Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

This article presents an overview of the characteristics of disinformation in the digital age, outlines the evolution of the EU’s efforts to tackling disinformation, and provides an overall analysis of its governance approach along policies, actors, and policy instruments. On this basis, we analyse its compatibility with the EU’s quest for digital sovereignty. Main findings are that the EU has maintained a notably stable approach by combining soft and hard instruments within a co-regulatory framework that involves private and public actors. We conclude that an interplay of the nature of disinformation, the setup of big online platforms, EU regulation, and the exposure to foreign influences creates a complex set of competing factors that facilitate and constrain digital sovereignty.

This article presents an overview of the characteristics of disinformation in the digital age, outlines the evolution of the EU’s efforts to tackling disinformation, and provides an overall analysis of its governance approach along policies, actors, and policy instruments. On this basis, we analyse its compatibility with the EU’s quest for digital sovereignty. Main findings are that the EU has maintained a notably stable approach by combining soft and hard instruments within a co-regulatory framework that involves private and public actors. We conclude that an interplay of the nature of disinformation, the setup of big online platforms, EU regulation, and the exposure to foreign influences creates a complex set of competing factors that facilitate and constrain digital sovereignty.

This article presents an overview of the characteristics of disinformation in the digital age, outlines the evolution of the EU’s efforts to tackling disinformation, and provides an overall analysis of its governance approach along policies, actors, and policy instruments. On this basis, we analyse its compatibility with the EU’s quest for digital sovereignty. Main findings are that the EU has maintained a notably stable approach by combining soft and hard instruments within a co-regulatory framework that involves private and public actors. We conclude that an interplay of the nature of disinformation, the setup of big online platforms, EU regulation, and the exposure to foreign influences creates a complex set of competing factors that facilitate and constrain digital sovereignty.

Die deutsche Afrikapolitik braucht ein neues Ambitionsniveau für kohärentes Handeln. Notwendig ist ein integrierter Ansatz, der unterschiedliche Politikfelder stärker miteinander verzahnt. Dafür braucht es ein ressortübergreifendes Narrativ und neue Institutionen und Verfahren zur Koordinierung der deutschen Afrikapolitik.

Die deutsche Afrikapolitik braucht ein neues Ambitionsniveau für kohärentes Handeln. Notwendig ist ein integrierter Ansatz, der unterschiedliche Politikfelder stärker miteinander verzahnt. Dafür braucht es ein ressortübergreifendes Narrativ und neue Institutionen und Verfahren zur Koordinierung der deutschen Afrikapolitik.

Die deutsche Afrikapolitik braucht ein neues Ambitionsniveau für kohärentes Handeln. Notwendig ist ein integrierter Ansatz, der unterschiedliche Politikfelder stärker miteinander verzahnt. Dafür braucht es ein ressortübergreifendes Narrativ und neue Institutionen und Verfahren zur Koordinierung der deutschen Afrikapolitik.

Der Rat der Europäischen Zentralbank (EZB) hat heute beschlossen, den Leitzins konstant zu halten. Dazu ein Statement von Marcel Fratzscher, Präsident des Deutschen Instituts für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW Berlin):

Die Entscheidung der Europäischen Zentralbank, die Zinsen konstant zu halten, ist nachvollziehbar. Allerdings hat die EZB die Gelegenheit verpasst, ein klares Signal für einen Richtungswechsel in der Geldpolitik zu senden. Die Geldpolitik ist viel zu restriktiv; sie ist die größte Bremse für die wirtschaftliche Erholung im Euroraum und insbesondere in Deutschland. 

Die Inflation sinkt deutlich schneller als erwartet. Dies betrifft auch die Kerninflation, die Inflationserwartungen sind gut verankert. Die schwache wirtschaftliche Entwicklung weltweit und insbesondere in Europa ist der wichtigste Grund dafür, dass die Inflation so schnell sinkt. Das größte Risiko für eine weiterhin zu hohe Inflation dürfte die Lohnentwicklung sein, da Beschäftigte eine starke Verhandlungsposition haben und versuchen werden, ihre erheblichen Reallohnverluste der vergangenen Jahre zumindest auszugleichen. 

Die EZB sollte jetzt einen schnellen Kurswechsel vollziehen. Unter den gegenwärtigen Bedingungen wäre eine erste Zinssenkung im ersten Quartal 2024 und weitere Zinssenkungen im Laufe des Jahres 2024 gerechtfertigt und notwendig. Der neutrale Zins, bei dem die Geldpolitik die Wirtschaft weder stützt noch bremst, liegt um die 2,5 Prozent. Damit sind die Zinsen im Euroraum noch um gut zwei Prozentpunkte zu hoch. Die EZB braucht jetzt Mut und Entschiedenheit, um den Kurswechsel zu vollziehen.

Der SOEPnewsletter Dezember 2023 ist ab sofort in der HTML-Version auf Deutsch verfügbar. Wenn Sie automatisch die neuen Ausgaben per E-Mail erhalten möchten, tragen Sie sich bitte in den Verteiler ein. 

Viel Spaß beim Lesen.

Die Ampel darf im künftigen Etat nicht an der falschen Stelle sparen. Ein Gastbeitrag von Stephan Klingebiel, Leiter des Forschungsprogramms „Inter- und transnationale Kooperation“.

Die Ampel darf im künftigen Etat nicht an der falschen Stelle sparen. Ein Gastbeitrag von Stephan Klingebiel, Leiter des Forschungsprogramms „Inter- und transnationale Kooperation“.

Die Ampel darf im künftigen Etat nicht an der falschen Stelle sparen. Ein Gastbeitrag von Stephan Klingebiel, Leiter des Forschungsprogramms „Inter- und transnationale Kooperation“.

This paper focuses on analysing how Chinese firms operate in Latin America, Asia and Africa in regard to ESG (environmental, social and governance) standards and sustainability issues. How do they respond to the increasing global value chain requirement to incorporate and maintain ESG standards? Is their space for an alignment between Western development cooperation ESG policies, frameworks, strategies and practices and Chinese political and economic stakeholders in the developing world? The paper uses a variety of case studies covering Chinese firms (disaggregated into SOEs (state-owned enterprises) and large, medium and small private sector firms) operating in various sectors in countries across the developing world. It uses a three dimensional framework to analyse different types of Chinese firms in terms of value chain operations covering many of the ESG standards they are required to meet:
1. Supply chain relations (i.e. approach to supporting upgrading of local suppliers);
2. Internal firm processes (i.e. approach to local labour, training and upskilling);
3. Social licence to operate (i.e. approach to meaningfully engaging with local communities taking account of their social and economic needs).
There are examples of Chinese firms behaving according to the negative type casting that has dominated much of the literature. However, Chinese firms in developing countries are fairly flexible and more willing to adapt to ESG standards than conventionally assumed. There are sufficient instances of Chinese firms in host developing countries showing significant movement to alignment on ESG dimensions. Unlike the industrialised world, these firms are not driven by civil society socio-political pressure within China. China’s relationship to ESG has instead been driven by a) geo-political considerations involving the Chinese government’s global presence, and b) primarily economic risk considerations of Chinese lead firms operating internationally – risk relating to raising finance and ensuring that business operations in developing countries can avoid major disruption. For many Chinese lead firms operating in the developing world, ESG is increasingly being perceived as a fundamental risk mitigation tool assisting them to ensure that they are able to maintain continuous, consistent, and predictable economic operations. These tendencies can only be expected to grow much stronger as the Chinese government adopts more ESG standards within guidelines and regulatory frameworks and enforces compliance on Chinese firms operating abroad. As Chinese firms become more open to ESG compliance, this creates a foundation for potential development cooperation alignment with the Chinese government and Chinese lead firms operating in the developing world.

This paper focuses on analysing how Chinese firms operate in Latin America, Asia and Africa in regard to ESG (environmental, social and governance) standards and sustainability issues. How do they respond to the increasing global value chain requirement to incorporate and maintain ESG standards? Is their space for an alignment between Western development cooperation ESG policies, frameworks, strategies and practices and Chinese political and economic stakeholders in the developing world? The paper uses a variety of case studies covering Chinese firms (disaggregated into SOEs (state-owned enterprises) and large, medium and small private sector firms) operating in various sectors in countries across the developing world. It uses a three dimensional framework to analyse different types of Chinese firms in terms of value chain operations covering many of the ESG standards they are required to meet:
1. Supply chain relations (i.e. approach to supporting upgrading of local suppliers);
2. Internal firm processes (i.e. approach to local labour, training and upskilling);
3. Social licence to operate (i.e. approach to meaningfully engaging with local communities taking account of their social and economic needs).
There are examples of Chinese firms behaving according to the negative type casting that has dominated much of the literature. However, Chinese firms in developing countries are fairly flexible and more willing to adapt to ESG standards than conventionally assumed. There are sufficient instances of Chinese firms in host developing countries showing significant movement to alignment on ESG dimensions. Unlike the industrialised world, these firms are not driven by civil society socio-political pressure within China. China’s relationship to ESG has instead been driven by a) geo-political considerations involving the Chinese government’s global presence, and b) primarily economic risk considerations of Chinese lead firms operating internationally – risk relating to raising finance and ensuring that business operations in developing countries can avoid major disruption. For many Chinese lead firms operating in the developing world, ESG is increasingly being perceived as a fundamental risk mitigation tool assisting them to ensure that they are able to maintain continuous, consistent, and predictable economic operations. These tendencies can only be expected to grow much stronger as the Chinese government adopts more ESG standards within guidelines and regulatory frameworks and enforces compliance on Chinese firms operating abroad. As Chinese firms become more open to ESG compliance, this creates a foundation for potential development cooperation alignment with the Chinese government and Chinese lead firms operating in the developing world.

This paper focuses on analysing how Chinese firms operate in Latin America, Asia and Africa in regard to ESG (environmental, social and governance) standards and sustainability issues. How do they respond to the increasing global value chain requirement to incorporate and maintain ESG standards? Is their space for an alignment between Western development cooperation ESG policies, frameworks, strategies and practices and Chinese political and economic stakeholders in the developing world? The paper uses a variety of case studies covering Chinese firms (disaggregated into SOEs (state-owned enterprises) and large, medium and small private sector firms) operating in various sectors in countries across the developing world. It uses a three dimensional framework to analyse different types of Chinese firms in terms of value chain operations covering many of the ESG standards they are required to meet:
1. Supply chain relations (i.e. approach to supporting upgrading of local suppliers);
2. Internal firm processes (i.e. approach to local labour, training and upskilling);
3. Social licence to operate (i.e. approach to meaningfully engaging with local communities taking account of their social and economic needs).
There are examples of Chinese firms behaving according to the negative type casting that has dominated much of the literature. However, Chinese firms in developing countries are fairly flexible and more willing to adapt to ESG standards than conventionally assumed. There are sufficient instances of Chinese firms in host developing countries showing significant movement to alignment on ESG dimensions. Unlike the industrialised world, these firms are not driven by civil society socio-political pressure within China. China’s relationship to ESG has instead been driven by a) geo-political considerations involving the Chinese government’s global presence, and b) primarily economic risk considerations of Chinese lead firms operating internationally – risk relating to raising finance and ensuring that business operations in developing countries can avoid major disruption. For many Chinese lead firms operating in the developing world, ESG is increasingly being perceived as a fundamental risk mitigation tool assisting them to ensure that they are able to maintain continuous, consistent, and predictable economic operations. These tendencies can only be expected to grow much stronger as the Chinese government adopts more ESG standards within guidelines and regulatory frameworks and enforces compliance on Chinese firms operating abroad. As Chinese firms become more open to ESG compliance, this creates a foundation for potential development cooperation alignment with the Chinese government and Chinese lead firms operating in the developing world.

We use new data on political connections from the World Bank Enterprise Surveys to examine the impact of connections on firms’ participation in global value chains (GVCs) for six MENA countries (Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, the West Bank and Gaza, Jordan, and Lebanon). In addition to political connections, we construct several measures of “political influence” based on available data on lobbying and grand corruption. We also explore whether political connections help firms overcome barriers to trade and investment and increase their participation in GVCs at the extensive and intensive margins. Our findings suggest that political connections do matter for firms’ GVC participation. The impact is more pronounced for firms that combine political connections with informal payments to influence policymaking. Our findings on the significance of trade and investment barriers for GVC participation for different categories of firms’ political influence are – however – inconclusive.

We use new data on political connections from the World Bank Enterprise Surveys to examine the impact of connections on firms’ participation in global value chains (GVCs) for six MENA countries (Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, the West Bank and Gaza, Jordan, and Lebanon). In addition to political connections, we construct several measures of “political influence” based on available data on lobbying and grand corruption. We also explore whether political connections help firms overcome barriers to trade and investment and increase their participation in GVCs at the extensive and intensive margins. Our findings suggest that political connections do matter for firms’ GVC participation. The impact is more pronounced for firms that combine political connections with informal payments to influence policymaking. Our findings on the significance of trade and investment barriers for GVC participation for different categories of firms’ political influence are – however – inconclusive.

We use new data on political connections from the World Bank Enterprise Surveys to examine the impact of connections on firms’ participation in global value chains (GVCs) for six MENA countries (Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, the West Bank and Gaza, Jordan, and Lebanon). In addition to political connections, we construct several measures of “political influence” based on available data on lobbying and grand corruption. We also explore whether political connections help firms overcome barriers to trade and investment and increase their participation in GVCs at the extensive and intensive margins. Our findings suggest that political connections do matter for firms’ GVC participation. The impact is more pronounced for firms that combine political connections with informal payments to influence policymaking. Our findings on the significance of trade and investment barriers for GVC participation for different categories of firms’ political influence are – however – inconclusive.

Die Monopolkommission hat heute ihre Sektorgutachten zu den Bereichen Telekommunikation und Post gemeinsam mit der Bundesnetzagentur (BNetzA) vorgestellt. Tomaso Duso, Leiter der Abteilung Unternehmen und Märkte im DIW Berlin und Mitglied der Monopolkommission, kommentiert:

Die Bundesregierung hat sich zu Recht ehrgeizige Gigabit-Ziele gesetzt. Die digitale Infrastruktur ist die Grundvoraussetzung dafür, dass Deutschland bei der digitalen Transformation endlich vorankommt. Allerdings muss im Interesse der Endnutzer*innen in dieser kritischen Phase darauf geachtet werden, dass diese Märkte langfristig für den Wettbewerb offenbleiben und nicht durch kurzfristige Entscheidungen monopolisiert werden. Infrastrukturwettbewerb sollte weiterhin möglich bleiben, und die Glasfasernetze sollten durch einen frei verhandelten und wettbewerbsfreundlichen Netzzugang („Open Access“) weitgehend geöffnet werden. Neben dem Ausbauwettbewerb ist auch der Preiswettbewerb wichtig; ein Verbot des Überbaus von Glasfasernetzen ist nicht zielführend. Im Mobilfunkbereich sollten die demnächst auslaufenden Mobilfunkfrequenzen um maximal drei Jahre verlängert werden. Die dadurch entstehenden Wettbewerbsverzerrungen sollten allerdings durch wettbewerbsfördernde Auflagen ausgeglichen werden.

Zu begrüßen ist auch, dass nach über 25 Jahren endlich eine Novellierung des Postgesetzes gelingen könnte. Der Gesetzesentwurf, den das Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Klimaschutz am 28. November veröffentlicht hat, greift bereits viele Empfehlungen der Monopolkommission auf. Insbesondere im schrumpfenden Briefbereich empfiehlt die Monopolkommission, die Vorgaben zu entschlacken und an die Lebenswirklichkeit der Menschen anzupassen. In dicht besiedelten Regionen sollten die Vorteile von Wettbewerb auch weiterhin genutzt werden. In Regionen, in denen nicht mehrere Netze parallel profitabel sind, können Sendungsströme verschiedener Postdienstleister gebündelt werden. Bei der Frage der arbeits- und sozialrechtlichen Bestimmungen, insbesondere im wachsenden Paketbereich, empfiehlt die Monopolkommission, die Beschäftigten in die Lage zu versetzen, Missstände zu erkennen und anonym zu melden.

Die Weltgemeinschaft hat sich auf der UN-Klimakonferenz COP 28 in Dubai auf eine Abschlusserklärung geeinigt. Energieexpertin Claudia Kemfert, Leiterin der Abteilung Energie, Verkehr, Umwelt im DIW Berlin, kommentiert dieses Einigung wie folgt:

Die COP28-Klimakonferenz war reines Greenwashing. Dies bestätigt allein schon die Abschlusserklärung. Es ist kein "historisches Paket", wie der Konferenzpräsident behauptet – weder im positiven noch im negativen Sinne. „Abkehr“ statt „Ausstieg aus fossilen Energien“ – das ist der anscheinend maximal zu erreichende Minimalkonsens der Weltstaatengemeinschaft. Ein Umstieg ist kein Ausstieg aus fossilen Energien. Die hier gewählten Wortgirlanden lassen zu viele Schlupflöcher, zu viele Hintertüren offen, damit weiterhin fossile Energien genutzt werden können. Zwar ist die Einigung weniger schlimm als der ursprünglich vorgelegte Beschlussentwurf erwarten ließ, aber dennoch unzureichend, um dringend notwendige Klimaziele zu erreichen. Die jetzige Einigung spiegelt nicht die Dringlichkeit wider, die benötigt wird, um aus fossilen Energien auszusteigen und die Emissionen so schnell wie möglich zu senken. Nur eine Verpflichtung zum sofortigen Ausstieg aus fossilen Energien hätte dazu führen können, dass die Klimaziele erreicht werden. Mit dieser Einigung wird das 1,5-Grad-Ziel kaum mehr erreichbar sein.