Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

Im Jahr 2014 gründeten Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauretanien, Niger und Tschad eine neue regionale Organisation – die G5 Sahel („le groupe de cinq pays du Sahel“). In diesem Kapitel wird die Gründung der G5-Sahel untersucht und erläutert. Das Kapitel analysiert auch die Rolle, die die Europäische Union und ihre Mitgliedstaaten bei der Förderung der Gründung und Entwicklung der regionalen Organisation gespielt haben. Die Analyse kommt zu dem Ergebnis, dass ein regionales Machtvakuum, die Bedarf der G5-Sahel-Mitgliedsstaaten an zusätzlichen finanziellen Ressourcen und die wichtige Unterstützung durch die EU und ihre Mitgliedsstaaten die wichtigsten Erklärungsfaktoren für die Gründung der G5-Sahel sind.

Promoting coherence for sustainable development (PCSD) is a key means of implementation for the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, yet has been overlooked as policy discussions have predominantly focused on the financing of the agenda. The literature and policy debates about PCSD largely focus on processes and on OECD-countries, and they neglect their political and normative dimensions. This article complements recent literature on policy coherence for sustainable development (PCSD) by elaborating and testing a relational perspective on the concept. To address these issues, this article elaborates a relational perspective that responds to the misrepresentation of third countries as passive recipients of (in)coherent OECD policy preferences. The analysis presented summarizes the literature on the related concepts of PCSD and Policy Coherence for Development (PCD). Based on this, the article articulates a relational perspective on policy coherence that complements other critical perspectives in the literature. It subsequently explores the potential and pertinence of this relational perspective by analysing how the fisheries policy preferences of the European Union (EU) interact with those of Ghana. Overall, the analysis shows neither the EU's nor Ghana's commitment to sustainable fisheries can be assumed. Furthermore, assessing the EU and Ghana's responsibilities for sustainability and degrees of adherence are hard to determine as the result of the presence of other fishing nations and influences. In view of the EU's ambitious policy framework, the continued overfishing in Ghanaian waters negatively affects the credibility and justification of its continued involvement. Policy dialogue between the EU and the Ghanaian government and accompanying EU technical assistance have supported changes made to Ghanaian fisheries policies, but overfishing continues. Discussions on promoting PCSD should be supported further empirical research on to what extent and how policy preferences that policy makers consider coherent with the 2030 Agenda contribute to advancing the agenda in different country and regional contexts.

Promoting coherence for sustainable development (PCSD) is a key means of implementation for the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, yet has been overlooked as policy discussions have predominantly focused on the financing of the agenda. The literature and policy debates about PCSD largely focus on processes and on OECD-countries, and they neglect their political and normative dimensions. This article complements recent literature on policy coherence for sustainable development (PCSD) by elaborating and testing a relational perspective on the concept. To address these issues, this article elaborates a relational perspective that responds to the misrepresentation of third countries as passive recipients of (in)coherent OECD policy preferences. The analysis presented summarizes the literature on the related concepts of PCSD and Policy Coherence for Development (PCD). Based on this, the article articulates a relational perspective on policy coherence that complements other critical perspectives in the literature. It subsequently explores the potential and pertinence of this relational perspective by analysing how the fisheries policy preferences of the European Union (EU) interact with those of Ghana. Overall, the analysis shows neither the EU's nor Ghana's commitment to sustainable fisheries can be assumed. Furthermore, assessing the EU and Ghana's responsibilities for sustainability and degrees of adherence are hard to determine as the result of the presence of other fishing nations and influences. In view of the EU's ambitious policy framework, the continued overfishing in Ghanaian waters negatively affects the credibility and justification of its continued involvement. Policy dialogue between the EU and the Ghanaian government and accompanying EU technical assistance have supported changes made to Ghanaian fisheries policies, but overfishing continues. Discussions on promoting PCSD should be supported further empirical research on to what extent and how policy preferences that policy makers consider coherent with the 2030 Agenda contribute to advancing the agenda in different country and regional contexts.

Promoting coherence for sustainable development (PCSD) is a key means of implementation for the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, yet has been overlooked as policy discussions have predominantly focused on the financing of the agenda. The literature and policy debates about PCSD largely focus on processes and on OECD-countries, and they neglect their political and normative dimensions. This article complements recent literature on policy coherence for sustainable development (PCSD) by elaborating and testing a relational perspective on the concept. To address these issues, this article elaborates a relational perspective that responds to the misrepresentation of third countries as passive recipients of (in)coherent OECD policy preferences. The analysis presented summarizes the literature on the related concepts of PCSD and Policy Coherence for Development (PCD). Based on this, the article articulates a relational perspective on policy coherence that complements other critical perspectives in the literature. It subsequently explores the potential and pertinence of this relational perspective by analysing how the fisheries policy preferences of the European Union (EU) interact with those of Ghana. Overall, the analysis shows neither the EU's nor Ghana's commitment to sustainable fisheries can be assumed. Furthermore, assessing the EU and Ghana's responsibilities for sustainability and degrees of adherence are hard to determine as the result of the presence of other fishing nations and influences. In view of the EU's ambitious policy framework, the continued overfishing in Ghanaian waters negatively affects the credibility and justification of its continued involvement. Policy dialogue between the EU and the Ghanaian government and accompanying EU technical assistance have supported changes made to Ghanaian fisheries policies, but overfishing continues. Discussions on promoting PCSD should be supported further empirical research on to what extent and how policy preferences that policy makers consider coherent with the 2030 Agenda contribute to advancing the agenda in different country and regional contexts.

In the last years, the number of articles that have been calling for a stronger influence of local actors in conflict transformation and peacebuilding has been steadily increasing. At the practical level of peace-work, we can already find some examples where the local actors play an important role in the peace processes. This cooperative work can be found for example in the German Civil Peace Service (CPS) that is working in (post-) conflict countries with the aim of involving and working together with local actors in local peace processes. This article reflects on this cooperation and looks into the following questions: How can partnership in peacebuilding look like? What role do power-asymmetries play in the work of the CPS? And what do people working in the area of CPS need and what do they do? To answer these questions, the article uses the unique method of storytelling in order to combine voices from CPS-actors as well as researchers in order to discuss different perspectives and answers to this question. The article will introduce the CPS, its history, and forms of cooperation, will speak about chances and limitations for both local actors as well as German peace workers during the cooperation but also in their training and accompaniment and will close with recommendations for peace work that aims to cooperate with local actors.

In the last years, the number of articles that have been calling for a stronger influence of local actors in conflict transformation and peacebuilding has been steadily increasing. At the practical level of peace-work, we can already find some examples where the local actors play an important role in the peace processes. This cooperative work can be found for example in the German Civil Peace Service (CPS) that is working in (post-) conflict countries with the aim of involving and working together with local actors in local peace processes. This article reflects on this cooperation and looks into the following questions: How can partnership in peacebuilding look like? What role do power-asymmetries play in the work of the CPS? And what do people working in the area of CPS need and what do they do? To answer these questions, the article uses the unique method of storytelling in order to combine voices from CPS-actors as well as researchers in order to discuss different perspectives and answers to this question. The article will introduce the CPS, its history, and forms of cooperation, will speak about chances and limitations for both local actors as well as German peace workers during the cooperation but also in their training and accompaniment and will close with recommendations for peace work that aims to cooperate with local actors.

In the last years, the number of articles that have been calling for a stronger influence of local actors in conflict transformation and peacebuilding has been steadily increasing. At the practical level of peace-work, we can already find some examples where the local actors play an important role in the peace processes. This cooperative work can be found for example in the German Civil Peace Service (CPS) that is working in (post-) conflict countries with the aim of involving and working together with local actors in local peace processes. This article reflects on this cooperation and looks into the following questions: How can partnership in peacebuilding look like? What role do power-asymmetries play in the work of the CPS? And what do people working in the area of CPS need and what do they do? To answer these questions, the article uses the unique method of storytelling in order to combine voices from CPS-actors as well as researchers in order to discuss different perspectives and answers to this question. The article will introduce the CPS, its history, and forms of cooperation, will speak about chances and limitations for both local actors as well as German peace workers during the cooperation but also in their training and accompaniment and will close with recommendations for peace work that aims to cooperate with local actors.

With the creation of the European Peace Facility (EPF) in 2021, the European Union (EU) has placed greater emphasis on military instruments in its foreign policy. It has adopted a range of assistance measures under the EPF to support Ukraine against Russia’s aggression, but also for the benefit of African countries and regional organisations. The recent EU decision to provide lethal equipment to Niger’s armed forces demonstrates that the bloc is strengthening its efforts in military capacity-building. It is a key element of its engagement for peace and security in Africa. However, such a one-sided focus on military capacity-building stands at risk of not contributing to sustainable peace in fragile and conflict-affected countries if it is not embedded in a broader political strategy.

What is needed is a clear strategy for the EU’s conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities in Africa, the strengthening of EPF safeguard measures to prevent the misuse of delivered equipment, and a fresh impetus for AU-EU cooperation on peace and security.

With the creation of the European Peace Facility (EPF) in 2021, the European Union (EU) has placed greater emphasis on military instruments in its foreign policy. It has adopted a range of assistance measures under the EPF to support Ukraine against Russia’s aggression, but also for the benefit of African countries and regional organisations. The recent EU decision to provide lethal equipment to Niger’s armed forces demonstrates that the bloc is strengthening its efforts in military capacity-building. It is a key element of its engagement for peace and security in Africa. However, such a one-sided focus on military capacity-building stands at risk of not contributing to sustainable peace in fragile and conflict-affected countries if it is not embedded in a broader political strategy.

What is needed is a clear strategy for the EU’s conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities in Africa, the strengthening of EPF safeguard measures to prevent the misuse of delivered equipment, and a fresh impetus for AU-EU cooperation on peace and security.

With the creation of the European Peace Facility (EPF) in 2021, the European Union (EU) has placed greater emphasis on military instruments in its foreign policy. It has adopted a range of assistance measures under the EPF to support Ukraine against Russia’s aggression, but also for the benefit of African countries and regional organisations. The recent EU decision to provide lethal equipment to Niger’s armed forces demonstrates that the bloc is strengthening its efforts in military capacity-building. It is a key element of its engagement for peace and security in Africa. However, such a one-sided focus on military capacity-building stands at risk of not contributing to sustainable peace in fragile and conflict-affected countries if it is not embedded in a broader political strategy.

What is needed is a clear strategy for the EU’s conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities in Africa, the strengthening of EPF safeguard measures to prevent the misuse of delivered equipment, and a fresh impetus for AU-EU cooperation on peace and security.

Der erste Scientific Use File des Zusammenhaltspanels (ZHP-FGZ) ist nun verfügbar.

Das ZHP ist eine neu etablierte Längsschnittstudie, die die vielfältigen Aspekte sozialen Zusammenhalts in Deutschland erfasst. Es basiert auf einer repräsentativen Bevölkerungsstichprobe aus den deutschen Einwohnermelderegistern und wurde erstmals im Jahr 2021 durchgeführt. Neben den ausgewählten Personen richtet sich die jährliche Befragung auch an alle anderen erwachsenen Mitglieder ihrer Haushalte. Das ZHP wird vom Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung (BMBF) finanziert, in Kooperation vom Forschungsinstitut Gesellschaftlicher Zusammenhalt (FGZ) und dem Deutschen Sozioökonomischen Panel (SOEP) geleitet und durch das Umfrageinstitut infas implementiert.

Der SCP 2021_1 (Anchor)-Datensatz

Der veröffentlichte Datensatz umfasst erste Umfragedaten und generierte Indikatoren von 13.055 Haushaltsankerpersonen, die aus den Bevölkerungsregistern gezogen und anschließend befragt wurden. Zukünftige Datensätze werden umfassendere Informationen enthalten, einschließlich der Haushaltsdaten und der Umfragedaten aller erwachsenen Haushaltsmitglieder.

Weitere Informationen sowie die Dokumentation zum Datensatz sind auf der Landing Page des FGZ zu finden.

Datenzugang

Die Daten können von allen Postdoktorandinnen und Postdoktoranden, die einer wissenschaftlichen Institution angehören, bestellt werden. Dafür ist eine Registrierung unter https://fgz-risc-data.de/en/registration notwendig. Dieses Konto können Sie in Zukunft zur Bestellung aller im Forschungsdatenzentrum des Forschungsinstituts Sozialer Zusammenhalt (FDZ-FGZ) verfügbaren Scientific Use Files nutzen. Kontoinhaber (Primärnutzer) können die Daten mit Forscherinnen und Forschern unter ihrer Aufsicht (Sekundärnutzer) teilen. Sekundärnutzer müssen im Datenbenutzerkonto des Primärnutzers aufgeführt sein und eine Datenschutzerklärung unterzeichnen, die vom Primärnutzer verwahrt werden muss. Wir möchten darauf hinweisen, dass die Daten ausschließlich für wissenschaftliche Zwecke zur Verfügung gestellt werden.

Event Video 
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With just a few months until the SDG and Climate Ambition Summits, and with COP28 fast approaching, member states must do more to meet their climate commitments. Current projections estimate a global 2.8-degree increase in temperature by 2100. The Paris Agreement’s goal to limit warming to a 1.5-degree increase is still achievable, but global carbon emissions must be cut by 45 percent.

In response to the recent IPCC synthesis report, the UN Secretary-General has launched an “acceleration agenda” to raise ambition on cutting emissions and achieve a quantum leap in the delivery of climate justice. Last year at COP27, the UN Secretary-General called for a Climate Solidarity Pact urging all big emitters to cut emissions, efforts to secure financing for emerging economies to reduce their emissions, and an “acceleration agenda” to advance the process. These efforts require stakeholders to come together to supercharge efforts for a just transition.

To accelerate action by governments, business, finance, local authorities, and civil society, and hear from “first movers and doers,” the UN Secretary-General is convening a Climate Ambition Summit at UN Headquarters in New York on September 20, 2023. And in the words of the Secretary-General, “The world is watching—and the planet can’t wait.”

Ahead of the Climate Ambition Summit, this policy forum on July 27th examined what could be achieved from the summit. IPI President and Chief Executive Officer Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein and Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Climate Action and Just Transition Selwin Charles Hart discussed the Summit, ways to make it a success, and inspire climate action.  Al Hussein underscored that the Summit will be taking place against a backdrop where there is “a growing state of mistrust between the developing and the developed world.” At the core of this mistrust are the promises made that have not been kept.

Among the many issues affected by this distrust is the new loss and damage fund, which parties agreed to last year. Agreement on its details and operationalization will be a major test of trust and political will between countries. Read IPI’s report on loss and damage by Michael Franczak to learn more.

There are two cross-cutting themes at the core of the Summit: cooperation and acceleration. It highlights the need for cooperation across borders and across society to accelerate decarbonization and build climate-resilient societies. Engaging young people is critical, as evidenced by the Secretary-General’s establishment of a youth advisory group, whose input will feed into the summit and help push the needle.

Hart asserted that “we’ve run out of time. Decisions taken within this decade will make or break our efforts to have a livable, sustainable, prosperous, and secure future. Human activity has caused this problem, and human ingenuity and creativity can get us out.”

Speakers:
Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein, President and Chief Executive Officer, International Peace Institute
Selwin Charles Hart, Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Climate Action and Just Transition

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The women, peace, and security (WPS) agenda consists of four pillars, including participation and protection. However, engagement on these pillars has often been disconnected, with inadequate attention to the relationship between them. This can undermine progress on both pillars, as efforts to promote women’s meaningful participation in peacebuilding processes fall short without adequate protection measures that make that participation possible.

On July 26th, IPI hosted a launch event to share research findings on the nexus of women’s protection and participation in Libya presented in a new report authored by scholars Catherine Turner and Aisling Swaine. This report builds on previous IPI research focused on protection and participation in Northern Ireland.

During the event, participants heard directly from women representing civil society organizations in the region. Founder and CEO of Karama Hibaaq Osman discussed her work with the WPS agenda and some of the challenges she’s encountered. Osman highlighted Resolution 1325, which is non-binding and falls to the discretion of governments, many of whom do not see it as a priority, leaving its success in the hands of civil society and women’s organizations. While discussing gender parity and the relevancy of women’s integration into specific male-dominated roles, such as defense minister or director of the CIA, Osman urged participants to ask the question “Is the military becoming feminized, or are the women becoming militarized?”

Co-Founder and CEO of the Libyan Women’s Platform for Peace Zahra’ Langhi, drew upon her 12 years of activism in Libya and asserted that women’s participation is grounded in traditional, customary mechanisms and local contexts, “It is not enough to empower women, we need to dis-empower warlords.”

UN Women Policy Specialist Sarah Taylor outlined key recommendations, one of which includes responding to evolving threats and evolving participation spaces, both online and offline. Senior Gender Advisor and Chief of Gender Equality Section, United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) Nada Darwazeh expressed that we don’t need women with a PhD or women to be fully engaged in politics: “What matters is that they’re there.”

The launch event provided an opportunity to share the report’s findings with policymakers and to engage in conversation with other researchers and practitioners. It further sought to help member states and UN officials align policies related to women’s protection and participation with the realities on the ground.

Welcoming Remarks:
Adam Lupel, Vice President and Chief Operating Officer, International Peace Institute

Speakers:
Catherine Turner, Associate Professor of International Law and Deputy Director of the Durham Global Security Institute, Durham Law School (virtual)
Aisling Swaine, Professor of Gender Studies in the School of Social Policy, Social Work and Social Justice, University College Dublin (virtual)
Hibaaq Osman, Founder and CEO of Karama
Zahra’ Langhi, Co-Founder and CEO of the Libyan Women’s Platform for Peace
Nada Darwazeh, Senior Gender Advisor and Chief of Gender Equality Section, United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) (virtual)
Sarah Taylor, Policy Specialist, UN Women

Moderator:
Phoebe Donnelly, Senior Fellow and Head of Women, Peace, and Security, International Peace Institute

Die Bundesregierung will die heimische Wasserstoff-Produktionskapazität von fünf auf zehn Gigawatt bis 2030 verdoppeln. Das hat das Bundeskabinett heute beschlossen. Dazu ein Statement von Claudia Kemfert, Leiterin Energie, Verkehr, Umwelt des Deutschen Instituts für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW Berlin):

Die Herstellung von Wasserstoff ist teuer und wird sich nur rechnen, wenn man überschüssigen und abgeschriebenen Strom aus erneuerbaren Energien zur Verfügung hat. Deswegen sollte die Bundesregierung nicht auf blauen Wasserstoff der Erdgasindustrie setzen. Aus ökologischen und ökonomischen Gründen darf Wasserstoff nicht aus Öl, Gas oder Kohle hergestellt werden, sondern muss aus erneuerbaren Energien produziert werden. Ansonsten erreichen wir die Pariser Klimaziele und weitere Umweltziele nicht und das wird in jeder Hinsicht teuer.

Statt unbeliebter Übertragungsnetze oder Abregelung von Windanlagen wäre es daher sinnvoller, man würde die Produktion von Wasserstoff aus Windenergie ermöglichen. Erst wenn die Marktbarrieren abgeschafft werden, kann es zum erhöhten Einsatz von Wasserstoff kommen. Ob und wann sich die Produktion von Wasserstoff rechnet, hängt entscheidend davon ab, wie schnell erneuerbare Energien in Deutschland ausgebaut werden und die Rahmenbedingungen angepasst werden.

Grüner Wasserstoff ist extrem teuer, er ist der Champagner unter den Energieformen. Und „Champagner im SUV-Tank“ hilft weder dem Klima noch der Wirtschaft, sondern ist Verschwendung oder eine Verlagerung der klimaschädlichen Emissionen von der Straße in die mit fossilen Energien arbeitende Wasserstoff-Industrie. Die Bundesregierung muss stattdessen eine Verkehrswende vorantreiben, in der gezielt die Elektromobilität über den Ausbau der Ladeinfrastruktur sowie den öffentlichen Nahverkehr gefördert wird. Der ebenfalls verschwenderische und klimaschädliche Einsatz von Wasserstoff im Gebäudebereich kann verhindert werden, indem die energetische Gebäudesanierung gefördert wird und auch in Gebäuden konsequent erneuerbare Energien eingesetzt werden. So kann der kostbare Wasserstoff vor allem im Industriebereich zum Einsatz kommen, etwa bei der Herstellung von Stahl oder im Bereich Schwerlast- und Schiffsverkehr. Das wäre Wasserstoffnutzung mit Vernunft, also grün und effizient.

Historically, the women, peace, and security (WPS) agenda’s four pillars—prevention, protection, participation, and relief and recovery—have largely developed along separate trajectories. This has started to change with the UN Security Council’s recent progress in recognizing the link between women’s participation in peace and security and their protection, as well as the need to create “enabling environments” for women’s participation. Nonetheless, there is often a gap between international frameworks on participation and protection and the realities experienced by women, especially in conflict-affected contexts.

To address that gap, this paper analyzes the experiences of women in Libya and the obstacles they face when participating in peace and security and political processes. Using an ecological framework, it details the risks that women who participate encounter at six levels: individual, interpersonal, community, national institutional, societal, and global institutional. Through this analysis, the report deepens the evidence for and understanding of the critical relationship between protection and participation, broadens analysis of and provides pointers for the mainstreaming of WPS in UN mission mandates, and provides a new framework to advance the creation of safe and enabling environments for women’s participation.

In order to advance women’s full, equal, meaningful, and safe participation, the report offers the following recommendations.

For the Security Council and member states:

• Continue to build on progress on mainstreaming WPS in mission mandates;
• Prioritize the implementation of Resolution 2493’s provision on creating “enabling environments” for women’s participation; and
• Ensure gender advisers with context-specific expertise are mandated and properly resourced in all UN missions.

For UN missions, agencies, and partners:

• Conduct context-specific participation and protection analyses;
• Strengthen coordination between the UN missions, UN agencies, and other international organizations working on related issues to address the full range of protection-related barriers to women’s participation; and
• Ensure a gender-sensitive approach to the use of digital tools for participation to reflect the increased risks to women in online environments.

This paper reports on insights gathered from the recent workshop, “The future of the EU as a global development actor: Building alliances with the Global South in a polycrisis world,” organized on May 10-11 in Berlin. The workshop served as a platform for experts and thought leaders from various backgrounds to come together and delve into the challenges and opportunities presented by the evolving landscape of global development. Building upon the findings of this engaging event, the report encapsulates the collective wisdom and innovative ideas generated during the two-day session. As we navigate the complexities of polycrisis and its impact on EU development policy, this report sheds light on pathways to address pressing issues while fostering sustainable growth and cooperation. We invite you to explore the invaluable insights shared by our diverse panel of speakers, enabling us to pave the way for a more resilient and inclusive future in the realm of global development.