Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

The Applied Microeconomics Department at the DIW Berlin focuses on the economics of crime, labor, and inequality. The department analyzes the effects of labor market, social, and economic policy on the decisions and behavior of individuals and households. Research in the department is particularly concerned with aspects related to the economic causes and consequences of crime, as well as the potential interactions between crime on the one hand and equal opportunities and distributional issues on the other. The focus lies on microeconomic, empirical research that contributes to an evidence-based discourse. 

 Starting as soon as possible, the DIW Berlin is looking for a Postdoc (F/M/X) (Full time/39 hours per week).

This position is suitable for furthering scientific training according to Section 2, paragraph 1 of the Act on Fixed-Term Employment Contracts in Academic (WissZeitVG).

The Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), a research-driven infrastructure based at DIW Berlin, is one of the largest and longest running multidisciplinary panel studies worldwide, and currently surveys around 30,000 people in nearly 15,000 households. SOEP aims to capture social change and thus handles a constant stream of new and diverse topics and tasks. Its data collection and generation adhere to the concept of the survey or data life cycle.

Starting as soon as possible, DIW Berlin is looking for a

Postdoc (F/M/X) (Full time)

This position is suitable for furthering scientific training according to Section 2, paragraph 1 of the Act on Fixed-Term Employment Contracts in Academic (WissZeitVG).

Die am DIW Berlin angesiedelte forschungsbasierte Infrastruktureinrichtung Sozio-oekonomisches Panel (SOEP) sucht zum 15.01.2025 eine studentische Hilfskraft (w/m/div) (für 10 Wochenstunden).

Ihre Aufgabe ist die Unterstützung bei der Aufbereitung, Dokumentation und Bereitstellung von Daten für Datennutzende aus der Wissenschaft sowie bei umfragemethodischer Forschung zu den Daten des German Social Cohesion Panel (SCP). Dabei sind Sie direkt in ein laufendes Datenerhebungsprojekt eingebunden, nehmen unterstützend an der Forschungstätigkeit im Projekt teil und lernen so den ganzen Prozess von der Datenerhebung bis zur Publikation von Forschungsergebnissen kennen.

Resolution 2664, adopted by the UN Security Council on December 9, 2022, was a landmark resolution that created a clear and well-defined humanitarian carve-out for UN sanctions. The application of the carve-out to the 1267 ISIL/al-Qaida regime was particularly important given the far-reaching impact of that regime. It applies across multiple countries, including some of the world’s most challenging humanitarian contexts.

This paper examines how Resolution 2664 has established a humanitarian carve-out within UN sanctions regimes and its impact on facilitating humanitarian access to financial services. It also analyzes the limitations the resolution imposes on asset-freeze measures and specific humanitarian organizations, as well as the challenges of extending the carve-out for the 1267 ISIL/al-Qaida regime beyond its expiration in December 2024.

In order to maintain the positive impact on humanitarian operations of the resolution so far, including in situations impacted by the 1267 ISIL/al-Qaida regime, and to realize the full potential of Resolution 2664 in safeguarding humanitarian action, this paper offers the following recommendations:

• Security Council members should decide a standing application of the humanitarian carve-out for the 1267 ISIL/al-Qaida sanctions regime in December 2024.
• Humanitarian actors should continue to provide member states with evidence of the positive humanitarian impact of Resolution 2664.
• Humanitarian actors should continue to share information with member states and donors about their due-diligence and risk-mitigation practices and any instances of incidental benefits going to listed individuals or entities.
• All stakeholders should ensure that discussions around Resolution 2664 and the carve-out for the 1267 ISIL/al-Qaida regime are fact- and evidence-based.
• Member states should fully implement Resolution 2664 in a harmonized manner and pursue efforts to socialize and operationalize it.
• All stakeholders should pursue and strengthen cross-sector engagement.

Download

The post Safeguarding Humanitarian Action from the Unintended Effects of Sanctions: Resolution 2664 and the 1267 ISIL/al-Qaida Regime appeared first on International Peace Institute.

Die Abteilung Klimapolitik des Deutschen Instituts für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW Berlin) sucht zum nächstmöglichen Zeitpunkt

eine studentische Hilfskraft (w/m/div) im Bereich Sustainable Finance und Klimapolitik (für 12 Wochenstunden)

 

Die am DIW Berlin angesiedelte forschungsbasierte Infrastruktureinrichtung Sozio-oekonomisches Panel (SOEP) sucht zum 01.01.2025

 eine studentische Hilfskraft (w/m/div)  (für 12 Wochenstunden).

 

The policy brief outlines the strategic vision and structural reorganisation of the European Commission under Ursula von der Leyen’s second term. Emphasising “Security, Prosperity, and Democracy,” von der Leyen’s Commission 2.0 consolidates power through a streamlined, centralised structure with six Executive Vice-Presidents, aiming for a more responsive and efficient EU. Each Commissioner has been assigned specific, often overlapping, missions focusing on key areas such as the Green Deal, technological sovereignty, and European defence. This centralisation marks a shift toward a more presidential model, raising concerns about governance complexity and missed opportunities for deeper citizen engagement and clearer portfolio distinctions. At the same time, it constitutes the core strategic approach to addressing the EU’s complex priorities.

• Vision: President Ursula von der Leyen prioritises “Security, Prosperity, and Democracy,” aiming for a responsive, flexible, and efficient European Union.

• New Commission Structure: The von der Leyen Commission 2.0 introduces a centralised structure with six Executive Vice-Presidents, removing traditional Vice-Presidents to streamline leadership.

• Mission Letters: Each of the 26 Commissioners-designate received specific missions, with major focuses on the Green Deal, technological sovereignty, industrial sovereignty, and European defence.

• Presidentialisation: The Commission’s structure reflects increased centralisation, reinforcing von der Leyen’s authority and moving towards a presidential model.

• Challenges: Overlapping portfolios (e.g., environment, defence, and competitiveness) create complexity and redundancy across roles.

• Missed Opportunities: The new structure lacks a dedicated focus on EU governance reform and clearer citizen engagement pathways, which could enhance responsiveness to public concerns​.

• Strategic Approach: The persistent overlap of portfolios necessitates a centralised, streamlined structure to improve governance and address the EU’s complex priorities.

Read here in pdf the Policy brief by Spyros Blavoukos, Professor, Athens University of Economics and Business, Head of the ‘Arian Condellis’ European Programme, ELIAMEP; Dimitrios Kollias, Junior Research Fellow, Programme Manager, Ariane Condellis European Programme, ELIAMEP, Stefanos Spyridon Pappas, Research Assistant, EPACE-EU, ELIAMEP; Lefteris Foivos Vasilopoulos, Research Assistant, EPACE-EU, ELIAMEP.

Introduction

Ursula von der Leyen opened the game with a straight ‘Security, Prosperity, Democracy’ flush. The Commission President envisions a Europe that is more responsive to its citizens, grounded in local engagement and characterised by greater flexibility and efficiency. This vision is evident in the President’s initial written addresses to the Commissioners-designate. In the Mission Letters to Commissioners-designate (2024-2029), President von der Leyen establishes the priorities and expectations guiding each portfolio, setting a strategic tone for the responsibilities of each Commissioner and the collaborative goals within the Commission.

These letters draw upon insights and recommendations from landmark reports commissioned by previous administrations of the European executive. These documents include the Draghi Report, addressing the future of European competitiveness; the Strategic Dialogue report on the future of EU Agriculture; and the Letta Report, which focuses on the development of the Single Market. Additionally, the recent Niinistö Report, which will guide Europe’s civilian and defence preparedness, is also referenced. The incoming Commission will leverage these reports to underpin new proposals and initiatives.

The strategic orientation and concrete directives in each Commissioner-designate portfolio will be thoroughly discussed during the European Parliament’s rigorous screening process, scheduled between November 4th and 12th. This process is of high value in democratic and political terms. It will legitimise the Commission and reveal where prospective Commissioners stand on the more sensitive issues of the next five-year agenda.

This policy brief outlines and analyses the revamped structure and key features of the von der Leyen Commission 2.0. More importantly, it offers a comprehensive overview of the mission letters issued to the Commissioners-designate in anticipation of the forthcoming hearings.

The New Structure of von der Leyen’s Commission 2.0

Reshuffling of portfolios for a new Commission term is standard practice, necessary to accommodate the growing number of Commissioners and changing priorities. The 2019–2024 College of Commissioners bore some similarities to previous structures but also introduced notable differences. The Commission was directed by the President alongside Executive Vice-presidents (EVPs) and Vice-presidents (VPs). Each one of them was assigned the task of leading groups of Commissioners who focused on specific strategic pillars with a thematic orientation. Key portfolios, such as the European Green Deal, Promoting the European Way of Life, and Stronger Europe in the World, operated under the leadership of an EVP or VP, who in turn reported directly to the Commission President.

The mission letters addressed to the 2019-2024 College of Commissioners highlighted a clear distinction in structure and roles. Under von der Leyen’s initial leadership model, eight Vice-presidents were entrusted with guiding and coordinating thematic groups of Commissioners, each focused on one of the Commission’s key priorities, with support provided by the Secretariat-General. Every Commissioner was involved in one or more of these groups, with a notable exception: the Commissioner for Budget and Administration, Johannes Hahn, reported directly to the President of the European Commission. Among the eight Vice-presidents, three held the special role of Executive Vice-president, balancing dual responsibilities. These Executive Vice-presidents not only led a specific Commissioners’ Group, but also managed an assigned policy domain, overseeing a Directorate-General within their remit. A unique feature of this structure was that one of the three, First Vice-President Frans Timmermans, assumed the role of chairing the College in the President’s absence.

The von der Leyen Commission 2.0 features an increasingly centripetal organizational structure, reminiscent of presidential systems.

The von der Leyen Commission 2.0 features an increasingly centripetal organizational structure, reminiscent of presidential systems. Vice-presidents are out and the six Executive Vice-presidents (5 + the High Representative, Kaja Kallas) now oversee a select group of Directorates-General and departments, with their influence varying considerably by position. This resulting organizational structure is simpler, eliminating one layer of command and control, i.e. the Vice-presidents. This new organizational architecture is expected to remain irrespective of how the upcoming hearings of the Commissioners-designate play out.

Source: Politico, ‘Who works for whom in the new EU power structure’

 

Mission Letters in Brief

Reviewing the complete set of all twenty-six mission letters is a formidable task, even for EU enthusiasts. For this reason, we have compiled a table of concise overviews of the portfolios and the respective missions of the 2024–2029 Commissioners-designate.

Commissioner Portfolio Mission Teresa Ribera Rodríguez Executive VP for Clean, Just and Competitive Transition Circular Economy, European Green Deal, growth strategy and competition policy
• Clean Industry Deal
• European Climate Law: 90% reduction in emissions till 2040
• Social Climate Fund & Just Transition Fund Henna Virkkunen Executive VP for Tech Sovereignty, Security, and Democracy Cybersecurity, AI, Tech Sovereignty and internal security, border management – frontier technology, EU Digital Norms and Standards Internationally, digital public infrastructure
• Europe’s 2030 Digital Decade Targets
• AI Strategy – AI Factories Initiative
• European Data Union Strategy• European Democracy Shield Stéphane Séjourné Eexecutive VP for Prosperity and Industrial Sovereignty Productivity, Innovation, competitiveness, industrial strategy, horizontal Single Market strategy, research and development, Critical Raw Materials Act
• Clean Industrial Deal
• European Competitiveness Fund
• Competitiveness Coordination Tool Kaja Kallas High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and VP of the European Commission Strengthening security and defence, strategic partnerships, joined-up foreign policy
• Preparation of regular College of Commissioners’ debates on foreign policy issues.
• Modern and joined up FP (new foreign economic policy, external financial instruments) Roxana Mînzatu Executive VP for People, Skills and Preparedness Training and education, Erasmus+, European Sport Model, Quality Jobs roadmap
• European Pillar of Social Rights, New Pact for European Social Dialogue
• EU Anti-poverty Strategy
• European Affordable Housing Plan Raffaele Fitto Executive VP for Cohesion and Reforms Productivity, innovation, competitiveness, Next GenerationEU, resilience and sustainability
• Effective right to stay for every citizen
• European Affordable Housing Plan / New European Bauhaus Initiative
• Climate Adaptation Plan Maroš Šefčovič Commissioner for Trade and Economic Security; Interinstitutional Relations and Transparency Competitiveness, security, sustainability, free and fair trade, World Trade Organization, international negotiations, EU and the G7, new economic security doctrine
• European Economic Security Strategy
• Clean Trade and Investment Partnerships
• EU Customs Authority Valdis Dombrovskis Commissioner for Economy and Productivity; Implementation and Simplification Stability, Growth, NextGenerationEU, European Semester, competitiveness, digital euro
• Stability and Growth Pact
• Recovery and Resilience Facility
• Competitiveness Coordination Tool Dubravka Šuica Commissioner for Mediterranean Mediterranean, demography, external aspects of migration policy, security, crime, terrorism, Southern Neighbourhood
• New Pact for the Mediterranean
• Trans-Mediterranean Energy and Green Tech Cooperation Initiative
• Reconstruction plan for Gaza
• Gulf Strategy Olivér Várhelyi Commissioner for Health and Animal Welfare Health and Animal Welfare, European Health Union, modernisation of rules on animal welfare, food safety standards
• Critical Medicines Act
• European Biotech Act
• European Health Data Space Wopke Hoekstra Commissioner for Climate, Net Zero and Clean Growth Climate risks, climate diplomacy, security, ecological transition, emissions trading scheme and taxation
• European Climate Law
• Clean Industrial Deal / European Climate Adaptation Plan
• Revision of the Energy Taxation Directive Andrius Kubilius Commissioner for Defence and Space European Defence Union, space, military mobility, civil-military, EU-NATO strategy
• White Paper on the Future of European Defence
• EU Space Strategy for Security and Defence / EU Space Law
• European Defence Fund / European Defence Industrial Strategy Marta Kos Commissioner for Enlargement Enlargement, EU neighbourhood policy, Ukraine, Turkey, Balkans, Southern Caucasus
• Gradual integration of candidate countries
• Black Sea Strategy Jozef Síkela Commissioner for International Partnerships Clean trade and investment partnerships

• Team Europe approach

• Global Gateway Costas Kadis Commissioner for Fisheries and Oceans Coastal communities, food security, food sovereignty
• Common Fisheries Policy
• EU Ocean Research and Innovation Strategy
• Climate Adaptation Plan Maria Luís Albuquerque Commissioner for Financial Services and the Savings and Investments Union Financing green, social and digital transition, EU as global leader in sustainable finance

•             Banking Union / European Deposit Insurance Scheme

•             European Savings and Investments Union Hadja Lahbib Commissioner for Preparedness and Crisis Management; Equality Civil preparedness, integrated approach to crisis management, international humanitarian law, roadmap for women’s rights, antiracist action, LGBTIQ rights, People with Disability Rights, and rights of minorities
• EU Preparedness Union Strategy / EU Preparedness Law
• European Civil Defence Mechanism
• Gender Equality Strategy
• Anti-racism Strategy
• LGBTIQ Equality Strategy
• Strategy for the Persons with Disabilities Magnus Brunner Commissioner for Internal Affairs and Migration Internal security, strong common borders, migration, fight again organised crime, cybercrime, improvements of Schengen framework
• European Internal Security Strategy
• EU Visa-Policy Strategy
• Pact on Migration and Asylum Jessika Roswall Commissioner for Environment, Water Resilience and a Competitive Circular Economy European Green Deal, water security and resilience, natural world, bioeconomy, global water leadership
• European Water Resilience Strategy
• Climate Adaptation Plan
• New European Bauhaus Piotr Serafin Commissioner for Budget, Anti-Fraud and Public Administration Responsive budget, anti-fraud, modern public administration
• European Competitiveness Fund
• Conditionality Regulation
• European Anti-Fraud Office Dan Jørgensen Commissioner for Energy and Housing Energy Union, sustainable and affordable housing
• European Affordable Housing Plan
• Clean Industrial Deal
• Electrification Action Plan Ekaterina Zaharieva Commissioner for Startups, Research and Innovation Startups, research and development, innovation
• European Innovation Council / European Research Council
• European Innovation Act
• European Research Area Michael McGrath Commissioner for Democracy, Justice, and the Rule of Law Democracy, Justice and Rule of Law, fairness and integrity, single market
• European Democracy Shield
• Rule of Law Report
• Consumer Agenda 2025-2030 Apostolos Tzitzikostas Commissioner for Sustainable Transport and Tourism Resilient and competitive tourism sector, sustainable transport

• Trans-European Transport Corridor

• Single Market for Transport Services

• Comprehensive EU Port Strategy Christophe Hansen Commissioner for Agriculture and Food Food security, rural areas, food sovereignty
• European Water Resilience Strategy
• Vision for Agriculture and Food Glenn Micallef Commissioner for Intergenerational Fairness, Youth, Culture and Sport Strategy on Intergenerational Fairness, youth participation, Culture Compass, European Sport Diplomacy
• Youth Policy Dialogues
• President’s Youth Advisory Board
• EU Strategy on the Rights of the Child

 

The Keywords of the new Commission: Presidentialisation, Overlap and Missed Opportunities

In her re-election speech to the European Parliament and subsequent political guidelines for the 2024-2029 European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen has outlined a strategic framework of action centred around seven key pillars. These define the focal areas of her vision and include:

• A New Plan for Europe’s Sustainable Prosperity and Competitiveness
• A new era for European Defence and Security
• Supporting people, strengthening our societies and our social model
• Sustaining our quality of life: food security, water and nature
• Protecting our democracy, upholding our values
• A global Europe: Leveraging our power and partnerships
• Delivering together and preparing our Union for the future.

In their in-depth analysis of the political guidelines and mission letters Levente Kocsis and Eric Maurice, identify 194 specific commitments made by the President of the Commission. These commitments are broadly organised across the strategic pillars mentioned in the guidelines, as seen in the following graph, in percentage terms. They also align closely with the priorities defined in the Strategic Agenda adopted in June 2024, as well as with those of the European political parties whose support was essential for von der Leyen’s re-election by the Parliament.

Source: EPC, COMPENDIUM EUROPEAN POLITICS AND INSTITUTIONS PROGRAMME 24 OCTOBER 2024

When considering the new structure of the Commission (absent of Vice-presidents) in tandem with the study of specific policy areas in each portfolio, three features emerge: increased presidentialisation, continuity of overlapping mandates, and missed opportunities to upgrade policies and streamline Commision’s work.

Presidentialisation

Von der Leyen’s first term has been characterised by a slow but undoubtable shift of power to the Commission’s centre, i.e. a presidentialisation of the institution, that is especially poignant compared to the two previous office holders, namely José Manuel Barroso and Jean-Claude Juncker (Kassim 2021). The initial presidentialist thrust owes much to the first use of the Spitzenkandidaten process in 2014 (Dimitrakopoulos et al. 2024: 8). The multi-faceted and continuous crisis environment, from the global pandemic to the land war at the EU’s doorstep, have created windows of opportunity for the incremental centralisation of power and authority in the hands of the Commission President (Moens et al 2024). Von der Leyen has capitalised on all the above. This trend conflicts with the traditional Commission ethos of purely collegial pluralism, wherein Commissioners are of de facto equal rank and free to exercise independent judgment, as enshrined in the Treaties (Article 17(8) TEU and Articles 234 and 250 TFEU).

Still, there are references in the Treaties that pave the way for a different conceptualisation of the Commission President’s role. Such alternative approaches could be justified by the fact that Commission Presidents are elected first (as President-elect) and exercise considerable control over the subsequent composition of the College (Article 17(7) TEU). Furthermore, after the confirmation of the Commissioners, the President retains full control of the body. Their power to unilaterally compel the resignation of an individual Commissioner, except the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, is proof of this (Article 18(1) TEU). Finally, the Commission President has wide-ranging organisational powers that allow them to exert significant control over individual Commissioners, whether through re-shuffling of portfolios or division of portfolios (Article 17(6) TEU and Article 248 TFEU) (Cotter 2024).

…centralisation may allow for greater effectiveness, especially in a poly- and perma-crisis environment. 

The ongoing centralisation is accompanied by greater politicisation that risks undermining the technocratic nature of the Commission. The fusion of politics and technocracy may be anathema to many, whilst others may see it as a necessary step towards further political integration in the European project. Nevertheless, centralisation may allow for greater effectiveness, especially in a poly- and perma-crisis environment. While acknowledging the legitimacy concerns of such a development, its positive effect may prove catalytic for the association between European demos and the – oft demonised – EU institutional architecture.

Regardless of one’s disposition towards the Commission’s presidentialisation, what appeared to be an unorganized and seemingly improvisational manoeuvre in von der Leyen’s first term now seems baked into her strategy. The Commission’s new structure, with its murky portfolios and downgraded Vice-presidents now limited to a seemingly obedient executive role, hints at a transformation of the Commission from a collegial body into a Presidential office, as Alberto Alemanno argues. This restructuring is designed to drive key priorities forward by simplifying the ‘line of command’. In the new format, Executive Vice-presidents oversee only a select few Directorates-General and departments, with their influence varying significantly across roles. Certain Commissioners—including ‘heavy guns’ like former Vice-presidents Valdis Dombrovskis and Maros Šefčovič but also Piotr Serafin who will handle the EU budget ‘hot potato’ during the Multi-Annual Financial Framework negotiations—will report directly to the President. The new setup clearly indicates a Commission that operates under the strict supervision and guidance of President von der Leyen in most if not all key issues, including economic security and productivity. Thus, the structure of the new Commission is clearly hierarchical, which testifies to its further presidentialisation.

Overlaps

Each new College of Commissioners is typically prefaced by discussions around “overlap,” an issue recognised as fact rather than speculation. After successive enlargements, the number of Commissioners now exceeds the scope of EU competences, raising valid questions about the substantive content of certain portfolios. This presents a structural problem that underlies any discussion about the inevitable overlap of individual portfolios.

Clear examples of overlap include Teresa Ribera Rodríguez, Executive VP for a Clean, Just and Competitive Transition and Stéphane Séjourné, Executive VP for Prosperity and Industrial Sovereignty. The authority of Ribera Rodriguez appears somewhat uncertain. Although officially tasked with overseeing the implementation of the Green Deal, her remit includes control over the powerful Directorate-General for Competition (DG COMP), the EU body with exclusive competence over competition; this is a policy area currently being transfigured by economic sovereignty concerns. She is tasked, among others, with the Circular Economy (although there is a Commissioner on Circular Economy: Jessika Roswall), the European Green Deal, growth strategy and competition policy, the Clean Industry Deal and the Social Climate Fund & Just Transition Fund. Crucially, Séjourné, responsible for prosperity and industrial sovereignty (and not competitiveness), is also responsible (among others) for Productivity (as opposed to growth strategy), competitiveness, industrial strategy the Clean Industrial Deal, the European Competitiveness Fund and the Competitiveness Coordination Tool.

Furthermore, an even more weirded situation exists between Roxana Mînzatu, Executive VP for People, Skills and Preparedness, in a triple (or more) partial overlap with Executive VP of Cohesion and Reforms Raffaele Fitto; and Commissioners-designate Glenn Micallef, Commissioner for Intergenerational Fairness, Youth, Culture and Sport; and Dan Jørgensen, Commissioner on Energy and Housing. The first focuses on skills and labour gaps, training and education, Erasmus+, the European Sport Model, the Quality Jobs roadmap, the European Pillar of Social Rights, the New Pact for European Social Dialogue, the EU Anti-poverty Strategy and the European Affordable Housing Plan. The second, Raffaele Fitto, also focuses on the European Affordable Housing Plan and New European Bauhaus Initiative, the Climate Adaptation Plan, competitiveness and NextGenerationEU. Glenn Micallef follows with every youth and culture-related topic before going back to Dan Jørgensen and sustainable and affordable housing, specifically the European Affordable Housing Plan and the Clean Industrial Deal (among other things).

Maroš Šefčovič, Commissioner for Trade and Economic Security, Interinstitutional Relations and Transparency, has a portfolio that overlaps with the International Partnerships portfolio of Commissioner Jozef Síkela.

Executive Vice-president Henna Virkkunen, overseeing Tech Sovereignty, Security, and Democracy, manages a portfolio that intersects significantly with technology—particularly AI—and the strengthening of external borders, especially in relation to managing migration flows. Her role directly references the Pact on Asylum and Migration and is closely aligned with the operations of Frontex. This creates a reciprocal overlap with Andrius Kubilius, Commissioner for Defence and Space; Magnus Brunner, Commissioner for Internal Affairs and Migration; and Dubravka Šuica, Commissioner for the Mediterranean, highlighting a cohesive yet complex interrelation across portfolios.

Having already highlighted the overlap between Executive Vice-president Henna Virkkunen and Commissioner for Defence and Space Andrius Kubilius, it is essential to address another area of significant overlap—namely, the intersection of foreign policy and defence. Kaja Kallas, High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and VP of the European Commission, among others, also operates with a mandate to strengthen security and defence (focusing on Ukraine, European Defence Union, NATO, and sanctions).

Bearing in mind the above discussion, three features characterise the structure of the new College: overlapping hierarchy; significant differences between executive Vice-presidential portfolios; and reporting lines that run in different directions with several Executive Vice-presidents responsible for several Commissioners and von der Leyen being directly responsible for some parts of the Commissioners’ portfolios (Patrin 2024).

Missed Opportunities

The new Commission has missed the opportunity to sharpen its objectives and distribute more clearly defined portfolios.

The new Commission has missed the opportunity to sharpen its objectives and distribute more clearly defined portfolios. An example is that of the Belgian Commissioner-designate, Hadja Lahbib, who is responsible for “preparedness”, encompassing mainly prevention and crisis management. However, her portfolio also includes the promotion of gender equality and the combating of discrimination—two areas of competence notably distinct from her primary crisis-related duties, creating some confusion and raising doubts about the rationale behind this competence allocation. Moreover, considering the portfolio of Olivér Várhelyi, integrating public health policy with animal health could inadvertently undermine the efforts within his primary sector—a potentially shortsighted approach. Health policy is intricately connected to economic drivers such as biotechnology and pharmaceuticals and is essential in addressing significant challenges, including demographic shifts, the implications of an ageing population, workforce sustainability, and the potential emergence of future health crises, such as pandemics.

A second missed opportunity regards interaction with European citizens. Although the Mission Letters broadly state that the Commission intends to usher in a new era of dialogue with citizens, this commitment is not clearly reflected in the responsibilities assigned in the mission statements. If the new Commission aims to integrate citizens into its work, this priority should have been explicitly incorporated into the Commission’s structure, ideally through the defined role of at least one Executive Vice-President (Zuleeg and Emmanouilidis, 2024).

Finally, the overarching goal of strengthening EU governance, rendered especially important in response to numerous internal and external challenges and the potential expansion to over 30 member states, is notably absent in the new Commission’s structure. This priority is only lightly touched upon in the general section of the Mission Letters and is not evident in the distribution of major portfolios. Such omissions strongly suggest that governance reform within the EU is not a central focus of the second von der Leyen Commission. 

Conclusion

…a much more centralised, compact and centripetal approach is required. Adopting a more streamlined, hierarchical structure is a strategic decision to enhance proactive and better-coordinated governance within the Commission.

As previously noted, portfolio reshuffling and overlap among Commissioners is not uncommon. On the contrary, it has become the norm. The Treaty-enshrined high number of Commissioners, directly linked with the number of member-states, and the challenge of accommodating all of them in different portfolios remain ongoing concerns. This was a notable feature of the prior political cycle and continues to be so in the new Commission structure. Restructuring and reshuffling have not yet solved the major problem of overlap as evidenced by the priorities of the Commissioners-designate discussed in the first section of this policy brief. The shift toward a more centripetal approach, therefore, may not be an unforeseen or undesirable development, especially given the ambitious and highly complex triptych of ‘Security, Prosperity, Democracy’ put forward by Von der Leyen herself. To achieve these goals, a much more centralised, compact and centripetal approach is required. Given the inevitability of portfolio overlaps, adopting a more streamlined, hierarchical structure is a strategic decision to enhance proactive and better-coordinated governance within the Commission. 

 

References

Cotter, J. (2024) ‘La Commission, c’est moi? The invisible hand of Article 17(6) TEU in the presidentialisation of the European Commission’, 25 September, https://verfassungsblog.de/eu-commission-new-von-der-leyen-president/

Dimitrakopoulos, D., Ceron, M. and Christiansen, Th. (2024) ‘Introduction: The Politicisation of the European Commission’s Presidency’ in Dimitrakopoulos, D., Ceron, M. and Christiansen, Th. (eds) The Politicisation of the European Commission’s Presidency Spitzenkandidaten and Beyond, Palgrave Macmillan.

Draghi, M., 2024. Report on European Competitiveness. Commissioned by the European Commission. Available at: https://commission.europa.eu/topics/strengthening-european-competitiveness/eu-competitiveness-looking-ahead_en  [Accessed 31 October 2024].

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Fondation Robert Schuman, 2024. Analysis on the Structure of the von der Leyen II Commission. Paris: Fondation Robert Schuman. Available at: https://server.www.robert-schuman.eu/storage/en/doc/questions-d-europe/qe-764-en.pdf [Accessed 31 October 2024].

Kassim, H. (2021) ‘The European Commission: from collegiality to presidential leadership’, in D. Hodson, U. Puetter, S. Saurugger, and J. Peterson (eds) The Institutions of the European Union (5th edn), Oxford: Oxford University Press. 

Kocsis, L. and Maurice, E., 2024. 194 Specific Commitments Analysis in European Politics and Institutions Programme. EPC Compendium on European Politics, European Policy Centre, Brussels.

Letta, E., 2024. Report on the Future of the Single Market. Commissioned by the European Commission. Available at: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/ny3j24sm/much-more-than-a-market-report-by-enrico-letta.pdf  (Accessed: 31 October 2024).

Moens, B., Griera, M. and Barigazzi, J (2024) ‘From queen to empress: Inside Ursula von der Leyen’s power grab’, Politico, 19 September, https://www.politico.eu/article/ursula-von-der-leyen-europe-commission-brussels-power/

Niinistö, S. (2024) Safer Together Strengthening Europe’s Civilian and Military Preparedness and Readiness, Report by Sauli Niinistö, former President of the Republic of Finland, In his capacity as Special Adviser to the President of the European Commission, European Commission. Available at: https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/5bb2881f-9e29-42f2-8b77-8739b19d047c_en?filename=2024_Niinisto-report_Book_VF.pdf (Accessed: 31 October 2024).

Parliament Hearing Committee, 2019. Concerns on Nominees László Trócsányi, Rovana Plumb, and Sylvie Goulard. Internal Report, European Parliament Hearings, Brussels.

Patrin, M. (2024) ‘New Structure, New Priorities – Why the Next Commission May Be More Hierarchical but less Coherent’, 15 October, https://verfassungsblog.de/commissions-new-structure/

Piodi, F. (2007) A Study of the proceedings of the European Convention accompanied by archive documents, EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT. Available at: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/pdf/cardoc/pe_and_job_ce_en.pdf  (Accessed: 31 October 2024).

Strategic Dialogue Group, 2024. Report on the Future of EU Agriculture. European Commission, Brussels. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_4528 (Accessed: 31 October 2024).

Taylor, S. (2014) How jeleva was forced out, POLITICO. Available at: https://www.politico.eu/article/how-jeleva-was-forced-out  (Accessed: 31 October 2024).

von der Leyen, U., 2024. Political Guidelines for the 2024-2029 European Commission. Brussels: European Commission. Available at: https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/e6cd4328-673c-4e7a-8683-f63ffb2cf648_en?filename=Political%20Guidelines%202024-2029_EN.pdf&trk=public_post_comment-text (Accessed: 31 October 2024).

von der Leyen, U., 2024. Re-election Speech to the European Parliament. European Parliament, Strasbourg, 4 July.

von der Leyen, U. (2019) Misson Letter Margrethe Vestager, European Commission. Available at: https://commissioners.ec.europa.eu/document/download/0146cc5f-761f-48ee-8316-a3e92dc3e7ca_en?filename=mission-letter-margrethe-vestager_2019_en.pdf(Accessed: 01 November 2024).

Zuleeg, F. and Emmanouilidis, J. (2024) Reactions to the next commission, EPC – European Policy Centre. Available at: https://www.epc.eu/en/publications/Reactions-to-the-next-Commission~5d5e58  (Access

Die im DIW Berlin angesiedelte forschungsbasierte Infrastruktureinrichtung Sozio-oekonomisches Panel (SOEP) sucht für die Innovationsstichprobe sowie das in Kooperation mit der Universität Bremen durchgeführte Zusammenhaltspanel zum nächstmöglichen Zeitpunkt

zwei studentische Hilfskräfte (w/m/div) (für je 10 Wochenstunden)

Ihre Aufgabe ist die Mitwirkung bei der umfragemethodischen Erforschung der Daten, inklusive der Aufbereitung, Prüfung, Analyse und Visualisierung von längsschnittlichen und experimentellen Umfragedaten. Eine der beiden Stellen hat einen starken Fokus auf die Auswertung von Videodaten. Sie sind direkt in laufende Datenanalyseprojekte eingebunden, nehmen unterstützend an der Forschungstätigkeit teil und lernen so den Prozess von der Projektplanung über die Datenerhebung bis zur Publikation von Forschungsergebnissen kennen.

Ioannis Armakolas and Alexandra Voudouri, co-authored the article “Relaunching Enlargement: How Will It Affect the Western Balkans?” for the 21st European Institute of the Mediterranean Yearbook, which focuses on the developments and perspectives of European policy in the wider Mediterranean region.

In their paper, the authors highlight the process of redefining the EU’s enlargement strategy in the light of geopolitical changes, especially after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, with a focus on the integration of Ukraine, Moldova and the Western Balkans by 2030. They argue that the cycle of indecision can be broken if the EU links the new Growth Plan to critical reforms and negotiating chapters, providing incentives for candidate countries to overcome bilateral differences. Furthermore, according to the authors, a credible roadmap for deeper integration, clarity on the necessary reforms and effective communication to ensure public support are essential for a successful enlargement process.

You can read the article here.

This database provides an inventory and critical appraisal of available estimates and indicators related to irregular migration flows.  The datasets include meta-level information on sources and methodology and a quality assessment based on MIrreM’s criteria.

Siruno, L., Leerkes, A., Badre, A., Bircan, T., Brunovská, E., Cacciapaglia, M., Carvalho, J., Cassain, L., Cyrus, N., Desmond, A., Fihel, A., Finotelli, C., Ghio, D., Hendow, M., Heylin, R., Jauhiainen, J.S., Jovanovic, K., Kierans, D., Mohan, S.S., Nikolova, M., Oruc, N., Ramos, M.P.G., Rössl, L., Sağiroğlu, A.Z., Santos, S., Schütze, T., & Sohst, R.R. (2024) MIrreM Public Database on Irregular Migration Flow Estimates and Indicators. Krems: University for Continuing Education Krems (Danube University Krems). https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.10813413

Zusammenfassung:

31. Oktober 2024 – Am 5. November 2024 haben die US-Amerikaner*innen die Wahl zwischen der demokratischen Präsidentschaftskandidatin Kamala Harris und dem republikanischen Kandidaten Donald Trump. Beide unterscheiden sich auch in Fragen der Energie-, Umwelt- und Klimapolitik stark. Diese Politikfelder wurden im bisherigen Wahlkampf kaum beachtet, die entsprechenden Positionen von Harris und Trump sind der breiten Öffentlichkeit bisher wenig bekannt. Daher beleuchtet dieses DIW aktuell einige der wichtigsten Aspekte und gibt einen Ausblick, was unter einer Präsidentin Harris beziehungsweise einem Präsidenten Trump zu erwarten wäre. In jedem Fall muss damit gerechnet werden, dass die USA auch in den nächsten Jahren ihre starke fossile Energieproduktion aufrechterhalten werden. Eine beschleunigte Dekarbonisierung ist nicht zu erwarten, obwohl die Klimaziele – denen die USA (derzeit noch) verpflichtet sind – ohne deutliche Emissionsminderungen nicht erreicht werden können.

This policy paper explores Russia’s use of the Wagner Group in Africa, highlighting how the concept of plausible deniability allows the Kremlin to expand its influence in regions such as Mali and the Central African Republic. By distancing itself from direct responsibility for controversial military actions, Russia is able to exert significant geopolitical control. The paper also examines the continuation of Wagner Group operations following the death of its leader, Yevgeny Prigozhin, and discusses the broader implications of these developments for Africa and the Mediterranean region.

• The Wagner Group’s operations continued after the death of its leader, Yevgeny Prigozhin, with increased integration into Russia’s Ministry of Defence, signaling Russia’s deeper involvement in the continent’s security dynamics.
• Moscow’s activities in Africa signal a broader strategy to challenge Western influence by supporting local regimes and displacing Western control over critical resources, while securing Russia’s standing as a dominant player in the region’s security and economic landscape.
• Russia has secured access to valuable natural resources through its African interventions, extracting billions in gold and pursuing strategic control over uranium in countries like Niger. These resources likely help fund Russia’s broader geopolitical ambitions, including its war efforts in Ukraine.
• Russia offers “pragmatic engagement” as a substitute for dwindling Western aid in Africa, capitalizing on the gap left by reduced Western support to build influence through military assistance, resource extraction, and infrastructure projects.

Read here in pdf the Policy brief by Natalia Tellidou, Research Fellow at ELIAMEP’s Mediterranean Programme.

Russia’s Strategic Push into Africa

In 2020, the world witnessed a record 56 unique conflicts, the highest number in a single year since 1946.[1] Over half of these were internationalized civil wars, where external powers sponsor local actors to fight on their behalf. This practice, known as conflict delegation, has become a strategic tool for powerful states looking to extend their influence without direct involvement. As a result, geopolitical tensions have escalated, with proxy wars becoming a common feature of modern conflict.

One of the most prominent players in these proxy wars is Russia, which relies heavily on private military security contractors (PMSCs) like the Wagner Group. These contractors provide a range of services, including intelligence gathering, military training, logistical support, and infrastructure protection. Operating in countries like Mali and the Central African Republic (CAR), the Wagner Group has supplied military training and assistance while enabling Russia to maintain plausible deniability. By relying on these contractors, Russia can distance itself from controversial actions, all while securing a foothold in these key regions.

Even after the death of Wagner’s leader, Yevgeny Prigozhin, the group’s operations have continued, underscoring the strategic importance of their mission. Russia has adapted to ensure these activities persist, maintaining its involvement in ongoing conflicts and protecting its interests in Africa (Figure 1). Beyond military influence, Russia reaps significant rewards from these operations, including increased security leverage, access to critical natural resources, and the ability to offer African states an alternative to dwindling Western aid.

By multiplying risks in the Global South, Russia seeks to undermine the United States and its allies, positioning itself as a dominant force in the region.

By multiplying risks in the Global South, Russia seeks to undermine the United States and its allies, positioning itself as a dominant force in the region.

Considering all this, this policy brief will first explore how the Wagner Group became instrumental in providing military support to countries like Mali and the CAR followed by an analysis of the post- Prigozhin period and the operations. Finally, the discussion will focus on what Russia gains from these activities—enhanced security leverage, access to valuable natural resources, and a pragmatic engagement to the diminishing development aid offered by Western countries.

Figure 1: Where and How Wanger Group Has Engaged in Africa. Sources: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, ACLED, Kathrin Buchholz https://www.statista.com/chart/30665/wagner-group-engagement-africa/

Wagner Group in Africa: A Tool for Russia’s Military and Political Ambitions 

 

Long before the war in Ukraine, Russia was already actively expanding its influence in the Global South, particularly through the Wagner Group, that allows Moscow to operate in conflict zones with plausible deniability.

Long before the war in Ukraine, Russia was already actively expanding its influence in the Global South, particularly through the Wagner Group, that allows Moscow to operate in conflict zones with plausible deniability. Plausible deniability refers to a strategy in which a sponsoring state avoids direct responsibility for its involvement in foreign conflicts[2]. By covertly supporting proxies, as the Wagner Group, the sponsor-state can reap the benefits of a potential victory without facing the risks and costs associated with direct intervention, including defeat or international condemnation. This approach allows the state to distance itself from the consequences of its actions, evading criticism from both international and domestic audiences. As a result, plausible deniability becomes a key incentive for states to engage in proxy wars. By leveraging Wagner’s presence, Russia has been able to support regimes and shape outcomes while distancing itself from the group’s often controversial and illegal activities.

Take Mali, for example. Since December 2021, Wagner has been actively involved in the country’s security landscape, invited by the Malian government, which had grown frustrated with international forces like the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali, the UN peacekeeping mission (MINUSMA) and French troops. Wagner’s presence was intended to stabilize the country and support the peace process following the 2012 crisis. At its peak, over 2,000 Wagner personnel were stationed in Mali, providing military support, handling air force operations, and securing the ruling elite.

Wagner’s primary objective was to strengthen Mali’s offensive capabilities, particularly in the conflict-ridden northern region. Unlike international forces, Wagner and the Malian government reject population-centric, “soft” approaches to counterinsurgency. Wagner forces are notorious for their violent tactics, especially towards civilians, and they often coerce prisoners and locals into collaborating by providing intelligence or leading them to insurgent hideouts. While the French-backed reconciliation process with northern Tuareg rebels sought a more diplomatic solution, the Malian government—supported by Wagner—favored a military strategy, fueling renewed conflict in the north. Without Wagner, Mali’s armed forces would struggle to challenge insurgent control, and the demand for Wagner’s expertise in training and air force operations continues to grow.

Politically and socially, the group has exploited widespread discontent with the security situation and anti-French sentiments, positioning itself as a necessary force for stability.

Wagner’s impact in Mali is not confined to military efforts alone. Politically and socially, the group has exploited widespread discontent with the security situation and anti-French sentiments, positioning itself as a necessary force for stability. This multifaceted approach extends Russia’s influence far beyond the battlefield.

A similar pattern can be observed in the Central African Republic (CAR). Since January 2018, Wagner—alongside another Russian PMC, Patriot—has provided military training and security in exchange for access to valuable resources like gold, uranium, and diamonds. Wagner has been instrumental in bolstering the regime of President Faustin-Archange Touadéra, particularly during a 2020 rebel incursion into Bangui, where the group played a critical role in defending the government. Wagner has since become a cornerstone of Touadéra’s war efforts, helping him reclaim rebel-held territories.

However, Wagner’s involvement in CAR has exacerbated violence and militarization, much like in Mali. Russian mercenaries have instructed local militias to merge with the national army and function as self-defense units. These units, however, soon became rogue, committing widespread human rights abuses against civilians. Wagner’s presence has not only intensified the violence but also fragmented the region’s security environment, further entrenching instability.

In both Mali and the CAR, Wagner’s role extends beyond providing military support—it is about leveraging local grievances, securing valuable resources, and deepening Russia’s influence while operating in the shadows. The group’s activities have serious implications for the stability of these regions and underscore Russia’s strategic use of conflict delegation to assert itself on the global stage. 

Post-Prigozhin Dynamics 

While disruptions following the group’s mutiny and Prigozhin’s death caused some temporary instability—such as delayed salaries and suspended missions—operations quickly resumed, signaling the group’s resilience.

Despite the death of Yevgeny Prigozhin, the Wagner Group’s operations across Africa have persisted, though not without adjustments. The “Expeditionary Corps,” Wagner’s key operational unit, continued its activities in countries like Sudan, Niger, and Burkina Faso, maintaining its original objectives and utilizing the same resources. While disruptions following the group’s mutiny and Prigozhin’s death caused some temporary instability—such as delayed salaries and suspended missions—operations quickly resumed, signaling the group’s resilience. 

In Mali, for instance, after internal disagreements, Wagner reached a new agreement to work directly under the Russian Ministry of Defence. This shift allowed the Ministry to supply Wagner with essential military assets—vehicles, planes, and ammunition—at no cost, reinforcing Wagner’s role in the region. Moreover, the Ministry of Defence has sought additional means of support, including potential collaborations with other groups like Redut, which operate similarly to Wagner.

Following Prigozhin’s mutiny, the Kremlin formally moved Wagner’s African operations under the control of Russian military intelligence, the GRU. This reorganization saw senior Russian officials, including General Averyanov and Deputy Defence Minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov, visiting former Wagner strongholds in Africa in early September. Far from signaling the end of Russia’s involvement, Prigozhin’s death marked a deeper entrenchment of Russian influence in the region. Wagner’s activities have since been rebranded under the Ministry of Defence as the “Africa Corps,” reflecting this increased oversight[3].

Russia’s diplomatic engagement has also expanded. In January 2024, Chad’s junta leader, Mahamat Idriss Déby, met with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow to discuss strengthening bilateral ties. This meeting is particularly significant, as Chad had previously maintained a pro-Western stance. These developments indicate that Russia’s strategy in Africa, spearheaded by the Wagner Group and its successors, remains robust and continues to adapt to evolving geopolitical realities.

Strategic Returns: Russia’s Gains from its African Engagement

Russia’s involvement in Africa through the Wagner Group brings several strategic advantages. First and foremost, it strengthens Russia’s security posture. One clear example is Russia’s ongoing effort to establish a naval base at Port Sudan, which would grant Russia vital access to the Red Sea. Although the agreement has faced setbacks due to United States pressure, Russia remains determined to secure this critical foothold, signaling its broader ambitions in the region.

Secondly, Russia gains access to valuable natural resources. Over the past two years, Russia has reportedly extracted $2.5 billion worth of gold from Africa, with much of this wealth likely funding its war in Ukraine, according to the Blood Gold Report. Russian fighters, many of them former Wagner mercenaries, also took control of the Intahaka gold mine in northern Mali, a strategically significant asset long contested by various armed groups. In Niger, Russia is actively pursuing uranium concessions, aiming to reduce French influence over these critical resources. The broader pattern is clear: Russia seeks to challenge Western dominance over Africa’s minerals and energy reserves, positioning itself as a key player in this global resource competition.

Russia presents itself as a “pragmatic engagement” to diminishing Western development aid.

Lastly, Russia presents itself as a “pragmatic engagement” to diminishing Western development aid. With countries like the UK significantly cutting back on foreign aid, many African nations are turning to Russia as a reliable partner. By filling the void left by the West, Russia secures both influence and access to resources, while offering these nations military assistance, infrastructure projects, and less conditional diplomatic engagement. This approach allows Russia to build alliances, exert political influence, and further undermine Western presence in the region.

Implications for Global Security: Russia’s Growing Role in Africa

In conclusion, Russia’s strategy in Africa, executed largely through the Wagner Group and other proxies, represents a multifaceted attempt to enhance its geopolitical influence while undermining the global standing of the United States and its allies. By providing military support, gaining control over vital natural resources, and offering a pragmatic alternative to Western aid, Russia is positioning itself as a dominant force across the continent. 

Moving forward, it is crucial for policymakers and international actors to recognize the implications of Russia’s growing influence and to respond accordingly.

The death of Yevgeny Prigozhin did little to disrupt these plans, as Russia’s operations have not only persisted but have expanded under direct Kremlin oversight. This deepened involvement, combined with its strategic maneuvering in key areas like Mali, the Central African Republic, and Chad, ensures that Russia remains a pivotal player in the Global South. Moving forward, it is crucial for policymakers and international actors to recognize the implications of Russia’s growing influence and to respond accordingly. The stakes are not only regional but have far-reaching consequences for global security and resource access.

[1] Trends in Armed Conflict, 1946-2020 is published by the Peace Research Institute Oslo. Figure 1, page 2, presents the number of battle deaths and conflicts.

[2] Mark Galeotti presents the benefits Russia reaps from covert proxy relationships highlighting how plausible deniability was expertly used in Ukraine, before the military invasion in 2022.

[3] Wagner Group is a reference to the composer Richard Wagner. The reasons why this name was chosen remains a mystery.

 

References

‘A Mixed Picture: How Mali Views the Wagner Group’. 2024. 11.10.2024. https://rusi.orghttps://rusi.org

Arduino, Alessandro. 2024. ‘Wagner Group Is Now Africa Corps. What This Means for Russia’s Operations on the Continent’. The Conversation. 14.02.2024. https://theconversation.com/wagner-group-is-now-africa-corps-what-this-means-for-russias-operations-on-the-continent-223253.

Bloomberg.Com. 2024. ‘Russia Raises the Stakes in Tussle Over Africa’, 30.01.2024. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/newsletters/2024-01-30/russia-raises-the-stakes-in-tussle-over-africa.

‘Decoding the Wagner Group: Analyzing the Role of Private Military Security Contractors in Russian Proxy Warfare’. n.d. New America. Accessed 11.10.2024. http://newamerica.org/future-security/reports/decoding-wagner-group-analyzing-role-private-military-security-contractors-russian-proxy-warfare/.

Doxsee, Catrina. 2023. ‘How Does the Conflict in Sudan Affect Russia and the Wagner Group?’, April. https://www.csis.org/analysis/how-does-conflict-sudan-affect-russia-and-wagner-group.

Galeotti, Mark. 2016. ‘Hybrid, Ambiguous, and Non-Linear? How New Is Russia’s “New Way of War”?’ Small Wars & Insurgencies 27 (2): 282–301. https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2015.1129170.

‘Infographic: Where & How Wagner Group Has Engaged in Africa’. 2023. Statista Daily Data. 24 August 2023. https://www.statista.com/chart/30665/wagner-group-engagement-africa.

Jones, Seth G., Catrina Doxsee, Brian Katz, Eric McQueen, and Joe Moye. 2021. ‘Russia’s Corporate Soldiers: The Global Expansion of Russia’s Private Military Companies’, July. https://www.csis.org/analysis/russias-corporate-soldiers-global-expansion-russias-private-military-companies.

Liik, Kadri. 2023. ‘From Russia with Love: How Moscow Courts the Global South’. ECFR. 21.12.2023. https://ecfr.eu/publication/from-russia-with-love-how-moscow-courts-the-global-south/.

‘Moscow’s Mercenary Wars: The Expansion of Russian Private Military Companies’. 2023. Moscow’s Mercenary Wars: The Expansion of Russian Private Military Companies. Accessed 11.10.2024. https://russianpmcs.csis.org.

Reuters. 2024. ‘Putin Meets Chad Junta Leader as Russia Competes with France in Africa’, 24 January 2024, sec. Africa. https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/putin-meets-chad-junta-leader-russia-competes-with-france-africa-2024-01-24/.

‘Russia Is Using the Soviet Playbook in the Global South to Challenge the West – and It Is Working | Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank’. 2024. 16.05.2024. https://www.chathamhouse.org/2024/05/russia-using-soviet-playbook-global-south-challenge-west-and-it-working.

Saucedo, Natalia. 2023. ‘Russia’s Influence in Mali’. Human Rights Foundation (blog). 11.08.2023. https://hrf.org/russias-influence-in-mali/.

‘Stop Taking the Global South for Granted | Wilson Center’. 2024. Accessed 11.10.2024. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/stop-taking-global-south-granted.

‘The Blood Gold Report’. n.d. Blood Gold Report. Accessed 11.10.2024. https://bloodgoldreport.com/.

‘Wagner in Africa: How the Russian Mercenary Group Has Rebranded’. 2024, 20.02.2024. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-68322230.

Watts, Stephen, Bryan Frederick, Nathan Chandler, Mark Toukan, Christian Curriden, Erik E. Mueller, Edward Geist, et al. 2023. ‘Proxy Warfare in Strategic Competition: Military Implications’. RAND Corporation. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA307-3.html.

 

[1] Trends in Armed Conflict, 1946-2020 is published by the Peace Research Institute Oslo. Figure 1, page 2, presents the number of battle deaths and conflicts.

[2] Mark Galeotti presents the benefits Russia reaps from covert proxy relationships highlighting how plausible deniability was expertly used in Ukraine, before the military invasion in 2022.

[3] Wagner Group is a reference to the composer Richard Wagner. The reasons why this name was chosen remains a mystery.

Based on 20 countries across Europe, North America and North Africa, this report synthesises key trends and patterns of national policy approaches towards migrant irregularity, highlighting commonalities and differences across various contexts. In particular, this report examines three key research questions: how have irregular migration policies evolved over time and in response to what; what pathways into and out of irregularity have these policies produced or aimed to address; and what challenges have hindered policy implementation. In doing so, the report aims to contextualise irregular migration policy changes, as well as how such policies can channel migrants into or out of irregularity.

 

Hendow, M., Qaisrani, A., Rössl, L., Schütze, T., Kraler, A., Ahmad Yar, A. W., Bircan, T., Oruc, N., Mohan, S. S., Triandafyllidou, A., Jauhiainen, J. S., Smolander, S., Toivonen, H., Cyrus, N., Nikolova, M., Desmond, A., Heylin, R., Cacciapaglia, M., Bonizzoni, P., … Sohst, R. R. (2024). Comparing national laws and policies addressing irregular migrants. In MIrreM Working Paper No. 6. Krems: University for Continuing Education Krems (Danube University Krems). https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.10782561

The Public Database on Irregular Migration Stock Estimates (the Database) provides an inventory and critical appraisal of country-level estimates of irregular migration stocks in 13 European countries, the United States and Canada for the period 2008 to 2023. It is a deliverable of the MIrreM project, which is a follow-up to Clandestino. Clandestino covered the period 2000-2008.

Kierans, D., Vargas-Silva, C., Ahmad-Yar, A. W., Bircan, T., Cacciapaglia, M., Carvalho, J., Cassain, L., Cyrus, N., Desmond, A., Fihel, A., Finotelli, C., Gonzalez Ramos, M. P., Heylin, R., Jauhiainen, J., Kraler, A., Leerkes, A., Nikolova, M., Rössl, L., Santos, S., … Sohst, R. R. (2024). MIrreM Public Database on Irregular Migration Stock Estimates (Version 2) [Data set]. Krems: University for Continuing Education Krems (Danube University Krems). https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.13856861

Siruno, L., Leerkes, A., Badre, A., Bircan, T., Brunovská, E., Cacciapaglia, M., Carvalho, J., Cassain, L., Cyrus, N., Desmond, A., Fihel, A., Finotelli, C., Ghio, D., Hendow, M., Heylin, R., Jauhiainen, J.S., Jovanovic, K., Kierans, D., Mohan, S.S., Nikolova, M., Oruc, N., Ramos, M.P.G., Rössl, L., Sağiroğlu, A.Z., Santos, S., Schütze, T., & Sohst, R.R. (2024) MIrreM Public Database on Irregular Migration Flow Estimates and Indicators. Krems: University for Continuing Education Krems (Danube University Krems). https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.10813413

 

This brief provides an abridged overview of the national policy landscape on irregular migration in Greece, based on a more extensive policy analysis. It also provides an overview of the main types of migrant irregularity that emerge and the pathways into and out of irregularity, including regularisations as relevant. Annexed to this deliverable is also an overview of the mapped legal and policy frameworks.

Nikolova, M. (2024). MIrreM Country Brief on Migration Policy Context – Greece. In MIrreM Report. Krems: University for Continuing Education Krems (Danube University Krems). https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.12606423

Die Abteilung Energie, Verkehr, Umwelt des Deutschen Instituts für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW Berlin) sucht für das Forschungsprojekt „Modeling Infrastructure Development & Strategies for Expansion of Trade (MINDSET) for Clean H2“ (MINDSET_Clean_H2) zum nächstmöglichen Zeitpunkt

eine studentische Hilfskraft (w/m/div)

(für 10 Wochenstunden)

Das Projekt wird gemeinsam mit der TU München und der französischen Hochschule Centrale Supélec durchgeführt. Im Projekt untersuchen wir, inwiefern strategisches Verhalten den Markthochlauf und den Handel von Wasserstoff beeinflussen wird. Am DIW Berlin beschäftigen wir uns u.a. mit dem internationalen Handel mit Wasserstoff, seiner Modellierung und Auswirkungen auf potenzielle Exportländer. Darüber hinaus werden Themen wie Preise und Infrastrukturbedarf erforscht. Das Projekt sucht gleichzeitig den Dialog und regelmäßigen Austausch mit Praxispartner*innen, der vom DIW Berlin organisiert wird.

Das Statistische Bundesamt hat heute bekannt gegeben, dass die deutsche Wirtschaft im dritten Quartal um 0,2 Prozent gegenüber dem Vorquartal gewachsen ist. Dazu eine Einschätzung von Jan-Christopher Scherer, Konjunkturexperte und Leiter der Prognose für die deutsche Wirtschaft im Deutschen Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW Berlin):

Die deutsche Wirtschaft sendet vorsichtige Signale der Belebung. Nach dem leichten Zuwachs der Wirtschaftsleistung im dritten Quartal umschifft Deutschland die technische Rezession. Gleichwohl bleibt die konjunkturelle Entwicklung insgesamt eingetrübt, denn gleichzeitig war das Bruttoinlandsprodukt im zweiten Quartal nun stärker rückläufig als zuvor ausgewiesen. Dennoch geben die heutigen Zahlen Grund zu vorsichtigem Optimismus, denn mit dem Konsum konnte die wichtigste inländische Komponente zulegen. Auch zum Jahresende dürfte der Konsum die konjunkturelle Dynamik stützen, da die Verbraucher*innen von der mittlerweile deutlich gesunkenen Inflation und den robusten Tariflohnsteigerungen profitieren und sich die Konsumstimmung weiter deutlich aufgehellt hat. Von den Investitionen sind trotz der eingeleiteten Zinswende der Europäischen Zentralbank aber weiterhin keine Impulse zu erwarten: Vor allem das Verarbeitende Gewerbe leidet unter der schlechten Stimmung in den Unternehmen und der anhaltend hohen politischen Unsicherheit. Insgesamt dürfte die deutsche Wirtschaft 2024 stagnieren.

Anlässlich des heute stattfindenden Industriegipfels bei Bundeskanzler Scholz und des Treffens der FDP-Fraktion mit Wirtschaftsverbänden ein Statement von Marcel Fratzscher, Präsident des Deutschen Instituts für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW Berlin):

Sowohl der Industriegipfel bei Bundeskanzler Scholz als auch das Treffen der FDP-Fraktion mit Wirtschaftsverbänden sind gute Initiativen, um das stark angeschlagene gegenseitige Vertrauen zu verbessern. Die deutsche Wirtschaft war in den letzten 80 Jahren immer dann erfolgreich, wenn Arbeitgeber, Arbeitnehmer und Politik vertrauensvoll zusammengearbeitet haben. Dieses Vertrauen fehlt derzeit – weil die Bundesregierung mutlos agiert und sie nicht mit einer Stimme spricht und weil viele Entscheider in den Unternehmen ihrer Verantwortung nicht gerecht werden. Ohne mehr Verantwortung und Vertrauen wird Deutschland nicht aus dieser wirtschaftlichen und politischen Krise herausfinden, stattdessen würde sich diese verschärfen.

Die beiden Treffen heute sollten drei Ziele verfolgen: Zum ersten benötigen wir dringend einen Schulterschluss zwischen Politik, Wirtschaft und Zivilgesellschaft zu den zentralen Prioritäten in der Wirtschaftspolitik. Wir benötigen eine Verbindlichkeit der Absprachen von allen Seiten und keine vagen Versprechungen und gegenseitigen Schuldzuweisungen. Zum zweiten braucht es den Mut für eine wirtschaftspolitische Kehrtwende mit einem massiven Investitionsprogramm in Infrastruktur, Innovation, Bildung und Klimaschutz. Die Bundesregierung sollte ihre Obsession mit der Schuldenbremse aufgeben. Wirtschaft und Bürger*innen benötigen eine starke und glaubwürdige Entlastung, so dass Investitionen und Konsum die Wirtschaft wiederbeleben und die Transformation zum Erfolg führen. Dafür sind die jüngsten Vorschläge des Bundeswirtschaftsministers ein guter erster Schritt, der nun von der gesamten Bundesregierung finalisiert und zügig umgesetzt werden sollte.

Zum dritten sollte die Bundesregierung einen Kurswechsel in ihrer Industriepolitik vollziehen und ihre Klientelpolitik beenden. Die Bundesregierung sollte nicht einzelnen Unternehmen oder Branchen mit Subventionen unter die Arme greifen, sich in die Entscheidung einzelner Unternehmen einmischen und existierende Strukturen versuchen zu zementieren. Alle Unternehmen – insbesondere kleine und mittlere Unternehmen auch in den Dienstleistungsbranchen – brauchen bessere Rahmenbedingungen mit weniger Bürokratie, geringeren Steuern und einer besseren Infrastruktur.

Die Bundesregierung hat noch immer die Möglichkeit, einen Kurswechsel in ihrer Wirtschaftspolitik zu vollziehen und Deutschland erfolgreich aus dieser Krise zu führen. Nur durch Mut und entschiedenes Handeln aller Seiten kann Vertrauen wiederhergestellt und die deutsche Wirtschaft zukunftsfähig werden.