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Tax expenditures (TEs) in Zimbabwe represent a significant portion of government spending, amounting to 2.8 percent of GDP, 24.7 percent of total revenue, and 21.2 percent of public spending in 2023. Companies benefitting from TEs enjoy tax savings that trigger a reduction in government revenue, which may in turn result in higher budget deficits and sovereign debt. TEs are often regressive, e.g., when TEs related to personal income tax (PIT) benefit those in higher income tax brackets more, and TEs related to value-added tax (VAT) provide a larger benefit to higher income households, given their larger consumption in absolute terms. Although TEs are meant to boost investment, exports, innovation and employment, their real impact is often unknown, as Zimbabwe lacks a culture of ex-ante and ex-post evaluation of TEs.

Transparency: Section 3 of the Public Finance Management Act [Chapter 22:19] aims to secure transparency, accountability and sound management of revenues and expenditure, but does not provide specific provisions on TEs assessments nor reporting to the Parliament of Zimbabwe. Section 30 of the Zimbabwe Investment Development Agency (ZIDA) Act also highlights that ZIDA, in consultation with the Minister responsible for Finance, should publish guidelines for investment, which include general and special incentives applicable to specific categories of licensed investors. Against this backdrop, it is fair to say that there is no explicit policy on TE transparency in Zimbabwe.

Complex landscape: The rationale for the introduction of business-related TEs is to stimulate investment and production, which should then create employment opportunities and other benefits, potentially leading to higher government revenues in the medium or long term. If well-designed, tax incentives for investment can be a cost-effective policy tool. However, TEs may be vulnerable to lobbying and abuse, providing preferential tax treatment to specific groups with vested interests to keep the incentives in place even without much benefit to the economy at large. Empirical evidence on TEs is still limited in Zimbabwe, which undermines evidence-based tax policymaking.

Evaluation challenges: The government of Zimbabwe committed to develop a tax incentive monitoring and evaluation framework, managed by the Zimbabwe Revenue Authority (ZIMRA), to facilitate the management of TEs and inform cost-benefit analyses by Treasury on an annual basis with effect from 1 January 2019. No ex-ante evaluation has been conducted so far, but some ex-post evaluations of TEs were undertaken in 2021 and 2023. In addition, ZIMRA has started to publish TE figures from 2019 onwards in its annual reports, although the statistics published are highly aggregated and do not cover all taxes upon which TEs are granted. The published TEs from the annual reports are revenue forgone from domestic and trade taxes. Although the Parliament of Zimbabwe has the competence to oversee the national budget cycle, it is currently not involved in the monitoring and control of TEs.

Fiscal sustainability: Fiscal sustainability enables governments to meet future public expenditure and financial obligations without resorting to excessive borrowing. Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No. 20) Act, 2013 (Act No. 1 of 2013, Section 299) provides for Parliamentary oversight of state revenues and expenditure to ensure accountability, monitoring and fiscal sustainability (Government of Zimbabwe, 2023a). Section 298 (1) b i of the Constitution states that the burden of taxation must be shared equally which implies that TEs should not be allocated without evaluating if they are beneficial to Zimbabwe. TEs can be described as hidden government spending, which can negatively affect fiscal sustainability. Zimbabwe’s TEs amounted to US$1.34 billion in 2023, which is about 2.8 percent of GDP, compared to the global average of about 4 percent of GDP. However, VAT rate reductions and exemptions on domestic sales, which constituted 51 percent and 27.1 percent of total TEs reported by ZIMRA in 2020, were not reported through the new Tax and Revenue Management System (TaRMS) in 2023. Moreover, TEs for CIT, PIT and excise duty were not reported since they are not captured by ZIMRA. The bulk of the reported figures for 2023 were TEs related to custom duties. Thus, the extent of TE use in Zimbabwe is underreported and may in fact be considerably higher than the global average. Moreover, this is happening at a time when Zimbabwe is facing limited fiscal space, with public debt constituting 59.7 percent of GDP in 2024.

Policy recommendations: The Government of Zimbabwe should conduct or commission ex-ante and ex-post evaluations of TEs to enhance their effectiveness. Statistics on TE use and revenue forgone should be publicly available and easily accessible to enhance transparency and access of information to the users. All TEs should be time-bound (with sunset clauses) and, ideally, only be renewed after an assessment has been undertaken to justify their existence. All new TEs should be subject to an ex-ante evaluation to clarify expectations and ensure that only effective TEs are implemented in the country. The Parliament of Zimbabwe should be involved in the monitoring and control of TEs. The legislation should ensure that TE proposals are in line with national development plans and policies. The Parliament of Zimbabwe should also ensure that TE reports are published at pre-defined dates. TE reporting should be comprehensive, reported annually. This means there should be a designated authority responsible for preparing the TE report, preferably in the Ministry of Finance, Economic Development and Investment Promotion. The legal framework should also establish the structure and frequency of TE evaluations, including both ex-ante assessments and ex-post evaluations.

Tax expenditures (TEs) in Zimbabwe represent a significant portion of government spending, amounting to 2.8 percent of GDP, 24.7 percent of total revenue, and 21.2 percent of public spending in 2023. Companies benefitting from TEs enjoy tax savings that trigger a reduction in government revenue, which may in turn result in higher budget deficits and sovereign debt. TEs are often regressive, e.g., when TEs related to personal income tax (PIT) benefit those in higher income tax brackets more, and TEs related to value-added tax (VAT) provide a larger benefit to higher income households, given their larger consumption in absolute terms. Although TEs are meant to boost investment, exports, innovation and employment, their real impact is often unknown, as Zimbabwe lacks a culture of ex-ante and ex-post evaluation of TEs.

Transparency: Section 3 of the Public Finance Management Act [Chapter 22:19] aims to secure transparency, accountability and sound management of revenues and expenditure, but does not provide specific provisions on TEs assessments nor reporting to the Parliament of Zimbabwe. Section 30 of the Zimbabwe Investment Development Agency (ZIDA) Act also highlights that ZIDA, in consultation with the Minister responsible for Finance, should publish guidelines for investment, which include general and special incentives applicable to specific categories of licensed investors. Against this backdrop, it is fair to say that there is no explicit policy on TE transparency in Zimbabwe.

Complex landscape: The rationale for the introduction of business-related TEs is to stimulate investment and production, which should then create employment opportunities and other benefits, potentially leading to higher government revenues in the medium or long term. If well-designed, tax incentives for investment can be a cost-effective policy tool. However, TEs may be vulnerable to lobbying and abuse, providing preferential tax treatment to specific groups with vested interests to keep the incentives in place even without much benefit to the economy at large. Empirical evidence on TEs is still limited in Zimbabwe, which undermines evidence-based tax policymaking.

Evaluation challenges: The government of Zimbabwe committed to develop a tax incentive monitoring and evaluation framework, managed by the Zimbabwe Revenue Authority (ZIMRA), to facilitate the management of TEs and inform cost-benefit analyses by Treasury on an annual basis with effect from 1 January 2019. No ex-ante evaluation has been conducted so far, but some ex-post evaluations of TEs were undertaken in 2021 and 2023. In addition, ZIMRA has started to publish TE figures from 2019 onwards in its annual reports, although the statistics published are highly aggregated and do not cover all taxes upon which TEs are granted. The published TEs from the annual reports are revenue forgone from domestic and trade taxes. Although the Parliament of Zimbabwe has the competence to oversee the national budget cycle, it is currently not involved in the monitoring and control of TEs.

Fiscal sustainability: Fiscal sustainability enables governments to meet future public expenditure and financial obligations without resorting to excessive borrowing. Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No. 20) Act, 2013 (Act No. 1 of 2013, Section 299) provides for Parliamentary oversight of state revenues and expenditure to ensure accountability, monitoring and fiscal sustainability (Government of Zimbabwe, 2023a). Section 298 (1) b i of the Constitution states that the burden of taxation must be shared equally which implies that TEs should not be allocated without evaluating if they are beneficial to Zimbabwe. TEs can be described as hidden government spending, which can negatively affect fiscal sustainability. Zimbabwe’s TEs amounted to US$1.34 billion in 2023, which is about 2.8 percent of GDP, compared to the global average of about 4 percent of GDP. However, VAT rate reductions and exemptions on domestic sales, which constituted 51 percent and 27.1 percent of total TEs reported by ZIMRA in 2020, were not reported through the new Tax and Revenue Management System (TaRMS) in 2023. Moreover, TEs for CIT, PIT and excise duty were not reported since they are not captured by ZIMRA. The bulk of the reported figures for 2023 were TEs related to custom duties. Thus, the extent of TE use in Zimbabwe is underreported and may in fact be considerably higher than the global average. Moreover, this is happening at a time when Zimbabwe is facing limited fiscal space, with public debt constituting 59.7 percent of GDP in 2024.

Policy recommendations: The Government of Zimbabwe should conduct or commission ex-ante and ex-post evaluations of TEs to enhance their effectiveness. Statistics on TE use and revenue forgone should be publicly available and easily accessible to enhance transparency and access of information to the users. All TEs should be time-bound (with sunset clauses) and, ideally, only be renewed after an assessment has been undertaken to justify their existence. All new TEs should be subject to an ex-ante evaluation to clarify expectations and ensure that only effective TEs are implemented in the country. The Parliament of Zimbabwe should be involved in the monitoring and control of TEs. The legislation should ensure that TE proposals are in line with national development plans and policies. The Parliament of Zimbabwe should also ensure that TE reports are published at pre-defined dates. TE reporting should be comprehensive, reported annually. This means there should be a designated authority responsible for preparing the TE report, preferably in the Ministry of Finance, Economic Development and Investment Promotion. The legal framework should also establish the structure and frequency of TE evaluations, including both ex-ante assessments and ex-post evaluations.

The OECD Conference on the Future of International Development Co-operation convened in Paris on 11-12 May 2026. Andy Sumner and Stephan Klingebiel consider one core idea arising.

The OECD Conference on the Future of International Development Co-operation convened in Paris on 11-12 May 2026. Andy Sumner and Stephan Klingebiel consider one core idea arising.

The OECD Conference on the Future of International Development Co-operation convened in Paris on 11-12 May 2026. Andy Sumner and Stephan Klingebiel consider one core idea arising.

This study examines the synergistic effects of digital and green economies on sustainable development in 35 Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries over the period 2010–2021. Using a two-step System GMM estimator, we analyze the interaction among digital technology index (DT), green total factor productivity (GP), and adjusted net savings (ANS) as a percentage of GNI. The baseline results reveal a negative association between DT and ANS at low levels of green productivity. However, this penalty is mitigated as green productivity rises indicating a synergistic effect. Robustness checks across income levels, regions, and infrastructure types uncover heterogeneities. Specifically, the marginal penalty associated with fixed broadband subscription improves by 0.41% point as economies move from the 25th to the 50th percentile of green productivity, and by a larger 0.828% points when moving from the 25th to the 75th percentile. While basic mobile connectivity remains sustainability-neutral, high-capacity fixed broadband requires environmental efficiency to avoid eroding national savings. Furthermore, digitalization attenuates the negative relationship between natural resource rents and ANS. These findings underscore that achieving sustainable development in SSA requires synchronized policy strategies rather than isolated investments in technology or green initiatives.

This study examines the synergistic effects of digital and green economies on sustainable development in 35 Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries over the period 2010–2021. Using a two-step System GMM estimator, we analyze the interaction among digital technology index (DT), green total factor productivity (GP), and adjusted net savings (ANS) as a percentage of GNI. The baseline results reveal a negative association between DT and ANS at low levels of green productivity. However, this penalty is mitigated as green productivity rises indicating a synergistic effect. Robustness checks across income levels, regions, and infrastructure types uncover heterogeneities. Specifically, the marginal penalty associated with fixed broadband subscription improves by 0.41% point as economies move from the 25th to the 50th percentile of green productivity, and by a larger 0.828% points when moving from the 25th to the 75th percentile. While basic mobile connectivity remains sustainability-neutral, high-capacity fixed broadband requires environmental efficiency to avoid eroding national savings. Furthermore, digitalization attenuates the negative relationship between natural resource rents and ANS. These findings underscore that achieving sustainable development in SSA requires synchronized policy strategies rather than isolated investments in technology or green initiatives.

This study examines the synergistic effects of digital and green economies on sustainable development in 35 Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries over the period 2010–2021. Using a two-step System GMM estimator, we analyze the interaction among digital technology index (DT), green total factor productivity (GP), and adjusted net savings (ANS) as a percentage of GNI. The baseline results reveal a negative association between DT and ANS at low levels of green productivity. However, this penalty is mitigated as green productivity rises indicating a synergistic effect. Robustness checks across income levels, regions, and infrastructure types uncover heterogeneities. Specifically, the marginal penalty associated with fixed broadband subscription improves by 0.41% point as economies move from the 25th to the 50th percentile of green productivity, and by a larger 0.828% points when moving from the 25th to the 75th percentile. While basic mobile connectivity remains sustainability-neutral, high-capacity fixed broadband requires environmental efficiency to avoid eroding national savings. Furthermore, digitalization attenuates the negative relationship between natural resource rents and ANS. These findings underscore that achieving sustainable development in SSA requires synchronized policy strategies rather than isolated investments in technology or green initiatives.

Heute sprechen Alexander Roth und Wolf-Peter Schill mit Dr. Anna Billerbeck und Alexander Burkhardt vom Fraunhofer ISI über Fernwärme und Wärmespeicher. Wie wichtig ist der Wärmesektor für die Energiewende und warum geht es dort langsamer vor als beim Strom? Was ist eigentlich Fernwärme, wie hat sie ...

• Financial markets still provide financing on a large scale for investments in environmentally harmful activities, while projects conducive to the green transformation are often not funded. 
• Sustainable finance policies, such as new reporting requirements and standards for sus¬tain¬able financial instruments, have so far mostly focused on creating transparency. However, transparency alone is insufficient to turn the financial sector from a driver of en¬viron¬mental crises into a lever for the green transformation.
• Many countries of the Global South face special challenges, including high interest rates, currency depreciation and limited oppor¬¬tu¬nities to shape global policies (e.g. banking regulations and standards for sus-tainable finan¬cial instruments) in their interests.
• Aligning financial markets with sustainability objectives requires a comprehensive policy mix comprising policies that change incen-tives. These policies can include credit guidance instruments such as credit targets, green refinancing schemes and differentiated capital requirements, and tax policies such as differentiated capital gains taxes for green and non-green assets.
• International forums, such as the Network for Greening the Financial System (NGFS) and 
the Sustainable Banking and Finance Network (SBFN), remain valuable for mutual learning and for addressing cross-border effects of finan¬cial regulations.
• Policies to mobilise private resources should not be considered as a substitute for public investments or public steering, which are both crucial for the green transformation.

• Financial markets still provide financing on a large scale for investments in environmentally harmful activities, while projects conducive to the green transformation are often not funded. 
• Sustainable finance policies, such as new reporting requirements and standards for sus¬tain¬able financial instruments, have so far mostly focused on creating transparency. However, transparency alone is insufficient to turn the financial sector from a driver of en¬viron¬mental crises into a lever for the green transformation.
• Many countries of the Global South face special challenges, including high interest rates, currency depreciation and limited oppor¬¬tu¬nities to shape global policies (e.g. banking regulations and standards for sus-tainable finan¬cial instruments) in their interests.
• Aligning financial markets with sustainability objectives requires a comprehensive policy mix comprising policies that change incen-tives. These policies can include credit guidance instruments such as credit targets, green refinancing schemes and differentiated capital requirements, and tax policies such as differentiated capital gains taxes for green and non-green assets.
• International forums, such as the Network for Greening the Financial System (NGFS) and 
the Sustainable Banking and Finance Network (SBFN), remain valuable for mutual learning and for addressing cross-border effects of finan¬cial regulations.
• Policies to mobilise private resources should not be considered as a substitute for public investments or public steering, which are both crucial for the green transformation.

• Financial markets still provide financing on a large scale for investments in environmentally harmful activities, while projects conducive to the green transformation are often not funded. 
• Sustainable finance policies, such as new reporting requirements and standards for sus¬tain¬able financial instruments, have so far mostly focused on creating transparency. However, transparency alone is insufficient to turn the financial sector from a driver of en¬viron¬mental crises into a lever for the green transformation.
• Many countries of the Global South face special challenges, including high interest rates, currency depreciation and limited oppor¬¬tu¬nities to shape global policies (e.g. banking regulations and standards for sus-tainable finan¬cial instruments) in their interests.
• Aligning financial markets with sustainability objectives requires a comprehensive policy mix comprising policies that change incen-tives. These policies can include credit guidance instruments such as credit targets, green refinancing schemes and differentiated capital requirements, and tax policies such as differentiated capital gains taxes for green and non-green assets.
• International forums, such as the Network for Greening the Financial System (NGFS) and 
the Sustainable Banking and Finance Network (SBFN), remain valuable for mutual learning and for addressing cross-border effects of finan¬cial regulations.
• Policies to mobilise private resources should not be considered as a substitute for public investments or public steering, which are both crucial for the green transformation.

Heiner Janus and Michael Roll argue that the largest aid contraction on record coincides with a reopened decades-old fault line: what “development” means, who it serves — and how the field can reinvent itself for what comes next.

Heiner Janus and Michael Roll argue that the largest aid contraction on record coincides with a reopened decades-old fault line: what “development” means, who it serves — and how the field can reinvent itself for what comes next.

Heiner Janus and Michael Roll argue that the largest aid contraction on record coincides with a reopened decades-old fault line: what “development” means, who it serves — and how the field can reinvent itself for what comes next.

Le gouvernement moldave envisage de remplacer le rouble transnistrien, en vigueur dans la région séparatiste de la rive gauche du Dniestr depuis 1994, par le leu moldave. Côté, Transnistrie, le Président dément tout changement de monnaie.

- Articles / Radio Free Europe, Transnistrie, Moldavie Russie UE, Moldavie, Economie, Relations internationales

We replied to citizens who took the time to write to the Parliament (in English, Italian, French and Spanish):

English

The responsibility to provide consular protection to citizens lies with the national authorities of individual countries.

EU statements on Global Sumud Flotilla

The European Parliament may express political views but does not define the foreign policy of the European Union (EU). This is set by the EU countries and implemented by the EU diplomatic service led by Kaja Kallas, Vice-President of the European Commission and High Representative for Foreign Affairs.

During its press briefing of 30 April 2026, the Commission stated that the ‘freedom of navigation under international law must be upheld’ and urged Israel to respect international law, including international humanitarian law and international maritime law.

Regarding the previous Global Sumud Flotilla mission, Kaja Kallas said that the EU respects the intention of those on board of the flotilla ships to draw attention to the humanitarian plight of the population of Gaza. She added that attacks against such flotillas are not acceptable and constitute a grave breach of humanitarian law.

Parliament position on the humanitarian situation in Gaza

The European Parliament has held numerous debates and adopted several resolutions on Gaza, voicing grave concerns about the persistent obstacles to humanitarian access.

In a January 2026 resolution, Parliament emphasises the obligation of all parties to comply with international law and relevant UN resolutions, including those pertaining to the protection of civilians, humanitarian personnel and journalists.

In a September 2025 resolution, Parliament strongly condemns the Israeli government’s obstruction of humanitarian aid. It calls for all relevant border crossings to be opened to ensure access to and sustained distribution of humanitarian aid.

Share your views

If you wish, you can share your views with any Member of the European Parliament, in particular with Members of the Delegation for relations with Palestine and the Delegation for relations with Israel. By clicking on a Member’s name, you can access their full profile and contact details.

You may also wish to share your views with the EU Delegation to Israel, whose mission is similar to that of an embassy.

Italian

La responsabilità di fornire protezione consolare ai cittadini spetta alle autorità nazionali dei singoli paesi

Dichiarazioni dell’UE sulla Global Sumud Flotilla

Il Parlamento europeo può esprimere opinioni politiche ma non definisce la politica estera dell’Unione Europea (UE). Essa è definita dai paesi dell’UE e attuata dal Servizio diplomatico dell’UE guidato da Kaja Kallas, Vicepresidente della Commissione europea e Alto rappresentante per gli Affari esteri.

Durante la sua conferenza stampa del 30 aprile 2026, la Commissione ha dichiarato che “la libertà di navigazione ai sensi del diritto internazionale deve essere garantita” e ha esortato Israele a rispettare il diritto internazionale, compreso il diritto umanitario internazionale e il diritto marittimo internazionale.

Per quanto riguarda la precedente missione della Global Sumud Flotilla, Kaja Kallas ha dichiarato che l’UE rispetta l’intenzione di quanti a bordo delle navi della flottiglia intendono attirare l’attenzione sulla difficile situazione umanitaria della popolazione di Gaza. Ha aggiunto che gli attacchi contro le flottiglie non sono accettabili e costituiscono una grave violazione del diritto umanitario.

Posizione del Parlamento sulla situazione umanitaria a Gaza

Il Parlamento europeo ha tenuto numerosi dibattiti e approvato diverse risoluzioni su Gaza, esprimendo seria preoccupazione per i persistenti ostacoli all’accesso umanitario.

In una risoluzione del gennaio 2026, il Parlamento pone in evidenza l’obbligo di tutte le parti di rispettare il diritto internazionale e le pertinenti risoluzioni delle Nazioni Unite, comprese quelle relative alla protezione dei civili, del personale umanitario e dei giornalisti.

In una risoluzione del settembre 2025, il Parlamento condanna fermamente il blocco degli aiuti umanitari a Gaza da parte del governo israeliano.  Chiede l’apertura di tutti i pertinenti valichi di frontiera per garantire l’accesso e la distribuzione continua degli aiuti umanitari

Condivida le Sue opinioni

Se lo desidera, può condividere le Sue opinioni con i deputati al Parlamento europeo, in particolare con i deputati della Delegazione per le relazioni con la Palestina e della Delegazione per le relazioni con Israele. Cliccando sul nome di un deputato, può accedere al profilo completo e alle coordinate di contatto.

Potrebbe anche voler condividere le Sue opinioni con la Delegazione dell’UE in Israele, la cui missione è simile a quella di un’ambasciata.

French

La responsabilité d’assurer la protection consulaire des citoyens incombe aux autorités nationales de chaque pays.

Déclarations de l’Union européenne sur la flottille Global Sumud

Le Parlement européen peut exprimer des positions politiques, mais il ne définit pas la politique étrangère de l’Union européenne (UE). Celle-ci est déterminée par les pays membres de l’UE et mise en œuvre par le service diplomatique de l’UE dirigé par Kaja Kallas, vice-présidente de la Commission européenne et haute représentante pour les affaires étrangères.

Lors de son point de presse du 30 avril 2026, la Commission a déclaré que « la liberté de navigation en vertu du droit international doit être respectée » et a exhorté Israël à respecter le droit international, y compris le droit international humanitaire et le droit maritime international.

Concernant la précédente mission de la flottille Global Sumud, Kaja Kallas a déclaré que l’UE respecte la volonté des passagers de ces flottilles d’attirer l’attention sur la détresse humanitaire de la population de Gaza. Elle a ajouté que les attaques visant ces navires ne sont pas acceptables et constituent une violation grave du droit humanitaire.

Position du Parlement sur la situation humanitaire à Gaza

Le Parlement européen a tenu de nombreux débats et adopté plusieurs résolutions sur Gaza, exprimant de vives préoccupations face aux obstacles persistants à l’accès humanitaire.

Dans une résolution de janvier 2026, le Parlement souligne l’obligation pour toutes les parties de respecter le droit international et les résolutions pertinentes des Nations unies, y compris celles relatives à la protection des civils, du personnel humanitaire et des journalistes.

Dans une résolution de septembre 2025, le Parlement condamne fermement l’entrave à l’aide humanitaire par le gouvernement israélien. Il appelle à l’ouverture de tous les points de passage concernés afin de garantir l’accès et la distribution continue de l’aide humanitaire.

Partagez votre point de vue

Si vous le souhaitez, vous pouvez faire part de votre point de vue à tout député au Parlement européen, en particulier aux membres de la délégation pour les relations avec la Palestine et de la délégation pour les relations avec Israël. En cliquant sur le nom d’un député, vous accéderez à son profil complet ainsi qu’à ses coordonnées. Vous pouvez également adresser votre message à la délégation de l’UE en Israël, dont la mission est comparable à celle d’une ambassade.

Spanish

La responsabilidad de prestar protección consular a los ciudadanos y ciudadanas recae en las autoridades nacionales de cada país.

Declaraciones de la UE sobre la Flotilla Global Sumud

El Parlamento Europeo puede adoptar posiciones políticas sobre lo que ocurre en el mundo, pero no determina la política exterior de la Unión Europea (UE). Esta política la definen los países de la UE y la lleva adelante el servicio diplomático de la UE, dirigido por Kaja Kallas, vicepresidenta de la Comisión Europea y alta representante para Asuntos Exteriores.

En su sesión informativa para la prensa de 30 de abril de 2026 (página web en inglés), la Comisión declaró que la libertad de navegación consagrada en el derecho internacional debe ser respetada e instó a Israel a cumplir el derecho internacional, incluido el derecho humanitario internacional y el derecho marítimo internacional.

En relación con la anterior misión de la Flotilla Global Sumud, Kaja Kallas declaró que la UE respeta la intención de las personas a bordo de las flotillas de llamar la atención sobre la difícil situación humanitaria de la población de Gaza. Añadió que los ataques contra estas flotillas son inadmisibles y constituyen una grave violación del derecho humanitario.

Posición del Parlamento sobre la situación humanitaria en Gaza

El Parlamento Europeo ha celebrado numerosos debates y ha aprobado varias resoluciones sobre Gaza. De forma reiterada ha mostrado su grave preocupación por los persistentes obstáculos a la llegada de ayuda humanitaria.

En una resolución de enero de 2026, el Parlamento destacó la obligación de todas las partes de cumplir el derecho internacional y las resoluciones de las Naciones Unidas, incluidas las relativas a la protección de la población civil, el personal humanitario y los periodistas.

En una resolución de septiembre de 2025, el Parlamento condenaba enérgicamente la obstrucción de la ayuda humanitaria a Gaza por parte del Gobierno israelí. Pedía la apertura de todos los pasos fronterizos pertinentes para garantizar la llegada y la distribución de la ayuda humanitaria.

A quién dirigirse

Si lo desea, puede compartir sus puntos de vista con los diputados y diputadas del Parlamento Europeo, en particular con los miembros de las delegaciones para las relaciones con Palestina e Israel.

También puede ponerse en contacto con la Delegación de la UE en Israel (página web en inglés), cuyas funciones son similares a las de una embajada.

Background

Citizens often send messages to the President of the European Parliament or to the institution as such expressing their views and/or requesting action. The Citizens’ Enquiries Unit (AskEP) within the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) replies to these messages, which may sometimes be identical as part of wider public campaigns.

Le refus d'Aleksandar Vučić de participer aux célébrations du 20e anniversaire de l'indépendance du Monténégro a provoqué une vive polémique entre Podgorica et Belgrade. Les déclarations du président serbe, qualifiant l'indépendance monténégrine de « sécession », ont relancé les débats sur les relations entre les deux États.

- Articles / Courrier des Balkans, Indépendance du Monténégro 2006, Monténégro, Serbie, Relations régionales

Nach Jahren beim Hersteller Head wechselt Justin Murisier seinen Ski-Hersteller. Der Walliser wandelt damit auf den Spuren des legendären Pirmin Zurbriggen.

In einem Mehrfamilienhaus an der Heiligkreuzstrasse in St. Gallen brach am frühen Dienstagmorgen ein Brand aus. Eine Person wurde schwer verletzt ins Spital gebracht. Feuerwehr und Polizei sind weiterhin im Einsatz. Die Brandursache ist unklar.