European Parliamentary Research Service Blog

Written by Marcin Grajewski.

Russia’s war on Ukraine and its entire population has generated a historic outflow of people, largely women and children, fleeing the hostilities. About five million refugees from Ukraine have been recorded across the EU and other countries, triggering a refugee and humanitarian crisis at a scale unseen in Europe since World War II. A recent study by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development suggests that EU policies focus on giving refugees quick access to support for integration and further building their skills without hampering a possible return to Ukraine once the situation allows.

The EU is debating an overhaul of its migration rules to make them fairer for Member States that receive high number of migrants due to their geographical location. The number of refugees using the Mediterranean and Western Balkan routes to seek to enter the EU has also been on the rise.

This note gathers links to the recent publications and commentaries from many international think tanks on migration in Europe and on debates on how to reform its rules.

Population displacements in the Ukraine War: The challenge of first humanitarian assistance
Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Studies, December 2022

La mobilisation citoyenne et l’hébergement des personnes exilées: Vers un nouveau modèle d’accueil?
Institut français des relations internationales, December 2022

Russia hopes a winter wave of Ukrainian refugees will divide Europe
Atlantic Council, November 2022

Is migration Europe’s Achilles heel?
Carnegie Europe, November 2022

Anti-migration cooperation between Vienna, Budapest and Belgrade
Centre for Eastern Studies, November 2022

Europe’s migration problems are back
Centre for European Reform, November 2022

Gender, displacement, and climate change
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, November 2022

Protecting Eden, or the dark new geopolitics of ‘Fortress Europe’
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, November 2022

Re-thinking approaches to labour migration: Potentials and gaps in four EU member states’ migration infrastructures
European Centre for Development Policy Management, November 2022

Disinformation on refugees from Ukraine: Boosting Europe’s resilience after Russia’s invasion
European Policy Centre, November 2022

Automating decision-making in migration policy: A navigation guide
German Marshall Fund, November 2022

Conditioning or cutting aid is not effective against irregular migration
German Marshall Fund, November 2022

Financing responses to climate migration: The unique role of multilateral development banks
Migration Policy Institute, November 2022

Reassessing recruitment costs in a changing world of labor migration
Migration Policy Institute, November 2022

Migration Update November 2022
Wilfried Martens Centre, November 2022

Central Europe facing a new wave of migration from the Balkans
Centre for Eastern Studies, October 2022

Enabling migration as adaptation
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, October 2022

Attracting and retaining talents in the EU: What role can the EU play in ensuring a sustainable and competitive ecosystem for labour migration?
Egmont, October 2022

Keeping a cool head: How to improve the EU migration crisis response
European Policy Centre, October 2022

Refugee protection in the EU: Building resilience to geopolitical conflict
European Policy Centre, October 2022

More connected, less protected? How the EU interoperability framework will affect the European migration space
German Marshall Fund, October 2022

Promoting evidence-informed immigrant integration policymaking
Migration Policy Institute, October 2022

Rebooting the asylum system? The role of digital tools in international protection
Migration Policy Institute, October 2022

Spain’s decentralized immigration system allows local integration policies to lead the way
Migration Policy Institute, October 2022

Amidst refugee flows, irregular migration, and authoritarianism: The politics of citizenship in Turkey
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, October 2022

The economic impact of a more efficient US-Mexico border: How reducing wait times at land ports of entry would promote commerce, resilience, and job creation
Atlantic Council, September 2022

The ‘instrumentalisation’ of migration
Barcelona Centre for International Affairs, September 2022

Long-term protection in Europe needed for Ukrainian refugees
Clingendael, September 2022

Italy’s far-right and the migration debate: Implications for Europe
Istituto Affari Internazionali, September 2022

Ukrainian refugees at the border: The first experience of communication
Razumkov Centre, September 2022

Migration restrictions in the West: Some ethical concerns
Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Studies, August 2022

Explaining immigration restrictions using a sequential path dependency model
Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Studies, August 2022

Developments along the route: The role of transit countries in shaping mixed-migration flows to Europe
Centre for European Policy Studies, July 2022

How EU asylum policy created a refugee prison in paradise
Chatham House, July 2022

Atypical work and the social protection of migrants in Europe
Foundation for European Progressive Studies, July 2022

The missing link: Connecting eligible asylees and asylum seekers with benefits and services
Migration Policy Institute, July 2022

Neue Entwicklungen in der Governance globaler Migration: Nachlese zum ersten International Migration Review Forum
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, July 2023

Read this briefing on ‘Latest on migration‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Suzanna Anghel and Ralf Drachenberg.

The last regular European Council meeting of 2022 is scheduled to take place on 15 December, and to deal with the main topics of this year: Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, security and defence, energy and the economy. On Russia’s war on Ukraine, EU leaders are likely to reiterate their commitment to political and military support to Ukraine. Energy and the economy are purposely due to be dealt with together, to contain the discussion and to avoid a debate on setting up additional EU funding mechanisms. Moreover, EU leaders are set to hold a strategic discussion on relations with the Southern Neighbourhood, and review the outcome of the recent Western Balkans Summit. Both points are likely to include numerous migration related aspects, as the numbers of illegal border crossings into the European Union have again been rising significantly in the second half of 2022. Additionally, EU leaders will address transatlantic relations in light of rising concerns regarding the new United States Inflation Reduction Act (IRA),

The anticipated possible addition of the rule of law conditionality mechanism to the official agenda seems to have been avoided at the last moment, with a deal struck between the Member States on 12 December. The government of Viktor Orbán agreed to unblock the various files it has been blocking in the Council, in particular the adoption of €18 billion in EU aid for Ukraine, in the context of changes agreed to the Commission’s proposal to freeze the EU funds to Hungary.  

1. European Council agenda

According to the Leaders’ Agenda 2022, the European Council meeting was scheduled to last two days (15‑16 December), with a Euro Summit following on the second day. However, the European Council is, in the end, scheduled to last only one day and, for the second time in 2022, the Euro Summit meeting has been cancelled. The Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union (TSCG, or Fiscal Compact Treaty) stipulates that the Heads of State or Government of the euro area must meet informally at least twice a year, and requires the Euro Summit President to present a report to the European Parliament after each meeting. Neither of these requirements has however been fulfilled on a regular basis in recent years, as shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1. Number of Euro Summit meetings and subsequent reports to Parliament

As this meeting represents the last entry in the soon-to-expire Leaders’ Agenda 2022, the European Council President, Charles Michel, may possibly present a new document covering European Council meetings and topics for (part of) 2023.

2. European Council meeting Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine

EU leaders are set to discuss the situation in Ukraine for the eighth time since the outbreak of the war in February 2022. They will likely again express their support for Ukraine’s sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity within the internationally recognised borders and condemn the war. The EU’s political, humanitarian and military aid to Ukraine will again be at the centre of the debate. As unity remains key, EU leaders are likely to reiterate their commitment to political as well as military support to Ukraine. It has also become a tradition that the President of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, addresses EU leaders by videoconference when Ukraine is on the agenda.

Since the outbreak of the war, the EU has provided €523 million in humanitarian aid for Ukraine and neighbouring Moldova; an additional €443 million was provided as in-kind assistance through the EU Civil Protection Mechanism, enabling a response to the growing needs for access to basic services and utilities, medical needs and food supplies. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 4.8 million refugees from Ukraine are now in the EU, whilst 6.5 million people are believed to be internally displaced inside Ukraine. In addition to humanitarian aid, the EU has pledged €9 billion in macro-financial assistance to Ukraine in 2022. For 2023, however, the European Commission has proposed a more sustainable and predictable financial support solution entailing the disbursement of €18 billion in monthly tranches of €1.5 billion aimed at helping Ukraine ‘maintain essential public services’. On 10 December, agreement was reached in Council on a structural solution to provide this short-term relief, which has been submitted to the European Parliament for a vote this week.

With respect to military support, the EU has pledged €3.1 billion in military assistance through its off-EU budget European Peace Facility (EPF), funded by Member States .The pledged amount exceeds half of the entire EPF envelope (€5.7 billion by 2027). On 12 December 2022, the Foreign Affairs Council agreed politically to increase the EPF envelope by €2 billion (2018 prices), confirming the possibility of ‘a further increase at a later stage’; a decision EU leaders will most probably endorse during the European Council meeting.

Member States individually, and in consultation with allies in NATO and around the world, will also likely continue to offer bilateral military assistance to Ukraine in the form of funding and equipment. The most pressing issue remains to further reinforce Ukraine’s air-defence capacities, which have recently been strengthened with IRIS T, NASAMS and Aspide air defence systems. Another, rapidly growing, challenge is demining. This might prove a medium to long-term challenge, which will have an impact on return and reconstruction as well as on food security in Ukraine and elsewhere.

Food security has been a constant subject of concern on the European Council’s agenda since the outbreak of the war. EU leaders are likely to revert to the topic and again highlight the importance of the UN Black Sea Grain Initiative and of the EU solidarity lanes, which enable exports of agricultural products and fertilisers to countries most in need.

EU leaders have consistently condemned Russia’s continuous attacks against Ukrainian civilians and infrastructure, including the multiplication of attacks on the country’s energy infrastructure. Russia is using energy as a weapon against the most vulnerable; EU leaders are therefore likely to reaffirm the Union’s determination to support Ukraine in its resilience-building efforts, including the rebuilding of damaged energy infrastructure. The EU has already pledged €25.5 million ‘to cover the immediate needs of the energy sector’. The safety of the civilian nuclear facilities in Ukraine is a matter of continuous concern to the international community, and EU leaders are likely to reiterate their call on Russia to refrain from endangering their functioning.

EU leaders are scheduled to return to the discussion of accountability for war crimes as well as Ukraine’s reconstruction, two topics they last addressed in October 2022, when they invited the European Commission to present possible options for a way ahead. On 30 November 2022, the European Commission presented different options ‘to make sure that Russia is held accountable for the atrocities and crimes committed during the war in Ukraine’.

As regards war crimes accountability, the proposals include the creation of ‘a special independent international tribunal’ or of a ‘specialised court’, each requiring United Nations support. Commission President Ursula von der Leyen stressed that ‘Russia must pay for its horrific crimes, including for its crime of aggression against a sovereign state’, and that the EU is working to secure the broadest international support for the creation of a ‘specialised court’.

With respect to Ukraine’s reconstruction, the proposals include the creation of a dedicated structure ‘to manage the frozen (Russian) public funds, invest them and use the proceeds in favour of Ukraine’. As part of a peace settlement once the war has ended, such frozen Russian assets could be regarded as war reparations to Ukraine. In this context, she mentioned that material war damage is estimated at €600 billion, whilst the EU and its G7 partners have frozen €300 billion of Russian Central Bank assets, and EU Member States have also frozen €19 billion of assets belonging to Russian oligarchs. In a recent resolution, the European Parliament recognised Russia to be ‘a state sponsor of terrorism’ and called for full accountability for war crimes committed in the context of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine.

Eight new packages of sanctions have been put in place progressively since the start of the war, whilst an additional package targeting Russia’s drone sector is under discussion. EU leaders might explore ways to further increase pressure on Russia, including by reaffirming the importance of implementing sanctions jointly with like-minded partners. They could also welcome the recent agreement on an international oil price cap, set at US$60 per barrel on Russian seaborne crude oil.

Energy and economy

As in October 2022, energy is likely to be central to the debate. EU leaders will probably assess progress made in implementing their previous conclusions, which centred on: 1) energy demand reduction; 2) security of supply; and 3) lower prices. They could also start preparing for next year, focusing on joint purchasing, replenishing winter stocks, infrastructure building and support for renewables, as well as on the phasing-out Russian energy from the EU energy mix.

Security of supply as well as the European Commission’s proposal for a regulation on a temporary gas market correction mechanism – ‘to protect EU businesses and households from episodes of excessively high gas prices in the EU’ – are scheduled for discussion at ministerial level prior to the European Council. If no agreement is reached in the Council, the correction mechanism could come to the heart of the debate. Reform of the electricity market is another sensitive item, regularly debated in the past year, for which the Commission will present an impact assessment. A reformed electricity market would only serve a sovereign and climate neutral energy union.

The debate on the economy will likely once again be intertwined with that on energy, focusing on high energy prices. Considering the forecast contraction of the EU economy in the first half of 2023, EU leaders are likely to consider single market competitiveness, building economic resilience, particularly in the industrial domain, and enhanced coordination.

Security and defence

A year ago, the European Council President, Charles Michel, declared that ‘2022 will be the year of European defence’. The outbreak of the war in Ukraine has placed security and defence at the centre of the EU’s agenda, with the subject discussed by the European Council for the fourth time this year.

EU leaders are expected to reaffirm the Union’s commitment to strengthen defence cooperation as well as its capacity to act autonomously. They are likely to take stock of progress made in implementing the Versailles agenda and the Strategic Compass, a document setting out the vision for the Union, which the European Council endorsed in March 2022. EU leaders are likely to focus on EU-NATO cooperation, a point which has featured most frequently in their conclusions when discussing defence. They could also consider progress made in bolstering the joint procurement of capabilities, cyber-defence, the implementation of military mobility, the flagship PESCO project, and the further development of the EU’s crisis management capacity.

Several defence files, aimed at bolstering joint procurement, are likely to attract EU leaders’ attention. This is the case with the proposed European defence industry reinforcement through common procurement act, which is currently being considered in committee in Parliament, whilst the Council has recently agreed on its general approach on the proposal. It is also the case for the European defence investment programme, which the European Commission is still to present following a request from the European Council.

Southern Neighbourhood

EU leaders will discuss the Southern Neighbourhood, a topic last addressed in December 2021, when they called to accelerate work on the New Agenda for the Mediterranean. They could revert again to the subject in autumn 2023, as the forthcoming Spanish Presidency of the Council of the EU has indicated that the Southern Neighbourhood will be one of its presidency pillars.

External relations Transatlantic relations

The European Council may hold a strategic discussion on EU-US relations at a time when transatlantic unity is key. EU leaders could review the outcome of bilateral high-level contacts, such as the visit to the US by the President of France, Emmanuel Macron. They could also take stock of the outcome of the recent EU-US Trade and Technology Council, whilst considering the bilateral trade relationship amid rising concerns regarding the US Inflation Reduction Act. 

Western Balkans

EU leaders are expected to address the Western Balkans and could endorse the expected General Affairs Council conclusions on enlargement of 13 December 2022, notably the recommendation to grant Bosnia and Herzegovina candidate country status as proposed by the European Commission.

They could also consider the outcome of the recent EU-Western Balkans Summit in Tirana, which focused on the consequences of Russia’s war on Ukraine, on building resilience to foreign interference and on tackling terrorism, organised crime and migration, a phenomenon on the rise on the Western Balkans route in 2022. The Tirana Declaration, in many ways similar to the Brdo (2020), Zagreb (2020) and Sofia (2018) declarations, has reconfirmed the Western Balkans’ European perspective, called for the acceleration of the accession process, stressed the importance of good neighbourly relations and invited partners to align with the EU sanctions imposed on Russia.

Read this briefing on ‘Outlook for the European Council meeting of 15 December 2022‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Marin Mileusnic.

The Next Generation EU (NGEU) instrument and its centrepiece, the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF), are the largest-ever EU financing tools, created to mitigate the socio-economic fall-out of the pandemic. The facility is organised around six pillars representing policy areas of EU relevance that require strengthening in order to make the EU economies and societies robust and futureproof. The pillars define investment priorities and the scope of financing under the RRF. This briefing focuses on the ‘Policies for next generation’ pillar and in particular on the policy measures in education, training and skills, early childhood education and care that the Member States have laid out in their individual National Recovery and Resilience Plans (NRRPs).

These NRRPs are required to list reforms and investments the Member States commit to making in order to meet the RRF objectives. To receive RRF grants and loans, the Member States should have successfully completed the relevant milestones and targets that accompany the planned measures. That is, the facility is a performance-based instrument, as specified in the RRF Regulation. Even though it only plays a supporting role in education policy, the EU has made RRF funding available for actions in this policy area to address the structural shortcomings in the education sector – likely worsened by the COVID-19 crisis – across all Member States. Tackling these shortcomings efficiently can guarantee recovery and resilience, maintain alignment with the job market and ultimately safeguard the integrity of the single market.

The RRF is defined as a one-off instrument that would be discontinued after 2026, following the implementation of all the measures included in the NRRPs. While the main EU initiatives for education policy are defined in the long term and thus extend beyond the planned lifetime of the RRF, the facility is nevertheless capable of supporting large-scale investment and reforms with a medium- to long-term impact. The European Parliament welcomes the measures in the areas of education and training built into the NRRPs, and encourages the development of a European dimension in the Member States’ education policies.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Education policy in the National Recovery and Resilience Plans‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Common indicators for the ‘Policies for next generation’ pillar in 12 Member States NRRP components exclusively dedicated to education, skills and training (in million €, per EU country) Policies for next generation (expenditure as % of individual NRRP costs)

Written by Guillaume Ragonnaud (1st edition).

The Construction Products Regulation (Regulation (EU) No 305/2011, CPR) has applied fully since 1 July 2013. Its objective is to achieve the proper functioning of the internal market for construction products (such as sheets for waterproofing, thermal insulation foams, chimneys and wood-based panels produced for permanent incorporation in construction works), by means of harmonised rules for their marketing in the EU. The CPR, which provides a common technical language to assess the performance of construction products, enables Member States to define the legal requirements towards construction works. On 30 March 2022, the Commission put forward a proposal to revise the CPR; the proposal is part of a package with several other sectoral proposals aimed at making sustainable products the norm in the EU and boosting circular business models. The stated aims of the proposal are to improve the functioning of the internal market for construction products, address the implementation challenges that still exist at national level (particularly regarding market surveillance), simplify the legal framework and support the green and digital transition in the sector. In Parliament, the Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO) is responsible for the file; the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI) is associated (under Rule 57), with exclusive and shared competence. In particular, ENVI has exclusive competence regarding the new environmental obligations for manufacturers. The vote in IMCO is expected in March 2023.

Versions

• December 2022: Revision of the Construction Products Regulation (1st edition)

Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down harmonised conditions for the marketing of construction products, amending Regulation (EU) 2019/1020 and repealing Regulation (EU) 305/2011 Committee responsible:Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO)COM(2020) 144
30.3.2022Rapporteur:Christian Doleschal (EPP, Germany)2020/0094(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Maria Grapini (S&D, Romania)
Sandro Gozi (Renew, France)
Claude Gruffat (Greens/EFA, France)
Alessandra Basso (ID, Italy)
Carlo Fidanza (ECR, Italy)
Kateřina Konečná (The Left, Czechia)Ordinary legislative procedure (COD)
(Parliament and Council on equal footing
– formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Vote on draft report in committee

Written by Agnieszka Widuto, Jakub Przetacznik and Sidonia Mazur.

On 23 November 2022, the European Parliament partnered with Eurocities to launch the ‘Generators of Hope’ campaign in order to provide Ukraine with energy equipment for the winter. Russian attacks on civilian infrastructure temporarily left around 10 million Ukrainians without electricity, while temperatures have already dropped below zero. The campaign will facilitate city-to-city donations of power generators, transformers and other devices, sent with the logistical support of the EU Civil Protection Mechanism.

‘Generators of Hope’ initiative – How does it work?

The ‘Generators of Hope‘ campaign was launched on 23 November 2022 by Roberta Metsola, President of the European Parliament, and Dario Nardella, President of Eurocities and Mayor of Florence, a city twinned with the capital of Ukraine, Kyiv. Eurocities is a network of over 200 of the largest cities in 38 countries, with many of the organisation’s members already providing support to Ukraine. The campaign aims to facilitate city-to-city support in order to meet Ukraine’s energy needs in view of the targeted Russian attacks on civilian infrastructure. It calls on cities to donate energy equipment to Ukrainian cities, in order to keep essential services running and provide energy to ‘hospitals, schools, water supply facilities, relief centres, shelters, phone masts and more’, according to the campaign’s website. On 8 December 2022, the European Parliament announced a donation of a generator to Ukraine as part of the campaign.

Ukrainian authorities have provided a list of equipment needed to replace the damaged energy infrastructure. This includes ‘generators (from less than 10 kW to more than 300 kW), heating centres, transformers, autotransformers, current and voltage transformers, reactors, circuit breakers, disconnectors, surge arresters, batteries, as well as relay protection and emergency automatic products’. Generators and high-voltage electrical equipment, such as transformers, play an important role in providing back-up power supply in case of emergency and power outage.

Cities that wish to donate energy equipment can contact their national civil protection authorities, which will help arrange the logistical transport to one of the three hubs operating in Poland, Romania and Slovakia under the EU Civil Protection Mechanism. The equipment will then be transported to Ukraine, with the whole procedure expected to be completed within a few days. The 24/7 contact point is the Emergency Response Coordination Centre.

Situation in Ukraine

Russia’s war on Ukraine has now been going on for nine months and Ukrainian citizens have paid the highest price to defend the country’s independence. In recent months, the Ukrainian army has liberated significant areas of the country; in response, Russia has increased its attacks against civilian infrastructure. Around half of the country’s power capacity has been damaged and the network is constantly under repair; it is estimated that the attack on 16 November alone caused power shortages in 10 700 000 households, equal to half of the country. Russia continues to shell civilian infrastructure, including electricity grids, cutting people off from water, electricity and heating, health services and communication tools ahead of winter, during which daily temperatures may reach -20OC. Ukraine is opening over 4 000 points of invincibility that provide the civilian population with access to independent heating, energy for mobile devices and basic services in case of major disturbances caused by shelling.

The EU Commissioner for Crisis Management assessed back in mid-November that ‘the destruction of Ukraine’s energy infrastructure is reaching a critical point’, making the scaling up of ‘winterisation‘ assistance a main priority of EU humanitarian assistance. Several EU Member States are already preparing for a possible ‘new wave‘ of refugees.

Ukraine’s energy needs and interconnection with the EU grid

Around 53 % of households – especially in cities – are heated through district heating systems, with thermal energy being produced by combined heat and power plants (CHPs) and over 19 000 heat-only boilers (HOBs). In 2021, HOBs transported thermal energy by 1.9 million km of pipelines and distributed warmth to households through over 5 500 central heating points. They are also being targeted by Russian shelling, and require electricity to function. In 2021, 55 % of Ukraine’s energy was produced by its four nuclear power plants (NPP), while almost 24 % of its energy was produced by 12 thermal power plants. The biggest NPP in Europe – Zaporizhzhia (ZNPP), occupied since early March 2022 – used to account for around half of the Ukrainian NPPs’ production. The remaining NPPs together produce around the same amount of energy as ZNPP alone; all of them are being repeatedly switched off, due to Russian missile strikes. Ukraine’s urgent electricity grid synchronisation with the EU’s took place on 16 March 2022, thanks to which trade in electricity with Ukraine is possible and started at the end of June. Over the summer, it was Ukraine that exported its energy surplus to the EU.

Russian attacks on civilian infrastructure as a war crime

International humanitarian law (IHL) – many of the rules of which have been broken by Russia – and specifically the 1977 Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, explicitly prohibits attacks against objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, but does not explicitly mention electrical infrastructure. The commentary specifies that the definition of indispensable objects can depend on local climatic conditions. Moreover, the 1977 Additional Protocol II prohibits attacks or threats for which the primary purpose is to spread terror among the civilian population. Research by Human Rights Watch assesses that, by repeatedly targeting critical energy infrastructure, and knowing its impact on the civilian population, ‘Russia appears to be seeking unlawfully to create terror among civilians’ and make life ‘untenable for as many Ukrainian civilians as possible’. The two protocols have been ratified by Russia and 170 other countries (but not the US), and are therefore binding on Russia.

European Union aid to Ukraine

The EU and Western allies are supporting the country with in-kind, financial, diplomatic and military assistance. While Ukraine has received considerable support from the EU and European financial institutions since 2014, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, relaunched on 24 February 2022, has triggered two-fold and unprecedented mobilisation of EU and Member States’ funds for humanitarian action and military support. Support from ‘Team Europe’ has steadily increased, to €19.7 billion in financial, humanitarian, emergency and budget support, with a further €3.1 billion in military assistance via the European Peace Facility, supplemented by bilateral military assistance. For 2023, the Commission has proposed to provide Ukraine with macrofinancial assistance of €18 billion in highly concessional loans to support essential state functions and public services, maintain macro-financial stability and repair critical infrastructure.

EU Civil Protection Mechanism (EUCPM) for Generators of Hope

The logistics of the Generators of Hope initiative are expected to be financed through the EUCPM. The EUCPM facilitates cooperation between the EU, the EU Member States and eight other participating states in the field of civil protection to improve the emergency response to natural and man-made disasters. Based on lessons learnt from managing the coronavirus crisis, the EUCPM was strengthened in organisational and budgetary terms in 2021. The EUCPM has already been activated for Ukraine, becoming the EUCPM’s largest-ever operation. All 27 EU countries, plus Norway, Turkey, North Macedonia and Iceland, have offered medical supplies, shelter items, vehicles and energy equipment, including generators. The items are being delivered to Ukraine directly or through logistical hubs established in Poland, Romania and Slovakia. As of 16 November, almost 74 000 tonnes of aid had been delivered. In addition, the EU coordinates medical evacuations of Ukrainian patients to EU hospitals and supports Ukrainian refugees across Europe.

On 23 November, the European Parliament adopted a resolution which states that the destruction of civilian infrastructure, together with the deliberate attacks and atrocities against the civilian population ‘amount to acts of terror against the Ukrainian population and constitute war crimes’. Based on this, the Parliament recognises Russia as both a state sponsor of terrorism and a state which uses means of terrorism.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Generators of Hope: Delivering energy equipment to Ukraine for the winter ahead‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Clare Ferguson with Sophia Stone.

Members return to Strasbourg for the final plenary session of 2022, with much of the agenda still reflecting issues we flagged up back in January in our analysis of the ‘ten issues to watch‘ this year – the green and digital transitions, energy supply security, defence and human rights. A ‘This is Europe’ debate is planned with the Prime Minister of Slovenia, Robert Golob, on Tuesday. The outcome of the recent COP27 climate change conference will be debated on Monday afternoon. European Commission representatives will give statements on relations with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the European Union response to the United States Inflation Reduction Act, the Commission’s reports on the situation of journalists, and various human rights issues.

Supporting people’s basic rights and democratic values, both in the EU and the wider world, is one of Parliament’s top priorities. Parliament has awarded the Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought for outstanding achievements in defending human rights and fundamental freedoms since 1988. Laureates Nelson Mandela, Malala Yousafzai, Denis Mukwege and Nadia Murad subsequently won the Nobel Peace Prize. Having taken a courageous stand for freedom and democracy in the face of great hardship since the Russian invasion, the 2022 award goes to the brave people of Ukraine. President Roberta Metsola is due to present the Sakharov Prize in a ceremony in a formal plenary sitting on Wednesday.

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The war in Ukraine and its consequences are also having a considerable impact on the EU’s finances, with the multiannual financial framework (MFF) under extreme strain. The MFF was not designed to cope with emergencies with huge financial implications, such as COVID‑19 and Russia’s invasion of its neighbour. Members are therefore expected to debate a Committee on Budgets own-initiative report on Wednesday, calling for an urgent revision of the MFF to increase the EU budget and make it more flexible. The committee calls for the Commission to propose an upscaled 2021-2027 MFF to provide a resilient EU budget fit for new challenges – with a bigger and more flexible budget, fresh revenue streams, action on preserving the budget from fluctuations in debt repayment for the EU recovery instrument and greater scrutiny and transparency.

The consequences of Russia’s attack on Ukraine are also scheduled for debate on Tuesday, when Members are due to consider a Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE) report on the European Commission’s proposal to amend EU energy legislation under the REPowerEU plan. The ITRE committee implicitly endorses the higher renewable and energy efficiency targets proposed, and goes further, calling for a reduction in the delays in approving renewable energy installations. The vote on the file should set Parliament’s position for trilogue negotiations.

The war in Ukraine and the COVID‑19 pandemic have also affected international relations worldwide. One such area is relations with China, which are undoubtedly set to change, posing questions as to the EU’s priorities in trade, particularly in sensitive areas such as telecoms. Members are set to hear the Commission’s answers on the protection of strategic infrastructure from China’s influence during the question time session scheduled for Tuesday.

However, access to strategic infrastructure is not uniform for EU citizens themselves. Over 80 % of total EU territory is rural, supplying much of the EU’s natural resources in terms of biodiversity, agriculture and more. Those living in many rural EU areas face challenges ranging from finding employment to connecting to the internet. To remedy the situation, the European Commission has drawn up a long-term vision for the EU’s rural areas to encourage their resilience in the face of an ageing population, poor connectivity, and lack of opportunity. Parliament’s Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development (AGRI) has responded with an own-initiative report, due for debate in plenary on Monday. The report underlines the key role of rural areas in the EU, and the need for action to support the needs of their populations, underpinned by dedicated funding.

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Continued discrimination and a failure to ensure equal rights for persons with disabilities to participate in social and political life are compounded by a lack of suitable accommodation, among other things. On Monday, Parliament is scheduled to debate a Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) own-initiative report on progress towards implementing the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in the EU. While the report recognises the efforts made to meet the standards described in the Convention, the committee decries a number of serious failings, particularly the use of EU funding to construct institutions, despite an EU target to end the practice of placing persons with disabilities in care.

Finally, on Tuesday, Parliament is set to debate a Committee on Culture and Education (CULT) own-initiative report on the implementation of the new European agenda for culture and the EU strategy for international cultural relations. The first strategy sets social and economic objectives for EU cultural policy (for the post-pandemic recovery, employment) and touches on opportunities also identified in the second, for cooperation with non-EU countries on the role of cultural diversity and heritage in sustainable socio-economic development and driving peace. The CULT committee recommends, among other things, paying stricter attention to employment conditions for creative workers, easier access to funding for small entities, better synergies with programmes like Erasmus+, Horizon Europe and the New European Bauhaus initiative, and emphasises freedom of artistic expression as an indicator of respect for the rule of law. Looking to cultural relations outside the EU, the report regrets the lack of focus on sustainable development and warns against perceptions of cultural diplomacy as ‘Eurocentric’.

The full agenda is available here.

• 2022 Sakharov Prize laureate: The brave people of Ukraine
• A long-term vision for the EU’s rural areas
• Cultural policy in EU and external relations
• Upscaling the 2021‑2027 multiannual financial framework: A resilient EU budget fit for new challenges
• Towards equal rights for persons with disabilities
• REPowerEU: Amending energy legislation
• Question time: Protection of strategic infrastructure from China’s influence
• COP27 climate change conference: Outcomes
• Ten issues to watch in 2022

Written by Virginia Mahieu.

Quantum technologies could be a game-changer in the digital transformation of health care. By enabling much faster and more complex data analysis, they could open the door to the accelerated discovery and development of novel therapeutics, improved diagnostics and treatments, including for rare and complex diseases, genuinely personalised medicine, and better data-driven health policy planning. However, as is also the case in other sectors, quantum technologies come with risks, particularly to cybersecurity and data privacy, as well as economics, trade, and global competition. The EU legislators need to prepare the health technology assessment process for the possible changes that this developing technology could entail.

The advent of quantum computing (one aspect of the broader category of quantum technologies) has been on the horizon for some time. Where a classical computer uses binary code to store data, a quantum computer uses qubits. Conceptually, if a bit is like either end of a piece of string, a qubit could be anywhere on that piece of string. In practice, this could allow for drastically faster computing speeds, potentially cutting certain calculations that would take today’s fastest supercomputer 10 000 years to 200 seconds (though this specific claim is debated).

This extra computing power has a broad range of potential applications in all fields and across all of society, including in health care. However, as with many disruptive technologies it is important to consider possible unintended side effects of its deployment, so that long-term policy decisions can maximise on the opportunities that it brings and mitigate potential risks to human health and healthcare systems.

Potential impacts and developments

Quantum technologies allow the use of much more complex algorithms and simulations, allowing calculations to be performed in a fraction of the time needed by a classical computer, thus potentially rendering them accessible to healthcare practitioners and researchers in their day-to-day work. In parallel, the body of available health and medical data sources (such as electronic health records and clinical trial results) is growing, and is expected to be boosted by the implementation of the European health data space. These two factors in combination – more accessible high-power computing and more data to run it on – have the potential to revolutionise health care in the EU, to move from reactive to predictive treatment, reducing health costs and saving lives.

For instance, quantum-supported molecular modelling could improve researchers’ ability to find, develop, and administer new therapeutics, including for diseases that are currently untreatable. Already today, the European High Performance Computing Joint Undertaking (EuroHPC JU) is actively searching for treatments for COVID-19. A quantum computer could accelerate this process to the point that we could beat another pandemic before it even began. This boost in algorithmic processing power could also enable clinical trials to be done in silico (i.e. in a computer rather than a living being), whereby a digital twin of an organ or an entire body could be created to simulate and virtually study the effects of a treatment and its interaction with genetic, environmental, and lifestyle factors. This would have the dual benefit of reducing the need for animal and human research, while also streamlining and reducing costs in the clinical trials process. It would also mean that researchers could control variables more easily than with live patients, for example by accounting for whether patients use a treatment correctly and in the prescribed way (i.e. at the right time with the right dosage), and improving the certainty of how well new and existing medicines work.

Furthermore, quantum computing could boost researchers’ ability to sequence and analyse genetic information rapidly, giving better insight into the functions of the human genome and its interactions with the environment. Along the same vein, it could allow for better research and understanding of the complex interactions of microorganisms in the gut and body, which play a major role in many aspects of health and well-being. Quantum technologies, especially quantum imaging and quantum sensing could improve imaging diagnoses from, for example, MRI or PET scanners. Not only would it generally help make more powerful medical algorithmic decisions, quantum sensors could make highly precise biological measurements and take better resolution images than current methods. Quantum computing could also facilitate data-driven optimisation (and possibly reduction) of pricing of health insurance premiums, as well as improving detection of fraudulent insurance claims.

All of this information could go into patient care, to achieve truly personalised medicine, and could even be used to predict and prevent illnesses, ultimately reducing healthcare costs and improving quality of life as well as life expectancy. For example, imagine a patient presents to a neurologist with symptoms of Parkinson’s disease. By combining a digital model of the patient’s brain with their health records, genetic, cellular, and environmental information, a doctor could use a quantum molecular simulation to determine exactly which treatment to administer, at what dosage, what side effects the treatment might incur and how to reduce these. Indeed, a doctor could even estimate with high certainty whether a patient was likely to develop Parkinson’s disease in the first place and tailor preventative treatment for them.

Anticipatory policy-making

Supporting innovation in healthcare technologies is essential in the face of mounting global health challenges, such as an ageing population, a rise in non-communicable diseases, and health inequalities. The advances in health care facilitated by quantum computing outlined above will have a broad impact on society, which EU policy must anticipate to be able to reap its advantages fully. In addition, challenges may arise. For instance, the intellectual property of the technology may be proprietary (e.g. owned by Google or IBM), adding to the already-complex duality of healthcare as a public service provisioned by private corporations. Furthermore, healthcare cybersecurity and data protection – already important considerations in the digitalisation of health – will become all the more relevant due to concerns over the potential for the first quantum computers to break through existing classical computing security systems easily. Conversely, quantum cryptography could also help make data much more secure. This is particularly relevant given the sensitive nature of health data, especially that involving quantum-accelerated genetic sequencing. With the increasing use and availability of genetic data – considered sensitive personal data under the GDPR – genetic privacy could become a greater issue of concern, tied to the protection of fundamental rights.

Beyond direct patient care and research and innovation, there are also dimensions of external relations, health diplomacy, trade, and competition to be considered. The development of quantum computing is the current-day space race, and the EU must be at the forefront of this geostrategic competition to maintain its position in the global pharmaceutical market, and as a healthcare leader. If the EU lags behind, its strategic partners and rivals could gain significant advantages, and it would become more difficult for the EU to catch up. The Quantum Technologies Flagship, an initiative launched in 2018, is boosting research in the EU into all aspects of quantum technologies. Its main pillars include quantum computing, simulation, communication, and sensing, all of which have healthcare applications. In parallel, the EU is planning to build state-of-the-art ‘hybrid’ computers blending quantum and already-existing classical computing technologies by 2023, as part of the EuroHPC JU. By June 2019, all 27 EU Member States had signed the EuroQCI Declaration, agreeing to work together towards building a secure EU-wide quantum communications infrastructure. It will consist of an earth-based component linking strategic sites using existing fibre networks, as well as a space component to cover long distances. In conjunction with these initiatives, the implementation of the European health data space must be strategically prepared for the upcoming advances and changes that the EU’s investments in quantum technologies will bring.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘What if quantum technologies were to revolutionise healthcare?‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Listen to podcast ‘What if quantum technologies were to revolutionise healthcare?’ on YouTube.

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Written by Sofija Voronova.

International Anti-Corruption Day is marked every year on 9 December to raise awareness of the negative effects of corruption on all areas of life. While difficult to measure, corruption entails not only economic but also social and political costs. International and EU anti-corruption efforts have translated into a multi-layered policy and legal framework. The European Parliament recently called for strengthened EU anti-corruption rules.

Background Why an International Anti-Corruption Day?

On 31 October 2003, the United Nations (UN) General Assembly adopted the UN Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) and designated 9 December as International Anti-Corruption Day, to raise awareness of corruption and of the role of the convention in combating and preventing it. On the eve of the convention’s 20th anniversary, the 2022 edition of International Anti-Corruption Day, dubbed UNCAC at 20: Uniting the World Against Corruption, seeks to highlight the link between the absence of corruption and peace, security, and development.

The negative impact of corruption on sustainable development and human rights is widely recognised by the international community. According to the UN, corruption ‘undermines the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and has a negative impact on peace, stability, security, the rule of law, gender equality, the environment and human rights’. The importance of action against corruption is explicitly highlighted in SDG 16 (peace, justice and strong institutions), with its set targets for reducing bribery, strengthening institutions and ensuring public access to information. Preventing corruption is instrumental in the achievement of all the other goals.

Cost and prevalence of corruption

While corruption is difficult to measure, it is known to be costly, in economic but also in political and social terms. It hampers growth and the distribution of benefits across populations, by undermining trust in public institutions, weakening the state’s capacity to perform its core functions and hindering public and private investment. In 2016, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimated the yearly cost of bribery alone at about US$1.5 trillion to US$2 trillion (around 2 % of global gross domestic product – GDP). Regarding the European Union (EU), the 2016 European Parliamentary Research Service cost of non-Europe report found that corruption costs the EU economy between €179 billion and €990 billion per year, representing up to 6 % of EU GDP in terms of lost tax revenue and investment.

Moreover, corruption facilitates the infiltration of organised crime networks in all sectors of society, including politics and law enforcement. According to the latest Europol threat assessment, more than 80 % of criminal networks active in the EU use legal business structures for their criminal activities, and around 60 % engage in corruption. Europol underlines that corruption takes place at all levels of society, ranging from petty bribery to complex multi-million-euro corruption schemes. Not only does it hinder economic development, it also weakens state institutions and erodes the rule of law.

The 2021 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) from Transparency International (TI) reveals that not much progress has been made in reducing perceived corruption levels across the world, with the global average rate unchanged for 10 years in a row (43 out of 100 points, with 100 meaning perceived as the least corrupt). No country is exempt from corruption. According to TI, anti-corruption efforts have stalled in Europe too, although western Europe and the EU still register the best scores (with an average of 66 out of 100). Behind this image of the least corrupt region in the world, significant differences persist within the EU: while 6 EU countries are in the top 10, 5 score less than 50 out of 100 points). Another TI survey, the 2021 Global Corruption Barometer, dedicated to the EU, shows that 62 % of respondents consider government corruption to be a big problem in their country while 30 % pay a bribe or use a personal connection to access public services. The recent Eurobarometer surveys on perception of corruption by EU citizens and businesses show a similar picture: 68 % of citizens believe that corruption is still widespread in their country, especially in national public institutions, political parties and among politicians at various levels. A similar share of EU businesses (63 %) point to widespread corruption across all activity sectors surveyed (this view is shared by even higher proportions of businesses active in healthcare (68 %) and financial services (66 %)); and 70 % indicate that favouritism and corruption hamper business competition in their country.

Global response to corruption International framework

The very first international instrument was adopted in 1997 in the context of international trade. The OECD Anti-Bribery Convention (Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions) introduced a legally binding obligation to criminalise bribery, focusing on the ‘supply-side’ of bribery transactions. There are 44 parties to the convention (all OECD and 6 non-OECD countries). In 2021, the parties agreed on a new Anti-Bribery Recommendation, complementing the original convention, designed to reinforce prevention, detection and investigation of foreign bribery.

In 1999, the Council of Europe (CoE) adopted two other tools: the Civil Law Convention on Corruption and the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption. The Criminal Law Convention aims at the coordinated criminalisation of a large number of corrupt practices and better international cooperation in the prosecution of corruption offences. The Civil Law Convention was the first attempt to define common international rules in the field of civil law and corruption, providing effective remedies for persons having suffered damage as a result of acts of corruption, including the possibility of obtaining compensation.

The year 2003 saw the adoption of the above-mentioned UN Convention against Corruption, the only universal legally binding instrument addressing corruption in a comprehensive manner. It covers five main areas: preventive measures, criminalisation and law enforcement, international cooperation, asset recovery, and technical assistance and information exchange. The convention requires state parties to establish as criminal offences many different forms of corruption, such as bribery, trading in influence, abuse of functions, and various acts of corruption in the private sector. It contains an entire chapter dedicated to prevention and a specific chapter on asset recovery, as well as provisions on mutual legal assistance. At this point in time, 189 states across the world have joined the convention and committed to its obligations.

EU action

All EU Member States are party to the UNCAC and the CoE conventions, and are bound by corresponding standards. However, the EU has sought to coordinate and support Member States’ efforts within the limits of shared competence, provided by the EU Treaties, in the area of freedom, security and justice. As part of its anti-corruption policy, the EU has adopted several instruments, including legislation on corruption in the private sector, on public procurement rules (Directives 2014/23/EU, 2014/24/EU, and 2014/25/EU), on anti-money-laundering efforts and on whistleblower protection. Protection of the EU budget, including against corruption, is governed by the 2017 Directive on the fight against fraud to the Union’s financial interests (PIF Directive) and falls within the competence of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO), operating since 1 June 2021. The EU has also sought to address corruption outside its territory through its external action and international trade tools, such as trade agreements and human rights dialogues. The European Commission has recently announced a review of the EU’s anti-corruption legislative framework and an update of the EU sanctions toolbox to include corruption, as advocated by Parliament.

European Parliament position
The European Parliament has addressed corruption, both within the EU and in the context of external policies, in numerous resolutions and reports. Most recently, it has looked into systemic challenges to the rule of law and deficiencies in the fight against corruption across the EU, focusing for instance on measures to prevent corruption and the misuse of national and EU funds. Parliament has called repeatedly either for legislative amendments to extend the scope of the current EU global human rights sanctions regime to cover corruption, or for a new sanctions regime to address serious acts of corruption. In February 2022, Parliament adopted recommendations on corruption and human rights, calling for an EU global anti-corruption strategy, enhanced support for anti-corruption capacity-building, and a strengthened EU anti-corruption framework, including an anti-corruption directive establishing common minimum rules for criminal sanctions against corruption.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘International Anti-Corruption Day‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Ionel Zamfir.

For two decades, the EU has sought to modernise its preferential trade relationship with the sub-Saharan African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries and establish free trade areas with regional groupings under so-called economic partnership agreements (EPAs). The process of establishing the EPAs has been longer and more complicated than initially expected, encountering criticism and opposition from civil society and some governments in ACP countries, who have been worried about the potential negative impact. So far, the results are mixed, with nine agreements negotiated – covering more than half of the ACP countries – but not yet all implemented.

EPAs are free trade agreements that allow ACP countries to continue exporting their products to the EU duty free and quota free, while ensuring full compliance with World Trade Organization (WTO) rules. EU goods should also benefit gradually from full liberalisation, though with numerous exceptions related to goods ACP countries wish to protect from external competition, particularly agricultural products. In this respect, EPAs are development-oriented, asymmetric agreements providing important advantages and safeguards to ACP countries, to foster their sustainable economic development, regional integration and integration on world markets.

While their potential impact has given rise to both numerous fears and great expectations, assessments of EPAs that have already been implemented show very limited effects, possibly due to their long drawn-out and gradual implementation. The risk of fragmenting regional integration schemes, particularly in Africa, is mitigated by the slow pace of trade integration on the continent.

The European Parliament has closely monitored the EPA process from the beginning. In a resolution of June 2022 on the future of EU trade with Africa, the Parliament insisted on a careful assessment of their impact by the Commission, on strengthening their – currently limited – sustainable development provisions and introducing a sanctions mechanism for non-compliance, and on the need to ensure that they do not disrupt regional integration.

This briefing updates a previous publication from July 2018.

Read the complete briefing on ‘EU economic partnership agreements with ACP countries: Which way forward?‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Listen to policy podcast ‘EU economic partnership agreements with ACP countries: Which way forward?’ on YouTube.

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Written by Mar Negreiro (1st edition).

The volume of online child sexual abuse materials (CSAM) and frequency of grooming activities, increasingly targeting younger children, is rising sharply. On 11 May 2022, the European Commission adopted a proposal for mandatory legislation to combat what is an escalating problem. Reporting of suspected online child sexual abuse increased by 35 % in 2021 compared with 2020, representing a historical peak. Most of the activities detected were hosted in Europe.

The Commission proposal would require interpersonal communication services and others to search proactively for CSAM materials and grooming activities targeting children. However, this poses many concerns regarding privacy, security and law enforcement investigations. The proposal also provides for the establishment of a new EU centre to support implementation and supervision.

In Parliament, the file has been assigned to the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE).

Versions

• November 2022: Combating child sexual abuse online (1st edition)

Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down rules to prevent and combat child sexual abuse Committee responsible:Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE)COM(2020) 209
11.5.2022Rapporteur:Javier Zarzalejos (EPP, Spain)2020/0155(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Paul Tang (S&D, the Netherlands)
Hilde Vautmans (Renew, Belgium)
Patrick Breyer (Greens/EFA, Germany)
Annalisa Tardino (ID, Italy)
Vicenzo Sofo (ECR, Italy)
Cornelia Ernst (The Left, Germany)Ordinary legislative procedure (COD)
(Parliament and Council on equal footing
– formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Publication of draft report

Written by Ulrich Jochheim.

Founded in 1967, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is often compared with the EU. Both organisations brought together former adversaries and successfully resolved tensions through cooperation, helping to bring peace and prosperity to their regions. However, the EU and ASEAN operate in very different ways. ASEAN is a strictly intergovernmental organisation in which decisions are based on consensus. While this approach has made it difficult for south-east Asian countries to achieve the same level of integration as the EU, it has also enabled ASEAN to accommodate huge disparities among its 10 member states.

ASEAN’s impact has been uneven. The organisation is an effective platform for cooperation between its member states and the wider Indo-Pacific region, but its goal of promoting peaceful cooperation is undermined by growing geopolitical tensions, especially in the South China Sea and with regard to Myanmar. While there has been significant economic integration, the goal of an EU-style single market is still a long way off – something that partially explains why intra-regional trade remains relatively weak.

EU-ASEAN relations span more than four decades and have steadily deepened, building on common values as well as booming trade and investment. In 2020, the two sides upgraded to a strategic partnership. In the current environment of huge geopolitical challenges, both sides seem determined to take their bilateral cooperation to a higher level, as exemplified by the new plan of action (2023-2027), the first bilateral summit at leaders’ level and the ongoing and intensifying cooperation between the European Parliament and the ASEAN member states’ parliaments.

This briefing updates a previous one published in November 2021.

Read the complete briefing on ‘ASEAN: The EU’s strategic partner in Asia‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Liselotte Jensen.

The 27th Conference of the Parties (COP27) in Sharm el‑Sheikh ended, after a 39-hour prolongation, on the morning of 20 November 2022. The conference host Egypt declared this year’s conference the ‘Implementation COP’ – about ensuring countries turn objectives into action. The event’s main delivery was an agreement on a ‘loss and damage’ fund, with only limited progress on the implementation programme to cut emissions faster.

Outcomes of the conference

COP27 agreed on an overarching ‘cover decision’, the Sharm el-Sheikh Implementation Plan. It reuses language on 1.5°C and phasing down coal from last year’s Glasgow Climate Pact, but makes the first ever mentions of food security risks, climate tipping points and the need for financial system reform. The main COP27 delivery was the ‘loss and damage’ fund. Targeting vulnerable developing countries, the fund will respond to loss and damage, the adverse effects of climate change. A transitional committee is to make recommendations at COP28 next year on operationalising the fund, with an emphasis on finding new and innovative funding arrangements. COP27 also finalised a mitigation work programme focused on pooling ideas to accelerate action, with no binding elements. Calls to ensure a peak in emissions by 2025 and a phase-down of fossil fuels were not included in the final text.

The Koronivia Joint Work on Agriculture won a 4-year extension, with a debate surrounding food security and sustainable agriculture, but the final text includes no mention of the sustainable food systems advocated by non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Beyond the cover decision, countries launched a 12-month decarbonisation master plan under the Breakthrough Agenda. The United Nations (UN) launched the action plan to ensure early warning systems coverage for everyone, within 5 years, and the 2023-2027 work programme of the Technology Mechanism for technology transfer and deployment. The World Bank announced a financing facility to support the Global Shield against Climate Risks initiative for climate disaster impacts. The Global Environment Facility received pledges totalling US$105.6 million from six EU Member States, the Walloon region in Belgium and Switzerland, for climate adaptation in low-lying and low-income states. Home to 52 % of the world’s rainforests, Brazil, Indonesia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo launched an alliance to halt deforestation, seeking funds to protect forest carbon sinks.

European Parliament position and role

At its October II plenary session ahead of COP27, the European Parliament adopted a COP27 resolution. It stressed that countries need to raise their targets to align with the Paris Agreement’s 1.5°C target. Welcoming the Glasgow Dialogue on ‘loss and damage’, Parliament urged the EU to engage ahead of COP27 with discussions concerning a potential loss and damage facility. Parliament also called on the EU to increase the proportion of adaptation finance in the Global Europe Instrument, noting the need to prioritise grants over loans in all climate finance, and to align all types of financial flows to the 1.5°C target.

Reactions and next steps

Developing nations and NGOs welcomed the creation of a ‘loss and damage’ fund as a major advance, although questions remain as to who would contribute to the fund and who would benefit. The absence of new targets on mitigation caused disappointment, with the latest UN Environment Programme emissions gap report stressing that current mitigation efforts are insufficient to limit global warming to 2°C, let alone 1.5°C. In particular, the lack of commitment to phase out fossil fuels has caused frustration. Next year, at COP28, the first global stocktake of the Paris Agreement will conclude, offering an opportunity to assess collective progress on climate action and determine what still needs to be done to reach the targets.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘COP27 climate change conference: Outcomes‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Marcin Grajewski.

Several simultaneous crises have put renewed pressure on the European Union to revise decision-making procedures and economic policies. Russia’s war on Ukraine, growing protectionism worldwide, technological rivalry with China and the US, problems with the rule of law in some Member States, post-pandemic issues and migration woes pose many challenges on the political side. On the economic front, many economists and politicians are calling for fiscal reforms, energy system overhaul and new EU funds. Those funds would finance the EU’s transition towards a green economy, and boost the bloc’s ability to deal with external shocks, such as the current energy crisis.

Among topics discussed are increasing the scope of qualified majority voting by EU Member States in the Council, creating more coherent unions for energy and health, improving rules for sharing the costs of immigration, and modifying enlargement policies. In the economic area, discussions focus on overhauling fiscal rules for the euro area and the wider EU, issuing more EU debt, countering unfair competition from abroad, increasing cooperation in the energy sector, and new industrial policies to foster growth of innovative and high-technology companies.

This note offers links to recent commentaries and reports from international think tanks on the EU and proposed reforms. Earlier papers on the State of the Union can be found in a recent edition of ‘What Think Tanks are Thinking’.

Economy

The European Stability mechanism is not ready for the next crisis
Centre for European Reform, November 2022

The EU’s trillion-euro question
European Policy Centre, November 2022

RePowering EU: Managing a tough energy transition
Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale, November 2022

European Union fiscal rules: is a better system feasible?
Bruegel, October 2022

Does the European Union need an energy crisis fund?
Bruegel, October 2022

European fiscal rules and the German debt brake: Reform options
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, October 2022

La stratégie industrielle de l’Union européenne: Concilier concurrence et défis géoéconomiques
Institut français des relations internationales, October 2022

The future of common borrowing
Jacques Delors Institute, October 2022

Monetary policy and central fiscal capacity in the euro area
LUISS School of European Political Economy, October 2022

Two large shocks in quick succession: How can Europe avoid another decade of growth disappointment?
Brookings Institution, September 2022

Should the European Union turn to financial markets to finance its programs?
Bruegel, September 2022

Politics

Europeans must prepare for the post-Biden era
Carnegie Europe, November 2022

Flexible ‘EU-centricness’ is the key ingredient to ensure the European Political Community’s success
Centre for European Policy Studies, October 2022

Can EU enlargement gain momentum?
Centre for European Reform, November 2022

Europe’s power is built upon its social contract
European Policy Centre, November 2022

After the storm: The EU in uncharted waters
European Policy Centre, November 2022

No power without values: Why the EU needs to embrace political leadership if it wants to safeguard democracy
European Policy Centre, November 2022

European strategic autonomy and defence after Ukraine
Real Instituto Elcano, November 2022

The European (geo)Political Community: More than meets the eye?
Barcelona Centre for International Affairs, October 2022

The EU and the creative and destructive impact of crises
Carnegie Europe, October 2022

Five takeaways from the European Political Community summit
Carnegie Europe, October 2022

The (sorry) state of EU defense cooperation
Carnegie Europe, October 2022

Analysis of the European Political Community misses the point
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, October 2022

A new generation of European Citizens’ Panels: Making citizens’ voices a regular part of policymaking
European Policy Centre, October 2022

Can Europe master its destiny through the European Political Community?
German Marshal Fund, October 2022

The potential implications of a proposed European Political Community
Institute of International and European Affairs, October 202

Towards QMV in EU foreign policy: Different paths at multiple speeds
Jacques Delors Centre, October 2022

More EU decisions by qualified majority voting: But how?
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, October 2022

The Commission v the member states: Who wins in court, and why?
Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies, October 2022

Enlarging and deepening: Giving substance to the European Political Community
Bruegel, September 2022

Five lessons on international rule of law support
Carnegie Europe, September 2022

European unity can endure the winter of discontent
Carnegie Europe, September 2022

The economic basis of democracy in Europe
Chatham House, September 2022

Science-based and evidence-based policy-making in the European Union: Coexisting or conflicting concepts?
College of Europe, September 2022

When founding member states look at the future of Europe: Benelux countries’ contribution to the COFOE
Egmont, September 2022

Mapping eco-social policy mixes for a just transition in Europe
European Trade Union Institute, September 2022

Strengthening the European Health Union
Federation for European Progressive Studies, September 2022

Is nationalism compatible with the European project?
Friends of Europe, September 2022

Divergence in the quality of political institutions in Europe
Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy, September 2022

Putin vs Monnet: European resilience, energy and the Ukraine war
Istituto Affari Internazionale, September 2022

A new dawn for EU enlargement?
Peterson Institute for International Economics, September 2022

The Italian elections of 2022: What do they mean for the EU?
Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies, September 2022

EU subsidiarity as an antidote to centralisation and inefficiency
Wilfried Martens Centre, September 2022

Read this briefing on ‘Future EU reforms‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Laurence Amand-Eeckhout.

World AIDS Day, proclaimed by the United Nations in 1988, takes place each year on 1 December. The aim is to raise awareness, fight prejudice, encourage progress in prevention, and improve treatment around the world. Although infection with the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) is preventable, significant HIV transmission remains a challenge to EU Member States’ health systems. This year’s theme ‘Equalize’ underlines the urgent need to address the inequalities that are holding back progress in ending acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS), and give equal access to essential HIV services.

Background

Attacking the body’s immune system (the white blood cells or ‘CD4 cells’), HIV weakens its defence against other infections and diseases, including tuberculosis and some types of cancer. The most advanced stage of HIV infection (with a CD4 count below 200) is AIDS. Found in a variety of body fluids, such as blood, semen, vaginal secretions and breast milk, HIV can be transmitted through sex, blood transfusion, the sharing of contaminated needles, and between mother and child during pregnancy, delivery and breastfeeding. People who are at high risk of getting HIV can take pre-exposure prophylaxis (PrEP) medicine to reduce the risk of infection. People diagnosed with HIV and treated early can now expect to live a normal lifespan. Infections can be treated to prevent progression to AIDS by decreasing viral load in an infected body (antiretroviral therapy, ‘ART’). However ART does not cure HIV infection, and there is no vaccine.

There is some evidence that people living with HIV experience more severe outcomes and have higher comorbidities from COVID‑19.

The United Nations (UN) Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) is leading the global effort to end the AIDS epidemic by 2030, as part of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) adopted by the UN in 2015 (Goal 3). UNAIDS unites the efforts of 11 UN organisations, including the World Health Organization (WHO).

On World AIDS Day 2022, the WHO’s three main messages to global decision-makers are: re-commit to end HIV, as the challenges posed by the coronavirus pandemic require a renewed effort to address this public health threat by 2030; focus on equality to ensure that everyone, everywhere, has equal access to HIV prevention, testing, treatment and care; and focus on those who have been left behind in the global response to HIV and AIDS (children and key populations – men who have sex with men, transgender people, people who use drugs, sex workers, prisoners and migrants – and their partners). Facts and figures

UNAIDS data show that, in 2021, 1.5 million people contracted HIV, 38.4 million people were living with HIV, and 650 000 people died of AIDS-related causes.

According to the 2022 report on ‘HIV/AIDS surveillance in Europe’ (2021 data), published jointly by the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) and the WHO Regional Office for Europe, HIV affects over 2.3 million people in the WHO European region (made up of 53 countries covering a vast geographical region from the Atlantic to the Pacific Oceans), including over 590 000 people in the EU/European Economic Area (EEA).

In the EU/EEA specifically, 16 624 people were newly diagnosed with HIV in 2021. The decline in new cases being diagnosed in 2020 and 2021 is probably due, in part, to decreased case detection because of less testing and limited surveillance capacity during lockdown, and may also result from reduced transmission owing to fewer physical contacts during the pandemic. The use of formal and informal PrEP may also have played a role in the decline in numbers of new HIV diagnoses.

An estimated 88 000 people are living with undiagnosed HIV in the EU/EEA, implying that about one in eight of those living with HIV are not aware of their status.

EU action on HIV/AIDS

EU Member States are responsible for their own healthcare policies and systems. However, according to Article 168 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, the EU complements national policies while also fostering cooperation between Member States. In the EU, HIV/AIDS policy focuses on prevention and on supporting people living with the disease. The European Commission has mobilised measures and instruments across several policy areas in the fight against HIV/AIDS. This includes support for Member States to help them reach the global target under Goal 3 of the UN SDGs, to end the AIDS epidemic by 2030. In that context, the Commission facilitates the exchange of best practices through the Health Security Committee, as well as dedicated networks on the EU Health Policy Platform.

Since the early years of the AIDS epidemic in the 1980s, the EU has invested significantly in HIV/AIDS research. Both the EU’s former programme for research and innovation, Horizon 2020, and the 2021‑2027 Horizon Europe programme support research ranging from basic research to the development and testing of new treatments, new vaccine (e.g. through the European HIV Vaccine Alliance and the European AIDS Vaccine Initiative 2020), and novel diagnostic tools.

The ECDC has developed operational guidance to support countries in their efforts to integrate PrEP into their existing HIV prevention packages for those most at risk of HIV infection. Its July 2022 progress report underlines that certain key populations, such as people who inject drugs, prisoners and undocumented migrants, remain ineligible for PrEP in many countries.

On the world stage, the EU supports the Global Fund against AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis (in 2019, the EU pledged €550 million for the 2020‑2022 period, and in September 2022, €715 million for the 2023-2025 period). In addition, in March 2022, the Global Fund approved US$15 million in emergency funding to support the continuity of HIV and tuberculosis prevention, testing and treatment services in Ukraine.

In its May 2021 resolution on accelerating progress and tackling inequalities towards ending AIDS as a public health threat by 2030, the European Parliament called on the Commission to address AIDS as a global public health crisis, to prioritise health as part of the EU–Africa strategy, to work with Member States and partners to invest in community engagement and community-led responses as key components in the fight against HIV/AIDS-related stigma and discrimination, and to integrate HIV prevention and care with other local healthcare service offers, as an entry point for HIV information, education, communication and training. Challenges

Despite the progress made, communicable diseases such as HIV/AIDS are examples of epidemics that pose significant public health and economic challenges and require a multi-sectoral approach and multi-level cooperation.

Progress needs to be made in terms of diagnosis, which often comes too late, when the immune system has already started to fail. Delayed treatment can also lead to the spread of HIV infection to others.

Better prevention tools (awareness-raising, PrEp, needle exchange programmes, promotion of safer sex) are crucial, in particular for people who are reluctant to use health services. The fear of discrimination and stigmatisation can reduce the incentive to take an HIV test (HIV self-testing and community-based HIV testing can help).

Research and innovative solutions are required to find an effective prophylactic vaccine and therapeutic HIV vaccines or cure, to fight the threat of HIV drug resistance, and to improve the quality of life for those living with the disease, including long-term management of patients.

HIV infection has become a manageable chronic health condition. However many people living with HIV face inequalities. In addition to the prospect of reduced quality of life and poorer health outcomes than the rest of population, many of them are economically disadvantaged, have lower levels of education, and lack rapid access to quality treatment and care. The UNAIDS 2021‑2026 Global AIDS Strategy highlights the need for a new approach that reduces the inequalities that drive the AIDS epidemic and puts people at its centre, involving communities and prioritising human rights, respect and dignity.

This updates an ‘at a glance’ note from November 2021.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘World AIDS Day 2022: 1 December‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Clare Ferguson with Sophia Stone.

In its resolution on the new circular economy action plan (CEAP) adopted in February 2021, the European Parliament reiterated its support to the move away from a traditional economic ‘take-make-consume-throw away’ pattern to a more circular economy. The Parliament made over 130 policy recommendations for more circularity. It called, among other things, on the Commission to propose science-based binding EU targets for reducing the use of primary raw materials and environmental impacts. It also demanded binding footprint targets for the whole product lifecycle for each product category placed on the EU market, and product-specific and/or sector-specific binding targets for recycled content.

A circular economy minimises waste through reusing, repairing, refurbishing and recycling existing materials and products. The EU’s circular economy action plan is a step towards reaching the European Union’s 2050 climate neutrality target through measures to normalise sustainable products in the EU, to empower consumers, to cut waste and increase circularity. The plan focuses on sectors that have a big circularity potential, such as electronics, packaging, plastics, textiles and buildings. The European Commission presented the overall plan in March 2020. While Parliament welcomed the Commission’s proposal as a contribution to the European Green Deal, it has asked the Commission to introduce binding EU targets for 2030 to reduce the EU’s consumption footprint. The Parliament also stressed the importance of ensuring products and materials on the EU market are durable, safe and non-toxic. Furthermore, the Parliament requested the Commission to propose waste targets to minimise waste output. Under the new CEAP, the European Commission is expected to propose new measures on 30 November 2022 to achieve the CEAP aims.

One of these new initiatives under the plan is a revision of the Packaging and Waste Directive. This Directive sets out the EU’s rules on managing packaging and packaging waste. Measured by weight, packaging accounts for over 3 % of all waste generated in the EU and is made up of: paper and cardboard (41 %); plastic (19 %); glass (19 %); wood (16 %); and metal (5 %). This waste can be reduced by transforming it into a resource through waste prevention, reuse, recyclability, compostable packaging and other measures. Thanks to a new law – adopted by Parliament and Council very recently – by the end of 2024, all mobile phones, tables and cameras sold in the EU will be equipped with a USB Type‑C charging port, cutting associated waste by up to 13 000 tonnes a year.

Furthermore, many products, such as plastics and chemicals, are still produced using virgin fossil-based carbon resources. In view of the EU’s ambition to reach climate neutrality by 2050, such fossil-based materials could be replaced with sustainably sourced bio-based materials, or by optimising the circular economy solution in which carbon rich products are recycled and remain stored.

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Over the past few decades, the amount of clothes bought per person in the EU has increased by 40 %, with fast fashion and falling prices encouraging consumption. However, clothing has the fourth highest impact on the environment of all EU consumption categories. The production process and environmental footprint is large, due to the amount of water, chemicals, energy and micro plastics involved. Only 1 % of all clothes handed in for recycling are actually recycled into new clothes. The Commission has proposed several ways to counter the environmental impact, such as by designing clothes in a way that makes reuse and recycling easier – also known as circular fashion – convincing consumers to buy fewer clothes and incentivising consumers to opt for more sustainable options.

The first part of CEAP includes a proposed ecodesign directive, which sets out product-specific requirements to increase the lifetime and energy efficiency of the things we buy, making them more durable, repairable and reusable. In response, the Parliament adopted two resolutions in 2020 and 2021, calling on the Commission to establish a consumer’s ‘right to repair‘: Repair during the legal guarantee, the right to repair after the legal guarantee has expired, and the right for consumers to repair products themselves.

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Accept YouTube Content Further reading and listening

See EPRS legislative train carriages for each of the circular economy files, for instance:

• Revision of Directive 94/62/EC on Packaging and Packaging Waste
• Ecodesign for a circular economy
• Substantiating green claims
• New circular economy action plan
• Right to Repair podcast
• Sustainable carbon cycles: Promoting removal, storage and recycling podcast
• Circular economy infographic
• New circular economy action plan
• Sustainable carbon cycles: Promoting removal, storage and recycling
• A common charger for electronic devices: Revision of the Radio Equipment Directive
• Textiles and the environment
• Setting ecodesign requirements for sustainable products
• Right to repair

Written by Issam Hallak (1st edition).

The European Parliament will shortly vote on adopting the regulation on markets in crypto-assets (MiCA). The regulation would establish harmonised rules for crypto-assets at EU level, thereby providing legal certainty for crypto-assets not covered by existing EU legislation. By enhancing the protection of consumers and investors as well as financial stability, the regulation promotes innovation and use of crypto-assets.

The regulation identifies and covers three types of crypto-assets, namely asset-referenced tokens (ART), electronic money tokens (EMT), and other crypto-assets not covered by existing EU law. The legislation would regulate issuance and trading of crypto-assets as well as the management of the underlying assets, where applicable, with additional regulatory rules aimed at ‘significant’ ART and EMT. The provisional agreement resulting from the negotiations aims at securing liquidity and redemption, and envisages the inclusion of the environmental impact of crypto-assets in communications to investors.

Versions

• November 2022: Markets in crypto-assets (MiCA) (1st edition)

Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Markets in Crypto-assets, and amending Directive (EU) 2019/1937 Committee responsible:Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON)COM(2020) 593
24.9.2020Rapporteur:Stefan Berger (EPP, Germany)2020/0265(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Eero Heinäluoma (S&D, Finland)
Ondřej Kovařik (Renew, Czechia)
Ernest Urtasun (Greens, Spain)
Antonio Maria Rinaldi (ID, Italy)
Andżelika A. Możdżanowska (ECR, Poland)
Chris Macmanus (The Left, Ireland)Ordinary legislative procedure (COD)
(Parliament and Council on equal footing
– formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Final first-reading vote in plenary

Written by Vivienne Halleux (1st edition).

Under the farm to fork strategy, part of the European Green Deal, the EU has set itself a double target: a 50 % reduction in the overall use of and risk from chemical plant protection products, and a 50 % reduction in the use of more hazardous ones by 2030. The proposal for a regulation tabled by the European Commission on 22 June 2022, which would replace the 2009 sustainable use directive, would require Member States to contribute collectively to achieving these EU-wide targets through the adoption and attainment of binding national targets. To protect biodiversity and citizens’ health, the use of all plant protection products would be banned in specific, sensitive areas. Monitoring and reporting obligations would be strengthened.

Stakeholders are strongly divided on the proposal. While environmental organisations are pushing for more ambition, the farming community is concerned about the lack of alternatives for farmers, the broad coverage of sensitive areas, and consequences for business continuity. Indicators used to track progress towards the targets are also subject to criticisms from various sides.

In Parliament, the proposal has been referred to the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI). In the Council, work is ongoing at working party level.

Versions

• November 2022: Sustainable use of plant protection products (1st edition)

Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the sustainable use of plant protection products and amending Regulation (EU) 2021/2115 Committee responsible:Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI)COM(2022) 305
22.6.2022Rapporteur:Sarah Wiener (Greens/EFA, Austria)2022/0196(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Alexander Bernhuber (EPP, Austria)
Maria Arena (S&D, Belgium)
Jan Huitema (Renew, the Netherlands)
Anja Hazekamp (The Left, the Netherlands)Ordinary legislative procedure (COD)
(Parliament and Council on equal footing
– formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Publication of draft report

Written by Marcin Grajewski.

After decades of growing global integration, the world is becoming more fragmented in a number of areas, many analysts say. Deglobalisation can be defined as movement towards a less connected world, characterised by powerful nation states, local solutions, and border controls, rather than global institutions, treaties, and free movement.

The recent growth of protectionism, problems with supply chains, the diminishing role of global institutions, geopolitical shifts, technological rivalry and falling foreign investment, as well as energy and food crises, have been accompanied by events such as Russia’s war on Ukraine, the COVID-19 pandemic, Brexit, authoritarianism in China and populism in the US and elsewhere. On the other hand, phenomena such as the coronavirus pandemic, international crime and climate change demonstrate the continuing relevance of global collaboration.

This note offers links to recent commentaries, studies and reports from international think tanks on the shifting balance between gobalising and deglobalising forces.

Does digitizing government payments increase financial access and usage?
Brookings Institution, November 2022

Renewing global climate change action for fragile and developing countries
Brookings Institution, November 2022

Human development in an age of uncertainty
Brookings Institution, November 2022

Introducing hyperlocal: Place governance in a fragmented world
Brookings Institution, November 2022

The free world and its enemies: What Putin’s war and China’s global ambitions mean for us
Brookings Institution, November 2022

Deglobalisation and protectionism
Bruegel, November 2022

Is globalisation really doomed?
Bruegel, November 2022

Is climate cooperation trumping human rights?
Carnegie Europe, November 2022

Democratic innovations from around the world: Lessons for the West
Carnegie Europe, November 2022

The globalization myth
Council on Foreign Relations, November 2022

China’s growing interference in domestic politics: Globally and in the United States
Council on Foreign Relations, November 2022

A reliable global cyber power
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, November 2022

Has Globalisation really peaked for Europe?
European Centre for International and Political Economy, November 2022

Principles for global order: How Europeans and the global south can shape the international order together
European Council on Foreign Relations, November 2022

The geopolitics of space – The economy of space: Evolution and forecast
Istituto Affari Internazionali, November 2022

International trade: Globalisation is here to stay
Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale, November 2022

‘Fragmentegration’: A new chapter for globalisation
Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale, November 2022

The Biden-Xi meeting in Bali: What changed, what didn’t?
Peterson Institute for International Economics, November 2022

The portfolio of economic policies needed to fight climate change
Peterson Institute for International Economics, November 2022

How the G20 can advance WTO reform
Peterson Institute for International Economics, November 2022

Blockchain technology: Pain, perspective and positivity
Wilson Center, November 2022

China and the West: Growing apart as geopolitical tensions grow
Bruegel, October 2022

Geopolitics of the energy transition
Brussels School of Governance, October 2022

Supply chain sovereignty and globalization
Center for Strategic and International Studies, October 2022

China between lockdowns and the 20th Party Congress: What can we expect for the EU and globally?
Egmont, October 2022

The American order is over, and China is ready to dive in
Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale, October 2022

Globalization is in retreat for the first time since the Second World War
Peterson Institute for International Economics, October 2022

The global minimum corporate tax will not end forces that drive tax competition
Peterson Institute for International Economics, October 2022

The globalization of remote work: Will digital offshoring make waves in the U.S. labor market?
Rand Corporation, October 2022

The challenge to cultivate global semiconductor talent
Wilson Centre, October 2022

Getting ready for post-pandemic border policy
Wilson Centre, October 2022

The age of fuzzy bifurcation: Lessons from the pandemic and the Ukraine War
Brussels School of Governance, September 2022

La transition géopolitique européenne
Groupe d’études géopolitiques, September 2022

Policy options for an equitable re-globalization
Hellenic Foundation for European and Security Policy, September 2022

Developments in the global gas markets up to 2030
Institute of Energy Economics at the Cologne University, September 2022

Fault lines: Global perspectives on a world in crisis
Open Society Foundation, September 2022

Russia is intensifying the global food crisis
Centre for Eastern Studies, August 2022

The U.S. could cope with deglobalisation, Europe could not
Centre for European Reform, August 2022

Water stress: A global problem that’s getting worse
Council on Foreign Relations, August 2023

Global value chain disruptions: Challenges and opportunities
Atlantic Council, July 2022

The awakening of geopolitical Europe?
Carnegie Europe, July 2022

Geopolitics of oil and inflation
Center for Strategic and International Studies, July 2022

The great rewiring: How global supply chains are reacting to today’s geopolitics
Center for Strategic and International Studies, July 2022

The de-globalisation of oil: Risks and implications from the politicisation of energy markets
Istituto Affari Internazionali, July 2022

Global economies disrupted, local communities responding
Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 2022

The great reset: towards an existential geopolitical order?
Friends of Europe, June 2022

Russia’s status as an energy superpower is waning
International Institute for Strategic Studies, June 2022

Read this briefing on ‘‘Deglobalisation’‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Piotr Bąkowski.

Having originated in national police and intelligence circles in the early 2000s, the concept of ‘radicalisation’ quickly attracted the attention of EU policy-makers and became the framework of choice for analysing what it is that brings individuals and groups to terrorism. There is no uniform definition of radicalisation, even though the academics and institutions involved in tackling this phenomenon have come up with multiple interpretations. Experts tend to describe the radicalisation process as a set of stages and use models to illustrate how someone might go through these stages before becoming a terrorist. They disagree, however, on the role of specific factors in this process, such as ideology. Some have pointed to the undesired consequences of policies targeting radicalisation and questioned the concept’s suitability as a tool to advance our understanding of terrorism.

With the notable exception of rules on terrorist content online, EU action to prevent radicalisation is essentially non-legislative. The EU supports its Member States in countering radicalisation by coordinating their activities and facilitating information sharing and the exchange of best practice. The latter mostly takes places within the Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN), an umbrella network connecting ‘first-line practitioners’ – including youth workers, local authority representatives and prison officers – from across the EU. Projects tackling radicalisation receive funding from a range of EU funds and programmes, such as the Internal Security Fund and the EU’s framework programme for research and innovation (Horizon Europe).

The scope of EU activities is very broad, going beyond counter-terrorism policy and extending to areas such as education, employment and social inclusion, to name but a few. However, this comprehensive approach faces competence limitations: some of these areas are outside the EU’s remit, while in others the EU only plays a secondary role, in line with the principle of subsidiarity. Unsurprisingly, the European Commission’s direct engagement with local and regional players – which is characteristic of its counter-radicalisation efforts – has led to tensions with the Member States. Over time, national governments have increasingly demanded a greater say in defining policy priorities. The EU has responded by restructuring the RAN and creating some additional cooperation structures to ensure the Member States’ participation.

The EU’s counter-radicalisation policy has been shaped by broader policy instruments on EU security and counter-terrorism and by strategies specifically targeting radicalisation. Their content has evolved over time to reflect the evolution of the EU terrorism threat landscape since the inception of the EU counter-radicalisation policy. Policy changes have been introduced, as the initial exclusive focus on jihadist terrorism has given way to a broader approach targeting various forms of extremism.

The coronavirus pandemic created a new context that may prove to be a breeding ground for extremism. Groups from various ideological backgrounds have already incorporated COVID-19 into their narratives; furthermore, the pandemic seems to have contributed to the emergence of new ideologies with a potential impact on radicalisation and violence. As internet use has soared, the increased online presence of extremists is particularly problematic, given its potential to exacerbate the already increasing polarisation of opinions. With social media platforms in the spotlight, these groups have been exploring other, less controlled environments. For example, there are reports of online video games being used as a tool for spreading propaganda among young people.

Whereas over the past 20 years the EU has adopted a prolific number of counter-terrorism measures, only recently have the first attempts been made to review and evaluate them. In 2017, the Commission gave a positive assessment of EU efforts to prevent radicalisation, stressing, however, the need to improve the coordination, outreach and impact of existing instruments. One year later, following an audit of the Commission’s counter-radicalisation activities, the European Court of Auditors concluded that the policy objectives and actions had been designed in a way that reflected Member States’ needs, but that there were some shortfalls regarding coordination and evaluation

Read this ‘in-depth analysis’ on ‘Preventing radicalisation in the European Union: How EU policy has evolved‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

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Written by Clare Ferguson and Katarzyna Sochacka.

The highlight of the November II 2022 plenary session was the ceremony marking the 70th anniversary of the European Parliament, with the participation of the Prime Ministers of France, Belgium and Luxembourg.

Russia’s war against Ukraine again featured high on the agenda, not least with the adoption of a resolution recognising the Russian Federation as a state sponsor of terrorism, and a joint debate with a vote on regulations governing EU financial assistance to Ukraine.

Political debates were held on Hungary’s compliance with the rule of law conditions under the Conditionality Regulation and the state of play of the Hungarian recovery and resilience plan; on diabetes in the EU on the occasion of World Diabetes Day; and on the human rights situation in the context of the FIFA World Cup in Qatar. Other debates included: the need for a European solution on asylum and migration including search and rescue; eliminating violence against women; the human rights situation in Egypt; and the legacy of the European Year of Youth 2022. Members also debated a post-2020 global biodiversity framework and the COP15 conference under the UN Convention on Biological Diversity, and protection of livestock farming and large carnivores. The EU response to the protests in Iran and EU-China relations were debated with the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the Commission (HR/VP), Josep Borrell.

Recognising Russia as a state sponsor of terrorism

Parliament adopted a resolution recognising the Russian Federation as a state sponsor of terrorism, tabled following a debate on 18 October. The move could facilitate the introduction of a legal framework to officially designate states as sponsors of terrorism, allowing for more significant restrictive measures against Moscow, including the confiscation of Russian assets.

Resilience of critical entities

With recent gas pipeline sabotage and the damage done by the pandemic fresh in mind, Members debated and adopted the political agreement reached with the Council on boosting the resilience of critical entities in the EU. Parliament’s negotiators from the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) ensured that systems safeguarding the rule of law will be prepared to face disruption, along with key infrastructure and networks throughout the EU.

Digital decade policy programme

The rise in cyber-attacks also demonstrates the need to set out a strong digital policy direction for Europe. Members debated and adopted a provisional agreement on the proposed ‘Path to the digital decade‘ programme, setting out action to pursue the EU digital strategy to 2030. Negotiators from the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE) secured a strong role for Parliament in scrutinising progress on these digital targets. Measured with a ‘digital compass’, they will strengthen broadband infrastructure, digitalise public and private sectors, narrow the digital divide and progress adoption of new technologies.

Gender balance on corporate boards

While gender-diverse company boards provide undeniable benefits, only 34.1 % of the largest EU companies’ board members are women. Members adopted at second reading the proposal, blocked in the Council for many years, on improving gender balance on company boards in the EU. Parliament has long pushed for progress, finally reaching agreement with the Council on the text earlier this year. Parliament negotiators have ensured a 2026 deadline for companies to hit the target of minimum 33 % women directors, and specific penalties for companies that do not comply.

The European Union’s 2023 budget

Parliament debated and adopted the EU’s general budget for 2023, with Members voting by a large majority to endorse the provisional agreement reached on 14 November 2022 in conciliation between Parliament and the Council, and subsequently adopted by the Council. Parliament succeeded in ensuring funding for its priorities: support for Ukraine, the post-pandemic recovery, and the climate, energy and humanitarian crises. Commitment appropriations for 2023 will amount to €186.6 billion and payments to €168.6 billion, including special instruments.

Borrowing strategy to finance Next Generation EU

Members debated a Committee on Budgets (BUDG) report on the borrowing strategy to finance Next Generation EU (the EU’s temporary post-coronavirus pandemic recovery instrument). The report welcomes the smooth implementation of the strategy, allowing payment of a combination of loans and grants to Member States through EU programmes. The BUDG committee also underlines the need for transparency, urging the Commission to present systematic accounts of the spending to Parliament for proper scrutiny.

System of own resources of the European Union

Members also voted overwhelmingly in favour of another BUDG report, calling for rapid adoption of a decision on three new own resources. The resources proposed would gather contributions to the EU budget from an extended emissions trading scheme (ETS), a carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM), and a share of reallocated very large multinational company profits. The report also highlights the need for ambitious, balanced and transparent own resources that do not depend on taxing citizens, and that move away from gross national income-dependent resources towards financing tailored to objectives.

Common fisheries policy – Access restrictions to Union waters

The common fisheries policy (CFP) gives EU countries equal access to fisheries resources in each other’s waters, but with a long-standing temporary provision enabling countries to reserve waters up to 12 miles from their coastlines for local and neighbouring fishing vessels. As the current agreement allowing Member States to limit access to the 12‑mile zone expires at the end of the year, Members adopted a provisional agreement to extend the rules on access to coastal waters for another 10 years.

New EU strategy for enlargement

Ukraine’s recent request to join the EU has put enlargement firmly back on the agenda. However, European integration prospects for the Western Balkans and Türkiye have seen little progress. Aimed at re-energising EU enlargement policy, Members debated and adopted an own-initiative report from Parliament’s Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET) on a new EU enlargement strategy. The AFET committee proposes to overhaul the process and provide candidates with roadmaps setting specific milestones to reach on their path to EU membership. The report further suggests formal suspension of negotiations with Türkiye.

Situation in Libya

Members debated and adopted another AFET own-initiative report, on the deteriorating political and security situation in Libya. The report proposes to nominate an EU special representative for Libya, redoubling EU diplomatic efforts to promote peace. The AFET committee also recommends strong support for United Nations-led reconciliation efforts seeking a peaceful and democratic transition, in a country where weak governance and a proxy war have strengthened violent groups at the cost of democracy.

Question time

Members questioned Executive Vice-President of the Commission, Valdis Dombrovskis, and Commissioner for Economy, Paolo Gentiloni, regarding the possible new direction for the EU’s economic governance framework. Members then questioned Josep Borrell on the impact of Russia’s war of aggression on non-EU countries, in relation to the ‘Black Sea Grain Initiative’ agreement. While the agreement helped to prevent widespread food global crisis, countries dependent on food imports and aid remain vulnerable.

Opening of trilogue negotiations

Members confirmed, without vote, two mandates for negotiations from the Committee on Transport and Tourism (TRAN) and one from the LIBE committee.

This ‘at a glance’ note is intended to review some of the highlights of the plenary part-session, and notably to follow up on key dossiers identified by EPRS. It does not aim to be exhaustive. For more detailed information on specific files, please see other EPRS products, notably our ‘EU legislation in progress’ briefings, and the plenary minutes.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Plenary round-up – November II 2022‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.