Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

Zusammenfassung:

31. Oktober 2024 – Am 5. November 2024 haben die US-Amerikaner*innen die Wahl zwischen der demokratischen Präsidentschaftskandidatin Kamala Harris und dem republikanischen Kandidaten Donald Trump. Beide unterscheiden sich auch in Fragen der Energie-, Umwelt- und Klimapolitik stark. Diese Politikfelder wurden im bisherigen Wahlkampf kaum beachtet, die entsprechenden Positionen von Harris und Trump sind der breiten Öffentlichkeit bisher wenig bekannt. Daher beleuchtet dieses DIW aktuell einige der wichtigsten Aspekte und gibt einen Ausblick, was unter einer Präsidentin Harris beziehungsweise einem Präsidenten Trump zu erwarten wäre. In jedem Fall muss damit gerechnet werden, dass die USA auch in den nächsten Jahren ihre starke fossile Energieproduktion aufrechterhalten werden. Eine beschleunigte Dekarbonisierung ist nicht zu erwarten, obwohl die Klimaziele – denen die USA (derzeit noch) verpflichtet sind – ohne deutliche Emissionsminderungen nicht erreicht werden können.

This policy paper explores Russia’s use of the Wagner Group in Africa, highlighting how the concept of plausible deniability allows the Kremlin to expand its influence in regions such as Mali and the Central African Republic. By distancing itself from direct responsibility for controversial military actions, Russia is able to exert significant geopolitical control. The paper also examines the continuation of Wagner Group operations following the death of its leader, Yevgeny Prigozhin, and discusses the broader implications of these developments for Africa and the Mediterranean region.

• The Wagner Group’s operations continued after the death of its leader, Yevgeny Prigozhin, with increased integration into Russia’s Ministry of Defence, signaling Russia’s deeper involvement in the continent’s security dynamics.
• Moscow’s activities in Africa signal a broader strategy to challenge Western influence by supporting local regimes and displacing Western control over critical resources, while securing Russia’s standing as a dominant player in the region’s security and economic landscape.
• Russia has secured access to valuable natural resources through its African interventions, extracting billions in gold and pursuing strategic control over uranium in countries like Niger. These resources likely help fund Russia’s broader geopolitical ambitions, including its war efforts in Ukraine.
• Russia offers “pragmatic engagement” as a substitute for dwindling Western aid in Africa, capitalizing on the gap left by reduced Western support to build influence through military assistance, resource extraction, and infrastructure projects.

Read here in pdf the Policy brief by Natalia Tellidou, Research Fellow at ELIAMEP’s Mediterranean Programme.

Russia’s Strategic Push into Africa

In 2020, the world witnessed a record 56 unique conflicts, the highest number in a single year since 1946.[1] Over half of these were internationalized civil wars, where external powers sponsor local actors to fight on their behalf. This practice, known as conflict delegation, has become a strategic tool for powerful states looking to extend their influence without direct involvement. As a result, geopolitical tensions have escalated, with proxy wars becoming a common feature of modern conflict.

One of the most prominent players in these proxy wars is Russia, which relies heavily on private military security contractors (PMSCs) like the Wagner Group. These contractors provide a range of services, including intelligence gathering, military training, logistical support, and infrastructure protection. Operating in countries like Mali and the Central African Republic (CAR), the Wagner Group has supplied military training and assistance while enabling Russia to maintain plausible deniability. By relying on these contractors, Russia can distance itself from controversial actions, all while securing a foothold in these key regions.

Even after the death of Wagner’s leader, Yevgeny Prigozhin, the group’s operations have continued, underscoring the strategic importance of their mission. Russia has adapted to ensure these activities persist, maintaining its involvement in ongoing conflicts and protecting its interests in Africa (Figure 1). Beyond military influence, Russia reaps significant rewards from these operations, including increased security leverage, access to critical natural resources, and the ability to offer African states an alternative to dwindling Western aid.

By multiplying risks in the Global South, Russia seeks to undermine the United States and its allies, positioning itself as a dominant force in the region.

By multiplying risks in the Global South, Russia seeks to undermine the United States and its allies, positioning itself as a dominant force in the region.

Considering all this, this policy brief will first explore how the Wagner Group became instrumental in providing military support to countries like Mali and the CAR followed by an analysis of the post- Prigozhin period and the operations. Finally, the discussion will focus on what Russia gains from these activities—enhanced security leverage, access to valuable natural resources, and a pragmatic engagement to the diminishing development aid offered by Western countries.

Figure 1: Where and How Wanger Group Has Engaged in Africa. Sources: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, ACLED, Kathrin Buchholz https://www.statista.com/chart/30665/wagner-group-engagement-africa/

Wagner Group in Africa: A Tool for Russia’s Military and Political Ambitions 

 

Long before the war in Ukraine, Russia was already actively expanding its influence in the Global South, particularly through the Wagner Group, that allows Moscow to operate in conflict zones with plausible deniability.

Long before the war in Ukraine, Russia was already actively expanding its influence in the Global South, particularly through the Wagner Group, that allows Moscow to operate in conflict zones with plausible deniability. Plausible deniability refers to a strategy in which a sponsoring state avoids direct responsibility for its involvement in foreign conflicts[2]. By covertly supporting proxies, as the Wagner Group, the sponsor-state can reap the benefits of a potential victory without facing the risks and costs associated with direct intervention, including defeat or international condemnation. This approach allows the state to distance itself from the consequences of its actions, evading criticism from both international and domestic audiences. As a result, plausible deniability becomes a key incentive for states to engage in proxy wars. By leveraging Wagner’s presence, Russia has been able to support regimes and shape outcomes while distancing itself from the group’s often controversial and illegal activities.

Take Mali, for example. Since December 2021, Wagner has been actively involved in the country’s security landscape, invited by the Malian government, which had grown frustrated with international forces like the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali, the UN peacekeeping mission (MINUSMA) and French troops. Wagner’s presence was intended to stabilize the country and support the peace process following the 2012 crisis. At its peak, over 2,000 Wagner personnel were stationed in Mali, providing military support, handling air force operations, and securing the ruling elite.

Wagner’s primary objective was to strengthen Mali’s offensive capabilities, particularly in the conflict-ridden northern region. Unlike international forces, Wagner and the Malian government reject population-centric, “soft” approaches to counterinsurgency. Wagner forces are notorious for their violent tactics, especially towards civilians, and they often coerce prisoners and locals into collaborating by providing intelligence or leading them to insurgent hideouts. While the French-backed reconciliation process with northern Tuareg rebels sought a more diplomatic solution, the Malian government—supported by Wagner—favored a military strategy, fueling renewed conflict in the north. Without Wagner, Mali’s armed forces would struggle to challenge insurgent control, and the demand for Wagner’s expertise in training and air force operations continues to grow.

Politically and socially, the group has exploited widespread discontent with the security situation and anti-French sentiments, positioning itself as a necessary force for stability.

Wagner’s impact in Mali is not confined to military efforts alone. Politically and socially, the group has exploited widespread discontent with the security situation and anti-French sentiments, positioning itself as a necessary force for stability. This multifaceted approach extends Russia’s influence far beyond the battlefield.

A similar pattern can be observed in the Central African Republic (CAR). Since January 2018, Wagner—alongside another Russian PMC, Patriot—has provided military training and security in exchange for access to valuable resources like gold, uranium, and diamonds. Wagner has been instrumental in bolstering the regime of President Faustin-Archange Touadéra, particularly during a 2020 rebel incursion into Bangui, where the group played a critical role in defending the government. Wagner has since become a cornerstone of Touadéra’s war efforts, helping him reclaim rebel-held territories.

However, Wagner’s involvement in CAR has exacerbated violence and militarization, much like in Mali. Russian mercenaries have instructed local militias to merge with the national army and function as self-defense units. These units, however, soon became rogue, committing widespread human rights abuses against civilians. Wagner’s presence has not only intensified the violence but also fragmented the region’s security environment, further entrenching instability.

In both Mali and the CAR, Wagner’s role extends beyond providing military support—it is about leveraging local grievances, securing valuable resources, and deepening Russia’s influence while operating in the shadows. The group’s activities have serious implications for the stability of these regions and underscore Russia’s strategic use of conflict delegation to assert itself on the global stage. 

Post-Prigozhin Dynamics 

While disruptions following the group’s mutiny and Prigozhin’s death caused some temporary instability—such as delayed salaries and suspended missions—operations quickly resumed, signaling the group’s resilience.

Despite the death of Yevgeny Prigozhin, the Wagner Group’s operations across Africa have persisted, though not without adjustments. The “Expeditionary Corps,” Wagner’s key operational unit, continued its activities in countries like Sudan, Niger, and Burkina Faso, maintaining its original objectives and utilizing the same resources. While disruptions following the group’s mutiny and Prigozhin’s death caused some temporary instability—such as delayed salaries and suspended missions—operations quickly resumed, signaling the group’s resilience. 

In Mali, for instance, after internal disagreements, Wagner reached a new agreement to work directly under the Russian Ministry of Defence. This shift allowed the Ministry to supply Wagner with essential military assets—vehicles, planes, and ammunition—at no cost, reinforcing Wagner’s role in the region. Moreover, the Ministry of Defence has sought additional means of support, including potential collaborations with other groups like Redut, which operate similarly to Wagner.

Following Prigozhin’s mutiny, the Kremlin formally moved Wagner’s African operations under the control of Russian military intelligence, the GRU. This reorganization saw senior Russian officials, including General Averyanov and Deputy Defence Minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov, visiting former Wagner strongholds in Africa in early September. Far from signaling the end of Russia’s involvement, Prigozhin’s death marked a deeper entrenchment of Russian influence in the region. Wagner’s activities have since been rebranded under the Ministry of Defence as the “Africa Corps,” reflecting this increased oversight[3].

Russia’s diplomatic engagement has also expanded. In January 2024, Chad’s junta leader, Mahamat Idriss Déby, met with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow to discuss strengthening bilateral ties. This meeting is particularly significant, as Chad had previously maintained a pro-Western stance. These developments indicate that Russia’s strategy in Africa, spearheaded by the Wagner Group and its successors, remains robust and continues to adapt to evolving geopolitical realities.

Strategic Returns: Russia’s Gains from its African Engagement

Russia’s involvement in Africa through the Wagner Group brings several strategic advantages. First and foremost, it strengthens Russia’s security posture. One clear example is Russia’s ongoing effort to establish a naval base at Port Sudan, which would grant Russia vital access to the Red Sea. Although the agreement has faced setbacks due to United States pressure, Russia remains determined to secure this critical foothold, signaling its broader ambitions in the region.

Secondly, Russia gains access to valuable natural resources. Over the past two years, Russia has reportedly extracted $2.5 billion worth of gold from Africa, with much of this wealth likely funding its war in Ukraine, according to the Blood Gold Report. Russian fighters, many of them former Wagner mercenaries, also took control of the Intahaka gold mine in northern Mali, a strategically significant asset long contested by various armed groups. In Niger, Russia is actively pursuing uranium concessions, aiming to reduce French influence over these critical resources. The broader pattern is clear: Russia seeks to challenge Western dominance over Africa’s minerals and energy reserves, positioning itself as a key player in this global resource competition.

Russia presents itself as a “pragmatic engagement” to diminishing Western development aid.

Lastly, Russia presents itself as a “pragmatic engagement” to diminishing Western development aid. With countries like the UK significantly cutting back on foreign aid, many African nations are turning to Russia as a reliable partner. By filling the void left by the West, Russia secures both influence and access to resources, while offering these nations military assistance, infrastructure projects, and less conditional diplomatic engagement. This approach allows Russia to build alliances, exert political influence, and further undermine Western presence in the region.

Implications for Global Security: Russia’s Growing Role in Africa

In conclusion, Russia’s strategy in Africa, executed largely through the Wagner Group and other proxies, represents a multifaceted attempt to enhance its geopolitical influence while undermining the global standing of the United States and its allies. By providing military support, gaining control over vital natural resources, and offering a pragmatic alternative to Western aid, Russia is positioning itself as a dominant force across the continent. 

Moving forward, it is crucial for policymakers and international actors to recognize the implications of Russia’s growing influence and to respond accordingly.

The death of Yevgeny Prigozhin did little to disrupt these plans, as Russia’s operations have not only persisted but have expanded under direct Kremlin oversight. This deepened involvement, combined with its strategic maneuvering in key areas like Mali, the Central African Republic, and Chad, ensures that Russia remains a pivotal player in the Global South. Moving forward, it is crucial for policymakers and international actors to recognize the implications of Russia’s growing influence and to respond accordingly. The stakes are not only regional but have far-reaching consequences for global security and resource access.

[1] Trends in Armed Conflict, 1946-2020 is published by the Peace Research Institute Oslo. Figure 1, page 2, presents the number of battle deaths and conflicts.

[2] Mark Galeotti presents the benefits Russia reaps from covert proxy relationships highlighting how plausible deniability was expertly used in Ukraine, before the military invasion in 2022.

[3] Wagner Group is a reference to the composer Richard Wagner. The reasons why this name was chosen remains a mystery.

 

References

‘A Mixed Picture: How Mali Views the Wagner Group’. 2024. 11.10.2024. https://rusi.orghttps://rusi.org

Arduino, Alessandro. 2024. ‘Wagner Group Is Now Africa Corps. What This Means for Russia’s Operations on the Continent’. The Conversation. 14.02.2024. https://theconversation.com/wagner-group-is-now-africa-corps-what-this-means-for-russias-operations-on-the-continent-223253.

Bloomberg.Com. 2024. ‘Russia Raises the Stakes in Tussle Over Africa’, 30.01.2024. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/newsletters/2024-01-30/russia-raises-the-stakes-in-tussle-over-africa.

‘Decoding the Wagner Group: Analyzing the Role of Private Military Security Contractors in Russian Proxy Warfare’. n.d. New America. Accessed 11.10.2024. http://newamerica.org/future-security/reports/decoding-wagner-group-analyzing-role-private-military-security-contractors-russian-proxy-warfare/.

Doxsee, Catrina. 2023. ‘How Does the Conflict in Sudan Affect Russia and the Wagner Group?’, April. https://www.csis.org/analysis/how-does-conflict-sudan-affect-russia-and-wagner-group.

Galeotti, Mark. 2016. ‘Hybrid, Ambiguous, and Non-Linear? How New Is Russia’s “New Way of War”?’ Small Wars & Insurgencies 27 (2): 282–301. https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2015.1129170.

‘Infographic: Where & How Wagner Group Has Engaged in Africa’. 2023. Statista Daily Data. 24 August 2023. https://www.statista.com/chart/30665/wagner-group-engagement-africa.

Jones, Seth G., Catrina Doxsee, Brian Katz, Eric McQueen, and Joe Moye. 2021. ‘Russia’s Corporate Soldiers: The Global Expansion of Russia’s Private Military Companies’, July. https://www.csis.org/analysis/russias-corporate-soldiers-global-expansion-russias-private-military-companies.

Liik, Kadri. 2023. ‘From Russia with Love: How Moscow Courts the Global South’. ECFR. 21.12.2023. https://ecfr.eu/publication/from-russia-with-love-how-moscow-courts-the-global-south/.

‘Moscow’s Mercenary Wars: The Expansion of Russian Private Military Companies’. 2023. Moscow’s Mercenary Wars: The Expansion of Russian Private Military Companies. Accessed 11.10.2024. https://russianpmcs.csis.org.

Reuters. 2024. ‘Putin Meets Chad Junta Leader as Russia Competes with France in Africa’, 24 January 2024, sec. Africa. https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/putin-meets-chad-junta-leader-russia-competes-with-france-africa-2024-01-24/.

‘Russia Is Using the Soviet Playbook in the Global South to Challenge the West – and It Is Working | Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank’. 2024. 16.05.2024. https://www.chathamhouse.org/2024/05/russia-using-soviet-playbook-global-south-challenge-west-and-it-working.

Saucedo, Natalia. 2023. ‘Russia’s Influence in Mali’. Human Rights Foundation (blog). 11.08.2023. https://hrf.org/russias-influence-in-mali/.

‘Stop Taking the Global South for Granted | Wilson Center’. 2024. Accessed 11.10.2024. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/stop-taking-global-south-granted.

‘The Blood Gold Report’. n.d. Blood Gold Report. Accessed 11.10.2024. https://bloodgoldreport.com/.

‘Wagner in Africa: How the Russian Mercenary Group Has Rebranded’. 2024, 20.02.2024. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-68322230.

Watts, Stephen, Bryan Frederick, Nathan Chandler, Mark Toukan, Christian Curriden, Erik E. Mueller, Edward Geist, et al. 2023. ‘Proxy Warfare in Strategic Competition: Military Implications’. RAND Corporation. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA307-3.html.

 

[1] Trends in Armed Conflict, 1946-2020 is published by the Peace Research Institute Oslo. Figure 1, page 2, presents the number of battle deaths and conflicts.

[2] Mark Galeotti presents the benefits Russia reaps from covert proxy relationships highlighting how plausible deniability was expertly used in Ukraine, before the military invasion in 2022.

[3] Wagner Group is a reference to the composer Richard Wagner. The reasons why this name was chosen remains a mystery.

Based on 20 countries across Europe, North America and North Africa, this report synthesises key trends and patterns of national policy approaches towards migrant irregularity, highlighting commonalities and differences across various contexts. In particular, this report examines three key research questions: how have irregular migration policies evolved over time and in response to what; what pathways into and out of irregularity have these policies produced or aimed to address; and what challenges have hindered policy implementation. In doing so, the report aims to contextualise irregular migration policy changes, as well as how such policies can channel migrants into or out of irregularity.

 

Hendow, M., Qaisrani, A., Rössl, L., Schütze, T., Kraler, A., Ahmad Yar, A. W., Bircan, T., Oruc, N., Mohan, S. S., Triandafyllidou, A., Jauhiainen, J. S., Smolander, S., Toivonen, H., Cyrus, N., Nikolova, M., Desmond, A., Heylin, R., Cacciapaglia, M., Bonizzoni, P., … Sohst, R. R. (2024). Comparing national laws and policies addressing irregular migrants. In MIrreM Working Paper No. 6. Krems: University for Continuing Education Krems (Danube University Krems). https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.10782561

The Public Database on Irregular Migration Stock Estimates (the Database) provides an inventory and critical appraisal of country-level estimates of irregular migration stocks in 13 European countries, the United States and Canada for the period 2008 to 2023. It is a deliverable of the MIrreM project, which is a follow-up to Clandestino. Clandestino covered the period 2000-2008.

Kierans, D., Vargas-Silva, C., Ahmad-Yar, A. W., Bircan, T., Cacciapaglia, M., Carvalho, J., Cassain, L., Cyrus, N., Desmond, A., Fihel, A., Finotelli, C., Gonzalez Ramos, M. P., Heylin, R., Jauhiainen, J., Kraler, A., Leerkes, A., Nikolova, M., Rössl, L., Santos, S., … Sohst, R. R. (2024). MIrreM Public Database on Irregular Migration Stock Estimates (Version 2) [Data set]. Krems: University for Continuing Education Krems (Danube University Krems). https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.13856861

Siruno, L., Leerkes, A., Badre, A., Bircan, T., Brunovská, E., Cacciapaglia, M., Carvalho, J., Cassain, L., Cyrus, N., Desmond, A., Fihel, A., Finotelli, C., Ghio, D., Hendow, M., Heylin, R., Jauhiainen, J.S., Jovanovic, K., Kierans, D., Mohan, S.S., Nikolova, M., Oruc, N., Ramos, M.P.G., Rössl, L., Sağiroğlu, A.Z., Santos, S., Schütze, T., & Sohst, R.R. (2024) MIrreM Public Database on Irregular Migration Flow Estimates and Indicators. Krems: University for Continuing Education Krems (Danube University Krems). https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.10813413

 

This brief provides an abridged overview of the national policy landscape on irregular migration in Greece, based on a more extensive policy analysis. It also provides an overview of the main types of migrant irregularity that emerge and the pathways into and out of irregularity, including regularisations as relevant. Annexed to this deliverable is also an overview of the mapped legal and policy frameworks.

Nikolova, M. (2024). MIrreM Country Brief on Migration Policy Context – Greece. In MIrreM Report. Krems: University for Continuing Education Krems (Danube University Krems). https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.12606423

Die Abteilung Energie, Verkehr, Umwelt des Deutschen Instituts für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW Berlin) sucht für das Forschungsprojekt „Modeling Infrastructure Development & Strategies for Expansion of Trade (MINDSET) for Clean H2“ (MINDSET_Clean_H2) zum nächstmöglichen Zeitpunkt

eine studentische Hilfskraft (w/m/div)

(für 10 Wochenstunden)

Das Projekt wird gemeinsam mit der TU München und der französischen Hochschule Centrale Supélec durchgeführt. Im Projekt untersuchen wir, inwiefern strategisches Verhalten den Markthochlauf und den Handel von Wasserstoff beeinflussen wird. Am DIW Berlin beschäftigen wir uns u.a. mit dem internationalen Handel mit Wasserstoff, seiner Modellierung und Auswirkungen auf potenzielle Exportländer. Darüber hinaus werden Themen wie Preise und Infrastrukturbedarf erforscht. Das Projekt sucht gleichzeitig den Dialog und regelmäßigen Austausch mit Praxispartner*innen, der vom DIW Berlin organisiert wird.

Das Statistische Bundesamt hat heute bekannt gegeben, dass die deutsche Wirtschaft im dritten Quartal um 0,2 Prozent gegenüber dem Vorquartal gewachsen ist. Dazu eine Einschätzung von Jan-Christopher Scherer, Konjunkturexperte und Leiter der Prognose für die deutsche Wirtschaft im Deutschen Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW Berlin):

Die deutsche Wirtschaft sendet vorsichtige Signale der Belebung. Nach dem leichten Zuwachs der Wirtschaftsleistung im dritten Quartal umschifft Deutschland die technische Rezession. Gleichwohl bleibt die konjunkturelle Entwicklung insgesamt eingetrübt, denn gleichzeitig war das Bruttoinlandsprodukt im zweiten Quartal nun stärker rückläufig als zuvor ausgewiesen. Dennoch geben die heutigen Zahlen Grund zu vorsichtigem Optimismus, denn mit dem Konsum konnte die wichtigste inländische Komponente zulegen. Auch zum Jahresende dürfte der Konsum die konjunkturelle Dynamik stützen, da die Verbraucher*innen von der mittlerweile deutlich gesunkenen Inflation und den robusten Tariflohnsteigerungen profitieren und sich die Konsumstimmung weiter deutlich aufgehellt hat. Von den Investitionen sind trotz der eingeleiteten Zinswende der Europäischen Zentralbank aber weiterhin keine Impulse zu erwarten: Vor allem das Verarbeitende Gewerbe leidet unter der schlechten Stimmung in den Unternehmen und der anhaltend hohen politischen Unsicherheit. Insgesamt dürfte die deutsche Wirtschaft 2024 stagnieren.

Anlässlich des heute stattfindenden Industriegipfels bei Bundeskanzler Scholz und des Treffens der FDP-Fraktion mit Wirtschaftsverbänden ein Statement von Marcel Fratzscher, Präsident des Deutschen Instituts für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW Berlin):

Sowohl der Industriegipfel bei Bundeskanzler Scholz als auch das Treffen der FDP-Fraktion mit Wirtschaftsverbänden sind gute Initiativen, um das stark angeschlagene gegenseitige Vertrauen zu verbessern. Die deutsche Wirtschaft war in den letzten 80 Jahren immer dann erfolgreich, wenn Arbeitgeber, Arbeitnehmer und Politik vertrauensvoll zusammengearbeitet haben. Dieses Vertrauen fehlt derzeit – weil die Bundesregierung mutlos agiert und sie nicht mit einer Stimme spricht und weil viele Entscheider in den Unternehmen ihrer Verantwortung nicht gerecht werden. Ohne mehr Verantwortung und Vertrauen wird Deutschland nicht aus dieser wirtschaftlichen und politischen Krise herausfinden, stattdessen würde sich diese verschärfen.

Die beiden Treffen heute sollten drei Ziele verfolgen: Zum ersten benötigen wir dringend einen Schulterschluss zwischen Politik, Wirtschaft und Zivilgesellschaft zu den zentralen Prioritäten in der Wirtschaftspolitik. Wir benötigen eine Verbindlichkeit der Absprachen von allen Seiten und keine vagen Versprechungen und gegenseitigen Schuldzuweisungen. Zum zweiten braucht es den Mut für eine wirtschaftspolitische Kehrtwende mit einem massiven Investitionsprogramm in Infrastruktur, Innovation, Bildung und Klimaschutz. Die Bundesregierung sollte ihre Obsession mit der Schuldenbremse aufgeben. Wirtschaft und Bürger*innen benötigen eine starke und glaubwürdige Entlastung, so dass Investitionen und Konsum die Wirtschaft wiederbeleben und die Transformation zum Erfolg führen. Dafür sind die jüngsten Vorschläge des Bundeswirtschaftsministers ein guter erster Schritt, der nun von der gesamten Bundesregierung finalisiert und zügig umgesetzt werden sollte.

Zum dritten sollte die Bundesregierung einen Kurswechsel in ihrer Industriepolitik vollziehen und ihre Klientelpolitik beenden. Die Bundesregierung sollte nicht einzelnen Unternehmen oder Branchen mit Subventionen unter die Arme greifen, sich in die Entscheidung einzelner Unternehmen einmischen und existierende Strukturen versuchen zu zementieren. Alle Unternehmen – insbesondere kleine und mittlere Unternehmen auch in den Dienstleistungsbranchen – brauchen bessere Rahmenbedingungen mit weniger Bürokratie, geringeren Steuern und einer besseren Infrastruktur.

Die Bundesregierung hat noch immer die Möglichkeit, einen Kurswechsel in ihrer Wirtschaftspolitik zu vollziehen und Deutschland erfolgreich aus dieser Krise zu führen. Nur durch Mut und entschiedenes Handeln aller Seiten kann Vertrauen wiederhergestellt und die deutsche Wirtschaft zukunftsfähig werden.

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IPI in partnership with Sasakawa Peace Foundation USA, cohosted a policy forum on “National Action Plans for National Challenges: Addressing Environmental Crises through the WPS Agenda” on October 24th.

The women, peace, and security (WPS) agenda has recently expanded to include issues outside of “traditional conflict,” such as climate change and environmental disasters. As the agenda has evolved, this expansion has become a key part of contextualizing and applying WPS principles and priorities in different countries. However, despite recognizing that preparing for disasters and climate emergencies are gendered processes, few national action plans (NAPs) on WPS incorporate specific language about disasters. Incorporating disaster preparedness and climate considerations into NAPs is an important way to consider peace through a feminist viewpoint and define it as more than just the absence of violent conflict. NAPs should be tailored to a specific country’s context and integrating disaster risk reduction (DRR) or climate dynamics more broadly can be a powerful way to make an NAP relevant to a country’s internal dynamics. Panelists at the event explored how the WPS agenda has been expanded to include climate and environmental concerns and how different member states contextualize these issues within their NAPs.

Welcoming Remarks:
Adam Lupel, Vice President and COO, International Peace Institute

Opening Remarks:
Shanti Shoji, Director of Programs, Sasakawa Peace Foundation USA
Irene Fellin, Special Representative for Women, Peace and Security, NATO 

Speakers:
Sho Ono, Minister, Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Permanent Mission of Japan to the UN
Katrina Fotovat, Principal Deputy Director, Office of Global Women’s Issues, US Department of State
Japhet Eichel, Associate Expert, Climate, Peace and Security, UN Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs
Maryruth Belsey-Priebe, Co-Founder, aXXelerate
Harriette Williams Bright, WPS Humanitarian Action Compact Lead, UN Women

Interventions from the floor:
Miwako Kitamura, Researcher (specially appointed), International Research Institute of Disaster Science, Tohoku University
Dalal El Taher, Board Member at Syria Civil Defence, The White Helmets (Virtual)

Moderator:
Phoebe Donnelly, Senior Fellow and Head of Women, Peace and Security, International Peace Institute

The post National Action Plans for National Challenges: Addressing Environmental Crises through the WPS Agenda appeared first on International Peace Institute.

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IPI in partnership with the Berghof Foundation, cohosted a policy forum on “Building Bridges for Nonviolent Change: The Role of Women as Insider Mediators” onn October 23rd. This event was held the day before the UN Security Council open debate on women, peace and security (WPS) and focused on the vital need to increase women’s participation in formal mediation processes.

This policy forum exposed multiple stakeholders in New York to the crucial work of women as informal bridge-builders in conflict situations, and discussed strategies for including their expertise in formal mediation processes. At the event, the Berghof Foundation launched research reports and a policy brief on the role of women mediators in recent protests in Venezuela, Thailand, and Iraq. These reports offer specific and actionable recommendations for how international donors and practitioners can fulfill capacity building and support needs to empower these women to sustain and deepen their engagement, thereby expanding the potential for achieving peaceful change and conflict transformation.

Opening Remarks:
Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein, President and CEO, International Peace Institute
H.E. Jacqueline O’Neill, Canada’s Ambassador for Women, Peace and Security
H.E. Pascale Christine Baeriswyl, Permanent Representative of Switzerland to the UN
H.E. Arlene Tickner, Ambassador-At-Large for Gender Issues and Global Feminist Politics, Government of Colombia

Speakers:
Rachel Gasser, Senior Adviser, Negotiation and Mediation Support, Berghof Foundation
Isabella Picón, Activist and Researcher (Venezuela)
Nang Raw Zahkung, Peace Practitioner and Facilitator (Myanmar)
Tahani Abbas Ali Balalelsheib, Women Activist and Human Rights Defender (Sudan)
Sarah Taylor, Policy Specialist, Women, Peace and Security and Resilience, UN Women

Moderator:
Phoebe Donnelly, Senior Fellow and Head of Women, Peace and Security, International Peace Institute

The post Building Bridges for Nonviolent Change: The Role of Women as Insider Mediators appeared first on International Peace Institute.

Bundeswirtschaftsminister Robert Habeck hat heute seine Ideen für eine Modernisierungsagenda vorgestellt. Dazu ein Statement von Marcel Fratzscher, Präsident des Deutschen Instituts für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW Berlin):

Der von Bundeswirtschaftsminister Robert Habeck vorgeschlagene Deutschlandfonds für Investitionen und Infrastruktur verfolgt die richtigen Ziele. Seit Jahrzehnten ist die Industrie eine der zentralen Stärken der deutschen Wirtschaft und sichert den Wohlstand des Landes. Viele Industrieunternehmen, vor allem mittelständische „Hidden Champions“, behaupten sich durch Offenheit und hohe Exportquoten im internationalen Wettbewerb. Sie prägen das Qualitätsmerkmal „Made in Germany“. Viele Industriezweige sind hoch innovativ und schaffen positive Synergien für die gesamte Wirtschaft. Daher ist es klug, die Industrie zu stärken und die Deindustrialisierung zu verhindern. 

Doch der Fonds ist das falsche Instrument, um die wirtschaftliche Transformation zu fördern. Subventionen könnten vor allem Mitnahmeeffekte erzeugen, ohne zusätzliche Investitionen oder Innovationen zu fördern. Manche Unternehmen könnten sich auf solche staatlichen Unterstützungen verlassen, statt Risiken bei Innovationen und Produktentwicklungen einzugehen. Dies mindert den Wettbewerb und bremst die notwendige technologische und wirtschaftliche Transformation.  

Unternehmen müssen mehr Verantwortung übernehmen und vergangene Versäumnisse korrigieren, etwa in der Automobilbranche. Die Politik muss nach zwei verschlafenen Jahrzehnten endlich massiv in Infrastruktur, Bildung und Innovation investieren. Diese Bundesregierung hat mehr Versäumnisse korrigiert als die vier vorherigen. Sie sollte jedoch nicht mit individuellen Subventionen für wenige Branchen helfen, sondern die Rahmenbedingungen für alle Unternehmen verbessern. Dies erfordert eine Investitionsoffensive von mehr als 100 Milliarden Euro jährlich. Die Politik, insbesondere die Opposition, muss die schädliche Schuldenbremse klug reformieren – und zwar jetzt, und nicht erst nach der nächsten Bundestagswahl. 

Die ebenfalls vorgeschlagene „Deutschland-App“ zur Bündelung aller Sozialleistungen ist eine exzellente Initiative, der Teufel dürfte jedoch in den Details der Umsetzbarkeit stecken.

The Transatlantic Periscope is an interactive, multimedia tool that brings together expert commentary, high-quality media coverage, official policy documents, quantitative data, social media posts, and gray literature. It will provide on a monthly basis a summary of the most important news concerning the Greek-US relations, as reflected in the media. Below you will find an overview for September 2024.

US interest in utilizing Alexandroupoli as a key liquified natural gas (LNG) transportation hub was highlighted by the agreement reached between the American company Venture Global and the Greek company Gastrade on September 17. According to this agreement, Venture Global will store its LNG in 25% of the total capacity of the new floating storage and regasification unit (FSRU). One million metric tons of LNG per year from Venture Global’s terminals in Louisiana will be unloaded at the Alexandroupoli FSRU facilities to be regasified and channeled through the Greek pipelines to the markets of Southeast Europe, thus strengthening the region’s security of supply.

On the defence front, according to Reuters, the Greek government plans to buy Switchblade drones from the United States to further strengthen its armed forces. Vassilis Nedos (Kathimerini) reports that the Defense Ministry’s decision to procure US-manufactured Switchblade-type roving ammunition for the Special Warfare Command will soon head to Parliament for approval. The total cost amounts to US$75 million, of which the US will cover US$50 million, with Greece bearing the remaining US$25 million.

Still on the defence front, in an interview with Kathimerini’s Stavros Ioannidis. J.R. McDonald, Lockheed Martin’s Vice President for F-35 Business Development, confirmed that the Greek F-35 program is on track, with the signing of the contract between Lockheed Martin and the US government for the start of production expected to take place next. Greece initially aims to acquire a squadron of 20 fighter jets, with an option to procure an additional 20 F-35s after 2030.

More at: https://transatlanticperiscope.org/relationship/GR#

The climate crisis is a child rights crisis. Children face distinct and heightened risks from the escalating im- pacts of climate change and increase in disasters. As disasters increase in number and severity around the world, children and young people in several countries but also in Greece bear the greatest burdens that can last a lifetime. They are often impacted first and most severely by crisis in their education, livelihoods, health and wellbeing. Girls, women, people with disabilities, displaced children, and families living under the poverty line are especially vulnerable. Disasters threaten all children’s inherent rights guaranteed in the Convention on the Rights of the Child to life, survival, protection, development, participation and free expression. The pres- ent report provides an analysis of the state of climate in Greece; a review of the climate policy and regulatory framework assessing the extent of child sensitivity and inclusivity; a children’s vulnerability mapping of the 13 Regions of Greece; and lastly how climate change affects children in Greece, mainly in the domain of education, overall service provision, mental health and well-being. The key outcomes have been shaped into a set of recommendations to competent Authorities and stakeholders that directly address the critical challenges faced by children in Greece in the aftermath of environmental disasters, exacerbated by climate change.

Key findings & takeaways of the present report:

• 2023 was the warmest year of the last 30 years, and the third driest year since 1991.
• 25 Municipalities declared State of Emergency on the grounds of drought and water stress in the period May-September 2024.
• Existing national policy & regulatory framework on climate change adaptation lacks particular measures and pro- visions for and by children, as well as other social standards.
• Peloponnese, Thessaly and Western Greece are the three Regions of Greece with a higher disaster risks 307,763 children are estimated to be at high risk of being affected by climate change in Greece.
• 80% of teachers that participated in the focus group discussion stated that the schools they work (or have previously worked) at are inadequately equipped to handle extreme weather events.
• Almost 70% of students that participated in the U-Report poll reported that they were not able to attend their class- es due to adverse weather during the last year.
• Increased anxiety, followed by limited greenery and forests were the two most prevalent effects of climate change as reported by young people participating in the U-Report poll.

Authors: George Dikaios, PhD, Research Fellow,ELIAMEP; Persefoni Kerentzi , PhD (c ), Schoolteacher; Vagia Tsoutsi, PhD, Reseacher at Aiginiteio University Hospital Athens; Marianna Terezaki, Research Assistant, ELIAMEP; Socratis Vlachakis, Programme Officer- Climate & Environment, UNICEF.
Advisory committee: Emmanouella Doussis, Professor, NKUA

Read the full report here in pdf.