European Parliamentary Research Service Blog

Written by Vasco Guedes Ferreira.

How can the EU develop an innovation ecosystem involving our seas, oceans, and inland waters? And what about the effects of climate-related dynamics, biodiversity, energy efficiency, food, renewable energy and industrial competitiveness on the water, marine and maritime sectors? These questions were posed and answered at a European Parliament Panel for the Future of Science and Technology (STOA) workshop organised on 17 April 2024.

Christian Ehler (EPP, Germany), the STOA Chair, was joined by STOA Member Pernille Weiss (EPP, Denmark) in welcoming the participants, and setting the stage for a comprehensive discussion on a future Knowledge and Innovation Community (KIC), proposed in the European Institute of Innovation & Technology (EIT) Strategic Innovation Agenda for 2021‑2027. According to Christian Ehler, the EIT is the right EU-level instrument to create an innovation and education ecosystem in the water, marine, and maritime sectors. Establishing a KIC (usually referred to as the ‘Water KIC’) would aim to strengthen innovation ecosystems and accelerate the uptake of new technologies. This pan-European, multi-disciplinary community would promote the global competitiveness of European fresh water, marine and maritime science and technology, bringing innovative projects to market that address urgent societal and sustainability challenges.

External experts Siri Granum Carson and Sveinung Sægrov from the Norwegian University of Science and Technology, and Richard Sempere from Aix-Marseille University presented the findings of an ongoing STOA study into the role of technology and innovation in the fields of water and oceans and on the usefulness and establishment of a ‘Water KIC’. They underscored the need for sustainable and coherent political initiatives at all levels to tackle the challenges in these sectors. The experts emphasised the importance of a more innovative public-private and cross-sector cooperation, with innovation, education and training playing a critical role in scarcity and safety, water efficiency, ocean conservation, water utility operations, monitoring and treatment, maritime sector data and analytics.

The workshop featured two panels with key stakeholders. The goal was to gather feedback on the preliminary study findings and collect additional insights for its finalisation.

The first panel focused on ‘Building innovation ecosystems’. The panellists included Manuel Irun Molina, EIT Liaison Officer, Luca Perego, Head of Unit ‘Innovation and EIT’ at the European Commission’s Directorate General for Education and Culture, and Richard Zaltzman, CEO of EIT Food. The panel discussion highlighted the importance of building robust innovation ecosystems to address the major economic, environmental, and societal challenges in the water, marine, and maritime sectors. Luca Perego presented the current state of play of the ongoing ex-ante analysis evaluating the relevance of the ‘Water KIC’. Manuel Irun Molina of EIT reinforced the support provided for the launch of new KICs, and the best practice and coordination initiatives between the different communities already established. Richard Zaltzman from EIT Food reinforced the idea of exploiting synergies between KICs, while underpinning the need to focus on specific key priority areas to ensure effective management of the day-to-day activities of KICs.

The second panel focused on ‘Attracting private investment for education and innovation’. The panellists included Durk Krol, Executive Director of Water Europe, Kestutis Sadauskas, European Commission Deputy Director-General for Maritime Affairs and Fisheries in charge of Mission Ocean, Margherita Cappelletto, Coordinator of the Sustainable Blue Economy Partnership, and Joaquim Poças Martins – entrepreneur and Professor of the University of Porto. The panel discussion emphasised the importance of attracting private investment to foster education and innovation in the water, marine, and maritime sectors. Durk Krol linked current EU industrial initiatives on chips and hydrogen with significant water needs, and consequently competing uses for water. Joaquim Poças Martins talked about two areas where a Water KIC could have considerable impact: water utilities and hydrogen production. Kestutis Sadauskas highlighted the current underfunding of the blue economy goals, and the importance of attracting private funding and the efforts and different instruments the European Commission is using to advance innovation in these sectors. He launched some ideas for consideration in the next political cycle – blue bonds, for example.

The workshop concluded with closing remarks from Pernille Weiss, reinforcing the case for strengthening the network of stakeholders active in these fields and ultimately contributing to the Commission’s ongoing work and the implementation of the EIT strategic agenda.

The workshop was a significant step towards understanding the potential strategic value of a ‘Water KIC’ and its role in addressing the major economic, environmental, and societal challenges in the water, marine, and maritime sectors. It underscored the importance of building robust innovation ecosystems and attracting private investment to foster education and innovation in these sectors, and will contribute to the finalisation of the ongoing STOA study.

Your opinion counts for us. To let us know what you think, get in touch via stoa@europarl.europa.eu.

Event recording:

https://multimedia.europarl.europa.eu/en/webstreaming/panel-for-future-of-science-and-technology_20240417-1400-SPECIAL-STOA

© European Union 2024 – Source : EP© European Union 2024 – Source : EP© European Union 2024 – Source : EP© European Union 2024 – Source : EP© European Union 2024 – Source : EP© European Union 2024 – Source : EP

Written by Giulio Sabbati.

Updated on 04.06.2024.

This briefing, published by the European Parliamentary Research Service, aims to provide a broad range of key facts and figures about the European Parliament. Its many graphics offer a picture of the Parliament’s Members and the institution’s structures and activity in the current parliamentary term (July 2019 to June 2024) and in previous five-year terms since direct elections were introduced in June 1979.

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Interactive infographic: European Parliament: Facts and figures

The seven political groups in the current Parliament, in order of size, are:

• Group of the European People’s Party (Christian Democrats) (EPP),
• Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D),
• Renew Europe Group,
• Group of the Greens/European Free Alliance (Greens/EFA),
• European Conservatives and Reformists Group (ECR),
• Identity and Democracy Group (ID),
• The Left Group in the European Parliament – GUE/NGL.
  In addition, some MEPs sit as non-attached Members (‘Non-inscrits’ – NI).

The briefing is updated regularly, but for an up-to-date picture of the facts and figures on Members of the European Parliament today, as well as in each term since 1979, see our interactive infographic:
https://facts-and-figures.europarl.europa.eu/

Versions

• European Parliament: Facts and Figures: April 2024
• European Parliament: Facts and Figures: May 2023
• European Parliament: Facts and Figures: March 2022
• European Parliament: Facts and Figures: October 2021
• European Parliament: Facts and Figures: October 2019
• European Parliament: Facts and Figures: April 2019 (available in ES, DE, EN, FR, IT, NL and PL)
• European Parliament: Facts and Figures: April 2018 (available in ES, DE, EN, FR, IT, NL and PL)
• European Parliament: Facts and Figures: March 2017 (available in ES, DE, EN, FR, IT, NL and PL)
• European Parliament: Facts and Figures: March 2016 (available in ES, DE, EN, FR, IT, NL and PL)
• European Parliament: Facts and Figures: April 2015 (available in ES, DE, EN, FR, IT and PL)
• European Parliament: Facts and Figures: November 2014

Download images from the Graphics Warehouse.

Size of political group Conference of Presidents The bureau President of the European Parliament Number of legislative and own-initiative reports Number of trilogues per year and per committee Co-decision procedure Ordinary legislative procedure / co-decision European Parliament legislative activity, 2004-2023 Inter-parliamentary delegations Share of committee chairs by political group (April 2024) Parliamentary committees Activity in European Parliament plenary sessions in the ninth term so far (July 2019 – December 2023) Electoral threshold Minimum age of candidates Voting methods for citizens resident abroad Voting system and number of MEPs National parties and political groups in the European Parliament Strengths of the political groups in each parliamentary term Women MEPs by Member State Women in the European Parliament and EU national parliaments Proportion of men and women in the European Parliament Age of MEPs Age of MEPs Age distribution of MEPs Size of political groups in the European Parliament by Member State (as of 1 April 2024) Proportion of Members in each political group

Written by Hendrik Mildebrath.

Traditionally, political parties and electoral administrations in the European Union have been slow to adopt campaign and election technologies. However, there is now a noticeable shift among European actors towards leveraging key technologies to enhance political communication and voting procedures. Authorities in Belgium, Bulgaria, Estonia, France and one district in Portugal have already used electronic voting methods. Additionally, political parties are widely adopting data-driven campaign technology throughout Europe, including in Germany, Spain, France, Italy, Hungary, Norway and the Netherlands. Experts anticipate that political parties will further harness artificial intelligence (AI) to enhance their communication strategies.

Outlining the risks and opportunities associated with these technologies, this briefing examines how the recently updated legal framework governs content management tools utilised by political parties for the creation and dissemination of content. More specifically, it shows that political parties, intermediary services and providers of content creation solutions are subject to a range of data processing restrictions, transparency obligations and risk management requirements under the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), the e-Privacy Directive (e-PD), and the Digital Services Act (DSA). These obligations will become more stringent once the Regulation on the Transparency and Targeting of Political Advertising (TTPA) and the Artificial Intelligence Act (AIA) become applicable after the 2024 European Parliament elections.

Read the complete briefing on ‘The arrival of e-voting and campaign technologies in Europe: Promise, perils and preparedness‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Velina Lilyanova.

To protect the EU’s financial interests and detect fraud, corruption and conflicts of interest, it is necessary to know who benefits from EU funds. However, publicly available data are currently fragmented and often incomplete, complicating the process of identifying the final beneficiaries of EU funding. The European Parliament and its Committee on Budgetary Control have consistently called for transparency in the allocation and use of EU funds. The ultimate goal is to enable the tracing of funds, and ensure targeted and effective EU spending. When it comes to the EU’s Next Generation EU recovery instrument and its main component, the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF), Parliament has maintained its focus on ensuring transparency.

The RRF is a temporary instrument designed to release substantial financial support to EU Member States within a limited time (December 2026 at the latest). It is performance-based: unlike other EU spending programmes, RRF payments to Member States are not linked to the eligibility of a beneficiary, project, and declared costs, but to the satisfactory achievement of predefined milestones and targets. Funds enter the national budget and are further distributed within the Member State. Because of these characteristics, as well as its size and the timing and purpose of the instrument’s creation (amid the COVID-19 pandemic), public interest in how RRF funds are spent is high. Parliament has thus sought to increase the transparency of RRF implementation by introducing the requirement for Member States to report regularly on the 100 largest final beneficiaries of RRF funds, and publish the data on dedicated national online portals. Information as to where and on what RRF funds are spent is meant to increase the transparency of how the EU helps address common challenges, and improve its credibility. This is especially important as alleged cases of fraud emerge in the media and are reported by the European Public Prosecutors Office.

Since 2023, data on the top 100 recipients has been accessible on the European Commission’s Recovery and Resilience Scoreboard. Member States are expected to continue updating the data twice a year. While all have complied, there is some concern that in practice the definition of ‘final recipient’ used in the RRF Regulation does not guarantee the desired level of transparency.

Read the complete briefing on ‘The 100 largest recipients of Recovery and Resilience Facility funds‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Tarja Laaninen.

As social media has become the main gateway to information for many young people, how will it influence the youth vote in the 2024 European elections? The turnout among young people in the 2019 European elections was relatively high, and many hope for a repeat performance in June this year. But ahead of the 2024 elections, the main European institutions have largely ‘excluded’ themselves from one of the most popular video-sharing platforms among young people – TikTok – over data security concerns. Social media in itself is a difficult phenomenon to study, as recommendation algorithms mean that everyone sees different content.

Social media as a new campaign front in elections

According to Eurostat, 84 % of young people in the EU used the internet to participate in social media networks during 2022. Social media platforms have thus become a significant channel for political campaigning. As an example, the spring 2023 parliamentary elections in Finland were dubbed the ‘first TikTok elections‘, with some of the young candidates gaining publicity – and a seat in the parliament – quite possibly thanks to their visibility in the social media used by teens and young adults. Back then, some 70 % of 18-21 year-olds said they had seen political advertising on TikTok. Social media platforms are also the dominant news sources for 16-24 year-olds. TikTok, as the 24/7 news channel for many young people, has surged in popularity in recent years in Europe, particularly against rivals such as X (formerly Twitter), Facebook, Instagram, YouTube and Snapchat. Fact-checking services have found that social media platforms’ recommendation systems have a ‘funnelling effect‘, promoting a narrow selection of videos and narrowing the range of views to which users are exposed. There are concerns, but not yet enough research, as to whether social media and its recommendation algorithms are pushing users into bubbles, echo chambers with like-minded users, or even to ‘rabbit holes’ towards increasingly extreme content.

Young people’s participation in European elections and their media habits

The European Youth Forum has been campaigning to lower the voting age to 16; this is a national competence, however, and is therefore for the Member States to decide. In the 2024 European elections, four Member States (Belgium, Germany, Malta and Austria) will allow their citizens to vote from the age of 16, and in Greece the voting age is 17.

After declining ever since the first European elections in 1979, electoral turnout in the 2019 elections rose by 8 percentage points compared with 2014, reaching 50.6 %. This increase was driven by a surge in youth participation. The results of a Eurobarometer survey on youth and democracy published on 13 May 2024 show that 64 % of young people (aged 15 to 30) plan to vote in the upcoming European elections. However, 19 % of young people say they are not interested in politics and 13 % say they are not interested in voting. Although voting was considered the most effective action for making their voices heard by decision-makers, ‘engaging in social media’ came in second place, selected by 32 % of the young respondents.

A 2023 European Parliament study highlights that ‘young people have never withdrawn from politics or become inactive, but engage in various forms’. Social media is the preferred channel for young people’s online political engagement, offering the possibility to mobilise a massive number of people, at an incredible speed, across borders. On social media, young people inform themselves about politics and current affairs that they consider relevant to them.

The Eurobarometer News & Media Survey 2023 showed that, while older respondents have a preference for using the website of the news source (of a newspaper etc.) to access news, younger respondents are more likely read articles or posts that appear in their online social networks, or content shared by friends on messaging apps. Compared with the previous survey conducted in 2022, the use of TikTok as an online social media platform had increased across all age groups.

Examples of EU policies affecting social media ahead of the elections

In its meeting of 15 May 2024, the European Commission discussed the danger of disinformation accelerating ahead of the June elections. ‘Disinformation is on the rise, cheaper to produce with artificial intelligence and more widely distributed through social media’, Commission Vice-President Věra Jourová warned. The Commission had identified narratives that are pushed to undermine trust in media and election processes, and warned about deepfake video or audio clips trying to discredit candidates shortly before the elections.

In February 2023, the Commission, the European Parliament and the Council banned their staff from using TikTok on their devices using work-related apps, owing to cyber security concerns. The Parliament also blocks the app on its internal Wi-Fi. However, during the winter and spring of 2024, ahead of the European elections, many of the candidates and the Parliament finally went back on the app, considering their presence on TikTok to be essential if they want to reach young voters.

The Commission has taken numerous actions regarding social platforms under the recent Digital Services Act – for example, requesting more information from X on its content moderation activities, in particular curtailing its team of content moderators and reducing linguistic coverage from eleven EU languages to seven. The Commission has also opened probes into Meta’s Facebook and Instagram, as well as TikTok. Although critical voices in the fact-checking community point out that these probes are too late to make a change ahead of the European elections, they will be useful for the future.

A strengthened Code of Practice on Disinformation, signed by 44 companies – including Google, Meta and TikTok – was set up in 2022. The signatories committed to taking action in several areas to combat disinformation, inter alia setting up a rapid response system to ensure swift cooperation during election periods. Originally among the signatories, X later withdrew from the code in May 2023.

A year ahead of the elections, the European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO) established a Task Force on the 2024 European Elections. The EDMO fact-checking network, covering all 27 EU Member States, has been publishing daily, weekly and monthly reports analysing disinformation narratives and trends linked to the European elections at national, regional and European level, as well as investigations to counter disinformation. Examples of disinformation circulating ahead of the elections include the EU ‘forcing people to eat insect food‘ against their will, and various themes linked to the Green Deal, such as the EU wanting to ban repairing cars older than 15 years. In Germany, false stories about how to use voting ballots have been circulating that would actually make the vote invalid.

On 21 May 2024, the Council approved conclusions on safeguarding elections from foreign interference, providing an overview of the various mechanisms that the EU has at its disposal. On 10 May, Eurostat also launched a temporary fact-checking service for the election period.

Possible future steps

According to the 2023 News & Media Eurobarometer, 79 % of young Europeans (aged between 15 and 24) follow influencers – content creators who post content on social media and video-sharing platforms – while only 14 % of those aged over 55 do so. In the meeting of Education, Youth, Culture and Sport Ministers on 14 May 2024, the Council adopted conclusions on the rise of influencers as part of the EU’s media ecosystem, noting that influencers are having an increasing impact on the online content and information that people consume on a daily basis in the EU. While this impact is often positive, it can potentially be harmful, both to individuals’ mental health and at a societal level in areas such as democracy. The Council conclusions stress that influencers need media literacy skills to understand the potential negative impact of sharing mis- and disinformation, online hate speech, cyberbullying and other illegal or harmful content.

Among the recommendations proposed by the EU Youth Conference – held in March 2024 in Ghent, Belgium, as part of the 10th cycle of the EU Youth Dialogue – is a proposal to implement critical thinking workshops in schools, enabling youngsters to gain long-term critical thinking and media literacy skills. The youth representatives also proposed that the EU should, in cooperation with the Member States, establish a campaign for young people on how to identify quality information and fight disinformation.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Youth, social media and the European elections‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

You probably use your phone or laptop every day, so you surely want to know your data is stored safely. In 2021, media organisations broke the story that several EU and non-EU governments had used Pegasus commercial spyware against journalists, politicians, diplomats, law enforcement officials, lawyers, business people and civil society actors. Pegasus is designed to breach mobile phones and extract vast amounts of data, including text messages, call interceptions, passwords, locations, microphone and camera recordings, and information from installed apps.

While other institutions shied away from action, the European Parliament responded immediately. It set up a Committee of Inquiry (the Committee of Inquiry to investigate the use of Pegasus and equivalent surveillance spyware – PEGA) to investigate the use of Pegasus and equivalent surveillance spyware. During its mandate, the committee interviewed over 215 interlocutors, commissioned studies, held hearings with experts and people who had been targeted, and organised fact-finding visits to Israel, Poland, Greece, Cyprus, Hungary and Spain. In March 2023, PEGA adopted a 145‑page report with the results of its investigation; Parliament adopted its final recommendation in June 2023.

Parliament found that both EU and non-EU countries had used Pegasus and similar spyware for political and even criminal purposes. Parliament was concerned that some Member States had spied on targets under the pretext of ‘national security’ to escape EU oversight. It concluded that Greek and, in particular, Polish and Hungarian legal frameworks and practices violated Union law and did not offer citizens sufficient protection. Parliament also made specific recommendations for Spain and Cyprus. Parliament envisaged stronger institutional and legal safeguards to ensure fundamental rights-compliant use of spyware, such as conditions for ordering, authorising, executing, and overseeing spyware operations. It also advocated a clear definition of ‘national security’. Parliament called on the European Commission to enforce existing laws more stringently and to follow up on possible abuses. It also tasked the Commission with drafting new laws, such as common EU standards for the use of spyware and a regulation on commercial spyware on the EU market.

Although the PEGA committee terminated on 9 June 2023, the chair and rapporteur announced that Parliament would continue working on the topic, for instance, within the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs.

Parliament used its powers of oversight and scrutiny to immediately take action to protect European citizens. Parliament’s powers fall broadly into six, often overlapping, domains: law-making, the budget, scrutiny of the executive, external relations, and, to a lesser extent, constitutional affairs and agenda-setting. This graphic shows more examples of areas where Parliament used one or more of its different powers to influence legislation:

Mapping the European Parliament’s powers in different areas

For a fuller picture of the European Parliament’s activity over the past five years, take a look at our publication Examples of Parliament’s impact: 2019 to 2024: Illustrating the powers of the European Parliament, from which this case is drawn.

We all benefit from a tax system that is fair and efficient, as it enables governments to provide important infrastructure and services. However, EU countries struggle with issues such as international corporate tax avoidance, with losses of around €35 to €70 billion annually in the EU and €60 billion in lost value added tax (VAT) revenue.

Taxation is very complex, in particular for companies operating across the EU. The difficulty of having to comply with all the different national tax rules creates barriers preventing businesses from enjoying the full benefits of the single market, to the detriment of economic growth, job creation and consumer choice.

EU countries have exclusive power to set and collect taxes. As such, the European Parliament can only produce non-binding opinions on tax-related matters. However, in June 2020, it decided to set up a Subcommittee on Tax Matters (FISC). This was the European Parliament’s first permanent committee on tax affairs, focusing on all tax-related matters, particularly the fight against tax fraud, tax evasion and tax avoidance, as well as tax transparency.

Four years later, the subcommittee has established itself as a key forum to discuss EU tax matters. Members have engaged extensively with tax experts from academia, non-governmental organisations and businesses and organised meetings with national parliaments to enhance cooperation. More specifically, the subcommittee held hearings on the status and efficacy of the tax reforms countries committed to as part of their post-pandemic recovery programmes to access the EU’s Next Generation EU recovery funds.

The FISC subcommittee has also engaged actively with countries outside the EU. It has used fact-finding missions, for instance to Singapore and the United States, to promote good tax governance standards, encouraging countries to join the global agreement on international corporate tax reform.

In addition, the FISC committee has adopted a series of recommendations to shape the EU’s tax agenda and maintain pressure on both the European Commission and the Council to enable a fairer and growth-friendly tax system. For example, FISC has called for measures to further harmonise electronic invoicing, to simplify the withholding tax framework and to counteract the misuse of shell companies. Several legislative initiatives in this area are now being debated by the Member States.

Parliament thus used its oversight and scrutiny powers to put pressure on both EU countries and the institutions to ensure their tax systems are fair and efficient. Parliament’s powers fall broadly into six, often overlapping, domains: law-making, the budget, scrutiny of the executive, external relations, and, to a lesser extent, constitutional affairs and agenda-setting. This graphic shows more examples of areas where Parliament used one or more of its different powers to influence legislation:

Mapping the European Parliament’s powers in different areas

For a fuller picture of the European Parliament’s activity over the past five years, take a look at our publication Examples of Parliament’s impact: 2019 to 2024: Illustrating the powers of the European Parliament, from which this case is drawn.

Our daily or weekly groceries have become more expensive recently. These price rises are happening – even though the European Union is one of the world’s most food-secure regions – because the pandemic and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine disrupted feed, fertiliser and energy imports, while extreme weather events have led to crop failures. As a result of this confluence of factors, food prices have skyrocketed, hitting lower-income households most harshly. To protect EU citizens, the European Parliament has consistently advocated measures to make the EU depend less on imports and become more resilient to climate change.

The EU’s most powerful tool to address these challenges and ensure our food security is the common agricultural policy (CAP), which has supported the EU’s primary food producers – farmers – for over 60 years. In 2017, EU agricultural policy was thoroughly reformed. The European Parliament played a central role in shaping the new CAP, which was adopted in 2021 and consists of three regulations: on national strategic plans, on financing, management and monitoring; and on the single common organisation of the markets.

Parliament worked to ensure the new CAP rules incentivise a farming system that is greener, fairer, more efficient and better at preventing and mitigating future threats to food security. During long and intense negotiations, Parliament pushed for greater social and environmental commitments tosupport farmers, preserve biodiversity and maintain healthy soils. As a result, the new CAP devotes 35 % of its €95.5 billion budget to fund rural development, and 25 % of direct payments to farmers will aim to encourage sustainable farming and better animal welfare practices.

Members also advocated strongly for small and family farms, ensuring that at least 10 % of the direct payments budget reinforces the support allocated to them. Moreover, thanks to the European Parliament, at least 3 % of the CAP budget must specifically benefit young farmers. Because fairness and efficiency are important to keep farms running, Members pushed for the introduction of social conditionality – making payments dependent on respect for labour standards – and tougher measures to combat fraud, entailing better monitoring of funds.

Parliament also insisted on the creation of an annual €450 million crisis reserve to shield farmers, stabilise markets and protect consumers from future shocks. This mechanism was used for the first time following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, helping to mitigate energy and agricultural supply disruption, and averting a wider food security crisis in the EU. This way, Parliament used its law-making powers to shield farmers and protect consumers from future crises. Parliament’s powers fall broadly into six, often overlapping, domains: law-making, the budget, scrutiny of the executive, external relations, and, to a lesser extent, constitutional affairs and agenda-setting. This graphic shows more examples of areas where Parliament used one or more of its different powers to influence legislation:

Mapping the European Parliament’s powers in different areas

For a fuller picture of the European Parliament’s activity over the past five years, take a look at our publication Examples of Parliament’s impact: 2019 to 2024: Illustrating the powers of the European Parliament, from which this case is drawn.

Written by Sebastian Clapp.

On 24 February 2022, Russia’s unjustified aggression against Ukraine signalled the return of high-intensity warfare to Europe. In response, and to ensure the EU’s long-term goal of achieving defence industrial readiness, the European Commission adopted the first-ever European defence industrial strategy (EDIS) on 5 March 2024.

As an immediate and central step to deliver the strategy, the Commission put forward a proposal for a European defence industry programme (EDIP) regulation, also on 5 March 2024. EDIP – with a proposed budget of €1.5 billion – seeks to achieve defence industrial readiness by bridging the gap between short-term emergency measures that have been implemented since 2023 and will end in 2025 and a more structural, long-term approach.

Complete version

• May 2024: European defence industry programme (EDIP) (1st edition)

Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on establishing the European Defence Industry Programme and a framework of measures to ensure the timely
availability and supply of defence products (‘EDIP’) Committee responsible:Pending final decision on the referralCOM(2024) 0150
5.3.2024Rapporteur:To be determined2024/0061(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:To be determinedOrdinary legislative
procedure (COD)
(Parliament and
Council on equal
footing – formerly
‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Draft report

Written by Piotr Bąkowski.

Cannabis is by far the most commonly used illicit drug in the European Union (EU), where its distribution, cultivation, possession and use (consumption) are largely banned. The prohibition of drug-related activities other than those performed for medical or scientific purposes is the defining feature of the international drug control system. Set up by the United Nations (UN), this system is composed of three complementary conventions, to which all EU Member States are party.

Countries around the world have made use of the flexibility of the UN system, forgoing criminal penalties in some cases (e.g. for possession of small amounts of drugs for personal use), or replacing them with administrative ones. The UN bodies monitoring compliance with the conventions seem to have come to accept these policy choices. However, they remain resistant to the still rare yet increasingly common practice of legalising the recreational use of cannabis, which may entail regulating drug distribution and sale in a manner akin to that for alcohol and tobacco.

In the EU, drug policy has remained primarily a Member State preserve. The EU has fostered Member State cooperation on law enforcement and health-related issues, while at the same time respecting their diverse philosophies on how to address recreational drug use. National approaches range from very restrictive policies that prioritise criminal law responses, to more liberal ones that focus primarily on reducing the health and social harms resulting from drug use. In 2021, Malta became the first Member State to legalise, within strict limits, recreational cannabis, and several others have since taken steps that could potentially lead to similar drug policy reforms.

This briefing updates an earlier one, entitled Recreational use of cannabis, published in 2023. The following EPRS policy analysts contributed to the country analyses: Antonio Albaladejo Roman (Spain), David De Groot (Germany), Micaela Del Monte (Luxembourg), Verena Kern (Austria), Silvia Kotanidis (Italy), Marie Lecerf (France), Gabija Leclerc (Lithuania), Katrien Luyten (Belgium), Ingeborg Odink (the Netherlands), Anita Orav (Estonia), Marketa Pape (Czechia), Martina Prpic (Croatia) and Rosamund Shreeves (Malta).

Read the complete briefing on ‘Recreational use of cannabis: Laws and policies in selected EU Member States’‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Vasco Guedes Ferreira.

High-assay low-enriched uranium (HALEU) stands out as a critical nuclear fuel supply for medical isotopes production in the EU, as well as for advanced nuclear reactor development. Against a backdrop of a challenging global geopolitical context and the EU’s commitment to energy security and climate ambitions, HALEU could potentially be a game-changer. With the EU designing a comprehensive strategy for the development and deployment of small modular reactors (SMRs), the role of HALEU as a nuclear fuel is attracting attention for its promise of cost-effectiveness and reliability. Concurrently, HALEU already has significance beyond electricity production, particularly in the production of medical supplies in the EU, and their export to global markets. As the EU navigates the complexities of nuclear energy policy, anchored within ongoing geopolitical dynamics and climate imperatives, a thorough examination of HALEU’s potential and challenges is paramount for informed decision-making.

A timely STOA workshop was held on 8 April 2024 to further the discussion on the EU’s strategic autonomy in nuclear fuel supplies, with a particular emphasis on HALEU use and availability. The event responded to a mounting interest in SMRs and their capacity to address the EU’s dual goals of energy security and climate resilience, all while examining the critical production of isotopes crucial for medical diagnostics and cancer treatment.

The event featured opening statements from a panel of distinguished experts in the field. Jon Carmack, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Fuel Cycle and Supply Chain at the Office of Nuclear Energy, US Department of Energy, shared insights into the work by the United States on promoting domestic production of HALEU and nuclear fuels in general via a recorded message. He highlighted the partnerships with the private sector within the US HALEU availability programme, which received US$700 million under the 2022 Inflation Reduction Act.

According to Stefano Ciccarello, the acting Director-General of the Euratom Supply Agency (ESA), the EU acquired around 300 kg of HALEU for non-power applications (i.e. medical isotopes production and research reactors) in 2022, half of which was supplied by Russia and the other half by the US. ESA expects that HALEU needs for non-power applications will be around 700‑1 000 kg/year in 2035. As ESA proposes that these needs are met through domestic production, it therefore launched the preparatory phase for a European production capability to secure a supply of HALEU to fuel European research reactors and the production of medical radioisotopes. Stefano Ciccarello also noted that, depending on the rate of SMR deployment, there is potential competition between the use of HALEU for health applications and energy production.

Ghislain Pascal, policy officer from the European Commission’s Directorate-General for Energy, introduced the recently launched European Industrial Alliance on SMRs, including its governance model. The Alliance hopes to provide a framework for coordinating activities, preparing analytical studies, sharing best practices, developing, and conducting joint actions aimed at fostering the deployment of SMRs in Europe.

Navid Samandari, Co-founder and Chief Executive Officer of Seaborg Technologies, highlighted the challenges of the deployment of advanced nuclear reactor technologies in Europe, particularly when compared to the situation in the US. He underscored the critical importance of having a diversified and secure supply chain of nuclear fuels, including HALEU fuel. However, he stated that this is not the case in the EU, prompting his company to pivot towards low enriched uranium (LEU) fuel. This shift inevitably led to increased costs and delays in bringing their advanced modular reactor design to market.

On the other hand, Hidde Baars, Government Affairs Director Netherlands & EU at Urenco, a leading European manufacturer of nuclear fuels, offered reassurance regarding HALEU supply. He affirmed that Urenco is committed to producing all types of fuels required, including HALEU, and ensuring their availability where needed. He stated that at the current level of HALEU demand in the EU, investment in production capacity is not necessary, while showing support for the role of the recently launched European Industrial Alliance on SMRs in bringing together European stakeholders and advancing decision making at the EU level.

A lively Q&A session was opened by former Member Paul Rübig, who mentioned the ongoing work of the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) on drafting a report on medical isotopes and asked about the quantities of HALEU available and mapping of stockpiles. STOA Panel member Jutta Paulus (Greens, Germany)  enquired about the costs and possible economies of scale of SMRs, recent failures of SMR deployment and potential proliferation risks.

Panellists addressed questions from the audience, underlining that EU HALEU production for medical isotopes is in a preparatory stage, but stressing that there are many uncertainties regarding the development of SMRs, in particular the hard-to-estimate future fuel needs. It was also clarified that SMRs can be of third or fourth generation, and that third-generation SMRs (the same generation of conventional nuclear power plants in operation that use LEU) are a mature technology and probably already cost-effective. On proliferation, the importance of the Euratom safeguards legal framework and EU nuclear inspectors was mentioned, as well as the need for international cooperation on the topic in the context of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

In closing the debate, STOA Panel member Pernille Weiss (EPP, Denmark) reiterated the importance of a continuous, comprehensive political discussion based on sound scientific evidence, especially in the context of the need to reduce dependence on Russian gas and fossil fuels in general.

This workshop served as a platform for a much-needed balanced discussion on nuclear energy in the EU, acknowledging both its potential benefits and drawbacks. It provided a comprehensive overview of the latest advances in reactors that use HALEU and contributed to the political discussion in the EU on how this particular fuel could potentially play a role in ensuring a more secure energy supply.

For more details, you can watch the event recording or read a comprehensive EPRS briefing entitled: Strategic autonomy and the future of nuclear energy in the EU: Use and availability of high-assay low-enriched uranium and its potential role in securing a clean, safe energy supply.

Your opinion matters to us. To let us know what you think, get in touch via stoa@europarl.europa.eu and follow us on X at @EP_ScienceTech.

© European Union 2024 – Source : EP© European Union 2024 – Source : EP© European Union 2024 – Source : EP© European Union 2024 – Source : EP© European Union 2024 – Source : EP© European Union 2024 – Source : EP

In this year of elections more than ever, everyone needs access to fair and unbiased reporting. You might have noticed worrying trends in the news about media politicisation and a lack of transparency around media ownership across the European Union. With threats, harassment, public shaming and even assassinations of journalists having a considerable chilling effect on the media landscape, Parliament has advocated better protection for press freedom and media pluralism in the EU and beyond. Its November 2020 resolution, for example, raised awareness of attempts by some EU governments to silence critical media and undermine media freedom and pluralism. So what has the Parliament done to protect our media environment?

The European Media Freedom Act (EMFA), the first ever EU-level regulation on media freedom, pluralism and protecting journalists, applies since April 2024. It ensures that the rules are the same for media online and offline, throughout the EU. It addresses the risk of ‘media capture’ through hidden funding, lack of transparency in the ownership of media outlets, the use of spyware, and provides guarantees against financial distress and market concentration. Parliament succeeded in removing a proposed reference to ‘protecting national security’ that might give state authorities a ‘blank cheque’ to spy on journalists. The act states that EU countries will have to respect media service providers’ editorial freedom. In line with Parliament’s request, all public authorities will have to publish annual accounts of their public advertising expenditure, including when advertising on online platforms. Parliament also ensured that very big online platforms, sometimes known as ‘gateways’, have to give a statement of reasons before they restrict content.

At the time of her murder in 2017, Maltese journalist Daphne Caruana Galizia was facing 43 different vexatious libel suits. To end this type of harassment of journalists – strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs) – the EU adopted its Anti-SLAPP Directive in April 2024. The law obliges EU countries to ensure courts can dismiss these kinds of cases as unfounded, and do so early, under a mechanism for early dismissal of abusive cases,to avoid lengthy and cumbersome civil procedures. To help EU countries organise measures to deal with criminal proceedings brought abusively against journalists and other activists, the European Commission has provided guidance in a non-binding recommendation.

This way, Parliament used both its law-making and agenda-setting powers to promote democratic participation, fight disinformation and support media freedom and pluralism. Parliament’s powers fall broadly into six, often overlapping, domains: law-making, the budget, scrutiny of the executive, external relations, and, to a lesser extent, constitutional affairs and agenda-setting. This graphic shows more examples of areas where Parliament used one or more of its different powers to influence legislation:

Mapping the European Parliament’s powers in different areas

For a fuller picture of the European Parliament’s activity over the past five years, take a look at our publication Examples of Parliament’s impact: 2019 to 2024: Illustrating the powers of the European Parliament, from which this case is drawn.

Written by Clément Evroux (1st edition).

According to the Flash Eurobarometer 528 survey, released in December 2023, 81 % of Europeans believe that foreign interference in our democratic systems is a serious problem that needs to be addressed. The current geopolitical tensions highlight the following dilemma: while international cooperation is required to tackle global challenges such as climate change, including the participation of third countries in the EU debate, such activities also carry the risk of foreign interference in EU policymaking, which can be defined as the harnessing of EU policy proceedings through coercive, covert or deceptive means.

On 12 December 2023, the Commission published the defence of democracy package, which includes a proposal for a directive establishing harmonised requirements on transparency of interest representation carried out on behalf of third countries, as well as two proposals for Council recommendations, one on inclusive and resilient electoral processes in the Union, and one on promoting the engagement of citizens and civil society organisations in public policymaking. The majority of Member States have already adopted legislative or non-legislative measures to regulate interest representation activities in general, with several of them having also established specific registers. This proposal is about ensuring the transparency of interest representation activities geared towards influencing policymaking in the EU as a whole, while also facilitating the exercise of such activities across the single market.

Complete version

• May 2024: ‘Making representation of third countries’ interests more transparent‘ (1st edition)

Proposal for a directive establishing harmonised requirements in the internal market on transparency of interest representation carried out on behalf of third countries and amending Directive (EU) 2019/1937Committee responsible:Internal Market and Consumer Protection
(IMCO)COM(2023) 637
12.12.2023Rapporteur:Pablo Arias Echeverría (EPP, Spain)2023/0463(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Sandro Gozi (Renew, France),
Alexandra Geese (Greens/EFA, Germany),
Virginie Joron (ID, France)Ordinary legislative
procedure (COD)
(Parliament and Council
on equal footing –
formerly ‘co-decision’)Next steps expected: Presentation of the Committee report

Citizens are protesting against a revision of certain provisions of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) adopted at the end of the 2019-2024 legislative term. Many people have written to the President of the European Parliament on this subject since April 2024. These citizens are concerned that the revision, voted on during the 24 April 2024 plenary session, would be detrimental to environmental protection. They also criticise the speed with which the reform is being adopted.

We replied to citizens who took the time to write to the President (in French). The main elements of our reply were:

English European Commission proposal

In response to farmers’ protests, the European Commission submitted a legislative proposal to simplify a number of environmental requirements with which farmers must comply in order to qualify for EU funding.

Among other things, the proposal abolishes the obligation for farmers to leave fallow at least 4 % of arable land. In return, farmers can receive financial support if they keep a proportion of their arable land fallow or introduce other measures (such as planting hedges or trees). In some EU countries, farmers would be given a choice between crop diversification and crop rotation, the latter being more restrictive. Finally, to avoid a disproportionate administrative burden, small farms of less than 10 hectares would be exempt from controls and penalties linked to environmental requirements.

More information on the Commission’s proposal is available in this press release.

Vote in the European Parliament

On 24 April 2024, following a request to hold a debate as an urgent procedure, Parliament adopted the Commission’s proposal with technical amendments proposed by the Council. The text was adopted with 425 votes in favour, 130 against and 33 abstentions. To see how each Member of the European Parliament voted, you can consult the voting results (point 30.24).

More information is available in this press release.

In accordance with Article 2 of Parliament’s Rules of Procedure, Members exercise their mandate freely and independently. The President of the European Parliament cannot influence their votes, and the President does not vote on texts adopted by Parliament.

French Proposition de la Commission européenne

En réponse aux protestations des agriculteurs, la Commission européenne a soumis une proposition législative visant à assouplir plusieurs exigences environnementales auxquelles les agriculteurs doivent se conformer pour pouvoir bénéficier des financements européens.

La proposition supprime entre autre l’obligation pour les agriculteurs de laisser au moins 4 % des terres arables en jachère. Au lieu de cela, les agriculteurs peuvent recevoir un soutien financier s’ils conservent une part de leurs terres arables en jachère ou s’ils introduisent d’autres mesures (telles que planter des haies ou des arbres). En outre, si leur pays offre cette possibilité, les agriculteurs pourraient choisir entre la diversification des cultures et la rotation des cultures, qui est plus contraignante. Enfin, pour éviter une charge administrative disproportionnée, les petites exploitations de moins de 10 hectares seront exemptées de contrôles et de sanctions liés aux exigences environnementales.

Plus d’informations sur la proposition de la Commission sont disponibles dans ce communiqué de presse.

Vote au Parlement européen

Le 24 avril 2024, à l’issue d’une procédure dite d’urgence, le Parlement a adopté la proposition de la Commission avec des modifications techniques proposées par le Conseil. Le texte a été adopté avec 425 votes en faveur, 130 contre et 33 abstentions. Pour voir comment chaque député a voté, vous pouvez consulter les résultats des votes (point 30.24).

Plus d’informations sont disponibles dans ce communiqué de presse.

Conformément à l’article 2 du règlement intérieur du Parlement, les députés européens exercent leur mandat de façon libre et indépendante. La Présidente du Parlement européen ne peut pas influencer le vote des députés européens, et elle ne vote pas sur les textes adoptés par le Parlement.

Background

Citizens often send messages to the President of the European Parliament expressing their views and/or requesting action. The Citizens’ Enquiries Unit (AskEP) within the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) replies to these messages, which may sometimes be identical as part of wider public campaigns.

Written by Kamil Baranik, Micaela Del Monte, Silvia Kotanidis and Hendrik Mildebrath.

This briefing discusses the issue of the ‘Europeanisation’ of the ballot papers in Member States ahead of the 2024 European Parliament elections. The European Parliament has made two recent attempts at electoral reform seeking to ‘Europeanise the European elections. The second of these – still to be agreed with the Council – seeks to align electoral rules across the EU Member States. With the 2024 European elections imminent, it is useful to take a closer look at the rules as they currently stand.

The focus of this briefing is the notion of the ‘Europeanisation’ of the electoral ballot in its narrowest sense, namely whether ballot papers used in each Member State for the European Parliament elections can include the logos and/or names of the European political parties to which the respective national political parties are affiliated.

This exploration of the issue of the visibility of European political parties on the ballot papers for European elections is broken down into three parts. The first is the rationale behind and progress in the ‘Europeanisation’ of the European electoral process, with a particular focus on reforms geared towards showing the affiliation of national parties to European political parties on the ballot paper. The EU institutions have taken several initiatives intended to inject mutual European features into the national political processes ahead of the elections to the European Parliament. The second is a discussion of the data on European features of national ballot papers for the 2014 and 2019 European Parliament elections. The third part analyses the current state of ballot papers in all Member States, i.e. those applicable to the 2024 European elections, examining the extent to which Member States allow or forbid the visibility of European political party logos and/or names on the ballot paper for the European elections. This last section includes a synopsis of the similarities and differences between Member States.

Read the complete briefing on ‘‘Europeanising’ the electoral ballot‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Marketa Pape and Balazs Szechy with Mislav Grbesa.

Europe is experiencing a significant demographic shift, which greatly influences daily life and requires comprehensive, integrated responses. As EU citizens enjoy longer, healthier lifespans, it is imperative for all Union policies to be proactive and facilitate the transition from an ageing society to one that embraces longevity.

The demography toolbox, devised by the European Commission, incorporates insights from across the EU and presents a holistic strategy to address demographic transformation through four key areas: supporting parents, empowering younger generations, enhancing the well-being of older generations, and managing migration effectively. The toolbox acknowledges the importance of considering the geographical aspects of demographic trends, particularly in areas facing population decline and notable emigration of young workers.

This briefing delves into the initiatives implemented following the release of two pivotal Commission communications: the green paper on ageing and the long-term vision for rural areas. It outlines the EU legislative instruments and programmes that bolster the four central components of the toolbox. Furthermore, the paper examines the demographic trends at regional and local level, focusing on the implementation of the Commission’s Talent Booster Mechanism. The briefing also provides a synopsis of the EU cohesion funding mechanisms designed to mitigate the adverse impacts of demographic change.

This briefing has been drafted at the request of a member of the European Economic and Social Committee, in the framework of the agreement between the European Parliament and the Committee.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Demographic change in Europe: A toolbox for action‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Ivana Katsarova.

Pollination is a fundamental process for the survival of our ecosystems and ultimately, of our planet. Nearly 90 % of the world’s wild flowering plant species depend on pollination, along with more than 75 % of the world’s food crops and 35 % of global agricultural land. Without pollination, many interconnected species and processes functioning within the ecosystem would collapse. Not only do pollinators contribute directly to food security, but they are key to conserving biodiversity.

There are different pollinator species – such as bees, butterflies, birds and bats. Most of the 25 000 to 30 000 species of bees – Hymenoptera: Apidae – are pollinators, and together with moths, flies, wasps, beetles, and butterflies, they make up the majority of pollinating species. However, close to 35 % of invertebrate pollinators, such as bees and butterflies, face extinction globally. If this trend continues, staple crops like rice, corn and potatoes will increasingly be substituted for nutritious crops, such as fruits, nuts and vegetables, eventually resulting in an imbalanced diet.

Intensive farming practices, land-use change, mono-cropping, improper use of pesticides and higher temperatures associated with climate change all pose threats to bee colonies, by reducing their access to food and nesting sites, exposing them to harmful chemicals, and weakening their immune systems. 

We all depend on pollinators and it is therefore crucial to try and reverse their decline. To raise awareness of the importance of pollinators, the threats they face and their contribution to sustainable development, the United Nations designated 20 May as World Bee Day.

Every year pollinators make a €15 billion contribution to the agriculture industry and ensure pollination of around 80 % of crops and wild plants in the EU. In 2022, the over 710 000 EU beekeepers took care of more than 20 million beehives. Greece had the highest number of hives per beekeeper (99), followed by Bulgaria and Cyprus (81) and Spain (80).

The EU is the second largest honey producer after China, but it is also a net importer of honey mainly from China (40 %), Ukraine (26 %) and Argentina (12 %). EU countries with the largest honey production – Germany (34 %), France (31 %), Romania (30 %), Spain (27 %), Hungary (25 %), Italy (25 %), Poland (24 %) and Greece (22 %) – are mainly located in southern Europe, where climatic conditions are more favourable to beekeeping.

In 2023, the European Commission registered 1 million valid signatures to the ‘Save Bees and Farmers’ citizens’ initiative. To protect bees and people’s health, the European citizens called on the Commission to propose legal acts to help phase out synthetic pesticides by 2035, restore biodiversity, and support farmers in the transition.

More recently, in 2024, the European Parliament and Council approved measures to protect consumers and beekeepers from adulterated honey, and to facilitate informed consumer choices through increased transparency. The new piece of legislation makes it compulsory to indicate clearly, close to the product name, the countries of origin of the honey, ‘in descending order of their share in weight, together with the percentage that each one represents’. However, EU countries would have the flexibility to enforce this obligation for the four largest shares only when they account for more than 50 % of the blend. Should this not be the case, the percentages would have to be indicated for all the countries of origin. To ensure flexibility, packs under 30 g could indicate the names of the countries of origin by international two-letter ISO codes (DE for Germany for instance), as suggested by Parliament.

However, Members of Parliament had to come to a compromise on traceability. Parliament would have preferred that every producer had a unique identification code, so that all batches could be traced to the harvesting producer or importer. Instead, the Commission will need to conduct feasibility studies before proposing harmonised methods of analysis to detect honey adulteration with sugar, a uniform methodology to trace the origin of honey, and criteria to ensure that honey is not overheated when sold to consumers. Parliament was successful in its demand for the establishment of an EU platform of experts to collect data, improve controls, detect adulteration in honey and make recommendations for the future EU traceability system. After a formal adoption by the Council and by Parliament in April 2024, the new legislation will be published in the EU Official Journal and will enter into force 20 days later. EU countries will have to apply the new rules two years after entry into force. 

We all benefit from a society based on common values – such as justice, equality, solidarity, or tolerance. In the European Union, these common values are enshrined in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU). The article lists six fundamental EU values that are common to the EU Member States: (i) human dignity, (ii) freedom, (iii) democracy, (iv) equality, (v) rule of law, and (vi) human rights (including the rights of people who belong to minorities). The European Court of Justice (ECJ) has underlined that these values ‘define the very identity of the European Union as a common legal order’. The European Parliament strongly exercises its powers to ensure all EU countries respect these values. Let’s take a look at how Parliament has continued to protect EU values and fundamental rights during the 2019-2024 legislative term.

The EU institutions can ensure all EU countries uphold these values through monitoring, preventive and sanctioning mechanisms. For example, when a breach of the rule of law affects the EU’s financial interests, the Conditionality Regulation allows the EU to suspend or cut funding. Even though the European Parliament cannot trigger the mechanism itself, it has repeatedly called on the European Commission to do so, and has even taken the Commission to the ECJ over its inactivity. Parliament decided to take the Commission to court again in March 2024, this time because the Commission unfroze funds for Hungary despite persistent concerns over respect for EU values in that Member State.

Parliament had already activated the preventive mechanism enshrined in Article 7(1) of the TEU in 2018, to call formally on the Council to establish that Hungary might seriously breach EU values. Parliament’s concerns covered a broad array of issues, including the functioning of the constitutional and electoral system, minority rights and the freedom of expression. However the Council has blocked these proceedings since 2018. Parliament has continued to urge the Member States to take a decision.

To make its voice better heard in matters of fundamental rights and EU values, Parliament has called repeatedly for a mechanism on democracy, rule of law and fundamental rights to facilitate cooperation between the Parliament, Council and Commission. Moreover, Parliament has regularly adopted topical resolutions on issues relating to the rule of law, fundamental rights and EU values more generally, in particular in reaction to the Commission’s annual rule of law reports. In response to Parliament’s calls, the Commission included country-specific recommendations for each of the 27 EU Member States from 2022 – and takes stock of progress in addressing those recommendations since 2023.

Parliament’s focus on protecting human rights is therefore evidenced in its exercise of influence on constitutional issues to ensure EU values are respected. Parliament’s powers fall broadly into six, often overlapping, domains: law-making, the budget, scrutiny of the executive, external relations, and, to a lesser extent, constitutional affairs and agenda-setting. This graphic shows more examples of areas where Parliament used one or more of its different powers to influence legislation:

Mapping the European Parliament’s powers in different areas

For a fuller picture of the European Parliament’s activity over the past five years, take a look at our publication Examples of Parliament’s impact: 2019 to 2024: Illustrating the powers of the European Parliament, from which this case is drawn.

Written by Katrien Luyten.

With no end in sight to the war in Ukraine, the EU has started preparing for the post‑March 2025 period, when temporary protection for displaced people from Ukraine ends. The Temporary Protection Directive – triggered for the first time ever in March 2022, shortly after Russia invaded Ukraine – has enabled EU Member States to offer assistance and rights to people in need of immediate protection.

In principle, once the temporary protection period ends, the general laws on protection and on non-EU nationals in Member States will apply, including on return. Yet, there is a general fear that when large numbers of beneficiaries of temporary protection suddenly start seeking international protection, asylum systems risk being overwhelmed. Moreover, uncertainty about temporary protection beneficiaries’ legal status might place them in a legal limbo, with potential periods of irregular residence owing to slow processing of applications for international protection. Moreover, even if eligible for refugee or subsidiary protection status, beneficiaries will not enjoy the same rights as under the Temporary Protection Directive.

Academics and organisations dealing with migration management therefore agree on the urgency of finding a solution that would ensure a smooth transition out of the temporary protection regime and encourage eventual return to Ukraine. However, with the European elections taking place in June, the timing may not be ideal to amend existing EU legislation or craft new EU laws, as the legislative work in the European institutions will temporarily be put on hold. Moreover, a newly composed European Parliament and European Commission, as well as a new rotating presidency of the Council of the EU as from July, might also complicate decision-making.

This briefing provides an overview of the potential exit strategies discussed by experts in the field, including the pros and cons of the most widely discussed options.

Read the complete briefing on ‘When EU temporary protection for displaced people from Ukraine ends: Possible scenarios‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by David De Groot.

‘Rainbow families’ – same-sex couples with or without children – still face many obstacles while exercising their free movement rights today.

In a debate in the European Parliament in September 2010, then‑European Commissioner for Justice, Fundamental Rights and Citizenship, Viviane Reding, stated, ‘Let me stress this. If you live in a legally recognised same-sex partnership, or marriage, in country A, you have the right – and this is a fundamental right – to take this status and that of your partner to country B. If not, it is a violation of EU law, so there is no discussion about this. This is absolutely clear, and we do not have to hesitate on this’.

Over a decade later, same-sex couples still experience issues when relying on their free movement rights.

While the European Court of Human Rights has upheld that all member countries must provide for a registered partnership for same-sex couples if they do not provide for same-sex marriage, it can be unclear which rights should be attached to such a status. And while the European Court of Justice has ruled that same-sex marriages and parenthood established for same-sex couples have to be recognised in all EU Member States for the purpose of free movement, this case law is still very unclear, due to mixed concepts, which has led to consistent Member State violations.

In her 2020 State of the Union Speech, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen stated ‘If you are [a] parent in one country, you are [a] parent in every country’. In 2021, the European Parliament declared the EU an LGBTIQ Freedom Zone. It has expressed its deepest concern regarding the discrimination suffered by rainbow families and their children in the EU and insists that the EU needs to take a common approach to the recognition of same-sex marriages and partnerships. In December 2022, the Commission proposed a regulation on the recognition of parenthood.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Free movement rights of rainbow families‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.