Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

Government officials, diplomats, private sector representatives, human rights institutions and key players gathered on October 24th to call upon international organizations, NGOs, global law organizations, and other stakeholders to work together to create resilient communities that work in tandem with security dimensions of executive and judicial organizations to end the intolerable human rights violations suffered by irregular migrants.

Opening the webinar on “Irregular Migration in the MENA Region,” IPI MENA Senior Director Nejib Friji highlighted the importance of terminology: “It is vital that we avoid the term illegal migration as most irregular migrants are not criminals.” He quoted the distinction drawn by the UN, European Union, and Council of Europe, stating that “illegal” is used to refer to the status of a process, and “irregular” when referring to a person.

Highlighting the plight of irregular migrants, Mr. Friji pointed out that irregular border crossing creates a category of people “unknown to the state,” rendering them especially vulnerable. They are removed from the protection of the law and fall into the informal economy, where exploitative practices can – and, unfortunately, do – take place.

“Each and every act of exploitation must be documented with the purpose of bringing those perpetrators…to justice,” he emphasized.

IPI MENA Intern Anuja Jaiswal pointed to frequent headlines reporting on capsized migrant boats on their way to Europe, emphasizing that this is only one tragic part of the story. She proposed a more holistic, human rights-based approach to migration that examines the treatment of migrants in countries of origin, transit, and destination.

“We must highlight the legal tools available to advocate for migrants,” she stated, explaining the legal distinction between human trafficking and migrant smuggling. “We hope that by evaluating the legal tools available, we can build an understanding of how to apply them to complex realities.”

She underlined the consequences of cross-border partnerships on irregular migration, pointing to recent reports which reveal that such agreements can result in widespread human rights violations. “A solely preventative approach to irregular migration makes migrants more vulnerable to human rights abuses and overlooks their frequent victimization in trafficking and smuggling networks…Ultimately, everyone responsible for abuses against migrants must be held accountable.”

Moussa Mara, former Prime Minister of the Republic of Mali emphasized the importance of understanding two main truths when dealing with irregular migration on a global scale: Firstly, migration represents a point of concern for countries of destination. Secondly, migration functions as an obligation, rather than choice for people in countries of origin. “Nobody will leave his own town with happiness…they will go out only to try to live.”

Regarding Mali, Mr. Mara stated that the combination of significant land loss due to climate change and rapid population growth creates a “scissor effect” on local economy, driving greater migration. He pointed out that the situation will not change soon, stressing the importance of international cooperation and convening around this issue: “It is a global concern that needs a global solution.”

In closing, he emphasized the importance of accountability: “We need to use all means against traffickers, smugglers, and the mafia…all the people who are drinking the blood of the migrants.”

Zoi Sakelliadou, Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Officer on Trafficking in Persons and Migrant Smuggling at UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) spoke about the international legal framework against human trafficking and smuggling of migrants, and the challenges in its implementation. “The current global environment is one of turmoil,” she stressed. Several factors, such as armed conflict, environmental disaster, climate change, and poverty, force migrants to leave their homes and many turn to smugglers in the absence of alternatives. Citing a UNODC study, Mrs. Sakelliadou revealed that smuggled migrants are often subjected to extreme violence, torture, and rape.

“Migration is no crime – but smuggling of migrants is,” she clarified, emphasizing the importance of treating migrants humanely with the full respect of human rights. “There is an imperative need to talk to the migrants and listen to them…migrants that have suffered in the hands of smugglers are entitled to assistance.”

Mrs. Sakelliadou also highlighted the widespread nature of migrant smuggling: “There is no country in the world that is immune to this crime.” Referencing UNODC data, she stated that unfortunately, the level of convictions for migrant smuggling and human trafficking is still very low and “we need to bring those responsible to justice.”

Abdelbasset Hassen began by acknowledging that there are many ideas, programs, and strategies implemented by various civil society organizations and migrant and refugee communities. He stated that the MENA region is suffering from a lack of policies and shared vision on the issue of irregular migration.

He pointed to the narrow security-based lens applied to issues of migration and refugees, suggesting that it indicates a perspective grounded in fear. Looking forward to the 75th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, he quoted the objective to “free people from fear and want,” emphasizing the need for a different approach.

“We need to move to a rights-based vision that will take into consideration the deep causes and roots of this issue,” he stated, referring to economic, social, and political problems driving migration around the world. “We need to invest in this holistic and rights-based approach, which is not at all in contradiction with security issues.”

In closing, he proposed, “it is time we make human rights the way to address these issues.”

During the open floor debate session, Anna J. Louis, ambassador of the Philippines, raised the fluidity of categories in this issue, pointing out that one can begin as a regular migrant but become irregular through the course of events. She emphasized the importance of grassroots-level participation, describing the prevalence of local government units in the Philippines.

Mr. Mara stated that there is a lack of political will within some countries of origin because migration is seen as a “solution,” reducing the pressure of people on leadership. “We need to face this reality. Migration is not a solution…migration means death for our youth. We need to tell the truth inside our countries.”

Abdulnabi Alekry, correspondent at the Delmon Post, spoke about the issue of “forced emigration” in the context of forced displacement, referring to the Palestinian and Rohingya communities. He asked about the responsibility of the UN and other stakeholders in addressing this issue.

In response, Mr. Hassen reminded the audience that human rights is one of the foundational values of the UN system, and any political solutions must be based on a recognition of the rights of people.

Die im DIW Berlin angesiedelte forschungsbasierte Infrastruktureinrichtung Sozio-oekonomisches Panel (SOEP) sucht zum nächstmöglichen Zeitpunkt eine studentische Hilfskraft (w/m/div) für 12 Wochenstunden.

Ihre Aufgabe ist die Mitwirkung bei der Fragebogentestung, Datenaufbereitung und -prüfung sowie Berichtslegung und wissenschaftliche Recherche. Dabei lernen Sie das reichhaltige Angebot der SOEP-Daten in seiner ganzen Breite kennen und gewinnen Einblicke in die Arbeit mit empirischen Daten.

Die im DIW Berlin angesiedelte forschungsbasierte Infrastruktureinrichtung Sozio-oekonomisches Panel (SOEP) sucht zum nächstmöglichen Zeitpunkt eine studentische Hilfskraft (w/m/div) für 10 Wochenstunden.

Ihre Aufgabe ist die Mitwirkung im Forschungsprojekt SUARE (Längsschnittstudie zu Geflüchteten aus der Ukraine in Deutschland) bei der wissenschaftlichen Recherche, Datenaufbereitung und im Informationsmanagement. Dabei lernen Sie das reichhaltige Angebot der SOEP-Daten in seiner ganzen Breite kennen und gewinnen Einblicke in die Themenfelder Gesundheit, Migration und Diskriminierung.

Triangular cooperation has become an increasingly popular development partnership modality. This study examines how and to what extent members of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) - i.e. traditional donors - engage with triangular cooperation, and how this engagement plays out in the Arab region. Commissioned by the United Nations Office for South-South Cooperation, the study finds that DAC member engagement with triangular cooperation has been heterogeneous, ranging from proactive promotion to complete neglect. As part of the global portfolio of DAC members, triangular cooperation with the Arab region presents a similar heterogeneous picture. Beyond complex coordination processes, however, the existing triangular cooperation schemes involving DAC members and Arab partners suggest that there is space for expanding joint action.

Triangular cooperation has become an increasingly popular development partnership modality. This study examines how and to what extent members of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) - i.e. traditional donors - engage with triangular cooperation, and how this engagement plays out in the Arab region. Commissioned by the United Nations Office for South-South Cooperation, the study finds that DAC member engagement with triangular cooperation has been heterogeneous, ranging from proactive promotion to complete neglect. As part of the global portfolio of DAC members, triangular cooperation with the Arab region presents a similar heterogeneous picture. Beyond complex coordination processes, however, the existing triangular cooperation schemes involving DAC members and Arab partners suggest that there is space for expanding joint action.

Triangular cooperation has become an increasingly popular development partnership modality. This study examines how and to what extent members of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) - i.e. traditional donors - engage with triangular cooperation, and how this engagement plays out in the Arab region. Commissioned by the United Nations Office for South-South Cooperation, the study finds that DAC member engagement with triangular cooperation has been heterogeneous, ranging from proactive promotion to complete neglect. As part of the global portfolio of DAC members, triangular cooperation with the Arab region presents a similar heterogeneous picture. Beyond complex coordination processes, however, the existing triangular cooperation schemes involving DAC members and Arab partners suggest that there is space for expanding joint action.

The cement industry is responsible for more greenhouse gas emissions than international air traffic, it takes up massive amounts of water and energy in the production process and creates highly destructive stone pit mines. The case we are presenting here stands for a complex transnational struggle for environmental justice involving the indigenous Sedelur Sikep community and a subsidiary of the German HeidelbergCement AG linking the Javanese lime stone landscapes of the Kendeng mountains with nodes of decision-making in Jakarta and Germany. The Kendeng mountains on the island of Java are important sites of social and cultural reproduction for the Sedelur Sikep, providing important ecosystem services. The community rejects the market economy and in particular the trading of products they have not produced themselves. Their practices have contributed to the conservation of this biodiversity rich landscapes for centuries. The plans of the HeidelbergCement AG to construct a cement factory raises concerns among the Sedelur Sikep. The group worries that the factory and the stone pit mine alter the hydrological cycle affecting their wet-rice fields and ultimately their lifestyles. Despite protests by Sedelur Sikep and allied conservation and human-rights organizations, the subsidiary of Heidelberg Cement AG hold son to its plans, referring to a completed environmental impact assessment and related permits.Building on the concepts of environmental justice and epistemic justice, we investigate how the Sedelur Sikep, together with conservation and human-rights organizations have (so far) successfully prevented the construction of the cement factory by challenging the procedural aspects of the permit process, stressing their role as indigenous communities and by challenging dominant forms of knowledge production used in environmental impact assessments. We show how successful resistance is organized employing the mainstream nature conservation narrative. We also show that the employment of different knowledge system is part of a strategy, while the groups own understanding of respecting and living with the mountain goes beyond this mainstream narrative.

The cement industry is responsible for more greenhouse gas emissions than international air traffic, it takes up massive amounts of water and energy in the production process and creates highly destructive stone pit mines. The case we are presenting here stands for a complex transnational struggle for environmental justice involving the indigenous Sedelur Sikep community and a subsidiary of the German HeidelbergCement AG linking the Javanese lime stone landscapes of the Kendeng mountains with nodes of decision-making in Jakarta and Germany. The Kendeng mountains on the island of Java are important sites of social and cultural reproduction for the Sedelur Sikep, providing important ecosystem services. The community rejects the market economy and in particular the trading of products they have not produced themselves. Their practices have contributed to the conservation of this biodiversity rich landscapes for centuries. The plans of the HeidelbergCement AG to construct a cement factory raises concerns among the Sedelur Sikep. The group worries that the factory and the stone pit mine alter the hydrological cycle affecting their wet-rice fields and ultimately their lifestyles. Despite protests by Sedelur Sikep and allied conservation and human-rights organizations, the subsidiary of Heidelberg Cement AG hold son to its plans, referring to a completed environmental impact assessment and related permits.Building on the concepts of environmental justice and epistemic justice, we investigate how the Sedelur Sikep, together with conservation and human-rights organizations have (so far) successfully prevented the construction of the cement factory by challenging the procedural aspects of the permit process, stressing their role as indigenous communities and by challenging dominant forms of knowledge production used in environmental impact assessments. We show how successful resistance is organized employing the mainstream nature conservation narrative. We also show that the employment of different knowledge system is part of a strategy, while the groups own understanding of respecting and living with the mountain goes beyond this mainstream narrative.

The cement industry is responsible for more greenhouse gas emissions than international air traffic, it takes up massive amounts of water and energy in the production process and creates highly destructive stone pit mines. The case we are presenting here stands for a complex transnational struggle for environmental justice involving the indigenous Sedelur Sikep community and a subsidiary of the German HeidelbergCement AG linking the Javanese lime stone landscapes of the Kendeng mountains with nodes of decision-making in Jakarta and Germany. The Kendeng mountains on the island of Java are important sites of social and cultural reproduction for the Sedelur Sikep, providing important ecosystem services. The community rejects the market economy and in particular the trading of products they have not produced themselves. Their practices have contributed to the conservation of this biodiversity rich landscapes for centuries. The plans of the HeidelbergCement AG to construct a cement factory raises concerns among the Sedelur Sikep. The group worries that the factory and the stone pit mine alter the hydrological cycle affecting their wet-rice fields and ultimately their lifestyles. Despite protests by Sedelur Sikep and allied conservation and human-rights organizations, the subsidiary of Heidelberg Cement AG hold son to its plans, referring to a completed environmental impact assessment and related permits.Building on the concepts of environmental justice and epistemic justice, we investigate how the Sedelur Sikep, together with conservation and human-rights organizations have (so far) successfully prevented the construction of the cement factory by challenging the procedural aspects of the permit process, stressing their role as indigenous communities and by challenging dominant forms of knowledge production used in environmental impact assessments. We show how successful resistance is organized employing the mainstream nature conservation narrative. We also show that the employment of different knowledge system is part of a strategy, while the groups own understanding of respecting and living with the mountain goes beyond this mainstream narrative.

Tax expenditures (TEs) are tax benefits that lower government revenue and the tax liability of the beneficiary. Governments worldwide use TEs to pursue different policy goals such as attracting investment, boosting innovation and mitigating  inequality. At the same time, TEs are costly (the global average over the 1990-2022 period is 3.8 percent of GDP and 23.0 percent of tax revenue) and often ineffective in reaching their stated goals. They can sometimes be highly distortive and trigger negative externalities. Yet, despite the fact that TEs have similar effects on public budgets as direct spending, the lack of transparency in the TE field is striking: only 105 out of 218 jurisdictions have reported on TEs at least once since 1990. In addition, the quality, regularity and scope of such reports are highly heterogeneous and, in many cases, do not allow to engage in meaningful discussions on the effectiveness and efficiency of TEs. The Global Tax Expenditures Transparency  Index (GTETI) is the first comparative assessment of TEreporting that covers countries worldwide. It provides a systematic framework to rank countries according to the regularity, quality and scope of their TE reports, and seeks to increase  transparency and accountability in the TE field. This Companion Paper introduces the GTETI and provides a detailed description of the 5 dimensions and 25 indicators that make up the index. It also discusses the rationale and scope as well as the methodology and assumptions underpinning the GTETI assessment process. The Companion Paper also explains the limitations and issues that the users need to bear in mind when using the index, which is publicly available free of charge on the Tax Expenditures Lab website, www.taxexpenditures.org. Finally, the normative approach behind the GTETI is illustrated in Appendix 1, where a detailed description of an ideal TE report is provided. Appendix 2 contains the GTETI scoring sheet with a detailed list of all indicators and the required supporting documentation.

Tax expenditures (TEs) are tax benefits that lower government revenue and the tax liability of the beneficiary. Governments worldwide use TEs to pursue different policy goals such as attracting investment, boosting innovation and mitigating  inequality. At the same time, TEs are costly (the global average over the 1990-2022 period is 3.8 percent of GDP and 23.0 percent of tax revenue) and often ineffective in reaching their stated goals. They can sometimes be highly distortive and trigger negative externalities. Yet, despite the fact that TEs have similar effects on public budgets as direct spending, the lack of transparency in the TE field is striking: only 105 out of 218 jurisdictions have reported on TEs at least once since 1990. In addition, the quality, regularity and scope of such reports are highly heterogeneous and, in many cases, do not allow to engage in meaningful discussions on the effectiveness and efficiency of TEs. The Global Tax Expenditures Transparency  Index (GTETI) is the first comparative assessment of TEreporting that covers countries worldwide. It provides a systematic framework to rank countries according to the regularity, quality and scope of their TE reports, and seeks to increase  transparency and accountability in the TE field. This Companion Paper introduces the GTETI and provides a detailed description of the 5 dimensions and 25 indicators that make up the index. It also discusses the rationale and scope as well as the methodology and assumptions underpinning the GTETI assessment process. The Companion Paper also explains the limitations and issues that the users need to bear in mind when using the index, which is publicly available free of charge on the Tax Expenditures Lab website, www.taxexpenditures.org. Finally, the normative approach behind the GTETI is illustrated in Appendix 1, where a detailed description of an ideal TE report is provided. Appendix 2 contains the GTETI scoring sheet with a detailed list of all indicators and the required supporting documentation.

Tax expenditures (TEs) are tax benefits that lower government revenue and the tax liability of the beneficiary. Governments worldwide use TEs to pursue different policy goals such as attracting investment, boosting innovation and mitigating  inequality. At the same time, TEs are costly (the global average over the 1990-2022 period is 3.8 percent of GDP and 23.0 percent of tax revenue) and often ineffective in reaching their stated goals. They can sometimes be highly distortive and trigger negative externalities. Yet, despite the fact that TEs have similar effects on public budgets as direct spending, the lack of transparency in the TE field is striking: only 105 out of 218 jurisdictions have reported on TEs at least once since 1990. In addition, the quality, regularity and scope of such reports are highly heterogeneous and, in many cases, do not allow to engage in meaningful discussions on the effectiveness and efficiency of TEs. The Global Tax Expenditures Transparency  Index (GTETI) is the first comparative assessment of TEreporting that covers countries worldwide. It provides a systematic framework to rank countries according to the regularity, quality and scope of their TE reports, and seeks to increase  transparency and accountability in the TE field. This Companion Paper introduces the GTETI and provides a detailed description of the 5 dimensions and 25 indicators that make up the index. It also discusses the rationale and scope as well as the methodology and assumptions underpinning the GTETI assessment process. The Companion Paper also explains the limitations and issues that the users need to bear in mind when using the index, which is publicly available free of charge on the Tax Expenditures Lab website, www.taxexpenditures.org. Finally, the normative approach behind the GTETI is illustrated in Appendix 1, where a detailed description of an ideal TE report is provided. Appendix 2 contains the GTETI scoring sheet with a detailed list of all indicators and the required supporting documentation.

Public participation is an instrument used by governments to increase the effectiveness of decision-making processes and nurture accountability relationships between citizens and government officials. When successfully implemented, public  participation can contribute to deepening democracy. Particularly at the local level, the close proximity between citizens and officials is believed to enable the public to monitor state activities, thereby contributing to more effective and inclusive  governance and service delivery. Kenya is one of the frontrunners in Africa in this regard: The constitutional reforms of 2010 introduced a newly devolved system of governance and institutionalized public participation at all levels. Looking at Nakuru City – a secondary city in Kenya – the policy brief examines to what extent public participation contributes to three values of democratic governance: legitimacy, effectiveness and social justice. It finds that although public participation has contributed to  enhancing social justice, improvements in governance effectiveness and legitimacy are less evident. The lacking responsiveness of local elites in daily interactions, political and legal loopholes, and the public’s narrow scope for participation hamper the creation of productive accountability relationships.

Public participation is an instrument used by governments to increase the effectiveness of decision-making processes and nurture accountability relationships between citizens and government officials. When successfully implemented, public  participation can contribute to deepening democracy. Particularly at the local level, the close proximity between citizens and officials is believed to enable the public to monitor state activities, thereby contributing to more effective and inclusive  governance and service delivery. Kenya is one of the frontrunners in Africa in this regard: The constitutional reforms of 2010 introduced a newly devolved system of governance and institutionalized public participation at all levels. Looking at Nakuru City – a secondary city in Kenya – the policy brief examines to what extent public participation contributes to three values of democratic governance: legitimacy, effectiveness and social justice. It finds that although public participation has contributed to  enhancing social justice, improvements in governance effectiveness and legitimacy are less evident. The lacking responsiveness of local elites in daily interactions, political and legal loopholes, and the public’s narrow scope for participation hamper the creation of productive accountability relationships.

Public participation is an instrument used by governments to increase the effectiveness of decision-making processes and nurture accountability relationships between citizens and government officials. When successfully implemented, public  participation can contribute to deepening democracy. Particularly at the local level, the close proximity between citizens and officials is believed to enable the public to monitor state activities, thereby contributing to more effective and inclusive  governance and service delivery. Kenya is one of the frontrunners in Africa in this regard: The constitutional reforms of 2010 introduced a newly devolved system of governance and institutionalized public participation at all levels. Looking at Nakuru City – a secondary city in Kenya – the policy brief examines to what extent public participation contributes to three values of democratic governance: legitimacy, effectiveness and social justice. It finds that although public participation has contributed to  enhancing social justice, improvements in governance effectiveness and legitimacy are less evident. The lacking responsiveness of local elites in daily interactions, political and legal loopholes, and the public’s narrow scope for participation hamper the creation of productive accountability relationships.

Recent health emergencies such as the 2018–2020 Ebola crisis in DRC, in conjunction with the early stages of the COVID-19 pandemic, demonstrate the importance of health responses that take the local context into account, especially in settings that are already affected by violent conflict. When humanitarian health responses fail to understand and adapt to their impact on conflict dynamics, they risk exacerbating those dynamics, impeding the health response, and placing health workers at risk. As healthcare becomes increasingly and globally politicized, it is more crucial than ever to recognize the links between health and peace and promote a more deliberate approach to delivering emergency health responses in violent conflict environments.

In this context, this paper first discusses the global normative environment for emergency health responses in situations of violent conflict and proposals to strengthen the links between international health and peace activities, especially the GHPI. Second, it examines the concepts at the core of the GHPI initiative and considers their operationalization in violent conflict environments. Third, it summarizes the emergency health response to the 2018–2020 Ebola epidemic in eastern DRC, how it interacted disastrously with conflict dynamics, and the lessons learned from the experience. Finally, it highlights several risk areas that emergency health interventions working at the humanitarian-peace nexus in conflict will likely face and considers options for mitigating their impact.

The paper concludes by offering the following recommendations, aimed at supporting the further development of the conceptual framework for the health and peace agenda and informing the operationalization of the GHPI and similar initiatives.

• WHO should develop the GHPI conceptual framework further, including by elaborating on when health actors should pursue peace-responsive programming and how they should coordinate with peace and security actors, as well as the relationship between the GHPI and political processes.
• WHO should design a strategy to operationalize the GHPI in violent conflict settings, including by developing tools, guidance, and training on conflict-sensitive analysis and programming; identifying the political skills required of those leading the implementation of such programming; and clarifying how to manage ethical dilemmas.
• The Executive Office of the Secretary-General should conduct a formal assessment of the Ebola emergency coordinator position during the 2018–2020 Ebola crisis.
• The UN Department for Safety and Security should review security risk assessment processes and safety and security measures and develop an inventory of safety and security measures that could be used in place of armed security.
• The UN Department of Peace Operations should review operational guidance for armed escorts and area security during site visits.

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Civil society organisations (CSOs) in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) face mounting challenges, especially in authoritarian states, where they encounter closures, persecution and smear campaigns. Consequently, their crucial work in advancing human rights, good governance and inclusive human development is increasingly stifled and criminalised. Activists and professionals linked to CSOs also endure surveillance and persecution. This should worry European policymakers since a vibrant and free civil society in MENA is in their interest, as it is key for human development. This policy brief proposes seven ways for development cooperation to protect CSOs in authoritarian regimes in the MENA and beyond.
European foreign and development policies in the MENA region have led to governmental partnerships that often sustain authoritarian regimes at the expense of citizens’ rights, for instance on migration (Francavilla, 2023; Grimm & Roll, 2023). Although substantial humanitarian aid reaches conflict zones, one of the root causes of the continuing political violence and conflicts – absence of accountable democratic governments – remains inadequately addressed (Barakat & Fakih, 2021). To avoid further empowering authoritarian rule in the region, European policymakers should reassess their multi- and bilateral governmental cooperation. The prevalent assumption amongst many policymakers that the incumbent authoritarian regimes in MENA can provide political stability needs to be discarded. The stability paradigm guiding European relations with the Arab World should instead be replaced with a do-no-harm approach. Although “do no harm” is a core principle of European development cooperation policy, it often is ignored in practice or trumped by other interests (Leininger, 2023). Development cooperation benefitting citizens must prioritise inclusive human development through cooperation with a wide range of actors, including elected state bodies, independent media and watchdog CSOs (Rutzen, 2015). This policy brief develops seven recommendations for European policymakers in development cooperation. The first step is to overcome the prevalent stability-through-cooperation paradigm to prevent further negative effects on human rights, democracy and civil society. Therefore, it is important that European policymakers recognise these authoritarian regimes’ unwillingness to implement reforms that would reduce their control over political institutions. Second, it remains crucial that policymakers acknowledge the increasingly shrinking space for critical voices in civil society. Third, governments and regional organisations should give CSOs a voice at international summits and in international organisations to increase the visibility of their demands and show support for oppressed voices. Fourth, European development cooperation professionals should establish flexible crisis funding lines for at-risk CSOs and their staff. Fifth, at-risk journalists, activists or human rights defenders (HRDs) need access to fast-track visa programmes to ensure they can continue their work from abroad when the authorities want to silence them. Sixth, European development cooperation profession-als should continue to support marginalised voices and groups and push for more inclusive governance. Lastly, European governments should limit arms exports to authoritarian regimes.

Civil society organisations (CSOs) in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) face mounting challenges, especially in authoritarian states, where they encounter closures, persecution and smear campaigns. Consequently, their crucial work in advancing human rights, good governance and inclusive human development is increasingly stifled and criminalised. Activists and professionals linked to CSOs also endure surveillance and persecution. This should worry European policymakers since a vibrant and free civil society in MENA is in their interest, as it is key for human development. This policy brief proposes seven ways for development cooperation to protect CSOs in authoritarian regimes in the MENA and beyond.
European foreign and development policies in the MENA region have led to governmental partnerships that often sustain authoritarian regimes at the expense of citizens’ rights, for instance on migration (Francavilla, 2023; Grimm & Roll, 2023). Although substantial humanitarian aid reaches conflict zones, one of the root causes of the continuing political violence and conflicts – absence of accountable democratic governments – remains inadequately addressed (Barakat & Fakih, 2021). To avoid further empowering authoritarian rule in the region, European policymakers should reassess their multi- and bilateral governmental cooperation. The prevalent assumption amongst many policymakers that the incumbent authoritarian regimes in MENA can provide political stability needs to be discarded. The stability paradigm guiding European relations with the Arab World should instead be replaced with a do-no-harm approach. Although “do no harm” is a core principle of European development cooperation policy, it often is ignored in practice or trumped by other interests (Leininger, 2023). Development cooperation benefitting citizens must prioritise inclusive human development through cooperation with a wide range of actors, including elected state bodies, independent media and watchdog CSOs (Rutzen, 2015). This policy brief develops seven recommendations for European policymakers in development cooperation. The first step is to overcome the prevalent stability-through-cooperation paradigm to prevent further negative effects on human rights, democracy and civil society. Therefore, it is important that European policymakers recognise these authoritarian regimes’ unwillingness to implement reforms that would reduce their control over political institutions. Second, it remains crucial that policymakers acknowledge the increasingly shrinking space for critical voices in civil society. Third, governments and regional organisations should give CSOs a voice at international summits and in international organisations to increase the visibility of their demands and show support for oppressed voices. Fourth, European development cooperation professionals should establish flexible crisis funding lines for at-risk CSOs and their staff. Fifth, at-risk journalists, activists or human rights defenders (HRDs) need access to fast-track visa programmes to ensure they can continue their work from abroad when the authorities want to silence them. Sixth, European development cooperation profession-als should continue to support marginalised voices and groups and push for more inclusive governance. Lastly, European governments should limit arms exports to authoritarian regimes.