions. However, not all new AI hardware is necessarily called neuromorphic, and there are many routes of active inquiry.

Scientists are also developing photonic chips, which make direct use of light as an input, for their advantages in time-critical applications like autonomous driving, and in computer vision where AI is used to process visual information. Another technology being developed for machine-learning chips is the memristor, a circuit component similar to a resistor. Memristors’ electrical properties could reduce the amount of computer memory needed for machine-learning programs and speed up the computations needed to train and run them.

Current research in both photonic and memristive technologies is routinely published in major peer-reviewed academic journals. The performance of existing hardware, such as Google’s Tensor Processing Units, is likewise being studied. The consensus is that new hardware could surpass existing solutions both in terms of performance and energy efficiency, and more than one technology may succeed in doing so.

From an industrial perspective, memristor-based hardware more closely resembles the process for traditional silicon chips (though sometimes requiring slightly different materials). Photonic chips present an entirely new paradigm, though existing photolithography techniques – where Europe is already a leader – are still relevant. In either case, new industrial facilities may be necessary for full-scale commercialisation.

Multiple new companies, including Ephos, Lightmatter (photonic chips) and Graphcore (dedicated AI processors), have received funding – including from the European Innovation Council (EIC) – to develop hardware informed by new scientific research. Within the next decade, one or multiple technologies will likely become available to the market. GPUs for AI represented a US$48 billion market in 2023 that is projected to grow by roughly 25 % year on year. This creates a strong incentive for new technologies to compete. Combined with a growing awareness of the energy costs of AI, it is highly probable that new, specifically designed hardware will be sought after and implemented as it becomes available.

Anticipatory policymaking

A concerted research effort could position Europe as the leader of a new wave of machine-learning hardware developments. The European Chips Act already has objectives, including energy efficiency and innovation in semiconductor technologies, that align with supporting purpose-built AI hardware. The increased energy efficiency of this hardware would also align with European Green Deal goals.

More efficient hardware would lower the cost of generative AI applications, leading to their even greater proliferation. Generative AI is already causing concern, especially among creative and programming workers, and ‘deepfake’ media is troubling for both law enforcement and European citizens concerned with the integrity of elections. The risk to democracy exists regardless of whether new AI tools are actually used maliciously, since their mere presence can be enough to create distrust.

The risks of AI have been covered in other EPRS publications, discussing how those risks apply to democracy, the European economy, and healthcare, among other things. The AI Act has already set a strong regulatory standard, so far unique in the world, and the European AI safety initiative has been followed up by the creation of the Centre for Algorithmic Transparency. Building on existing regulation, information on how to use AI tools responsibly should be distributed, with special attention given to elections. The risks of AI should not discourage the promotion and development of new hardware.

European digital leadership could be improved by pairing the safety and transparency created through strong regulation with investment in new machine-learning hardware. If the best AI hardware were European, this would create an incentive to bring new AI applications to the European market. Strong regulation could be reframed as a new European brand – tied to a certification standard – for AI products. An ‘EU Safe AI’ label, reflecting compliance and quality, could promote European hardware and software.

There are ways to advance this strategy and strengthen the EU’s competitive resilience. First, directing funds from Horizon Europe and the next framework programme for research and innovation towards new and existing machine-learning hardware research would help position AI hardware as a fundamental part of Europe’s digital and industrial value chains. Second, funds such as the European Fund for Strategic Investments Equity Instrument could help companies with actionable product designs. Finally, an incentive structure could be created to encourage AI software companies to develop applications in the EU that comply with the AI Act using the new European hardware. These actions should cover the whole industrial chain, from raw materials to software, in turn generating both software- and hardware-related jobs.

European AI products would emerge with a reputation for safety, privacy, efficiency, and speed. Broad investment in multiple new machine-learning hardware technologies would increase resilience and minimise risks, and a similar research investment structure could also benefit related fields. Novel hardware could provide Europe with a unique and decisive competitive edge in technological innovation.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘What if Europe championed new AI hardware?‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Martina Prpic.

Human trafficking is a serious crime and a violation of human rights. It has been on the rise because of increasing mobility, the spread of internet use and the generally low risks and high profit involved. The true extent of the problem can only be estimated, as complete statistics are not available and data are difficult to collect. However, even without exact numbers, it can be observed that a victim’s gender influences the likelihood, manner and purpose of their being exploited. Available data on the prevalence of human trafficking show that most victims are women and girls, although men and boys are registered as victims in increasing numbers, as are transgender people. Sexual exploitation is by far the number one purpose of trafficking in women, while forced labour is the main purpose of trafficking in male victims.

The leading factors that contribute to trafficking in women are their vulnerability, particularly as a consequence of violence, and demand for their sexual services. Traffickers usually exploit the dire economic situation of people searching for a better life abroad. The internet plays an important role, as does migrant smuggling. Sex trafficking also has an impact on how EU Member States legislate for prostitution, as authorities are aware that many people may not engage in prostitution willingly.

The EU has adopted key instruments to tackle trafficking in human beings. In line with international standards, these instruments take a victim-centred approach and recognise that support and protection of victims, as well as prevention, should be gender-specific. In the most recent legislative instruments, the crime’s digital dimension has been given more attention. The European Parliament is playing an important part in shaping EU policies in the field, and has pushed for more progress.

This updates a briefing written by Anja Radjenovic and Sofija Voronova in 2016.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Human trafficking: The gender dimension‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Global percentages of victims by gender, selected years Global percentages of victims by form of exploitation, selected years EU percentages of victims by form of exploitation

Written by Gisela Grieger.

To discuss the implications of the outcome of the recent United States election for transatlantic security and trade relations, EPRS held an online policy roundtable on 19 November 2024. Étienne Bassot, Director of the Members’ Research Service, welcomed the audience and introduced the participants, among whom were EU Ambassador to the US, Jovita Neliupšienė, and Brando Benifei (S&D, Italy), Chair of the European Parliament Delegation for relations with the US.

Ambassador Neliupšienė stressed that a key transatlantic priority for the incoming Trump administration is cooperation on China and non-market economic activities in the US and globally. Brando Benifei similarly emphasised the bipartisan support in the US for a tough approach to China and expressed his view that the Trump administration could expect the EU to align with the US approach to China to avoid a tariff war. As the rapporteur for the EU Artificial Intelligence Act, he was confident that common ground could be found with the US in this field.

The ensuing discussion, moderated by Eva-Maria Poptcheva, Head of the EPRS External Policies unit, featured five distinguished panellists and attracted more than 230 attendees. Bruce Stokes, of the German Marshall Fund, explained that 72 % of Americans are discontented with their country’s direction, and this led them to vote for change. Class politics has re-emerged as a major dividing line in American politics. According to Bruce Stokes, Democrats are no longer seen as representing the interests of the working class. The Democratic Party has become the party of urban voters with advanced degrees, whilst the Republican Party is largely seen as the party representing rural areas.

Matthew Boyse, of the Hudson Institute, stated that he was not worried about NATO’s future, but that he would strongly suggest that EU Member States whose defence spending was not yet at 2 % of GDP make efforts to achieve this target soon and that all of them should plan for 3.5 % or 4 %. He warned that confronting the Trump administration on divisive issues would be counterproductive and concerns could become a self-fulfilling prophesy. He recommended approaching the Trump administration with a positive, constructive and collaborative frame of mind.

Leslie Vinjamuri (Chatham House), pointed to a significant shift in the general direction in the US, coupled with a reorientation of its priorities. Europe is currently undertaking a lot of hedging, manoeuvring and preparing for what is ahead in the US. A big part of the motivation for this is not only to prepare for what a Republican administration might mean, but also carries the memory of Afghanistan and seeks to avoid being excluded from US decisions when it comes to Ukraine – via a ‘grand bargain’ with Putin. She predicted that linkage politics is on the rise. The economic security agenda has blurred the line between open markets and the rules-based order on the economic side and security commitments and defence spending. The use of linkages across these two domains that used to be sacredly distinct is certainly the direction going forward.

Mark Strand, former President of the Congressional Institute, stressed that Trump won a broad-based, multi-racial, working-class majority. Trump won votes not only from white and Hispanic men, but he also doubled his support among black Americans. He also dramatically shifted voters to back him in states that he lost. Mark Strand stressed that Trump is not an isolationist, but rather a realist who takes countries as they are and does not seek to change them. On tariffs, he stated these are a tool for Trump to force certain behaviours. He suggested that the EU enter into sectoral trade agreements with the US, to seize opportunities where there is low-hanging fruit to see US tariffs disappear.Walter Goetz, Head of the EU-US Congress Liaison Office in Washington DC, noted that the Washington office will continue to serve as a transatlantic bridge to build good relations with the incoming administration by facilitating exchanges between Members and US lawmakers, including in the framework of the Transatlantic Legislators’ Dialogue.

Citizens are calling on the European Union to establish a European plan for hedges with the aim of doubling their length by 2050. Many citizens have written to the President of the European Parliament on this subject since November 2024.

We replied to citizens who took the time to write to the President:

English

The European Parliament recognises the importance of hedges for the environment. It has worked in recent years to introduce measures into European Union legislation to promote the protection and restoration of hedges in agricultural landscapes.

European law on nature restoration

In 2024, the EU adopted a law on nature restoration. It requires EU countries to restore at least 30% of habitats in poor condition by 2030, 60% by 2040 and 90% by 2050. For agricultural ecosystems, countries must make progress on high diversity landscape features, such as hedges.

The law also obliges EU countries to increase farmland bird populations and to halt the decline of pollinating insects. Hedges help to achieve these goals by providing space for wildlife.

Financial support under the EU’s common agricultural policy

In 2021, the EU adopted rules on financial support under the common agricultural policy. Under these rules, EU countries must compensate farmers who preserve landscapes and protect the environment. Farmers who maintain and create hedges are eligible for this support.

European Parliament’s position

In 2021, Parliament called on Member States to implement measures to promote high diversity landscape features, including hedgerows. In addition, in 2019, Parliament called on the European Commission and EU countries to promote good hedge maintenance.

New proposals

In the EU, only the European Commission can propose new legislation.

French

Le Parlement européen reconnaît l’importance des haies pour l’environnement. Il a travaillé ces dernières années pour introduire des mesures dans la législation de l’Union européenne (UE) afin de promouvoir la protection et la reconstitution des haies dans les paysages agricoles.

Loi européenne de restauration de la nature

En 2024, l’UE a adopté une loi pour la restauration de la nature. Cette loi oblige les pays de l’UE à restaurer au moins 30% des habitats en mauvais état d’ici 2030, 60% d’ici 2040 et 90% d’ici 2050. Pour les écosystèmes agricoles, les pays doivent progresser sur les éléments de paysage à haute diversité, comme les haies.

Cette loi oblige aussi les pays de l’UE à augmenter les populations d’oiseaux agricoles et à stopper le déclin des insectes pollinisateurs. Les haies aident à atteindre ces objectifs, en offrant de l’espace à la faune sauvage.

Aides de la politique agricole commune de l’UE

En 2021, l’UE a adopté les règles sur les aides de la politique agricole commune. Selon ces règles, les pays de l’UE doivent récompenser les agriculteurs qui préservent les paysages et protègent l’environnement. Le maintien et la création de haies permettent aux agriculteurs de bénéficier des aides.

Position du Parlement européen

En 2021, le Parlement a invité les pays membres à mettre en place des mesures pour promouvoir les éléments de paysage à haute diversité, dont les haies vives. Par ailleurs, en 2019, le Parlement a demandé à la Commission européenne et aux pays de l’UE de promouvoir le bon entretien des haies.

Nouvelles propositions

Dans l’UE, la Commission européenne est la seule à pouvoir proposer une nouvelle législation.

Background

Citizens often send messages to the President of the European Parliament expressing their views and/or requesting action. The Citizens’ Enquiries Unit (AskEP) within the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) replies to these messages, which may sometimes be identical as part of wider public campaigns.

Written by Marc Jütten and Kadri Paris.

Leaders met in Rio de Janeiro on 18-19 November 2024 for the 19th summit of the G20, hosted by the Brazilian G20 presidency. The meeting was overshadowed by events that are further increasing divisions among the world’s leading and emerging economies: Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, which entered its 1 000th day, the escalating conflict in the Middle East, and the election to a second term of President Donald Trump, whose ‘America First’ approach to foreign policy includes threats to impose tariffs on imports. The G20 leaders adopted a declaration addressing pressing global issues, including combating hunger, reforming international institutions, and climate change.

Background

The G20 is an intergovernmental forum for international economic cooperation between the world’s leading economies. It consists of 19 countries, the African Union and the EU. The G20 countries together account for more than 80 % of the world’s GDP, 75 % of global trade and two thirds of the world’s population. The G20 Summit represents the conclusion of the work carried out by the country holding the group’s rotating presidency, with a leaders’ declaration adopted at the end of the summit. In 2023, the G20 decided to grant permanent member status to the African Union.

Brazil’s G20 presidency

Brazil took over the annual G20 presidency from India on 1 December 2023. After years of ‘quasi-isolationism’ under President Lula’s predecessor Jair Bolsonaro, the presidency provided an opportunity to show to the world that Brazil is back on the international stage as a promoter of the Global South to tackle global challenges. Under the theme ‘Building a Just World and a Sustainable Planet’, the Brazilian government established the following three G20 priorities:

• The fight against hunger, poverty and inequality
• The three dimensions of sustainable development (economic, social and environmental)
• The reform of global governance

These priorities provide a certain continuity with the topics chosen by the Indian G20 presidency (green development, inclusive growth, progress on the UN SDGs, technological transformation, multilateral institutions for the 21st century, and women-led development). President Lula emphasised that the Brazilian G20 presidency places the poor, and ‘those who have always been invisible’, at the centre of the international agenda. This stance is symbolised by the initiatives for a two per cent tax on the world’s billionaires for climate action and poverty relief, and the Global Alliance against Hunger and Poverty.

Key takeaways from the summit: The G20 Rio de Janeiro Leaders’ Declaration

As in previous years, the G20 leaders committed to a series of actions and goals in a wide-ranging 85‑paragraph-long leaders’ declaration. Some of the key takeaways are:

Ukraine: Against the background of President Biden’s authorisation to allow Ukraine to use long-range US missiles (ATACMS) and the fact that Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine entered its 1 000th day during the summit, the media focused on the question of how the G20 leaders would address the issue. Compared to previous declarations, in particular the G20 Bali leaders’ declaration, the declaration issued on 19 November refers to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine in the weakest possible terms. In fact, the document does not even mention Russia, but highlights the human suffering and negative added impacts of the war with regard to global food and energy security, supply chains, macro-financial stability, inflation and growth. Moreover, leaders welcomed all relevant and constructive initiatives that support a comprehensive, just, and durable peace. Russian President Vladimir Putin did not attend the summit, and was represented by Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov. Ukraine’s President, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, was not invited to attend the meeting.

Middle East: On the other key geopolitical issue, the escalating conflict in the Middle East, G20 leaders expressed their deep concern about the catastrophic humanitarian situation in the Gaza Strip and the escalation in Lebanon. Moreover, leaders called for a comprehensive ceasefire in Gaza. However, the declaration does not contain a condemnation of Hamas nor a call for the release of all hostages. Leaders affirmed the Palestinian right to self-determination and reiterated their commitment to the vision of the two-state solution.

Climate:The G20 summit took place while the 2024 United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP29) was being held in Baku, Azerbaijan (from 11 to 22 November 2024). Hopes were high that G20 leaders would give a strong impetus to the difficult UN climate talks. However, the declaration does not go beyond the G20 New Delhi Leaders’ Declaration. In particular, it remains unclear from which sources the scaling-up of climate finance from billions to trillions should come. The reference of ‘transitioning away from fossil fuels’, to which all nations agreed last year at COP28 in Dubai, did not find its way into the text.

Hunger:Probably the most concrete result of the Brazilian G20 presidency was the launch of the Global Alliance against Hunger and Poverty. The alliance was created with 148 founding members, among them 82 countries, the African Union, the EU and international organisations. The alliance pursues the goal of reaching 500 million people with cash transfer programmes in low- and lower-middle-income countries by 2030.

Tax on the super-rich: Regarding the Brazilian presidency’s initiative for a two per cent tax on the world’s billionaires, leaders agreed for the first time to engage cooperatively to ensure that ultra-high-net-worth individuals are effectively taxed.

Position of the EU

Charles Michel, President of the European Council, and Ursula von der Leyen, President of the European Commission, represented the EU at the G20 summit. In his speech, Charles Michel stressed that the world needs a robust and effective multilateral system more than ever. With a view to the agenda of the Brazilian G20 presidency, he recalled that trade was a powerful tool to fight poverty and called for reform of the World Trade Organization (WTO), including the dispute resolution mechanism. Von der Leyen stressed, among other things, that the EU fully supports the Global Alliance against Hunger and Poverty and that the EU is committed to making the fight against poverty a priority for ‘domestic policies’.

Some observers saw the opportunity for the EU and Mercosur to advance talks on the EU-Mercosur trade agreement on the margins of the G20 summit, as key leaders from both sides were participating. However, it seems that, instead, resistance might grow, with French President Emmanuel Macron reiterating that France would not sign the agreement as it stands. Following his bilateral meeting with Argentine President Javier Milei, Macron reported that Milei was not satisfied with the deal either.

The tenth G20 Parliamentary Speakers Summit took place on 7-8 November in Brasilia, on the topic of ‘Parliaments for a just world and a sustainable planet’. It concluded with the adoption of a joint statement. A parliamentary forum on gender equality and women’s empowerment preceded the summit.

Outlook

On 1 December 2024, South Africa, another key state from the Global South and the third BRICS country in a row, takes over the G20 baton. The three consecutive G20 presidencies by countries from the Global South present an opportunity to push for the interests of developing and emerging countries on the world stage. It will also be the first time that the African continent hosts the G20. The theme for South Africa’s G20 presidency will be ‘Fostering Solidarity, Equality, and Sustainable Development’ and will address critical global challenges, with a strong focus on Africa’s development in alignment with the African Union’s Agenda 2063.

Looking further into the future of the G20, some experts such as Markus Engels from the Global Solutions Initiative (GSI) are of the opinion that the forum could take the lead in driving multilateralism forward. However, for this to happen the G20 system would need to be strengthened in three areas: the G20 needs to become a decision-making body rather than just an advisory one; the G20’s representativeness needs to be further improved; and the G20 organisation needs to be consolidated and professionalised, including having a permanent secretariat.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘The 2024 G20 Summit in Rio de Janeiro‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Clare Ferguson with Gemma Patterson.

For the third plenary session of this month (an extraordinary meeting took place on 19 November to mark 1 000 days of Russia’s war on Ukraine), Members’ agenda includes important debates on the election of the European Commission and next year’s EU budget.

Members are set to take the penultimate step in the investiture process for the second von der Leyen Commission on Wednesday morning. Following the confirmation hearings for Commissioners-designate, after discussions in Parliament’s Conference of Presidents on 20 November, the committees concluded their evaluations of the remaining candidates that evening. A further meeting of the Conference of Presidents early on Wednesday morning is set to clear the way for a key debate and vote later that day. Parliament’s consent would allow the European Council to formally appoint the new Commission by qualified majority, enabling it to assume office on 1 December 2024. If approved, the new European Commission will serve until 2029.

Parliament has insisted on a people-centred approach to the 2025 budget, which prioritises social, economic, and environmental goals. During negotiations, it secured over €230 million in additional funding for key areas. These increases include €50 million for humanitarian aid, €25 million for Horizon Europe and €10 million for the European Public Prosecutor’s Office, as well as funding for security-focused programmes such as Europol and border management. It has enhanced funding for research, health, and education, including an additional €180 million for research, using unspent funds. Following extensive negotiations, the Conciliation Committee (composed of a delegation of 27 Members of Parliament and 27 Member State representatives), reached a provisional agreement on 16 November 2024. Parliament plans to vote on the agreed text on Wednesday, after which President Metsola would then sign the budget into law, with the 2025 EU budget to enter into force on 1 January 2025.

The first day of this plenary week coincides with the International Day for the Elimination of Violence against Women, and Parliament plans to open the session with a statement on this issue. Violence against women remains widespread, with one in three women worldwide experiencing physical or sexual violence in their lifetime. Parliament has called repeatedly for the EU to combat violence against women.

Members are expected to debate the rising trend of anti-LGBTI propaganda laws on Wednesday afternoon. The discussion follows Bulgaria’s controversial August 2024 amendments to its education law, prohibiting the promotion of ‘non-traditional sexual orientation’ in schools. Earlier anti-LGBTI laws in Hungary are now under review by the EU Court of Justice in a landmark case. Parliament has long opposed such measures, declaring the EU an LGBTIQ Freedom Zone in 2021. This debate underscores Parliament’s unwavering commitment to equality, tolerance, and a discrimination-free EU.

On Thursday morning, Members are due to hear a Commission statement on strengthening children’s rights, marking 35 years since the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. Recent EU achievements on children’s rights include the Temporary Protection Directive, aiding Ukrainian childre; enhanced measures against child sexual abuse and online risks; and the European Child Guarantee, to combat child poverty.

Aiming to better protect young people in particular against second-hand smoke and aerosols from new products such as heated tobacco and e-cigarettes, Members are set to debate a proposed Council Recommendation on Wednesday afternoon. The non-binding text would aim to create a Tobacco-Free Generation by 2040, where less than 5 % of the population uses tobacco. It recommends expanding smoke-free policies to outside areas in playgrounds, schools, hospitals, and public transport stops.

On Monday evening, Members are due to hear Commission statements on the outcomes of two important recent international meetings: the G20 Summit in Rio de Janeiro and the 16th conference of parties to the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity (COP16), held in Cali, Colombia. In a tense geopolitical environment, the G20 Summit adopted a declaration addressing the current conflicts, combating hunger and climate change, as well as reforming international institutions. At COP16, the EU played a significant role, highlighting its biodiversity strategy for 2030, committing €7 billion in external biodiversity funding, and launching €160 million in new initiatives to support global biodiversity efforts. Parliament has previously called for an ambitious global biodiversity framework.

• Vote of investiture for the Commission
• Adoption of the European Union’s 2025 budget
• Elimination of violence against women
• Recent legislation targeting LGBTI persons
• Convention on the Rights of the Child: 35th anniversary
• Smoke- and aerosol-free environments
• G20 Summit in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
• Outcomes of the COP16 biodiversity conference

Written by Gabija Leclerc.

A sharp deterioration in the population’s health, as well as in healthcare systems, is often the consequence of armed conflicts, natural hazards or human-made disasters, of which there have been many in recent times. The European Union (EU), a significant global humanitarian player, views health as an essential part of its assistance.

Background

More frequent and severe natural hazards, amplified by climate change and environmental degradation, as well as human-made emergencies, such as industrial accidents or armed conflicts, or often a combination of multiple factors, can lead to humanitarian crises. These crises are marked by a decline in population health and compromised functioning of and access to health services. On one hand, emergencies directly affect healthcare facilities and the population by inflicting physical damage to infrastructure and the workforce, as well as inducing traumas and injuries. On the other hand, indirect effects, such as the risk of epidemic outbreaks (over 70 % of epidemics occur in conflict-affected, environmentally and economically vulnerable areas), food insecurity, economic fragility, interrupted treatment of patients with chronic diseases, displacement and gender-based violence, can overwhelm already strained health services and increase healthcare demand. In such cases, the most vulnerable groups, especially women and children, are often the most affected. External assistance is often crucial in preventing catastrophic health consequences.

EU humanitarian health assistance

Health, as a core component of humanitarian assistance, is central to EU humanitarian action. This action guided by international humanitarian principles and the European consensus on humanitarian aid. The European Commission’s humanitarian health guidelines govern EU funding for health-related humanitarian assistance. The main aim of EU health assistance in emergencies, as outlined in the 2022 EU global health strategy, is to limit excess preventable mortality, permanent disability, and disease associated with humanitarian crises. The EU considers health the primary indicator for evaluating humanitarian response.

Humanitarian assistance is a shared competence of the EU and the Member States, as set out in Article 4(4) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU. This means that the EU and the Member States can act in a complementary and mutually reinforcing way. At the EU level, health assistance is primarily coordinated by the Commission’s Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (DG ECHO). With a view to updating its health policy, in 2023, DG ECHO contracted an external evaluator to carry out a consultation with stakeholders, and support the drafting of the policy update based on the feedback received.

The EU provides high-quality humanitarian health assistance to the most vulnerable by building on and in harmony with pre-existing local facilities, programmes and systems to the greatest extent possible. It focuses on immediate needs during and after crises, including through emergency medical assistance, sexual and reproductive health care, and mental health and psychosocial support. Emphasising a ‘health in all policies’ cross-sectoral approach, the EU supports water and sanitation, nutrition, protection and disability inclusion, among other areas. It also adopts an integrated approach by linking humanitarian health aid with development cooperation (humanitarian-development-peace nexus) to ensure long-term resilience. This encompasses epidemic prevention, preparedness and response, strengthening of primary health care, and addressing the root causes of health crises such as poverty, conflict, and weak governance.

EU tools

The EU employs both financial resources and operational capabilities to provide support for health in situations of emergency. In 2023, €334 million, or 13.8 % of the EU’s total humanitarian funding for that year, was allocated to health (in comparison, the United States dedicated more than €532 million, or around 5.8 % of its total humanitarian funding, to health). The majority of this funding was directed towards Syria, Yemen, Ukraine, Sudan and Afghanistan, to assist the efforts of recognised humanitarian and health players such as the World Health Organization (WHO) and the Red Cross and Red Crescent societies. A part of this funding is channelled through the Epidemics Tool (for emergencies caused by infectious disease outbreaks), the Small-Scale Tool (for localised disasters) under the Emergency Toolbox, and the Disaster Response Emergency Fund. This enables the EU to provide swift support to its humanitarian partners on the ground in response to outbreaks, and to mitigate the impact of disasters on health.

To strengthen operational support, in February 2016 the Commission launched the European Medical Corps (EMC). Coordinated by the EU’s Emergency Response Coordination Centre under the EU Civil Protection Mechanism (EUCPM), the EMC allows for the rapid deployment of medical assistance and public health expertise from all Member States and participating countries during a health emergency within the EU and beyond. Since 2020, the EU has bolstered its readiness, including strengthening its reserve of capacities through rescEU. This reserveoffers services such as (i) aerial medical evacuations (MedEvac); (ii) emergency medical teams (EMTs) that provide direct medical care; and (iii) access to a stockpiling reserve of medical products. Additionally, the European Humanitarian Response Capacity (EHRC) provides support through humanitarian air bridges, stockpiles of health-related supplies, including personal protective equipment and first aid kits, common warehousing services (e.g. for temperature-sensitive health items) and health expertise. DG ECHO and the European Centre for Disease Control (ECDC) collaborate in deploying experts from the ECDC EU Health Task Force (EUTF), who are also available to support UN or international health efforts. Together with the Health Emergency Preparedness and Response Authority, they also coordinate support for threat detection, health emergency preparedness and the response in the area of medical countermeasures. Furthermore, the EU backs the WHO health emergencies programme, assisting in standards development and classification processes for globally deployable EMTs and coordinating with the WHO to support its own EMTs. Furthermore, the EU supports disaster management capacity-building in regional organisations such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. At international fora, in line with 2021 Commission communication on humanitarian action, the EU is a vocal advocate for respecting UN Security Council Resolution 2286 on health care in armed conflict, which includes the protection of humanitarian and healthcare workers.

Example: EU humanitarian health assistance in Ukraine

Despite the resilience of Ukraine’s healthcare system during Russia’s invasion, certain regions, the vulnerable, displaced, and those with chronic illnesses have been disproportionately affected. The EU has therefore provided political, financial and humanitarian assistance to Ukraine’s healthcare system, as well as support to those who had to flee the country. It has sent its rescEU stockpiles, including power generators (crucial for the functioning of healthcare facilities) and medical supplies. Since March 2022, a ‘MedEvac’ capability has been in use. In September 2022, the EU set up a centre in Rzeszów, Poland, to provide medical care to Ukrainians before their transfer to hospitals in other Member States. In June 2023, the Commission and the Ministry of Health of Ukraine signed a cooperation arrangement, which, inter alia, covers mental health and psychosocial support in Ukraine and for those displaced to the EU; healthcare for those displaced from Ukraine; patient repatriation after MedEvac; and continued EU4Health funding.

Example: EU humanitarian health assistance in the Gaza Strip

Israel’s attack following Hamas terrorist acts of 7 October 2023 resulted in the implosion of the healthcare system in the Gaza Strip. War-induced traumas, displacement, malnutrition, lack of hygiene and economic vulnerability have massively increased demand for health services. In this context, the EU has increased its humanitarian funding, including for health. This funding is channelled through humanitarian partners such as the UN agencies, most notably its Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA, recently banned from Israel), the IRCC and non-governmental organisations. In 2024, the EU allocated €32.5 million in humanitarian funding to health-related issues in Gaza. The EU also supports the WHO’s Gaza EMT coordination cell in Cairo, Egypt, with 22 experts deployed from the EU and the UCPM countries. Under the EHRC, EUHTF experts have been deployed to Amman, Jordan, to support UNRWA, and 60 humanitarian air bridge operations have transported essentials, including medical items to Gaza. Following the activation of the UCPM by the WHO, the EU supports the coordination of the medical evacuations, with assistance offered by Belgium, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Romania, Slovakia and Spain.

Read this ‘At a glance’ note on ‘Health in emergencies: EU contribution to humanitarian health initiatives worldwide‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Polona Car.

Enforcement of the Digital Services Act at national level is still very limited owing to delayed implementation. The European Commission has therefore begun infringement procedures against several Member States. At European level, the Commission has started formal proceedings against five very large platforms and has found, on a preliminary basis, that the platform X does not comply with the act. The other investigations are still ongoing.

Digital Services Act: A short introduction

The Digital Services Act (DSA) is designed to prevent illegal and harmful activities online, while protecting users’ fundamental rights and safety and nurturing trust in the digital environment. The DSA does this through a ‘layered responsibilities’ approach, which means that online intermediary services’ obligations correspond to their role, size and impact. Very large online platforms (VLOPs) and very large online search engines (VLOSEs) that pose particular risks must abide by the strictest rules. These are platforms that have, on average, at least 45 million active monthly users in the EU. The DSA imposes significant fines for non-compliance of up to 6 % of the intermediary’s annual worldwide turnover. Users who have suffered damage or losses due to online intermediaries’ infringements may also seek compensation.

Enforcement of the DSA is shared between national authorities and the Commission. National authorities supervise and enforce smaller platforms’ compliance, while the Commission’s primary responsibility is supervising VLOPs and VLOSEs. The DSA also established the European Board for Digital Services (EBDS), an independent advisory group composed of national digital service coordinators (DSCs) and chaired by the Commission. The EBDS plays a crucial role in applying the DSA and became operational in February 2024. In addition, the European Centre for Algorithmic Transparency was established to provide technical assistance in enforcing the DSA; it was launched in April 2023. The Commission has also set up the DSA whistleblower tool, to help it monitor compliance by VLOPs and VLOSEs.

Enforcement at national level

National enforcement of the DSA is still very limited due to delayed designation and/or empowerment of several DSCs. These are independent authorities, responsible for supervising and enforcing intermediary services’ compliance with the DSA on the territory of the Member States. DSCs have the power to request access to data, conduct inspections, and issue fines to intermediary service providers within their jurisdiction. Each Member State was required to designate a national DSC by February 2024, when all providers of online intermediary services became accountable to a set of general, due diligence obligations imposed by the DSA.

Some DSCs have already taken action on enforcement. The Irish DSC, for example, has opened a review of several platforms’ compliance with the DSA provisions on contact points for recipients of the service and a notice and action mechanism for reporting illegal content. The Dutch national authority conducted a survey, in which it established that many companies do not comply with the DSA. It committed to opening formal investigations as soon as it is fully empowered to do so.

In response to the late implementation, the Commission sent letters of formal notice to six Member States in April 2024, and a further six in July 2024. While some Member States have taken the necessary steps to enable enforcement of the DSA, others have only partially complied. The Commission has already sent reasoned opinions to Czechia, Cyprus and Portugal for not empowering their designated DSCs. The Commission could issue further reasoned opinions, as in Belgium and Poland the formal designation of DSCs is still pending, while in a few other countries designated DSCs have not yet been empowered.

Enforcement at EU level

At EU level, the Commission has responsibility for supervising and enforcing additional obligations imposed on VLOPs and VLOSEs. These include enhanced due diligence obligations to address systemic risks, such as dissemination of illegal content, conducting annual risk assessments, and facilitating access by authorities and vetted researchers to data and algorithms. In April 2023, the Commission adopted the first designation decisions under the DSA, designating 17 VLOPs and 2 VLOSEs. These platforms must comply with the DSA within 4 months of their designation, and are obliged to deliver risk assessment reports. The number of designated VLOPs and VLOSEs has since increased and now amounts to 23 VLOPs and 2 VLOSEs. Temu was the last platform to be designated as a VLOP in May 2024 after the European Consumer Organisation (BEUC) submitted a complaint against it.

Requests for information

The Commission can send formal requests for information about measures that the VLOPs and VLOSEs have put in place to comply with the DSA provisions. These investigatory acts do not prejudge potential further steps by the Commission, and can result in fines for incorrect, misleading or incomplete responses. Most requests seek to gather additional information on access to data – i.e. on measures VLOPs and VLOSEs have taken to comply with the obligation to give access to data to eligible researchers. In addition, the Commission is enquiring about measures on risk mitigation to prevent illegal and harmful content and risks linked to generative AI, recommender systems, and the protection of minors. Some requests enquire about dark patterns, advertising, notice and action mechanisms, and content moderation. As a result of receiving such a request for information, LinkedIn announced steps to comply with the DSA provisions on targeted advertising based on sensitive data. The request was initiated by a complaint from civil society.

Formal proceedings

The Commission has opened formal proceedings against five platforms so far. It can start such proceedings if it is not satisfied with the replies to its requests for information. So far, the Commission has issued preliminary findings on part of the investigations against the platform X, while all the other investigations are at an earlier stage. These proceedings could serve as an example to national authorities when they start enforcement at national level.

More precisely, in December 2023 the Commission opened formal proceedings against X, investigating its compliance with several DSA provisions. The Commission adopted preliminary findings in July 2024, which identified a potential breach of the DSA regarding dark patterns because the platform’s verified accounts system potentially deceives users. In addition, the Commission’s preliminary view was that X breaches the DSA rules on transparency of advertising, as it does not have a searchable and reliable advertisement repository, and makes it difficult to monitor and investigate potential risks of online ads. Finally, the Commission identified, on a preliminary basis, a breach regarding access to data by researchers, as X prohibits eligible researchers from independently accessing its public data. Moreover, its process for granting eligible researchers access to its application-programming interface appears to dissuade researchers. X may now exercise its right of defence and reply to the preliminary findings in writing; in parallel, the Commission will consult the EBDS. The Commission can only adopt a non-compliance decision if the preliminary findings are confirmed.

In February 2024, the Commission opened formal proceedings against TikTok, investigating its compliance with provisions on risk management of addictive design and harmful content, protection of minors, transparency of advertising, and access to data. Further proceedings against TikTok were opened in April 2024 to investigate whether the launch of the TikTok Lite rewards programme, which allows users to earn points while performing certain tasks on the platform, is in breach of the DSA because it was launched without due diligence risk assessment. The latter proceedings were closed in August 2024, after TikTok committed to withdrawing the feature from its applications offered within the EU.

Formal proceedings against AliExpress started in March 2024, investigating compliance with provisions on risk management of illegal content, notice of action, internal complaint handling, traders’ traceability, advertising transparency, recommender systems, and access to data. In April and May 2024, the Commission opened proceedings against Meta (Instagram and Facebook). The investigations are assessing Meta’s conformity regarding transparency of content moderation, a notice and action mechanism to flag illegal content, dark patterns and protection of minors, and risk management in relation to integrity of elections, dissemination of harmful content and addictive design, and access to data for researchers. In October 2024, the Commission started proceedings against Temu, to investigate what the platform is doing to limit the sale of non-compliant products as well as its compliance with the DSA provisions concerning addictive design, recommender systems, and access to data for researchers.

Read this ‘At a glance’ note on ‘Enforcing the Digital Services Act: State of play‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Guillaume Ragonnaud.

The EU’s ability to boost its competitiveness, become a climate-neutral economy by 2050, sustain the green and digital transition and achieve strategic autonomy depends heavily on access to critical raw materials (CRMs). Key technologies, across all industries, depend on CRMs’ unique physical properties.

The CRM Act (CRMA), aimed at making the EU’s supply of CRMs more secure, resilient and sustainable, entered into force on 23 May 2024. The CRMA lists 34 CRMs, of which 17 are considered ‘strategic’ (SRMs). The act includes measures to strengthen the EU’s raw materials supply chains, monitor and mitigate supply risks and increase the sustainability of the CRMs consumed in the EU. It sets the following non-binding benchmarks for the overall capacity at EU level to be achieved by 2030 (in terms of annual consumption of SRMs): the EU should mine 10 % of its annual needs, process 40 % of its needs, and cover 25 % of its needs through recycling. Furthermore, the EU should diversify its imports of SRMs and, for each SRM, should not depend on any single third country for more than 65 % of its supply by 2030. The CRMA also sets a number of deadlines for key developments up to 2031.

The time has now come to implement the new regulation. The CRMA has generally been hailed as a good first step in the right direction, but its weaknesses have also been highlighted. These include the lack of specific EU funding and doubt as to whether the measures to accelerate mining will prove effective. The EU’s capacity to achieve the benchmarks for 2030 has therefore been questioned by a number of experts.

Many proposals for improving the EU’s CRM policy have recently been put forward. The Draghi Report includes 11 specific priority actions, including setting up a dedicated EU CRM platform to deliver a more comprehensive and coordinated strategy covering the whole CRM value chain. The Letta Report suggests that the EU could use joint purchasing to set up strategic reserves of key CRMs to the benefit of the single market. Other proposals outlined in this briefing include measures to boost circularity, ensure coherence of EU law affecting the CRM sector, and develop global partnerships to diversify supply.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Implementing the EU’s Critical Raw Materials Act‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Timeline of the adoption of the EU CRMA Strategic partnerships signed by the EU

Written by David Ashton.

The current EU consumer protection cooperation framework has been in place for almost 5 years. This framework provides important means for consumer protection authorities in the Member States to enforce the EU consumer law acquis, to the benefit not only of consumers throughout the Union, but also of a functioning and legally predictable single market.

The European Commission has started to reflect on the functioning of the consumer protection cooperation enforcement framework. Sufficient time has elapsed to gather experience of the rules in place since 2020. The reflection process was triggered by the reporting obligation under the current Consumer Protection Cooperation Regulation, following which the Commission published its assessment of the application to date of the current rules in July 2024. This report was presented in the European Parliament’s Committee on Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO) on 12 September 2024.

It will be the prerogative of the new Commission to decide what next steps to take, in particular whether to propose a legislative revision of the current framework. Such a review could be expected to address various points of the current regime, including by feeding into the debate about how to ensure consumer protection in relation to imported products purchased through third-country online platforms.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Current developments in consumer protection policy‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Györgyi Mácsai and Maria-Margarita Mentzelopoulou.

Child migration takes many forms, from family reunification and moving in the hope of finding a better life to forced and traumatic migration caused by conflict, poverty or climate change. Overall, the number of migrant children has been rising globally since the turn of the century. In 2020, there were an estimated 35.5 million international migrant children globally, the largest number ever recorded. This infographic focuses exclusively on forced and irregular movements of migrant children to the EU. According to Eurostat, on 1 January 2023 around 7.4 million children in the EU under the age of 18 did not have the citizenship of their country of residence.

Read the complete infographic on ‘Child migrants: Irregular entry and asylum‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Share in 2022 Irregular EU border crossings Third-country national children found to be irregularly present in the EU in 2023, by age and gender Third-country nationals found to be irregularly present in the EU, 2013-2023 Migrant children found to be irregularly present by Member State in 2023 Children effectively returned from the EU in 2023, by age and gender Children ordered to leave the EU in 2023, by age and gender Top 10 nationalities of children ordered to leave the EU and/or returned in 2023 First-time child applicants in 2023, by age and gender First-time applicants, per age group Unaccompanied children applying
for international protection Unaccompanied children applying for international protection in 2023, in absolute and relative numbers Unaccompanied children applying for international protection in 2023, in absolute and relative numbers Number of positive first-instance decisions on applications
for international protection in the EU Positive first-instance decisions on applications
for international protection by Member State (2023) Positive final decisions on appeal or review on children’s
applications for international protection Positive final decisions on children’s applications for international protection per Member State in 2023

Written by Ingeborg Odink.

Child sexual exploitation and sexual abuse are among the worst forms of violence against children, and are crimes that know no borders. The constant rise in these crimes is exacerbated by the use of digital technologies. Harmonised national laws and international cooperation are essential to improve prevention, protect victims and prosecute perpetrators. The European Day helps to raise awareness to that end.

Background

The European Day for the Protection of Children against Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse is marked every year on 18 November. A Council of Europe initiative, the Day is designed to raise awareness and facilitate an open discussion on the need to prevent child sexual exploitation and abuse, and protect children from these crimes. The Day’s 2024 edition is dedicated to ‘Emerging technologies: Threats and opportunities for the protection of children from sexual exploitation and sexual abuse’. At EU level, the European Commission launched the EU strategy for a more effective fight against child sexual abuse in 2020. A form of cybercrime, child sexual exploitation is also an EU priority in the fight against serious and organised crime under the 2020‑2025 EU security union strategy and the European Multidisciplinary Platform Against Criminal Threats (EMPACT).

A new UNICEF report estimates that one in five girls and women and one in seven boys and men alive today globally have been subjected to sexual violence as children. In Europe, one in five children are estimated to be the victim of some form of sexual violence, and between 70 % and 85 % of child victims know their abuser. A third of abused children never tell anyone about the abuse. Reasons for this include feelings of shame and guilt, fear of not being believed, not knowing whom to tell, or inability to recognise the abuse. Child sexual abuse and exploitation increasingly occur online. The National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC), a United States-based non-profit organisation, saw the number of reports worldwide of online child sexual exploitation increase from 1 million in 2010 to more than 21.7 million in 2020. The figures jumped to 29.3 million reports in 2021 during the pandemic, involving nearly 85 million images and videos, and reached new record highs of more than 36.2 million in 2023, with NCMEC identifying 63 892 urgent reports that involved a child in imminent danger. Both the European Commission and Europol have expressed concern about this growing phenomenon, highlighting the need to promote preventive and educational initiatives across Europe.

International and EU efforts to combat child sexual abuse International legal framework

The 1989 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child formed the starting point for an international framework for combating child sexual abuse and exploitation, providing for the protection of children from all forms of (sexual) exploitation and abuse, and maltreatment. In 2007, the Council of Europe adopted a Convention on the Protection of Children against Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse (CETS No 201). Known as the ‘Lanzarote Convention‘, this was the first international instrument to establish the various forms of child sexual abuse as criminal offences. It requires the parties to adopt appropriate legislation and measures to prevent these offences from occurring, to protect victims, and to prosecute perpetrators. It entered into force on 1 July 2010 and has been ratified by all EU Member States.

EU legal framework

The European Commission is working to ensure that the EU has an adequate legal framework to protect children. The main EU legal instrument to combat the sexual abuse and sexual exploitation of children and child pornography is Directive 2011/93/EU. The directive criminalised various forms of child sexual abuse and exploitation, harmonised these criminal offences across the EU, and established minimum sanctions. Furthermore, Article 25 of the directive, on the removal of and blocking of access to websites containing or disseminating child sexual abuse material, contributes to the fight against online child sexual exploitation and abuse. Adopted a year later, the Victims’ Rights Directive (Directive 2012/29/EU) complements the existing framework, as it takes a child-sensitive approach, and requires primary consideration to be given to the best interests of the child. The EU strategy on the rights of the child, issued in March 2021, offers an EU policy framework to combat violence against children and protect them from all forms of abuse.

Recent developments

On 6 February 2024, under the EU strategy for a more effective fight against child sexual abuse, the Commission submitted a proposal for a revision of the 2011 Combating Child Sexual Abuse Directive. The revised rules expand the definitions of offences, to include new forms of online child sexual abuse, and introduce higher penalties and more specific requirements for prevention and assistance to victims. They also set minimum statutes of limitations, to allow victims to seek justice effectively.

In addition, the Commission has launched the revision of the Victims’ Rights Directive, and on 23 April 2024 it adopted a recommendation on integrated child protection systems – a key delivery under the children’s rights strategy to protect children from violence more effectively.

Work has also continued on the 2022 legislative proposal that would make the detection, reporting and removal of child sexual abuse material mandatory for providers of online communication services. It also envisages the creation of an EU centre to prevent and counter child sexual abuse. Pending an agreement in the Council (a new compromise text from the Hungarian Presidency is now on the table), Parliament and Council agreed to extend the 2021 interim regulation providing a temporary derogation from EU rules on confidentiality of electronic communication, to enable detection, reporting and removal on a voluntary basis.

International cooperation through EU agencies, initiatives and networks

Various EU agencies, such as Europol, support law enforcement cooperation among Member States to form a united front against (online) sexual exploitation and abuse of children in the EU and beyond. The stop child abuse – trace an object initiative, designed to help trace the origin of objects linked to criminal investigations, is one example of Europol’s efforts; the initiative has led to the identification of a number of victims, as well as offenders. Eurojust supports judicial cooperation among Member States to facilitate the prosecution of child sexual abuse perpetrators in cross-border cases. In addition, the European Commission funds and supports several initiatives and networks, including the Better Internet for Kids (BIK) portal, raising awareness of the potential risks children face online, and INHOPE, a network of hotlines combating online child sexual abuse material by analysing and reporting illegal content. The WePROTECT Global Alliance, supported by the United States, the United Kingdom and the European Commission, develops political and practical solutions to make the digital world safe for children, and seeks to prevent online sexual abuse and long-term harm. The Internet Watch Foundation, co-funded by the EU, provides a hotline for reporting online sexual abuse content globally, and raises awareness through prevention campaigns.

European Parliament position

The European Parliament’s Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) is currently working on the proposed revision of the Combating Child Sexual Abuse Directive. The draft report (rapporteur: Jeroen Lenaers, EPP/Netherlands) was published on 16 April 2024. Ever since its first assessment in 2017, Parliament and its Children’s Rights Coordinator have called repeatedly for full transposition of the directive’s provisions, and urged action in several areas. Parliament has previously demanded better child protection and victim support and a greater focus on prevention and awareness-raising, stressed that information and communications technology companies and online platforms should take some responsibility in the fight against child sexual abuse material, and called for more national investment in digital education. Parliament has welcomed Europol’s prevention and awareness-raising work, and supported the establishment of an EU centre to prevent and counter child sexual abuse.

Read this ‘At a glance’ note on ‘European Day for the Protection of Children against Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Clare Ferguson and Katarzyna Sochacka.

Parliament’s first session of November 2024 opened with Members observing a minute of silence for the victims of the recent devastating floods in Spain. Members discussed the urgent need to support the victims, to improve preparedness and to continue to tackle the climate crisis. Parliament agreed a resolution calling for more targeted EU sanctions against Russia’s ‘shadow fleet’, which by transporting oil ultimately finances Russia’s war on Ukraine. Members heard and debated European Commission statements regarding EU-US relations in light of the outcome of the US presidential elections, and on Georgia’s worsening democratic crisis following the recent elections. Members also condemned recent unacceptable attacks against Israeli football fans in the Netherlands.

EU civilian and defence preparedness  

Former Finnish President Sauli Niinistö presented his recent report, ‘Safer Together: Strengthening Europe’s Civilian and Military Preparedness and Readiness’. Parliament has already called on Member States and EU institutions to ensure EU society is prepared to face military and non-military threats, including natural disasters. The Niinistö report underlines the need for comprehensive preparedness to face traditional and new challenges to EU food security, public health, the economy and infrastructure. Proposals for the EU to consider include new legislation, coordination mechanisms, and involving citizens. The report discusses how investment in preparedness/crisis resilience could boost preparedness for defence. Afterwards, Members debated measures to bolster Europe’s civilian and defence preparedness and readiness in practice.

United Nations Climate Change Conference 2024 in Baku, Azerbaijan (COP29)

The European Commission and the Council responded to oral questions posed by Parliament’s Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI) regarding the ongoing UN Climate Change Conference in Baku. With COP29 largely focused on financing climate action, the Commission was asked to clarify how it will guarantee progress on the new collective quantified goal on climate finance. Following a debate, Members approved a resolution calling for all high-emission countries to commit to provide socially fair financial support for climate action.

EU listing of Russia as a high-risk third country

A debate followed a Commission statement on the possible listing of Russia as a high-risk country for money laundering and terrorist financing. Although the EU follows the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) listings, the Commission can act independently and list third countries with a delegated act. Russia is not currently listed as a high-risk third country. Placing countries on the EU list can help protect the internal market by requiring banks and financial institutions to apply ‘enhanced due diligence measures’ when dealing with such a country. In Russia’s case, corruption and state-embedded organised crime, as well as its war on Ukraine, make the risks very high.

Corrigenda

Following committee approval of corrigenda on two further legislative files voted in plenary before the end of last term, these were announced in the plenary, under Rule 251 of the Rules of Procedure. As no request to vote on them was received within 24 hours, these are now deemed approved.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘Plenary round-up – November I 2024‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Clément Evroux.

On 9 July 2024, the successful maiden flight of the new heavy-lift rocket Ariane 6 reinstated the EU’s autonomous access to space. This came after several months of reliance on private United States launchers as a result of the temporary unavailability of an EU rocket.

In recent years, the space sector has witnessed the conjunction of three trends. First, the space economy has grown globally, also because of competitive private actors. Second, as a consequence, space is now increasingly congested, with ever more space objects floating in orbit. Third, space has become a contested domain. With 80 countries having at least one satellite registered, space operations can now be instrumentalised: for instance, in 2021, Russia conducted an illegal anti‑satellite strike.

In her political guidelines for 2024-2029, the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, refers to space as an enabler of EU competitiveness, to be supported through investment. The guidelines mention space as a key domain for EU open strategic autonomy, to be enhanced through further cooperation by an EU–NATO partnership. Furthermore, Mario Draghi’s September 2024 report on the future of European competitiveness stresses that, despite owning world-class space infrastructure and services, the EU is under-investing in space compared with its global competitors, and is lacking a unified legal framework on space.

Ursula von der Leyen’s mission letter to Andrius Kubilius, nominated on 17 September 2024 as Commissioner-designate for Defence and Space, names a set of initiatives to unleash a space contribution to EU competitiveness. It includes, in particular, the task of preparing a proposal for an EU space law to ensure a common EU playing field in space while ensuring security, safety, and sustainability. The letter also sets the task of fostering a strong and innovative space sector with a view to achieving several objectives, including maintaining the EU’s autonomous access to space, curating EU spatial infrastructure, and enhancing the use of space data and services.

Read the complete briefing on ‘EU space policy: State of play‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Ralf Drachenberg.

The European Council consists of the Heads of State or Government of the 27 EU Member States, as well as the President of the European Council and the President of the European Commission. It became a formal European Union (EU) institution with a full-time President in 2009, with the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon. Although it does not include legislative functions, the European Council’s role – to ‘provide the Union with the necessary impetus for its development’ and to define its ‘general political directions and priorities’ – has developed rapidly over the past 15 years. The European Council’s President plays a crucial part in the preparation, conduct and follow-up of meetings as well as in the external representation of the Union.

On 1 December 2024, former Portuguese Prime Minister António Costa will take over as President of the European Council. This briefing provides an overview of the functions and responsibilities of this office by answering some of the most frequently asked questions in relation to the President of the European Council. It also looks at the mandates of the previous office-holders and the President’s interaction with the European Parliament.

This updates an EPRS briefing from March 2022.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Role and election of the President of the European Council: Frequently asked questions (FAQ)‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

European Council Presidents: European political party affiliation, Member State and date of (re)election Overview of high-level office-holders since the 2009 European elections

Written by Annastiina Papunen and Rebecca Torpey.

On 7-8 November, the European Political Community (EPC) held its 5th meeting in Budapest. The event gathered 42 European heads of state or government, among them the EU leaders, and was followed, for the European Council members, by a dinner and an informal meeting the next day. Beyond the official agenda, the outcome of the US presidential elections shaped the discussions.

Amid Russia’s continuing war of aggression on Ukraine and the escalating situation in the Middle East, the EPC summit, held on 7 November, focused on Europe’s security challenges. The next day, members of the European Council discussed EU competitiveness and adopted the Budapest Declaration, building on the conclusions of the April 2024 special European Council meeting. Next to competitiveness, the informal meeting also discussed foreign policy topics linked to the elections in the US and Georgia, and Israel’s decision to ban the UN Palestinian Refugee Agency (UNRWA).

General

The US election results set the tone of the two back-to-back meetings in Budapest. Considering the undeniable tensions in transatlantic relations under President-elect Trump’s previous term, an exchange of views on how best to prepare for the next four years was deemed important. The European Parliament President, Roberta Metsola, said: ‘Our mentality is not ‘America elects and Europe reacts’, but ‘Europe acts’.’

Figure 1 – European Council President’s tweet

Source: C. Michel, ‘Congratulations to President-elect…’, X/Twitter, 6 November 2024.

Two EU leaders did not travel to Budapest: the Spanish Prime Minister, Pedro Sanchez, on account of the flash floods that ravaged Valencia, and the German Chancellor, Olaf Scholz, following the collapse of the three-party federal government coalition the night before. In the preamble to the Budapest Declaration, EU leaders expressed their deepest condolences to and solidarity with the people of Spain. The violence towards Israeli football fans in Amsterdam on 7 November was mentioned by the Dutch Prime Minister, Dick Schoof, and condemned by the European Council President, Charles Michel, during the press conference.

As this informal meeting was the last for Charles Michel as European Council President, the participants thanked him for his dedication over the past five years. On 1 December, the former Portuguese Prime Minister, António Costa, will take the helm of the European Council.

1.     The European Political Community meeting

The fifth EPC meeting took place on 7 November at the Puskás Arena in Budapest. It was attended by 42 European leaders, among them the EU leaders. The EU was represented by President Michel and the European Commission President, Ursula von der Leyen. The European Parliament President, Roberta Metsola, also attended the EPC. The former Dutch Prime Minister, Mark Rutte, took part in his capacity as NATO Secretary-General. Noteworthy was the attendance of the Turkish President, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who had only attended the first EPC meeting in Prague.

The overarching theme of the day was addressing the major security challenges facing Europe, with two important aspects being the ongoing Russian war on Ukraine and the escalating conflict in the Middle East. The outcome of the US elections had a significant impact on the security discussion. Just ahead of the elections, the Polish Prime Minister, Donald Tusk, had tweeted that ‘the era of geopolitical outsourcing is over’. President Metsola echoed these words at the opening of the EPC meeting, capturing the sentiment expressed by many leaders.

The morning session focused on security challenges and was followed by breakout sessions on migration and economic security. After the opening remarks by the Hungarian Prime Minister, Viktor Orbán, the Ukrainian President, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, delivered a speech emphasising the importance of ‘peace through strength’ and not through concessions. Interestingly, Chapter 10 of the 2024 US Republican Party platform reads ‘Return to peace through strength’. The session on migration, co-chaired by the Austrian Chancellor, Karl Nehammer, and the UK Prime Minister, Keir Starmer, covered irregular migration and its instrumentalisation, building on discussions during the fourth EPC meeting. The session on economic security, led by the Latvian Prime Minister, Evika Siliņa (in place of Chancellor Scholz, originally planned as co-chair), and the Norwegian Prime Minister, Jonas Gahr Støre, addressed connectivity-related issues such as energy, transport and global trade.

Originally, it was the French President, Emmanuel Macron, who on 9 May 2022 proposed establishing a forum for political dialogue among European countries. At the first EPC meeting in Prague in October 2022, it was agreed that this informal platform would aim to foster discussions among peers at the highest level and build cooperation on issues of concern for the European continent. Due to the informal nature of EPC meetings, no declarations are adopted at their close. Instead, their value lies precisely in their informality, allowing for strategic discussions, roundtables and bilateral meetings between leaders of European countries – within the EU and outside it – to take place. The talks held between Erdoğan and the Cypriot President, Níkos Christodoulídis, demonstrate the unique bilateral opportunities provided by the EPC. Those talks were also attended by the Greek Prime Minister Kyriákos Mitsotákis and the Albanian Prime Minister, Edi Rama.

EPC summits are held on a bi-annual basis, hosted alternately by the EU country holding the EU Council Presidency and a non-EU country. Albania is to host the sixth EPC summit in the first half of 2025, followed by Denmark in the second half.

2.     The informal European Council meeting Foreign policy and transatlantic relations

Ahead of the 8 November informal European Council meeting, EU leaders met for dinner and discussed a range of topics, including transatlantic relations, Georgia and Israel. Having missed the EPC meeting, Chancellor Scholz joined the EU leaders for dinner. The strategic debate on transatlantic relations focused on three main aspects: (i) bilateral relations; (ii) security and geopolitics, with a special focus on Ukraine; and (iii) global challenges and international cooperation.

EU leaders congratulated Trump on his election victory on X, in press statements and over the phone. Even if relations between the new US administration and the EU were centre stage, many EU leaders seemed to focus more on bilateral relations between their own countries and the US than on a joint approach, prompting von der Leyen to tweet that, ‘The EU and the US are more than just allies. We are bound by a true partnership between our people, uniting 800 million citizens’. Some EU leaders, notably Germany’s and Portugal’s, also mentioned their countries’ partnerships with the US within NATO. At the door, the Luxembourg Prime Minister, Luc Frieden, stated that ‘we will stick to our principles but we want to have a friendly partnership with the United States’.

When it comes to Russia’s war on Ukraine, there was much speculation about the new US administration’s plans, particularly in relation to what point 8 of Trump’s 20 core campaign promises meant for Ukraine in practical terms: ‘Prevent World War 3, restore peace in Europe’. When interviewed, EU leaders were keen to avoid hypothetical discussions about what would happen if Trump cut funding for Ukraine’s defence. Dick Schoof stated, ‘We should only talk about the stop of the American support at the moment that that is the topic’. However, it is likely that EU leaders considered various scenarios when discussing the impact of Trump’s election on EU security and geopolitics. Siliņa underlined that the European Council had already emphasised the importance of defence, which is now a core priority in the Strategic Agenda 2024-2029, as indicated by the nomination of a European Commissioner for defence. Despite this, several EU leaders, such as the Danish Prime Minister, Mette Frederiksen, and the Finnish Prime Minister, Petteri Orpo, pointed out that the EU needed to do more for its own security and defence.

Concerns were also raised about the Trump presidency’s potential impact on international efforts to tackle climate change. The Irish Taoiseach (prime minister), Simon Harris, for instance, emphasised the importance of the EU and the US remaining actively engaged in global issues, notably climate.

Georgia

Georgia was on track for EU membership in 2023. However, in recent months the ruling (pro-Russian) Georgian Dream party has been steering the country away from the EU path. EU leaders have expressed concerns about acts of intimidation against civil society representatives, political leaders, civil activists and journalists in Georgia. They have also called on Georgia to reverse its adoption of the transparency of foreign influence law. In October 2023, the Commission noted that ‘the level of constructive political dialogue [has been] significantly reduced’ since the adoption of this law. Georgia’s accession process is now de facto halted. Following Georgia’s recent parliamentary elections, thousands protested over alleged election fraud, yet the ruling party claimed victory. Election observation missions raised concerns about several shortcomings. Before the informal dinner, the leaders of Germany, France, and Poland released a joint statement on the situation in Georgia, which fed into discussions amongst EU leaders on the way forward.

Middle East

In October 2024, the European Council emphasised the crucial role of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA) and condemned any efforts to revoke the 1967 agreement between Israel and the agency. However, the Israeli Parliament approved two bills that would impede UNRWA’s humanitarian aid work in the occupied Palestinian territories. Ireland, Norway, Slovenia and Spain issued a joint condemnation of the legislation, while France, Belgium and other European countries expressed concerns about its potential consequences. EU leaders discussed how this move would affect EU-Israeli relations.

Competitiveness

President Michel set the scene in his invitation letter by stressing that ‘Over the past 20 years, the EU’s share of world GDP has halved’, and urging action to strengthen EU competitiveness. On 8 November, the former European Central Bank (ECB) President, Mario Draghi, presented to EU leaders his report on ‘The future of European competitiveness‘, which had already been mentioned briefly at the October meeting. It provides a relatively grim picture of the EU’s economy, and calls for urgent action. However, it creates divisions among Member States, notably as regards the proposed measures’ funding. The idea of new common debt was, for instance, rejected by Germany. The Draghi report has already fed into the Commission’s political guidelines, the Commissioners’ mission letters, and seems to constitute a guiding document for the next 5 years.

Considering the complexity of the current global setting, the discussion on EU competitiveness was particularly timely. The outcome of the US elections may indeed have far-reaching implications on transatlantic relations, especially on trade; the recent BRICS meeting in Kazan has also highlighted the changing dynamics. The BRICS countries, currently accounting for 37.3 % of global GDP, have plans to replace US dollar payments with a new system called the Brics Bridge. This could have major implications for world trade, financial systems and the global power balance between countries. The current ECB President, Christine Lagarde, also shared her views on the situation of the EU economy. The picture she presented follows the sobering statement on EU competitiveness issued by the Eurogroup meeting, held in an inclusive format, on 4 November.

Budapest Declaration on the new European competitiveness deal

The Budapest Declaration follows the path set by the Versailles and Granada declarations, the April 2024 European Council conclusions and the EU’s Strategic Agenda 2024-2029. It mentions how the Enrico Letta and Draghi reports are a wake-up call and underlines that ‘business as usual is no longer an option’. One key request in the declaration is ‘a new and comprehensive horizontal strategy on the deepening of the Single Market’, with a roadmap indicating a clear timeline and milestones by June 2025. This request was already mentioned in April, but the details are now more specific.

EU leaders also focused on moving towards a savings and investment union by 2026, making progress on the capital markets union and banking union. They called on the High Representative and the Commission to present ‘without delay’ options for public and private funding to increase EU defence readiness and capabilities.

Regarding industrial policy, EU leaders went further than in April, asking the Commission ‘as a priority’ for a comprehensive industrial strategy, including both competitive industries and quality jobs. The current industrial strategy was last updated in 2021. The EU car industry is struggling, and potential US tariffs could affect it further. Furthermore, as a result of a trade dispute with China over green technology imports, the EU applies tariffs on Chinese EVs.

Regarding research and innovation, EU leaders stated that closing the innovation gap with global competitors and putting ‘Europe at the forefront of research and innovation globally’ is an urgent priority. In that context, EU leaders reiterated that R&D should constitute 3 % of EU GDP by 2030 and voiced support for the idea of a fifth freedom of research, innovation, knowledge and education.

Considering current high and volatile energy prices, EU leaders called for urgent measures to address them. They also called for the acceleration of the energy transition and for the establishment of a genuine energy union as ‘a matter of priority’.

Regarding trade and economic security, EU leaders reiterated the central role of the World Trade Organization and the need to pursue an ambitious, robust, open and sustainable trade policy to ensure a level playing field. Trade agreements remain a controversial issue, with France recently warning that the EU should not sign the Mercosur trade deal without French approval.

The declaration also includes a request for a circular economy act (with no specific deadline) and for new Commission proposals on the digital economy by June 2025. Moreover, EU leaders request a ‘simplification revolution’ to ease reporting requirements, particularly for SMEs, ‘by at least 25 % in the first half of 2025’. Finally, the declaration mentions the future of EU funding, with the next multiannual financial framework proposal expected in July 2025.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Outcome of the meetings of EU leaders on 7-8 November 2024‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Clare Ferguson.

Moving swiftly from a packed schedule of confirmation hearings for the members of the new European Commission, Members address some of the thorniest issues facing the European Union in plenary this week. Defence issues, the ongoing Russian war against Ukraine, and EU relations with the United States are all likely to top Parliament’s agenda.

Former Finnish President Sauli Niinistö is due to make a formal address on Thursday morning to present his report, ‘Safer Together: Strengthening Europe’s Civilian and Military Preparedness and Readiness’. Parliament has already called on Member States and EU institutions to work on ensuring EU society is prepared to face the range of current military and non-military threats, including natural disasters. The report underlines the need for comprehensive preparedness to face traditional and new challenges that threaten EU food security, public health, the economy and infrastructure. It contains a number of proposals for the EU to consider: legislation, coordination mechanisms, programmes to involve citizens themselves; and discusses how investment in preparedness/crisis resilience could best boost preparedness for defence. Parliament will then debate a statement on measures to bolster Europe’s civilian and defence preparedness and readiness in practice. Defence certainly looks set to be a top priority during the current legislature, with a white paper on the future of European defence already in preparation.

One way the Parliament exercises its power of scrutiny over other EU institutions is by voting on resolutions following questions posed to the Council and European Commission. On Wednesday evening, Members are expected to hear a response from the Commission and Council to two oral questions posed by Parliament’s Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI) regarding the ongoing UN Climate Change Conference in Baku (COP29). With COP29 largely focused on financing climate action, the committee has asked the Commission to clarify how it will guarantee progress on the new collective quantified goal on climate finance. To raise ambition for the next round of nationally determined contributions, the Committee wishes to see the EU lead by example – and questions the measures to ensure that COP29 significantly advances the agenda in terms of mitigation, adaptation, finance, and loss and damage. Members are therefore set to vote on a resolution tabled by ENVI, and likely to underline the need for climate action aligned with the outcome of the global stocktake and to boost financial assistance for climate measures.

Another Commission statement is expected on Wednesday, on the possible listing of Russia as a high-risk country for money laundering and terrorist financing. Although the EU follows the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) listings, the Commission can independently identify high-risk third countries and list them through a delegated act. Neither the FATF nor the EU currently list Russia as a high-risk third country. The EU list aims to protect the internal market by requiring banks and financial institutions to apply ‘enhanced due diligence measures’ when dealing with a country such as Russia – where risks related to corruption and state-embedded organised crime, as well as the country’s war on Ukraine, are very high.

On Thursday morning, Members are also due to vote on a resolution on EU action to counter Russia’s efforts to evade sanctions against its oil industry by establishing a ‘shadow fleet’ of oil tankers to evade these restrictions. While EU countries and their allies are cooperating to disrupt these moves, with targeted sanctions on specific vessels, a debate in Parliament in October saw Members call for more maritime surveillance, tighter shipping controls, and expanded sanctions to address the environmental and safety threats posed by these vessels.

• EU civilian and defence preparedness
• COP29 climate change conference in Baku
• Listing Russia as a high-risk third country for money laundering and terrorist financing
• Russia’s ‘shadow fleet’: Bringing the threat to light
• White paper on the future of European Defence

Written by Sebastian Clapp.

Russia’s war on Ukraine has laid bare the challenges facing the European defence industry as it tries to meet increased demand and ramp up production in the wake of a fundamentally changed security environment in Europe. Europe’s defence industry comprises a number of large multinational companies, mid-caps and over 2 000 small and medium-sized enterprises. It faces a multitude of challenges, such as decades of under-investment, fragmentation, insufficient critical raw material and semiconductor supplies, and a lack of manufacturing capability.

The EU and its Member States have taken several steps to reinforce the European defence industry, especially since the start of Russia’s war on Ukraine. Member States have boosted their defence budgets, with their combined total expected to reach €350 billion a year in 2024. The European Defence Fund is investing in research and capability development projects and has achieved very positive results so far. Permanent structured cooperation also provides the legal framework and binding commitments for progress in collaborative defence. The EU has also broken taboos, by agreeing a joint defence procurement instrument (the European Defence Industry Reinforcement through Common Procurement Act) and an initiative to build up ammunition production (Act in Support of Ammunition Production). These form part of a three-track proposal to support Ukraine’s needs for ammunition (deliver ammunition from existing stocks, jointly procure from industry, and support the ramping up of production). In March 2024, the European Commission proposed the first-ever European defence industrial strategy and a defence industry programme to implement it.

Additionally, the European Peace Facility, best known for facilitating lethal weapon supply to Ukraine, is being used to procure defence materiel from Europe’s defence industry, further boosting its capacity. The European Chips Act and Critical Raw Materials Act are also expected to benefit the European defence industry by ensuring it has the necessary supplies to tackle the substantially increased demand for its products. These signals have led the industry to take the first steps to increase production capacity.

This updates a previous edition, published in 2023.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Reinforcing Europe’s defence industry‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Gregor Erbach with Cecilia Meinardi.

International climate finance is essential for developing countries to achieve their climate goals. By 2025, countries need to adopt a new collective goal for climate finance, to be defined at the 29th Conference of Parties (COP29) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in Baku, Azerbaijan. Discussions ahead of COP29 focus on the scope and quantitative elements of this new financial target, with the European Union and other contributor parties proposing a broader contributor base.

Climate finance under the UNFCCC

The UNFCCC categorises countries in three groups, according to their obligations and commitments. Annex I countries include industrialised nations and economies in transition, while Annex II – a subcategory of Annex I – refers only to industrialised nations that were OECD members in 1992 and the European Community, and has not been updated since. Annex II countries have an obligation to provide climate finance to developing countries. Developing countries are referred to as non-Annex I countries, with particular attention paid to least developed countries (LDCs) and those most vulnerable to climate change.

In the Copenhagen Accord adopted at COP15 in 2009, developed countries pledged to jointly mobilise US$100 billion per year by 2020 to support developing countries’ mitigation and adaptation efforts. However, this target was not reached until 2022, when developed countries provided US$115.9 billion in climate finance for developing countries. To assist the COP in exercising its function in relation to the financial mechanisms established by the Convention, COP16 established the Standing Committee on Finance. In 2015, COP21 adopted the Paris Agreement – which obliges developed countries and encourages other parties to provide climate finance to developing countries – and decided to extend the US$100 billion target up to 2025 and agree on a new collective quantified goal (NCQG), from a floor of US$100 billion, by 2025. To facilitate the adoption of the new climate finance goal, the 2022‑2024 ad hoc work programme comprises four technical expert dialogues per year. In 2023, COP28 in Dubai, United Arab Emirates, decided on the process for establishing an NCQG in 2024, to replace the current target of US$100 billion. The adoption of the NCQG is a main agenda item for COP29.

Green Climate Fund
The Green Climate Fund was established in 2010 to accelerate climate action in developing countries. During COP28, six countries made new pledges to contribute to the Green Climate Fund, with total pledges amounting to US$12.8 billion from 33 donor countries and one region.

In June 2024, the annual Bonn Climate Change Conference included discussions on details of the NCQG ahead of COP29. While parties made progress towards designing the content of the NCQG, the substantive framework for a draft decision was not finalised. In October 2024, Azerbaijan hosted pre-COP29 talks, with heads of delegation meetings and a high-level ministerial dialogue in which EU Commissioner for Climate Action Wokpe Hoekstra participated.

Financial flows

International climate finance to achieve the US$100 billion goal is defined as bilateral and multilateral public finance, as well as climate-related export credits and private finance mobilised by developed countries for climate action in developing countries. For an investment to be counted as climate finance, developed countries need to declare it as such to the UNFCCC. However, the fact that there is no official system of accountability or guidelines to define which activities qualify as climate finance has attracted criticism.

Almost 80 % of total climate finance in 2022 came from developed countries’ public finance, through both multilateral and bilateral means. Multilateral climate finance in particular grew by 226 % between 2013 and 2022, an increase driven by multilateral development banks. Private climate finance fluctuated around US$14 billion per year from 2017 to 2021, but then rose by 52 % from 2021 to 2022, to US$21.9 billion. Almost a third of climate finance in 2022 went to adaptation, up from 10 % in 2016. The EU and its Member States are the largest contributor, providing €28.6 billion in climate finance from public sources in 2023 and mobilising an additional €7.2 billion of private finance.

In addition, voluntary climate finance flows exist between developing countries. These do not count towards the US$100 billion target.

Climate finance at COP29: Issues at stake

COP29 will take place from 11 to 22 November 2024 in Baku, Azerbaijan. The conference will focus on climate finance and the adoption of an NCQG to replace the current US$100 billion commitment, on the basis of a substantive framework for a draft negotiating text. Countries have agreed that the new NCQG will be needs-based, taking account of the priorities and needs of developing countries on finance to tackle climate change. According to the UNFCCC’s Standing Committee on Finance, to meet developing countries’ costed needs, a total of US$5‑6.9 trillion would be required up to 2030, or US$455‑584 billion annually. This figure is based on countries’ estimated costs to meet the targets outlined in their nationally determined contributions (NDCs). Article 4 of the Paris Agreement states that countries must submit updated, more ambitious NDCs every 5 years. To prepare their new NDCs, due in 2025, developing countries need to know the approximate level of financial support they can expect to receive. Failure to agree on the NCQG at COP29 could impact the ambition level in developing countries’ NDCs, and would risk eroding trust between developing and developed countries.

The EU submitted its views on the NCQG to the UNFCCC in August 2024, emphasising that the collective finance goal can only be reached if parties with high greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and economic capabilities collaborate. This would require an expansion of the contributor base, to reflect the evolution of gross domestic product (GDP) growth and GHG emissions. This issue will be discussed at the upcoming COP29 conference, with the Umbrella Group and the Environmental Integrity Group of countries also supporting a broader contributor base. On the other hand, the largest group of parties, the ‘G77 and China’ which includes 134 developing countries, emphasises the responsibility and financial obligations of developed countries on account of their higher cumulative historical emissions.

Loss and Damage Fund
Other sources of international climate finance are not accounted for in the US$100 billion pledge, such as the finance necessary to address loss and damage resulting from climate impacts. The Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage was agreed at COP27 in 2022 and made operational by COP28. It will support vulnerable countries heavily impacted by climate disasters. Countries have committed US$702 million to the fund.

European Parliament and Council position

The Council conclusions of 14 October 2024 emphasise the need to broaden the group of contributors, reflecting the evolution in countries’ economic capabilities and shares of global GHG emissions in recent decades. The Council reiterates the importance of private finance to achieve ambitious NCQG goals, and underlines that public climate finance alone cannot deliver the levels of funding required to tackle climate change. It points out that the private sector is still financing fossil fuels and activities that are not aligned with the Paris Agreement. The Council conclusions do not propose a quantitative target for the NCQG.

In the European Parliament, the Committee on Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI) adopted a draft resolution on 21 October 2024 highlighting that international climate finance is fundamental for achieving the goals of the Paris Agreement, and that the NCQG should reflect the increased climate finance needs, in particular for LDCs and small-island states. The text calls for an NCQG that prioritises grants and combines public, private and innovative sources of climate finance from a broader contributor base, in line with social fairness and the polluter-pays principle. Moreover, the draft resolution emphasises that emerging economies with high GHG emissions and high GDP should contribute to the new financial goal.

Further reading

• Jensen, L. with Roniger, J., International climate finance: Status quo, challenges and policy perspectives, EPRS, European Parliament, 2023.

Read this ‘At a glance’ note on ‘Climate finance: State of play ahead of COP29‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Anna Caprile and Gabija Leclerc.

Following Russia’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine, the European Union (EU), G7, and allied partners imposed extensive sanctions targeting Russia’s economy, in particular the oil sector, in an effort to curb the Kremlin’s revenues which finance its war effort. Key measures include an embargo on Russian seaborne oil imports and a price cap on oil and oil products that restricts profits while still allowing sales below a certain price. Enforcement mechanisms prevent Russia from chartering or insuring oil tankers unless they comply with these limits. In response, Russia has sought new markets and established a ‘shadow fleet’ to evade these restrictions.

The terms ‘shadow fleet’, ‘dark fleet’ and ‘grey fleet’ have gained prominence following the imposition of sanctions on Russian energy exports, yet their definitions remain inconsistent among experts, leading to confusion. Analysts increasingly recognise that the broader definition, encompassing all vessels lacking Western insurance and belonging to non-EU/G7+ companies, captures the diverse tactics employed by Russia to circumvent sanctions and highlights the potential risks associated with these operations.

To evade sanctions, the Russian ‘shadow fleet’ makes use of flags of convenience and intricate ownership and management structures while employing a variety of tactics to conceal the origins of its cargo, including: ship-to-ship transfers; automatic identification system blackouts; falsified positions; transmission of false data; and other deceptive or even illegal techniques. In addition to bolstering its war chest, Russia’s ‘shadow fleet’, which consists of a growing number of aging and poorly maintained vessels that operate with minimal regard to the regulations, poses significant environmental, maritime safety, and security risks.

As Russia depends increasingly on its ‘shadow fleet’ to maintain oil exports, the EU and allied nations have implemented measures to counter these evasive tactics. These include imposing targeted sanctions on specific vessels and enhancing international collaboration to disrupt such activities.

During a plenary debate in October 2024, Members of the European Parliament called for enhanced maritime surveillance, tighter shipping controls, and expanded sanctions to address the significant environmental and safety threats posed by these vessels. Parliament is expected to vote on a resolution on this issue during its November I 2024 plenary session.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Russia’s ‘shadow fleet’: Bringing the threat to light‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.