Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

Since Donald Trump’s return to the US presidency, the UN system has come under unprecedented pressure. UN Secretary-General António Guterres and the UN Secretariat were already struggling with a protracted liquidity crisis (caused by recurrent delayed or incomplete payment of assessed contributions from major contributors such as the United States and China), looming reductions in major donors’ voluntary contributions and rising geopolitical tensions among UN member states (Camelli & Patz, 2026; Haug, 2024). But the Trump administration’s disdain for multilateralism in general, and the UN in particular, poses an even more fundamental and pressing challenge to the UN, both financially and (geo)politically. Since the establishment of the UN in 1945, the United States has played a key role as the host for the UN headquarters in New York and the largest contributor to UN budgets. Although relations between the UN and the US government have long been complex – with influential anti-UN voices persistently present in US domestic politics (Browne & Nakamura, 2009; Mingst, 2003) – it had never reached a point at which broader US support for the organisation appeared to be under threat. This has changed, as exemplified by the formal or de facto withdrawal of the United States from many parts of the UN system, including withdrawal from the World Health Organization (WHO) and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in 2025, as well as disengaging from 31 other UN entities in 2026 (The White House, 2026). With the faltering hegemonic position of the United States, a general turn to overt geopolitics (Haug, 2026) and “my-country-first” policies, as well as long-standing criticism about the organisation’s inefficiencies, duplication and fragmentation – driven by donors’ chronic uncoordinated funding behaviour – the UN’s position as the centre of an imperfectly functioning multilateral system is at stake. Other major powers and blocs – from China and the BRICS grouping to the EU and a diverse group of medium-sized states from across the globe – have been unable to put forward a joint response to the fickle and often adversarial posture of the United States. Many have instead exhibited more transactional and self-focused behaviour, such as advocating for UN staff relocations to their own countries. So far, there is no shared vision of what the future of multilateral cooperation through the UN system – including its development, humanitarian and global regulatory agencies – ought to look like. Against this backdrop, we first outline why recent reform attempts under the so-called UN80 Initiative – triggered primarily by the shift in US policy towards multilateral organisations – have missed several opportunities to strategically reform and strengthen the UN system. We then argue that UN multilateralism is still needed – maybe more than ever before. Finally, we turn to recommendations on what stakeholders should do in order to make the UN fit for purpose in an increasingly challenging global environment.

Over the last two decades, the People’s Republic of China has been central to significant shifts in the geography of international cooperation. With fundamental shifts in the United States’ posture towards international partnerships under the second Trump administration, China’s relevance has grown further, albeit on its own terms. In what follows, we discuss how recent international disruptions have affected China, how China-led cooperation has been evolving over the last decade and what more China-centred forms of cooperation mean for the future of bilateral and multilateral partnerships.

Over the last two decades, the People’s Republic of China has been central to significant shifts in the geography of international cooperation. With fundamental shifts in the United States’ posture towards international partnerships under the second Trump administration, China’s relevance has grown further, albeit on its own terms. In what follows, we discuss how recent international disruptions have affected China, how China-led cooperation has been evolving over the last decade and what more China-centred forms of cooperation mean for the future of bilateral and multilateral partnerships.

Over the last two decades, the People’s Republic of China has been central to significant shifts in the geography of international cooperation. With fundamental shifts in the United States’ posture towards international partnerships under the second Trump administration, China’s relevance has grown further, albeit on its own terms. In what follows, we discuss how recent international disruptions have affected China, how China-led cooperation has been evolving over the last decade and what more China-centred forms of cooperation mean for the future of bilateral and multilateral partnerships.

The year 1961 can be seen as the “Big Bang” of international development policy. First, in that year, the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD was established. In the context of the Cold War, the United States pushed for an international system to support developing countries. In 1961, US President John F. Kennedy consolidated existing efforts to assist developing nations into USAID. Last but not least, in the same year, Germany’s Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) was established in what was then West Germany as a dedicated ministry to support developing regions (Bracho, Carey, Hynes, Klingebiel, & Trzeciak-Duval, 2021). The DAC has long been both a symbol of, and a “norm entrepreneur” in, development cooperation (Esteves & Klingebiel, 2021; Janus, 2022; Sumner & Klingebiel, 2025). It is often seen as synonymous with the form of development cooperation practised by “traditional donors”, that is, a club of high-income countries. Linked to this has been the criticism that the governance of ODA reflects persistent global power inequalities. At the same time, the DAC has served as the central forum in which key norms and quality standards of development cooperation have been negotiated over more than 60 years. It was within the DAC that the concept of “official development assistance” (ODA) was developed. ODA refers to public resources provided on concessional terms to promote economic and social development in developing countries. DAC members are also regularly assessed through peer review processes that assess their adherence to agreed standards (Ashoff, 2013). Like the role of the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) in education policy, these reviews in theory serve both disciplinary and supportive functions. In practice, no DAC member country has wished to be publicly criticised for failing to comply with jointly adopted DAC standards and relevant international agreements. Last but not least, the DAC members also issue statements of good practice and position papers on the international development agenda. These documents have been influential and have, for instance, influenced the 2000 UN Millennium Declaration and the eight Millennium Development Goals adopted – which in turn evolved into the current 2030 Agenda and its Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). DAC membership has expanded considerably since its creation, growing to 33 members today. Several nations once classified as developing countries, such as Spain, South Korea and a number of states that joined the EU in and after 2004, later sought and obtained DAC membership. At the same time, a growing number of OECD members, including Turkey, Mexico and Chile, have decided not to join the DAC. This reflects differing approaches to development cooperation and varying degrees of commitment to ODA-based norms. Countries that do not see themselves as part of a collective commitment around the ODA target of 0.7 per cent – such as Mexico, which historically identified with the Global South and was a founding member of the G77 before joining the OECD in 1994 – have so far remained outside the committee. Despite these variations, the United States played a decisive role in establishing the DAC as a rule-setting and coordinating body. US influence extended beyond institutional design. For decades, the United States also dominated personnel decisions and held the DAC chair until a rotating system was introduced (Bracho et al., 2021).

The year 1961 can be seen as the “Big Bang” of international development policy. First, in that year, the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD was established. In the context of the Cold War, the United States pushed for an international system to support developing countries. In 1961, US President John F. Kennedy consolidated existing efforts to assist developing nations into USAID. Last but not least, in the same year, Germany’s Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) was established in what was then West Germany as a dedicated ministry to support developing regions (Bracho, Carey, Hynes, Klingebiel, & Trzeciak-Duval, 2021). The DAC has long been both a symbol of, and a “norm entrepreneur” in, development cooperation (Esteves & Klingebiel, 2021; Janus, 2022; Sumner & Klingebiel, 2025). It is often seen as synonymous with the form of development cooperation practised by “traditional donors”, that is, a club of high-income countries. Linked to this has been the criticism that the governance of ODA reflects persistent global power inequalities. At the same time, the DAC has served as the central forum in which key norms and quality standards of development cooperation have been negotiated over more than 60 years. It was within the DAC that the concept of “official development assistance” (ODA) was developed. ODA refers to public resources provided on concessional terms to promote economic and social development in developing countries. DAC members are also regularly assessed through peer review processes that assess their adherence to agreed standards (Ashoff, 2013). Like the role of the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) in education policy, these reviews in theory serve both disciplinary and supportive functions. In practice, no DAC member country has wished to be publicly criticised for failing to comply with jointly adopted DAC standards and relevant international agreements. Last but not least, the DAC members also issue statements of good practice and position papers on the international development agenda. These documents have been influential and have, for instance, influenced the 2000 UN Millennium Declaration and the eight Millennium Development Goals adopted – which in turn evolved into the current 2030 Agenda and its Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). DAC membership has expanded considerably since its creation, growing to 33 members today. Several nations once classified as developing countries, such as Spain, South Korea and a number of states that joined the EU in and after 2004, later sought and obtained DAC membership. At the same time, a growing number of OECD members, including Turkey, Mexico and Chile, have decided not to join the DAC. This reflects differing approaches to development cooperation and varying degrees of commitment to ODA-based norms. Countries that do not see themselves as part of a collective commitment around the ODA target of 0.7 per cent – such as Mexico, which historically identified with the Global South and was a founding member of the G77 before joining the OECD in 1994 – have so far remained outside the committee. Despite these variations, the United States played a decisive role in establishing the DAC as a rule-setting and coordinating body. US influence extended beyond institutional design. For decades, the United States also dominated personnel decisions and held the DAC chair until a rotating system was introduced (Bracho et al., 2021).

The year 1961 can be seen as the “Big Bang” of international development policy. First, in that year, the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD was established. In the context of the Cold War, the United States pushed for an international system to support developing countries. In 1961, US President John F. Kennedy consolidated existing efforts to assist developing nations into USAID. Last but not least, in the same year, Germany’s Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) was established in what was then West Germany as a dedicated ministry to support developing regions (Bracho, Carey, Hynes, Klingebiel, & Trzeciak-Duval, 2021). The DAC has long been both a symbol of, and a “norm entrepreneur” in, development cooperation (Esteves & Klingebiel, 2021; Janus, 2022; Sumner & Klingebiel, 2025). It is often seen as synonymous with the form of development cooperation practised by “traditional donors”, that is, a club of high-income countries. Linked to this has been the criticism that the governance of ODA reflects persistent global power inequalities. At the same time, the DAC has served as the central forum in which key norms and quality standards of development cooperation have been negotiated over more than 60 years. It was within the DAC that the concept of “official development assistance” (ODA) was developed. ODA refers to public resources provided on concessional terms to promote economic and social development in developing countries. DAC members are also regularly assessed through peer review processes that assess their adherence to agreed standards (Ashoff, 2013). Like the role of the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) in education policy, these reviews in theory serve both disciplinary and supportive functions. In practice, no DAC member country has wished to be publicly criticised for failing to comply with jointly adopted DAC standards and relevant international agreements. Last but not least, the DAC members also issue statements of good practice and position papers on the international development agenda. These documents have been influential and have, for instance, influenced the 2000 UN Millennium Declaration and the eight Millennium Development Goals adopted – which in turn evolved into the current 2030 Agenda and its Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). DAC membership has expanded considerably since its creation, growing to 33 members today. Several nations once classified as developing countries, such as Spain, South Korea and a number of states that joined the EU in and after 2004, later sought and obtained DAC membership. At the same time, a growing number of OECD members, including Turkey, Mexico and Chile, have decided not to join the DAC. This reflects differing approaches to development cooperation and varying degrees of commitment to ODA-based norms. Countries that do not see themselves as part of a collective commitment around the ODA target of 0.7 per cent – such as Mexico, which historically identified with the Global South and was a founding member of the G77 before joining the OECD in 1994 – have so far remained outside the committee. Despite these variations, the United States played a decisive role in establishing the DAC as a rule-setting and coordinating body. US influence extended beyond institutional design. For decades, the United States also dominated personnel decisions and held the DAC chair until a rotating system was introduced (Bracho et al., 2021).

The rules-based trading system has been a central pillar of the post–Cold War international order. Predictable economic relations and lower trade barriers supported an unprecedented expansion of global trade and economic integration. Institutions such as the WTO helped establish a framework of shared principles designed to prevent protectionism and resolve disputes peacefully. This system contributed significantly to economic growth and poverty reduction, particularly in emerging and developing economies (e.g. Baldwin, 2016). However, the system has also faced mounting difficulties over time, with its gradual erosion becoming increasingly evident in the collapse of the Doha Development Round after 2008 and the paralysis of the WTO Appellate Body from 2019 onwards. More recently, unilateral trade measures, successive waves of US tariffs, rising geopolitical competition and the resurgence of industrial policy have not only undermined the multilateral trading system but also generated substantial disruptions and uncertainties in both trade and investment relations. Developing countries are among the most affected by these developments, not least because contemporary global trade involves more than just the exchange of final goods. Around 80 per cent of world trade now takes place within global value chains (GVCs) linked to transnational corporations, with production stages fragmented across multiple countries (UNCTAD, 2013). In these chains, developing countries typically occupy upstream positions and specialise in supplying raw materials or labour-intensive inputs, whereas more technologically complex and higher value-added activities are concentrated elsewhere. Especially economies in Latin America and the Caribbean as well as in Africa remain locked into low-complexity, low-margin tasks, whereas foreign-controlled firms dominate higher-value segments (ADB et al., 2025). This structural position renders developing countries particularly vulnerable to substitution and constrains economic diversification and development (e.g. Barrot, Calderón, & Servén, 2018). Against this background, trade-related development cooperation plays a crucial role. At the multilateral level, it does so by helping to sustain a fair and inclusive rules-based trading system. At the regional and country levels, it does so by strengthening institutions and investing in infrastructure as well as productive and trade capacities. These efforts also enhance developing countries’ attractiveness as investment destinations and trading partners within GVCs, helping them integrate more effectively into global markets and supporting a more resilient development pathway in an increasingly fragmented global order. This contribution begins by examining the implications of a fragmenting global order for trade. It then highlights why development cooperation in the field of trade remains vital before concluding with an exploration of how development cooperation can help build a more equitable and sustainable international trading system.

The rules-based trading system has been a central pillar of the post–Cold War international order. Predictable economic relations and lower trade barriers supported an unprecedented expansion of global trade and economic integration. Institutions such as the WTO helped establish a framework of shared principles designed to prevent protectionism and resolve disputes peacefully. This system contributed significantly to economic growth and poverty reduction, particularly in emerging and developing economies (e.g. Baldwin, 2016). However, the system has also faced mounting difficulties over time, with its gradual erosion becoming increasingly evident in the collapse of the Doha Development Round after 2008 and the paralysis of the WTO Appellate Body from 2019 onwards. More recently, unilateral trade measures, successive waves of US tariffs, rising geopolitical competition and the resurgence of industrial policy have not only undermined the multilateral trading system but also generated substantial disruptions and uncertainties in both trade and investment relations. Developing countries are among the most affected by these developments, not least because contemporary global trade involves more than just the exchange of final goods. Around 80 per cent of world trade now takes place within global value chains (GVCs) linked to transnational corporations, with production stages fragmented across multiple countries (UNCTAD, 2013). In these chains, developing countries typically occupy upstream positions and specialise in supplying raw materials or labour-intensive inputs, whereas more technologically complex and higher value-added activities are concentrated elsewhere. Especially economies in Latin America and the Caribbean as well as in Africa remain locked into low-complexity, low-margin tasks, whereas foreign-controlled firms dominate higher-value segments (ADB et al., 2025). This structural position renders developing countries particularly vulnerable to substitution and constrains economic diversification and development (e.g. Barrot, Calderón, & Servén, 2018). Against this background, trade-related development cooperation plays a crucial role. At the multilateral level, it does so by helping to sustain a fair and inclusive rules-based trading system. At the regional and country levels, it does so by strengthening institutions and investing in infrastructure as well as productive and trade capacities. These efforts also enhance developing countries’ attractiveness as investment destinations and trading partners within GVCs, helping them integrate more effectively into global markets and supporting a more resilient development pathway in an increasingly fragmented global order. This contribution begins by examining the implications of a fragmenting global order for trade. It then highlights why development cooperation in the field of trade remains vital before concluding with an exploration of how development cooperation can help build a more equitable and sustainable international trading system.

The rules-based trading system has been a central pillar of the post–Cold War international order. Predictable economic relations and lower trade barriers supported an unprecedented expansion of global trade and economic integration. Institutions such as the WTO helped establish a framework of shared principles designed to prevent protectionism and resolve disputes peacefully. This system contributed significantly to economic growth and poverty reduction, particularly in emerging and developing economies (e.g. Baldwin, 2016). However, the system has also faced mounting difficulties over time, with its gradual erosion becoming increasingly evident in the collapse of the Doha Development Round after 2008 and the paralysis of the WTO Appellate Body from 2019 onwards. More recently, unilateral trade measures, successive waves of US tariffs, rising geopolitical competition and the resurgence of industrial policy have not only undermined the multilateral trading system but also generated substantial disruptions and uncertainties in both trade and investment relations. Developing countries are among the most affected by these developments, not least because contemporary global trade involves more than just the exchange of final goods. Around 80 per cent of world trade now takes place within global value chains (GVCs) linked to transnational corporations, with production stages fragmented across multiple countries (UNCTAD, 2013). In these chains, developing countries typically occupy upstream positions and specialise in supplying raw materials or labour-intensive inputs, whereas more technologically complex and higher value-added activities are concentrated elsewhere. Especially economies in Latin America and the Caribbean as well as in Africa remain locked into low-complexity, low-margin tasks, whereas foreign-controlled firms dominate higher-value segments (ADB et al., 2025). This structural position renders developing countries particularly vulnerable to substitution and constrains economic diversification and development (e.g. Barrot, Calderón, & Servén, 2018). Against this background, trade-related development cooperation plays a crucial role. At the multilateral level, it does so by helping to sustain a fair and inclusive rules-based trading system. At the regional and country levels, it does so by strengthening institutions and investing in infrastructure as well as productive and trade capacities. These efforts also enhance developing countries’ attractiveness as investment destinations and trading partners within GVCs, helping them integrate more effectively into global markets and supporting a more resilient development pathway in an increasingly fragmented global order. This contribution begins by examining the implications of a fragmenting global order for trade. It then highlights why development cooperation in the field of trade remains vital before concluding with an exploration of how development cooperation can help build a more equitable and sustainable international trading system.

In the context of the changing global order and rising nationalism, several countries, including the United States and some European countries, have cut their official development assistance (ODA). The OECD forecasts a decline of ODA by around 23 per cent between 2024 and 2025 (OECD, 2026). At the same time there is a significant financing gap for achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), currently estimated at about $4 trillion. Furthermore, the annual financing required to achieve the SDGs by 2030 increased by 36 per cent between 2015 and 2022, rising from $6.81 trillion to $9.24 trillion. This increase was driven by climate-related challenges, the impact of the pandemic, supply chain disruptions, and rising food and energy prices. These two trends have led to a significant SDG financing gap, which is projected to reach $6.4 trillion by 2030, assuming that it continues to grow at the rate observed between 2015 and 2022. Furthermore, mounting debt obligations are exerting pressure on pivotal investments in health, education and climate resilience (OECD, 2025). According to the debt sustainability analysis of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank, about half of low-income countries are either at high risk of debt distress or already in debt distress.

In the context of the changing global order and rising nationalism, several countries, including the United States and some European countries, have cut their official development assistance (ODA). The OECD forecasts a decline of ODA by around 23 per cent between 2024 and 2025 (OECD, 2026). At the same time there is a significant financing gap for achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), currently estimated at about $4 trillion. Furthermore, the annual financing required to achieve the SDGs by 2030 increased by 36 per cent between 2015 and 2022, rising from $6.81 trillion to $9.24 trillion. This increase was driven by climate-related challenges, the impact of the pandemic, supply chain disruptions, and rising food and energy prices. These two trends have led to a significant SDG financing gap, which is projected to reach $6.4 trillion by 2030, assuming that it continues to grow at the rate observed between 2015 and 2022. Furthermore, mounting debt obligations are exerting pressure on pivotal investments in health, education and climate resilience (OECD, 2025). According to the debt sustainability analysis of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank, about half of low-income countries are either at high risk of debt distress or already in debt distress.

In the context of the changing global order and rising nationalism, several countries, including the United States and some European countries, have cut their official development assistance (ODA). The OECD forecasts a decline of ODA by around 23 per cent between 2024 and 2025 (OECD, 2026). At the same time there is a significant financing gap for achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), currently estimated at about $4 trillion. Furthermore, the annual financing required to achieve the SDGs by 2030 increased by 36 per cent between 2015 and 2022, rising from $6.81 trillion to $9.24 trillion. This increase was driven by climate-related challenges, the impact of the pandemic, supply chain disruptions, and rising food and energy prices. These two trends have led to a significant SDG financing gap, which is projected to reach $6.4 trillion by 2030, assuming that it continues to grow at the rate observed between 2015 and 2022. Furthermore, mounting debt obligations are exerting pressure on pivotal investments in health, education and climate resilience (OECD, 2025). According to the debt sustainability analysis of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank, about half of low-income countries are either at high risk of debt distress or already in debt distress.

30 Milliarden Euro fehlen der Bundesregierung, um die akute Krise zu meistern. Zugleich sitzt das Land auf riesigen Goldreserven. Warum nicht einige davon nutzen? , Die Bundesregierung steckt mal wieder in einem finanziellen Dilemma: Auf der einen Seite klafft eine Haushaltslücke, die noch deutlich größer ausfallen dürfte als die 20 oder 30 Milliarden Euro, über die bisher diskutiert wird. Es könnte aber noch mehr Geld im Bundeshaushalt fehlen. Auf der anderen ...

Bonn, 11. Mai 2026. Die zunehmende Prominenz autoritärer Planungsansätze auf dem Weltstädteforum erhöht die Gefahr, dass UN-Habitats wichtigste Konferenz Autokraten eine globale Bühne bietet.

Vom 17. bis 22. Mai findet in Baku, Aserbaidschan, das 13. UN-Weltstädteforum (WUF) statt. Zum zweiten Mal in Folge und zum dritten Mal seit 2020 richtet ein autoritärer Staat UN-Habitats wichtigste Konferenz zur Stadtentwicklung aus. Während Deutschland und andere demokratische Staaten ihre Präsenz auf dem Forum zurückfahren, wächst die Sichtbarkeit autoritärer Staaten. Setzt sich dieser Trend fort, droht die Konferenz zu einer globalen Bühne für autoritären Urbanismus zu werden.

Das letzte WUF im Jahr 2024 war dafür ein Paradebeispiel. Gastgeberland Ägypten nutzte die globale mediale und politische Aufmerksamkeit in Kairo, um sein umstrittenes Projekt einer neuen Hauptstadt zu präsentieren: die mehrere Milliarden US-Dollar teure Planstadt wurde heftig dafür kritisiert vor allem einer kleinen wohlhabenden Minderheit zu dienen, weitgehend unbewohnt zu sein und Investitionen aus Ägyptens bestehenden Städten abzuziehen. Das Magazin „The Economist“ bezeichnete das Projekt pointiert als „Egypt‘s new pyramid scheme“ (übersetzt „Ägyptens neues Schneeballsystem“ – womit auf eine Betrugsmasche angespielt wird).

An städtischen Herausforderungen, die neue Entwicklungsansätze erfordern, mangelt es nicht. In Afrika schreitet die Urbanisierung rasant voran; die städtische Bevölkerung wird sich Prognosen zufolge von 700 Millionen im Jahr 2020 auf 1,4 Milliarden im Jahr 2050 verdoppeln. Weltweit leben noch immer rund eine Milliarde Menschen in informellen Siedlungen, oft ohne ausreichenden Zugang zu sauberem Wasser und sanitären Einrichtungen. Gleichzeitig verursachen Städte über 70 % der globalen Treibhausgasemissionen und spielen damit eine zentrale Rolle im Klimaschutz.

Doch der von vielen Autokratien bevorzugte Planungsansatz – der in ihren WUF-Pavillons deutlich sichtbar wird – scheitert häufig bei der Bewältigung dieser Herausforderungen, vor allem, weil er nicht darauf ausgelegt ist, der Mehrheit der Bevölkerung zugutezukommen. Vielmehr dient dieser Ansatz, den der Politikwissenschaftler James Scott als „autoritären Hochmodernismus“ bezeichnet hat, in der Regel vor allem den Interessen und Fantasien des Regimes, etwa der Festigung politischer Macht und der Ausübung sozialer Kontrolle. Als Ideologie setzt dieser Ansatz auf von oben gesteuerte Masterpläne, die notfalls auch mit Gewalt durchgesetzt werden und von den Lebensrealitäten der Menschen losgelöst sind.

Abgesehen davon, dass dieser Planungsansatz autoritäre Regime stärkt, zeigt sich historisch, dass er städtische Probleme häufig eher verschärft als löst. Der Ansatz geht in der Regel mit einer enormen Verschwendung öffentlicher und privater Ressourcen einher und verursacht meist erhebliche soziale und ökologische Schäden. Prominente Beispiele für gescheiterten autoritären Hochmodernismus sind Planstädte wie etwa Malaysias „Forest City“, Saudi-Arabiens „The Line“ und Abu Dhabis gescheiterte Ökostadt „Masdar City“. Schätzungen zufolge stehen zwei Drittel dieser neuen Stadtprojekte nahezu leer oder sind vollständig unbewohnt und resultieren in sogenannten „Geisterstädten“. Projekte wie diese kommen in erster Linie politischen Eliten, Interessengruppen und Investor*innen zugute – nicht den Bedürfnissen der Stadtbevölkerung oder deren Menschenrechten.

Alternative Stadtentwicklungsmodelle, die auf Stadterneuerung statt Masterpläne, auf Bürger*innenbeteiligung statt Eliteprojekte und auf die Bedürfnisse der Bevölkerung statt auf Regimeinteressen setzen, wirken oft weniger spektakulär. Diese pluralistischen Planungsansätze funktionieren jedoch häufig nicht nur besser, sondern sind auch unerlässlich für den Abbau städtischer Ungleichheit, auch und gerade in informellen Siedlungen.

Daher ist es wichtig, auf Konferenzen wie dem WUF pluralistische Ansätze der Stadtentwicklung sichtbar zu machen. Tausende politische Entscheidungsträger*innen, Investor*innen, Journalist*innen und Vertreter*innen der Zivilgesellschaft kommen bei solchen Veranstaltungen zusammen, um Planungskonzepte der Stadtentwicklung zu beleuchten, zu diskutieren und zu entwerfen. Beim letzten WUF in Kairo bot der deutsche Pavillon eine wichtige Insel demokratischen Diskurses inmitten einer Flut überwiegend autoritärer urbaner Visionen. Er war als öffentliches Forum konzipiert, brachte unterschiedliche Perspektiven und Denkweisen zusammen und ermöglichte somit wichtige inklusive Diskussionen.

In diesem Jahr in Baku wird es jedoch keinen deutschen Pavillon geben. Auch andere Demokratien reduzieren aufgrund von Kürzungen ihrer Entwicklungsprogramme ihre Präsenz auf der Konferenz. Die Abwesenheit dieser Pavillons und Begegnungsräume bedeutet verpasste Gelegenheiten, WUF-Teilnehmenden aus aller Welt demokratischere, pluralistische und nachhaltigere Wege der Stadtentwicklung vorzustellen.

Die in den Pavillons präsentierten Stadtvisionen sind natürlich nur eine Dimension der Veranstaltung. Doch wenn Deutschland und andere Demokratien ihre Partner bei der Bewältigung drängender städtischer Herausforderungen wirksam und zugleich finanziell verantwortungsvoll unterstützen wollen, dürfen sie sich dem globalen Wettbewerb um die Gestaltung der Städte von morgen nicht entziehen. Deutschland sollte daher erwägen, beim nächsten WUF 2028 in Mexiko-Stadt wieder einen Pavillon zu organisieren und gemeinsam mit demokratischen Partnerländern Möglichkeiten auszuloten, dem autoritären Trend entgegenzuwirken. Dies könnte auch bedeuten, selbst in der Zukunft ein Weltstädteforum auszurichten.

Bonn, 11. Mai 2026. Die zunehmende Prominenz autoritärer Planungsansätze auf dem Weltstädteforum erhöht die Gefahr, dass UN-Habitats wichtigste Konferenz Autokraten eine globale Bühne bietet.

Vom 17. bis 22. Mai findet in Baku, Aserbaidschan, das 13. UN-Weltstädteforum (WUF) statt. Zum zweiten Mal in Folge und zum dritten Mal seit 2020 richtet ein autoritärer Staat UN-Habitats wichtigste Konferenz zur Stadtentwicklung aus. Während Deutschland und andere demokratische Staaten ihre Präsenz auf dem Forum zurückfahren, wächst die Sichtbarkeit autoritärer Staaten. Setzt sich dieser Trend fort, droht die Konferenz zu einer globalen Bühne für autoritären Urbanismus zu werden.

Das letzte WUF im Jahr 2024 war dafür ein Paradebeispiel. Gastgeberland Ägypten nutzte die globale mediale und politische Aufmerksamkeit in Kairo, um sein umstrittenes Projekt einer neuen Hauptstadt zu präsentieren: die mehrere Milliarden US-Dollar teure Planstadt wurde heftig dafür kritisiert vor allem einer kleinen wohlhabenden Minderheit zu dienen, weitgehend unbewohnt zu sein und Investitionen aus Ägyptens bestehenden Städten abzuziehen. Das Magazin „The Economist“ bezeichnete das Projekt pointiert als „Egypt‘s new pyramid scheme“ (übersetzt „Ägyptens neues Schneeballsystem“ – womit auf eine Betrugsmasche angespielt wird).

An städtischen Herausforderungen, die neue Entwicklungsansätze erfordern, mangelt es nicht. In Afrika schreitet die Urbanisierung rasant voran; die städtische Bevölkerung wird sich Prognosen zufolge von 700 Millionen im Jahr 2020 auf 1,4 Milliarden im Jahr 2050 verdoppeln. Weltweit leben noch immer rund eine Milliarde Menschen in informellen Siedlungen, oft ohne ausreichenden Zugang zu sauberem Wasser und sanitären Einrichtungen. Gleichzeitig verursachen Städte über 70 % der globalen Treibhausgasemissionen und spielen damit eine zentrale Rolle im Klimaschutz.

Doch der von vielen Autokratien bevorzugte Planungsansatz – der in ihren WUF-Pavillons deutlich sichtbar wird – scheitert häufig bei der Bewältigung dieser Herausforderungen, vor allem, weil er nicht darauf ausgelegt ist, der Mehrheit der Bevölkerung zugutezukommen. Vielmehr dient dieser Ansatz, den der Politikwissenschaftler James Scott als „autoritären Hochmodernismus“ bezeichnet hat, in der Regel vor allem den Interessen und Fantasien des Regimes, etwa der Festigung politischer Macht und der Ausübung sozialer Kontrolle. Als Ideologie setzt dieser Ansatz auf von oben gesteuerte Masterpläne, die notfalls auch mit Gewalt durchgesetzt werden und von den Lebensrealitäten der Menschen losgelöst sind.

Abgesehen davon, dass dieser Planungsansatz autoritäre Regime stärkt, zeigt sich historisch, dass er städtische Probleme häufig eher verschärft als löst. Der Ansatz geht in der Regel mit einer enormen Verschwendung öffentlicher und privater Ressourcen einher und verursacht meist erhebliche soziale und ökologische Schäden. Prominente Beispiele für gescheiterten autoritären Hochmodernismus sind Planstädte wie etwa Malaysias „Forest City“, Saudi-Arabiens „The Line“ und Abu Dhabis gescheiterte Ökostadt „Masdar City“. Schätzungen zufolge stehen zwei Drittel dieser neuen Stadtprojekte nahezu leer oder sind vollständig unbewohnt und resultieren in sogenannten „Geisterstädten“. Projekte wie diese kommen in erster Linie politischen Eliten, Interessengruppen und Investor*innen zugute – nicht den Bedürfnissen der Stadtbevölkerung oder deren Menschenrechten.

Alternative Stadtentwicklungsmodelle, die auf Stadterneuerung statt Masterpläne, auf Bürger*innenbeteiligung statt Eliteprojekte und auf die Bedürfnisse der Bevölkerung statt auf Regimeinteressen setzen, wirken oft weniger spektakulär. Diese pluralistischen Planungsansätze funktionieren jedoch häufig nicht nur besser, sondern sind auch unerlässlich für den Abbau städtischer Ungleichheit, auch und gerade in informellen Siedlungen.

Daher ist es wichtig, auf Konferenzen wie dem WUF pluralistische Ansätze der Stadtentwicklung sichtbar zu machen. Tausende politische Entscheidungsträger*innen, Investor*innen, Journalist*innen und Vertreter*innen der Zivilgesellschaft kommen bei solchen Veranstaltungen zusammen, um Planungskonzepte der Stadtentwicklung zu beleuchten, zu diskutieren und zu entwerfen. Beim letzten WUF in Kairo bot der deutsche Pavillon eine wichtige Insel demokratischen Diskurses inmitten einer Flut überwiegend autoritärer urbaner Visionen. Er war als öffentliches Forum konzipiert, brachte unterschiedliche Perspektiven und Denkweisen zusammen und ermöglichte somit wichtige inklusive Diskussionen.

In diesem Jahr in Baku wird es jedoch keinen deutschen Pavillon geben. Auch andere Demokratien reduzieren aufgrund von Kürzungen ihrer Entwicklungsprogramme ihre Präsenz auf der Konferenz. Die Abwesenheit dieser Pavillons und Begegnungsräume bedeutet verpasste Gelegenheiten, WUF-Teilnehmenden aus aller Welt demokratischere, pluralistische und nachhaltigere Wege der Stadtentwicklung vorzustellen.

Die in den Pavillons präsentierten Stadtvisionen sind natürlich nur eine Dimension der Veranstaltung. Doch wenn Deutschland und andere Demokratien ihre Partner bei der Bewältigung drängender städtischer Herausforderungen wirksam und zugleich finanziell verantwortungsvoll unterstützen wollen, dürfen sie sich dem globalen Wettbewerb um die Gestaltung der Städte von morgen nicht entziehen. Deutschland sollte daher erwägen, beim nächsten WUF 2028 in Mexiko-Stadt wieder einen Pavillon zu organisieren und gemeinsam mit demokratischen Partnerländern Möglichkeiten auszuloten, dem autoritären Trend entgegenzuwirken. Dies könnte auch bedeuten, selbst in der Zukunft ein Weltstädteforum auszurichten.

Bonn, 11. Mai 2026. Die zunehmende Prominenz autoritärer Planungsansätze auf dem Weltstädteforum erhöht die Gefahr, dass UN-Habitats wichtigste Konferenz Autokraten eine globale Bühne bietet.

Vom 17. bis 22. Mai findet in Baku, Aserbaidschan, das 13. UN-Weltstädteforum (WUF) statt. Zum zweiten Mal in Folge und zum dritten Mal seit 2020 richtet ein autoritärer Staat UN-Habitats wichtigste Konferenz zur Stadtentwicklung aus. Während Deutschland und andere demokratische Staaten ihre Präsenz auf dem Forum zurückfahren, wächst die Sichtbarkeit autoritärer Staaten. Setzt sich dieser Trend fort, droht die Konferenz zu einer globalen Bühne für autoritären Urbanismus zu werden.

Das letzte WUF im Jahr 2024 war dafür ein Paradebeispiel. Gastgeberland Ägypten nutzte die globale mediale und politische Aufmerksamkeit in Kairo, um sein umstrittenes Projekt einer neuen Hauptstadt zu präsentieren: die mehrere Milliarden US-Dollar teure Planstadt wurde heftig dafür kritisiert vor allem einer kleinen wohlhabenden Minderheit zu dienen, weitgehend unbewohnt zu sein und Investitionen aus Ägyptens bestehenden Städten abzuziehen. Das Magazin „The Economist“ bezeichnete das Projekt pointiert als „Egypt‘s new pyramid scheme“ (übersetzt „Ägyptens neues Schneeballsystem“ – womit auf eine Betrugsmasche angespielt wird).

An städtischen Herausforderungen, die neue Entwicklungsansätze erfordern, mangelt es nicht. In Afrika schreitet die Urbanisierung rasant voran; die städtische Bevölkerung wird sich Prognosen zufolge von 700 Millionen im Jahr 2020 auf 1,4 Milliarden im Jahr 2050 verdoppeln. Weltweit leben noch immer rund eine Milliarde Menschen in informellen Siedlungen, oft ohne ausreichenden Zugang zu sauberem Wasser und sanitären Einrichtungen. Gleichzeitig verursachen Städte über 70 % der globalen Treibhausgasemissionen und spielen damit eine zentrale Rolle im Klimaschutz.

Doch der von vielen Autokratien bevorzugte Planungsansatz – der in ihren WUF-Pavillons deutlich sichtbar wird – scheitert häufig bei der Bewältigung dieser Herausforderungen, vor allem, weil er nicht darauf ausgelegt ist, der Mehrheit der Bevölkerung zugutezukommen. Vielmehr dient dieser Ansatz, den der Politikwissenschaftler James Scott als „autoritären Hochmodernismus“ bezeichnet hat, in der Regel vor allem den Interessen und Fantasien des Regimes, etwa der Festigung politischer Macht und der Ausübung sozialer Kontrolle. Als Ideologie setzt dieser Ansatz auf von oben gesteuerte Masterpläne, die notfalls auch mit Gewalt durchgesetzt werden und von den Lebensrealitäten der Menschen losgelöst sind.

Abgesehen davon, dass dieser Planungsansatz autoritäre Regime stärkt, zeigt sich historisch, dass er städtische Probleme häufig eher verschärft als löst. Der Ansatz geht in der Regel mit einer enormen Verschwendung öffentlicher und privater Ressourcen einher und verursacht meist erhebliche soziale und ökologische Schäden. Prominente Beispiele für gescheiterten autoritären Hochmodernismus sind Planstädte wie etwa Malaysias „Forest City“, Saudi-Arabiens „The Line“ und Abu Dhabis gescheiterte Ökostadt „Masdar City“. Schätzungen zufolge stehen zwei Drittel dieser neuen Stadtprojekte nahezu leer oder sind vollständig unbewohnt und resultieren in sogenannten „Geisterstädten“. Projekte wie diese kommen in erster Linie politischen Eliten, Interessengruppen und Investor*innen zugute – nicht den Bedürfnissen der Stadtbevölkerung oder deren Menschenrechten.

Alternative Stadtentwicklungsmodelle, die auf Stadterneuerung statt Masterpläne, auf Bürger*innenbeteiligung statt Eliteprojekte und auf die Bedürfnisse der Bevölkerung statt auf Regimeinteressen setzen, wirken oft weniger spektakulär. Diese pluralistischen Planungsansätze funktionieren jedoch häufig nicht nur besser, sondern sind auch unerlässlich für den Abbau städtischer Ungleichheit, auch und gerade in informellen Siedlungen.

Daher ist es wichtig, auf Konferenzen wie dem WUF pluralistische Ansätze der Stadtentwicklung sichtbar zu machen. Tausende politische Entscheidungsträger*innen, Investor*innen, Journalist*innen und Vertreter*innen der Zivilgesellschaft kommen bei solchen Veranstaltungen zusammen, um Planungskonzepte der Stadtentwicklung zu beleuchten, zu diskutieren und zu entwerfen. Beim letzten WUF in Kairo bot der deutsche Pavillon eine wichtige Insel demokratischen Diskurses inmitten einer Flut überwiegend autoritärer urbaner Visionen. Er war als öffentliches Forum konzipiert, brachte unterschiedliche Perspektiven und Denkweisen zusammen und ermöglichte somit wichtige inklusive Diskussionen.

In diesem Jahr in Baku wird es jedoch keinen deutschen Pavillon geben. Auch andere Demokratien reduzieren aufgrund von Kürzungen ihrer Entwicklungsprogramme ihre Präsenz auf der Konferenz. Die Abwesenheit dieser Pavillons und Begegnungsräume bedeutet verpasste Gelegenheiten, WUF-Teilnehmenden aus aller Welt demokratischere, pluralistische und nachhaltigere Wege der Stadtentwicklung vorzustellen.

Die in den Pavillons präsentierten Stadtvisionen sind natürlich nur eine Dimension der Veranstaltung. Doch wenn Deutschland und andere Demokratien ihre Partner bei der Bewältigung drängender städtischer Herausforderungen wirksam und zugleich finanziell verantwortungsvoll unterstützen wollen, dürfen sie sich dem globalen Wettbewerb um die Gestaltung der Städte von morgen nicht entziehen. Deutschland sollte daher erwägen, beim nächsten WUF 2028 in Mexiko-Stadt wieder einen Pavillon zu organisieren und gemeinsam mit demokratischen Partnerländern Möglichkeiten auszuloten, dem autoritären Trend entgegenzuwirken. Dies könnte auch bedeuten, selbst in der Zukunft ein Weltstädteforum auszurichten.

Revised version (May 2026)

Tax expenditures (TEs) are benefits granted through the tax system that lower government revenue and the taxliability of beneficiaries. Governments worldwide use TEs to pursue different policy goals such as attracting investment, boosting innovation and mitigating inequality. At the same time, TEs are costly: according to the Global Tax Expenditures Database (GTED), the worldwide average over the 1990-2023 period is 3.7 percent of GDP and 23.0 percent of tax revenue (Redonda et al., 2025). When ill designed, they can be ineffective in reaching their stated goals. They can also be highly distortive and trigger negative externalities. Yet, despite the fact that TEs have similar effects on public budgets as direct spending programmes, the lack of transparency in the TE field is striking, as only 116 out of 218 jurisdictions have reported on TEs at least once since 1990.1 In addition, the quality, regularity and scope of such reports are highly heterogeneous and, in many cases, do not allow to engage in meaningful discussions on the effectiveness and efficiency of TEs. The Global Tax Expenditures Transparency Index (GTETI) is the first comparative assessment of TE reporting covering jurisdictions worldwide. It provides a systematic framework to rank jurisdictions according to the regularity, quality and scope of their TE reports, and seeks to increase transparency and accountability in the TE field. Note that countries are not scored, ranked or compared on the size of revenue forgone reported, nor on the quality of their TE policy as such. This new version of the Companion Paper introduces the GTETI, outlines the updates made to the index since December 2024, and provides an in-depth explanation of its five dimensions and 25 indicators. It also discusses the rationale, scope, methodology, and assumptions underpinning the GTETI assessment process. The Companion Paper explains the limitations and issues users should bear in mind when consulting the index, which is publicly available free of charge on the Tax Expenditures Lab website, www.taxexpenditures.org.

Revised version (May 2026)

Tax expenditures (TEs) are benefits granted through the tax system that lower government revenue and the taxliability of beneficiaries. Governments worldwide use TEs to pursue different policy goals such as attracting investment, boosting innovation and mitigating inequality. At the same time, TEs are costly: according to the Global Tax Expenditures Database (GTED), the worldwide average over the 1990-2023 period is 3.7 percent of GDP and 23.0 percent of tax revenue (Redonda et al., 2025). When ill designed, they can be ineffective in reaching their stated goals. They can also be highly distortive and trigger negative externalities. Yet, despite the fact that TEs have similar effects on public budgets as direct spending programmes, the lack of transparency in the TE field is striking, as only 116 out of 218 jurisdictions have reported on TEs at least once since 1990.1 In addition, the quality, regularity and scope of such reports are highly heterogeneous and, in many cases, do not allow to engage in meaningful discussions on the effectiveness and efficiency of TEs. The Global Tax Expenditures Transparency Index (GTETI) is the first comparative assessment of TE reporting covering jurisdictions worldwide. It provides a systematic framework to rank jurisdictions according to the regularity, quality and scope of their TE reports, and seeks to increase transparency and accountability in the TE field. Note that countries are not scored, ranked or compared on the size of revenue forgone reported, nor on the quality of their TE policy as such. This new version of the Companion Paper introduces the GTETI, outlines the updates made to the index since December 2024, and provides an in-depth explanation of its five dimensions and 25 indicators. It also discusses the rationale, scope, methodology, and assumptions underpinning the GTETI assessment process. The Companion Paper explains the limitations and issues users should bear in mind when consulting the index, which is publicly available free of charge on the Tax Expenditures Lab website, www.taxexpenditures.org.

Revised version (May 2026)

Tax expenditures (TEs) are benefits granted through the tax system that lower government revenue and the taxliability of beneficiaries. Governments worldwide use TEs to pursue different policy goals such as attracting investment, boosting innovation and mitigating inequality. At the same time, TEs are costly: according to the Global Tax Expenditures Database (GTED), the worldwide average over the 1990-2023 period is 3.7 percent of GDP and 23.0 percent of tax revenue (Redonda et al., 2025). When ill designed, they can be ineffective in reaching their stated goals. They can also be highly distortive and trigger negative externalities. Yet, despite the fact that TEs have similar effects on public budgets as direct spending programmes, the lack of transparency in the TE field is striking, as only 116 out of 218 jurisdictions have reported on TEs at least once since 1990.1 In addition, the quality, regularity and scope of such reports are highly heterogeneous and, in many cases, do not allow to engage in meaningful discussions on the effectiveness and efficiency of TEs. The Global Tax Expenditures Transparency Index (GTETI) is the first comparative assessment of TE reporting covering jurisdictions worldwide. It provides a systematic framework to rank jurisdictions according to the regularity, quality and scope of their TE reports, and seeks to increase transparency and accountability in the TE field. Note that countries are not scored, ranked or compared on the size of revenue forgone reported, nor on the quality of their TE policy as such. This new version of the Companion Paper introduces the GTETI, outlines the updates made to the index since December 2024, and provides an in-depth explanation of its five dimensions and 25 indicators. It also discusses the rationale, scope, methodology, and assumptions underpinning the GTETI assessment process. The Companion Paper explains the limitations and issues users should bear in mind when consulting the index, which is publicly available free of charge on the Tax Expenditures Lab website, www.taxexpenditures.org.