European Parliamentary Research Service Blog

Written by Etienne Bassot.

The ninth edition of this annual publication presents 10 issues to watch in 2025, selected by the Members’ Research Service of the European Parliament. Some of these issues feature high on the 2025 European political agenda as they reflect the three pillars of the ‘competitiveness compass’ that the von der Leyen II Commission has identified for its 2024-2029 mandate: balancing scale with innovation for productivity, setting the 2040 climate target, and taking the next steps towards European economic security. Other subjects are more specific, such as waiting to move up a gear: European electric cars, and helping the EU compete on artificial intelligence. For some issues, progress has long been too slow and new impetus is needed: strengthening the European defence industry, and speeding up the return of irregular migrants. All these issues, as well as other issues beyond this list of 10, require financial means and investment, which in turn raises the additional challenge of shaping the EU’s future finances and strengthening capacity to invest in the future. The overarching issue of restoring trust in the public sphere – in traditional news media, social media, governments and institutions, and business – meanwhile affects all of the above.

As a new political cycle begins for the European institutions, with the latest mandates having started on 1 December 2024, this list of issues could seem daunting. Alternatively, they can be seen as a list of new opportunities for the European Union to assert itself, bounce back, and move ahead.

History teaches that it has been when under the pressure of events that the European Union (EU) has made most progress. It is already becoming clear how Russia’s war on Ukraine and changes in transatlantic relations have made the EU move ahead on security and defence. The challenges that are accumulating are the very same that offer the EU a chance to get stronger and assert itself on the world stage. These issues demand choices; they also offer opportunities. The European Parliament, as the place for debate among directly elected members and as co-legislator, will have an important role to play when it comes to deciding on the EU’s future course. The year 2025 will be a year of decisions – a theme that runs through this publication – as illustrated by its cover image.

These choices – these decisions – call for independent, objective and authoritative information: the motto of the European Parliamentary Research Service. EPRS publications rely on research, robust facts and figures, and informed analysis to provide the European Parliament’s Members with the elements they need to do their work, and ultimately build the trust that must underpin any democracy.

Readers will find analysis on issues that do not feature on this list of 10 in previous editions of this publication (listed under the ‘Further reading section’) and in the thousands of publications that EPRS has issued online and in paper over the years, enriching Parliament’s knowledge environment.

We hope that you will find this latest edition of ‘Ten Issues to watch’ informative and useful as you consider the challenges and opportunities of 2025.

Read the complete in-depth analysis on ‘Ten issues to watch in 2025‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Events that will shape 2025

Written by Yann-Sven Rittelmeyer and Rafał Mańko.

The Constitution of the Republic of Poland, in force since 1997, sets out a unitary, democratic state ruled by law and implementing the principles of social justice. The President of the Republic and the Council of Ministers (government) serve as the executive, while the Sejm (lower house) and the Senate (upper house) are vested with legislative power (Article 10). The Senate is considered a repository of democratic legitimacy on an equal footing with the Sejm, but the dominance of the Sejm in the legislative process is constitutionally guaranteed. The Sejm alone ultimately decides on the appointment of the government, on the wording of legislation, and on the acceptance or rejection of a presidential veto, among other things.

Members of the Sejm and Senate are elected for four years, on the same day, by universal, direct and secret ballot. Senators are chosen in single-member constituencies, while for Deputies a proportional open list system of multi-member constituencies applies, with a threshold of 5 % for political parties and 8 % for coalitions of parties. The Sejm may shorten its term of office by a resolution passed by a majority of at least two-thirds of the votes of the statutory number of Deputies. This simultaneously shortens the term of office of the Senate. The directly elected President of the Republic can also end a legislative term if the Sejm is unable to pass a vote of confidence in the government or adopt a budget within the constitutional deadline.

The government, composed of a prime minister and ministers, is accountable to the Sejm. It needs a vote of confidence by an absolute majority of votes in the presence of at least half of the statutory number of Deputies to be appointed. Once in place, the Sejm can pass a constructive vote of no confidence in the government (Article 158) or in an individual minister (Article 159). The debates in both assemblies are presided over by the Marshal or one of the Vice-Marshals elected from among their members. The two Marshals represent their assemblies in external matters and safeguard their rights.

Both houses have equal powers to amend the Constitution, with the Senate having (alongside the President and one-fifth of the Deputies) the right to initiate constitutional amendments; its consent is required for an amendment to be adopted. A majority of two-thirds in the Sejm and an absolute majority in the Senate are required to amend the Constitution.

When sitting in joint session, the Sejm and the Senate constitute the National Assembly. It has the power to declare that the President has a ‘permanent incapacity’ to exercise his/her duties and to indict him/her for infringing the Constitution or a statute, or for committing an offence.

Read the complete briefing on ‘The Polish Parliament and EU affairs‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Eszter Balázs (Legislative Planning and Coordination Unit, Directorate-General for the Presidency).

INTRODUCTION

Poland assumed the rotating presidency of the Council of the European Union on 1 January, and will hold the office until 30 June 2025. This is the second Polish Presidency after the country’s first stint in 2011. Poland is the opening member of a new trio, along with Denmark and Cyprus. Following Poland, Denmark will take over the presidency on 1 July 2025.

State and government

The Republic of Poland (Rzeczpospolita Polska) is a parliamentary republic, with a president as head of state and a prime minister (formally, the president of the Council of Ministers) as head of government.

The current head of government is the former President of the European Council, Donald Tusk (Koalicja Obywatelska, Civic Coalition). He had a previous spell as prime minister between 2007 and 2014, before his election to head the European Council. The coalition government he leads took office on 13 December 2023. His predecessor as prime minister was Mateusz Morawiecki (Zjednoczona Prawica, United Right, 2017-2023).

After parliamentary elections, the prime minister is nominated by the president and, together with its cabinet and agenda, are approved by the parliament.

The current president is Andrzej Duda, who was an MEP in 2014 and 2015. As president-elect, he resigned his membership of the Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (PiS, Law and Justice) party but was endorsed by PiS. His second term started in 2020. The next presidential elections are set for May 2025, during the country’s EU presidency. President Duda will stay in office until at least August 2025.

The president’s position in Poland is not as strong as, for instance, in France, but still much stronger than in countries such as Germany. Most importantly for the current governing coalition, the president can veto legislation (which can be overridden only by a three-fifths majority in the lower house of parliament). The president may also refer a law to the Constitutional Tribunal to check its compliance with the Polish Constitution. The president shares power with the government in defence and security, is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, and represents Poland internationally.

Parliament

The Polish parliament is bicameral, with a lower house (Sejm) and an upper house (Senate). The Sejm has 460 deputies and the Senate 100 senators. On ceremonial occasions and for the removal of the sitting president, the two houses convene as the National Assembly.

Members are elected for four-year terms, by first-past-the post voting for the Senate, and proportional representation for the Sejm. For the latter, a 5 % entry threshold applies to parties, and 8 % to coalitions.

For a bill to become law, it has to be approved by both houses, although the Sejm can override a refusal of the Senate to pass a bill.

The last Senate and Sejm elections took place on 15 October 2023. Amid record-high voter turnout of 74.4 % and almost 22 million votes cast, the United Right alliance of PiS took 35.38 % of the vote, securing 194 seats in the Sejm and coming first for the third consecutive time. However, it was the opposition alliance Koalicja Obywatelska (KO) that formed a government: it obtained 30.7 % of the vote, translating into 157 seats, and teamed up with parts of the Trzecia Droga (Third Way, TD) coalition (14.4 %) and the coalition Lewica (The Left) (8.61 %). The governing coalition currently has 241 seats.

In the Senate the opposition alliance Pakt Senacki 2023 (Senate Pact 2023) won the plurality of votes and a majority of seats.

The election results mean that both the Senate and the Sejm are in the hands of the current government, while the president remains on the other side.

Parties and coalitions in the Sejm:

Government (241)

• KO (EPP in EP) – 156 members
• Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe (Polish People’s Party, PSL-TD) (EPP in EP) – 32 members
• Polska 2050 Szymona Hołowni (Szymon Hołownia’s Poland 2050, PL2050) (Renew in EP) – 32 members
• Lewica (S&D in EP) – 21

Government is at times supported by (6)

• Razem (5)
• Independent (1)

Opposition (212)

• Zjednoczona Prawica (ECR in EP) – 190 members
• Konfederacja Wolność i Niepodległość (Confederation Liberty and Independence, KWiN) (ESN and PfE in EP) – 18 members
• Kukiz’15 (K’15) – 4 members

Parties and coalitions in the Senate:

• KO – 41 seats
• ZP – 34 seats
• TD – 11 seats
• Lewica – 9 seats
• Independent – 5 seats

The next elections for both houses are due to take place in October 2027.

European elections

The 2024 European elections in Poland were held on 9 June. Of the 53 seats for Poland, the governing coalition (EPP) secured 21 (+6 ) seats with 37.1 % of the vote, a coalition of the main opposition party PiS (ECR) obtained 20 seats (-7) with 36.2 %, and the anti-EU right-wing KWiN carried six seats with 12.1 % – three of them sit in ESN, two in PfE and one remains non-affiliated. The Nowa Lewica (New Left) coalition obtained three S&D seats (-1) with 6.3 %, while two members of the TD coalition (13.8%) sit with EPP and one with Renew.

The results mean that in this EP legislative term, there are nine more Polish MEPs in the EPP, five fewer in S&D, and seven fewer in the ECR, while Renew again has a Polish member.

State of play

During the previous PiS-led governments, clashes between the EU and Poland were frequent and resulted in the launch of an Article 7 TEU procedure and a delay in the disbursement of RRF and cohesion policy allocations. With the Tusk-government’s willingness to address rule of law concerns, RFF financing was released and the Article 7 procedure was closed in early 2024.

According to the most recent standard Eurobarometer survey, Poles consider the increased cost of living (42 %) as the main challenge for their country. They broadly support EU action in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, including sanctions (86 %), Ukraine’s status as a candidate for EU membership (75 %) and the supply of military equipment to Ukraine (80 %). Some 59 % of the population have a positive image of the EU.

POLITICAL PRIORITIES OF THE POLISH PRESIDENCY

‘Security, Europe’ is the motto of the Polish Presidency, motivated by the geopolitical reality of the erosion of the rules-based international order. In its programme presented on 10 December 2024, the presidency covers seven intertwined facets of security: external, internal, information, economic, energy, food and health. The programme is short on climate and environment pledges, apart from their impact on security. The Polish programme leans on parts of the 18-month programme of the Poland-Denmark-Cyprus trio of which it is the first member.

In the external dimension of security, Poland will push to boost the defence readiness of Europe, by raising defence spending and by strengthening cooperation with NATO and like-minded countries. It wishes to engage with the US to increase the resilience of the transatlantic relationship.

Poland is one of the staunchest supporters of Ukraine’s fight against Russian aggression, stressing that it is in the EU’s existential interest to stand by the country which is fighting for values that the EU shares. The presidency will work to maximise support to Ukraine militarily, economically and politically, with various Ukraine-linked points raised in several areas. The presidency will push strongly for further sanctions against Russia as well as for the use of profits from the Bank of Russia’s immobilised assets.

The Polish Presidency will pursue the integration of candidate countries. In parallel to that process, it will work on the four strands – values, policies, budget and governance – of future EU reform.

To ensure internal security for Europeans, and looking at migration through this lens, the presidency will work to protect the external borders and find innovative solutions to migration, including by establishing safe spaces in third countries. It aims to find an adequate answer to hybrid threats, such as the instrumentalisation of migration, of which Poland itself has been a victim.

The focus of the presidency on information security will extend to defence of democracy issues, including steps against information manipulation and foreign interference, to reduce the impact of hostile action in cyberspace. The presidency expects to fight against disinformation in areas such as environmental and climate policies.

Under economic security, Poland will look at how to make the EU economy more competitive and resilient. It intends to continue with robust cohesion policies, encourage the creation of innovative industries and cut red tape. For economic security, it considers a clean energy transition and affordable energy prices to be further essential elements. As drivers of climate policies, the presidency prefers incentives instead of penalties and restrictions.

To make Europe’s energy supplies more secure and versatile, the presidency seeks full withdrawal from Russian fossil fuel imports while providing access to sufficient energy, at lower prices, for the sake of competitiveness.

The presidency will focus on food security, through discussions on a common agricultural policy that encourages rather than forces farmers to limit climate change. In the broader focus on agriculture, it intends to protect vulnerable agricultural sectors, increase overall resilience and ensure that non-EU producers comply with EU standards. 

For secure public health policies in the EU, the presidency will concentrate on the digital transformation of healthcare, improving drug security in the EU and the mental health of children and adolescents.

During its tenure, the Polish Presidency will start discussions on the new post-2027 multiannual financial framework (MFF), currently in preparation, although formal negotiations are not expected to kick off during its tenure. In February 2025, it will hold a conference on the next MFF, including on a new own-resources system that includes financing for higher defence spending.

Legislative work

Poland takes over the presidency from the trio of Spain, Belgium and Hungary. Its predecessor, Hungary presided over the inaugural period of the 10th legislature as well as the selection of the members of the new Commission, during which work on legislation largely ground to a halt, with only nine files closed with trilogue agreements. The to-do list for the Polish Presidency has thus remained largely unchanged, although several additional files have now arrived at the negotiation phase. The topics to be addressed by the presidency include the following issues.

Defence and security

In line with the presidency’s singular focus on security, Poland has the ambition to start and conclude negotiations with the Parliament on the European Defence Industry Programme once Parliament is ready with its position.

Economy, finance and budget

The Polish Presidency is expected to steer a number of ongoing negotiations to conclusion, and to open others that are ready for talks, including the bank crisis management and deposit insurance framework.

Parliament has been waiting for the Council to reach a general approach on a series of other economic and financial topics. From among these files, the Polish Presidency wants to make progress in particular on the payment services package, the digital euro files, the Union Customs Code and Customs Authority, and the Late Payment Directive. In the field of taxation, Poland wants to continue work on administrative cooperation and energy taxation.

In the area of the budget, the Presidency is keen on starting talks with the Parliament and closing the legislative process on Moldova’s Reform and Growth Facility, once Parliament is ready.

Migration

The Polish Presidency is ready to start trilogue negotiations on the two files on smuggling of migrants (relating to transport operators and Europol) and on the revision of the Visa Suspension Mechanism when Parliament is ready. The presidency is also keen to start negotiations on the EU Talent Pool once the Parliament establishes its starting position, possibly in the second half of the Presidency’s term. The presidency expects to find agreement with Parliament on the recently proposed temporary derogation from the Entry/Exit System.Expected new versions of the Returns Directive (early 2025) and the instrumentalisation of migration are two priority subjects the Polish Presidency would steer in the Council once the Commission has tabled them.

Justice and home affairs

Both institutions are ready to start trilogue negotiations on combatting child sexual abuse and combatting corruption. They will continue negotiations on protection of victims of crime, compulsory licensing of patents and the enforcement of the General Data Protection Regulation. The presidency will continue work on rules to prevent unauthorised entries to the EU, judicial cooperation for the protection of adults, harmonising insolvency law and third-country interest representation.

Environment

Trilogue negotiations are currently under way on the Soil Monitoring Law and the Waste Framework Directive. The Polish Presidency intends to start negotiations with Parliament on several other important files for which the Council has already agreed on its position. These include priority substances in groundwater pollution, the Green Claims Directive, the accounting of greenhouse gas emissions of transport services, detergents and surfactants and the three files of the ‘one substance one assessment‘ package. The presidency will strive to reach a general approach on the proposed regulation on end-of-life vehicles.

Internal market and trade

On the files on the safety of toys and alternative dispute resolution for consumers, trilogue negotiations can start immediately. The Polish Presidency intends to start interinstitutional talks as soon as Parliament has a position on the screening of foreign investments. It will also continue in-house negotiations to find a full general approach on harmonising insolvency law.

Transport and tourism

Transport is another area where several topics have stayed in the pipeline of trilogue negotiations. The Hungarian Presidency kicked off talks on driving licences, driving disqualification, the single European railway area and on the Maritime Safety Agency. The Polish Presidency wants to make progress inside the Council on maximum weights and dimensions (for vehicles) currently blocked in the Council, the transport of animals, the Combined Transport Directive revision and on the long-stalled topic of air passenger rights. It will be able to start trilogue negotiations on river information services and the Package Travel Directive once Parliament establishes its mandates. Work on a pending revision of the roadworthiness package will start as soon as the Commission tables the proposal, the presidency said.

Employment and social affairs

The Polish Presidency will start negotiations with the Parliament on European Works Councils and restart them on the Coordination of social security systems. In addition, the Polish Presidency takes over the task of finding a general approach on the Traineeships directive and the long-stalled Equal Treatment Directive. The presidency also wants to conclude work on the Eurostat-related file on population and housing statistics.

Agriculture and fishery

The presidency expects to negotiate with the Parliament on the welfare of dogs and cats.

It will also concentrate its efforts to encourage Member States towards general approaches on new genomic techniques for plants, and the marketing of plant and forest reproductive material, files on which Parliament stands ready to start negotiations, and on forest monitoring, on which neither institution has a position yet.

Health security

Poland will continue the previous presidency’s efforts to clinch a deal on a general approach on the two files of the pharmaceuticals package, as comprehensive drug safety is among its priorities.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Priority dossiers under the Polish EU Council Presidency‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Marco Centrone and Meenakshi Fernandes.

In response to heightened geopolitical risks and security challenges, including Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine,European leaders have called for action to boost defence readiness. In this context, the European Union institutions have put forward several initiatives and reports. The European defence industrial strategy presents a range of ambitious measures to support Member States move towards a European defence union. The Letta Report calls for a ‘radical transformation to build a common market for the security and defence industry’. The Draghi Report presents ten proposals to improve the competitiveness of the European defence sector. The Niinistö Report underscores that security is a public good and that readiness is a common responsibility. A promising approach to respond to current and future challenges is deepening cooperation across Member States to leverage European economies of scale with regards to existing defence spending and activities, which are mainly organised at the national level.

What is the scope?

This ‘cost of non-Europe’ report investigates the quality of European defence spending and the extent to which deepening cooperation could leverage European economies of scale and boost efficiency, considering the nature of defence as a public good. It assesses the potential gains of scaling to the European level for different categories of defence spending. The research draws on an original quantitative analysis of publicly available data carried out by a research team from the Alexandru Ioan Cuza University based in Iași, Romania (see Annex I).

What are the key findings?

Table 1 presents the key findings for defence spending with respect to military forces and strategic assets, defence equipment procurement and defence research on emerging developing technologies. The cost of non-Europe in defence spending– in other words, the cost of not leveraging European economies of scale –is estimated to range from €18 to €57 billion per year.

European economies of scale can be leveraged by deeper cooperation between Member Statesfor all defence activities, including at the planning stage. The more ambitious and deeper the cooperation in the EU, the greater the potential gains for all Member States. The EU could provide complementary executive capacity and act further in the general interest of its citizens, thanks to the provision of financial incentives, facilitation and technical assistance. The EU could also reinforce the coordinated annual review on defence (CARD) process to broaden areas of common strategic interest especially for the 20-year horizon. Effort to improve the quality of European defence spending could promote higher standardisation and quality of European military equipment and generate other gains for society such as job creation, a more predictable environment for businesses and reinforced rule of law.

summary of findings

Read the complete study on ‘Improving the quality of European defence spending – Cost of non-Europe report‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Krisztina Binder.

To keep up with the constant shifts in labour markets and societies caused by major developments such as globalisation and technological advances, people need to develop their knowledge, skills and competences continuously. A varied and future-oriented skill set unlocks opportunities for individuals, promotes inclusion, social mobility and civic participation, and supplies the economy with the workforce needed for growth and innovation, not least in the context of the green and digital transitions. Offering quality learning opportunities, including upskilling and reskilling, that are accessible to learners of all ages and backgrounds is key to making all this possible.

The overall vision and objectives for education and training in the EU encompass lifelong learning that covers all levels and types of learning: formal, non-formal and informal, from early childhood to adulthood. In its 2020 communication on the European education area (EEA), the European Commission identified lifelong learning as an important aspect of education, while in its 2021 resolution on a strategic framework for European cooperation in education and training for 2021 to 2030, the Council highlighted lifelong learning and mobility as a priority area. The new Commission Executive Vice-President for Social Rights and Skills, Quality Jobs and Preparedness, Roxana Mînzatu, is responsible for developing a ‘Union of skills’, focusing on adult and lifelong learning among other things. The European Parliament has always embraced a holistic view of lifelong learning, arguing that it should promote personal and professional growth, foster social participation and employability, and empower active citizens. Parliament has called repeatedly for quality, inclusive and accessible education for all throughout life, as well as endorsing stronger links between education and skills requirements. Additionally, Parliament has continually insisted on the importance of Erasmus+ as a key tool for education and training.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Fostering participation in education and training throughout life‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Marc Jütten.

Economic security has become crucial for the EU. Both the Letta Report on the future of the single market and the Draghi Report on the future of European competitiveness emphasise the need to intensify efforts to secure the EU’s supply of critical raw materials (CRM). Europe is vulnerable to both coercion and geo-economic fragmentation because of its high dependency on strategic raw materials from countries with which the EU is not strategically aligned. Diversifying imports of strategic raw materials is key to mastering the clean transition of Europe’s economy, mitigating supply chain risks and reducing the EU’s strategic dependencies.

In line with its CRM strategy, the EU is seeking to conclude new partnerships in the context of the EU trade and Global Gateway strategies. However, the EU is not the only actor looking to secure access to CRM supplies. China, for example, is bolstering its global dominance in strategic and emerging technologies, continuously increasing its presence in Latin America (and Africa) in order to secure its supply of strategic raw materials. The region is primarily rich in lithium and copper, which are essential for renewable energy technologies and the production of the lithium-ion batteries used in laptops, smartphones, and hybrid and electric vehicles.

Since 2023, Latin America, too, has won the EU’s renewed attention, and real steps to enhance cooperation on CRM have been taken. In 2023, the EU signed a memorandum of understanding with Argentina and Chile on sustainable raw materials value chains. In November 2024, an interim trade agreement with Chile was ratified – the first EU trade agreement comprising a specific chapter on energy and raw materials. In December 2024, the EU and Mercosur finally reached a political agreement on the EU–Mercosur partnership agreement. As Mercosur countries, primarily Argentina and Brazil, are major producers of CRM, the agreement could help the EU secure an efficient, reliable and sustainable flow of the raw materials that are critical for the clean transition and for the EU’s strategic autonomy more widely.

Read the complete briefing on ‘EU–Latin America: Enhancing cooperation on critical raw materialsin the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Latin America’s share in global production and reserves of selected critical raw materials in 2023 (%)

Written by Ivana Katsarova.

Although origin labelling for food cannot be directly linked to a product’s intrinsic quality, consumers are increasingly interested in local food systems and in short supply chains. While the easiest way to convey origin information is through labelling, European Union (EU) law requires the display of such information only for a limited number of food products. EU consumers and consumer groups have long advocated greater transparency on food product origins.

In force since December 2014, the EU regulation on the provision of food information to consumers updated and harmonised food labelling requirements, set harmonised rules for the presentation of allergen information and tightened up the rules to prevent misleading practices. The regulation allows EU countries to adopt additional national measures concerning the mandatory labelling of food products, as long as these are justified by reasons specifically defined in the regulation.

Indicating the country of origin is currently mandatory for certain food products, such as fresh fruit and vegetables, fishery products, honey, olive oil, eggs, beef and beef products, unprocessed meat of swine, sheep, goat and poultry and the primary ingredient of a food when it differs from the origin given for the product as a whole. In the absence of EU rules, some EU countries have enacted national legislation requiring mandatory origin labelling for certain categories of foods.

As part of its ‘farm to fork’ strategy, adopted in 2020, the Commission intended to revise existing rules to extend the mandatory indication of origin to more categories of food products. However, such a proposal never emerged, and if or when it will be put forward remains unclear.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Food origin labelling: Developments and issues‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Gyorgyi Macsai (Members’ Research Service) with Raffaele Ventura (GlobalStat, EUI).

This infographic provides insight into the economic performance of China compared with the European Union (EU) and examines the trade dynamics between them. In 2023, while China’s GDP growth rate has returned to increase against the previous year, Europe’s GDP growth rate continues to decline and stands at 0.6 percent. Both countries’ inflation rates are down from the prior year, but Europe’s rate remains at 6.3 percent while China’s is at 0.2 percent. Over the last decade, trade between the EU and China has generally risen. Nevertheless, EU imports of goods from China saw a significant drop after 2022. The EU continues to be China’s primary trade partner, while China ranks as the EU’s second-largest partner.

Read this infographic on ‘China: Economic indicators and trade with EU‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

EU-UK trade, € billion GDP growth
(annual change, %) Gross domestic product (GDP) per capita
(at PPP 1 in thousands of international dollars) Female labour force participation rate
(% of female population aged 15+) 0
20
40
60
80
202320212019201720152013201120092007
60.7
24.5
(International dollars, 1 000s)(International dollars, 1 000s)(International dollars, 1 000s)
China
EU-27
current prices, Purchasing power parity
Total unemployment rate
(% of total labour force) FDI and remittances
Foreign direct investment (FDI) net inflows (% of GDP) Public finances, monetary and financial data China business environment and socio-economic indicators EU trade with China Main trade partners (2023)
Trade in goods, exports plus imports Top EU partners (2023)
Trade in goods EU exports of goods to China (2023) EU imports of goods from China (2023) EU exports of services to China (2023) EU imports of services from China (2023)

Written by Gisela Grieger.

On 6 December 2024, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and the four founding members of Mercosur – Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay – reached a political agreement on the trade pillar of the EU-Mercosur association agreement. Additional negotiations had taken place since March 2023 to address various concerns sparked by an earlier 2019 agreement in principle. While the legal basis of the text, now referred to as the EU-Mercosur Partnership Agreement, is still unknown, several ratification scenarios could be envisaged.

Background

The negotiations on the EU-Mercosur agreement were based on 1999 Council negotiating guidelines that sought to conclude an association agreement with Mercosur to upgrade the 1995 bloc-to-bloc Interregional Framework Cooperation Agreement (IFCA), in force since 1999. The three-pronged structure of the agreement originally envisaged is similar to other such agreements the EU concluded in the past with Central America (2012) and Chile (2002, modernised in 2024): it comprises a trade pillar, a political dialogue pillar and a cooperation pillar. The Commission, in charge of the trade pillar negotiations, published the chapters of the trade pillar on its dedicated website as agreed under the 2019 political agreement. In contrast, the European External Action Service, in charge of the negotiations on the other parts, has not published the text of the remaining pillars, although the corresponding negotiations closed in July 2020.

Following the political agreement on the trade pillar reached in December 2024 and the publication of its chapters as amended, and of a summary of the changes, the text is now due to undergo legal revision (‘scrubbing’) prior to being translated into the EU’s official languages. Once this is completed, the Commission will submit to the Council proposals for Council decisions to sign and conclude the whole agreement. The agreement will then need to be ratified.

Commission proposals for Council decisions to sign and conclude the agreement

The Commission proposals, expected in mid-2025, will spell out the substantive legal bases that determine whether the EU-Mercosur agreement will be submitted for ratification as a mixed agreement that – next to provisions relating to the EU’s exclusive trade competence (‘EU-only’ agreement) set out in Article 207 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) – contains provisions concerning competence(s) shared between the EU and its Member States. It is also conceivable that the agreement will be split into two agreements (one EU only, one mixed) that either: a) enter into force consecutively –first as an interim EU-only agreement, which then elapses once the final mixed agreement has been ratified by the EU Member States; or b) co-exist as legally separate agreements after their ratification.

Unlike EU-only agreements, mixed agreements not only require Council ratification and European Parliament consent but also ratification by the EU Member States in accordance with their constitutional requirements. The Council adopts its decisions to sign (under Article 218(5) TFEU) and – after the European Parliament has given its consent – concludes (under Article 218(6)) the agreement and, if necessary, agrees on its provisional application. It does so by qualified majority, with Article 218(8) providing a number of exceptions when unanimity is required, including for association agreements.

Ratification scenarios

As the Commission has not indicated the legal basis it intends to propose for the EU-Mercosur agreement, several ratification scenarios used in the recent past could be envisaged.

1) The EU-Canada agreement model: A single mixed agreement

The Commission’s initial proposal for Council decisions to sign and conclude the EU-Canada comprehensive economic and trade agreement (CETA) was subsequently modified to use a mixed legal basis. In its proposal for a Council decision, the Commission states that – since it could not agree with EU Member States whether CETA was a mixed agreement, and since CETA’s provisional application since 2017 was a priority – CETA was based on Article 43(2) (agriculture/fisheries), Article 91 (transport), Article 100(2) (transport), Article 153(2) (social policy), Article 192(1) (environment) and the first subparagraph of Article 207(4) (common commercial policy), in conjunction with Article 218(5), and was thus deemed a mixed agreement. Experts have argued that several legal bases (e.g. for the environment) would not have been applicable to CETA in light of the 2017 Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) Opinion 2/15 on the distribution of exclusive and shared competences in the EU-Singapore free trade agreement (FTA). Since CETA’s ratification at EU level, its ratification by EU Member States (17 of 27 have ratified as of December 2024) has been very slow. Mixed agreements bear the risk of blockage by a single EU Member State.

2) The EU-Chile agreement model: Split into an interim EU-only agreement and final mixed agreement

In 2023, the Commission submitted two proposals for Council decisions to sign and conclude the text for the modernisation of the 2002 EU-Chile association agreement. The proposals envisaged an interim EU-only agreement entering into force after ratification at EU level and ceasing to apply once a mixed agreement including the EU-only part enters into force after its ratification by all EU Member States:

• a proposal for an EU-only EU-Chile interim trade agreement (ITA) based on Article 91(1), Article 100(2) and Article 207(4) first paragraph, in conjunction with Article 218(5), adopted by a related Council decision; and
• a proposal for an EU-Chile Advanced Framework Agreement (AFA), a mixed agreement including the trade pillar, based on Article 91(1), Article 100(2), Article 207(4) first paragraph, Article 212 (economic, financial and technical cooperation with third countries), in conjunction with Article 218(5), adopted by a related Council decision. In its proposal for the AFA, the Commission states that the substantive legal basis for the Council decision depends mainly on the AFA’s objective and content. It adds that ‘the AFA pursues two main objectives and has two main components which fall within the scope of the common commercial policy, transport, and of the economic, financial and technical cooperation with third countries’. It concludes that, given ‘the fact that the predominant components of the Agreement are trade policy, transport, and economic, financial and technical cooperation with third countries, the voting rule for this particular case is therefore qualified majority’.

The ratification of the EU-Chile agreement may be seen as a pertinent model, given the considerable similarities in the structure (objectives) and content with the EU-Mercosur agreement, despite the absence of some elements (such as investment protection and far-reaching investment liberalisation) from the latter due to a Council mandate dating back to a pre-Lisbon Treaty era, when investment was entirely an EU Member State competence. Moreover, the Council mandate (Title XI) refers to an ITA.

3) The EU-Singapore agreement model: Split into separate EU-only and mixed agreements

After the 2017 CJEU Opinion 2/15 determined that the EU-Singapore FTA contained elements of shared competences (i.e. provisions on portfolio investment and investment dispute settlement) and therefore would have been deemed a mixed agreement, in 2018 the EU-Singapore FTA was split into an FTA based on Article 91, Article 100(2) and Article 207(4) and into an investment protection agreement (IPA) based on Article 207(4), both in conjunction with Article 218(5). The former entered into force and the latter continues its process of ratification by EU Member States. The EU-Vietnam FTA underwent a similar split, the result of which is two legally separate agreements that remain separate after ratification.

Consent by the European Parliament, and formal conclusion

Under Rule 117(7) of its Rules of Procedure (RoP), Parliament decides by a single vote – in accordance with Rule 107 RoP – on a Council request to give its consent to the conclusion, renewal or amendment of an international agreement. It provides that, if Parliament declines to give its consent, its President must inform the Council that the agreement at issue cannot be concluded, renewed or amended. The consent procedure may not be prolonged for more than one year.

Following Parliament’s consent, the Council would be able to adopt a decision to conclude the agreement pursuant to the procedure and voting rules set out in Article 218(6) and Article 218(8) TFEU respectively.

Read this complete ‘at a glance’ note on ‘Ratification scenarios for the EU‑Mercosur agreement‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Clare Ferguson and Katarzyna Sochacka.

The European Union’s external relations topped the agenda for the December 2024 plenary session, with several debates on statements by the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, and Vice-President of the European Commission, Kaja Kallas, attending the plenary for the first time in her new capacity. These included the toppling of the Syrian regime and its consequences; Russia’s disinformation activities and fraudulent justification of its war against Ukraine; the use of rape as a weapon of war (e.g. in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Sudan). The day after Kallas’s remarks on the crackdown on peaceful pro-European demonstrators in Georgia, Salome Zourabichvili, President of Georgia, addressed Members in a formal sitting.

Other debates on Commission statements covered, inter alia: the situation in Mayotte following the recent devastating cyclone; a European innovation act; harassment and cyber-violence against female politicians in EU candidate and neighbouring countries; a shared vision for sustainable European tourism; promoting social dialogue and the right to strike; tackling abusive subcontracting; the need to ensure swift action and transparency on public-sector corruption allegations; urgent EU action to preserve nature and biodiversity; and the Commission’s plans to revise outstanding proposals on animal welfare in its 2025 work plan.

Members also debated ahead of the European Council meeting of 19 December 2024 and set out their expectations ahead of the EU-Western Balkans Summit that took place the previous day. Parliament created two new standing committees, upgrading the former sub-committees on Public Health, and on Security and Defence; and set up two special committees: on the European Democracy Shield, and the Housing Crisis.

Sakharov Prize 2024

The Sakharov Prize celebrates those who defend fundamental freedoms and human rights, in often very difficult circumstances. President Roberta Metsola awarded the 2024 prize to María Corina Machado and Edmundo González Urrutia, leaders of Venezuela’s democratic opposition, recognised by Parliament as the Venezuelan people’s democratically chosen leaders.

Election of the Ombudsman

Teresa Anjinho was elected to serve as the next European Ombudsman in a vote conducted in two ballots. She will hold the office for the 2024-2029 term. Under the incumbent, Emily O’Reilly, the role of the European Ombudsman has seen important changes, with a new statute put in place.

Activities of the European Ombudsman: 2023 annual report

Parliament debated a Committee on Petitions (PETI) report proposing that Members approve the European Ombudsman’s 2023 activity report. The report highlights key issues, including transparency, accountability, and ethical concerns. The Ombudsman’s 2023 report notes that the Ombudsman opened 393 complaint-based inquiries and tackled systemic issues through 5 own-initiative inquiries, further cementing the role in promoting good administration.

Regional emergency support for reconstruction

Climate-related disasters are recurring increasingly often in Europe. To speed up the EU’s support for those affected, Members debated and adopted the RESTORE regional emergency support proposal. It seeks to allow EU countries to re-programme up to €17.7 billion from EU cohesion policy funds for disaster relief and reconstruction. This includes financing reconstruction work by up to 100 %, with 30 % pre-financing to allow funds to be immediately available.

EU conclusion of the UN Mauritius Convention

Investor-State dispute settlement, used to resolve disputes in international investment agreements, has long been criticised for its opacity. New rules came into force in 2014 to address the transparency issue, by mandating public access to proceedings and documents, bolstering legitimacy and public trust. Those rules apply only to post-2014 agreements, but the 2014 United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Mauritius Convention would extend their scope to earlier treaties. The EU sees the convention as a key step toward modernising the process. Following a Committee on International Trade (INTA) recommendation, Parliament gave consent to the EU’s conclusion of the Mauritius Convention.

EU priorities for the 69th session of the UN Commission on the Status of Women

Members debated EU priorities on gender equality. The plenary adopted a recommendation from Parliament’s Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality (FEMM) which urges the EU to lead by example on addressing gender-based violence, ensuring healthcare access, promoting gender equality in decision-making, and applying gender mainstreaming across policies, ahead of the 69th session of the UN Commission on the Status of Women. The session will mark the 30th anniversary of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, adopted by 189 countries in 1995, which provides a global roadmap for gender equality.

Misinformation and disinformation on social media

Romania recently annulled its presidential elections due to foreign interference linked to disinformation campaigns. Intelligence reports revealed thousands of accounts, many associated with foreign influence, amplifying political messaging. Following a Commission statement on the misinformation and disinformation on social media, Parliament debated measures to ensure that online platforms conform to the rules under the Digital Services Act, as well as strengthening EU resilience against election interference.

Improving EU farmers’ and agricultural workers’ working conditions and wellbeing

Following a statement from the European Commission, Members debated measures to improve working conditions and mental wellbeing for farmers and agricultural workers. Farmers face significantly higher risks at work than in other sectors, with fatality rates at 233 % above average, and elevated stress leading to higher suicide rates. Parliament has already called for improved working conditions in the sector, particularly for those working in remote regions.

Updating the European strategy for the rights of persons with disabilities

Parliament heard and debated a Commission statement on the need to update the EU’s 2021-2030 disability rights strategy, to focus on new initiatives for 2025-2030. While progress has been made on accessibility, employment, and inclusion through flagship action like the Disability Employment Package and the AccessibleEU resource centre, challenges remain for disability rights in areas including poverty, education, housing, and healthcare.

Right to clean drinking water in the EU

Access to clean drinking water is a fundamental right long championed by Parliament, but water scarcity, microplastics and other contaminants persist in the EU. Members debated a Commission statement on the right to clean drinking water , where updated EU rules under the Drinking Water Directive aim to enhance water quality and improve access for vulnerable groups.

Opening of trilogue negotiations

One decision to enter into interinstitutional negotiations from the Employment and Social Affairs Committee (EMPL), on the establishment and functioning of European works councils, was approved by a vote. Another, from the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee (ECON), on the framework for financial data access, was approved without a vote.

Corrigenda

Following committee approval of the corrigendum on the European health data space legislative file, voted in plenary before the end of last term, it was approved, under Rule 251 of the Rules of Procedure.

Read the complete ‘at a glance’ note on ‘Plenary round-up – December 2024‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Naja Bentzen

The role of information integrity in the proposed European democracy shield, announced by Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, was the subject of a roundtable discussion organised by EPRS on 10 December 2024. The notion of information integrity has been gaining ground in multilateral and international forums in recent years. The panel connected multilateral and European diplomatic perspectives on how to make our information ecosystems healthy, while protecting fundamental rights. Etienne Bassot, Director of the Members’ Research Service, opened the event, which was moderated by Michael Adam, Head of the Digital Policies Unit.

In her keynote speech, First Vice-President of the European Parliament, Sabine Verheyen (EPP, Germany), built on the EPRS motto, ‘Empowering through knowledge’. She underscored the importance of empowering citizens to navigate the digital landscape and resist the flood of manipulative content. She emphasised the need to build and maintain a resilient and trustworthy information sphere, in line with the announced European democracy shield. This includes strict enforcement of the EU’s digital regulation, notably the Digital Services Act (DSA), and the work of the European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO) and its regional hubs. It also includes the Artificial Intelligence Act, alongside the European Media Freedom Act and the regulation on political advertising.

Arvin Gadgil, Director of the Global Policy Centre for Governance, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), underlined that no aspect of information integrity can be limited by borders – and neither can the solutions. With UNDP the biggest development programme in the UN system ( present in 170 countries), he noted information integrity will become an increasing programming area for the UNDP. In the future, more countries will likely ask for UNDP assistance to build information integrity. The EU supports much of this assistance. He also underlined the importance of multi-stakeholder engagement, which requires long-term collaboration with trusted partners to find solutions, for example via the Global Action Coalition on Information Integrity (supported by Denmark’s Tech4Democracy Initiative). 

Charles Baubion, Head of the Information Integrity Team, Organisation for Economic

Co-operation and Development (OECD), cautioned never to take democracy for granted: upholding the values of democracy requires constant attention and continuous reflection, leveraging democracy’s ability to self-improve. Earlier this year, the OECD report ‘Facts not fakes: Tackling disinformation, strengthening information integrity‘ emphasised the urgency of boosting ‘the integrity of information spaces and combating disinformation’ to reinforce democracy and strengthen the fabric of open societies. In November 2024, the OECD invited stakeholders to comment on draft recommendations on information integrity, aiming to promote information integrity in line with the universal human rights of freedom of opinion and expression. Similar to the UN and EU approaches, all stakeholders and all levels of society are factored in. Charles Baubion emphasised that social media company self-regulation is not enough, more transparency and accountability is needed, not least with the added challenge of handling the role of AI. The Digital Services Act is a good example of EU leadership in this area.

Filip Grzegorzewski, Head of Information Integrity Division, European External Action Service (EEAS) started by defining foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI), a pattern of behaviour that threatens or has the potential to negatively impact our values, procedures and political processes. The EEAS focuses on behaviour rather than on narratives. Triggered by Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea, the EU has built a comprehensive toolbox to address the challenges. The work includes cooperating with all 27 Member States to reinforce internal defence against FIMI. Moreover, the EEAS expands these efforts across the world through its external network of 145 delegations and 24 common security and defence policy (CSDP) missions and operations. The EEAS also helps build resilience against FIMI in regions closest to home, via four task forces for the immediate neighbourhood: East, South, Western Balkans and Sub-Saharan Africa. In addition, the EEAS helps tackle FIMI globally, including via cooperation within the G7’s Rapid Reaction Mechanism.

Seemab Sheikh, Acting Deputy Tech Ambassador, Denmark, explained that the Danish tech ambassador (the first such post in the world) moved from San Francisco to Copenhagen last year, to expand the focus beyond the US, including Europe and the Global South. In addition to the work on the UN Global Digital Compact, Denmark, alongside the Netherlands and Wikimedia, is leading a multi-stakeholder task force for the Freedom Online Coalition, working towards a blueprint for a holistic and positive online information ecosystem. She noted, in the face of the erosion of information integrity, which AI is accelerating, tech companies need to take greater social responsibility. Information integrity will be a high priority during Denmark’s presidency in the second half of 2025, prioritising cooperation with private companies and with a special focus on AI, as well as enhancing resilience against hybrid threats. Seemab Sheikh noted the potential of the announced European democracy shield initiative to further strengthen and coordinate the EU’s response to FIMI.

Naja Bentzen highlighted the increasing influence of ‘corporate diplomacy’ on our information ecosystems, or our collective cognitive infrastructure. In some respects, the very large online platforms and search engines, with more than 45 million users in the EU, wield more geopolitical and geostrategic influence than most nation states. In the next years, underlying tension between what Anu Bradford sees as three different models for tech regulation (the EU’s rights-driven model; the US market-driven model; and China’s state-driven model) is likely to become even more visible. Brussels will face serious challenges in enforcing its rights-driven digital regulation, which is directly linked to the European democracy shield initiative.

The roundtable discussion took a bird’s-eye view of the challenges to our global information sphere, as well as the solutions. Meanwhile, current developments underscored the pertinence of the topic: Just four days before the event, Romania became the first EU country to cancel an election over foreign interference, following reports about information manipulation on TikTok. Parliament’s Internal Market and Consumer Protection Committee (IMCO) held an exchange of views with TikTok over compliance with the Digital Services Act (DSA). On 17 December 2024, the European Commission made statements, accompanied by a debate, in Parliament on misinformation and disinformation on social media platforms and risks to the integrity of elections in Europe. The following day, Parliament voted to establish a new Special Committee on the European Democracy Shield.

Indeed, as the exchange with the audience at the EPRS event also illustrated, democracy cannot be taken for granted. Against this backdrop, the discussion on the role of information integrity in a potential European democracy shield – and how to link such a shield with the rest of the world – could hardly have been more timely and relevant.

Citizens have expressed concern about the proposed EU-Mercosur Trade Deal and in particular its potential impact on agriculture and the environment. Many citizens have written to the President of the European Parliament on this subject since November 2023, calling on her to reject the treaty in its current form because they consider it poses significant risk to European agriculture, climate commitments, and global environmental stability.

We replied to citizens who took the time to write to the President:

EU negotiations

The European Commission is negotiating a Trade Agreement with the Mercosur countries on behalf of the European Union (EU).

Responding to a September 2024 parliamentary question, the Commission stated the agreement should take into account concerns raised by the EU agricultural sector. The Commission also wants a clear commitment from Mercosur to stop deforestation and make the Paris Agreement a key part of the trade deal.

European Parliament position

During a November 2024 visit to Paris to address a business forum, President Metsola spoke of the negotiations in an interview. She expressed the hope of finding a balanced solution that both protects the interests of EU farmers and unlocks new opportunities for EU businesses. She emphasised that no EU country should be left feeling isolated or abandoned.

In a 2020 resolution, Parliament recognised the importance of a stronger partnership with Latin America and the additional trade opportunities this would bring. Parliament stressed that the agreement must ensure fair competition and guarantee that European standards are upheld. Parliament wanted additional commitments on labour rights and environmental protection including the implementation of the Paris Climate Agreement.

More recently, in a 2023 resolution Parliament reiterated that the agreement should only be ratified if it includes climate change and deforestation commitments.

The European Parliament delegation for Mercosur is closely following the discussions.

Next steps

Once the negotiations are over, the Council adopts the agreement. The European Parliament must either approve or reject the deal; it cannot amend it.

If the final agreement covers areas beyond trade, it would also have to be ratified by each individual EU country. 

Background

Citizens often send messages to the President of the European Parliament expressing their views and/or requesting action. The Citizens’ Enquiries Unit (AskEP) within the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) replies to these messages, which may sometimes be identical as part of wider public campaigns.

Written by Marcin Szczepański.

The UK’s withdrawal from the EU on 31 January 2020 was followed by a period of tense relations, mainly around the issues concerning implementation of the Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland. The economic consequences of Brexit started to materialise. In 2023, the new UK government of Rishi Sunak agreed with the EU on the Windsor Framework, designed to find solutions to issues related to the implementation of the Protocol. A period of gradually improving relations ensued.

Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine made it clear that the EU and UK are facing a common threat and need to coordinate their policies better. Progress has been made in an increasing number of fields, from defence, through trade, research and innovation, to competition policies. With the change of leadership in the UK to a Labour government and the emergence of a new political cycle in the EU for 2024-2029, the reset of EU-UK relations has increasingly been gaining momentum.

While the UK has made clear that it will not return to the single market or customs union, the government of Keir Starmer has started to engage diplomatically with the EU, with a reset of the relationship as its priority. Both sides are interested mainly in a security and defence pact, the scope of which remains to be defined. The EU’s interests include improving mobility into the UK (including youth mobility), maintaining fisheries access, and ensuring rights of EU citizens in the UK. There are also a number of EU programmes that the UK may be considering joining, to mutual benefit, once financial contributions have been negotiated. The negotiations are set to intensify in early 2025.

The re-election of Donald Trump may complicate these negotiations, as it is likely to bring disruption, and its effects remain to be seen. The expert community sees possibilities for stronger cooperation on a range of issues such as climate and energy policies, resilience of supply chains, approximation of laws and building the defence industrial base. The European Parliament has been calling in numerous resolutions for closer cooperation in many areas not covered by the current arrangements.

Read the complete briefing on ‘EU-UK relations: Towards a stronger partnership in uneasy times in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Anita Orav.

Drawing attention to migrants’ human rights and highlighting their contribution to society, International Migrants’ Day is observed every year on 18 December. The day was designated by the United Nations General Assembly on 4 December 2000 in response to growing migration numbers around the world.

Context

Migration is and will continue to be part of the human experience, both globally and in the EU, as a natural response to adversity and violence of various kinds. On 1 January 2022, 27.3 million people (6.1 %) of the 448.8 million people living in the EU were non-EU citizens. Most migrants – approximately 2 to 3 million per year – arrive in the EU using legal channels. However, wars and upheaval in neighbouring countries are also triggering displacement of people and increased irregular arrivals of migrants.

Migration management in the EU

The EU and its Member States have shared competence in migration policy. In recent years, the priority accorded to migration has been reflected in the EU budget, with €22.7 billion allocated to migration and border policy from 2021 to 2027. Acknowledging that the EU needed to move away from ad hoc solutions and put in place a predictable and reliable migration management system, the European Commission put forward a new pact on migration and asylum in 2020. The pact combines key EU policies on migration, asylum and border management and was adopted in spring 2024. In addition, the Commission has initiated reforms to its legal migration policy by proposing a skills and talent package, intended to attract and retain highly skilled third-country nationals, and by creating the EU Talent Pool, which will match employers in the EU with jobseekers from non-EU countries. The objective is to help address critical labour shortages across Europe and to offer a response to the demographic situation in the EU of an ageing population. Research confirms that legal migration channels are a viable way to mitigate the problem of a declining EU workforce.

Honouring the contributions of migrants and respecting their rights

The theme for International Migrants’ Day in 2024 is ‘Honouring the contributions of migrants and respecting their rights’. It was chosen to raise awareness of the issue of exploitation and to highlight migrants’ positive contribution to society. The European Commission asserts that legal migration is an investment in the economy and society.

The EU action plan on integration and inclusion addresses perennial barriers to migrants’ education, labour market and housing. At the end of 2024, a mid-term review of progress made will be published, based on consultations with the Member States. Progress on practical action to support integration in areas such as health, housing and employment can already be visualised in the Commission’s progress tracker.

European Parliament position

The European Parliament has previously advocated a humane, solidarity-based and common approach to migration. In its resolution of 25 November 2021, taking into consideration that total labour supply in the euro area was projected to fall by 13 % (20 million people) between 2019 and 2070, Parliament encouraged the development of adequate legal economic migration channels.

Parliament’s adoption of the new pact on migration and asylum, to be applied from mid-2026, confirmed its willingness to take ‘an important step, to a common European asylum and migration policy that is well functioning and long-term’.

Read the complete ‘at a glance’ note on ‘International Migrants’ Day: 18 December 2024‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Maria Niestadt.

The governance of the internet has been a topic of debate since its creation. The internet is not governed by a centralised entity, but rather by a decentralised patchwork of stakeholders, including national governments, the private sector, the technical community and civil society. They work together in various internet governance bodies, such as the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) and the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Several United Nations specialised agencies, in particular the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), also participate in internet governance. The ITU manages resources that are critical for wireless services worldwide, for example.

It has long been debated whether governments should have a central role in internet governance or whether various stakeholders should be equally responsible for formulating principles, rules and procedures for the internet. The EU is a strong supporter of the multi-stakeholder approach to internet governance. This approach incorporates the views of a variety of stakeholders, including governments, businesses, technical communities and civil society on an equal footing. Not all actors share this view, however. China and Russia in particular believe that states should have a greater role in deciding on the content, operations and norms of the internet within their borders. China has also proposed to change the internet’s protocol design.

The EU is a strong defender of an open, free and unfragmented internet that remains a singular, decentralised network of networks. This vision contrasts with the more controlled approaches of some non-EU states that limit their citizens’ access to certain internet content and monitor citizens’ online activities. Private companies can also be an obstacle to the openness and unity of the internet when they develop their own physical infrastructure and protocols.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Internet governance: Keeping the internet open, free and unfragmented‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Ralf Drachenberg.

The last European Council meeting of 2024 will be the first to be prepared and chaired by the institution’s new President, António Costa. The agenda has a heavy external relations component, including, besides Ukraine, a strategic discussion on the ‘EU in the world’. This exchange over dinner, not designed to lead to written conclusions, will cover transatlantic relations, EU-UK relations and enlargement. In addition, EU leaders will discuss the situation in the Middle East and developments in Moldova and Georgia. Other items on the agenda include migration and readiness for future crises. The European Council meeting will be preceded by an EU-Western Balkans Summit on 18 December.

1.     EU-Western Balkans Summit

The EU-Western Balkans Summit is scheduled for the evening before the European Council meeting, on 18 December. At the summit, leaders will discuss: (i) implementation of the growth plan; (ii) regional integration efforts; (iii) further integration possibilities; and (iv) shared geopolitical challenges. In preparation for the meeting, President Costa had an informal dinner with the leaders of the Western Balkan countries on 3 December, also attended by the Commissioner for Enlargement, Marta Kos, and the High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy/Vice‑President (HR/VP), Kaja Kallas. After the dinner, Costa tweeted: ‘The future of the Western Balkans is in the EU. Let’s work to make it happen’.

2.     European Council meeting General

Following the customary opening address by the President of the European Parliament, Roberta Metsola, an in-person discussion with the President of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, is envisaged. As usual at the end of every 6-month presidency of the Council of the EU, the 19 December European Council meeting will conclude with a report by the Prime Minister of Hungary, Viktor Orbán, on the achievements of the Hungarian Presidency.

Before taking over the European Council presidency on 1 December, António Costa announced that he wanted to introduce a number of changes to the European Council’s working methods. His aim is to improve interinstitutional relations, shorten European Council meetings and close the gap between Europe’s citizens and the EU institutions. He appears to be off to a promising start. After a first meeting with the presidents of the European Parliament, Roberta Metsola, and of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, on 2 December, Costa attended the European Parliament’s Conference of Presidents meeting on 11 December. His invitation letter to the European Council meeting was sent 2 weeks ahead, contrasting with the last-minute missives of his predecessor. In line with the aim of shortening the European Council meetings, this first meeting is scheduled to last 1 day only.

Costa has also published a new leaders’ agenda for the European Council, setting out a work programme for the European Council for the whole of 2025, whereas the most recent editions issued by former President Charles Michel often only covered a couple of months. A first observation is that Ukraine and the Middle East will be on the agenda of the European Council at each meeting in 2025 for ‘as long as needed’. Moreover, the topics that were salient in the European Council in 2024 – and highlighted as priorities in the 2024-2029 strategic agenda, notably competitiveness, security and defence, and migration – also feature prominently on the agenda for 2025. However, the leaders’ agenda also envisages working sessions on topics that are rarely discussed by EU Heads of State or Government, such as oceans and housing. Regarding the latter, Costa most likely wants to make good on his promise to discuss ‘the problems of the citizens’.

Another innovation is Costa’s suggestion that the European Council should join the other EU institutions in the Interinstitutional Ethics Body, which will thereby also cover the position of the European Council President himself. If this proposal is confirmed by EU leaders, former European Council President Herman Van Rompuy will represent the European Council in this body.

Since the change at the helm, there also seems to be new impetus in the area of justice and home affairs. The Council has approved the ‘strategic guidelines for legislative and operational planning within the area of freedom, security and justice’, which, according to Article 68 TFEU, need to be adopted by the European Council for each institutional cycle. For the last 5 years, the European Council did not comply with this Treaty obligation; EU leaders should now endorse the guidelines.

Ukraine

On his first day as President of the European Council, Costa was in Kyiv and held meetings with Ukraine’s Prime Minister, Denys Shmyhal, Speaker of the Parliament, Ruslan Stefanchuk, and President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, followed by a joint press conference with the latter. Costa continued the messaging often reiterated by the European Council, emphasising that ‘we will stand with you for as long as necessary and whatever it takes. We stand firmly on the side of your right to self-defence, sovereignty and territorial integrity. And we will do our utmost to see you in the European Union as a free European nation as soon as possible’.

EU leaders are expected to emphasise that Russia must not win the war, and to call for increased efforts to help Ukraine, particularly in terms of air defence systems, ammunition and missiles. At the 19 November Foreign Affairs Council meeting, it was announced that the EU had almost reached the target of delivering 1 million rounds of ammunition to Ukraine – a target that should have been met 8 months ago. In view of past delays, EU leaders could discuss the importance of strengthening Ukraine’s own defence industry and deepening its cooperation with the EU defence industry. The European Council is likely to call for efforts to strengthen the EU Military Assistance Mission in support of Ukraine and for the decisions taken under the European Peace Facility (EPC) to be implemented. Reportedly, Hungary continues to refuse to participate in the proposal on voluntary contributions to the EPC.

The European Council is likely to welcome the 15th package of sanctions against Russia, which was adopted by the Council on 16 December. It may also reiterate previous calls for sanctions to be fully and effectively enforced. In addition, EU leaders are likely to condemn any support provided to Russia by third countries, namely military support from Iran and North Korea as well as the deployment of North Korean soldiers to Russia in order to participate in the war against Ukraine. EU leaders will condemn Russia’s continued attacks against civilian and energy infrastructure. They will also most likely call for extra support to keep Ukraine’s energy infrastructure running and for further integration of the Ukrainian and Moldovan systems in the EU’s energy network.

EU in the world

In his invitation letter, Costa announced that the EU’s engagement with the world would be the second core theme of the December meeting. EU leaders are to hold a ‘comprehensive and strategic discussion’ on the subject over dinner, but without agreeing on written conclusions. Costa has also highlighted three main topics for that strategic discussion. Enlargement, as ‘the main geopolitical investment we can make in our neighbourhood’, will be one of them, the invasion of Ukraine by Russia having given new impetus to the enlargement debate. The topic, which was not mentioned at all in the 2019-2024 Strategic Agenda, was given a prominent place in the 2024-2029 Strategic Agenda, which describes enlargement as ‘a geostrategic investment in peace, security, stability and prosperity‘. At the December meeting, EU leaders may discuss both aspects of the enlargement debate: the external aspect (the progress, or backsliding, of applicant states) and the internal aspect (the internal reforms announced at the June 2024 European Council meeting).

Transatlantic relations will also be part of the discussion on the EU in the world. The December European Council meeting will be the first formal meeting since Donald Trump’s election, and the last before he is sworn in for his second term as President of the United States. EU leaders are likely to discuss what his presidency will entail for European security and defence, and for the EU economy, and how best to work with the Trump administration on matters of interest to both sides. They might also follow up on EU foreign ministers’ recent discussion on EU-US relations, and its implications for Ukraine and the Middle East.

The third topic EU leaders will discuss over dinner are post-Brexit relations between the EU and the United Kingdom, which have improved since the Labour party came into government in July 2024. Two weeks after the UK election, at the European Political Community meeting in Oxfordshire, UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer made it clear that he wanted to reset the EU-UK relationship. The war in Ukraine and the unknowns brought about by the upcoming Trump presidency have led the EU and the UK to be increasingly open to cooperation in the area of security and defence. In October 2024, the British Foreign Secretary attended a meeting of EU foreign affairs ministers on shared security challenges facing Europe. In a joint statement, the HR/VP and the UK Foreign Secretary emphasised the importance of regular exchanges and the need to be close partners in security and defence. The EU and the UK are reportedly working on a joint security pact.

Middle East

EU leaders will reiterate calls for a ceasefire in Gaza, the release of all hostages, improved humanitarian access to Gaza, and the EU’s commitment to peace based on the two-state solution. They may also emphasise their commitment to providing humanitarian aid to the most vulnerable in the Middle East, notably in Gaza, where extreme food shortages have been reported. As regards Lebanon, the ceasefire agreement brokered between Israel and Hezbollah in November has been violated on numerous occasions. Thus, EU leaders may call on all parties to respect the ceasefire and work towards lasting peace in Lebanon.

EU leaders are also expected to address the situation in Syria. After an offensive launched by rebel groups on 27 November, the regime was toppled and deposed President Bashar al-Assad fled to Moscow. In a tweet, Slovenian Prime Minister Robert Golob stated that he was looking forward to discussing with EU leaders ways of helping the Syrian people and achieving a ‘dignified, secure, and stable future’. Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen, Czech Prime Minister Petr Fiala and Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk pointed to the links between Russia and the Assad regime, and others expressed concerns about the transition and the protection of civilians.

Given that one of the main rebel groups, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), formerly had links to Al-Qaida and Islamic State (Da’esh), EU leaders are expected to discuss how the EU should interact (or not) with the new powers in Syria. Even if HTS’s leader, Abu Mohammed al-Jolani/Ahmed al-Sharaa, has promised that Syrians, including minorities, will be safe, the stability of Syria and security of religious/ethnic groups is a matter of concern. In that context, EU leaders may discuss whether it is safe to return Syrians who have sought refuge in the EU since 2011. Some EU countries have halted the processing of Syrian asylum applications; the Austrian Interior Minister has even been preparing a repatriation and deportation programme. Conversely, Spain has said it will continue to process asylum applications. Thus, EU leaders are likely to discuss the implications of developments in Syria for security in the broader Middle East.

Resilience, preparedness, crisis prevention and response

EU leaders will discuss the report by the former President of Finland and Special Adviser to the President of the European Commission, Sauli Niinistö, on how to enhance the EU’s civilian and military preparedness and its readiness for future crises. Reflecting the changing geopolitical environment, the report follows the same logic seen in the 2024-2029 Strategic Agenda, building on an integrated approach to internal and external policies that links the internal and external aspects of security and economic policy. The report presents around 80 recommendations for short-, medium- and long-term actions, to help guide upcoming Commission initiatives, notably the ‘Preparedness Union’ strategy and the white paper on the future of European defence.

Migration

The main aim of the discussion on migration is for EU leaders to review the implementation of the previous European Council conclusions from the October 2024 meeting. The discussion will be informed by a letter from the European Commission President providing an overview of recent and upcoming activities. The two most concrete areas of activity concern returns and cooperation with third countries. On the former, the Commission is expected to present, within the first 100 days of the new Commission’s term, a proposal for a directive on returning third-country nationals who are staying illegally in the EU. On the latter, a series of memoranda of understanding for comprehensive partnership packages with third countries of origin and transit – following the model of the EU‑Tunisia agreement and the strategic and comprehensive partnership between Egypt and the EU – are currently being prepared with Lebanon, Mali, Niger, Chad, Nigeria and Ethiopia.

EU leaders might also continue their discussions on ‘innovative solutions’, notably return hubs, and possibly try to anticipate the impact of the situation in Syria on migration flows from that area. However, the conclusions on migration are expected to be rather short.

External relations

EU leaders may congratulate Moldova on the running of its presidential elections and of the referendum, despite Russian attempts to undermine the democratic process. They may also reiterate their support for Moldova on its European path and for its territorial integrity. Echoing the joint statement by leading MEPs, the European Council may express its regret about the Georgian government’s decision to halt the country’s EU accession process until 2028. Georgians took to the streets to protest against the decision, and EU leaders may condemn the violence against these protestors by the Georgian authorities.

Read this briefing on ‘Outlook for the EU leaders’ meetings on 18-19 December 2024‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Rebecca Torpey.

In May 2024, former European Parliament President Pat Cox described enlargement as perhaps the ‘EU’s most powerful, transformative and successful policy tool over the past five decades’. The European Council (EU heads of state or government) has, from the outset, played a central role in the EU’s enlargement process, shaping both formal and informal aspects. The Lisbon Treaty formally tasked the institution with defining the eligibility conditions to be applied to the accession process.

Each enlargement round has provided the Member States and EU institutions with the opportunity to reflect on the conditions of entry and on the impact on the functioning of the EU institutions. This has resulted in the more refined enlargement policy we have today, with the Copenhagen criteria set by the European Council in 1993 as core principles and, on that basis, a fine-tuned methodology for negotiations, adopted in 2020. This briefing will consider some of the challenges facing EU enlargement, look at the European Council’s current role in the process and demonstrate the historical evolution of the European Council’s involvement in enlargement.

Read the complete briefing on ‘The European Council and enlargement‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Clare Ferguson with Gemma Patterson.

The final plenary session of 2024 takes place in Strasbourg from 16 December. For the first time, Kaja Kallas will attend as High Representative, and there is a full agenda of foreign policy issues on which Members will want to hear from her, in particular the recent collapse of the Syrian dictatorship, and the crackdown on pro-European demonstrators in Georgia. Members will also debate preparation for the year’s final European Council on 19 December 2024.

The first highlight is the award of the Sakharov Prize on Tuesday lunchtime. The prize celebrates those who defend fundamental freedoms and human rights, in often very difficult circumstances. This year, President Roberta Metsola is expected to award the prize to María Corina Machado and Edmundo González Urrutia, leaders of Venezuela’s democratic opposition, recognised by Parliament as the Venezuelan people’s democratically chosen leaders, contrary to the oppressive regime of Nicolás Maduro.

It has been a year of change at the top of the EU institutions and on Tuesday Members are expected to elect the next Ombudsman, to hold the office for the 2024-2029 term. Six candidates from across the EU are in the running, including human rights experts, former judges, and regional ombudsmen. Under the current incumbent, Emily O’Reilly, the role of the European Ombudsman has seen important changes, with a new statute in place. The previous evening, Parliament is set to debate a Committee on Petitions (PETI) report that proposes Members approve the European Ombudsman’s 2023 activity report. The report highlights key issues, including transparency, accountability, and ethical concerns. The 2023 Ombudsman’s report notes 393 complaint-based inquiries were opened and that the Ombudsman tackled systemic issues through five own-initiative inquiries, further cementing the role in promoting good administration.

Investor-State dispute settlement, used to resolve disputes in international investment agreements, has long been criticised for its opacity. The 2014 United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Mauritius Convention addresses the transparency issue by mandating public access to proceedings and documents, bolstering legitimacy and public trust. While the rules apply to post-2014 agreements, the convention would extend their scope to earlier treaties. The EU sees the convention as a key step toward modernising the process. The Committee on International Trade (INTA) recommends Parliament give consent to the EU’s conclusion of the convention, with a debate on conclusion of the Mauritius Convention set for Monday evening.

Romania recently annulled its presidential elections due to foreign interference linked to disinformation campaigns. Intelligence reports revealed thousands of accounts, many associated with foreign influence, amplifying political messaging. Following a Commission statement on the situation in Romania on Tuesday afternoon, Parliament plans to debate measures to ensure that online platforms conform to the rules under the Digital Services Act, as well as strengthen EU resilience against election interference.

Parliament is also set to debate EU priorities on gender equality on Thursday. Parliament’s Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality (FEMM) has prepared a draft recommendation urging the EU to lead by example on addressing gender-based violence, ensuring healthcare access, promoting gender equality in decision-making, and applying gender mainstreaming across policies, ahead of the 69th session of the UN Commission on the Status of Women. The session will mark the 30th anniversary of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, adopted by 189 countries in 1995, which provides a global roadmap for gender equality.

On Thursday morning, Parliament is scheduled to debate the need to update the EU’s 2021-2030 disability rights strategy, to focus on new initiatives for 2025-2030. While progress has been made on accessibility, employment, and inclusion through flagship action like the Disability Employment Package and the AccessibleEU resource centre, challenges remain for disability rights in areas including poverty, education, housing, and healthcare.

Climate-related disasters are recurring increasingly often in Europe. To speed up the EU’s support for those affected, Members are set to debate the RESTORE regional emergency support proposal on Monday evening. The proposal seeks to allow EU countries to re-programme up to €17.7 billion from EU cohesion policy funds for disaster relief and reconstruction. This includes financing reconstruction work by up to 100 %, with 30 % pre-financing to allow funds to be made available immediately.

Following a statement from the European Commission on Wednesday afternoon, Members are expected to debate measures to improve working conditions and mental wellbeing for farmers and agricultural workers. Farmers face significantly higher risks at work than in other sectors, with fatality rates at 233 % above average and elevated stress leading to higher suicide rates. Parliament has already called for improved working conditions in the sector, particularly for those working in remote regions.

Access to clean drinking water is a fundamental right long championed by Parliament, but water scarcity, microplastics and other contaminants persist in the EU. Updated EU rules under the Drinking Water Directive aim to enhance water quality, monitor emerging substances, and improve access for vulnerable groups, with stricter per- and polyfluorinated alkyl substance (PFAS) limits taking effect by 2026. Members are expected to debate the right to clean drinking water on Monday.

• Laureates of the 2024 Sakharov Prize: María Corina Machado and Edmundo González Urrutia, fighting for democracy in Venezuela
• Election of the European Ombudsman
• Mis- and disinformation on social media and related risks to election integrity
• Updating the European strategy for the rights of persons with disabilities
• Improving EU farmers’ and agricultural workers’ working conditions and mental well-being
• Activities of the European Ombudsman: 2023 annual report
• Right to clean drinking water in the EU
• Regional emergency support for reconstruction 
• EU priorities for the 69th session of the UN Commission on the Status of Women 
• EU conclusion of the UN Mauritius Convention 

Written by Alina Dobreva with Anastasiia Vozovych.

Since the start of the Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, the EU has provided Ukraine with financial, military and humanitarian support on an unprecedented level, including macro-financial assistance, financial support via the Ukraine Facility, humanitarian aid and military assistance from its Member States and through the European Peace Facility.

Regulation (EU) 2024/2773 provides for a new macro-financial assistance loan for Ukraine and establishes a Ukraine Loan Cooperation Mechanism (ULCM). That loan and the ULCM are part of a G7 initiative adopted at the G7 summit in Apulia in June 2024 to support Ukraine with loans of up to US$50 billion (€45 billion).

The purpose of the G7 initiative is to provide Ukraine with sufficient and continuous financial support to address the immediate needs inflicted on the country by Russia’s ongoing aggression. The ULCM will provide Ukraine with non-repayable financial support to assist it in repaying loans provided by G7 partners. Given the urgent nature of Ukraine’s financing needs, the MFA will be available in 2024.

According to the annex to the final agreement between G7 finance ministers of 25 October 2024, the EU’s share of the G7 loan will be €18.115 billion. Extraordinary revenues originating from Russian sovereign assets immobilised in the G7 member states will be used to repay those loans and the associated interest costs. The ULCM will collect the extraordinary revenues and use them to repay the loans.

The European Parliament adopted the proposal on 22 October 2024 and Regulation (EU) 2024/2773 entered into force on 29 October 2024.

Read the complete briefing on ‘The Ukraine Loan Cooperation Mechanism and exceptional macro-financial assistance‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Micaela Del Monte with Titouan Faucheux.

Media freedom and pluralism are among the rights enshrined in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (Article 11) and the European Convention on Human Rights (Article 10), together with freedom of expression and information. The EU is actively engaged in protecting the independence and safety of journalists, as a crucial component in the proper democratic functioning of its institutions and Member States.

Nevertheless, in recent years an increasing number of attacks and threats against journalists have been documented and reported in Europe. Physical attacks against journalists as well as online threats and harassment in reprisal for journalists’ work are on the rise in several EU Member States. Around the world, the number of dead and wounded journalists is still too high, as is the number of journalists who are detained, imprisoned and mistreated.

The most recent Council of Europe assessment of press freedom in Europe reports that war remains a threat to press freedom and the safety of media workers. In total 18 journalists have been killed in Ukraine since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Reporters without Borders confirms that the situation is particularly dangerous for journalists, who are sometimes deliberately targeted by military fire despite displaying ‘Press’ identification. Correspondents for foreign outlets are also targeted and some of them become victims of ‘hostage diplomacy’, as was the case of the Wall Street Journal correspondent Evan Gershkovich.

Over the years, the European Parliament has called consistently for action to ensure the safety of journalists, both inside and outside armed conflict zones; it has stressed the crucial mission of journalists in gathering and disseminating reliable information about armed conflicts; and it has underlined the importance of ensuring journalists’ safe access to areas in which conflicts or human rights abuses are taking place.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Protection of journalists in the European Union‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Listen to podcast ‘Protection of journalists in the European Union‘ on YouTube.

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