European Parliamentary Research Service Blog

Written by Ralf Drachenberg and Rebecca Torpey.

The European Council took two important decisions on 27 June for the new institutional cycle: one on the EU’s institutional leadership, the other on the EU’s political priorities for the next five years. EU leaders elected António Costa as the next European Council President, proposed Ursula von der Leyen as the candidate for Commission President, and nominated Kaja Kallas as High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. They also adopted conclusions on Ukraine, the Middle East, security and defence, and competitiveness. Other topics addressed were migration, the Black Sea, Moldova, Georgia, hybrid threats, and the fight against antisemitism, racism and xenophobia. The European Council also agreed on a roadmap for future work on internal reforms.

General

As has become the practice, the European Council held an exchange of views with the President of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, on Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, and the European Union’s support for Ukraine and its people; this time, Zelenskyy attended the meeting in person.

Addressing EU leaders at the start of the meeting, the President of the European Parliament, Roberta Metsola, discussed how to turn the messages deriving from the recent European elections into a political programme for Parliament. Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez was not able to attend and was represented by German Chancellor Olaf Scholz.

European Council meeting Next institutional cycle

The European Council took two crucial decisions for the new institutional cycle, one on the EU’s institutional leadership, the other on the EU’s political priorities for the next five years.

High-level appointments

EU leaders agreed on the EU’s next institutional leadership. As widely anticipated ahead of the meeting, the package the European Council agreed upon includes: Ursula von der Leyen (Germany) for European Commission President; António Costa (Portugal) for European Council President; and Kaja Kallas (Estonia) for High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR/VP). In contrast to 2019, the agreement on the package was taken very swiftly.

As was the case for past European Council decisions on top jobs (e.g. in 2014 for the nomination of the Commission President, and in 2017 for the re-election of the European Council President), the candidates were not supported by all EU leaders. As announced, and as in 2014, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán did not support the package, nor did Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, who abstained due to the selection process excluding her political family.

Following the practice to date, the new European Council President was also elected by the Heads of State or Government of the euro-area Member States as President of the Euro Summit for the same term. Thus, António Costa will be President of the Euro Summit from 1 December 2024 to 31 May 2027. He indicated that his main priority as European Council President would be to build unity between the Member States in order to put the new Strategic Agenda on track.

Source: EPRS.

The newly composed European Parliament will complete the appointment process of the EU’s institutional leadership by electing its own President during its first session on 16-19 July. It is also expected to vote on the Commission President during that session, and then vote on the entire College of Commissioners in the autumn.

Main messages of the President of the European Parliament: President Metsola recalled that the Parliament remained firmly behind the lead candidate process. She informed the European Council that the leaders of the Parliament’s political groups would invite the nominee for President of the European Commission to discuss, on 2 July, a political programme reflecting the voters’ messages, and also ways of building the necessary majority in Parliament.

Strategic Agenda 2024-2029

In line with its Treaty-based role, which is to set the EU’s political priorities, the European Council adopted the Strategic Agenda 2024-2029. As flagged up by EPRS and outlined by the European Council President, Charles Michel, the Strategic Agenda 2024-2029 is built on three pillars: 1) ‘A free and democratic Europe’; 2) ‘A strong and secure Europe’; and 3) ‘A prosperous and competitive Europe’.

The Strategic Agenda 2024-2029 constitutes, on the one hand, an important shift in the European Union’s political priorities, but on the other shows a high degree of continuity in the topics included. The most obvious changes are the increased significance of security and defence, the addition of new elements on EU competitiveness and the salience of democracy, which is, for the first time, a headline priority. At the same time, many policy issues have been kept from the Strategic Agenda 2019-2024 (a detailed EPRS comparison of the old and new Strategic Agendas is forthcoming).

President von der Leyen stressed that the Strategic Agenda 2024-2029 provided an important input for the development of the next Commission’s political guidelines, which she will present to the European Parliament ahead of its vote on her candidacy for European Commission President.

Roadmap for future work on internal reforms

EU leaders set a roadmap for work on the reforms required to achieve the Union’s long-term objectives. They stressed that ‘this work should advance in parallel with the enlargement process, as both the Union and future Member States must be ready at the time of accession’. It envisages:

• an in-depth policy review by the Commission on i) values, ii) policies, iii) budget, and iv) governance, to be presented by spring 2025;
• the next Council presidencies taking the work of recent presidencies on the matter forward and presenting a follow-up report by June 2025;
• the European Council reviewing progress and giving further guidance in June 2025.

When discussing future internal reforms, the European Council did not refer to the results of the Conference on the Future of Europe, nor did it address the European Parliament’s formal request of 22 November 2023 calling for a Convention on the revision of the Treaties.

Ukraine

EU leaders’ discussions on Ukraine covered four main aspects. Following the significant increase in attacks on civilians and critical infrastructure, support for Ukrainian society was the first focal point. EU leaders urged increased support for Ukraine’s energy system, tasking the HR/VP and the Council to accelerate preparations for the winter. The European Council also welcomed the outcome of the recovery conference and – after the Council’s positive assessment of the Ukraine Plan – the distribution of €1.89 billion in pre-financing for Ukraine’s recovery and reconstruction. EU leaders also welcomed initiatives towards the return of unlawfully deported Ukrainian children and civilians.

The second point was military support for Ukraine. EU leaders welcomed recent positive steps, notably the signing of joint security commitments between Ukraine and the EU as well as bilateral agreements with Member States and partners. As discussed at the G7 summit, Ukraine’s reconstruction as well as military support is to be financed in the form of loans paid by the revenue obtained from frozen Russia assets, and disbursed through the Ukraine Assistance Fund (UAF). The first tranche of €1.4 billion is to be released in the summer, followed by another billion euro by the end of the year. The European Council invited the Council, the Commission and the HR/VP to take work forward on this. Hungary has reportedly been blocking the funds, but the Council legal service argued that Hungary could not do so as it had abstained in the vote on the creation of the UAF.

Third, the European Council welcomed recent steps along Ukraine’s EU path, with the first intergovernmental conference (IGC) on its accession held on 25 June. This followed a European Council decision of December 2023 to open accession negotiations with Ukraine, and the approval of the negotiating framework by the Council on 21 June 2024. EU leaders also welcomed the outcome of the peace summit, and committed to increasing the EU’s push for broader international support for peace in Ukraine based on the UN Charter, international law and Ukraine’s peace formula. Lastly, the European Council welcomed the 14th package of sanctions against Russia, as well as progress on efforts to see Russia and its leadership held accountable for their war of aggression.

Middle East

The European Council reiterated its condemnation of the Hamas attack and restated Israel’s right to defend itself, while stressing the need to do so in compliance with international law. It also reminded Israel of the legally binding nature of the order of the International Court of Justice of 24 May 2024, urging it to halt military operations in Rafah and expressing deep concern about the consequences on civilians of the ground operation in Rafah. Given the dire humanitarian situation in Gaza, the European Council reiterated calls for aid to reach Palestinians rapidly and unhindered. It condemned strikes on the International Committee of the Red Cross in Gaza, and attempts to label the UN Relief and Works Agency as a terrorist organisation. EU leaders reiterated their condemnation of extremist settler violence in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, inviting the Council to take forward work against perpetrators. Furthermore, they condemned Israeli government decisions to further expand illegal settlements across the occupied West Bank, and urged Israel to reverse these decisions.

The European Council welcomed the adoption of the UN Security Council resolution proposing a three-phase ceasefire deal, and called for its full and swift implementation. EU leaders also reiterated their commitment to sustainable peace based on a two-state solution; in that context, they called on Israel to stop actions that weaken the Palestinian Authority and to release withheld clearance funds. Meanwhile, following the escalating attacks on both sides of the Israeli-Lebanese border (due to the Israel-Hezbollah conflict), the European Council invited the Commission, the Council and the HR/VP to strengthen EU support to Lebanon, its armed forces and the UN force in Lebanon.

Security and defence

The European Council discussed urgent and medium-term European defence needs and defence initiatives, inviting the Council, Member States, the Commission and the HR/VP to take work forward on mobilising funds for defence initiatives. Several areas were highlighted: i) addressing critical capability gaps based on the capability development plan; ii) the European defence industry strategy; and iii) the European defence industry programme proposal (aiming for adoption by mid-2025). The Commission President reportedly presented three options to raise defence funding: i) increasing national contributions; ii) raising taxes; iii) EU borrowing/’eurobonds’. Chancellor Scholz (and The Netherlands) opposed the use of eurobonds and the refinancing of national defence budgets from the EU budget. In contrast, EU leaders welcomed the European Investment Bank’s security and defence action plan, calling for its swift adoption.

Competitiveness

Following its April conclusions calling for a new European competitiveness deal, the European Council stressed that ‘swift and decisive progress on all strands’ of the new deal was expected by the end of the year. Since April, the Council has adopted conclusions on the future of industrial policy and the future of the EU single market. However, the eagerly awaited report on EU competitiveness by former European Central Bank President Mario Draghi has not been released (it will probably now be published in July).

Other items

As anticipated, the European Council invited the Commission and the HR/VP to prepare a joint communication on building an EU strategic approach to the Black Sea. In light of the challenges posed by Russia’s war against Ukraine and destabilising activities in the region, EU leaders reiterated their support for Moldova, and welcomed the first IGC, on 25 June, on the country’s accession to the EU. In parallel, the European Council discussed recent developments in Georgia, notably the transparency of the foreign influence law and the increasingly difficult situation for civil society representatives, political leaders, civil activists and journalists in Georgia. It urged Georgia to reverse its current course of action, and to ensure that the elections in the autumn are free and fair.

Read this briefing on ‘Outcome of the European Council meeting of 27 June 2024‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Leading the European Union’s institutions, agencies and bodies is a high-profile position of great responsibility, with nominees called upon to represent all EU citizens. A broader renewal of the leadership of all the European Union’s main institutions follows the June 2024 European elections, in which both Parliament and the Council play a major role. The European Parliament has the power to nominate, vet and appoint people to these senior positions, although its exact role varies from case to case. Even where Parliament’s opinions are not legally binding, Parliament can closely scrutinise candidates to ensure they are qualified for the job. The publicity that often surrounds hearings and the questionnaires candidates answer provides Parliament with a further opportunity to exercise political leverage.

During the ninth legislative term, Parliament used its powers to nominate and appoint holders of senior positions in EU institutions and other EU bodies. Examples include the hearing process that led to the appointment of the von der Leyen Commission, the replacement of Commissioners mid-mandate, and the appointment of the first ever European Chief Prosecutor.

The appointment process for the college of Commissioners has evolved over the years and influenced the relationships and exercise of power between the institutions concerned. Parliament’s committees have expressed doubt as to candidates’ specific expertise and probed more deeply where needed. In 2019, Parliament’s Committee on Legal Affairs examined all candidate commissioners’ declarations of financial interests, to assess possible conflicts of interest prior to their hearings. Two candidates withdrew from the process after the committee hearings, and Parliament addressed additional written questions to four other candidates. The committee decided one candidate was unqualified to be a member of the college and her candidacy was withdrawn.

Parliament has also been actively involved in replacing individual commissioners during their mandates. For example, after he responded to written follow-up questions, Parliament voted in favour of Wopke Hoekstra as Frans Timmermans’ successor.

Parliament and the Council appoint the European Chief Prosecutor by common accord. In 2019, the selection process saw a long power struggle between the two institutions. The deadlock was finally broken following a public hearing organised by Parliament’s Committees on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs and on Budgetary Control. The successful candidate, Laura Codruţa Kövesi, had the Parliament’s backing.

Parliament thus ensures EU leaders are qualified for their position, by exercising its influence on constitutional issues and closely scrutinising candidates. Parliament’s powers fall broadly into six, often overlapping, domains: law-making, the budget, scrutiny of the executive, external relations, and, to a lesser extent, constitutional affairs and agenda-setting. This graphic shows more examples of areas where Parliament used one or more of its different powers to influence legislation:

Mapping the European Parliament’s powers in different areas

For a fuller picture of the European Parliament’s activity over the past five years, take a look at our publication Examples of Parliament’s impact: 2019 to 2024: Illustrating the powers of the European Parliament, from which this case is drawn.

The European Parliament regularly receives enquiries from citizens about how the EU regulates social media and protects its users.

The European Union (EU) has adopted a series of rules to protect the rights of social media users. These intend to provide a safer online environment for users and set clear standards on how the tech companies operate whilst promoting digitalisation.

Protection of personal data and privacy

Your right to protection of your personal data is enshrined in the EU charter of fundamental rights. In 2016, the EU adopted the General Data Protection Regulation – often referred to as ‘GDPR rules’. The regulation applies to all companies that process their users’ data within the EU. Under the GDPR, social media companies must obtain explicit consent from their users to access and process their data. It establishes a series of rights for citizens including the rights to:

• access, correct and erase personal data held by companies (‘right to be forgotten’)
• receive your personal data collected by a company and to have it transmitted to another company (‘data portability’)
• receive notification of a personal data breach.

Individual data protection authorities in the 27 EU countries enforce the GDPR. They have the power to investigate complaints and impose fines for breaches. They are independent from government and work together to ensure consistent application of the rules across the EU through the European Data Protection Board. In 2023, the Irish Data Protection Commission imposed the largest fine so far – €1.2 billion – on Facebook’s parent company in Ireland, Meta Platforms. Meta’s export to and storage in the United States of EU Facebook users’ personal data (based on standard contractual clauses) was deemed to have breached GDPR rules. Meta has announced plans to appeal.

Under the 2002 EU e-privacy rules, social media platforms and messaging services like WhatsApp are banned from enabling the surveillance of their users, unless the user has consented, or if the surveillance is carried out by a legally authorised person, such as the police. In 2017, the European Commission proposed new rules to enhance the security and confidentiality of communications and set clearer rules on tracking technologies such as cookies. Parliament has adopted its position, but the procedure is awaiting agreement among the governments of EU countries.

The new EU digital rulebook

One of the priorities of the von der Leyen Commission was to make Europe ‘fit for the digital age’. In 2022, Parliament and EU governments brought in two major new laws to create a fairer and safer online world: the Digital Markets Act and the Digital Services Act. Broadly, the idea is that ‘what is illegal offline should be illegal online’.

The Digital Markets Act – limiting the power of big digital companies

The Digital Markets Act creates a level-playing field for all digital companies, enabling smaller firms and start-ups to compete more easily with the industry giants.

The act sets clear rules for large platforms (‘gatekeepers’) to stop them imposing unfair conditions on businesses and consumers. The European Commission has so far designated six gatekeepers: Alphabet (Google, YouTube), Amazon, Apple, ByteDance (TikTok), Meta (Facebook, Instagram) and Microsoft.

These platforms will no longer be able to favour their own services and products over those offered by third parties on their platform. They will be required to give users the option to remove any pre-installed software or applications, making it easier for users to switch between platforms and apps.

The act will also enhance compatibility between different messaging platforms. This means that whether they are on a small or large platform, users will be able to send messages, share files, and make video calls across different messaging applications.

Non-compliance risks significant fines: up to 10 % of the company’s total worldwide annual turnover, or up to 20 % in the event of repeated infringements. In March 2024, the Commission opened investigations into certain uncompetitive practices that might breach the act. This includes Alphabet (for giving preference to its own services on Google Search); Apple (for preventing users from being able to choose services on iPhones); and Meta (for obliging customers to consent to their data being used for targeted advertising if they do not agree to pay a monthly fee – the ‘pay or OK model’).

The Digital Services Act – ensuring a safe online environment

The Digital Services Act is a ground-breaking new law. From 17 February 2024, it applies to any digital platform, including social media, that acts as an intermediary to connect users with goods, services, and content. It applies to all digital organisations providing services in the EU, including those established outside the EU. It applies to both large and small operators, but very large online platforms or search engines are subject to additional rules. The European Commission has designated 19 platforms as such, including social media and networking channels such as Facebook, Instagram, TikTok or X (previously Twitter), and the Google and Bing search engines.

The act will hold these platforms legally liable for their users’ unlawful behaviour if they are aware of illegal content. Such ‘content’ includes child sexual abuse material, terrorist content, illegal hate speech or illegal goods and services.
The new rules focus on:

• Countering illegal content and dangerous and counterfeit goods, by making it easier for users to report them and for authorities to enforce action against them;
• Tackling online harassment and cyber bullying, by making sure any non-consensual private images and other abusive content can be quickly flagged by users and removed;
• Protecting children, by requiring platforms to ensure a high level of privacy, safety and security of minors on their services;
• Banning targeted advertising online based on profiling children or on sensitive data like sexuality, religion or race;
• Banning ‘dark patterns’ or ‘nudging’ techniques that might manipulate users into making choices they do not intend to make.

National authorities and the European Commission can enforce the act through a set of investigative and sanctioning measures. Companies who do not comply face hefty fines (up to hundreds of millions of euro) and an EU-wide ban. On 19 February 2024, the Commission announced formal proceedings to assess whether TikTok has breached the Digital Services Act in relation to the protection of minors, advertising transparency, data access for researchers, and the risk management of addictive design and harmful content.

Media Freedom Act

The European Media Freedom Act, adopted in April 2024, protects EU journalists and media from political or economic interference. It introduces a mechanism to prevent very big online platforms, such as X (formerly Twitter), Facebook or Instagram, from arbitrarily restricting or deleting independent media content.

Parliament calls for more protection for social media users

In December 2023, Parliament urged the Commission to propose new legislation against addictive design features such as automatic play and infinite scrolling, which affect children and young people in particular, and can lead to behavioural patterns and internet use that mirror addiction. It also asked the Commission to put forward a digital ‘right not to be disturbed’ allowing consumers to turn off attention-seeking features.

Following a petition regarding the impossibility of accessing basic banking services without a mobile phone, Parliament acknowledged that a divide exists between people who are able to use a digital means of payment, or to access public services, and others who cannot or are reluctant to use them. Parliament stressed that companies providing everyday services should offer a non-digital solution. It called on the Commission to consider the risks of discrimination against older people and other vulnerable groups when assessing payment services, and to ensure that digitisation is ‘human-centric’.

Further information

• Digital Markets Act, overview, European Commission
• Digital Services Act overview, European Commission
• Q & A on Digital Services Act, European Commission
• Implications of the Digital Transformation on Different Social Groups, Study, European Parliament

Keep sending your questions to the Citizens’ Enquiries Unit (Ask EP)! We reply in the EU language that you use to write to us.

Written by Ralf Drachenberg with Paweł Bącal.

Resolutions are an essential way for the European Parliament to express its views on political processes, EU policies and developments in the world. Parliament also uses them to scrutinise other EU institutions, including the European Council. The need for accountability and increased scrutiny of the European Council has been a constant theme in the European Parliament’s resolutions throughout the 2019-2024 legislative term. The increased need to scrutinise the European Council also results from the changing role of the institution over recent years.

Based on an analysis of Parliament’s resolutions, this briefing will present the need for democratic oversight of the European Council and outline the different tools at Parliament’s disposal to do so. It provides a unique overview of the content of Parliament’s resolutions addressing the European Council and the messages it sends to EU leaders. Finally, the briefing identifies potential ways of further strengthening Parliament’s scrutiny of the European Council.

The European Council and the need for scrutiny

It is necessary to correct institutional imbalances that have arisen over time and to increase the accountability of the executive toward the legislature, in particular to grant Parliament scrutiny powers over the European Council.

European Parliament, 14 September 2023.

The European Council – a formal EU institution since the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon – consists of the Heads of State or Government of the 27 EU Member States, the President of the European Council and the President of the European Commission. The European Council’s core role is to ‘provide the Union with the necessary impetus for its development and define the general political directions and priorities’ (Article 15(1) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU)). Over the last decade, and notably fuelled by the various crises the EU has had to face, the European Council has expanded its influence over policymaking, which some consider to be ‘legislative trespassing’, and has de facto assumed executive powers. This development has been pointed out by Parliament:

under the pressure of the crisis, the European Council has considerably aggrandised its role, increasing the number of extraordinary meetings and raising to European Council level matters normally dealt with at Council of Ministers level; whereas in this respect the European Council has gone beyond the crucial Treaty injunction that it has no legislative functions.

Parliament has repeatedly criticised the growing institutional imbalance and, during both the ninth and eighth legislative terms, called for the situation to be remedied. In 2019, for example, it stated that the ‘European Council has, against the spirit and the letter of the Treaties, taken a number of important political decisions outside of the Treaty framework, thereby de facto excluding those decisions from the oversight of Parliament and undermining the democratic accountability which is essential with regard to such European policies’.

Accountability is one of the central principles of democracy. This principle also applies to the European Union: Article 10 TEU explicitly provides that ‘the functioning of the Union shall be founded on representative democracy’. Therefore, all the institutions shall be accountable either to the citizens directly, or to their representatives.

As Parliament underlined following the entry into force of the TEU, notably in its December 2013 resolution, members of the European Council, while being accountable individually to their own national parliaments, collectively are accountable only to themselves. Academics have argued that, in the EU’s architecture, the European Parliament is the only institution that might be able to provide a forum for democratic oversight over the European Council as a collective entity.

Parliament has been given a general political oversight function over the executive in the Treaties (Article 14(1) TEU). In an EU framework described by many observers as having a ‘dual executive’ split between the European Commission and the European Council – with respective responsibilities differing according to policy area – the Treaties provide the European Parliament with a number of instruments to hold the European Commission and its President accountable (e.g. censuring the Commission). However, they do not provide Parliament with similar instruments to hold the European Council and its President to account.

This rise in influence of the European Council has not been accompanied by the necessary increase in its accountability. On the contrary, it has even been argued that, in the context of the negotiations on the multiannual financial framework (MFF), ‘the European Council’s dominance distorted the institutional balance laid down in the Treaties … and undermined the transparency and democratic accountability of the decision-making process … the role played by the EUCO is difficult to reconcile with the wording and spirit of the [Lisbon Treaty]’. Therefore, as the role of the European Council has increased, so has the need for the scrutiny.

Read the complete briefing on ‘European Parliament’s scrutiny of the European Council: The use of Parliament resolutions‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Györgyi Mácsai, Members’ Research Service (EPRS) with Raffaele Ventura, GlobalStat, EUI.

This infographic provides an insight into the economic performance of Indonesia compared to the EU and looks at the trade dynamics between them. Indonesia’s economy managed to maintain sustained growth after the 2020 economic recession. The EU’s GDP growth, on the other hand, faced a slowdown starting in 2022. Divergent trends are also found in the foreign direct investment and remittance net inflows. For the former, Indonesia presents a more stable time series; for the latter, the EU remittances net inflow is more stable. The EU’s trade with Indonesia has shown a generally upward trend, with a sharp increase after the 2020 global economic slowdown. EU’s main exports are mechanical appliances and electrical equipment, while Indonesia’s primary export is agri-food.

Read this ‘infographic’ on ‘Indonesia: Economic indicators and trade with EU‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Indonesia’s business environment and socio-economic indicators EU imports of services from Indonesia (2022) EU exports of services to Indonesia (2022) EU imports of goods from Indonesia (2023) EU exports of goods to Indonesia (2023) Top EU partners (2023)
Trade in goods Main trade partners (2023)
Trade in goods, exports plus imports EU trade with Indonesia FDI and remittances Public finances, monetary and financial data GDP growth
(annual change, %) Female labour force participation rate
(% of female population aged 15+) Total unemployment rate(% of total labour force) Indonesia GDP per capita

Written by Ralf Drachenberg.

The European Council consists of the 27 Heads of State or Government of the EU Member States, who are voting members, together with the President of the European Council and the President of the European Commission, who have no vote (Article 15(2) Treaty on European Union). The chart shows the current members, the national office they hold, their most recent European political affiliation, and the year their membership began.

Recent developments

The duration of an individual Head of State or Government’s membership of the European Council is not laid down in the EU Treaties but is, rather, directly linked to changes in the composition of national governments within the EU Member States. There are thus significant variations between Member States, reflecting varying electoral cycles and frequency in leadership changes in these countries. As a result, some individual Heads of State or Government may be participating in their very first meeting of the European Council, while others might have participated for 10 years or more. In the period since February 2015, there have been changes in membership on average every two months. Since the previous edition of this publication, in April 2024, national and European political developments have led to a number of changes in the European Council’s membership, as set out below.

Changes in members and their status Members’ changes in status

Following the national elections in Belgium, which were held simultaneously with the elections to the European Parliament on 9 June, Prime Minister Alexander De Croo announced his resignation due to the substantial losses his political party (Open VLD) suffered. He will continue as caretaker until a new government is formed, which, based on past experience, could take a significant time.

As Robert Fico, the Slovak Prime Minister who usually represents the country in the European Council, is still recovering from the injuries he suffered in an attempted assassination, the country’s President, Peter Pellegrini, will attend European Council meetings until Fico is sufficiently recovered.

Expected changes

Following the parliamentary election in the Netherlands on 22 November 2023, a government agreement was reached between the Party for Freedom (PVV), the People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD), the Farmer-Citizen Movement (BBB) and New Social Contract (NSC). Dick Schoof has been proposed as the next prime minister, replacing long-term European Council member Mark Rutte (VVD). Schoof is not affiliated to any party at national level. If the parliamentary hearings are completed on time, he is expected to be sworn in on 2 July 2024.

Ongoing developments

On 9 June, alongside the elections to the European Parliament, Bulgaria held its sixth national elections in three years, with a record low turnout of about 30 %. The political coalition GERB–SDS, led by former Prime Minister Boyko Borisov, with 25 %, received the biggest share of seats in the Bulgarian Parliament. Explorative coalition negotiations between GERB–SDS and other political parties have been taking place, but Borisov has stated that ‘to date, forming a government is not possible’. Until a new government is formed the current interim Prime Minister Dimitar Glavchev will represent his country in the European Council. Another national election later this year is seen as likely.

Changes in the balance between political party affiliations

The upcoming change in the Netherlands from Mark Rutte to Dick Schoof will add one additional independent or non-affiliated member and reduce by one the Renew/ALDE members in the European Council. As a result of these changes, the European Council will then include 11 members from the European People’s Party (EPP), four from Renew Europe/ALDE, four from the Party of European Socialists (S&D/PES), two from the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR), and six independent or non-affiliated members.

NB

Under the Romanian constitution, the country’s president should not be a member of any political party. However, Klaus Iohannis, previously a member of an EPP-affiliated party, still regularly attends EPP pre-European Council meetings.

As Fico’s Smer-SD party, and also Pellegrini’s Hlas, have been suspended from membership of the Party of European Socialists as well as the S&D group in the European Parliament, Slovakia will be considered for the time being as represented by a non-attached member of the European Council.

Read this ‘at a glance note’ on ‘Current membership of the European Council‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Ralf Drachenberg and Rebecca Torpey.

The European Council meeting on 27–28 June 2024 has a full agenda. As the current EU institutional cycle draws to a close, it marks a critical moment in launching the new cycle. EU leaders will discuss, and likely agree on, high-level appointments to EU institutions, including on the proposed candidate for European Commission President. They are also set to adopt the Strategic Agenda 2024-2029, outlining the EU’s political priorities for the coming five years. They will also discuss Ukraine, security and defence, Middle East, competitiveness, migration and Georgia.

General

The President of the European Parliament, Roberta Metsola will make the customary opening address. As leader of the country currently holding the six-month EU Council presidency, the Belgian Prime Minister, Alexander De Croo, is expected to provide an overview of the results of the Belgian Presidency. This could be the last European Council meeting for long-time Dutch Prime Minister, Mark Rutte, whose successor, Dick Schoof, is expected to be sworn in on 2 July 2024.

European Council meeting Next institutional cycle

Following initial discussions at their informal meeting of 17 June, EU leaders will seek to reach two crucial agreements at their meeting on 27–28 June 2024. The first on high-level appointments to EU institutions, and the second on the Strategic Agenda 2024-2029. These agreements will mark the start of the new EU institutional cycle.

High-level appointments

The aim is to find political agreement on the candidate for the next European Commission President, on the nominee for High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Commission Vice-President (HR/VP), with the agreement of the candidate for Commission President, and on the European Council President.

Most European Council decisions, including on its conclusions, are taken by consensus, as specified in its rules of procedure. However, this is not the case for decisions on high-level appointments. If a vote on the candidate for Commission President, for other posts, or on the whole package, is necessary, a ‘reinforced’ qualified majority’ would be required. According to Article 238(3)b TFEU, the candidate would need the support of at least 72 % of the Member States, representing 65 % of the EU population. A vote took place for previous European Council decisions on top jobs, such as the election of Jean‑Claude Juncker as Commission President and the re-election of Donald Tusk as European Council President, with some Heads of State or Government voting against the decision.

Since the informal dinner, European Council President Charles Michel has consulted Member States and met the leadership of the European Parliament, while the European political parties have also discussed the appointments within and between each other.

Based on the party political balance in the European Council and the European Parliament, it is expected that the high-level positions will be shared between the European People’s Party, the Party of European Socialists and the liberal family (Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE)/Renew Europe). While last-minute changes cannot be excluded, it is thought Ursula von der Leyen will be proposed for a second mandate as European Commission President; the former Portuguese prime minister, António Costa, will be elected as next European Council President and the current Prime Minister of Estonia, Kaja Kallas, nominated as HR/VP.

2024–2029 strategic agenda

EU leaders are also expected to adopt the Strategic Agenda 2024-2029, setting the political priorities for the EU’s next institutional cycle. The main priorities are likely to be: 1) ‘A free and democratic Europe’, 2) ‘A strong and secure Europe’, and 3) ‘A prosperous and competitive Europe’. A noteworthy development is the shift of the ‘free and democratic Europe’ priority, placed last in previous drafts, to the number-one priority.

The European Council is also expected to adopt conclusions on a roadmap for future work on internal EU reform.

Ukraine

The European Council is set to highlight its previous conclusions in support of Ukraine and Moldova. The main focus regarding Ukraine will be on ways to support its right to self-defence in Russia’s war, which has included attacks against civilian and energy infrastructure (with arms imported from Iran and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea). EU leaders may also: 1) discuss acting against those providing direct military support to Russia; 2) demand effective enforcement of sanctions and anti-circumvention measures; and 3) welcome the 14th package of sanctions. The 14th package includes a ban on the re-export of Russian liquefied natural gas. The package was reportedly delayed due to reservations from some Member States, such as Germany and Hungary, regarding different aspects of the package.

Moreover, the European Council is scheduled to welcome the agreement on utilising extraordinary revenues from frozen Russian assets to fund Ukraine’s self-defence and reconstruction. It is also set to welcome bilateral security agreements between Ukraine and a number of Member States (Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Latvia, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden) and with partners Canada, Iceland, Japan, Norway and the United Kingdom. In addition, EU leaders may welcome the Ukraine Plan (Ukraine’s comprehensive reform and investment strategy for the next four years) and discuss the outcome of the June Ukraine Recovery Conference in Berlin.

The meeting is expected to take stock of the military support provided by the Ukraine Assistance Fund and Member State initiatives to supply ammunition, missiles, fighter jets, air defence and training.

An important point for discussion concerns restrictions on Ukraine’s use of weapons delivered by EU countries to strike targets inside Russian territory. The Member States hold varying stances on the issue. According to the Latvian President, Edgars Rinkēvičs, this restriction should be removed in July at the NATO Summit in Washington. French President Emmanuel Macron stated that French weapons sent to Ukraine, including long-range missiles, could be used to target bases inside Russia. Conversely, Italian Foreign Minister Antonio Tajani said any weapons supplied by Italy should not be used on Russian territory. EU leaders are also set to discuss the outcome of the Ukraine Peace Summit in Switzerland in June, which resulted in a majority of the attending states signing a communiqué on a Peace Framework. Reportedly, a second summit, hosted by Saudi Arabia, may take place.

With a busy agenda, EU leaders may not have time to hold a full discussion on the European path for Ukraine and Moldova. However, important developments have taken place since EU leaders’ last discussion. In June, the Commission announced that Ukraine and Moldova had met the criteria required to begin accession negotiations. On 14 June, EU ambassadors agreed in principle to the negotiating frameworks for accession negotiations with Ukraine and Moldova. On 25 June, the Belgian Presidency called the first Intergovernmental Conferences with Ukraine and Moldova.

Security and defence

EU security and defence is a recurring agenda point since February 2022. At this meeting, EU leaders are expected to focus more specifically on ways to fund the EU defence industry. Put forward in March 2024, the European Defence Industry Programme is intended to support the EU defence industry, by providing €1.5 billion over three years. It is likely that EU leaders will reiterate their demand for work on the proposal to continue. In March, EU leaders requested that the Council and Commission present a report examining all options for mobilising funds for the EU defence industry; this report is due to be presented at this European Council meeting. Ahead of the March European Council meeting, 14 Member States had written to the European Investment Bank (EIB) calling for a policy change on defence investment. The 21–22 March 2024 European Council conclusions invited the EIB to adapt its lending policy to the defence industry. It can be expected that EU leaders may reiterate their demands for the EIB to improve defence industry access to finance.

Middle East

EU leaders have clearly signalled their support for a lasting peace based on a two-state solution in the Middle East, and are likely to restate this. This is also the first formal European Council meeting since US mediators tabled the three-phase peace proposal. Some aspects of the plan reflect previous European Council conclusions, such as the calls for: 1) ceasefire; 2) release of hostages; 3) provision of humanitarian aid for Gaza; and 4) reconstruction of Gaza. EU leaders are likely to reiterate these demands.

Since the Hamas attack on 7 October 2023, EU leaders have been consistently keen to prevent further escalation in the region. Nevertheless, strikes between Hezbollah and Israel across the Israel-Lebanon border are ongoing. On 18 June, in response to threats against Haifa, the Israeli Foreign Minister warned that the state of Israel was very close to a decision on a war with Hezbollah: ‘In an all-out war, Hezbollah will be destroyed and Lebanon will be severely hit’. On 19 June, the leader of Hezbollah issued a warning to Cyprus, stating that if Cypriot airfields and bases were used by Israel to target Lebanon, this would be considered an act of war and be treated as such. The Cypriot President responded by stating that Cyprus is not involved in the conflict. The Commission’s spokesperson said that ‘any threat against one of our Member States is a threat against the European Union’. As the situation remains tense, EU leaders will again warn against the ignition of a broader regional conflict.

Competitiveness

This part of the meeting is expected mainly to follow up on the April meeting, which discussed a new European competitiveness deal. Discussion may centre on deepening the capital markets union and mobilising private funding to support EU priority investments, with EU leaders likely to review progress since April and to announce ‘additional steps’.

Former European Central Bank president Mario Draghi is currently preparing a report on EU competitiveness. Despite expectation that the final text would be presented at this meeting, this has not been confirmed, and publication in July seems to be more likely. Draghi outlined some of his ideas in speeches in Belgium on 16 April and Spain on 14 June, calling for an industrial strategy for Europe and for ‘radical change’ more generally. At the April European Council meeting, at which former Italian prime minister Enrico Letta’s report on the future of the single market was presented, EU leaders said they ‘look forward to the presentation of the upcoming report on Europe’s competitiveness’.

Due to the new economic governance framework, 2024 is a transitional year in EU fiscal policy coordination. The European Semester spring package was published on 19 June. The European Council usually discusses the country-specific recommendations in June, to allow the conclusion of the European Semester. However, this year it is likely the topic will be postponed to a later meeting. According to Hungary’s newly published EU Council Presidency programme, an informal European Council meeting will take place on 8 November in Budapest, focused on competitiveness, which the Hungarian Presidency expects to result in a ‘Budapest Declaration’.

Other items Migration

While no detailed discussion is anticipated, the European Council could adopt conclusions outlining the state of play on migration. EU leaders might take note of the Council’s negotiating mandate for a regulation strengthening Europol’s role in supporting Member States in their fight against migrant smuggling and trafficking in human beings. Agreeing on joint conclusions on migration is no small achievement, as in the recent past, EU leaders have failed several times to agree conclusions or statements on the issue. An individual leader might express their dissatisfaction with other European Council decisions, notably the high-level appointments, by blocking migration-specific conclusions.

Georgia

In response to the adoption of the law on transparency of foreign influence in the Georgian Parliament, EU leaders are set to discuss the situation in Georgia. The law is a step backwards on Georgia’s European path, according to Charles Michel and the Foreign Affairs Council. Large-scale protests against the law have recently taken place in the country.

Leaders are expected to invite the Commission and the High Representative to prepare a communication aimed at developing an EU strategic approach for the Black Sea. The EU’s current approach to the Black Sea is based on the Black Sea Synergy initiative, launched in 2007. The United States developed its own Black Sea security strategy in late 2023.

Read this briefing on ‘Outlook for the European Council meeting on 27‑28 June 2024‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Marin Mileusnic.

The European Union’s research and innovation (R&I) policy has become central in the attempt to safeguard the EU’s technological sovereignty, ensure prosperity, and advance social, economic and environmental sustainability. Various challenges persist nevertheless, from ageing populations and health hazards to (economic) security and the climate crisis. In addition, underinvestment in R&I is a shared concern across Member States, although to varying degrees.

To reach the EU’s spending target for R&I of 3 % of the EU’s annual gross domestic product, the Next Generation EU (NGEU) recovery instrument and its main spending tool, the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF), could play a vital role in providing additional funding to Member States. To emerge stronger from the COVID-19 crisis and benefit from these resources (channelled partly into R&I ecosystems), countries have drawn up individual national recovery and resilience plans (NRRPs). As a funding condition, Member States needed to address at least a significant subset of the European Semester’s country-specific recommendations and foster the green and digital transitions, by achieving the milestones and targets linked to the measures agreed in their NRRPs. The RRF is financing over €47 billion worth of R&I measures in the NRRPs, but the focus on R&I investment differs across the plans.

In this briefing, six case studies (either investment or reform measures) in R&I from individual recovery plans have been analysed. These measures range from investing in sustainable agriculture (Portugal), to reforming and integrating research, development and innovation organisations in the European Research Area (Romania). Each of the assessed case studies has been linked to one of the six R&I policy guidelines developed by the European Commission.

The briefing also touches on other financing opportunities for R&I under the traditional multiannual financial framework. Experts point out that NGEU might contribute to closing the innovation and underinvestment gap between Member States and the EU’s 3 % target. The European Parliament supports an ambitious EU-wide R&I policy, and continues to ensure transparency and democratic scrutiny in the implementation of the NGEU recovery instrument.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Research and innovation in the national recovery and resilience plans‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Anja Radjenovic.

According to United Nations Children’s Fund (Unicef) estimates, the number of migrant children increased from 24 million in the 1990–2000 period to 36 million in 2020. In 2022 alone, some 35 200 children arrived in southern European countries. Of them, some 23 500 (67 %) were unaccompanied or had been separated from family members during the journey. A child may be unaccompanied or get separated for various reasons, including persecution of the child or parents; international conflict and civil war; human trafficking and smuggling, including sale by parents; accidental separation from parents during the journey; and a search for better economic opportunities.

There is a comprehensive international legal framework on children’s rights and their protection in place, yet irregular migrant children, especially those unaccompanied or separated from their parents during their journey, face numerous obstacles and challenges during and after migration. These include a heightened risk of sexual exploitation and abuse, military recruitment, child labour (including for foster families) or detention. In many countries, children are routinely denied entry or detained by border or immigration officials. In other cases, they are admitted but denied access to asylum procedures, or their asylum claims are not handled in an age- or gender-sensitive manner.

The vulnerable situation of unaccompanied and separated children worldwide, and the threats they face, need to be addressed, particularly in view of the constant rise in their numbers. Applying the ‘best interests of the child’ principle, EU asylum law offers special protection to such children, and the EU has adopted numerous instruments and identified key actions for the protection of all children in migration, including those who are unaccompanied or who have been separated from their parents.

This is an update of a 2021 briefing.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Vulnerability of unaccompanied and separated
child migrants‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Age structure of of migrants across the world (in millions) Child migrants and young migrants as a share of the migrant population in host regions in 2020 Asylum applicants considered to be unaccompanied children (EU-27 countries)

Written by Rafał Mańko.

The roles of the EU institutions in negotiating and concluding international agreements, and the procedural steps, are set out in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. The European Parliament’s role corresponds to its law-making competences under the Treaties. If an international agreement falls exclusively within common and foreign security policy (CFSP), Parliament has no active role, but must still be informed at all stages by the Council, the European Commission or the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. If an international agreement does not fall exclusively within the CFSP, Parliament’s specific powers depend on whether the agreement’s substantive legal basis corresponds to an area of competence covered by the ordinary legislative procedure or special legislative procedure (SLP) with consent; if so, Parliament has the power to give or refuse consent to the conclusion of the agreement. If the agreement falls within the scope of an SLP where Parliament does not need to give consent, its role is limited to giving an opinion. Parliament is also entitled to call on the Court of Justice to verify ex ante whether an envisaged agreement is compatible with the EU Treaties.

The 2010 framework agreement on relations between the European Parliament and the European Commission was a key step in developing Parliament’s role in the negotiation and conclusion of international agreements. The agreement provides for Parliament to be informed from an early stage of negotiations on an international agreement, and for Members of Parliament to participate as observers in negotiations. The Commission undertook to keep Parliament informed on the entire negotiation process, with particular emphasis on agreements that fall within Parliament’s power of consent. Parliament’s Rules of Procedure lay down detailed procedural arrangements for the exercise of Parliament’s competences in concluding international agreements, in particular for verification of the legal basis of an envisaged agreement that impacts Parliament’s powers.

Read the complete briefing on ‘The European Parliament’s role in concluding international agreements‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Nera Kuljanic.

Exposure to ‘forever chemicals’, air pollution, stress and many other factors depends on where a person lives and their lifestyle choices. These exposures combine over the course of a lifetime, affecting human biology and health. The ‘exposome’ concept offers a framework for understanding and analysing this complex reality, and ultimately for informing the shaping of evidence-based policy on chemicals, food and the workplace, as well as on pollution, public health and the environment more generally.

Many chronic diseases result from the complex interplay between a person’s genetic predisposition for developing a disease and ‘outside’ factors linked to lifestyle and/or the environment. The totality of environmental exposures that a person experiences over their lifetime, the interaction between those exposures, and the way these relate to health can be referred to as the ‘exposome‘. Chemicals – whether naturally occurring or anthropogenic – are an obvious example of problematic exposure, from sources such as polluted air or water, diet, lifestyle and the workplace.

However, the exposome is more than that. It comprises numerous very diverse factors that can be categorised into three interlinked clusters. ‘Internal’ factors include, for example, metabolic processes, inflammation, endogenous hormones, oxidative stress and gut microflora. ‘Specific external exposures’ include infectious agents, chemicals and other environmental contaminants, diet and lifestyle factors. A ‘general external category’ includes socioeconomic and psychological influences.

Exposome science is about understanding the effects of the complex interactions between environmental exposures and genetics on a person from conception to death, and how those exposures affect that person’s biology and health. It is closely related to exposure science, which studies ‘the contact between stressors and receptors, and the associated sources, pathways and processes potentially leading to impacts on human health and the natural and built environment’. Exposome-based thinking, supported by innovative data collection and analysis, biomonitoring tools, high-throughput ‘omics‘ technologies and enhanced computational and analytical capacities, allows for more comprehensive and faster data collection and analysis of exposures and their associated biological responses. This improves understanding of diseases’ cause, development, prevention and treatment. The huge potential that artificial intelligence and advanced analytics offer when it comes to untangling the vast amount of exposome-related data has given rise to the term ‘exposome intelligence‘.

Potential impacts and developments

Understanding the exposome is important for advancing scientific research to address the challenges posed by environmental and other exposures on human health. It can provide a valuable framework for informing risk assessment and regulation, and for developing effective intervention strategies to promote health, ensuring they are based on comprehensive data on exposure and health outcomes.

Exposome research can help identify risk factors – including previously unknown factors – that contribute to the development of certain diseases, such as cancers, neurological disorders, respiratory disorders, cardiovascular diseases and obesity. These factors also offer new lenses through which to study sensitive population groups or critical life periods such as childhood. Research can explore the link between the exposome, epigenetic changes (i.e. reversible changes in gene expression that do not involve modifying the DNA sequence) and individuals’ biological adaptive capacity. Exposome research can detect soft outcomes such as environmental exposures resulting in detectable molecular changes in a body that could be linked to a disease onset later in life. It can also lead to an understanding of time sequence in a disease onset, or of complex, multiple or simultaneous exposures. This knowledge can lead to better disease prevention, and to strategies – both targeted ones and strategies aimed at the general population – to reduce harmful exposures and promote healthier living and working conditions. It can provide evidence for the regulation of environmental pollutants and toxins, influencing policies relating to air and water quality, chemicals, pollution, the safety of products such as toys, and occupational health and safety.

There are also considerable limitations and challenges.The human exposome is incredibly complex, which makes it challenging to quantify and analyse all exposures comprehensively, despite advanced technological capabilities. Problems relate to data quality, consistency and the lack of established standards for exposome research. This includes the identification and interpretation of the most relevant biomarkers for specific health outcomes, which can lead to varying approaches and hinder comparability between studies. The exposome approach may also struggle to account for variability between individuals and its impact on health outcomes: unique individual patterns of environmental exposures (including historical ones) based on factors such as occupation, lifestyle and geography can make it difficult to isolate the direct effects of individual exposures. Furthermore, the collection and use of extensive personal environmental and health data raise ethical and privacy concerns.

Conducting exposome research requires significant resources, including funding, expertise and infrastructure for data collection, analysis and interpretation. Translating research findings into actionable interventions and strategies is not straightforward, given the complexity of exposures and their interactions. Addressing these challenges will be crucial to further advancing exposome research and realising its potential to inform public policies and personalised healthcare interventions.

Anticipatory policymaking

In both public policy and research, the interactions between the environment and health are increasingly recognised as a critical area of focus. On a global level, seeking to protect health, address challenges such as the emergence of infectious diseases, antimicrobial resistance and food safety, and promote the health and integrity of ecosystems, the One Health initiative acknowledges that the health of humans, animals, plants and the wider environment are intertwined. The EU has developed a comprehensive framework of thematic programmes, strategic objectives and regulatory actions relating to the environment and health, such as those for chemicals (including endocrine disruptors), pollution (including microplastics) and health and safety at work. However, the legislation is often focused on individual factors of concern.

For exposome science to deliver on its ambitious potential to inform evidence-based policies, a dedicated scientific capacity is needed to advance the research and produce conclusive evidence. This means creating educational opportunities such as degree programmes, earmarking funding for exposome research and setting up calls for research projects. Examples include the EU-funded Human Exposome Network (EHEN), the world’s largest network of projects studying the impact of environmental exposure on human health, and the International Human Exposome Network (IHEN), which aims to put in place longer-term, multi-sectoral collaboration to improve global research and cooperation on the exposome.

The development of standards for producing strong evidence is crucial. This relates to methods, techniques and practices for data collection, analysis and reporting. The research results need to be translated to policy by, for example, linking them to existing institutional structures and encouraging interdisciplinarity in policy development. Ultimately, exposome-informed policies could include new ‘protective’ legislation to prevent harm to the environment, human health and safety, to update standards or to change monitoring practices.

Read this ‘at a glance note’ on ‘What if focusing on the system, not just the symptoms, were key to health?‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

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Written by Ralf Drachenberg.

On 17 June, the European Council members met for an informal dinner to discuss the results of the 2024 European Parliament elections and possible candidates for the leadership positions in the coming EU institutional cycle. The Heads of State or Government did not come to any decision on the appointments, and indeed they were not due to take any formal decision at this stage in the procedure. High-level discussions will now take place between the European Council and the European Parliament, as well as between the political families. The EU leaders are expected to agree on the package of high-level EU posts, and on the political priorities for the next 5 years, at the formal European Council meeting on 27‑28 June 2024.

Start of the meeting

As usual at the start of the meeting, the President of the European Parliament, Roberta Metsola, addressed the members of the European Council. While emphasising that the 2024 European elections had seen the ‘highest voter turnout in over 30 years’, she stressed that the main takeaway from the elections was that ‘the constructive pro-European centre holds’. This view was supported by German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, ahead of the meeting, who underlined that the elections had brought a stable majority of the political forces that had traditionally worked closely together in the European Parliament (the European People’s Party – EPP, the Socialists and Democrats – S&D, and the Liberal family – Renew Europe). Moreover, Metsola informed the EU leaders that the majority of political groups in Parliament supported the ‘lead candidate’ process and, in view of the results of the elections, agreed that the EPP was once again the largest political group in the European Parliament. Metsola’s address was followed by a statement by Ursula von der Leyen, the current European Commission President and EPP lead candidate for the post in the coming term. She presented her views on the future of the European Union.

As flagged up in the EPRS outlook, the purpose of this meeting was not to take a decision. This point was also stressed by some Heads of State or Government before the meeting, notably the Irish Taoiseach, Simon Harris, and reiterated by the European Council President, Charles Michel, after the meeting. The objective was to reflect on the election results and begin discussions on possible candidates for the EU top jobs ahead of the formal European Council meeting on 27-28 June.

Senior EU institutional posts to be filled

In 2024, the appointments to be made include three high-level EU positions: the presidents of the European Commission and of the European Council, and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Commission Vice-President (HR/VP). Several EU leaders, notably Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte, stressed that the decisions on these positions would be taken as a ‘package’. Harris called for ‘a balanced package reflecting the results of the European elections, geography and size of Member States’.

Another high-level post – that of European Parliament President – must also be filled at the start of the new institutional cycle. The European Council has no legal involvement in this case, as underlined by Metsola. However, Parliament does not make this choice in a vacuum and has to consider the wider context, notably the election results and the other high-level appointments. On 17 June, Metsola put forward her own candidacy to continue in the post of European Parliament President.

Party political balance in the EU institutions when filling senior posts

The allocation of high-level EU positions has a strong political party dimension (see EPRS briefing on European political parties and the European Council). Michel confirmed this when stating that ‘the political parties are playing a role and that is natural in such a political moment’; he also indicated that the European political families had made proposals for the EU institutional leadership posts.

NB Figure 1 represents the party political balance on 18 June 2024. For Parliament, this is based on preliminary election results. The membership of the European Council changes on average every 2 months and could be different at the next meeting.

As Figure 1 shows, in June 2024 the party political balance, in both the European Council and the European Parliament, differs from the situation after the 2019 elections. While the share of EPP-affiliated members in the European Council increased from 29 to 41 per cent from 2019 to 2024, the Liberal members’ share shrank from 29 to 19 per cent. Similarly, Socialist family leaders now account for only 15 per cent of European Council members compared with 25 per cent in 2019. This shift is also seen in the European Parliament.

Next steps: The formal European Council meeting of 27-28 June

Charles Michel stressed that it was important to have a transparent decision-making process, with all EU leaders having the same level of information; for him, the dinner on 17 June served that purpose.

The President of the European Council will now continue his consultations, notably with the European Parliament – the two institutions being ‘jointly responsible for the smooth running of the process leading to the election of the President of the European Commission’ (Declaration 11 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union). In that context, Metsola pointed out that Michel had been invited to attend Parliament’s Conference of Presidents, to discuss with the political group leaders, on 20 June, and again on 26 June.

At the same time, the European political parties will continue their internal discussions and their talks with other political families. The ‘negotiators‘ for the political families, who met initially ahead of the informal dinner, are: Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk and Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis for the EPP, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz and Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez for the PES, and French President Emmanuel Macron and Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte for ALDE/Renew Europe. An important point in the discussions will be whether there is again an understanding that the person appointed European Council President should see their 2.5-year mandate automatically renewed for the second half of the institutional cycle or whether another person from a different political family could take over at that point.

As various Heads of State or Government, such as Macron and Finnish Prime Minister Petteri Orpo, have mentioned, the European Council is expected to reach a political agreement on the EU’s new leadership positions at its next formal meeting, on 27-28 June. Michel also noted that another important decision was to be taken at that meeting: the adoption of the new political priorities for the European Union, in the form of the Strategic Agenda 2024-2029. Both of these decisions will then shape the coming EU institutional cycle (see EPRS briefing, The European Council’s role at the start of the new EU institutional cycle). In that context, Michel expressed the view that it was the European Council’s collective responsibility to take a decision on both these matters by the end of June.

Read this ‘at a glance note’ on ‘Outcome of the informal dinner of EU leaders of 17 June 2024‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Anita Orav.

In December 2000, the United Nations General Assembly designated 20 June as World Refugee Day, to mark the 50th anniversary of the 1951 Geneva Convention on to the Status of Refugees. It is a day to honour the courage of people who have been forced to flee their homes to escape conflict or persecution.

A refugee is a person who, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution in their country of origin based on race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, receives international protection from another state on its territory.

A call for solidarity with refugees

According to United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR) estimates, 130.8 million people worldwide have been forcibly displaced or are stateless in 2024, with over 32 million of them refugees. With growing numbers of people being forced to flee their homes, the international day serves as a reminder that refugees need support more than ever. This year, World Refugee Day is focusing on solidarity with refugees and creating a world where refugees are welcome. There are many ways to express solidarity, starting with an open and empathetic approach towards refugees, making them feel welcome and included. It also involves seeking solutions to end the conflicts causing their plight, providing them with opportunities to integrate and thrive in host societies, even temporarily, and ensuring adequate support for host countries and regions in their reception and integration efforts.

Looking for protection in the European Union

Many displaced people around the world seek protection in the European Union (EU). After a peak in migrant arrivals in 2015 and 2016, followed by a decrease due to the pandemic, arrival numbers began rising again in 2021. In 2023, over a million first-time asylum seekers applied for international protection in the EU, up 20 % from 2022 and the highest number since the peak in the 2015 to 2016 period. Additionally, there are nearly 6 million Ukrainians in the EU receiving support under the Temporary Protection Directive.

In addition to asylum-seekers arriving at EU borders, the EU has set up a system for all EU countries to receive refugees directly from countries outside the EU – such as Türkiye, Lebanon and Jordan – that are currently hosting large numbers. This scheme is based largely on EU cooperation with the UNHCR, which helps resettle refugees directly from refugee camps. For the 2024-2025 period, 14 EU Member States have pledged more than 60 735 places for resettlement and humanitarian admission.

Solidarity and inclusion in the EU

The European Parliament has consistently called for solidarity with refugees. In its 2016 resolution on the situation in the Mediterranean and the need for a holistic EU approach to migration, Parliament emphasised that hosting Member States ‘must offer refugees support and opportunities to integrate and build a life in their new society’. It also noted that respect for the EU’s founding values, as well as respect for the fundamental rights of refugees, must be integral to the integration process.

While the responsibility for integration policies lies primarily with the Member States, the EU has established its guiding principles in the EU action plan on integration and inclusion (2021-2027) to support national, regional and local authorities and civil society. To help bring together innovation, good practice and analysis on migrant integration at both EU and country levels, the European Commission launched the European website on integration (EWSI). The site currently lists over 1 440 successful practices from across the EU Member States.

Read this ‘at a glance note’ on ‘World Refugee Day 2024‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Marketa Pape.

Algorithms and artificial intelligence (AI) are changing the way people live and work. Depending on how AI technologies are used and what purpose they serve, they can drive progress and benefit the whole of society, but they also raise ethical concerns and may cause harm. When introduced to the world of work, their transformative potential runs into complex national and EU rules. Existing labour laws, put in place before AI systems came on the scene, do not appear fit to provide meaningful guiderails.

As with any new technologies, tensions arise between two opposing regulatory approaches: strict regulation to safeguard society from potential hazards and minimum regulation to promote the technology’s deployment and innovation. For employers who invest in AI systems, the main motivation is better workplace organisation, increased productivity, and competitiveness. Workers, on the other hand, may fear losing their jobs, and also want to have a say in how AI and algorithms are to become part of their daily lives.

Focusing on workplace deployment of AI, this briefing looks at the state of play of algorithmic management in the workplace and some issues relating to the data that algorithms use and generate. It offers an overview of the current top-down EU legislative approach, of insights brought by the European Parliament, and of advances in collective bargaining, demonstrating the potential of a bottom-up approach to complement AI deployment.    

The briefing looks at the potential use of sleeping clauses in the existing EU legal framework and – taking note of the views of both employers and trade unions – highlights the many open questions that remain.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Addressing AI risks in the workplace: Workers and algorithms‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Lasse Boehm with David Kläffling.

The European Union’s (EU) climate policies, part of the European Green Deal put forward by the von der Leyen Commission, will have profound consequences for other policy areas. During the 2019-2024 legislative term of the European Parliament, the EU adopted an overarching objective to cut net greenhouse gas emissions by at least 55 % by 2030, and achieve climate neutrality by 2050. This entails changing the way energy is produced and consumed in the EU, with knock-on effects for individual citizens, households, and businesses.

This briefing explores and maps out some of the social consequences of the Green Deal, focusing in particular on the effect the green transition will have on labour markets. It also touches briefly on the housing and transport sectors. The briefing’s purpose is to offer an overview of the most important impacts in these areas, without pretending to be a full study. For reasons of brevity, it leaves out or touches only briefly on other important dimensions, such as education and gender.

While insufficient action in the face of climate change would lead to significant costs as well as severe consequences for human life and the natural environment, the design of climate policies poses distributional challenges for individuals, and at a systemic level for different regions and industrial sectors. While studies on the Green Deal’s labour market consequences are often limited to the aggregate level, this ‘macro’ perspective can hide significant regional and sectoral diversity.

Existing EU funds and instruments have been designed to buffer against negative social consequences, particularly by providing upskilling opportunities, but their scope and size is limited. As the EU has only relatively limited competences in the area of social policy, significant policy action at national and regional level is unavoidable. The convergence and coordination of policy and funding instruments is crucial. Success or failure of regional, national, and European responses will be determined by the ability of policymakers to set up an integrated policy framework comprising social, labour market and industrial policy elements.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Social and labour market impactof the green transition‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Ralf Drachenberg.

The European Union’s institutional cycle begins anew every five years with the elections to the European Parliament. This is a crucial moment, as it updates both the hardware (the institutional leadership) and the software (the political priorities) of the EU. The European Council, composed of the Heads of State or Government of the EU Member States, plays a significant role in both processes. Not only is it directly or indirectly involved in the choice of who fills most of the top EU positions, it also establishes the EU’s long-term political priorities through setting its Strategic Agenda.

This briefing outlines the EU’s institutional cycle and highlights the European Council’s role in this cycle in institutional terms. It also describes the processes involved in the allocation of EU top institutional jobs and the adoption of the EU’s long-term priorities.

Read the complete briefing on ‘The European Council’s role at the start of the new EU institutional cycle‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

EU institutional cycle

Written by Anja Radjenovic.

Secondary movements occur when refugees or asylum-seekers move from the country in which they first arrived, to seek protection or for permanent resettlement elsewhere. While most asylum-seekers seek protection in countries close to their countries of origin, some are compelled or choose to move onwards (often in an irregular manner) from or through countries in which they have already, or could have sought, international protection, to other countries, where they may request such protection. Many different factors may influence these movements and the decision to settle in a particular country.

While asylum-seekers in the EU may have very legitimate reasons for seeking asylum in a Member State other that responsible for examining their asylum application, secondary movements are seen as a challenge for migration management in the EU. Although no genuine data are available that would provide reliable information about the scale of the phenomenon at the level of EU countries, some of the existing databases can give an indication of the travel routes relating to asylum-seekers’ secondary movements.

The aim of the common European asylum system’s current instruments has been to limit secondary movements of applicants for international protection between EU Member States. However, the increased inflow of asylum-seekers to Europe in the past decade has shown that the system has been unable to discourage secondary movements. For this purpose, among others, in 2016 and 2020 the European Commission proposed a comprehensive reform in order to harmonise asylum rules and introduce a range of new measures on asylum policy that would address such movements.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Secondary movements of asylum-seekers in the
EU asylum system‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Eurodac hits Member States (MS) with the highest share of foreign hits for each type of query

As a taxpayer, you want your money to be well spent. The European Union’s spending is based on a seven-year plan, the multiannual financial framework (MFF), and reflects the political priorities set by European leaders. The current long-term budget was agreed at the end of 2020, when the EU was addressing the dire economic and social consequences of the pandemic. With the Member States’ economies in bad shape, EU budgetary policy focused on means for recovery, in particular through the establishment of the temporary instrument Next Generation EU (NGEU). The 2021-2027 MFF and NGEU together form the largest budget ever financed in the EU.

With its power to decide on the EU budget, the European Parliament has always defended effective financing of the EU’s commitments and priorities and of EU citizens’ interests. Parliament secured budgetary reinforcements totalling €15 billion for 10 of the EU’s flagship programmes, including research, health, Erasmus+ and border protection. Parliament also enhanced the budget’s flexibility with €1 billion to cope with urgent needs, and established respect for the rule of law as a necessary condition for receiving EU financing.

As co-legislator, Parliament helped frame a legally binding plan to reform the EU’s financing system. This reform was one of the conditions set by Parliament for giving its consent to the 2021‑2027 MFF. Parliament successfully insisted on setting out a roadmap for the introduction of new own resources to finance additional expenditure for NGEU.

In December 2022, Parliament and the Council adopted the EU Conditionality Regulation, which allows the EU to take measures if breaches of the rule of law principle affect or risk affecting the EU’s financial interests. The effects of the strengthened rule of law mechanism are beginning to show. Both Member States and candidate countries have made significant improvements according to the most recent ‘Rule of Law Index‘.

From the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Parliament has insisted on credible, predictable and adequate EU funding for Ukraine in line with the country’s needs. In February 2024, an agreement on the first ever revision of the EU’s long-term budget was reachedafter Parliament’s repeated demands. The revision secured crucial financial resources for Ukraine, with €17 billion from the EU budget and €33 billion in loans, and further enhanced funding of €4 billion for migration-related challenges and to allow for some budget flexibility.

This scrutiny activity shows how Parliament used its law-making powers as well as its influence over the budget to protect EU citizens’ interests in the long-term EU budget. Parliament’s powers fall broadly into six, often overlapping, domains: law-making, the budget, scrutiny of the executive, external relations, and, to a lesser extent, constitutional affairs and agenda-setting. This graphic shows more examples of areas where Parliament used one or more of its different powers to influence legislation:

Mapping the European Parliament’s powers in different areas

For a fuller picture of the European Parliament’s activity over the past five years, take a look at our publication Examples of Parliament’s impact: 2019 to 2024: Illustrating the powers of the European Parliament, from which this case is drawn.

Written by Philippe Perchoc (updated on 05.07.2022).

Simone Veil, the first President of the directly elected European Parliament in 1979, and the first woman to hold the office, died on 30 June 2017, at the age of 89. A prominent French public figure beyond her years in office, she leaves an important and enduring legacy.

First President of the directly elected European Parliament © European Communities – EP, 17 July 1979

On 17 July 1979, Simone Veil was elected President of the European Parliament by her peers. She became the first female President of the Parliament, which had for the first time been elected directly by the citizens. In her first speech as President, she declared: ‘Our Parliament must also be a motive force in European integration. This is particularly true at a time when, as I already have mentioned, Europe’s prime need is a further measure of solidarity. This new Parliament will make it possible for the views of all Community citizens to be voiced at European level, and will at the same time more effectively impress upon every sector of society the need for a solidarity transcending immediate concerns, however legitimate, which must never be allowed to mask the fundamental interests of the Community’.

Indeed, the 1979 election was a turning point in the history of the European Parliament, as the newly directly elected assembly started to discuss possible reform of the European institutions. Altiero Spinelli launched a productive dialogue with Veil, President of the Parliament, on these issues as early as 1981. After her presidency, Simone Veil remained an active MEP until 1993, and the Parliament later decided to give her name to the agora, located in front of the Spinelli building, at the heart of its Brussels campus, as a symbolic way to encourage the continuation of this dialogue.

Defender of women’s rights

In France, Simone Veil is also known as a defender of human rights, in her capacity of judge working in the field of penitentiary policies. Known for her courage, she was nominated minister of health by the then newly elected President, Valery Giscard d’Estaing, who tasked her with decriminalising abortion in France in 1975. After four years as a minister, she carried on her human rights work in the European Parliament until 1993. After a further brief period as a minister, she continued her respected legal career as a member of the French Constitutional Council from 1998 until 2007.

A tragic family history

During the Second World War, Simone Veil was arrested in the street in Nice, and in 1944 her family was deported to concentration camps because of their Jewish background. She was freed from Bobrek and returned to France in 1945, but neither her parents nor her brother returned. Throughout her life, Simone Veil battled to make sure the Holocaust is never forgotten. In 2018, she was buried in the Panthéon in Paris, where those whom the French state honours have been laid to rest ever since the French Revolution.

Read this At a glance on ‘Simone Veil, European political pioneer‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Years later, we are all still experiencing the consequences of the COVID‑19 pandemic, as EU countries recover from the severe economic downturn that followed the 2020 outbreak. The EU Recovery Instrument – Next Generation EU (NGEU) was specifically created to help Member States address these challenges. It has a strong focus on the twin green and digital transitions – key priorities backed by the European Parliament and a total budget for recovery initiatives of €806.9 billion, financed through EU borrowing on the markets, which has to be paid out by the end of 2026.

While the Council established the NGEU, Parliament co-legislated the rules for its implementation, adopting the regulation on the NGEU’s Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) in February 2021. The RRF distributes 90 % of the NGEU allocation to the Member States, financing reforms and investments specified in their national recovery and resilience plans (NRRPs). Parliament wanted to ensure the RRF is managed transparently, that it stimulates progress in the green, digital and energy sectors, supports children, young people and women, and that respect for the rule of law is among the key prerequisites for receiving funding.

The European Commission has to update Parliament on RRF implementation progress, and present annual, mid-term and ex-post reports. To ensure it receives timely and detailed information, and to enable an exchange of views with other institutions, Parliament insisted on a bi-monthly meeting between Members of its Committees on Economic and Monetary Affairs and on Budgets and the European Commission representatives in charge. In addition, Parliament set up a special standing working group for RRF scrutiny, to discuss the quality of NRRP measures and progress on their implementation.

Parliament has also adopted a number of resolutions on these topics. Members have called, for example, for a thorough assessment of the plans and payment requests, stressed the importance of sound execution of the RRF objectives, and demanded that respect for the rule of law be a pre-condition for disbursements.

Since 2022, Members have looked very closely at RRF expenditure through the annual budgetary discharge procedure. RRF-related issues are prominent in the work of Parliament’s Committee on Budgetary Control (CONT), and were included in a dedicated chapter of the decision granting budget discharge to the European Commission. This procedure applies only to RRF grants, however; the loans are beyond Parliament’s scrutiny. Implementation of the RRF entered a decisive stage in 2024, as the 2026 deadline for payment execution approaches. To closely monitor NGEU allocation Parliament, thus used both its powers over the budget and on oversight and scrutiny. Parliament’s powers fall broadly into six, often overlapping, domains: law-making, the budget, scrutiny of the executive, external relations, and, to a lesser extent, constitutional affairs and agenda-setting. This graphic shows more examples of areas where Parliament used one or more of its different powers to influence legislation:

Mapping the European Parliament’s powers in different areas

For a fuller picture of the European Parliament’s activity over the past five years, take a look at our publication Examples of Parliament’s impact: 2019 to 2024: Illustrating the powers of the European Parliament, from which this case is drawn.