Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

Die Abteilung Energie, Verkehr, Umwelt sucht zum nächstmöglichen Zeitpunkt eine studentische Hilfskraft (w/m/div) für 9 Wochenstunden.

Having already been growing in importance for a number of years, geopolitics as it relates to the Global South has become tremendously more relevant following Russia’s aggression in Ukraine in 2022. Rivalries with China are set to become even more influential in future, determining intergovernmental relations as a whole.
Following the Russian invasion in February 2022, attention was initially concentrated on the stances adopted by states regarding the corresponding UN resolutions and UN debates. This focus alone illustrates the great significance attached to the positions taken by states and thus to strategic partisan thinking. At the same time, it would seem that none of the country alliances being formed to date differ fundamentally from those of recent years. Many developing countries are capitalising on their emancipated status gained in recent decades to formulate positions of their own, as well as to identify any double standards on the part of Western governments. It is important that German, European and other political players gain a better idea of the interests and perceptions of partners in the Global South. In development terms, Russia’s war of aggression represents a watershed moment. It is important to note the following in this context:
• At overall level, it will most likely be more difficult to achieve the 2030 Agenda, with its 17 SDGs (Sustainable Development Goals). The COVID-19 pandemic had already produced a huge socio-economic shock in the Global South, but this has now been dwarfed in many developing countries by the impact of the war. On top of this, the increasingly critical effects of climate change are proliferating all the time.
• While the most severe consequences of the Ukraine war are being felt by the country itself (need for comprehensive humanitarian assistance; future need for large-scale reconstruction work) and the surrounding region (refugee care, etc.), the surge in food and energy prices resulting from the conflict is having a major impact on developing countries.
• There are also other long-term challenges in regard to global sustainable development. Take innovative cooperation instruments for tackling climate change, for instance, the most prominent of which are just energy transition partnerships (JETP). The legitimacy of efforts to promote these ambitious cooperation initiatives could be undermined by European countries introducing short-term measures that involve a return to fossil fuel investment.
• The growing need to overcome cross-border challenges could intersect with cutbacks being made by donor countries to their long-term development programmes. For example, some nations (particularly the UK and, in some cases, Germany) may scale back funding or increasingly charge for providing in-donor refugee costs and thus move to report a number of their activities as Official Development Assistance (ODA) (as planned by the Netherlands and Norway, for instance).
• We can expect the Ukraine war to reinforce the general trend towards interest-based development policy and increase demand for approaches that deliver quick results. Nevertheless, it is not possible to derive a clear regional, thematic or country allocation pattern from this trend.
• The issue of governance in developing countries is receiving greater attention in light of the risks posed by autocratic systems. The increase in cooperation with China and Russia, two nations employing their own global discourse in an attempt to promote what they refer to as “real democracy”, is especially indicative of the way China in particular is striving to influence global debate.

Having already been growing in importance for a number of years, geopolitics as it relates to the Global South has become tremendously more relevant following Russia’s aggression in Ukraine in 2022. Rivalries with China are set to become even more influential in future, determining intergovernmental relations as a whole.
Following the Russian invasion in February 2022, attention was initially concentrated on the stances adopted by states regarding the corresponding UN resolutions and UN debates. This focus alone illustrates the great significance attached to the positions taken by states and thus to strategic partisan thinking. At the same time, it would seem that none of the country alliances being formed to date differ fundamentally from those of recent years. Many developing countries are capitalising on their emancipated status gained in recent decades to formulate positions of their own, as well as to identify any double standards on the part of Western governments. It is important that German, European and other political players gain a better idea of the interests and perceptions of partners in the Global South. In development terms, Russia’s war of aggression represents a watershed moment. It is important to note the following in this context:
• At overall level, it will most likely be more difficult to achieve the 2030 Agenda, with its 17 SDGs (Sustainable Development Goals). The COVID-19 pandemic had already produced a huge socio-economic shock in the Global South, but this has now been dwarfed in many developing countries by the impact of the war. On top of this, the increasingly critical effects of climate change are proliferating all the time.
• While the most severe consequences of the Ukraine war are being felt by the country itself (need for comprehensive humanitarian assistance; future need for large-scale reconstruction work) and the surrounding region (refugee care, etc.), the surge in food and energy prices resulting from the conflict is having a major impact on developing countries.
• There are also other long-term challenges in regard to global sustainable development. Take innovative cooperation instruments for tackling climate change, for instance, the most prominent of which are just energy transition partnerships (JETP). The legitimacy of efforts to promote these ambitious cooperation initiatives could be undermined by European countries introducing short-term measures that involve a return to fossil fuel investment.
• The growing need to overcome cross-border challenges could intersect with cutbacks being made by donor countries to their long-term development programmes. For example, some nations (particularly the UK and, in some cases, Germany) may scale back funding or increasingly charge for providing in-donor refugee costs and thus move to report a number of their activities as Official Development Assistance (ODA) (as planned by the Netherlands and Norway, for instance).
• We can expect the Ukraine war to reinforce the general trend towards interest-based development policy and increase demand for approaches that deliver quick results. Nevertheless, it is not possible to derive a clear regional, thematic or country allocation pattern from this trend.
• The issue of governance in developing countries is receiving greater attention in light of the risks posed by autocratic systems. The increase in cooperation with China and Russia, two nations employing their own global discourse in an attempt to promote what they refer to as “real democracy”, is especially indicative of the way China in particular is striving to influence global debate.

Having already been growing in importance for a number of years, geopolitics as it relates to the Global South has become tremendously more relevant following Russia’s aggression in Ukraine in 2022. Rivalries with China are set to become even more influential in future, determining intergovernmental relations as a whole.
Following the Russian invasion in February 2022, attention was initially concentrated on the stances adopted by states regarding the corresponding UN resolutions and UN debates. This focus alone illustrates the great significance attached to the positions taken by states and thus to strategic partisan thinking. At the same time, it would seem that none of the country alliances being formed to date differ fundamentally from those of recent years. Many developing countries are capitalising on their emancipated status gained in recent decades to formulate positions of their own, as well as to identify any double standards on the part of Western governments. It is important that German, European and other political players gain a better idea of the interests and perceptions of partners in the Global South. In development terms, Russia’s war of aggression represents a watershed moment. It is important to note the following in this context:
• At overall level, it will most likely be more difficult to achieve the 2030 Agenda, with its 17 SDGs (Sustainable Development Goals). The COVID-19 pandemic had already produced a huge socio-economic shock in the Global South, but this has now been dwarfed in many developing countries by the impact of the war. On top of this, the increasingly critical effects of climate change are proliferating all the time.
• While the most severe consequences of the Ukraine war are being felt by the country itself (need for comprehensive humanitarian assistance; future need for large-scale reconstruction work) and the surrounding region (refugee care, etc.), the surge in food and energy prices resulting from the conflict is having a major impact on developing countries.
• There are also other long-term challenges in regard to global sustainable development. Take innovative cooperation instruments for tackling climate change, for instance, the most prominent of which are just energy transition partnerships (JETP). The legitimacy of efforts to promote these ambitious cooperation initiatives could be undermined by European countries introducing short-term measures that involve a return to fossil fuel investment.
• The growing need to overcome cross-border challenges could intersect with cutbacks being made by donor countries to their long-term development programmes. For example, some nations (particularly the UK and, in some cases, Germany) may scale back funding or increasingly charge for providing in-donor refugee costs and thus move to report a number of their activities as Official Development Assistance (ODA) (as planned by the Netherlands and Norway, for instance).
• We can expect the Ukraine war to reinforce the general trend towards interest-based development policy and increase demand for approaches that deliver quick results. Nevertheless, it is not possible to derive a clear regional, thematic or country allocation pattern from this trend.
• The issue of governance in developing countries is receiving greater attention in light of the risks posed by autocratic systems. The increase in cooperation with China and Russia, two nations employing their own global discourse in an attempt to promote what they refer to as “real democracy”, is especially indicative of the way China in particular is striving to influence global debate.

Die Ergebnisse der heutigen Sitzung des Rates der Europäischen Zentralbank (EZB) kommentiert Marcel Fratzscher, Präsident des Deutschen Instituts für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW Berlin), wie folgt:

-->Mit ihrer stärker als erwarteten Erhöhung des Leitzinses sendet die EZB eine Mahnung an alle wirtschaftlichen Akteure, dass sie gewillt ist, die geldpolitischen Zügel so stark und so lange anzuziehen, bis die Inflation unter Kontrolle ist. Die deutliche Erhöhung des Leitzinses ist richtig und notwendig, zumal die Geldpolitik mit negativen Realzinsen auf Rekordniveau noch immer sehr expansiv ist. Ich erwarte zwei weitere Zinsschritte und eine weitere Erhöhung des Leitzinses in diesem Jahr um noch mal insgesamt 100 Basispunkte.

Allerdings läuft die EZB Gefahr, einen Fehler in ihrer Kommunikation zu begehen. Ihr Versprechen von weiteren starken Zinserhöhungen im Jahr 2023 und einer baldigen Rückkehr zur Preisstabilität wird sich mit hoher Wahrscheinlichkeit als unerfüllbar erweisen. Denn die EZB, wie die meisten anderen Zentralbanken, hat in diesen Krisenzeiten zu wenig Einfluss auf die Inflation über die kommenden eineinhalb Jahre, da diese hauptsächlich durch höhere Preise für Energie und andere vorrangig importierte Güter getrieben wird. Ich halte daher die EZB-Prognose einer Rückkehr zu einer Inflationsrate von knapp zwei Prozent im Jahr 2024 für unrealistisch.

Die Gefahr einer tiefen Rezession in der Eurozone 2023 und Risiken der Finanzstabilität werden es der EZB zudem kaum möglich machen, die Leitzinsen ähnlich stark zu erhöhen wie die US-Notenbank. Dabei ist nicht die Staatsverschuldung mancher Länder des Euroraums das Problem, sondern die Risiken bei privaten Investoren und einer noch tieferen Rezession. Die neue Kommunikationsstrategie der EZB ist gefährlich und könnte sich schädlich auf die Glaubwürdigkeit und damit die Effektivität der Geldpolitik auswirken. Dies könnte ultimativ bedeuten, dass die EZB die Inflationserwartungen weniger gut verankern kann und letztlich deutlich länger braucht, um ihrem Mandat der Preisstabilität wieder gerecht zu werden.

Event Video 
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On September 7th, IPI in partnership with the Grace Farms Foundation, UNESCO, UN Women, and United Kingdom Mission to the UN cohosted a discussion with the President of IPI, Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein, and British artist and activist, Hannah Rose Thomas, who has contributed to building a culture of peace and reconciliation through her innovative work within refugee communities.

The event featured works from the art exhibit “Tears of Gold,” which include portraits of Yezidi, Rohingya, and Nigerian women. The paintings are a visual testimony not only of war and injustice, but also of humanity, dignity, and resilience.

Welcome Remarks:
Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein, IPI President
Sharon Prince, CEO and Founder of the Grace Farms Foundation
Dame Barbara Woodward, Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom to the UN
Eliot Minchenberg, Director of Office and UNESCO Representative to the UN in New York
Asa Regner, Deputy Executive Director of UN Women

Click each portrait to read the women’s testimonies

This paper provides background to the State of the World’s Land and Water Resources for Food and Agriculture Report, Edition 2021 (SOLAW 21) with an innovative governance approach to addressing non-point pollution sources originating from agricultural activities: alliances between water utilities and farmers in designated water protection areas and drinking water extraction areas. The alliances revolve around the idea of balancing diverging targets such as maintaining drinking water standards and the viability and profitability of agricultural businesses. While farmers can achieve high food production levels by using mineral and organic fertilizers and pesticides, these may have enormous side effects: nitrate and phosphate are transferred into surface and groundwater, impairing water quality and aquatic life. It may also result in the water no longer being usable as drinking water without special, costly treatment. These negative effects led to the establishment of voluntary alliances between water utilities and farmers (hereafter called ‘drinking water alliances’ or ‘alliances’) in the 1980s when the German government strengthened the threshold values for nitrate in drinking water from 90 mg/l to 50 mg/l. Water utilities, together with the regional (Laender) governments, initiated alliances with farmers to adopt fertilization and land management practices in order to protect drinking water resources from nitrate pollution.

This paper provides background to the State of the World’s Land and Water Resources for Food and Agriculture Report, Edition 2021 (SOLAW 21) with an innovative governance approach to addressing non-point pollution sources originating from agricultural activities: alliances between water utilities and farmers in designated water protection areas and drinking water extraction areas. The alliances revolve around the idea of balancing diverging targets such as maintaining drinking water standards and the viability and profitability of agricultural businesses. While farmers can achieve high food production levels by using mineral and organic fertilizers and pesticides, these may have enormous side effects: nitrate and phosphate are transferred into surface and groundwater, impairing water quality and aquatic life. It may also result in the water no longer being usable as drinking water without special, costly treatment. These negative effects led to the establishment of voluntary alliances between water utilities and farmers (hereafter called ‘drinking water alliances’ or ‘alliances’) in the 1980s when the German government strengthened the threshold values for nitrate in drinking water from 90 mg/l to 50 mg/l. Water utilities, together with the regional (Laender) governments, initiated alliances with farmers to adopt fertilization and land management practices in order to protect drinking water resources from nitrate pollution.

This paper provides background to the State of the World’s Land and Water Resources for Food and Agriculture Report, Edition 2021 (SOLAW 21) with an innovative governance approach to addressing non-point pollution sources originating from agricultural activities: alliances between water utilities and farmers in designated water protection areas and drinking water extraction areas. The alliances revolve around the idea of balancing diverging targets such as maintaining drinking water standards and the viability and profitability of agricultural businesses. While farmers can achieve high food production levels by using mineral and organic fertilizers and pesticides, these may have enormous side effects: nitrate and phosphate are transferred into surface and groundwater, impairing water quality and aquatic life. It may also result in the water no longer being usable as drinking water without special, costly treatment. These negative effects led to the establishment of voluntary alliances between water utilities and farmers (hereafter called ‘drinking water alliances’ or ‘alliances’) in the 1980s when the German government strengthened the threshold values for nitrate in drinking water from 90 mg/l to 50 mg/l. Water utilities, together with the regional (Laender) governments, initiated alliances with farmers to adopt fertilization and land management practices in order to protect drinking water resources from nitrate pollution.

Bundeswirtschaftsminister Robert Habeck will zwei der drei verbleibenden Atomkraftwerke bis April in Reserve halten. Dazu eine Einschätzung von Claudia Kemfert, Energieökonomin und Leiterin der Abteilung Energie, Verkehr, Umwelt im Deutschen Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW Berlin):

Die Stresstests zeigen, dass die Energieversorgung in Deutschland gesichert werden kann und Atomkraft dazu nicht benötigt wird. Die Energieversorgung in Deutschland ist gesichert, auch ohne Atomkraft. Mögliche Versorgungsengpässe werden nicht durch deutsche, sondern vor allem durch marode französische Atomkraftwerke verursacht. Atomkraftwerke sind für die Netzreserve ungeeignet, da sie nicht mal eben an- und ausgeschaltet werden können. Sie müssen sicherheitstechnisch überprüft und es müssen Personal und Brennelemente vorgehalten werden. Dies ist aufwendig und teuer. Aufwand und Ertrag stehen also in keinem Verhältnis.

Nur knapp ein Prozent des in Deutschland verbrauchten Erdgases kann durch Atomkraft eingespart werden. Atomkraftwerke produzieren – anders als Kohlekraftwerke – nur Strom und keine Wärme. Die Hälfte der Gaskraftwerke hingegen produziert neben Strom auch Wärme. Zur Sicherung der Versorgung werden daher neben mehr erneuerbaren Energien auch Kohlekraftwerke aus der Netzreserve benötigt. Zur Sicherung der Versorgung sind der Ausbau erneuerbarer Energien – auch und gerade im Süden Deutschlands –, ein effektives Energie- und Lastmanagement, der Ausbau von Speicheroptionen und vor allem eine Ausweitung der Kapazitäten in Frankreich und anderen europäischen Ländern elementar.

After nearly a decade of military intervention, France has withdrawn its soldiers from Mali. The departure not only symbolises a failure of French intervention policy, argue Benedikt Erforth (IDOS) and Denis Tull (SWP) in this Megatrends Afrika Spotlight, but also reflects Europe’s foreign policy weakness. Yet, a more muted French footprint could also be an opportunity to build a more balanced and credible approach towards the Sahel.

After nearly a decade of military intervention, France has withdrawn its soldiers from Mali. The departure not only symbolises a failure of French intervention policy, argue Benedikt Erforth (IDOS) and Denis Tull (SWP) in this Megatrends Afrika Spotlight, but also reflects Europe’s foreign policy weakness. Yet, a more muted French footprint could also be an opportunity to build a more balanced and credible approach towards the Sahel.

After nearly a decade of military intervention, France has withdrawn its soldiers from Mali. The departure not only symbolises a failure of French intervention policy, argue Benedikt Erforth (IDOS) and Denis Tull (SWP) in this Megatrends Afrika Spotlight, but also reflects Europe’s foreign policy weakness. Yet, a more muted French footprint could also be an opportunity to build a more balanced and credible approach towards the Sahel.

Die Abteilung Makroökonomie des Deutschen Instituts für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW Berlin) sucht zum nächstmöglichen Zeitpunkt eine studentische Hilfskraft (m/w/div) für 10 Wochenstunden.

Das Deutsche Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW Berlin) sucht zum nächstmöglichen Zeitpunkt eine*n Vorstandsreferent*in (div/w/m) (Vollzeit mit 39 Stunden pro Woche, Teilzeit ist möglich).

The 2030 UN Agenda for Sustainable Development of 2015 prominently stresses that “the SDGs are integrated and indivisible and balance the three dimensions of sustainable development: the economic, social and environmental” (UN [United Nations], 2015, p. 3). Behind this statement lies a reality of complex interlinkages between the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and their targets, the implementation of which may produce synergies but also trade-offs. Another innovative trait of the 2030 Agenda is its strong commitment to the “quality of governance”. While the debate about the necessary elements of governance continues, most definitions today include inclusive and participatory decision-making, accountability, and transparency as its key institutional characteristics. These characteristics have been enshrined as targets under SDG 16 on “Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions” that are not only considered desirable outcomes but also as enablers of all other SDGs. Yet another central, transformative promise of the 2030 Agenda is to Leave No One Behind (LNOB), which requires the participation of all segments of society to contribute to its implementation. There is broad consensus in contemporary academic and policy debates that innovative governance approaches will be essential to achieve an integrated implementation of the interlinked SDGs and to fulfil the LNOB commitment. A more recent debate, which has gained traction since the 26th UN Climate Change Conference in 2021, focuses on the just transition towards climate-just, equitable and inclusive societies. At the centre of this debate lies the understanding that governments will be unable to gain public support for the prioritisation of climate actions if they do not succeed in drastically reducing poverty and inequality. It will be necessary that just climate transition be based on the principles of procedural, distributional and recognitional justice.
So far, these two debates have run in parallel without cross-fertilising each other. This Policy Brief makes the case that the debate on just transition has much to gain from the academic findings generated by research on the role of governance in managing SDG interlinkages. It is based on a recent study by IDOS and the UNDP Oslo Governance Centre (UNDP OGC) that collates empirical evidence on the effects of governance qualities (SDG 16) on the reduction of poverty (SDG 1) and inequalities (SDG 10) (DIE* & UNDP OGC, 2022). The study finds that:
• Improved levels of participation and inclusion are positively associated with poverty reduction;
• Higher levels of access to information, transparency and accountability help to improve access to basic services and targeting of social protection policies.
These findings provide policymakers with an empirical basis to argue that investments in the achievement of the governance targets of SDG 16 can act as catalysts for interventions seeking to reduce poverty and inequalities.
Against this backdrop, this Policy Brief argues that the governance targets of SDG 16 are not only institutional preconditions for the reduction of poverty and inequalities but also contribute towards just transitions. More specifically: they are institutions that contribute towards the justice principles that constitute the basis of just transition and exhibit the governance qualities postulated by SDG 16. It is important to note that debates on the quality of governance and just transition do not take place in a political vacuum. In view of global trends towards auto-cratisation (V-Dem 2022), the empirical findings regarding the enabling governance effects on poverty and inequality reduction carry the important policy implication that action to support just transition will in all likelihood be more successful if accompanied by proactive measures to protect and support democratic institutions and processes.

The 2030 UN Agenda for Sustainable Development of 2015 prominently stresses that “the SDGs are integrated and indivisible and balance the three dimensions of sustainable development: the economic, social and environmental” (UN [United Nations], 2015, p. 3). Behind this statement lies a reality of complex interlinkages between the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and their targets, the implementation of which may produce synergies but also trade-offs. Another innovative trait of the 2030 Agenda is its strong commitment to the “quality of governance”. While the debate about the necessary elements of governance continues, most definitions today include inclusive and participatory decision-making, accountability, and transparency as its key institutional characteristics. These characteristics have been enshrined as targets under SDG 16 on “Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions” that are not only considered desirable outcomes but also as enablers of all other SDGs. Yet another central, transformative promise of the 2030 Agenda is to Leave No One Behind (LNOB), which requires the participation of all segments of society to contribute to its implementation. There is broad consensus in contemporary academic and policy debates that innovative governance approaches will be essential to achieve an integrated implementation of the interlinked SDGs and to fulfil the LNOB commitment. A more recent debate, which has gained traction since the 26th UN Climate Change Conference in 2021, focuses on the just transition towards climate-just, equitable and inclusive societies. At the centre of this debate lies the understanding that governments will be unable to gain public support for the prioritisation of climate actions if they do not succeed in drastically reducing poverty and inequality. It will be necessary that just climate transition be based on the principles of procedural, distributional and recognitional justice.
So far, these two debates have run in parallel without cross-fertilising each other. This Policy Brief makes the case that the debate on just transition has much to gain from the academic findings generated by research on the role of governance in managing SDG interlinkages. It is based on a recent study by IDOS and the UNDP Oslo Governance Centre (UNDP OGC) that collates empirical evidence on the effects of governance qualities (SDG 16) on the reduction of poverty (SDG 1) and inequalities (SDG 10) (DIE* & UNDP OGC, 2022). The study finds that:
• Improved levels of participation and inclusion are positively associated with poverty reduction;
• Higher levels of access to information, transparency and accountability help to improve access to basic services and targeting of social protection policies.
These findings provide policymakers with an empirical basis to argue that investments in the achievement of the governance targets of SDG 16 can act as catalysts for interventions seeking to reduce poverty and inequalities.
Against this backdrop, this Policy Brief argues that the governance targets of SDG 16 are not only institutional preconditions for the reduction of poverty and inequalities but also contribute towards just transitions. More specifically: they are institutions that contribute towards the justice principles that constitute the basis of just transition and exhibit the governance qualities postulated by SDG 16. It is important to note that debates on the quality of governance and just transition do not take place in a political vacuum. In view of global trends towards auto-cratisation (V-Dem 2022), the empirical findings regarding the enabling governance effects on poverty and inequality reduction carry the important policy implication that action to support just transition will in all likelihood be more successful if accompanied by proactive measures to protect and support democratic institutions and processes.

The 2030 UN Agenda for Sustainable Development of 2015 prominently stresses that “the SDGs are integrated and indivisible and balance the three dimensions of sustainable development: the economic, social and environmental” (UN [United Nations], 2015, p. 3). Behind this statement lies a reality of complex interlinkages between the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and their targets, the implementation of which may produce synergies but also trade-offs. Another innovative trait of the 2030 Agenda is its strong commitment to the “quality of governance”. While the debate about the necessary elements of governance continues, most definitions today include inclusive and participatory decision-making, accountability, and transparency as its key institutional characteristics. These characteristics have been enshrined as targets under SDG 16 on “Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions” that are not only considered desirable outcomes but also as enablers of all other SDGs. Yet another central, transformative promise of the 2030 Agenda is to Leave No One Behind (LNOB), which requires the participation of all segments of society to contribute to its implementation. There is broad consensus in contemporary academic and policy debates that innovative governance approaches will be essential to achieve an integrated implementation of the interlinked SDGs and to fulfil the LNOB commitment. A more recent debate, which has gained traction since the 26th UN Climate Change Conference in 2021, focuses on the just transition towards climate-just, equitable and inclusive societies. At the centre of this debate lies the understanding that governments will be unable to gain public support for the prioritisation of climate actions if they do not succeed in drastically reducing poverty and inequality. It will be necessary that just climate transition be based on the principles of procedural, distributional and recognitional justice.
So far, these two debates have run in parallel without cross-fertilising each other. This Policy Brief makes the case that the debate on just transition has much to gain from the academic findings generated by research on the role of governance in managing SDG interlinkages. It is based on a recent study by IDOS and the UNDP Oslo Governance Centre (UNDP OGC) that collates empirical evidence on the effects of governance qualities (SDG 16) on the reduction of poverty (SDG 1) and inequalities (SDG 10) (DIE* & UNDP OGC, 2022). The study finds that:
• Improved levels of participation and inclusion are positively associated with poverty reduction;
• Higher levels of access to information, transparency and accountability help to improve access to basic services and targeting of social protection policies.
These findings provide policymakers with an empirical basis to argue that investments in the achievement of the governance targets of SDG 16 can act as catalysts for interventions seeking to reduce poverty and inequalities.
Against this backdrop, this Policy Brief argues that the governance targets of SDG 16 are not only institutional preconditions for the reduction of poverty and inequalities but also contribute towards just transitions. More specifically: they are institutions that contribute towards the justice principles that constitute the basis of just transition and exhibit the governance qualities postulated by SDG 16. It is important to note that debates on the quality of governance and just transition do not take place in a political vacuum. In view of global trends towards auto-cratisation (V-Dem 2022), the empirical findings regarding the enabling governance effects on poverty and inequality reduction carry the important policy implication that action to support just transition will in all likelihood be more successful if accompanied by proactive measures to protect and support democratic institutions and processes.