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Five years after its inception, the Comprehensive Planning and Performance Assessment System (CPAS) has evolved from a pilot project into a system for bringing together planning and performance assessment in iterative cycles in all United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations. CPAS supports multiple Action for Peacekeeping Plus (A4P+) priorities, including strategic and operational integration, and performance and accountability of peacekeepers. CPAS is also at the forefront of UN Peacekeeping’s embrace of technology and the integration of system-wide data for improved mandate delivery.

CPAS has emerged as one of the flagship vehicles through which the UN can better demonstrate the impact of its peacekeeping missions and improve their performance. The system allows missions to set out a framework that details how their operations influence stakeholders and processes in the country and helps missions assess, based on data, whether and how they make progress against mandated priorities. At present, peacekeeping operations have used CPAS to conduct thirty performance assessments since 2018, which have generated over 300 recommendations aimed at improving their operations and refining their planning.

In this context, IPI and the Permanent Mission of the Kingdom of the Netherlands to the UN, in partnership with the UN Department of Peace Operations, cohosted a policy forum assessing the rollout, implementation, and impact to date of CPAS in UN peacekeeping on October 27th.

Panelists highlighted CPAS’s progress and challenges as a tool for mission-wide impact assessment, strategic planning, and integration. Daniel Forti, Research Fellow at IPI’s Brian Urquhart Center for Peace Operations, described CPAS as an “ambitious, imperfect, and worthwhile experiment for UN peacekeeping.” Interventions also reflected on CPAS’s trajectory over the coming months and offer recommendations to sustain the system’s future, particularly in considering the current geopolitical context of UN peacekeeping.

The policy forum launched an IPI publication on UN peacekeeping and CPAS, written by Daniel Forti. This event and publication are part of IPI’s broader workstream on A4P+, funded by the Kingdom of the Netherlands. DPO’s Division for Performance, Evaluation and Training also shared its own internal lessons-learned study on CPAS at the event.

Welcome and Opening Remarks:
Jenna Russo, Director of Research and Head of the Brian Urquhart Center for Peace Operations, International Peace Institute
Djeyhoun Ostowar, Deputy Head of Political Section, Mission of the Kingdom of the Netherlands to the UN
David Haeri, Director of the Division of Policy, Evaluation and Training, UN Department of Peace Operations

Speakers:
Daniel Forti, Research Fellow, Brian Urquhart Center for Peace Operations, International Peace Institute
Major General Patrick Gauchat, Head of Mission and Chief of Staff, UN Truce Supervision Organization (via VTC)
Souleymane Thioune, Chief of Staff, UN Multidimensional Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (via VTC) 
Kym Taylor, Chief of the Evaluations Team, Division of Policy, Evaluation and Training, UN Department of Peace Operations  

Closing Remarks:
Jenna Russo, Director of Research and Head of the Brian Urquhart Center for Peace Operations, International Peace Institute

The European Union Circular Economy Action Plan (EU-CEAP) is key to transitioning to a circular economy and climate neutrality under the EU Green Deal, with developing and emerging countries (DECs) playing an important role. First, DECs are essential for the primary material chains, for example, supplying material for electric vehicle (EV) batteries to the European Union (EU). Second, DECs are involved in secondary material chains: To recycle its plastic packaging, Europe relies on DECs. But despite the essential role DECs play in Europe’s transition to a circular economy, the EU-CEAP’s impact on DECs has largely gone unexamined in literature and policy discourses – a shortcoming that could reinforce Eurocentrism and jeopardise the much-needed willingness to cooperate on multilateral solutions to global challenges (Messner, 2022). This policy brief and associated discussion paper (To, 2022) outline challenges and opportunities for DECs that are related to the EU-CEAP and present recommendations for German development cooperation. In the plastic packaging sector, DECs will likely be impacted by stricter waste shipment regulation (WSR), along with higher EU recycling targets, mandatory recycled content for plastics, and bans on certain single-use plastic items. Hence, the following recommended policy actions:
• To lower the risks of illegal plastic waste trade and disposal, DECs must be helped to enforce the WSR and meet tightened import regulations.
• The impact of plastic waste imports on DEC domestic markets in light of changing WSR must be monitored; discussion about stricter EU waste export regulations should be initiated accordingly.
• In response to plastic waste imports, plastic recycling in DECs must be improved by raising standards and investments in advanced machinery as well as working conditions for informal labourers.
• Changing EU plastic ban regulations must be monitored to anticipate increased demand for plastic alternatives.
For EVs and batteries, EU-CEAP regulations that could impact DECs include stricter due diligence requirements for raw materials, higher targets for retrieving secondary battery materials, as well as reusing, repurposing and recycling EVs and their batteries. In response, the following policy actions are recommended:
• Help DEC suppliers meet tighter supply-chain require-ments in light of the expected steady increase in demand for virgin raw materials from DECs.
• Help expand road infrastructure to make it possible to reuse EVs, ensure EV batteries for repurposing, and provide recycling machinery and know-how.

The European Union Circular Economy Action Plan (EU-CEAP) is key to transitioning to a circular economy and climate neutrality under the EU Green Deal, with developing and emerging countries (DECs) playing an important role. First, DECs are essential for the primary material chains, for example, supplying material for electric vehicle (EV) batteries to the European Union (EU). Second, DECs are involved in secondary material chains: To recycle its plastic packaging, Europe relies on DECs. But despite the essential role DECs play in Europe’s transition to a circular economy, the EU-CEAP’s impact on DECs has largely gone unexamined in literature and policy discourses – a shortcoming that could reinforce Eurocentrism and jeopardise the much-needed willingness to cooperate on multilateral solutions to global challenges (Messner, 2022). This policy brief and associated discussion paper (To, 2022) outline challenges and opportunities for DECs that are related to the EU-CEAP and present recommendations for German development cooperation. In the plastic packaging sector, DECs will likely be impacted by stricter waste shipment regulation (WSR), along with higher EU recycling targets, mandatory recycled content for plastics, and bans on certain single-use plastic items. Hence, the following recommended policy actions:
• To lower the risks of illegal plastic waste trade and disposal, DECs must be helped to enforce the WSR and meet tightened import regulations.
• The impact of plastic waste imports on DEC domestic markets in light of changing WSR must be monitored; discussion about stricter EU waste export regulations should be initiated accordingly.
• In response to plastic waste imports, plastic recycling in DECs must be improved by raising standards and investments in advanced machinery as well as working conditions for informal labourers.
• Changing EU plastic ban regulations must be monitored to anticipate increased demand for plastic alternatives.
For EVs and batteries, EU-CEAP regulations that could impact DECs include stricter due diligence requirements for raw materials, higher targets for retrieving secondary battery materials, as well as reusing, repurposing and recycling EVs and their batteries. In response, the following policy actions are recommended:
• Help DEC suppliers meet tighter supply-chain require-ments in light of the expected steady increase in demand for virgin raw materials from DECs.
• Help expand road infrastructure to make it possible to reuse EVs, ensure EV batteries for repurposing, and provide recycling machinery and know-how.

The European Union Circular Economy Action Plan (EU-CEAP) is key to transitioning to a circular economy and climate neutrality under the EU Green Deal, with developing and emerging countries (DECs) playing an important role. First, DECs are essential for the primary material chains, for example, supplying material for electric vehicle (EV) batteries to the European Union (EU). Second, DECs are involved in secondary material chains: To recycle its plastic packaging, Europe relies on DECs. But despite the essential role DECs play in Europe’s transition to a circular economy, the EU-CEAP’s impact on DECs has largely gone unexamined in literature and policy discourses – a shortcoming that could reinforce Eurocentrism and jeopardise the much-needed willingness to cooperate on multilateral solutions to global challenges (Messner, 2022). This policy brief and associated discussion paper (To, 2022) outline challenges and opportunities for DECs that are related to the EU-CEAP and present recommendations for German development cooperation. In the plastic packaging sector, DECs will likely be impacted by stricter waste shipment regulation (WSR), along with higher EU recycling targets, mandatory recycled content for plastics, and bans on certain single-use plastic items. Hence, the following recommended policy actions:
• To lower the risks of illegal plastic waste trade and disposal, DECs must be helped to enforce the WSR and meet tightened import regulations.
• The impact of plastic waste imports on DEC domestic markets in light of changing WSR must be monitored; discussion about stricter EU waste export regulations should be initiated accordingly.
• In response to plastic waste imports, plastic recycling in DECs must be improved by raising standards and investments in advanced machinery as well as working conditions for informal labourers.
• Changing EU plastic ban regulations must be monitored to anticipate increased demand for plastic alternatives.
For EVs and batteries, EU-CEAP regulations that could impact DECs include stricter due diligence requirements for raw materials, higher targets for retrieving secondary battery materials, as well as reusing, repurposing and recycling EVs and their batteries. In response, the following policy actions are recommended:
• Help DEC suppliers meet tighter supply-chain require-ments in light of the expected steady increase in demand for virgin raw materials from DECs.
• Help expand road infrastructure to make it possible to reuse EVs, ensure EV batteries for repurposing, and provide recycling machinery and know-how.

The article explores the spatial dimension of the contested renegotiation of society-nature relations in the context of the oil palm boom in Indonesia. Drawing on qualitative research as well as on concepts of political ecology, materialist state theory and literature on the transnationalization and internationalisation of the state, it argues that conflicts in the context of the oil palm boom cannot merely be conceptualised as local negotiation processes for access to land, but are increasingly transnational in character. Particularly, transnational actors such as oil palm companies and environmental protection organisations as well as transnational regulatory systems such as private sustainability and carbon standards are increasingly relevant in structuring local conflicts. To illustrate how these transnational mechanisms of contestation and conflict resolution operate, the article's empirical focus lies on conflicts over land in the Indonesian province of Jambi on the island of Sumatra.

The article explores the spatial dimension of the contested renegotiation of society-nature relations in the context of the oil palm boom in Indonesia. Drawing on qualitative research as well as on concepts of political ecology, materialist state theory and literature on the transnationalization and internationalisation of the state, it argues that conflicts in the context of the oil palm boom cannot merely be conceptualised as local negotiation processes for access to land, but are increasingly transnational in character. Particularly, transnational actors such as oil palm companies and environmental protection organisations as well as transnational regulatory systems such as private sustainability and carbon standards are increasingly relevant in structuring local conflicts. To illustrate how these transnational mechanisms of contestation and conflict resolution operate, the article's empirical focus lies on conflicts over land in the Indonesian province of Jambi on the island of Sumatra.

The article explores the spatial dimension of the contested renegotiation of society-nature relations in the context of the oil palm boom in Indonesia. Drawing on qualitative research as well as on concepts of political ecology, materialist state theory and literature on the transnationalization and internationalisation of the state, it argues that conflicts in the context of the oil palm boom cannot merely be conceptualised as local negotiation processes for access to land, but are increasingly transnational in character. Particularly, transnational actors such as oil palm companies and environmental protection organisations as well as transnational regulatory systems such as private sustainability and carbon standards are increasingly relevant in structuring local conflicts. To illustrate how these transnational mechanisms of contestation and conflict resolution operate, the article's empirical focus lies on conflicts over land in the Indonesian province of Jambi on the island of Sumatra.

The European Union Circular Economy Action Plan (EU-CEAP) is key to transitioning to a circular economy and climate neutrality under the EU Green Deal – and developing and emerging countries (DECs) play important roles. They are essential for primary material chains, for example, for electric vehicle batteries. DECs are also part of secondary material chains, and Europe relies on them to recycle its plastic packaging. Despite the crucial roles that DECs play in Europe’s transition to a circular economy, literature and policy discourses have not yet examined the EU-CEAP’s impact. This discussion paper fills this gap by outlining the EU-CEAP’s challenges and opportunities for DECs and presents recommendations for development cooperation.

The European Union Circular Economy Action Plan (EU-CEAP) is key to transitioning to a circular economy and climate neutrality under the EU Green Deal – and developing and emerging countries (DECs) play important roles. They are essential for primary material chains, for example, for electric vehicle batteries. DECs are also part of secondary material chains, and Europe relies on them to recycle its plastic packaging. Despite the crucial roles that DECs play in Europe’s transition to a circular economy, literature and policy discourses have not yet examined the EU-CEAP’s impact. This discussion paper fills this gap by outlining the EU-CEAP’s challenges and opportunities for DECs and presents recommendations for development cooperation.

The European Union Circular Economy Action Plan (EU-CEAP) is key to transitioning to a circular economy and climate neutrality under the EU Green Deal – and developing and emerging countries (DECs) play important roles. They are essential for primary material chains, for example, for electric vehicle batteries. DECs are also part of secondary material chains, and Europe relies on them to recycle its plastic packaging. Despite the crucial roles that DECs play in Europe’s transition to a circular economy, literature and policy discourses have not yet examined the EU-CEAP’s impact. This discussion paper fills this gap by outlining the EU-CEAP’s challenges and opportunities for DECs and presents recommendations for development cooperation.

Zu den Ergebnissen der heutigen Ratssitzung der Europäischen Zentralbank (EZB) äußert sich Marcel Fratzscher, Präsident des Deutschen Instituts für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW Berlin), wie folgt:

Die EZB erfüllt die an sie gerichteten Erwartungen und macht einen weiteren großen Zinsschritt. Zudem nimmt sie Veränderungen an ihren Kreditprogrammen vor, um die Geldpolitik weiter zu normalisieren. Trotzdem sollte niemand falsche Erwartungen an die EZB richten, denn kein noch so starker Zinsanstieg wird die größtenteils importierte Inflation in den kommenden zwölf Monaten merklich ändern können. 

Die größte Hilfe bei der Inflationsbekämpfung erhält die EZB von der Bundesregierung und anderen Regierungen, die mit Preisdeckeln für Gas und Strom die Inflation erheblich senken werden. Der Höhepunkt der Inflation dürfte bereits überschritten sein, auch wenn die Inflation im kommenden Jahr noch immer deutlich zu hoch bleiben dürfte. 

Die EZB befindet sich zunehmend im Zielkonflikt zwischen einer soliden Verankerung der Inflationserwartungen und der Verhinderung einer noch tieferen Rezession in vielen Teilen des Euroraums, allen voran in Deutschland. Zwar bleiben die Inflationserwartungen weiterhin gut verankert, der Anstieg der Kerninflation und die hohe Inflation bei den Produzentenpreisen sind jedoch besorgniserregend. Andererseits schwächt sich die Wirtschaft im Euroraum weiter ab und die Risiken einer länger anhaltenden Schwächephase nehmen zu. 

Ich erwarte daher, dass die EZB nun den größten Teil der Zinserhöhungen geleistet hat und das Leitzinsniveau ab Frühjahr 2023 erst einmal stabil bleibt.

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On October 26th, IPI in partnership with the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Korea to the UN and the Government of Finland, and in collaboration with the Office of the Secretary-General’s Envoy on Youth, cohosted a policy forum entitled “Youth Leaders on Peace and Climate Action: Priorities for COP27.”

From the Fridays for Future movement to the Youth Climate Action Coalition, youth movements have played an increasingly prominent role in calling for action to address climate change. At the global level, however, there is a need for a stronger institutional link between youth’s participation in the climate movement and their role in decision-making processes. The establishment of the secretary-general’s Advisory Group on Climate Change in July 2020 is a positive effort to bridge this gap by connecting youth leaders with the highest office at the UN. Furthermore, last month’s General Assembly resolution establishing the UN Youth Office will provide an opportunity for young people to systematically engage on issues related to climate change, peace and security, sustainable development, and human rights.

In the lead-up to the 27th Conference of the Parties (COP27) of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in Sharm El Sheikh, this policy forum brought together youth leaders to discuss and amplify their recommendations for global climate action. Amid growing awareness that climate change is hindering sustainable development and undermining peace and security, the policy forum also focused attention on the efforts and mobilization of young people working at the nexus of sustaining peace and climate action. As such, the discussion focused on the intersection of climate action and UN Security Council Resolution 2250 on youth, peace, and security.

The panel discussion highlighted topics including the gendered impacts of climate change, the importance of accountability and action, and resourcing needs. Jayathma Wickramanayake, the UN Secretary General’s Envoy on Youth, called for increased political and financial commitments to support youth leadership on climate. “We can’t expect young people to solve this crisis without more resources and support.” As speakers shared their hopes and expectations for upcoming climate negotiations and the first-ever Children and Youth Pavilion, the policy forum magnified youth leadership and set the stage for COP27.

Opening Remarks:
H.E. Jongin Bae, Deputy Permanent Representative of the Republic of Korea to the UN
H.E. Erik Lundberg, Deputy Director General for Political Affairs, Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland

Speakers:
Jayathma Wickramanayake, UN Secretary General’s Envoy on Youth
Omnia El Omrani, Youth Envoy for COP27
Heeta Lakhani, Founder, Climate Youth Negotiators Programme (CYNP); former YOUNGO Global Focal Point (2020–2021)
Saad Uakkas, Regional Coordinator for North Africa, African Youth Initiative for Climate Change

Moderator:
Jimena Leiva Roesch, Director of Global Initiatives and Head of Peace, Climate, and Sustainable Development, International Peace Institute

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The climate change – inequality nexus has become an increasingly important concept advanced by inequality and sustainability experts as well as international organisations like the United Nations. In this perspective paper, two arguments are made to further our understanding of the nexus and to promote action on SDG 10 (”Reducing inequalities within and among countries”) and SDG 13 (”Climate action”). First, climate change’s status as a “core” planetary boundary as well as its embeddedness in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, calls for a wider discussion on environmental and ecological degradation in the context of inequality. Second, the concept of inequalities of opportunity freedoms, under the guise of the influential human capabilities framework, is well suited to make sense of the complexity and multidimensionality of the climate change – inequality nexus. To this end, some (and by no means all) causal links between climate change, wider environmental and ecological degradations, and inequality are analysed. The paper concludes by arguing in favour of a framework that can aptly capture the full complexity and multidimensionality of the climate change – inequality nexus.

The climate change – inequality nexus has become an increasingly important concept advanced by inequality and sustainability experts as well as international organisations like the United Nations. In this perspective paper, two arguments are made to further our understanding of the nexus and to promote action on SDG 10 (”Reducing inequalities within and among countries”) and SDG 13 (”Climate action”). First, climate change’s status as a “core” planetary boundary as well as its embeddedness in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, calls for a wider discussion on environmental and ecological degradation in the context of inequality. Second, the concept of inequalities of opportunity freedoms, under the guise of the influential human capabilities framework, is well suited to make sense of the complexity and multidimensionality of the climate change – inequality nexus. To this end, some (and by no means all) causal links between climate change, wider environmental and ecological degradations, and inequality are analysed. The paper concludes by arguing in favour of a framework that can aptly capture the full complexity and multidimensionality of the climate change – inequality nexus.

The climate change – inequality nexus has become an increasingly important concept advanced by inequality and sustainability experts as well as international organisations like the United Nations. In this perspective paper, two arguments are made to further our understanding of the nexus and to promote action on SDG 10 (”Reducing inequalities within and among countries”) and SDG 13 (”Climate action”). First, climate change’s status as a “core” planetary boundary as well as its embeddedness in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, calls for a wider discussion on environmental and ecological degradation in the context of inequality. Second, the concept of inequalities of opportunity freedoms, under the guise of the influential human capabilities framework, is well suited to make sense of the complexity and multidimensionality of the climate change – inequality nexus. To this end, some (and by no means all) causal links between climate change, wider environmental and ecological degradations, and inequality are analysed. The paper concludes by arguing in favour of a framework that can aptly capture the full complexity and multidimensionality of the climate change – inequality nexus.