Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

Refugees rarely flee in isolation. Instead, their everyday lives and mobilities are fundamentally shaped by the broader set of social relations in which they are embedded, particularly by their families. Drawing on interviews with sixty displaced people living in Germany and in-depth case studies of the trajectories of refugees from Eritrea and Syria, we reconstruct the role that families and other social relations transgressing national borders have played in their mobility to Germany and how their lives have been rescaled since initial displacement. Based on central ideas from figurational sociology, which we link with scholarship on forced migration, transnationalism and family relations, our paper identifies four specific family figurations in displacement that represent typical mobility patterns and constellations of ‘doing family’ in transnational spaces: the lone yet connected traveller; the reunited nuclear family; the transnationally separated family; and the transnationally extended family. We argue that family figurations in displacement are, on the one hand, decisively shaped by specific family relations and distinct displacement trajectories with various phases of family separation and reunion. On the other hand, they are fundamentally configured by migration regimes and asylum systems that substantially constrain the opportunities to live dignified local or transnational family lives.

Refugees rarely flee in isolation. Instead, their everyday lives and mobilities are fundamentally shaped by the broader set of social relations in which they are embedded, particularly by their families. Drawing on interviews with sixty displaced people living in Germany and in-depth case studies of the trajectories of refugees from Eritrea and Syria, we reconstruct the role that families and other social relations transgressing national borders have played in their mobility to Germany and how their lives have been rescaled since initial displacement. Based on central ideas from figurational sociology, which we link with scholarship on forced migration, transnationalism and family relations, our paper identifies four specific family figurations in displacement that represent typical mobility patterns and constellations of ‘doing family’ in transnational spaces: the lone yet connected traveller; the reunited nuclear family; the transnationally separated family; and the transnationally extended family. We argue that family figurations in displacement are, on the one hand, decisively shaped by specific family relations and distinct displacement trajectories with various phases of family separation and reunion. On the other hand, they are fundamentally configured by migration regimes and asylum systems that substantially constrain the opportunities to live dignified local or transnational family lives.

This chapter assesses the political impact of the Sustainable Development Goals on global governance. We start by discussing the range of expectations for global governance arrangements, considering the stated objectives of the goals. We then assess the early performance of governance arrangements in terms of shifts in policy and practice against these expectations. Our research shows the impact of the Sustainable Development Goals is largely discursive, with limited transformative outcomes on governance practices. The High-level Political Forum, created to assess global progress towards the implementation of the goals, has failed to provide political leadership and promote coherence across the United Nations system. Our research also shows that the Sustainable Development Goals initiated peer-learning among governments and other actors, yet with limited evidence that this has led to structural transformation towards sustainability. As certain ambitions of the Global Goals have been part of ongoing debates in global governance, our review finally highlights that observable changes often reflect long-term reform trajectories that are not causally linked to the launch of the goals.

This chapter assesses the political impact of the Sustainable Development Goals on global governance. We start by discussing the range of expectations for global governance arrangements, considering the stated objectives of the goals. We then assess the early performance of governance arrangements in terms of shifts in policy and practice against these expectations. Our research shows the impact of the Sustainable Development Goals is largely discursive, with limited transformative outcomes on governance practices. The High-level Political Forum, created to assess global progress towards the implementation of the goals, has failed to provide political leadership and promote coherence across the United Nations system. Our research also shows that the Sustainable Development Goals initiated peer-learning among governments and other actors, yet with limited evidence that this has led to structural transformation towards sustainability. As certain ambitions of the Global Goals have been part of ongoing debates in global governance, our review finally highlights that observable changes often reflect long-term reform trajectories that are not causally linked to the launch of the goals.

This chapter assesses the political impact of the Sustainable Development Goals on global governance. We start by discussing the range of expectations for global governance arrangements, considering the stated objectives of the goals. We then assess the early performance of governance arrangements in terms of shifts in policy and practice against these expectations. Our research shows the impact of the Sustainable Development Goals is largely discursive, with limited transformative outcomes on governance practices. The High-level Political Forum, created to assess global progress towards the implementation of the goals, has failed to provide political leadership and promote coherence across the United Nations system. Our research also shows that the Sustainable Development Goals initiated peer-learning among governments and other actors, yet with limited evidence that this has led to structural transformation towards sustainability. As certain ambitions of the Global Goals have been part of ongoing debates in global governance, our review finally highlights that observable changes often reflect long-term reform trajectories that are not causally linked to the launch of the goals.

This paper examines whether heterogeneities in financial development among Vietnamese provinces matter for firm growth in Vietnam. Using a nationally representative firm survey that covers more than 41,000 firms for the period 2009 − 2013, we estimate the impact of provincial financial development on the growth rates of firms by accounting for sectoral differences in growth opportunities. We find that province-level financial development promotes the growth rates of sales, investment and sales per worker of small firms, and reduces the growth rate of the wage-to-sales ratio. Our results imply that firms grow faster in provinces with a higher level of financial development. Moreover, the effect of financial development on growth rates is larger when firms operate in sectors with better growth opportunities.

This paper examines whether heterogeneities in financial development among Vietnamese provinces matter for firm growth in Vietnam. Using a nationally representative firm survey that covers more than 41,000 firms for the period 2009 − 2013, we estimate the impact of provincial financial development on the growth rates of firms by accounting for sectoral differences in growth opportunities. We find that province-level financial development promotes the growth rates of sales, investment and sales per worker of small firms, and reduces the growth rate of the wage-to-sales ratio. Our results imply that firms grow faster in provinces with a higher level of financial development. Moreover, the effect of financial development on growth rates is larger when firms operate in sectors with better growth opportunities.

This paper examines whether heterogeneities in financial development among Vietnamese provinces matter for firm growth in Vietnam. Using a nationally representative firm survey that covers more than 41,000 firms for the period 2009 − 2013, we estimate the impact of provincial financial development on the growth rates of firms by accounting for sectoral differences in growth opportunities. We find that province-level financial development promotes the growth rates of sales, investment and sales per worker of small firms, and reduces the growth rate of the wage-to-sales ratio. Our results imply that firms grow faster in provinces with a higher level of financial development. Moreover, the effect of financial development on growth rates is larger when firms operate in sectors with better growth opportunities.

Social cohesion has recently gained increasing attention in academic and policy circles. Apart from being a necessary feature of stable societies per se, social cohesion is also a key factor for sustainable economic development. One potential means through which social cohesion could foster economic development is by enhancing financial development. In this paper, we examine whether social cohesion is significantly associated with firms’ access to finance in Africa. To this end, we use a recently constructed dataset on social cohesion in Africa, which is based on the Afrobarometer survey and the Varieties of Democracy database. The dataset contains indices for the three pillars of social cohesion – trust, inclusive identity and cooperation for the common good. Combining this dataset with that of the World Bank Enterprise Surveys, we build a sample which covers more than 12,500 firms and 27 African countries. Our results show that all three components of social cohesion are positively associated with at least one measure of firms’ access to external finance. In particular, trust – but not inclusive identity and cooperation for the common good – is significantly associated with the likelihood that firms have a checking or savings account, or are financially constrained. When we measure access to finance with respect to having a line of credit or a loan from a financial institution, all the three pillars of social cohesion, including inclusive identity and cooperation for the common good, are related to access to finance. The results are robust to addressing endogeneity concerns using a heteroskedasticity-based identification strategy. Overall, our results suggest that improving social cohesion (e.g. through social protection, education, strengthening civil society organisations) could do more than hold society together; it could also promote access to finance, growth of firms, and thus economic development and job creation.

Social cohesion has recently gained increasing attention in academic and policy circles. Apart from being a necessary feature of stable societies per se, social cohesion is also a key factor for sustainable economic development. One potential means through which social cohesion could foster economic development is by enhancing financial development. In this paper, we examine whether social cohesion is significantly associated with firms’ access to finance in Africa. To this end, we use a recently constructed dataset on social cohesion in Africa, which is based on the Afrobarometer survey and the Varieties of Democracy database. The dataset contains indices for the three pillars of social cohesion – trust, inclusive identity and cooperation for the common good. Combining this dataset with that of the World Bank Enterprise Surveys, we build a sample which covers more than 12,500 firms and 27 African countries. Our results show that all three components of social cohesion are positively associated with at least one measure of firms’ access to external finance. In particular, trust – but not inclusive identity and cooperation for the common good – is significantly associated with the likelihood that firms have a checking or savings account, or are financially constrained. When we measure access to finance with respect to having a line of credit or a loan from a financial institution, all the three pillars of social cohesion, including inclusive identity and cooperation for the common good, are related to access to finance. The results are robust to addressing endogeneity concerns using a heteroskedasticity-based identification strategy. Overall, our results suggest that improving social cohesion (e.g. through social protection, education, strengthening civil society organisations) could do more than hold society together; it could also promote access to finance, growth of firms, and thus economic development and job creation.

Social cohesion has recently gained increasing attention in academic and policy circles. Apart from being a necessary feature of stable societies per se, social cohesion is also a key factor for sustainable economic development. One potential means through which social cohesion could foster economic development is by enhancing financial development. In this paper, we examine whether social cohesion is significantly associated with firms’ access to finance in Africa. To this end, we use a recently constructed dataset on social cohesion in Africa, which is based on the Afrobarometer survey and the Varieties of Democracy database. The dataset contains indices for the three pillars of social cohesion – trust, inclusive identity and cooperation for the common good. Combining this dataset with that of the World Bank Enterprise Surveys, we build a sample which covers more than 12,500 firms and 27 African countries. Our results show that all three components of social cohesion are positively associated with at least one measure of firms’ access to external finance. In particular, trust – but not inclusive identity and cooperation for the common good – is significantly associated with the likelihood that firms have a checking or savings account, or are financially constrained. When we measure access to finance with respect to having a line of credit or a loan from a financial institution, all the three pillars of social cohesion, including inclusive identity and cooperation for the common good, are related to access to finance. The results are robust to addressing endogeneity concerns using a heteroskedasticity-based identification strategy. Overall, our results suggest that improving social cohesion (e.g. through social protection, education, strengthening civil society organisations) could do more than hold society together; it could also promote access to finance, growth of firms, and thus economic development and job creation.

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IPI, in partnership with the Republic of Korea, organized a public policy forum on August 11th, bringing together youth-led organizations working on digital education in areas affected by economic and political crises in the post-pandemic era. The aim of this event was to provide an opportunity for young people to share innovative solutions for supporting the education of children and youth around the world.

The COVID-19 pandemic significantly impacted the education sector and resulted in the closing of schools around the world. Access to education services was disrupted for more than 1.6 billion children and youth globally. While many countries were able to switch to online education, many developing countries, especially those experiencing multiple crises, could not provide online education due to a lack of affordable technology and resources, economic contractions, political uncertainty, and other reasons. As the COVID-19 pandemic and other crises continue to strain national budgets, there is an urgent need to ensure education remains a priority for governments.

In his report on “Our Common Agenda,” the UN Secretary-General stressed the need for young people to be better prepared for such challenges and the need to strengthen and update the education system globally. This September, the Secretary-General is organizing a summit on “Transforming Education” that seeks to mobilize commitment and action to accelerate progress on improving education for all to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

This policy forum comes at a strategic point in time, one month after SDG 4 on quality education was reviewed at this year’s High-Level Political Forum, and on the eve of International Youth Day.

Opening Remarks:
H.E. Ambassador Jongin Bae, Deputy Permanent Representative of the Republic of Korea to the UN
H.E. Dr. Michal Mlynár, Permanent Representative of Slovakia to the UN and UNICEF Executive Board President, a.i.

Speakers:
Victoria Ibiwoye, Youth Engagement Lead, Education 2030, UNESCO
Pashtana Durrani, Executive Director, LEARN Afghanistan (@LearnAfg)
Nhial Deng, Refugee and Peace Activist, South Sudan
Abheejit Khandagale, Founder, Ekatra; Top Innovator, UpLink—World Economic Forum

Moderator:
Adam Lupel, IPI Vice President and COO

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Deutschland und das Vereinigte Königreich Großbritannien und Nordirland (UK) sind im Hinblick auf Ausgaben für die Entwicklungszusammenarbeit (Official Development Assistance – ODA) die zweit- bzw. viertgrößten Geber weltweit. Bei internationalen politischen Debatten über globale Entwicklung in der Organisation für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung (OECD), der G7, der G20 und anderen wichtigen Zusammenschlüssen und Plattformen sind die beiden Länder zudem wichtige Akteure. Die Entwicklungspolitik beider Länder hat sich im ersten Jahrzehnt dieses Jahrtausends stark angenähert und es kam zu einer umfangreichen Zusammenarbeit. In dieser Zeit begannen die westlichen Länder die Entwicklungszusammenarbeit als erhebliche Quelle von Soft Power zu begreifen, was sich in steigenden Entwicklungsbudgets und aneinander angeglichenen politischen Ausrichtungen bemerkbar machte. Die Austeritätspolitik im Anschluss an die globale Wirtschafts- und Finanzkrise und die Entscheidung des Vereinigten Königreichs 2016, die Europäische Union (EU) zu verlassen, haben die bilateralen Beziehungen zwischen Deutschland und dem Vereinigten Königreich im Bereich der Entwicklungspolitik vor große Herausforderungen gestellt. Mit dem Austritt des Vereinigten Königreichs aus der EU hat sich die Zahl der gemeinsamen Maßnahmen und entsprechenden Möglichkeiten für Kooperationsinitiativen verringert. Nach der Hälfte des Zeitraums, der für die Umsetzung der Agenda 2030 vorgesehen ist, richten beide Länder ihre Entwicklungspolitik neu aus und arbeiten daran, ihre künftige Rolle in Europa und ihre globalen Entwicklungsambitionen festzulegen. Dennoch bleiben sie wichtige Partner im globalen Entwicklungssektor. Sowohl das Vereinigte Königreich als auch Deutschland haben ihre entwicklungspolitischen Strategien jüngst als Teil ihrer integrierten Außenpolitik angepasst oder sind dabei, solche Strategien zu erarbeiten. Die Auswirkungen des vor einigen Monaten ausgebrochenen Krieges in der Ukraine machen jedoch Anpassungen dieses Prozesses erforderlich. Es spricht nach wie vor viel für einen regelmäßigen Austausch und eine entwicklungspolitische Zusammenarbeit zwischen beiden Ländern, nicht zuletzt auch durch eine Intensivierung des Dialogs und die Wiederaufnahme gegenseitiger Abordnungen zwischen dem britischen Ministerium für Auswärtiges, Commonwealth und Entwicklung (Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office – FCDO) und dem Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung (BMZ). Vor allem zwei Bereiche bieten gute Perspektiven. Erstens sollten Deutschland und das Vereinigte König-reich eng zusammenarbeiten, um die Agenda der aktuellen G7-Präsidentschaft umzusetzen. Der Schwerpunkt auf Investitionen in Infrastrukturprojekte, der schon während der britischen G7-Präsidentschaft im vergangenen Jahr gesetzt wurde, sollte beibehalten werden. Weitere wichtige Möglichkeiten der Zusammenarbeit bestehen in den Bereichen Gleichstellung und Klimaschutz sowie bei der Bereitstellung globaler öffentlicher Güter. Zweitens sollten Deutschland und das Vereinigte Königreich darum bemüht sein, sich im Rahmen der OECD zu engagieren und ihre Rolle als Institution, die mit der Erarbeitung wichtiger Standards für die internationale Entwicklungspolitik betraut ist und ein wichtiges Forum für wechselseitiges Lernen darstellt, zu unterstützen. Da beide Länder wichtige Geldgeber für die globale Entwicklungsfinanzierung sind, ist die Legitimität des Berichtssystems der OECD von wesentlicher Bedeutung dafür, ihren Einfluss im globalen Entwicklungssektor geltend zu machen und einen entsprechenden Beitrag zu leisten.

Deutschland und das Vereinigte Königreich Großbritannien und Nordirland (UK) sind im Hinblick auf Ausgaben für die Entwicklungszusammenarbeit (Official Development Assistance – ODA) die zweit- bzw. viertgrößten Geber weltweit. Bei internationalen politischen Debatten über globale Entwicklung in der Organisation für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung (OECD), der G7, der G20 und anderen wichtigen Zusammenschlüssen und Plattformen sind die beiden Länder zudem wichtige Akteure. Die Entwicklungspolitik beider Länder hat sich im ersten Jahrzehnt dieses Jahrtausends stark angenähert und es kam zu einer umfangreichen Zusammenarbeit. In dieser Zeit begannen die westlichen Länder die Entwicklungszusammenarbeit als erhebliche Quelle von Soft Power zu begreifen, was sich in steigenden Entwicklungsbudgets und aneinander angeglichenen politischen Ausrichtungen bemerkbar machte. Die Austeritätspolitik im Anschluss an die globale Wirtschafts- und Finanzkrise und die Entscheidung des Vereinigten Königreichs 2016, die Europäische Union (EU) zu verlassen, haben die bilateralen Beziehungen zwischen Deutschland und dem Vereinigten Königreich im Bereich der Entwicklungspolitik vor große Herausforderungen gestellt. Mit dem Austritt des Vereinigten Königreichs aus der EU hat sich die Zahl der gemeinsamen Maßnahmen und entsprechenden Möglichkeiten für Kooperationsinitiativen verringert. Nach der Hälfte des Zeitraums, der für die Umsetzung der Agenda 2030 vorgesehen ist, richten beide Länder ihre Entwicklungspolitik neu aus und arbeiten daran, ihre künftige Rolle in Europa und ihre globalen Entwicklungsambitionen festzulegen. Dennoch bleiben sie wichtige Partner im globalen Entwicklungssektor. Sowohl das Vereinigte Königreich als auch Deutschland haben ihre entwicklungspolitischen Strategien jüngst als Teil ihrer integrierten Außenpolitik angepasst oder sind dabei, solche Strategien zu erarbeiten. Die Auswirkungen des vor einigen Monaten ausgebrochenen Krieges in der Ukraine machen jedoch Anpassungen dieses Prozesses erforderlich. Es spricht nach wie vor viel für einen regelmäßigen Austausch und eine entwicklungspolitische Zusammenarbeit zwischen beiden Ländern, nicht zuletzt auch durch eine Intensivierung des Dialogs und die Wiederaufnahme gegenseitiger Abordnungen zwischen dem britischen Ministerium für Auswärtiges, Commonwealth und Entwicklung (Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office – FCDO) und dem Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung (BMZ). Vor allem zwei Bereiche bieten gute Perspektiven. Erstens sollten Deutschland und das Vereinigte König-reich eng zusammenarbeiten, um die Agenda der aktuellen G7-Präsidentschaft umzusetzen. Der Schwerpunkt auf Investitionen in Infrastrukturprojekte, der schon während der britischen G7-Präsidentschaft im vergangenen Jahr gesetzt wurde, sollte beibehalten werden. Weitere wichtige Möglichkeiten der Zusammenarbeit bestehen in den Bereichen Gleichstellung und Klimaschutz sowie bei der Bereitstellung globaler öffentlicher Güter. Zweitens sollten Deutschland und das Vereinigte Königreich darum bemüht sein, sich im Rahmen der OECD zu engagieren und ihre Rolle als Institution, die mit der Erarbeitung wichtiger Standards für die internationale Entwicklungspolitik betraut ist und ein wichtiges Forum für wechselseitiges Lernen darstellt, zu unterstützen. Da beide Länder wichtige Geldgeber für die globale Entwicklungsfinanzierung sind, ist die Legitimität des Berichtssystems der OECD von wesentlicher Bedeutung dafür, ihren Einfluss im globalen Entwicklungssektor geltend zu machen und einen entsprechenden Beitrag zu leisten.

Deutschland und das Vereinigte Königreich Großbritannien und Nordirland (UK) sind im Hinblick auf Ausgaben für die Entwicklungszusammenarbeit (Official Development Assistance – ODA) die zweit- bzw. viertgrößten Geber weltweit. Bei internationalen politischen Debatten über globale Entwicklung in der Organisation für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung (OECD), der G7, der G20 und anderen wichtigen Zusammenschlüssen und Plattformen sind die beiden Länder zudem wichtige Akteure. Die Entwicklungspolitik beider Länder hat sich im ersten Jahrzehnt dieses Jahrtausends stark angenähert und es kam zu einer umfangreichen Zusammenarbeit. In dieser Zeit begannen die westlichen Länder die Entwicklungszusammenarbeit als erhebliche Quelle von Soft Power zu begreifen, was sich in steigenden Entwicklungsbudgets und aneinander angeglichenen politischen Ausrichtungen bemerkbar machte. Die Austeritätspolitik im Anschluss an die globale Wirtschafts- und Finanzkrise und die Entscheidung des Vereinigten Königreichs 2016, die Europäische Union (EU) zu verlassen, haben die bilateralen Beziehungen zwischen Deutschland und dem Vereinigten Königreich im Bereich der Entwicklungspolitik vor große Herausforderungen gestellt. Mit dem Austritt des Vereinigten Königreichs aus der EU hat sich die Zahl der gemeinsamen Maßnahmen und entsprechenden Möglichkeiten für Kooperationsinitiativen verringert. Nach der Hälfte des Zeitraums, der für die Umsetzung der Agenda 2030 vorgesehen ist, richten beide Länder ihre Entwicklungspolitik neu aus und arbeiten daran, ihre künftige Rolle in Europa und ihre globalen Entwicklungsambitionen festzulegen. Dennoch bleiben sie wichtige Partner im globalen Entwicklungssektor. Sowohl das Vereinigte Königreich als auch Deutschland haben ihre entwicklungspolitischen Strategien jüngst als Teil ihrer integrierten Außenpolitik angepasst oder sind dabei, solche Strategien zu erarbeiten. Die Auswirkungen des vor einigen Monaten ausgebrochenen Krieges in der Ukraine machen jedoch Anpassungen dieses Prozesses erforderlich. Es spricht nach wie vor viel für einen regelmäßigen Austausch und eine entwicklungspolitische Zusammenarbeit zwischen beiden Ländern, nicht zuletzt auch durch eine Intensivierung des Dialogs und die Wiederaufnahme gegenseitiger Abordnungen zwischen dem britischen Ministerium für Auswärtiges, Commonwealth und Entwicklung (Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office – FCDO) und dem Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung (BMZ). Vor allem zwei Bereiche bieten gute Perspektiven. Erstens sollten Deutschland und das Vereinigte König-reich eng zusammenarbeiten, um die Agenda der aktuellen G7-Präsidentschaft umzusetzen. Der Schwerpunkt auf Investitionen in Infrastrukturprojekte, der schon während der britischen G7-Präsidentschaft im vergangenen Jahr gesetzt wurde, sollte beibehalten werden. Weitere wichtige Möglichkeiten der Zusammenarbeit bestehen in den Bereichen Gleichstellung und Klimaschutz sowie bei der Bereitstellung globaler öffentlicher Güter. Zweitens sollten Deutschland und das Vereinigte Königreich darum bemüht sein, sich im Rahmen der OECD zu engagieren und ihre Rolle als Institution, die mit der Erarbeitung wichtiger Standards für die internationale Entwicklungspolitik betraut ist und ein wichtiges Forum für wechselseitiges Lernen darstellt, zu unterstützen. Da beide Länder wichtige Geldgeber für die globale Entwicklungsfinanzierung sind, ist die Legitimität des Berichtssystems der OECD von wesentlicher Bedeutung dafür, ihren Einfluss im globalen Entwicklungssektor geltend zu machen und einen entsprechenden Beitrag zu leisten.

In striving to achieve the Paris Agreement and the 2030 Agenda, governments have the opportunity to implement their climate and sustainability goals more coherently. Such coherence requires the coordination of interdependent policies across different policy fields, sectors and actors. This paper explores how governments design and implement synergic solutions to concomitantly achieve both international agendas. With the empirical cases of Germany and South Africa, we investigate two independent approaches to the synergic solution of a just energy transition, whereby countries aim to phase out coal as a means to tackle climate change while also ensuring that the achievement of other Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) is not hindered. Methodologically, we apply a deductive qualitative approach consisting of literature review, semi-structured interviews, and content analysis. To that end, we examine relevant policies and institutional arrangements by applying a combined conceptual framework of energy justice and just transition in both countries. We find major challenges in overcoming environmental, economic and social burdens of the coal phase-out, especially related to jobs and inequality (SDGs 8, 10) and the Water-Energy-Food-Land nexus (SDGs 2, 6, 7, 15). Through the selection of Germany and South Africa, we illustrate how countries with different political, social and economic backgrounds strive to manage such a transition. Our developed framework and case-studies’ findings point towards important considerations when designing just energy transition pathways, such as ensuring inclusiveness in decision-making, thoroughly assessing social, economic and environmental impacts, and adequately coordinating across different actors and the local, provincial and national levels.

In striving to achieve the Paris Agreement and the 2030 Agenda, governments have the opportunity to implement their climate and sustainability goals more coherently. Such coherence requires the coordination of interdependent policies across different policy fields, sectors and actors. This paper explores how governments design and implement synergic solutions to concomitantly achieve both international agendas. With the empirical cases of Germany and South Africa, we investigate two independent approaches to the synergic solution of a just energy transition, whereby countries aim to phase out coal as a means to tackle climate change while also ensuring that the achievement of other Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) is not hindered. Methodologically, we apply a deductive qualitative approach consisting of literature review, semi-structured interviews, and content analysis. To that end, we examine relevant policies and institutional arrangements by applying a combined conceptual framework of energy justice and just transition in both countries. We find major challenges in overcoming environmental, economic and social burdens of the coal phase-out, especially related to jobs and inequality (SDGs 8, 10) and the Water-Energy-Food-Land nexus (SDGs 2, 6, 7, 15). Through the selection of Germany and South Africa, we illustrate how countries with different political, social and economic backgrounds strive to manage such a transition. Our developed framework and case-studies’ findings point towards important considerations when designing just energy transition pathways, such as ensuring inclusiveness in decision-making, thoroughly assessing social, economic and environmental impacts, and adequately coordinating across different actors and the local, provincial and national levels.

In striving to achieve the Paris Agreement and the 2030 Agenda, governments have the opportunity to implement their climate and sustainability goals more coherently. Such coherence requires the coordination of interdependent policies across different policy fields, sectors and actors. This paper explores how governments design and implement synergic solutions to concomitantly achieve both international agendas. With the empirical cases of Germany and South Africa, we investigate two independent approaches to the synergic solution of a just energy transition, whereby countries aim to phase out coal as a means to tackle climate change while also ensuring that the achievement of other Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) is not hindered. Methodologically, we apply a deductive qualitative approach consisting of literature review, semi-structured interviews, and content analysis. To that end, we examine relevant policies and institutional arrangements by applying a combined conceptual framework of energy justice and just transition in both countries. We find major challenges in overcoming environmental, economic and social burdens of the coal phase-out, especially related to jobs and inequality (SDGs 8, 10) and the Water-Energy-Food-Land nexus (SDGs 2, 6, 7, 15). Through the selection of Germany and South Africa, we illustrate how countries with different political, social and economic backgrounds strive to manage such a transition. Our developed framework and case-studies’ findings point towards important considerations when designing just energy transition pathways, such as ensuring inclusiveness in decision-making, thoroughly assessing social, economic and environmental impacts, and adequately coordinating across different actors and the local, provincial and national levels.