Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

The European Investment Bank (EIB) not only is the bank of the European Union (EU), it also is the world’s largest multilateral lender. Hitherto rarely at the centre of public attention, the ongoing negotiations on the next EU budget round, the Multiannual Financial Framework (2021-2027) (MFF), have placed the EIB in the midst of the political struggles over form and function of the European development finance architecture.
In the context of the negotiations on the MFF 2021-2027, the European Commission (EC) proposes to reform the financing of its external action. With the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI), the Commission seeks to overhaul a multi-layered and fragmented external financial architecture and to integrate the eleven existing instruments into one. At the origin of the EC’s proposal lies the desire to develop a flexible, consistent, and simplified system (European Commission 2018). Geopolitical interests and considerations about aid effectiveness and impact are the main drivers behind this reform proposal. The debate centres on the allocation of funds and more importantly on the question of how “to do” development finance in the future. The substantive debate on development effectiveness and impact thereby also morphs into an institutional question, with different stakeholders advancing distinct preferences.
Against this backdrop, the paper takes stock of the European development finance landscape and the EIB’s role as part of this landscape. It looks at the interactions between different European development stakeholders and assesses the proposed reform and its potential impact on European development policy. With the EIB at the heart of the European financial architecture, the paper seeks to answer three questions: (1) What is the EIB’s role in the European development landscape and how does it respond to its operational environment? (2) What is the EIB’s institutional relationship with other EU actors. What are the main challenges and points of divergence? (3) What are the competing visions for the future of European development finance and what role will the EIB be able to play in the different scenarios?

The European Investment Bank (EIB) not only is the bank of the European Union (EU), it also is the world’s largest multilateral lender. Hitherto rarely at the centre of public attention, the ongoing negotiations on the next EU budget round, the Multiannual Financial Framework (2021-2027) (MFF), have placed the EIB in the midst of the political struggles over form and function of the European development finance architecture.
In the context of the negotiations on the MFF 2021-2027, the European Commission (EC) proposes to reform the financing of its external action. With the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI), the Commission seeks to overhaul a multi-layered and fragmented external financial architecture and to integrate the eleven existing instruments into one. At the origin of the EC’s proposal lies the desire to develop a flexible, consistent, and simplified system (European Commission 2018). Geopolitical interests and considerations about aid effectiveness and impact are the main drivers behind this reform proposal. The debate centres on the allocation of funds and more importantly on the question of how “to do” development finance in the future. The substantive debate on development effectiveness and impact thereby also morphs into an institutional question, with different stakeholders advancing distinct preferences.
Against this backdrop, the paper takes stock of the European development finance landscape and the EIB’s role as part of this landscape. It looks at the interactions between different European development stakeholders and assesses the proposed reform and its potential impact on European development policy. With the EIB at the heart of the European financial architecture, the paper seeks to answer three questions: (1) What is the EIB’s role in the European development landscape and how does it respond to its operational environment? (2) What is the EIB’s institutional relationship with other EU actors. What are the main challenges and points of divergence? (3) What are the competing visions for the future of European development finance and what role will the EIB be able to play in the different scenarios?

The European Investment Bank (EIB) not only is the bank of the European Union (EU), it also is the world’s largest multilateral lender. Hitherto rarely at the centre of public attention, the ongoing negotiations on the next EU budget round, the Multiannual Financial Framework (2021-2027) (MFF), have placed the EIB in the midst of the political struggles over form and function of the European development finance architecture.
In the context of the negotiations on the MFF 2021-2027, the European Commission (EC) proposes to reform the financing of its external action. With the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI), the Commission seeks to overhaul a multi-layered and fragmented external financial architecture and to integrate the eleven existing instruments into one. At the origin of the EC’s proposal lies the desire to develop a flexible, consistent, and simplified system (European Commission 2018). Geopolitical interests and considerations about aid effectiveness and impact are the main drivers behind this reform proposal. The debate centres on the allocation of funds and more importantly on the question of how “to do” development finance in the future. The substantive debate on development effectiveness and impact thereby also morphs into an institutional question, with different stakeholders advancing distinct preferences.
Against this backdrop, the paper takes stock of the European development finance landscape and the EIB’s role as part of this landscape. It looks at the interactions between different European development stakeholders and assesses the proposed reform and its potential impact on European development policy. With the EIB at the heart of the European financial architecture, the paper seeks to answer three questions: (1) What is the EIB’s role in the European development landscape and how does it respond to its operational environment? (2) What is the EIB’s institutional relationship with other EU actors. What are the main challenges and points of divergence? (3) What are the competing visions for the future of European development finance and what role will the EIB be able to play in the different scenarios?

Ny artikel undersøger forskydningerne i Udenrigsministeriets magt og status fra 1995 til i dag

Die Corona-Pandemie könnte Anlass sein, gemeinsam eine neue globale Partnerschaft zu begründen. Der Gastbeitrag.

Die Corona-Pandemie könnte Anlass sein, gemeinsam eine neue globale Partnerschaft zu begründen. Der Gastbeitrag.

Die Corona-Pandemie könnte Anlass sein, gemeinsam eine neue globale Partnerschaft zu begründen. Der Gastbeitrag.

Refugee response has become an important topic in economic-development policy, but the majority of macro-level analyses do not find an association between country income level and refugee numbers. We argue that the apparent lack of association stems from using the United Nations High Commission for Refugees’ count of refugees as the dependent variable in these analyses. Refugee counts reflect processes that take place in countries of arrival. In contrast, the decision to seek asylum may be more closely linked to conditions, including income, in countries of origin. Drawing on the ‘migration-hump’ concept from economic migration, we model counts of refugees and asylum seekers from conflict-affected countries for the same time period and find that differences in the level of gross domestic product (GDP) predict new asylum applications but not new refugee numbers. We outline reasons for this statistical finding, and discuss theoretical and practical consequences for our understanding of the relationship between country income and asylum-seeking.

Refugee response has become an important topic in economic-development policy, but the majority of macro-level analyses do not find an association between country income level and refugee numbers. We argue that the apparent lack of association stems from using the United Nations High Commission for Refugees’ count of refugees as the dependent variable in these analyses. Refugee counts reflect processes that take place in countries of arrival. In contrast, the decision to seek asylum may be more closely linked to conditions, including income, in countries of origin. Drawing on the ‘migration-hump’ concept from economic migration, we model counts of refugees and asylum seekers from conflict-affected countries for the same time period and find that differences in the level of gross domestic product (GDP) predict new asylum applications but not new refugee numbers. We outline reasons for this statistical finding, and discuss theoretical and practical consequences for our understanding of the relationship between country income and asylum-seeking.

Refugee response has become an important topic in economic-development policy, but the majority of macro-level analyses do not find an association between country income level and refugee numbers. We argue that the apparent lack of association stems from using the United Nations High Commission for Refugees’ count of refugees as the dependent variable in these analyses. Refugee counts reflect processes that take place in countries of arrival. In contrast, the decision to seek asylum may be more closely linked to conditions, including income, in countries of origin. Drawing on the ‘migration-hump’ concept from economic migration, we model counts of refugees and asylum seekers from conflict-affected countries for the same time period and find that differences in the level of gross domestic product (GDP) predict new asylum applications but not new refugee numbers. We outline reasons for this statistical finding, and discuss theoretical and practical consequences for our understanding of the relationship between country income and asylum-seeking.

France and Germany face common issues in global development policy, including climate change, migration and security. At the same time, their aid is spread across similar countries and sectors. Based on a quantitative overlap measure, the study reveals that the Franco-German overlap of aid allocation is more than four times as high as for the average donor. If France and Germany can bridge their divisions, the high overlap provides a momentum to take a leading role for international donor coordination. This is key in view of the opportunities and challenges of 2020 and beyond, including the German presidency of the Council of the European Union (EU), climate change as well as the recent Covid-19 pandemic. Against this background, this study explores the systemic challenges and opportunities for a stronger Franco-German coordination in the framework of four country case studies, where development cooperation of both donors strongly overlaps.
Evidence from Benin, Cameroon, India and Morocco reveals that the complex development systems of the two donors impose differing time horizons and standards of procedure. Moreover, geo-political priorities complicate consensus building. The case studies stress that sustainable Franco-German cooperation only works based on a regular exchange both on the political and operational level. In this regard, the long-lasting partnership between the French and German development banks, Agence Française de Développment (AFD) and Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau Entwicklungsbank (KfW), illustrates how mutual understanding and careful reconciliation of approaches can facilitate cooperation. Combining capacities, France and Germany finance large-scale projects to achieve sustainable development and, this way, crowd-in resources by other development actors from the EU and beyond. Although reconciling standards in technical cooperation is more challenging, the French and German agencies, Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit and Expertise France, are currently negotiating similar measures.

France and Germany face common issues in global development policy, including climate change, migration and security. At the same time, their aid is spread across similar countries and sectors. Based on a quantitative overlap measure, the study reveals that the Franco-German overlap of aid allocation is more than four times as high as for the average donor. If France and Germany can bridge their divisions, the high overlap provides a momentum to take a leading role for international donor coordination. This is key in view of the opportunities and challenges of 2020 and beyond, including the German presidency of the Council of the European Union (EU), climate change as well as the recent Covid-19 pandemic. Against this background, this study explores the systemic challenges and opportunities for a stronger Franco-German coordination in the framework of four country case studies, where development cooperation of both donors strongly overlaps.
Evidence from Benin, Cameroon, India and Morocco reveals that the complex development systems of the two donors impose differing time horizons and standards of procedure. Moreover, geo-political priorities complicate consensus building. The case studies stress that sustainable Franco-German cooperation only works based on a regular exchange both on the political and operational level. In this regard, the long-lasting partnership between the French and German development banks, Agence Française de Développment (AFD) and Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau Entwicklungsbank (KfW), illustrates how mutual understanding and careful reconciliation of approaches can facilitate cooperation. Combining capacities, France and Germany finance large-scale projects to achieve sustainable development and, this way, crowd-in resources by other development actors from the EU and beyond. Although reconciling standards in technical cooperation is more challenging, the French and German agencies, Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit and Expertise France, are currently negotiating similar measures.

France and Germany face common issues in global development policy, including climate change, migration and security. At the same time, their aid is spread across similar countries and sectors. Based on a quantitative overlap measure, the study reveals that the Franco-German overlap of aid allocation is more than four times as high as for the average donor. If France and Germany can bridge their divisions, the high overlap provides a momentum to take a leading role for international donor coordination. This is key in view of the opportunities and challenges of 2020 and beyond, including the German presidency of the Council of the European Union (EU), climate change as well as the recent Covid-19 pandemic. Against this background, this study explores the systemic challenges and opportunities for a stronger Franco-German coordination in the framework of four country case studies, where development cooperation of both donors strongly overlaps.
Evidence from Benin, Cameroon, India and Morocco reveals that the complex development systems of the two donors impose differing time horizons and standards of procedure. Moreover, geo-political priorities complicate consensus building. The case studies stress that sustainable Franco-German cooperation only works based on a regular exchange both on the political and operational level. In this regard, the long-lasting partnership between the French and German development banks, Agence Française de Développment (AFD) and Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau Entwicklungsbank (KfW), illustrates how mutual understanding and careful reconciliation of approaches can facilitate cooperation. Combining capacities, France and Germany finance large-scale projects to achieve sustainable development and, this way, crowd-in resources by other development actors from the EU and beyond. Although reconciling standards in technical cooperation is more challenging, the French and German agencies, Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit and Expertise France, are currently negotiating similar measures.

Zusammenfassung:

Spätestens seit Ende März ist die Corona-Krise endgültig in Deutschland angekommen. Unklar ist aber bis heute, inwieweit die offizielle Fallzahl die tatsächliche Entwicklung der Epidemie widerspiegelt. Nutzen und Kosten einer möglichen Lockerung der einschränkenden Maßnahmen können allerdings nur dann sinnvoll betrachtet werden, wenn die Zahl der Erkrankten und die aktuelle Infektionsgeschwindigkeit bekannt sind. Gleichermaßen benötigen die Gesundheitssysteme in Deutschland und Europa Informationen über die Ausbreitung der Epidemie, um Kapazitäten anzupassen und die Versorgung der Patienten sicherzustellen. Die Entscheidungskriterien, welche Menschen getestet werden, sind in den europäischen Ländern, aber auch innerhalb Deutschlands sehr unterschiedlich. Die derzeit verfügbaren Informationen zu den getesteten Personen sind unzureichend – und damit keine angemessene Grundlage für informierte politische Entscheidungen.

Many have interpreted Chinas international reaction to the coronavirus as a soft power triumph. But the virus is in fact a strain on China´s relation to many international partners

Local populations exposed to radiation from former nuclear test sites

On 9 April, BBC Newsnight presenter Emily Maitlis opened by characterising the Corona pandemic as “a health issue with huge ramifications for social welfare, and a welfare issue with huge ramifications for public health.” But what does a response to COVID-19 look like in the absence of functioning public health and welfare systems? Some early insights can be gleaned from Somalia, a country that since the early 1990s has suffered persistent state collapse, identity and religious conflict, and a series of humanitarian crises. Has the virus changed life in Somalia ‘as we know it’, or is it one crisis amongst many?