Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

Non-governmental actors perform an important role in the functioning of democracy. However, they are often perceived as being less tied to its principles as they are not fully controlled by democratic procedures and institutions. This chapter focuses on transnational alliances between cities in the European Arctic as a special kind of non-governmental actors. Different to other non-governmental actors, the collaborating actors are here elected representatives. But do such alliances have a greater authority in Arctic politics? The purpose of this chapter is twofold: First, it introduces the Nordic model of local self-government to discuss public participation in Arctic cities and the possibilities and hindrances of stakeholders to inform policy-making processes in the context of Arctic urban development. Second, this chapter seeks to assess in how far city-alliances – like the Arctic Mayors’ Forum (AMF) – as a specific kind of non-governmental actors have a unique say in Arctic politics at the national, regional, and local levels. It further investigates in how far such alliances can be perceived as actors that are crucial to enhance more coherent policy-making in the Arctic. This chapter is based on a transdisciplinary approach that considers legal challenges and the power/knowledge nexus in policy-making.

Non-governmental actors perform an important role in the functioning of democracy. However, they are often perceived as being less tied to its principles as they are not fully controlled by democratic procedures and institutions. This chapter focuses on transnational alliances between cities in the European Arctic as a special kind of non-governmental actors. Different to other non-governmental actors, the collaborating actors are here elected representatives. But do such alliances have a greater authority in Arctic politics? The purpose of this chapter is twofold: First, it introduces the Nordic model of local self-government to discuss public participation in Arctic cities and the possibilities and hindrances of stakeholders to inform policy-making processes in the context of Arctic urban development. Second, this chapter seeks to assess in how far city-alliances – like the Arctic Mayors’ Forum (AMF) – as a specific kind of non-governmental actors have a unique say in Arctic politics at the national, regional, and local levels. It further investigates in how far such alliances can be perceived as actors that are crucial to enhance more coherent policy-making in the Arctic. This chapter is based on a transdisciplinary approach that considers legal challenges and the power/knowledge nexus in policy-making.

Die im DIW Berlin angesiedelte forschungsbasierte Infrastruktureinrichtung Sozio-oekonomisches Panel (SOEP) sucht zum nächstmöglichen Zeitpunkt eine studentische Hilfskraft (w/m/div) für 10 - 19 Wochenstunden.

Ihre Aufgaben umfassen die Mitwirkung bei der Datenaufbereitung und der Generierung von nutzerfreundlichen Variablen (in R) sowie die Unterstützung der Forschung im Rahmen des Projekts „Bremer Initiative zur Stärkung der frühkindlichen Entwicklung“ (BRISE). Dabei besteht die Möglichkeit, die Arbeit mit komplexen Mehrebenendaten, den Umgang mit R und das wissenschaftliche Arbeiten in einem interdisziplinär orientierten Team kennenzulernen.

Zweck dieser Studie ist es, die Beziehungen zwischen Staat und Gesellschaft im Irak durch die konzeptionelle Linse des Gesellschaftsvertrages zu betrachten. Aus diesem Zugang können sich zudem potenzielle Betätigungsfelder für außenstehende Akteure ableiten lassen – wie zum Beispiel die deutsche Entwicklungszusammenarbeit (EZ) und die Technische Zusammenarbeit (TZ). Sie können dazu beitragen, die Neuverhandlung dieses angespannten Beziehungsgeflechts zu unterstützen. Dieser Analyse liegt das Verständnis eines Gesellschaftsvertrages zugrunde, welches das Verhältnis zwischen Regierten und Regierung primär als Verhandlungsprozess betrachtet und sich beispielsweise entlang der sogenannten 3Ps (participation/Beteili-gung, provision/öffentliche Güter und protection/Schutz-Rechtsstaat) operationalisieren lässt. Insofern fließen in das Verständnis zeitgenössische Ansätze ein, aber auch die klassischen Überlegungen der französischen und angelsächsischen Denker, welche die individuelle Freiheitseinschränkung im Gegenzug zu staatlich gewährleisteter Rechtssicherheit betonen.
Die Studie teilt sich dazu in drei Abschnitte. In einem ersten Schritt werden die schwache Staatlichkeit und die Zerrüttung der Gesellschaft im heuristischen Kontext des Gesellschaftsvertrages erörtert. Des Weiteren wird die Rolle externer Akteure bei der Entwicklung des Irak nach 2003 beschrieben. Dabei werden das politische Proporzsystem und dessen gesellschaftspolitische Implikationen näher beleuchtet. Im dritten Teil werden als Synthese der ersten beiden Abschnitte Überlegungen angestellt, wie externe Akteure aus der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit einen Beitrag zur friedlichen Ausverhandlung des dysfunktionalen irakischen Gesellschaftsvertrages leisten können. Diese Überlegungen vollziehen sich vor dem systemischen Hintergrund eines Rentenstaates mit hybrider Regierungsführung und sie nehmen sowohl die äußerst brüchige Beziehung zwischen Regierung und Bevölkerung in den Blick als auch die bislang tendenziell gescheiterten externen Interventionen. So zeigen sich die Schwachpunkte des über weite Strecken dysfunktionalen irakischen Gesellschaftsvertrages, die gleichzeitig Ansatzpunkte liefern, ihn zu verbessern und neu zu verhandeln.

Zweck dieser Studie ist es, die Beziehungen zwischen Staat und Gesellschaft im Irak durch die konzeptionelle Linse des Gesellschaftsvertrages zu betrachten. Aus diesem Zugang können sich zudem potenzielle Betätigungsfelder für außenstehende Akteure ableiten lassen – wie zum Beispiel die deutsche Entwicklungszusammenarbeit (EZ) und die Technische Zusammenarbeit (TZ). Sie können dazu beitragen, die Neuverhandlung dieses angespannten Beziehungsgeflechts zu unterstützen. Dieser Analyse liegt das Verständnis eines Gesellschaftsvertrages zugrunde, welches das Verhältnis zwischen Regierten und Regierung primär als Verhandlungsprozess betrachtet und sich beispielsweise entlang der sogenannten 3Ps (participation/Beteili-gung, provision/öffentliche Güter und protection/Schutz-Rechtsstaat) operationalisieren lässt. Insofern fließen in das Verständnis zeitgenössische Ansätze ein, aber auch die klassischen Überlegungen der französischen und angelsächsischen Denker, welche die individuelle Freiheitseinschränkung im Gegenzug zu staatlich gewährleisteter Rechtssicherheit betonen.
Die Studie teilt sich dazu in drei Abschnitte. In einem ersten Schritt werden die schwache Staatlichkeit und die Zerrüttung der Gesellschaft im heuristischen Kontext des Gesellschaftsvertrages erörtert. Des Weiteren wird die Rolle externer Akteure bei der Entwicklung des Irak nach 2003 beschrieben. Dabei werden das politische Proporzsystem und dessen gesellschaftspolitische Implikationen näher beleuchtet. Im dritten Teil werden als Synthese der ersten beiden Abschnitte Überlegungen angestellt, wie externe Akteure aus der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit einen Beitrag zur friedlichen Ausverhandlung des dysfunktionalen irakischen Gesellschaftsvertrages leisten können. Diese Überlegungen vollziehen sich vor dem systemischen Hintergrund eines Rentenstaates mit hybrider Regierungsführung und sie nehmen sowohl die äußerst brüchige Beziehung zwischen Regierung und Bevölkerung in den Blick als auch die bislang tendenziell gescheiterten externen Interventionen. So zeigen sich die Schwachpunkte des über weite Strecken dysfunktionalen irakischen Gesellschaftsvertrages, die gleichzeitig Ansatzpunkte liefern, ihn zu verbessern und neu zu verhandeln.

Zweck dieser Studie ist es, die Beziehungen zwischen Staat und Gesellschaft im Irak durch die konzeptionelle Linse des Gesellschaftsvertrages zu betrachten. Aus diesem Zugang können sich zudem potenzielle Betätigungsfelder für außenstehende Akteure ableiten lassen – wie zum Beispiel die deutsche Entwicklungszusammenarbeit (EZ) und die Technische Zusammenarbeit (TZ). Sie können dazu beitragen, die Neuverhandlung dieses angespannten Beziehungsgeflechts zu unterstützen. Dieser Analyse liegt das Verständnis eines Gesellschaftsvertrages zugrunde, welches das Verhältnis zwischen Regierten und Regierung primär als Verhandlungsprozess betrachtet und sich beispielsweise entlang der sogenannten 3Ps (participation/Beteili-gung, provision/öffentliche Güter und protection/Schutz-Rechtsstaat) operationalisieren lässt. Insofern fließen in das Verständnis zeitgenössische Ansätze ein, aber auch die klassischen Überlegungen der französischen und angelsächsischen Denker, welche die individuelle Freiheitseinschränkung im Gegenzug zu staatlich gewährleisteter Rechtssicherheit betonen.
Die Studie teilt sich dazu in drei Abschnitte. In einem ersten Schritt werden die schwache Staatlichkeit und die Zerrüttung der Gesellschaft im heuristischen Kontext des Gesellschaftsvertrages erörtert. Des Weiteren wird die Rolle externer Akteure bei der Entwicklung des Irak nach 2003 beschrieben. Dabei werden das politische Proporzsystem und dessen gesellschaftspolitische Implikationen näher beleuchtet. Im dritten Teil werden als Synthese der ersten beiden Abschnitte Überlegungen angestellt, wie externe Akteure aus der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit einen Beitrag zur friedlichen Ausverhandlung des dysfunktionalen irakischen Gesellschaftsvertrages leisten können. Diese Überlegungen vollziehen sich vor dem systemischen Hintergrund eines Rentenstaates mit hybrider Regierungsführung und sie nehmen sowohl die äußerst brüchige Beziehung zwischen Regierung und Bevölkerung in den Blick als auch die bislang tendenziell gescheiterten externen Interventionen. So zeigen sich die Schwachpunkte des über weite Strecken dysfunktionalen irakischen Gesellschaftsvertrages, die gleichzeitig Ansatzpunkte liefern, ihn zu verbessern und neu zu verhandeln.

Am 30. und 31. März 2023 findet am Deutschen Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung in Berlin (DIW Berlin) der gemeinsam mit dem Deutschen Zentrum für Integration und Migration (DeZIM) organisierte 15. Workshop der Panelsurveys im deutschsprachigen Raum statt. 

Im Rahmen des Workshops besteht die Möglichkeit aktuelle Themen und Befunde der Umfrageforschung sowie erhebungspraktische Herausforderungen und Innovationen in Panelstudien zu diskutieren. 
Die präsentierten Themen sollen dabei explizit in einem Bezug zu der Erhebung von Panelstudien stehen. Sehr gerne können in diesem Zusammenhang auch die Konzeption und die Daten neuer Panelstudien vorgestellt werden.

Vortragsideen können bis zum 18.12.2022 unter panelworkshop@diw.de eingereicht werden. 
Weitere Informationen und der Call for Papers finden sich auf unserer Veranstaltungsseite. 

Event Video 
Photos

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IPI and the Elsie Initiative for Women in Peace Operations, in partnership with the Permanent Missions of Germany, Mongolia, Uruguay, and Zambia to the UN cohosted a policy forum event on November 9th entitled “When We Know Better, We Do Better: The Elsie Initiative and Improving Mission Environments.”

Since the launch of the Elsie Initiative for Women in Peace Operations in 2017, research has shown that the mission environment can be a significant barrier to increasing women’s meaningful participation in UN peace operations. Specific barriers include the physical environment, the culture of a mission, and the prevalence of sexual harassment in mission environments, with one in three UN staff members having experienced sexual harassment in the workplace and one in four women peacekeepers reporting that they personally witnessed sexual abuse while deployed.

This event provided a venue to convene women peacekeepers and key stakeholders from the UN and troop- and police-contributing countries to discuss what receptive environments for women peacekeepers look like, the culture in security institutions, and taboos and stigmas facing women in security institutions.

In her opening remarks, Åsa Regnér, Deputy Executive Director of UN Women, reflected on the continued importance of gender parity in peacekeeping. “Five years ago, the #MeToo movement opened many eyes to widespread gender inequality. Today, we must renew our attention.”

The following panel discussion highlighted a range of topics, including the specific health needs of women peacekeepers, integrated support networks, and financial commitments. Women peacekeepers shared their own experiences working in a mission environment, and the discussion concluded with a resounding call for more inclusive peacekeeping.

Welcoming Remarks:
H.E. Bob Rae, Permanent Representative of Canada to the UN
H.E. Carlos Amorin, Permanent Representative of Uruguay to the UN
H.E. Thomas Peter Zahneisen, Deputy Permanent Representative of the Federal Republic of Germany to the UN
Regina C. Boma Phiri, Deputy Permanent Representative of the Republic of Zambia to the UN
Atul Khare, Under-Secretary-General, UN Department of Operational Support
Åsa Regnér, Deputy Executive Director, UN Women

Panelists:
Nkechi Esionye Uzodimma, Capacity Development Officer in Policy, Office of Military Affairs, UN Department of Peace Operations
Véronique Orebi-Deplace, Chief of Mission Management and Support Section, UN Police
Brigadier General Sandra Keijer, Programme Management Officer and Expert on Police Performance, Office of Peacekeeping Strategic Partnership, UN Department of Peace Operations

Moderator:
Zeid Ra’ad Al-Hussein, President and CEO, International Peace Institute

Closing Remarks:
H.E. Bob Rae, Permanent Representative of Canada to the UN

The global policy debate on just transitions is concerned with how to achieve a socially just and acceptable transition toward a climate-neutral and climate-resilient global economy. At the core of this debate is the assumption that efforts to combat environmental threats will not succeed unless combined with measures to reduce poverty and inequality. Our research explores the potential of carbon fiscal reforms, combining a carbon tax of levels deemed appropriate to achieve climate targets and the transfer of the revenues raised to vulnerable households.
The current energy and cost-of-living crisis shows the importance of protecting the poorest and most vulnerable households from price increases. It also shows the difficulty of achieving short- and long-term policy priorities. Despite the current spikes in energy prices, carbon fiscal reforms can achieve both social and environmental goals through simultaneously decreasing emissions and reducing poverty and inequality. They should act as an effective enabler of just transitions.
Carbon fiscal reform can avoid some environmental impacts by incentivising reductions in emissions. Carbon pricing has been increasingly advocated and is now at the centre of policy debates, including the UNFCCC Conference of the Parties (COP) and the recent German presidency of the world’s leading industrial nations (G7). But carbon fiscal reforms can also be used to raise revenue from carbon pricing instruments to offset the negative effects of higher prices on poorer households as well as further reaching distributional targets and poverty alleviation. Climate targets are negotiated every year, including at COP, hence it is critical to re-evaluate and improve estimates of the distributional impacts of climate policies such as carbon pricing.
Public acceptability of climate policies is key to their implementation, but it depends to a large extent on the perceived fairness of such policies. Recycling revenues from carbon taxes directly back to vulnerable households is likely to gain the approval of a large number of people, especially in low-income countries where the high proportion of the population involved in the informal economy means that lowering income tax does not benefit the poorest and most vulnerable sections of society. But the targeting of these direct transfers needs careful consideration.
Here, we assess the impact on poverty and inequality of a global carbon tax and national redistribution of revenues to vulnerable households. We look at different options for such redistribution, including a lump sum payment, the use of current social assistance programmes, and an expansion of social assistance following COVID-19.
We find that a carbon tax of US$50/tCO2 without revenue redistribution could increase global extreme poverty, but the redistribution of revenue from such a carbon tax could substantially reduce poverty by between 16% and 27% (110 to 190 million people), and reduce inequality (the average Gini coefficient would decline by between 4% and 8%), depending on the scenario. This shows that the way in which revenue from a carbon tax is redistributed greatly affects its impact, underlining the importance of policy design and targeting mechanisms. The recycling of revenues should also take into account the specific political economy of a country and consider international transfers.
These findings provide policy makers with a strong basis for informing discussions, starting off with those at COP27, in which ambitious climate targets and just transition should both remain central goals in the context of the ongoing international energy crisis.

The global policy debate on just transitions is concerned with how to achieve a socially just and acceptable transition toward a climate-neutral and climate-resilient global economy. At the core of this debate is the assumption that efforts to combat environmental threats will not succeed unless combined with measures to reduce poverty and inequality. Our research explores the potential of carbon fiscal reforms, combining a carbon tax of levels deemed appropriate to achieve climate targets and the transfer of the revenues raised to vulnerable households.
The current energy and cost-of-living crisis shows the importance of protecting the poorest and most vulnerable households from price increases. It also shows the difficulty of achieving short- and long-term policy priorities. Despite the current spikes in energy prices, carbon fiscal reforms can achieve both social and environmental goals through simultaneously decreasing emissions and reducing poverty and inequality. They should act as an effective enabler of just transitions.
Carbon fiscal reform can avoid some environmental impacts by incentivising reductions in emissions. Carbon pricing has been increasingly advocated and is now at the centre of policy debates, including the UNFCCC Conference of the Parties (COP) and the recent German presidency of the world’s leading industrial nations (G7). But carbon fiscal reforms can also be used to raise revenue from carbon pricing instruments to offset the negative effects of higher prices on poorer households as well as further reaching distributional targets and poverty alleviation. Climate targets are negotiated every year, including at COP, hence it is critical to re-evaluate and improve estimates of the distributional impacts of climate policies such as carbon pricing.
Public acceptability of climate policies is key to their implementation, but it depends to a large extent on the perceived fairness of such policies. Recycling revenues from carbon taxes directly back to vulnerable households is likely to gain the approval of a large number of people, especially in low-income countries where the high proportion of the population involved in the informal economy means that lowering income tax does not benefit the poorest and most vulnerable sections of society. But the targeting of these direct transfers needs careful consideration.
Here, we assess the impact on poverty and inequality of a global carbon tax and national redistribution of revenues to vulnerable households. We look at different options for such redistribution, including a lump sum payment, the use of current social assistance programmes, and an expansion of social assistance following COVID-19.
We find that a carbon tax of US$50/tCO2 without revenue redistribution could increase global extreme poverty, but the redistribution of revenue from such a carbon tax could substantially reduce poverty by between 16% and 27% (110 to 190 million people), and reduce inequality (the average Gini coefficient would decline by between 4% and 8%), depending on the scenario. This shows that the way in which revenue from a carbon tax is redistributed greatly affects its impact, underlining the importance of policy design and targeting mechanisms. The recycling of revenues should also take into account the specific political economy of a country and consider international transfers.
These findings provide policy makers with a strong basis for informing discussions, starting off with those at COP27, in which ambitious climate targets and just transition should both remain central goals in the context of the ongoing international energy crisis.

The global policy debate on just transitions is concerned with how to achieve a socially just and acceptable transition toward a climate-neutral and climate-resilient global economy. At the core of this debate is the assumption that efforts to combat environmental threats will not succeed unless combined with measures to reduce poverty and inequality. Our research explores the potential of carbon fiscal reforms, combining a carbon tax of levels deemed appropriate to achieve climate targets and the transfer of the revenues raised to vulnerable households.
The current energy and cost-of-living crisis shows the importance of protecting the poorest and most vulnerable households from price increases. It also shows the difficulty of achieving short- and long-term policy priorities. Despite the current spikes in energy prices, carbon fiscal reforms can achieve both social and environmental goals through simultaneously decreasing emissions and reducing poverty and inequality. They should act as an effective enabler of just transitions.
Carbon fiscal reform can avoid some environmental impacts by incentivising reductions in emissions. Carbon pricing has been increasingly advocated and is now at the centre of policy debates, including the UNFCCC Conference of the Parties (COP) and the recent German presidency of the world’s leading industrial nations (G7). But carbon fiscal reforms can also be used to raise revenue from carbon pricing instruments to offset the negative effects of higher prices on poorer households as well as further reaching distributional targets and poverty alleviation. Climate targets are negotiated every year, including at COP, hence it is critical to re-evaluate and improve estimates of the distributional impacts of climate policies such as carbon pricing.
Public acceptability of climate policies is key to their implementation, but it depends to a large extent on the perceived fairness of such policies. Recycling revenues from carbon taxes directly back to vulnerable households is likely to gain the approval of a large number of people, especially in low-income countries where the high proportion of the population involved in the informal economy means that lowering income tax does not benefit the poorest and most vulnerable sections of society. But the targeting of these direct transfers needs careful consideration.
Here, we assess the impact on poverty and inequality of a global carbon tax and national redistribution of revenues to vulnerable households. We look at different options for such redistribution, including a lump sum payment, the use of current social assistance programmes, and an expansion of social assistance following COVID-19.
We find that a carbon tax of US$50/tCO2 without revenue redistribution could increase global extreme poverty, but the redistribution of revenue from such a carbon tax could substantially reduce poverty by between 16% and 27% (110 to 190 million people), and reduce inequality (the average Gini coefficient would decline by between 4% and 8%), depending on the scenario. This shows that the way in which revenue from a carbon tax is redistributed greatly affects its impact, underlining the importance of policy design and targeting mechanisms. The recycling of revenues should also take into account the specific political economy of a country and consider international transfers.
These findings provide policy makers with a strong basis for informing discussions, starting off with those at COP27, in which ambitious climate targets and just transition should both remain central goals in the context of the ongoing international energy crisis.

Die Abteilung Bildung und Familie des Deutschen Instituts für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW Berlin) sucht zum 01.01.2023 zwei studentische Hilfskräfte (w/m/div) für je 10 Wochenstunden für die Mitarbeit in Forschungsprojekten. Bei allen Projekten steht die Analyse von großen Mikrodatensätzen im Vordergrund.

Current global crises are complex. Tackling issues separately or in sequence will be futile. Transformation can happen only when multiple issues are tackled at the same time. To help do so, a new study by UNDP’s Oslo Governance Centre (OGC) and the German Development Institute (DIE/GDI) investigates how aspects of SDG 16 that are considered critical features of governance institutions – transparency, accountability and inclusion – help or hinder progress on key dimensions of SDG 1 on poverty and SDG 10 on inequality. The study is the first attempt to consolidate evidence on this link and fills a gap in the existing literature on how different SDGs can reinforce each other.
Based on a scoping literature review of 400+ academic papers, the study finds empirical evidence from across the globe that investing in accountable, transparent and inclusive governance can boost the reduction of poverty and inequality. For example, in election years, social benefits are better targeted to those with low incomes; reducing corruption is positively correlated with access to education and improved literacy rates; and civil society engagement enables the provision of health care access. It offers initial policy insights on why, how and with whom national actors can use the employed methodology to identify, prioritize and sequence governance policies with ‘booster effects’ in their own country.

Current global crises are complex. Tackling issues separately or in sequence will be futile. Transformation can happen only when multiple issues are tackled at the same time. To help do so, a new study by UNDP’s Oslo Governance Centre (OGC) and the German Development Institute (DIE/GDI) investigates how aspects of SDG 16 that are considered critical features of governance institutions – transparency, accountability and inclusion – help or hinder progress on key dimensions of SDG 1 on poverty and SDG 10 on inequality. The study is the first attempt to consolidate evidence on this link and fills a gap in the existing literature on how different SDGs can reinforce each other.
Based on a scoping literature review of 400+ academic papers, the study finds empirical evidence from across the globe that investing in accountable, transparent and inclusive governance can boost the reduction of poverty and inequality. For example, in election years, social benefits are better targeted to those with low incomes; reducing corruption is positively correlated with access to education and improved literacy rates; and civil society engagement enables the provision of health care access. It offers initial policy insights on why, how and with whom national actors can use the employed methodology to identify, prioritize and sequence governance policies with ‘booster effects’ in their own country.

Current global crises are complex. Tackling issues separately or in sequence will be futile. Transformation can happen only when multiple issues are tackled at the same time. To help do so, a new study by UNDP’s Oslo Governance Centre (OGC) and the German Development Institute (DIE/GDI) investigates how aspects of SDG 16 that are considered critical features of governance institutions – transparency, accountability and inclusion – help or hinder progress on key dimensions of SDG 1 on poverty and SDG 10 on inequality. The study is the first attempt to consolidate evidence on this link and fills a gap in the existing literature on how different SDGs can reinforce each other.
Based on a scoping literature review of 400+ academic papers, the study finds empirical evidence from across the globe that investing in accountable, transparent and inclusive governance can boost the reduction of poverty and inequality. For example, in election years, social benefits are better targeted to those with low incomes; reducing corruption is positively correlated with access to education and improved literacy rates; and civil society engagement enables the provision of health care access. It offers initial policy insights on why, how and with whom national actors can use the employed methodology to identify, prioritize and sequence governance policies with ‘booster effects’ in their own country.

While cities are important emitters of greenhouse gases (GHG), they are also vulnerable to the impacts of climate change; at the same time they constitute innovation hubs for climate action. For cities to fulfil their potential for global climate action, a thorough understanding of the governance of transformative change towards the decarbonisation of cities is necessary.
This study asks: Which governance approaches facilitate successful transformative change towards zero carbon in cities? It specifically addresses the three key aspects stakeholder involvement, financing, and impact assessment, and looks at how they contribute to transformative change – particularly to the dimensions CO2 reduction, the dynamics of transformation, and acceptance by citizens.
The empirical analysis is based on a mixed methods approach. An international survey involving city government officials of cities that are proactive in the fight against climate change was conducted in order to obtain an overview of socio-ecological transformation paths. In addition to this macro-level approach, in-depth case studies of three cities that are widely regarded as proactive on climate action in their respective world regions – Bonn, Quito and Cape Town – provide complementary insights.
The survey data show a generally positive tendency in the way local governments approach GHG emission reduction activities. Most of the participating cities engage in the mainstreaming of policies to address climate change in local decision-making and have established climate action plans and emission reduction targets; however, on actual climate action and the reduction of emissions, the picture is more mixed.
While stakeholder involvement is generally considered a key success factor in the survey responses and in the three case-study cities, stakeholders were seldom involved in a truly inclusive and cooperative way. While Bonn has gradually expanded citizen engagement, in Quito relations between the local government and stakeholder groups have often been short-term and project-bound, while a close connection between city government and academic institutions has been established in Cape Town.
In terms of finance, cities mostly rely on traditional financing sources such as intergovernmental transfers, local taxes and fees, as well as international grants to cities of the Global South. Additional funding through the generation of local revenues or market-based finance mechanisms is less widespread. Both Quito and Cape Town depend heavily on external funding from international organisations and donors, along with central government transfers, which are less relevant in Bonn. While building the metro is absorbing finances for additional climate action in Quito, perverse incentives exist in South Africa where cities receive revenues from re-selling fossil fuel-based energy to consumers. Bonn has recently started to experiment with a sustainability budget to align budgeting with sustainability and climate goals.
As far as impact assessment is concerned, most cities in the survey including the three case-study cities collect relevant data. However, systematic impact assessment or the incorporation of lessons learned from monitoring and evaluation into policy occur less frequently.
Despite its limitations, this study contributes to the theoretical and empirical discussions in the field of transformative urban governance by suggesting a conceptual framework for dimensions of success for transformative change, by combining survey and case study-based data, and by looking at finances and impact assessment which are two important governance dimensions that are not frequently investigated.

While cities are important emitters of greenhouse gases (GHG), they are also vulnerable to the impacts of climate change; at the same time they constitute innovation hubs for climate action. For cities to fulfil their potential for global climate action, a thorough understanding of the governance of transformative change towards the decarbonisation of cities is necessary.
This study asks: Which governance approaches facilitate successful transformative change towards zero carbon in cities? It specifically addresses the three key aspects stakeholder involvement, financing, and impact assessment, and looks at how they contribute to transformative change – particularly to the dimensions CO2 reduction, the dynamics of transformation, and acceptance by citizens.
The empirical analysis is based on a mixed methods approach. An international survey involving city government officials of cities that are proactive in the fight against climate change was conducted in order to obtain an overview of socio-ecological transformation paths. In addition to this macro-level approach, in-depth case studies of three cities that are widely regarded as proactive on climate action in their respective world regions – Bonn, Quito and Cape Town – provide complementary insights.
The survey data show a generally positive tendency in the way local governments approach GHG emission reduction activities. Most of the participating cities engage in the mainstreaming of policies to address climate change in local decision-making and have established climate action plans and emission reduction targets; however, on actual climate action and the reduction of emissions, the picture is more mixed.
While stakeholder involvement is generally considered a key success factor in the survey responses and in the three case-study cities, stakeholders were seldom involved in a truly inclusive and cooperative way. While Bonn has gradually expanded citizen engagement, in Quito relations between the local government and stakeholder groups have often been short-term and project-bound, while a close connection between city government and academic institutions has been established in Cape Town.
In terms of finance, cities mostly rely on traditional financing sources such as intergovernmental transfers, local taxes and fees, as well as international grants to cities of the Global South. Additional funding through the generation of local revenues or market-based finance mechanisms is less widespread. Both Quito and Cape Town depend heavily on external funding from international organisations and donors, along with central government transfers, which are less relevant in Bonn. While building the metro is absorbing finances for additional climate action in Quito, perverse incentives exist in South Africa where cities receive revenues from re-selling fossil fuel-based energy to consumers. Bonn has recently started to experiment with a sustainability budget to align budgeting with sustainability and climate goals.
As far as impact assessment is concerned, most cities in the survey including the three case-study cities collect relevant data. However, systematic impact assessment or the incorporation of lessons learned from monitoring and evaluation into policy occur less frequently.
Despite its limitations, this study contributes to the theoretical and empirical discussions in the field of transformative urban governance by suggesting a conceptual framework for dimensions of success for transformative change, by combining survey and case study-based data, and by looking at finances and impact assessment which are two important governance dimensions that are not frequently investigated.