European Parliamentary Research Service Blog

Written by Gabija Leclerc.

A sharp deterioration in the population’s health, as well as in healthcare systems, is often the consequence of armed conflicts, natural hazards or human-made disasters, of which there have been many in recent times. The European Union (EU), a significant global humanitarian player, views health as an essential part of its assistance.

Background

More frequent and severe natural hazards, amplified by climate change and environmental degradation, as well as human-made emergencies, such as industrial accidents or armed conflicts, or often a combination of multiple factors, can lead to humanitarian crises. These crises are marked by a decline in population health and compromised functioning of and access to health services. On one hand, emergencies directly affect healthcare facilities and the population by inflicting physical damage to infrastructure and the workforce, as well as inducing traumas and injuries. On the other hand, indirect effects, such as the risk of epidemic outbreaks (over 70 % of epidemics occur in conflict-affected, environmentally and economically vulnerable areas), food insecurity, economic fragility, interrupted treatment of patients with chronic diseases, displacement and gender-based violence, can overwhelm already strained health services and increase healthcare demand. In such cases, the most vulnerable groups, especially women and children, are often the most affected. External assistance is often crucial in preventing catastrophic health consequences.

EU humanitarian health assistance

Health, as a core component of humanitarian assistance, is central to EU humanitarian action. This action guided by international humanitarian principles and the European consensus on humanitarian aid. The European Commission’s humanitarian health guidelines govern EU funding for health-related humanitarian assistance. The main aim of EU health assistance in emergencies, as outlined in the 2022 EU global health strategy, is to limit excess preventable mortality, permanent disability, and disease associated with humanitarian crises. The EU considers health the primary indicator for evaluating humanitarian response.

Humanitarian assistance is a shared competence of the EU and the Member States, as set out in Article 4(4) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU. This means that the EU and the Member States can act in a complementary and mutually reinforcing way. At the EU level, health assistance is primarily coordinated by the Commission’s Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (DG ECHO). With a view to updating its health policy, in 2023, DG ECHO contracted an external evaluator to carry out a consultation with stakeholders, and support the drafting of the policy update based on the feedback received.

The EU provides high-quality humanitarian health assistance to the most vulnerable by building on and in harmony with pre-existing local facilities, programmes and systems to the greatest extent possible. It focuses on immediate needs during and after crises, including through emergency medical assistance, sexual and reproductive health care, and mental health and psychosocial support. Emphasising a ‘health in all policies’ cross-sectoral approach, the EU supports water and sanitation, nutrition, protection and disability inclusion, among other areas. It also adopts an integrated approach by linking humanitarian health aid with development cooperation (humanitarian-development-peace nexus) to ensure long-term resilience. This encompasses epidemic prevention, preparedness and response, strengthening of primary health care, and addressing the root causes of health crises such as poverty, conflict, and weak governance.

EU tools

The EU employs both financial resources and operational capabilities to provide support for health in situations of emergency. In 2023, €334 million, or 13.8 % of the EU’s total humanitarian funding for that year, was allocated to health (in comparison, the United States dedicated more than €532 million, or around 5.8 % of its total humanitarian funding, to health). The majority of this funding was directed towards Syria, Yemen, Ukraine, Sudan and Afghanistan, to assist the efforts of recognised humanitarian and health players such as the World Health Organization (WHO) and the Red Cross and Red Crescent societies. A part of this funding is channelled through the Epidemics Tool (for emergencies caused by infectious disease outbreaks), the Small-Scale Tool (for localised disasters) under the Emergency Toolbox, and the Disaster Response Emergency Fund. This enables the EU to provide swift support to its humanitarian partners on the ground in response to outbreaks, and to mitigate the impact of disasters on health.

To strengthen operational support, in February 2016 the Commission launched the European Medical Corps (EMC). Coordinated by the EU’s Emergency Response Coordination Centre under the EU Civil Protection Mechanism (EUCPM), the EMC allows for the rapid deployment of medical assistance and public health expertise from all Member States and participating countries during a health emergency within the EU and beyond. Since 2020, the EU has bolstered its readiness, including strengthening its reserve of capacities through rescEU. This reserveoffers services such as (i) aerial medical evacuations (MedEvac); (ii) emergency medical teams (EMTs) that provide direct medical care; and (iii) access to a stockpiling reserve of medical products. Additionally, the European Humanitarian Response Capacity (EHRC) provides support through humanitarian air bridges, stockpiles of health-related supplies, including personal protective equipment and first aid kits, common warehousing services (e.g. for temperature-sensitive health items) and health expertise. DG ECHO and the European Centre for Disease Control (ECDC) collaborate in deploying experts from the ECDC EU Health Task Force (EUTF), who are also available to support UN or international health efforts. Together with the Health Emergency Preparedness and Response Authority, they also coordinate support for threat detection, health emergency preparedness and the response in the area of medical countermeasures. Furthermore, the EU backs the WHO health emergencies programme, assisting in standards development and classification processes for globally deployable EMTs and coordinating with the WHO to support its own EMTs. Furthermore, the EU supports disaster management capacity-building in regional organisations such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. At international fora, in line with 2021 Commission communication on humanitarian action, the EU is a vocal advocate for respecting UN Security Council Resolution 2286 on health care in armed conflict, which includes the protection of humanitarian and healthcare workers.

Example: EU humanitarian health assistance in Ukraine

Despite the resilience of Ukraine’s healthcare system during Russia’s invasion, certain regions, the vulnerable, displaced, and those with chronic illnesses have been disproportionately affected. The EU has therefore provided political, financial and humanitarian assistance to Ukraine’s healthcare system, as well as support to those who had to flee the country. It has sent its rescEU stockpiles, including power generators (crucial for the functioning of healthcare facilities) and medical supplies. Since March 2022, a ‘MedEvac’ capability has been in use. In September 2022, the EU set up a centre in Rzeszów, Poland, to provide medical care to Ukrainians before their transfer to hospitals in other Member States. In June 2023, the Commission and the Ministry of Health of Ukraine signed a cooperation arrangement, which, inter alia, covers mental health and psychosocial support in Ukraine and for those displaced to the EU; healthcare for those displaced from Ukraine; patient repatriation after MedEvac; and continued EU4Health funding.

Example: EU humanitarian health assistance in the Gaza Strip

Israel’s attack following Hamas terrorist acts of 7 October 2023 resulted in the implosion of the healthcare system in the Gaza Strip. War-induced traumas, displacement, malnutrition, lack of hygiene and economic vulnerability have massively increased demand for health services. In this context, the EU has increased its humanitarian funding, including for health. This funding is channelled through humanitarian partners such as the UN agencies, most notably its Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA, recently banned from Israel), the IRCC and non-governmental organisations. In 2024, the EU allocated €32.5 million in humanitarian funding to health-related issues in Gaza. The EU also supports the WHO’s Gaza EMT coordination cell in Cairo, Egypt, with 22 experts deployed from the EU and the UCPM countries. Under the EHRC, EUHTF experts have been deployed to Amman, Jordan, to support UNRWA, and 60 humanitarian air bridge operations have transported essentials, including medical items to Gaza. Following the activation of the UCPM by the WHO, the EU supports the coordination of the medical evacuations, with assistance offered by Belgium, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Romania, Slovakia and Spain.

Read this ‘At a glance’ note on ‘Health in emergencies: EU contribution to humanitarian health initiatives worldwide‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Polona Car.

Enforcement of the Digital Services Act at national level is still very limited owing to delayed implementation. The European Commission has therefore begun infringement procedures against several Member States. At European level, the Commission has started formal proceedings against five very large platforms and has found, on a preliminary basis, that the platform X does not comply with the act. The other investigations are still ongoing.

Digital Services Act: A short introduction

The Digital Services Act (DSA) is designed to prevent illegal and harmful activities online, while protecting users’ fundamental rights and safety and nurturing trust in the digital environment. The DSA does this through a ‘layered responsibilities’ approach, which means that online intermediary services’ obligations correspond to their role, size and impact. Very large online platforms (VLOPs) and very large online search engines (VLOSEs) that pose particular risks must abide by the strictest rules. These are platforms that have, on average, at least 45 million active monthly users in the EU. The DSA imposes significant fines for non-compliance of up to 6 % of the intermediary’s annual worldwide turnover. Users who have suffered damage or losses due to online intermediaries’ infringements may also seek compensation.

Enforcement of the DSA is shared between national authorities and the Commission. National authorities supervise and enforce smaller platforms’ compliance, while the Commission’s primary responsibility is supervising VLOPs and VLOSEs. The DSA also established the European Board for Digital Services (EBDS), an independent advisory group composed of national digital service coordinators (DSCs) and chaired by the Commission. The EBDS plays a crucial role in applying the DSA and became operational in February 2024. In addition, the European Centre for Algorithmic Transparency was established to provide technical assistance in enforcing the DSA; it was launched in April 2023. The Commission has also set up the DSA whistleblower tool, to help it monitor compliance by VLOPs and VLOSEs.

Enforcement at national level

National enforcement of the DSA is still very limited due to delayed designation and/or empowerment of several DSCs. These are independent authorities, responsible for supervising and enforcing intermediary services’ compliance with the DSA on the territory of the Member States. DSCs have the power to request access to data, conduct inspections, and issue fines to intermediary service providers within their jurisdiction. Each Member State was required to designate a national DSC by February 2024, when all providers of online intermediary services became accountable to a set of general, due diligence obligations imposed by the DSA.

Some DSCs have already taken action on enforcement. The Irish DSC, for example, has opened a review of several platforms’ compliance with the DSA provisions on contact points for recipients of the service and a notice and action mechanism for reporting illegal content. The Dutch national authority conducted a survey, in which it established that many companies do not comply with the DSA. It committed to opening formal investigations as soon as it is fully empowered to do so.

In response to the late implementation, the Commission sent letters of formal notice to six Member States in April 2024, and a further six in July 2024. While some Member States have taken the necessary steps to enable enforcement of the DSA, others have only partially complied. The Commission has already sent reasoned opinions to Czechia, Cyprus and Portugal for not empowering their designated DSCs. The Commission could issue further reasoned opinions, as in Belgium and Poland the formal designation of DSCs is still pending, while in a few other countries designated DSCs have not yet been empowered.

Enforcement at EU level

At EU level, the Commission has responsibility for supervising and enforcing additional obligations imposed on VLOPs and VLOSEs. These include enhanced due diligence obligations to address systemic risks, such as dissemination of illegal content, conducting annual risk assessments, and facilitating access by authorities and vetted researchers to data and algorithms. In April 2023, the Commission adopted the first designation decisions under the DSA, designating 17 VLOPs and 2 VLOSEs. These platforms must comply with the DSA within 4 months of their designation, and are obliged to deliver risk assessment reports. The number of designated VLOPs and VLOSEs has since increased and now amounts to 23 VLOPs and 2 VLOSEs. Temu was the last platform to be designated as a VLOP in May 2024 after the European Consumer Organisation (BEUC) submitted a complaint against it.

Requests for information

The Commission can send formal requests for information about measures that the VLOPs and VLOSEs have put in place to comply with the DSA provisions. These investigatory acts do not prejudge potential further steps by the Commission, and can result in fines for incorrect, misleading or incomplete responses. Most requests seek to gather additional information on access to data – i.e. on measures VLOPs and VLOSEs have taken to comply with the obligation to give access to data to eligible researchers. In addition, the Commission is enquiring about measures on risk mitigation to prevent illegal and harmful content and risks linked to generative AI, recommender systems, and the protection of minors. Some requests enquire about dark patterns, advertising, notice and action mechanisms, and content moderation. As a result of receiving such a request for information, LinkedIn announced steps to comply with the DSA provisions on targeted advertising based on sensitive data. The request was initiated by a complaint from civil society.

Formal proceedings

The Commission has opened formal proceedings against five platforms so far. It can start such proceedings if it is not satisfied with the replies to its requests for information. So far, the Commission has issued preliminary findings on part of the investigations against the platform X, while all the other investigations are at an earlier stage. These proceedings could serve as an example to national authorities when they start enforcement at national level.

More precisely, in December 2023 the Commission opened formal proceedings against X, investigating its compliance with several DSA provisions. The Commission adopted preliminary findings in July 2024, which identified a potential breach of the DSA regarding dark patterns because the platform’s verified accounts system potentially deceives users. In addition, the Commission’s preliminary view was that X breaches the DSA rules on transparency of advertising, as it does not have a searchable and reliable advertisement repository, and makes it difficult to monitor and investigate potential risks of online ads. Finally, the Commission identified, on a preliminary basis, a breach regarding access to data by researchers, as X prohibits eligible researchers from independently accessing its public data. Moreover, its process for granting eligible researchers access to its application-programming interface appears to dissuade researchers. X may now exercise its right of defence and reply to the preliminary findings in writing; in parallel, the Commission will consult the EBDS. The Commission can only adopt a non-compliance decision if the preliminary findings are confirmed.

In February 2024, the Commission opened formal proceedings against TikTok, investigating its compliance with provisions on risk management of addictive design and harmful content, protection of minors, transparency of advertising, and access to data. Further proceedings against TikTok were opened in April 2024 to investigate whether the launch of the TikTok Lite rewards programme, which allows users to earn points while performing certain tasks on the platform, is in breach of the DSA because it was launched without due diligence risk assessment. The latter proceedings were closed in August 2024, after TikTok committed to withdrawing the feature from its applications offered within the EU.

Formal proceedings against AliExpress started in March 2024, investigating compliance with provisions on risk management of illegal content, notice of action, internal complaint handling, traders’ traceability, advertising transparency, recommender systems, and access to data. In April and May 2024, the Commission opened proceedings against Meta (Instagram and Facebook). The investigations are assessing Meta’s conformity regarding transparency of content moderation, a notice and action mechanism to flag illegal content, dark patterns and protection of minors, and risk management in relation to integrity of elections, dissemination of harmful content and addictive design, and access to data for researchers. In October 2024, the Commission started proceedings against Temu, to investigate what the platform is doing to limit the sale of non-compliant products as well as its compliance with the DSA provisions concerning addictive design, recommender systems, and access to data for researchers.

Read this ‘At a glance’ note on ‘Enforcing the Digital Services Act: State of play‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Guillaume Ragonnaud.

The EU’s ability to boost its competitiveness, become a climate-neutral economy by 2050, sustain the green and digital transition and achieve strategic autonomy depends heavily on access to critical raw materials (CRMs). Key technologies, across all industries, depend on CRMs’ unique physical properties.

The CRM Act (CRMA), aimed at making the EU’s supply of CRMs more secure, resilient and sustainable, entered into force on 23 May 2024. The CRMA lists 34 CRMs, of which 17 are considered ‘strategic’ (SRMs). The act includes measures to strengthen the EU’s raw materials supply chains, monitor and mitigate supply risks and increase the sustainability of the CRMs consumed in the EU. It sets the following non-binding benchmarks for the overall capacity at EU level to be achieved by 2030 (in terms of annual consumption of SRMs): the EU should mine 10 % of its annual needs, process 40 % of its needs, and cover 25 % of its needs through recycling. Furthermore, the EU should diversify its imports of SRMs and, for each SRM, should not depend on any single third country for more than 65 % of its supply by 2030. The CRMA also sets a number of deadlines for key developments up to 2031.

The time has now come to implement the new regulation. The CRMA has generally been hailed as a good first step in the right direction, but its weaknesses have also been highlighted. These include the lack of specific EU funding and doubt as to whether the measures to accelerate mining will prove effective. The EU’s capacity to achieve the benchmarks for 2030 has therefore been questioned by a number of experts.

Many proposals for improving the EU’s CRM policy have recently been put forward. The Draghi Report includes 11 specific priority actions, including setting up a dedicated EU CRM platform to deliver a more comprehensive and coordinated strategy covering the whole CRM value chain. The Letta Report suggests that the EU could use joint purchasing to set up strategic reserves of key CRMs to the benefit of the single market. Other proposals outlined in this briefing include measures to boost circularity, ensure coherence of EU law affecting the CRM sector, and develop global partnerships to diversify supply.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Implementing the EU’s Critical Raw Materials Act‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Timeline of the adoption of the EU CRMA Strategic partnerships signed by the EU

Written by David Ashton.

The current EU consumer protection cooperation framework has been in place for almost 5 years. This framework provides important means for consumer protection authorities in the Member States to enforce the EU consumer law acquis, to the benefit not only of consumers throughout the Union, but also of a functioning and legally predictable single market.

The European Commission has started to reflect on the functioning of the consumer protection cooperation enforcement framework. Sufficient time has elapsed to gather experience of the rules in place since 2020. The reflection process was triggered by the reporting obligation under the current Consumer Protection Cooperation Regulation, following which the Commission published its assessment of the application to date of the current rules in July 2024. This report was presented in the European Parliament’s Committee on Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO) on 12 September 2024.

It will be the prerogative of the new Commission to decide what next steps to take, in particular whether to propose a legislative revision of the current framework. Such a review could be expected to address various points of the current regime, including by feeding into the debate about how to ensure consumer protection in relation to imported products purchased through third-country online platforms.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Current developments in consumer protection policy‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Györgyi Mácsai and Maria-Margarita Mentzelopoulou.

Child migration takes many forms, from family reunification and moving in the hope of finding a better life to forced and traumatic migration caused by conflict, poverty or climate change. Overall, the number of migrant children has been rising globally since the turn of the century. In 2020, there were an estimated 35.5 million international migrant children globally, the largest number ever recorded. This infographic focuses exclusively on forced and irregular movements of migrant children to the EU. According to Eurostat, on 1 January 2023 around 7.4 million children in the EU under the age of 18 did not have the citizenship of their country of residence.

Read the complete infographic on ‘Child migrants: Irregular entry and asylum‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Share in 2022 Irregular EU border crossings Third-country national children found to be irregularly present in the EU in 2023, by age and gender Third-country nationals found to be irregularly present in the EU, 2013-2023 Migrant children found to be irregularly present by Member State in 2023 Children effectively returned from the EU in 2023, by age and gender Children ordered to leave the EU in 2023, by age and gender Top 10 nationalities of children ordered to leave the EU and/or returned in 2023 First-time child applicants in 2023, by age and gender First-time applicants, per age group Unaccompanied children applying
for international protection Unaccompanied children applying for international protection in 2023, in absolute and relative numbers Unaccompanied children applying for international protection in 2023, in absolute and relative numbers Number of positive first-instance decisions on applications
for international protection in the EU Positive first-instance decisions on applications
for international protection by Member State (2023) Positive final decisions on appeal or review on children’s
applications for international protection Positive final decisions on children’s applications for international protection per Member State in 2023

Written by Ingeborg Odink.

Child sexual exploitation and sexual abuse are among the worst forms of violence against children, and are crimes that know no borders. The constant rise in these crimes is exacerbated by the use of digital technologies. Harmonised national laws and international cooperation are essential to improve prevention, protect victims and prosecute perpetrators. The European Day helps to raise awareness to that end.

Background

The European Day for the Protection of Children against Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse is marked every year on 18 November. A Council of Europe initiative, the Day is designed to raise awareness and facilitate an open discussion on the need to prevent child sexual exploitation and abuse, and protect children from these crimes. The Day’s 2024 edition is dedicated to ‘Emerging technologies: Threats and opportunities for the protection of children from sexual exploitation and sexual abuse’. At EU level, the European Commission launched the EU strategy for a more effective fight against child sexual abuse in 2020. A form of cybercrime, child sexual exploitation is also an EU priority in the fight against serious and organised crime under the 2020‑2025 EU security union strategy and the European Multidisciplinary Platform Against Criminal Threats (EMPACT).

A new UNICEF report estimates that one in five girls and women and one in seven boys and men alive today globally have been subjected to sexual violence as children. In Europe, one in five children are estimated to be the victim of some form of sexual violence, and between 70 % and 85 % of child victims know their abuser. A third of abused children never tell anyone about the abuse. Reasons for this include feelings of shame and guilt, fear of not being believed, not knowing whom to tell, or inability to recognise the abuse. Child sexual abuse and exploitation increasingly occur online. The National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC), a United States-based non-profit organisation, saw the number of reports worldwide of online child sexual exploitation increase from 1 million in 2010 to more than 21.7 million in 2020. The figures jumped to 29.3 million reports in 2021 during the pandemic, involving nearly 85 million images and videos, and reached new record highs of more than 36.2 million in 2023, with NCMEC identifying 63 892 urgent reports that involved a child in imminent danger. Both the European Commission and Europol have expressed concern about this growing phenomenon, highlighting the need to promote preventive and educational initiatives across Europe.

International and EU efforts to combat child sexual abuse International legal framework

The 1989 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child formed the starting point for an international framework for combating child sexual abuse and exploitation, providing for the protection of children from all forms of (sexual) exploitation and abuse, and maltreatment. In 2007, the Council of Europe adopted a Convention on the Protection of Children against Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse (CETS No 201). Known as the ‘Lanzarote Convention‘, this was the first international instrument to establish the various forms of child sexual abuse as criminal offences. It requires the parties to adopt appropriate legislation and measures to prevent these offences from occurring, to protect victims, and to prosecute perpetrators. It entered into force on 1 July 2010 and has been ratified by all EU Member States.

EU legal framework

The European Commission is working to ensure that the EU has an adequate legal framework to protect children. The main EU legal instrument to combat the sexual abuse and sexual exploitation of children and child pornography is Directive 2011/93/EU. The directive criminalised various forms of child sexual abuse and exploitation, harmonised these criminal offences across the EU, and established minimum sanctions. Furthermore, Article 25 of the directive, on the removal of and blocking of access to websites containing or disseminating child sexual abuse material, contributes to the fight against online child sexual exploitation and abuse. Adopted a year later, the Victims’ Rights Directive (Directive 2012/29/EU) complements the existing framework, as it takes a child-sensitive approach, and requires primary consideration to be given to the best interests of the child. The EU strategy on the rights of the child, issued in March 2021, offers an EU policy framework to combat violence against children and protect them from all forms of abuse.

Recent developments

On 6 February 2024, under the EU strategy for a more effective fight against child sexual abuse, the Commission submitted a proposal for a revision of the 2011 Combating Child Sexual Abuse Directive. The revised rules expand the definitions of offences, to include new forms of online child sexual abuse, and introduce higher penalties and more specific requirements for prevention and assistance to victims. They also set minimum statutes of limitations, to allow victims to seek justice effectively.

In addition, the Commission has launched the revision of the Victims’ Rights Directive, and on 23 April 2024 it adopted a recommendation on integrated child protection systems – a key delivery under the children’s rights strategy to protect children from violence more effectively.

Work has also continued on the 2022 legislative proposal that would make the detection, reporting and removal of child sexual abuse material mandatory for providers of online communication services. It also envisages the creation of an EU centre to prevent and counter child sexual abuse. Pending an agreement in the Council (a new compromise text from the Hungarian Presidency is now on the table), Parliament and Council agreed to extend the 2021 interim regulation providing a temporary derogation from EU rules on confidentiality of electronic communication, to enable detection, reporting and removal on a voluntary basis.

International cooperation through EU agencies, initiatives and networks

Various EU agencies, such as Europol, support law enforcement cooperation among Member States to form a united front against (online) sexual exploitation and abuse of children in the EU and beyond. The stop child abuse – trace an object initiative, designed to help trace the origin of objects linked to criminal investigations, is one example of Europol’s efforts; the initiative has led to the identification of a number of victims, as well as offenders. Eurojust supports judicial cooperation among Member States to facilitate the prosecution of child sexual abuse perpetrators in cross-border cases. In addition, the European Commission funds and supports several initiatives and networks, including the Better Internet for Kids (BIK) portal, raising awareness of the potential risks children face online, and INHOPE, a network of hotlines combating online child sexual abuse material by analysing and reporting illegal content. The WePROTECT Global Alliance, supported by the United States, the United Kingdom and the European Commission, develops political and practical solutions to make the digital world safe for children, and seeks to prevent online sexual abuse and long-term harm. The Internet Watch Foundation, co-funded by the EU, provides a hotline for reporting online sexual abuse content globally, and raises awareness through prevention campaigns.

European Parliament position

The European Parliament’s Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) is currently working on the proposed revision of the Combating Child Sexual Abuse Directive. The draft report (rapporteur: Jeroen Lenaers, EPP/Netherlands) was published on 16 April 2024. Ever since its first assessment in 2017, Parliament and its Children’s Rights Coordinator have called repeatedly for full transposition of the directive’s provisions, and urged action in several areas. Parliament has previously demanded better child protection and victim support and a greater focus on prevention and awareness-raising, stressed that information and communications technology companies and online platforms should take some responsibility in the fight against child sexual abuse material, and called for more national investment in digital education. Parliament has welcomed Europol’s prevention and awareness-raising work, and supported the establishment of an EU centre to prevent and counter child sexual abuse.

Read this ‘At a glance’ note on ‘European Day for the Protection of Children against Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Clare Ferguson and Katarzyna Sochacka.

Parliament’s first session of November 2024 opened with Members observing a minute of silence for the victims of the recent devastating floods in Spain. Members discussed the urgent need to support the victims, to improve preparedness and to continue to tackle the climate crisis. Parliament agreed a resolution calling for more targeted EU sanctions against Russia’s ‘shadow fleet’, which by transporting oil ultimately finances Russia’s war on Ukraine. Members heard and debated European Commission statements regarding EU-US relations in light of the outcome of the US presidential elections, and on Georgia’s worsening democratic crisis following the recent elections. Members also condemned recent unacceptable attacks against Israeli football fans in the Netherlands.

EU civilian and defence preparedness  

Former Finnish President Sauli Niinistö presented his recent report, ‘Safer Together: Strengthening Europe’s Civilian and Military Preparedness and Readiness’. Parliament has already called on Member States and EU institutions to ensure EU society is prepared to face military and non-military threats, including natural disasters. The Niinistö report underlines the need for comprehensive preparedness to face traditional and new challenges to EU food security, public health, the economy and infrastructure. Proposals for the EU to consider include new legislation, coordination mechanisms, and involving citizens. The report discusses how investment in preparedness/crisis resilience could boost preparedness for defence. Afterwards, Members debated measures to bolster Europe’s civilian and defence preparedness and readiness in practice.

United Nations Climate Change Conference 2024 in Baku, Azerbaijan (COP29)

The European Commission and the Council responded to oral questions posed by Parliament’s Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI) regarding the ongoing UN Climate Change Conference in Baku. With COP29 largely focused on financing climate action, the Commission was asked to clarify how it will guarantee progress on the new collective quantified goal on climate finance. Following a debate, Members approved a resolution calling for all high-emission countries to commit to provide socially fair financial support for climate action.

EU listing of Russia as a high-risk third country

A debate followed a Commission statement on the possible listing of Russia as a high-risk country for money laundering and terrorist financing. Although the EU follows the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) listings, the Commission can act independently and list third countries with a delegated act. Russia is not currently listed as a high-risk third country. Placing countries on the EU list can help protect the internal market by requiring banks and financial institutions to apply ‘enhanced due diligence measures’ when dealing with such a country. In Russia’s case, corruption and state-embedded organised crime, as well as its war on Ukraine, make the risks very high.

Corrigenda

Following committee approval of corrigenda on two further legislative files voted in plenary before the end of last term, these were announced in the plenary, under Rule 251 of the Rules of Procedure. As no request to vote on them was received within 24 hours, these are now deemed approved.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘Plenary round-up – November I 2024‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Clément Evroux.

On 9 July 2024, the successful maiden flight of the new heavy-lift rocket Ariane 6 reinstated the EU’s autonomous access to space. This came after several months of reliance on private United States launchers as a result of the temporary unavailability of an EU rocket.

In recent years, the space sector has witnessed the conjunction of three trends. First, the space economy has grown globally, also because of competitive private actors. Second, as a consequence, space is now increasingly congested, with ever more space objects floating in orbit. Third, space has become a contested domain. With 80 countries having at least one satellite registered, space operations can now be instrumentalised: for instance, in 2021, Russia conducted an illegal anti‑satellite strike.

In her political guidelines for 2024-2029, the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, refers to space as an enabler of EU competitiveness, to be supported through investment. The guidelines mention space as a key domain for EU open strategic autonomy, to be enhanced through further cooperation by an EU–NATO partnership. Furthermore, Mario Draghi’s September 2024 report on the future of European competitiveness stresses that, despite owning world-class space infrastructure and services, the EU is under-investing in space compared with its global competitors, and is lacking a unified legal framework on space.

Ursula von der Leyen’s mission letter to Andrius Kubilius, nominated on 17 September 2024 as Commissioner-designate for Defence and Space, names a set of initiatives to unleash a space contribution to EU competitiveness. It includes, in particular, the task of preparing a proposal for an EU space law to ensure a common EU playing field in space while ensuring security, safety, and sustainability. The letter also sets the task of fostering a strong and innovative space sector with a view to achieving several objectives, including maintaining the EU’s autonomous access to space, curating EU spatial infrastructure, and enhancing the use of space data and services.

Read the complete briefing on ‘EU space policy: State of play‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Ralf Drachenberg.

The European Council consists of the Heads of State or Government of the 27 EU Member States, as well as the President of the European Council and the President of the European Commission. It became a formal European Union (EU) institution with a full-time President in 2009, with the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon. Although it does not include legislative functions, the European Council’s role – to ‘provide the Union with the necessary impetus for its development’ and to define its ‘general political directions and priorities’ – has developed rapidly over the past 15 years. The European Council’s President plays a crucial part in the preparation, conduct and follow-up of meetings as well as in the external representation of the Union.

On 1 December 2024, former Portuguese Prime Minister António Costa will take over as President of the European Council. This briefing provides an overview of the functions and responsibilities of this office by answering some of the most frequently asked questions in relation to the President of the European Council. It also looks at the mandates of the previous office-holders and the President’s interaction with the European Parliament.

This updates an EPRS briefing from March 2022.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Role and election of the President of the European Council: Frequently asked questions (FAQ)‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

European Council Presidents: European political party affiliation, Member State and date of (re)election Overview of high-level office-holders since the 2009 European elections

Written by Annastiina Papunen and Rebecca Torpey.

On 7-8 November, the European Political Community (EPC) held its 5th meeting in Budapest. The event gathered 42 European heads of state or government, among them the EU leaders, and was followed, for the European Council members, by a dinner and an informal meeting the next day. Beyond the official agenda, the outcome of the US presidential elections shaped the discussions.

Amid Russia’s continuing war of aggression on Ukraine and the escalating situation in the Middle East, the EPC summit, held on 7 November, focused on Europe’s security challenges. The next day, members of the European Council discussed EU competitiveness and adopted the Budapest Declaration, building on the conclusions of the April 2024 special European Council meeting. Next to competitiveness, the informal meeting also discussed foreign policy topics linked to the elections in the US and Georgia, and Israel’s decision to ban the UN Palestinian Refugee Agency (UNRWA).

General

The US election results set the tone of the two back-to-back meetings in Budapest. Considering the undeniable tensions in transatlantic relations under President-elect Trump’s previous term, an exchange of views on how best to prepare for the next four years was deemed important. The European Parliament President, Roberta Metsola, said: ‘Our mentality is not ‘America elects and Europe reacts’, but ‘Europe acts’.’

Figure 1 – European Council President’s tweet

Source: C. Michel, ‘Congratulations to President-elect…’, X/Twitter, 6 November 2024.

Two EU leaders did not travel to Budapest: the Spanish Prime Minister, Pedro Sanchez, on account of the flash floods that ravaged Valencia, and the German Chancellor, Olaf Scholz, following the collapse of the three-party federal government coalition the night before. In the preamble to the Budapest Declaration, EU leaders expressed their deepest condolences to and solidarity with the people of Spain. The violence towards Israeli football fans in Amsterdam on 7 November was mentioned by the Dutch Prime Minister, Dick Schoof, and condemned by the European Council President, Charles Michel, during the press conference.

As this informal meeting was the last for Charles Michel as European Council President, the participants thanked him for his dedication over the past five years. On 1 December, the former Portuguese Prime Minister, António Costa, will take the helm of the European Council.

1.     The European Political Community meeting

The fifth EPC meeting took place on 7 November at the Puskás Arena in Budapest. It was attended by 42 European leaders, among them the EU leaders. The EU was represented by President Michel and the European Commission President, Ursula von der Leyen. The European Parliament President, Roberta Metsola, also attended the EPC. The former Dutch Prime Minister, Mark Rutte, took part in his capacity as NATO Secretary-General. Noteworthy was the attendance of the Turkish President, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who had only attended the first EPC meeting in Prague.

The overarching theme of the day was addressing the major security challenges facing Europe, with two important aspects being the ongoing Russian war on Ukraine and the escalating conflict in the Middle East. The outcome of the US elections had a significant impact on the security discussion. Just ahead of the elections, the Polish Prime Minister, Donald Tusk, had tweeted that ‘the era of geopolitical outsourcing is over’. President Metsola echoed these words at the opening of the EPC meeting, capturing the sentiment expressed by many leaders.

The morning session focused on security challenges and was followed by breakout sessions on migration and economic security. After the opening remarks by the Hungarian Prime Minister, Viktor Orbán, the Ukrainian President, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, delivered a speech emphasising the importance of ‘peace through strength’ and not through concessions. Interestingly, Chapter 10 of the 2024 US Republican Party platform reads ‘Return to peace through strength’. The session on migration, co-chaired by the Austrian Chancellor, Karl Nehammer, and the UK Prime Minister, Keir Starmer, covered irregular migration and its instrumentalisation, building on discussions during the fourth EPC meeting. The session on economic security, led by the Latvian Prime Minister, Evika Siliņa (in place of Chancellor Scholz, originally planned as co-chair), and the Norwegian Prime Minister, Jonas Gahr Støre, addressed connectivity-related issues such as energy, transport and global trade.

Originally, it was the French President, Emmanuel Macron, who on 9 May 2022 proposed establishing a forum for political dialogue among European countries. At the first EPC meeting in Prague in October 2022, it was agreed that this informal platform would aim to foster discussions among peers at the highest level and build cooperation on issues of concern for the European continent. Due to the informal nature of EPC meetings, no declarations are adopted at their close. Instead, their value lies precisely in their informality, allowing for strategic discussions, roundtables and bilateral meetings between leaders of European countries – within the EU and outside it – to take place. The talks held between Erdoğan and the Cypriot President, Níkos Christodoulídis, demonstrate the unique bilateral opportunities provided by the EPC. Those talks were also attended by the Greek Prime Minister Kyriákos Mitsotákis and the Albanian Prime Minister, Edi Rama.

EPC summits are held on a bi-annual basis, hosted alternately by the EU country holding the EU Council Presidency and a non-EU country. Albania is to host the sixth EPC summit in the first half of 2025, followed by Denmark in the second half.

2.     The informal European Council meeting Foreign policy and transatlantic relations

Ahead of the 8 November informal European Council meeting, EU leaders met for dinner and discussed a range of topics, including transatlantic relations, Georgia and Israel. Having missed the EPC meeting, Chancellor Scholz joined the EU leaders for dinner. The strategic debate on transatlantic relations focused on three main aspects: (i) bilateral relations; (ii) security and geopolitics, with a special focus on Ukraine; and (iii) global challenges and international cooperation.

EU leaders congratulated Trump on his election victory on X, in press statements and over the phone. Even if relations between the new US administration and the EU were centre stage, many EU leaders seemed to focus more on bilateral relations between their own countries and the US than on a joint approach, prompting von der Leyen to tweet that, ‘The EU and the US are more than just allies. We are bound by a true partnership between our people, uniting 800 million citizens’. Some EU leaders, notably Germany’s and Portugal’s, also mentioned their countries’ partnerships with the US within NATO. At the door, the Luxembourg Prime Minister, Luc Frieden, stated that ‘we will stick to our principles but we want to have a friendly partnership with the United States’.

When it comes to Russia’s war on Ukraine, there was much speculation about the new US administration’s plans, particularly in relation to what point 8 of Trump’s 20 core campaign promises meant for Ukraine in practical terms: ‘Prevent World War 3, restore peace in Europe’. When interviewed, EU leaders were keen to avoid hypothetical discussions about what would happen if Trump cut funding for Ukraine’s defence. Dick Schoof stated, ‘We should only talk about the stop of the American support at the moment that that is the topic’. However, it is likely that EU leaders considered various scenarios when discussing the impact of Trump’s election on EU security and geopolitics. Siliņa underlined that the European Council had already emphasised the importance of defence, which is now a core priority in the Strategic Agenda 2024-2029, as indicated by the nomination of a European Commissioner for defence. Despite this, several EU leaders, such as the Danish Prime Minister, Mette Frederiksen, and the Finnish Prime Minister, Petteri Orpo, pointed out that the EU needed to do more for its own security and defence.

Concerns were also raised about the Trump presidency’s potential impact on international efforts to tackle climate change. The Irish Taoiseach (prime minister), Simon Harris, for instance, emphasised the importance of the EU and the US remaining actively engaged in global issues, notably climate.

Georgia

Georgia was on track for EU membership in 2023. However, in recent months the ruling (pro-Russian) Georgian Dream party has been steering the country away from the EU path. EU leaders have expressed concerns about acts of intimidation against civil society representatives, political leaders, civil activists and journalists in Georgia. They have also called on Georgia to reverse its adoption of the transparency of foreign influence law. In October 2023, the Commission noted that ‘the level of constructive political dialogue [has been] significantly reduced’ since the adoption of this law. Georgia’s accession process is now de facto halted. Following Georgia’s recent parliamentary elections, thousands protested over alleged election fraud, yet the ruling party claimed victory. Election observation missions raised concerns about several shortcomings. Before the informal dinner, the leaders of Germany, France, and Poland released a joint statement on the situation in Georgia, which fed into discussions amongst EU leaders on the way forward.

Middle East

In October 2024, the European Council emphasised the crucial role of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA) and condemned any efforts to revoke the 1967 agreement between Israel and the agency. However, the Israeli Parliament approved two bills that would impede UNRWA’s humanitarian aid work in the occupied Palestinian territories. Ireland, Norway, Slovenia and Spain issued a joint condemnation of the legislation, while France, Belgium and other European countries expressed concerns about its potential consequences. EU leaders discussed how this move would affect EU-Israeli relations.

Competitiveness

President Michel set the scene in his invitation letter by stressing that ‘Over the past 20 years, the EU’s share of world GDP has halved’, and urging action to strengthen EU competitiveness. On 8 November, the former European Central Bank (ECB) President, Mario Draghi, presented to EU leaders his report on ‘The future of European competitiveness‘, which had already been mentioned briefly at the October meeting. It provides a relatively grim picture of the EU’s economy, and calls for urgent action. However, it creates divisions among Member States, notably as regards the proposed measures’ funding. The idea of new common debt was, for instance, rejected by Germany. The Draghi report has already fed into the Commission’s political guidelines, the Commissioners’ mission letters, and seems to constitute a guiding document for the next 5 years.

Considering the complexity of the current global setting, the discussion on EU competitiveness was particularly timely. The outcome of the US elections may indeed have far-reaching implications on transatlantic relations, especially on trade; the recent BRICS meeting in Kazan has also highlighted the changing dynamics. The BRICS countries, currently accounting for 37.3 % of global GDP, have plans to replace US dollar payments with a new system called the Brics Bridge. This could have major implications for world trade, financial systems and the global power balance between countries. The current ECB President, Christine Lagarde, also shared her views on the situation of the EU economy. The picture she presented follows the sobering statement on EU competitiveness issued by the Eurogroup meeting, held in an inclusive format, on 4 November.

Budapest Declaration on the new European competitiveness deal

The Budapest Declaration follows the path set by the Versailles and Granada declarations, the April 2024 European Council conclusions and the EU’s Strategic Agenda 2024-2029. It mentions how the Enrico Letta and Draghi reports are a wake-up call and underlines that ‘business as usual is no longer an option’. One key request in the declaration is ‘a new and comprehensive horizontal strategy on the deepening of the Single Market’, with a roadmap indicating a clear timeline and milestones by June 2025. This request was already mentioned in April, but the details are now more specific.

EU leaders also focused on moving towards a savings and investment union by 2026, making progress on the capital markets union and banking union. They called on the High Representative and the Commission to present ‘without delay’ options for public and private funding to increase EU defence readiness and capabilities.

Regarding industrial policy, EU leaders went further than in April, asking the Commission ‘as a priority’ for a comprehensive industrial strategy, including both competitive industries and quality jobs. The current industrial strategy was last updated in 2021. The EU car industry is struggling, and potential US tariffs could affect it further. Furthermore, as a result of a trade dispute with China over green technology imports, the EU applies tariffs on Chinese EVs.

Regarding research and innovation, EU leaders stated that closing the innovation gap with global competitors and putting ‘Europe at the forefront of research and innovation globally’ is an urgent priority. In that context, EU leaders reiterated that R&D should constitute 3 % of EU GDP by 2030 and voiced support for the idea of a fifth freedom of research, innovation, knowledge and education.

Considering current high and volatile energy prices, EU leaders called for urgent measures to address them. They also called for the acceleration of the energy transition and for the establishment of a genuine energy union as ‘a matter of priority’.

Regarding trade and economic security, EU leaders reiterated the central role of the World Trade Organization and the need to pursue an ambitious, robust, open and sustainable trade policy to ensure a level playing field. Trade agreements remain a controversial issue, with France recently warning that the EU should not sign the Mercosur trade deal without French approval.

The declaration also includes a request for a circular economy act (with no specific deadline) and for new Commission proposals on the digital economy by June 2025. Moreover, EU leaders request a ‘simplification revolution’ to ease reporting requirements, particularly for SMEs, ‘by at least 25 % in the first half of 2025’. Finally, the declaration mentions the future of EU funding, with the next multiannual financial framework proposal expected in July 2025.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Outcome of the meetings of EU leaders on 7-8 November 2024‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Clare Ferguson.

Moving swiftly from a packed schedule of confirmation hearings for the members of the new European Commission, Members address some of the thorniest issues facing the European Union in plenary this week. Defence issues, the ongoing Russian war against Ukraine, and EU relations with the United States are all likely to top Parliament’s agenda.

Former Finnish President Sauli Niinistö is due to make a formal address on Thursday morning to present his report, ‘Safer Together: Strengthening Europe’s Civilian and Military Preparedness and Readiness’. Parliament has already called on Member States and EU institutions to work on ensuring EU society is prepared to face the range of current military and non-military threats, including natural disasters. The report underlines the need for comprehensive preparedness to face traditional and new challenges that threaten EU food security, public health, the economy and infrastructure. It contains a number of proposals for the EU to consider: legislation, coordination mechanisms, programmes to involve citizens themselves; and discusses how investment in preparedness/crisis resilience could best boost preparedness for defence. Parliament will then debate a statement on measures to bolster Europe’s civilian and defence preparedness and readiness in practice. Defence certainly looks set to be a top priority during the current legislature, with a white paper on the future of European defence already in preparation.

One way the Parliament exercises its power of scrutiny over other EU institutions is by voting on resolutions following questions posed to the Council and European Commission. On Wednesday evening, Members are expected to hear a response from the Commission and Council to two oral questions posed by Parliament’s Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI) regarding the ongoing UN Climate Change Conference in Baku (COP29). With COP29 largely focused on financing climate action, the committee has asked the Commission to clarify how it will guarantee progress on the new collective quantified goal on climate finance. To raise ambition for the next round of nationally determined contributions, the Committee wishes to see the EU lead by example – and questions the measures to ensure that COP29 significantly advances the agenda in terms of mitigation, adaptation, finance, and loss and damage. Members are therefore set to vote on a resolution tabled by ENVI, and likely to underline the need for climate action aligned with the outcome of the global stocktake and to boost financial assistance for climate measures.

Another Commission statement is expected on Wednesday, on the possible listing of Russia as a high-risk country for money laundering and terrorist financing. Although the EU follows the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) listings, the Commission can independently identify high-risk third countries and list them through a delegated act. Neither the FATF nor the EU currently list Russia as a high-risk third country. The EU list aims to protect the internal market by requiring banks and financial institutions to apply ‘enhanced due diligence measures’ when dealing with a country such as Russia – where risks related to corruption and state-embedded organised crime, as well as the country’s war on Ukraine, are very high.

On Thursday morning, Members are also due to vote on a resolution on EU action to counter Russia’s efforts to evade sanctions against its oil industry by establishing a ‘shadow fleet’ of oil tankers to evade these restrictions. While EU countries and their allies are cooperating to disrupt these moves, with targeted sanctions on specific vessels, a debate in Parliament in October saw Members call for more maritime surveillance, tighter shipping controls, and expanded sanctions to address the environmental and safety threats posed by these vessels.

• EU civilian and defence preparedness
• COP29 climate change conference in Baku
• Listing Russia as a high-risk third country for money laundering and terrorist financing
• Russia’s ‘shadow fleet’: Bringing the threat to light
• White paper on the future of European Defence

Written by Sebastian Clapp.

Russia’s war on Ukraine has laid bare the challenges facing the European defence industry as it tries to meet increased demand and ramp up production in the wake of a fundamentally changed security environment in Europe. Europe’s defence industry comprises a number of large multinational companies, mid-caps and over 2 000 small and medium-sized enterprises. It faces a multitude of challenges, such as decades of under-investment, fragmentation, insufficient critical raw material and semiconductor supplies, and a lack of manufacturing capability.

The EU and its Member States have taken several steps to reinforce the European defence industry, especially since the start of Russia’s war on Ukraine. Member States have boosted their defence budgets, with their combined total expected to reach €350 billion a year in 2024. The European Defence Fund is investing in research and capability development projects and has achieved very positive results so far. Permanent structured cooperation also provides the legal framework and binding commitments for progress in collaborative defence. The EU has also broken taboos, by agreeing a joint defence procurement instrument (the European Defence Industry Reinforcement through Common Procurement Act) and an initiative to build up ammunition production (Act in Support of Ammunition Production). These form part of a three-track proposal to support Ukraine’s needs for ammunition (deliver ammunition from existing stocks, jointly procure from industry, and support the ramping up of production). In March 2024, the European Commission proposed the first-ever European defence industrial strategy and a defence industry programme to implement it.

Additionally, the European Peace Facility, best known for facilitating lethal weapon supply to Ukraine, is being used to procure defence materiel from Europe’s defence industry, further boosting its capacity. The European Chips Act and Critical Raw Materials Act are also expected to benefit the European defence industry by ensuring it has the necessary supplies to tackle the substantially increased demand for its products. These signals have led the industry to take the first steps to increase production capacity.

This updates a previous edition, published in 2023.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Reinforcing Europe’s defence industry‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Gregor Erbach with Cecilia Meinardi.

International climate finance is essential for developing countries to achieve their climate goals. By 2025, countries need to adopt a new collective goal for climate finance, to be defined at the 29th Conference of Parties (COP29) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in Baku, Azerbaijan. Discussions ahead of COP29 focus on the scope and quantitative elements of this new financial target, with the European Union and other contributor parties proposing a broader contributor base.

Climate finance under the UNFCCC

The UNFCCC categorises countries in three groups, according to their obligations and commitments. Annex I countries include industrialised nations and economies in transition, while Annex II – a subcategory of Annex I – refers only to industrialised nations that were OECD members in 1992 and the European Community, and has not been updated since. Annex II countries have an obligation to provide climate finance to developing countries. Developing countries are referred to as non-Annex I countries, with particular attention paid to least developed countries (LDCs) and those most vulnerable to climate change.

In the Copenhagen Accord adopted at COP15 in 2009, developed countries pledged to jointly mobilise US$100 billion per year by 2020 to support developing countries’ mitigation and adaptation efforts. However, this target was not reached until 2022, when developed countries provided US$115.9 billion in climate finance for developing countries. To assist the COP in exercising its function in relation to the financial mechanisms established by the Convention, COP16 established the Standing Committee on Finance. In 2015, COP21 adopted the Paris Agreement – which obliges developed countries and encourages other parties to provide climate finance to developing countries – and decided to extend the US$100 billion target up to 2025 and agree on a new collective quantified goal (NCQG), from a floor of US$100 billion, by 2025. To facilitate the adoption of the new climate finance goal, the 2022‑2024 ad hoc work programme comprises four technical expert dialogues per year. In 2023, COP28 in Dubai, United Arab Emirates, decided on the process for establishing an NCQG in 2024, to replace the current target of US$100 billion. The adoption of the NCQG is a main agenda item for COP29.

Green Climate Fund
The Green Climate Fund was established in 2010 to accelerate climate action in developing countries. During COP28, six countries made new pledges to contribute to the Green Climate Fund, with total pledges amounting to US$12.8 billion from 33 donor countries and one region.

In June 2024, the annual Bonn Climate Change Conference included discussions on details of the NCQG ahead of COP29. While parties made progress towards designing the content of the NCQG, the substantive framework for a draft decision was not finalised. In October 2024, Azerbaijan hosted pre-COP29 talks, with heads of delegation meetings and a high-level ministerial dialogue in which EU Commissioner for Climate Action Wokpe Hoekstra participated.

Financial flows

International climate finance to achieve the US$100 billion goal is defined as bilateral and multilateral public finance, as well as climate-related export credits and private finance mobilised by developed countries for climate action in developing countries. For an investment to be counted as climate finance, developed countries need to declare it as such to the UNFCCC. However, the fact that there is no official system of accountability or guidelines to define which activities qualify as climate finance has attracted criticism.

Almost 80 % of total climate finance in 2022 came from developed countries’ public finance, through both multilateral and bilateral means. Multilateral climate finance in particular grew by 226 % between 2013 and 2022, an increase driven by multilateral development banks. Private climate finance fluctuated around US$14 billion per year from 2017 to 2021, but then rose by 52 % from 2021 to 2022, to US$21.9 billion. Almost a third of climate finance in 2022 went to adaptation, up from 10 % in 2016. The EU and its Member States are the largest contributor, providing €28.6 billion in climate finance from public sources in 2023 and mobilising an additional €7.2 billion of private finance.

In addition, voluntary climate finance flows exist between developing countries. These do not count towards the US$100 billion target.

Climate finance at COP29: Issues at stake

COP29 will take place from 11 to 22 November 2024 in Baku, Azerbaijan. The conference will focus on climate finance and the adoption of an NCQG to replace the current US$100 billion commitment, on the basis of a substantive framework for a draft negotiating text. Countries have agreed that the new NCQG will be needs-based, taking account of the priorities and needs of developing countries on finance to tackle climate change. According to the UNFCCC’s Standing Committee on Finance, to meet developing countries’ costed needs, a total of US$5‑6.9 trillion would be required up to 2030, or US$455‑584 billion annually. This figure is based on countries’ estimated costs to meet the targets outlined in their nationally determined contributions (NDCs). Article 4 of the Paris Agreement states that countries must submit updated, more ambitious NDCs every 5 years. To prepare their new NDCs, due in 2025, developing countries need to know the approximate level of financial support they can expect to receive. Failure to agree on the NCQG at COP29 could impact the ambition level in developing countries’ NDCs, and would risk eroding trust between developing and developed countries.

The EU submitted its views on the NCQG to the UNFCCC in August 2024, emphasising that the collective finance goal can only be reached if parties with high greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and economic capabilities collaborate. This would require an expansion of the contributor base, to reflect the evolution of gross domestic product (GDP) growth and GHG emissions. This issue will be discussed at the upcoming COP29 conference, with the Umbrella Group and the Environmental Integrity Group of countries also supporting a broader contributor base. On the other hand, the largest group of parties, the ‘G77 and China’ which includes 134 developing countries, emphasises the responsibility and financial obligations of developed countries on account of their higher cumulative historical emissions.

Loss and Damage Fund
Other sources of international climate finance are not accounted for in the US$100 billion pledge, such as the finance necessary to address loss and damage resulting from climate impacts. The Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage was agreed at COP27 in 2022 and made operational by COP28. It will support vulnerable countries heavily impacted by climate disasters. Countries have committed US$702 million to the fund.

European Parliament and Council position

The Council conclusions of 14 October 2024 emphasise the need to broaden the group of contributors, reflecting the evolution in countries’ economic capabilities and shares of global GHG emissions in recent decades. The Council reiterates the importance of private finance to achieve ambitious NCQG goals, and underlines that public climate finance alone cannot deliver the levels of funding required to tackle climate change. It points out that the private sector is still financing fossil fuels and activities that are not aligned with the Paris Agreement. The Council conclusions do not propose a quantitative target for the NCQG.

In the European Parliament, the Committee on Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI) adopted a draft resolution on 21 October 2024 highlighting that international climate finance is fundamental for achieving the goals of the Paris Agreement, and that the NCQG should reflect the increased climate finance needs, in particular for LDCs and small-island states. The text calls for an NCQG that prioritises grants and combines public, private and innovative sources of climate finance from a broader contributor base, in line with social fairness and the polluter-pays principle. Moreover, the draft resolution emphasises that emerging economies with high GHG emissions and high GDP should contribute to the new financial goal.

Further reading

• Jensen, L. with Roniger, J., International climate finance: Status quo, challenges and policy perspectives, EPRS, European Parliament, 2023.

Read this ‘At a glance’ note on ‘Climate finance: State of play ahead of COP29‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Anna Caprile and Gabija Leclerc.

Following Russia’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine, the European Union (EU), G7, and allied partners imposed extensive sanctions targeting Russia’s economy, in particular the oil sector, in an effort to curb the Kremlin’s revenues which finance its war effort. Key measures include an embargo on Russian seaborne oil imports and a price cap on oil and oil products that restricts profits while still allowing sales below a certain price. Enforcement mechanisms prevent Russia from chartering or insuring oil tankers unless they comply with these limits. In response, Russia has sought new markets and established a ‘shadow fleet’ to evade these restrictions.

The terms ‘shadow fleet’, ‘dark fleet’ and ‘grey fleet’ have gained prominence following the imposition of sanctions on Russian energy exports, yet their definitions remain inconsistent among experts, leading to confusion. Analysts increasingly recognise that the broader definition, encompassing all vessels lacking Western insurance and belonging to non-EU/G7+ companies, captures the diverse tactics employed by Russia to circumvent sanctions and highlights the potential risks associated with these operations.

To evade sanctions, the Russian ‘shadow fleet’ makes use of flags of convenience and intricate ownership and management structures while employing a variety of tactics to conceal the origins of its cargo, including: ship-to-ship transfers; automatic identification system blackouts; falsified positions; transmission of false data; and other deceptive or even illegal techniques. In addition to bolstering its war chest, Russia’s ‘shadow fleet’, which consists of a growing number of aging and poorly maintained vessels that operate with minimal regard to the regulations, poses significant environmental, maritime safety, and security risks.

As Russia depends increasingly on its ‘shadow fleet’ to maintain oil exports, the EU and allied nations have implemented measures to counter these evasive tactics. These include imposing targeted sanctions on specific vessels and enhancing international collaboration to disrupt such activities.

During a plenary debate in October 2024, Members of the European Parliament called for enhanced maritime surveillance, tighter shipping controls, and expanded sanctions to address the significant environmental and safety threats posed by these vessels. Parliament is expected to vote on a resolution on this issue during its November I 2024 plenary session.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Russia’s ‘shadow fleet’: Bringing the threat to light‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Tarja Laaninen with Ka Yeong Kim.

Media consumption patterns have changed profoundly in recent years, creating challenges for traditional news companies. News media are now faced with digitally native younger generations who often pay more attention to influencers and celebrities than they do to journalists, even when it comes to news. The teaching of media literacy skills is more necessary than ever to help people – especially children and young people – understand the difference between news circulating on social media and news provided by professional media sources.

Social media platforms as news channels for young generations

Young people mostly consume news online, which makes them vulnerable to encountering inaccurate information. Up to 96 % of young people in the EU use the internet daily, and 84 % of them use it to participate in social media networks. In 2023, almost half the EU population aged 16 to 29 reported seeing messages online that were hostile or degrading towards groups of people or individuals. A report ahead of this year’s World Economic Forum in Davos estimated that the biggest short-term risk globally stems from artificial intelligence-generated misinformation and disinformation, capable of flooding global information systems with false narratives, and leading to widening societal and political divides.

Media consumption patterns in general have been changing rapidly, with citizens increasingly using online services and digital devices. However, the change is even more striking when comparing young people’s news consumption patterns with those of older generations, who were used to watching the news on television and reading their trusted newspaper.

According to the Reuters Institute Digital News Reports, ‘social natives’, those who grew up in the world of the social, participatory web, differ from ‘digital natives’, who grew up before the rise of social networks. For the ‘first social media generation’ in particular, social media have become one of the main sources of news. As audiences for media organisations, these young people are increasingly hard to reach.

News brands to which older generations were accustomed tend to be less meaningful for youngsters. While those over 35 are likely to go first directly to a news site, those born after the mid-1990s first turn to social media and messaging apps such as Instagram, TikTok and Snapchat. The Eurobarometer Media & News Survey 2023 showed that, while older respondents prefer to use the website of a news source (for instance, a newspaper) to access news, younger respondents are more likely to read articles or posts that appear on their online social networks, or content shared by friends on messaging apps.

What is ‘wrong’ with the traditional news, according to the young people surveyed

While the younger generations are curious about a broad range of topics, from environment to sexuality, they see the traditional news as dealing mostly with repetitive and narrow issues – something that does not satisfy their needs. Younger generations tend to have little interest in many conventional news offers such as politics or economics, oriented towards older generations’ habits, interests and values. When it comes to news topics, they pay more attention to celebrities and social media influencers than to journalists or media companies, and prefer the more personality-based, personalised options offered by social media. Younger users also seem to take a wider view of what is ‘news’, including updates on music, sport, food, fitness, fashion and travel. Celebrity, sports and music news tend to dominate teens’ social media news diet.

Furthermore, young people tend to prefer video-based news. The Reuters Institute 2023 Digital News Report showed that video-based networks, such as YouTube and TikTok, are growing fast across the world, and are increasingly the gateways for younger audiences to access their news.

These audiences are also particularly suspicious and less trusting of all information. This means they are also sceptical of news organisations’ agendas, which makes them look for more diverse voices and perspectives. Mainstream news brands are not inherently more valued for impartiality by some young people. Many young people also consider that media organisations should take a stand on issues such as climate change, and think that journalists should be free to express their personal views on social media.

Shifting habits, changing formats

Illustrating the changes, while television was still the most likely first source of morning news for the over‑35s in 2019, nearly half (45 %) of 18- to 24-year-olds already got their first news of the day through their smartphone. According to the Reuters Institute 2023 Digital News Report, for 84 % of 18- to 24-year-olds, the internet is the principal way of following news. With those young people’s reliance on mobile devices, much of their media use is on-demand and algorithmically personalised.

In its Trends and Predictions 2024 report, the Reuters Institute observes that individual young news video creators can have more followers and regular video views than the BBC or New York Times combined, even for important stories such as Gaza. In France, the Reuters Institute 2024 Digital News Report notes, a young YouTuber, Hugo Travers – known online as Hugo Décrypte – has become a leading news source for young people in the country, with 2.6 million subscribers on YouTube and 5.7 million on TikTok. The social media generation is unlikely to start reading a newspaper or watching television news at 30, as this news influencer was quoted as saying. This poses a challenge for traditional news brands, which need to consider ways of appealing to next-generation audiences.

In addition to individual news influencers, some youth-focused news brands have built large audiences too. These brands are engaging young people by using younger hosts and a different agenda, including more climate-, social justice- and mental health-related content, for example. Several ideologically motivated investigation sites exist, as well, which often criticise traditional news organisations for under-playing important issues. Most of these sites are co-operatives relying on crowdfunding.

Another emerging trend is that, in all the countries surveyed in the Reuters Institute reports so far, women tend to be absent in the video-based news market, with ‘mostly male hosts armed with oversized microphones talking to mostly male guests’. Many young people, however, still might have an ‘anchor news brand‘ they will turn to when a major story breaks and needs verifying, and many of them also still like to consume a range of formats, including text, video and audio.

European Parliament

In its 2023 resolution on the new European strategy for better internet for kids (BIK+), Parliament called for the EU and Member States to invest more in education in order to ensure digital literacy. In a further 2023 resolution on addictive design of online services and consumer protection, Parliament called for an evaluation of the addictive and mental health effects of social media platforms, and a review of existing EU legislation if necessary. In its 2021 resolution on Europe’s Media in the Digital Decade, Parliament recommended establishing a permanent ‘news media fund’, to safeguard the independence of European journalists and journalism, and guarantee the freedom of the press.

Examples of related EU policies

The EU supports news media through the Creative Europe programme’s MEDIA and cross-sectoral strands, under research programmes, as well as in pilot projects proposed by the European Parliament. In its media and audiovisual action plan, the European Commission decided to launch a news initiative, bundling existing and new policy actions and financial support for the news media sector. The new European Media Freedom Act will apply as of August 2025. Furthermore, over the past 10 years, the EU has stepped up its efforts to counter disinformation.

The Audiovisual Media Services Directive requires Member States to develop their citizens’ media literacy skills so as to empower them to navigate the news environment in the digital era, to enhance critical thinking and the ability to identify disinformation.

Read this ‘At a glance’ note on ‘Young people and the news‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Marc Jütten.

Under Russia’s presidency, BRICS (acronym for the founding states – Brazil, Russia, India and China) held its first summit following the group’s expansion on 1 January 2024, from 22 to 24 October in Kazan (Russia). With more than 30 delegations, 22 heads of state or government and several representatives of international organisations including United Nations (UN) Secretary-General António Guterres attending, the summit was a diplomatic success for Russia: it offered President Vladimir Putin the opportunity to demonstrate to the world that Russia is not isolated. For the first time, a NATO member, Türkiye, attended the summit, and applied to join BRICS. The meeting in Kazan underlined BRICS’s ambition to foster relations with the Global South, and its aim of shaping an alternative multipolar world order, particularly in the global financial and trade system.  

Background

BRICS is an intergovernmental organisation originally comprising Brazil, China, India, Russia and South Africa. On 1 January 2024, BRICS admitted four new members: Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran and the United Arab Emirates. Saudi Arabia has been invited to join but has yet to accept the invitation. Argentina, under the leadership of President Javier Milei, turned down the invitation. BRICS represents about 45 % of the world’s population (compared with the G7’s 10 %), and accounts for 37.3 % of global gross domestic product – more than twice as much as the EU (14.5 %). The recent expansion stresses BRICS’s goal to create an alternative world order by giving greater prominence to the perspectives of the Global South and making them more central to global discussions.

Russia’s 2024 BRICS presidency

On 1 January 2024, Russia took over the rotating BRICS presidency from South Africa. Under the South African presidency, the group, at the 15th BRICS Summit in Johannesburg (August 2023), agreed the decision to expand. The Russian BRICS presidency was therefore special in that the expanded BRICS circle came together for the first time at the Kazan Summit.

Outlining Russia’s priorities at the start of its presidency, President Putin stressed that Russia would promote the BRICS partnership in three key areas: politics and security, economy and finance, and cultural and humanitarian contacts. In his address, Putin highlighted the attraction of BRICS for other countries from the Global South, and stated that about 30 additional countries would be prepared to join the BRICS’s multidimensional agenda. Moreover, he said that Russia would focus on enhancing the BRICS’s role in the international monetary system, expanding both interbank cooperation and the use of national currencies in mutual trade. Consequently, Russia called for concrete steps to establish a new international payments system, the ‘BRICS Bridge‘. The idea behind this alternative to the dollar-based trading system is to build a sanctions-proof payments system that would use digital money issued by central banks and backed by fiat currencies.

The Russian BRICS programme included, under the three above-mentioned priorities, 40 measures covering a broad variety of topics, such as the integration of the association’s new members, creating strong BRICS ties with developing nations, combating money laundering and fighting terrorism. Over 200 side meetings and events organised by the Russian presidency were scheduled to take place over the course of 2024.

The most striking development from the EU’s perspective might well be that in September 2024, prior to the Kazan summit, a leaked document reportedly revealed that Türkiye submitted an application for membership in BRICS. Analysts see Türkiye’s intention to join the group as confirmation of the country’s foreign policy independence and geopolitical balancing policy between Russia, China and the West.

Summit result: ‘Strengthening multilateralism for just global development and security’

The 16th BRICS Summit, held in Kazan under the theme ‘Strengthening multilateralism for just global development and security’, was deemed a diplomatic success for Russia, since – as observers pointed out – it offered Putin a welcome opportunity to demonstrate to the world that Russia is not isolated. Leaders participating in the meeting included the President of China, Xi Jinping, the President of Egypt, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, the Prime Minister of Ethiopia, Abiy Ahmed, the Prime Minister of India, Narendra Modi, the President of Iran, Masoud Pezeshkian, and the President of South Africa, Cyril Ramaphosa. (The President of Brazil, Lula da Silva, took part via video conference, as he was unable to travel.) In addition, invited guests such as Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, President of Türkiye, and UN Secretary‑General António Guterres attended the meeting, as well.

The BRICS’s outreach towards states from the Global South is considered another of the Russian BRICS presidency’s achievements. The summit declaration, adopted by all leaders, includes references to cooperation with the Global South and the group’s intention to include additional emerging markets and developing countries from Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America and the Middle East. Although no further countries were invited to join the alliance as full members, 13 nations have been added as partners: Algeria, Belarus, Bolivia, Cuba, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Nigeria, Thailand, Türkiye, Uganda, Vietnam and Uzbekistan.

Looking at the specific results, an analyst argues that the Kazan declaration fell short in particular with a view to Putin’s key objective, i.e. to take concrete steps to establish the BRICS Bridge alternative payment system mentioned above. On this, the final declaration remains rather vague, mentioning the widespread benefits of faster, low-cost, more efficient, transparent, safe and inclusive cross-border payment instruments, built on the principle of minimising trade barriers and non-discriminatory access. The expert points out that notably Brazil and India have no strong interest to ‘de-dollarise’ the world economy.

Outlook

In 2025, Brazil, which currently also holds the G20 presidency, is expected to take over the BRICS presidency. In his speech during the open plenary session of the BRICS summit, President Lula said that the forthcoming Brazilian BRICS presidency plans to reaffirm the bloc’s vocation in the fight for a multipolar world, for less asymmetrical relations between countries, and to move forward with creating alternative payment methods for transactions between the BRICS countries.

The multifaceted debate surrounding BRICS expansion and its potential impact on global affairs is influenced by differing viewpoints. Proponents argue that the inclusion of additional countries in BRICS+ could provide a platform for the Global South to assert its interests and challenge traditional Western dominance in global affairs. They point to BRICS countries’ combined economic strength, arguing that this collective economic weight could serve as a counterbalance to what they perceive as Western hegemony. Sceptics see BRICS as a ‘paper tiger’. According to them, the inclusion of countries with varying political, economic and social interests could lead to internal tensions and hinder the group’s ability to reach consensus on key issues. As regards the EU, experts stress that the growing global interest in BRICS membership should be reason enough to monitor BRICS’s further development strategically, and to cooperate politically and economically more closely with the Global South.

European Parliament position

In an October 2023 exchange of views with European Commission representatives, Members of the Parliament’s Committee on International Trade (INTA) underlined the need to pay close attention to BRICS’s expansion, in particular considering the effect of a potential BRICS+ currency and the consequences for EU trade policy. The EU as a whole does not entertain formal relations with BRICS. Although no dedicated BRICS policy or strategy targeting the group as a whole exists, the EU has bilateral and interregional agreements and partnerships with the individual members.

Read this ‘At a glance’ note on ‘Outcome of the 16th BRICS Summit in Kazan, Russia‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Stefano De luca.

By the 2030s, quantum computers might compromise traditional cryptography, putting digital infrastructure at high risk in the European Union (EU) and around the world. Specifically, it is expected that quantum computers’ unique capabilities will allow them to solve complex mathematical problems, such as breaking the traditional cryptographic systems used universally. The confidentiality, integrity and authenticity of sensitive data – including health, financial, security and defence information – will be exposed to threats from any actor possessing a sufficiently powerful quantum computer. There is a pressing need for the EU to start preparing its digital assets to face this risk.

Post-quantum cryptography (which uses classical computer properties) and quantum cryptography (which uses quantum mechanical properties) are the two types of critical technology able to protect digital infrastructure from quantum computer attacks. Robust post-quantum cryptography algorithms have been identified, but swift and efficient implementation is crucial before malicious actors exploit the power of quantum computers. Experts stress the need for quantum preparedness to be put in place now, with some of them even warning of a ‘quantum cybersecurity Armageddon’.

Several countries are adopting strategies to address post-quantum cryptography. The EU is working with Member States and the United States to speed up the transition to post-quantum cryptography, and is also exploring long-term quantum cryptography initiatives.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Cryptographic security: Critical to Europe’s digital sovereignty‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Polona Car.

Standards are voluntary guidelines, providing technical specifications for products, processes and services. They ensure a certain level of quality, enable interoperability, boost consumer confidence and remove trade barriers. Laws may prescribe standards as a preferred or mandatory requirement for compliance. In the digital sphere, their strategic importance has made them the focus of geopolitical competition.

Why standards?

Digital standards ensure that the products we use daily, ranging from WiFi routers to mobile phones, comply with prescribed technical specifications. Standards enable users to communicate with each other using digital technologies, safely and at a lower cost, while companies using them can integrate and compete in the global value chain. For instance, established mobile network standards, such as GSM (the Global System for Mobile Communications) and its successor standards (3G, 4G, 5G, …), allow a user to phone any other user around the world, regardless of the type of phone. Standards also enable users to browse the worldwide web, to connect Bluetooth devices and, in the European Union, to use a USB-C charger for any mobile phone.

Standards provide a common language of agreed terms and definitions, they define organisational processes, set metrics for testing and performance, and define quality and safety requirements for products, as well as requirements for compatibility and interoperability. As such, they play an important role in digital industry development, allowing companies to share data and compete on the global markets. By promoting product and service security, building trust in emerging technologies and promoting innovation, they boost competitiveness in the European digital transition. They allow companies to be more efficient, reduce costs and focus their efforts on innovation. Synergies between standardisation, innovation and competitiveness seem to be particularly significant in the digital sector.

Real market needs drive standards, industry therefore plays a key role in their development. Moreover, when combined with patents, such as standard essential patents (SEPs), standards generate royalties supporting innovation. Companies have an interest in competing to transform their patents to widely used standards, as this can lead to a financial virtuous circle. Standards are mostly developed by consensus in recognised, standard-setting organisations (SSOs), according to agreed principles. In addition to SSOs, industry consortia, such as the Blu-ray Disc Association, also create standards, which SSO may later publish (e.g. the PDF format). Some segments of the digital sector, such as software development, require a more open industry-oriented approach to standards development.

EU actors and priorities

The process of developing European standards in support of reaching the goals of the European digital decade takes place through one of the three European standardisation organisations (ESOs), where stakeholders come together to reach a consensus:

• CEN (European Committee for Standardisation), an association of national standardisation bodies,
• CENELEC (European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardisation), an association of national electro-technical committees, and
• ETSI (European Telecommunications Standards Institute), a standards body dealing with telecommunications, broadcasting and other electronic communications networks and services.

The High-level forum on European standardisation, a Commission expert group formed by representatives from the ESOs, industry, civil society and academia, steers the development of European standards, including for the digital single market. This structure was requested in the European standardisation strategy (ESS), which stressed the importance of standards in supporting innovation, better addressing the EU’s strategic goals and leading on standards-setting to be more competitive at international level.

The EU multi-stakeholder platform on ICT standardisation is a specialised advisory expert group on all matters relating to implementation of ICT standardisation policies. Together with the Commission, the group develops an annual rolling plan for ICT standardisation, highlighting ICT standardisation needs. Standards for artificial intelligence have been high on the agenda in recent years, as well as standardisation for cybersecurity (e.g. to support implementation of the Cyber Resilience Act), data economy and data interoperability (e.g. supporting the European digital identity framework). The plan also looks at standardisation beyond 5G, at edge computing and intelligent transport systems.

Standards for the AI Act
Article 40(2) of the European Union Artificial Intelligence Act (AI Act) oblige the Commission to ‘issue, without undue delay, standardisation requests’ covering requirements for high-risk AI systems, obligations for providers of general-purpose AI models, and obligations of providers of general-purpose AI models with systematic risk. High-risk AI systems or general-purpose AI models that conform to harmonised standards, shall be presumed to be in conformity with the requirements of the AI Act for high-risk AI systems. The Commission’s standardisation request tasked the CEN and CENELEC with delivering the requested standards, including on risk-management systems, quality of data sets, robustness, cybersecurity and transparency, by 30 April 2025. CEN-CENELEC established a Joint Technical Committee for AI and published a work programme, as well as several standards.

International dimension

Standards are instrumental in addressing the challenges and opportunities of digital technologies. Therefore, the United Nations Industrial Development Organization underlines the need for a collaborative process and multi-stakeholder approach in standards development, to circumvent potential monopolies or abuse of dominant market position, and enable equitable digital transformation globally. However, as academics note, international technology standardisation is regarded as a space of geopolitical competition. In addition, the global adoption of digital technologies has intensified competition, especially because SEPs support innovation and benefit royalty holders.

The United Stated (US), China, and the EU have all recently aligned their standardisation policies with their strategic and political objectives. It seems that the US and China are each seeking technological supremacy and have both adopted a hybrid approach, where governments and the private sector cooperate in shaping international standards. According to experts, the EU seems to be seeking a ‘careful equilibrium between competition on the one hand, and continued cooperation with rival states on the other’.

China’s policy shift on standardisation took place in 2021. With its new policy, China dropped its top-down approach for a more collaborative public-private model, similar to the US. 5G standardisation was a key moment for China. Academics note the country ‘began to challenge the regime of international standards which has been dominated by the US and partially by EU and Japan’. China is seeking to expand its influence in existing SSOs, like the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), but is also working to establish its own standardisation system based on its values, mostly with the Belt and Road Initiative.

China’s push for 5G standardisation
Researchers identified China’s push for 5G standardisation as an important shift in its standardisation strategy, as it relied on intellectual property rights produced by Chinese technology firms. China managed to be the first-mover ‘through aggressive investments and strong state support’. As experts note, this is directly visible in Huawei’s presence in the ITU study group on fixed and mobile network protocols. Indeed, Huawei, with government support, has requested the highest number of applications for SEPs for 5G.

The US shifted its standardisation policy in 2023 from a traditional corporate-led approach toward stronger government engagement to counter China’s tech rise. According to experts, the 2023 US National Standards Strategy aims at improving investment, promoting government participation in SSOs, addressing skill shortage and ‘protecting the integrity and inclusivity of current standardization practices’. So far, private consortia like the Internet Engineering Task Force have driven US technological dominance. Experts note these consortia remain leading international SSOs in internet and networking standardisation.

The US and the EU are also trying to counterbalance China’s rising influence in setting critical and emerging technologies’ standards in the framework of the EU-US Trade and Technology Council (TTC). The TTC addressed this issue in late 2023 in a mapping exercise that identified common features of digital identities, in the context of emerging technologies standards in support of transatlantic cooperation.

Read this ‘At a glance’ note on ‘How standards support Europe’s digital competitiveness‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Elena Lazarou.

In her political guidelines presented on 18 July 2024, European Commission President-elect Ursula von der Leyen identified defence as a priority and a key sector in completing the single market. An important part of that effort will be building a ‘European Defence Union’. To frame the new approach and to identify defence investment needs, von der Leyen committed that the new Commission would present a white paper on the future of European defence within the first 100 days of taking office. Subsequently, the Commissioners designated to take on the High Representative/Vice President portfolio (Kaja Kallas, Estonia) and the portfolio for Defence and Space (Andrius Kubilius, Lithuania) have been tasked with producing the paper.

The white paper is expected to predominantly address defence sector capability issues, industrial competitiveness and investment needs. It should also frame the overall approach to EU defence integration, with the aim of strengthening the EU’s ability to respond to threats, particularly in the context of Russia’s continuing aggression in Ukraine, combined with evolving geopolitical challenges to the south and increased military capabilities of other global actors.

Among other things, the white paper should outline the path towards key initiatives such as a European air shield to bolster air defence across the continent and expanded cyber-defence capabilities; closer EU-NATO cooperation; more efficient EU Member State defence spending; the reduction of external dependencies in defence procurement; and increased intra-EU collaboration in industrial, innovation, procurement and production issues. Experts widely agree that a key challenge to address is how to increase financing for the defence industry with, inter alia, the provision of incentives for investors and the creation of economies of scale; a clear assessment of the EU’s defence needs; and coordination among the many EU defence initiatives proposed in recent years.

The European Parliament first called for an EU white paper on security and defence as early as 2016.

Read the complete briefing on ‘White paper on the future of European defence‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Annastiina Papunen.

Competitiveness is a multifaceted concept connected with the need to foster the EU’s productivity, the most important driver of long-term growth. While competitiveness has always been an important focus of attention for EU leaders, the past years of multiple crises and an increasingly complex geopolitical situation have brought the topic to the forefront of the political agenda. Turning the EU into a strong and independent global actor supported by a robust economic base, as well as competitive products and services, has become a core priority for the European Council.

Recently, much thinking has gone into ways of strengthening both EU competitiveness and the EU’s internal market. At a special meeting on 17-18 April 2024, the European Council discussed competitiveness extensively. Landmark reports by two Italian former prime ministers – Enrico Letta and Mario Draghi – have also fed into the discussion.

Furthermore, in the Strategic Agenda for 2024 to 2029, which sets the European Council’s priorities for the current 5-year institutional cycle, ‘a prosperous and competitive Europe’ features as one of the three core headline objectives, alongside ‘a free and democratic Europe’ and ‘a strong and secure Europe’. Likewise, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s political guidelines also call for ‘a new plan for Europe’s sustainable prosperity and competitiveness’. Competitiveness will be discussed in depth during an informal meeting of Heads of State or Government on 8 November 2024, which is expected to result in a ‘Budapest Declaration’.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Competitiveness on the European Council agenda‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.