European Parliamentary Research Service Blog

Written by Rita Lobo and Ulrich Jochheim.

Following the 20th Congress of China’s Communist party, which announced President Xi Jinping’s third 5‑year term as its General Secretary, EPRS held an online roundtable on Xi Jinping’s third mandate and what is next for China on 27 October 2022. The discussion focused on analysing China’s foreign and economic policy priorities.

Wolfgang Hiller, Director for Impact Assessment and European Added Value at EPRS, welcomed the participants and the audience. Following his introductory remarks René Repasi, (S&D, Germany), Vice-Chair of the Delegation for relations with the People’s Republic of China highlighted the importance of the Party Congress in identifying in which direction China is heading, particularly with regard to its foreign policy. The decision to allow Xi Jinping a third mandate as General Secretary – unseen since the times of Mao Zedong – was expected in the West. René Repasi suggested that the removal of Hu Jintao (Xi Jinping’s predecessor) from the Party Congress was staged deliberately, to set the tone for Xi Jinping’s third mandate. He added that there is a clear loyalty to Xi Jinping among those appointed to the Politburo Standing Committee. He pointed to the fact that Beijing has decided to shift from using GDP as a central measure of China’s global success towards the notion of national strength. Furthermore, he drew attention to expert estimates that China’s economic growth will not reach the 2022 target of 5.5 %, reaching only 3 % instead.

René Repasi emphasised that there was no reference to the future of the zero-coronavirus strategy during the Party Congress, and expects that it will not be lifted any time soon. With regard to the EU-China relationship, he raised concerns about the EU’s powerlessness to impose the same sanctions that it has on Russia vis-à-vis China, if the latter were to invade Taiwan. More specifically, he argued that the EU’s economic dependence on China makes the consequences of imposing sanctions even more challenging for the EU. As such, he stressed the need for the EU to diversify and to identify any dependencies, as well as to invest in the proposed corporate sustainability and due diligence directives. Lastly, in relation to Taiwan, René Repasi warned that Beijing has made clear that any attempt to recognise Taiwan’s independence by foreign states would be met with force.

Elena Lazarou, acting Head of the External Policies Unit of EPRS, presented the panel members: Jacob Funk Kirkegaard, Senior Fellow, Peterson Institute for International Economics and German Marshall Fund of the United States; Yu Jie, Senior Research Fellow on China, Asia-Pacific Programme, Chatham House; Alice Ekman, Senior Analyst in charge of Asia, European Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) and Ulrich Jochheim, Policy Analyst, External Policies Unit, Members’ Research Service, EPRS.

On energy, Elena Lazarou pointed out that China is the world’s biggest energy importer, in terms of both oil and gas, and asked how that would impact Europe’s energy challenge once the zero-coronavirus strategy is relaxed. René Repasi argued that, due to the current tensions between the European Parliament and China, particularly the sanctions against certain Members, he is not optimistic that the ratification of the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment would begin soon. He added that the decision to promote Li Qiang, who was responsible for the tough stance on the zero-coronavirus policy in Shanghai, signals that the strategy will remain.

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Jacob Funk Kirkegaard focused on the key economic takeaways from the Party Congress. More specifically, the officials that Xi Jinping has appointed are not reformists and are primarily loyal to Xi Jinping, with no signal that the Chinese economy will reopen. He noted that China will not be able to reopen its economy until they have a vaccine that can protect their elderly population, likely not before the end of 2023. Although this benefits the EU in the short term, as China imports less liquid natural gas (LNG), in the longer term, it will have critical economic consequences for everyone. He also stressed China’s dramatic demographic transition and housing market collapse, which will slow economic growth. Jacob Funk Kirkegaard argued that China’s economic model is heavily dependent on investment and unless the country fundamentally changes its economic growth model, indebtedness will continue to rise, potentially leading to large-scale financial crisis. Stimulating Chinese public infrastructure investment will contribute to this indebtedness and will prove unsustainable. He warned that the EU should prepare for China potentially devaluing its currency. He added that should Russia lose its war (likely to happen in the next six months, in his opinion), this would be considered as a political setback for Xi Jinping but would not affect China’s economy. Lastly, he agreed that the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment is dead, politically.

Yu Jie began by highlighting a new section (five) of the Party Congress’ work report, referring to the need for China to improve its home-grown talents. While Xi Jinping had previously focused on finance and capital, the importance was placed on high-end manufacturing during this conference. According to Yu Jie, this strategy can only work if there is fair competition in the private and state sector. She also stressed that the newly appointed politburo members, mainly hold PhDs in nuclear science and physics, signifying a clear shift from appointing economic planners. On China-United States relations, she noted that Xi Jinping did not refer to the ‘strategic opportunity for China’, a term that advocated for a stable relationship with the West. The party no longer has an incentive to develop this to advance its economy. In her view, China is returning to a solely domestic focus.

Alice Ekman emphasised that China’s priorities have shifted from the economy to security. Moreover, she stressed that Xi Jinping’s speech was particularly ideological, with clear references to Marxism. This shift will have consequences for China’s interaction with the US and EU. She anticipates that Beijing will introduce further controls on the economy, including within the technology and private education sector. Increased surveillance of the Chinese population should also be expected, with Xi Jinping continuously warning against ‘hedonism, worship and egocentricity’. According to Ekman, this ideology was developed against the backdrop of the West’s sanctions against Russia and thus the need to become independent and self-reliant.  On China-US relations, she emphasised that Xi Jinping referred to ‘gross provocation in respect to Taiwan’, alluding to foreign interference. She noted that China continues to reach out to countries that it considers ‘friends’ while simultaneously maintaining its ‘wolf warrior’ diplomacy to countries it considers hostile. Lastly, she highlighted Xi Jinping’s comments that he will support ‘patriots’ in Taiwan while fighting against separatist forces and foreign interference and stressed that China may attempt to promote its strategic objectives through lawfare, as it did in Hong Kong.

Ulrich Jochheim agreed that Xi Jinping’s speech was ideological and indicative that China has decided to turn inwards. He argued that China would turn to the concept of hybrid warfare to deal with Taiwan, using all means except classical warfare to manipulate Taiwan and improve its own geostrategic position. However, the composition of the Central Military Commission indicates that Xi is also planning to increasingly use military means to intimidate Taiwan. While Taiwan seems well-prepared to face disinformation campaigns, Jochheim anticipates that Xi Jinping will focus on manipulating the 2024 presidential elections in Taiwan. He concluded that China is becoming increasingly communist and stressed scepticism regarding the innovation and technology strategy. Several questions were raised during the Q&A session related to a potential Chinese invasion of Taiwan. According to Alice Ekman, China’s aggressive and ambitious foreign policy will persist; as such, she predicts that the ultimate deadline for the invasion of Taiwan is 2049. She also described the types of lawfare tactics that China could deploy against Taiwan, namely, the extradition treaty to repatriate ‘Taiwanese criminals’ from foreign countries; adapting the Anti-Secession law making it more specific and turning it into a unilateral unification law; adding further institutions to its ‘black list’. However, Yu Jie noted that the current economic situation means there is very little that Xi Jinping can do, as he is not a risk-taker and the Chinese public would not be willing to exchange its standard of life for running Taiwan. Yu Jie also highlighted that China would struggle to consolidate power should it take Taiwan, with Kierkegaard also questioning China’s ability to finance an invasion of Taiwan. He also pointed out that sanctions following a Chinese invasion would not have the same effect as they do on Russia. Ulrich Jochheim anticipated that the EU will have no choice but to impose sanctions on China if it invades Taiwan. He also highlights that Republic of Korea and Japanese support for the EU on the Russian war in Ukraine is linked to their expectation of support should a war occur in their region. Kierkegaard responded that Russia and China complement each other economically, although historically they are not ‘natural allies’; and express similar anti-American sentiment. This convergence, for Alice Ekman, is greater than has been described and has materialised through stronger coordination. She believes that China is advocating for Russia to attend the G20 and is attempting to shape the agenda so that the war in Ukraine does not dominate. For Yu Jie, China is apprehensive of an unstable Russia on its borders. Ulrich Jochheim highlighted that the chief of Vietnam’s ruling Communist Party will be the first foreign leader to visit China after the Party Congress – a symbolic event that aligns with the Party Congress’s ideological strategy. He concluded by arguing that China wants ‘to have its cake and eat it’ – e.g. to have good relations with Russia while simultaneously attempting to have a neutral position on Ukraine.  

Citizens often send messages to the President of the European Parliament (or to the institution’s public portal) expressing their views on current issues and/or requesting action from the Parliament. The Citizens’ Enquiries Unit (AskEP) within the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) looks into these issues and replies to the messages, which may sometimes be identical as part of wider public campaigns.

The European Parliament and its President have recently received a large number of messages calling for support for the protests in Iran. Citizens first began to write on this subject in November 2022. In its resolution of 6 October 2022, Parliament condemned the killing of Mahsa Amini and called for EU sanctions against her killers and those involved in violence against street protests. Parliament also condemned the widespread and disproportionate use of force by Iranian security forces against protesting citizens, and called on the authorities to immediately release and drop any charges against demonstrators.

Please find below the main points of the reply sent to citizens who took the time to write to the European Parliament and its President on this matter (in English and German).

Main points made in the reply in English

Following the brutal death of Mahsa Amini, President Metsola spoke of the situation in Iran at the start of the plenary session on 3 October 2022. In her opening remarks, she said that the European Parliament stands with the women of Iran demanding change.

Addressing the European Parliament on 17 October, President Metsola paid tribute to the brave, defiant men and women protesting in Iran. She stressed that the sanctions adopted by the European Union (EU) ‘will hold accountable those who are responsible for the brutal crimes against women, youths and men – demonstrators outraged by the death in police custody of 22-year-old Mahsa Amini’.

On 9 November, President Metsola opened the plenary session, stating in response to the deteriorating situation in Iran: ‘We need an international investigation to keep the oppressive regime accountable for its ongoing human rights violations. It is now time to impose further targeted sanctions. There can be no business as usual with the Iranian regime’.

European Parliament’s position on the situation in Iran

On 6 October, the European Parliament adopted a resolution condemning the killing of Mahsa Amini and calling for EU sanctions against her killers and those involved in violence against street protests.

Parliament also condemns the widespread and disproportionate use of force by Iranian security forces against the crowds, and calls on the authorities to immediately release and drop any charges against demonstrators.

Parliament encourages those EU countries with a diplomatic presence in Tehran to coordinate their actions in order to protect human rights defenders. More information is available in the press release on our website.

Regarding Iran’s nuclear activities, in December 2021, the European Parliament urged Iran to immediately cease nuclear activities that violate the Iran Nuclear deal. In February 2022, Parliament recalled that the Iran Nuclear deal remains the only way to stop the regime’s worrying nuclear activities.

EU-Iran relations

Diplomatic relations between the European Union and non-EU countries such as Iran are not led by the European Parliament, but by the European External Action Service (EEAS). Outside its borders, the European Union is usually represented by diplomatic representations, which have a similar role to that of an embassy. However, the EU as a bloc does not have a diplomatic representation in Iran. More information on the EU-Iran relations is available on the EEAS website.

Individual EU countries have the right to determine their own diplomatic relations with any country in the world, including Iran. Any decision on cutting bilateral diplomatic ties with Iran is for each individual EU country to take.

EU sanctions against Iran

Sanctions against certain countries, entities or individuals are not decided by the European Parliament, but by the Council of the European Union (representing the governments of EU countries). Each EU country is responsible for implementing these sanctions within their respective jurisdictions.

In response to the death of Mahsa Amini, and the violent repression of the recent demonstrations in Iran, the Council of the EU added, on 17 October and 14 November 2022, 40 individuals and 7 entities to the list of those subject to restrictive measures in the context of the existing Iran human rights sanctions regime. The measures imposed consist of a travel ban and an asset freeze. EU citizens and companies are forbidden to make funds available to the listed individuals and entities. Furthermore, the sanctions prohibit exports of equipment to Iran that might be used for internal repression or for monitoring telecommunications. More information about the EU sanctions against Iran is available on the Council’s website.

Main points made in the reply in German

Im Zuge des brutalen Tods von Mahsa Amini sprach Präsidentin Metsola in der Plenarsitzung am 3. Oktober 2022 über die Situation im Iran. Sie sagte in ihren einleitenden Worten, dass das Europäische Parlament den Frauen, die den Wandel im Iran fordern, zur Seite steht.

In ihrer Ansprache an das Europäische Parlament am 17. Oktober 2022, zollte Präsidentin Metsola den mutigen Männern und Frauen, welche im Iran protestieren, Tribut. Sie betonte, dass die von der Europäischen Union (EU) beschlossenen Sanktionen ‚diejenigen zur Rechenschaft ziehen werden, die für die brutalen Verbrechen gegen Frauen, Jugendliche und Männer verantwortlich sind – Demonstranten, die über den Tod der 22-jährigen Mahsa Amini in Polizeigewahrsam entsetzt sind‘.

Am 9. November 2022 hat Präsidentin Metsola die Plenarsitzung mit einer Antwort auf die sich verschlimmernde Situation im Iran begonnen: ‚Wir brauchen eine internationale Untersuchung um das unterdrückende Regime für ihre anhaltenden Menschenrechtsverletzungen zur Rechenschaft zu ziehen. Jetzt ist die Zeit um mehr gezielte Sanktionen zu erzwingen. Wir können die bisherige Politik mit dem iranischen Regime nicht weiterführen‘.

Die Position des Europäischen Parlaments bezüglich der Situation im Iran

Am 6. Oktober 2022 verabschiedete das Europäische Parlament eine Entschließung, in welcher es die Ermordung von Mahsa Amini verurteilte und EU-Sanktionen gegen die Täter sowie alle, die in die Gewalt gegen die Straßenproteste involviert waren, forderte.

Das Parlament verurteilt außerdem den großflächigen und unverhältnismäßigen Personaleinsatz der iranischen Sicherheitskräfte gegen die Protestierenden und fordert die Behörden auf, Protestierende sofort freizulassen und alle Anschuldigungen gegen sie fallen zu lassen.

Das Parlament ermutigt die EU-Länder mit einer diplomatischen Vertretung in Teheran, ihre Bemühungen zum Schutz von Menschenrechtsverteidigern zu koordinieren. Weitere Informationen sind in der Pressemitteilung auf unserer Website erhältlich.

Bezüglich Irans nuklearer Aktivitäten im Dezember 2021 hat das Europäische Parlament den Iran aufgefordert, diese sofort zu beenden, da sie die Bestimmungen des iranischen Atomdeals verletzen. Im Februar 2022 erinnerte das Parlament daran, dass der Atomdeal das einzige Mittel sei, die besorgniserregenden Atomaktivitäten des iranischen Regimes einzuschränken.

EU-Iran Beziehungen

Die diplomatischen Beziehungen zwischen der Europäischen Union und Drittstaaten, wie zum Beispiel dem Iran, werden nicht durch das Parlament, sondern den Europäischen Auswärtigen Dienst (EAD) verwaltet.

Außerhalb ihrer Grenzen wird die Europäische Union meistens durch diplomatische Vertretungen repräsentiert, welche eine ähnliche Rolle wie eine Botschaft einnehmen. Allerdings hat die EU selbst keine diplomatische Vertretung im Iran. Mehr Informationen zu den EU-Iran-Beziehungen sind auf der Website des EAD erhältlich.

EU-Länder haben das Recht ihre diplomatische Beziehungen mit jedem Land der Welt zu gestalten, auch mit dem Iran. Jede Entscheidung, diplomatische Beziehungen mit dem Iran zu beenden, obliegt jedem EU-Land.

EU-Sanktionen gegen den Iran

Sanktionen gegen Länder, Einheiten oder Individuen werden nicht vom Europäischen Parlament, sondern vom Rat der Europäischen Union getroffen (dieser repräsentiert die Regierungen der Mitgliedstaaten). EU-Länder sind für die Durchsetzung der Sanktionen innerhalb des eigenen Hoheitsgebiets verantwortlich.

Als Reaktion auf den Tod von Mahsa Amini und die gewalttätige Unterdrückung der aktuellen Demonstrationen im Iran, hat der Rat der Europäischen Union am 17. Oktober 2022 sowie am 14. November 2022, im Rahmen der angesichts der Menschenrechtslage in Iran bestehenden Sanktionsregelung, 40 Personen und sieben Organisationen in die Liste der Personen, Einrichtungen und Organisationen, die restriktiven Maßnahmen unterliegen, aufgenommen. Bei den verhängten Maßnahmen handelt es sich um ein Reiseverbot und das Einfrieren von Vermögenswerten. EU-Bürgern und Unternehmen ist es untersagt, die aufgelisteten Personen und Einrichtungen mit finanziellen Mitteln zu unterstützen. Außerdem verbieten die Sanktionen Exporte mit Equipment in den Iran, welche für die interne Unterdrückung oder für die Überwachung von Telekommunikation benutzt werden könnte. Mehr Informationen über die EU-Sanktionen gegen den Iran sind auf der Website des Rates erhältlich.

Written by Maria Margarita Mentzelopoulou (1st edition).

In 2021, Aleksandr Lukashenko’s Belarusian regime began actively attracting migrants from Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Yemen and other countries, before encouraging and even forcing them to cross the borders into the European Union. This put pressure on the neighbouring countries of Latvia, Lithuania and Poland, and was the Belarusian regime’s response to EU sanctions imposed following the regime’s rigging of elections in 2020 and violent repression of civil society in 2021.

In December 2021, the European Commission presented a proposal for a regulation addressing situations of instrumentalisation in the field of migration and asylum, coupled with a proposal amending the Schengen Borders Code (SBC), to define the instrumentalisation of migrants. The proposal was initiated following the increasing role of state actors in the facilitation of irregular migration, using certain migratory flows as a tool for political purposes. The main changes the proposal brings include extending registration periods for asylum applications, applying the border procedure to all asylum claims, limiting reception conditions to meet only basic needs, and expediting return procedures.

The proposal is now being examined by the Parliament and the Council.

Versions

• November 2022: Instrumentalisation in the field of migration and asylum (1st edition)

Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council addressing situations of instrumentalisation in the field of migration and asylum Committee responsible:Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE)COM(2021)890
14.12.2021Rapporteur:Patryk Jaki (ECR, Poland)2021/0427(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Lena Düpont (EPP, Germany)
Pietro Bartolo (S&D, Italy)
Róża Thun und Hohenstein (Renew, Poland)
Tineke Strik (Greens/EFA, the Netherlands)
Patricia Chagnon (ID, France)
Anne-Sophie Pelletier (The Left, France)Ordinary legislative procedure (COD) (Parliament and Council on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Publication of the draft report

Written by Agnieszka Widuto.

On 9 November 2022, the European Commission proposed a temporary emergency regulation on accelerating the deployment of renewable energy. Its main aim is to simplify permit-granting procedures for renewable energy projects, in particular for solar installations, heat pumps, and projects involving the repowering of renewable energy plants. Accelerating the rollout of renewables is considered one of the main measures that could help the EU address the current energy crisis, improve security of supply and reduce energy prices.

Background

The European Commission published a legislative proposal for a Council regulation laying down a framework to accelerate the deployment of renewable energy on 9 November 2022. The proposal defines renewable energy projects as being of an overriding public interest and proposes to streamline the permit-granting procedure for installing solar energy equipment, repowering renewable energy plants and deploying heat pumps. The regulation targets technologies that are quick to implement in the short term, have considerable potential for reducing gas consumption and, because of their low operational cost, could help bring down energy bills. The regulation would apply for 1 year, but its length could be extended following a review scheduled to take place by 1 July 2023.

The regulation comes in response to the European Council conclusions of 20-21 October 2022, which called for the ‘fast-tracking of the simplification of permitting procedures to accelerate the rollout of renewables and related grids’. It complements several other regulations adopted in 2022 to mitigate the energy crisis, such as the regulations on gas storage, gas demand reduction and on addressing high energy prices. The newly proposed regulation also builds on the REPowerEU plan, which includes a revision of the Renewable Energy Directive (RED) focusing on long-term structural changes (currently under negotiation).

The legal basis for this regulation is Article 122 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), which envisages adoption by the Council only. The Commission justifies the use of this article as opposed to Article 194 (joint adoption by the European Parliament and the Council), by the urgent and temporary nature of the measure, and the time needed to adopt and begin transposing the revised Renewable Energy Directive. The lack of ‘democratic checks’ was one of the concerns voiced by the European Environmental Bureau, along with reservations regarding the interplay with environmental legislation. However, industry players, such as Solar Power Europe, have been strongly supportive of the emergency proposal.

Main points of the proposed Council regulation Overriding public interest

The proposal regards renewable energy plants and installations as being of an overriding public interest and therefore as eligible for a simplified assessment during the permit-granting procedures. Some derogations from EU environmental legislation (the Water Framework, Birds and Habitats Directives) would be made possible, providing appropriate species conservation measures were ensured.

Solar energy installations

A maximum 1-month deadline is proposed for the permit-granting procedure for solar energy equipment on artificial structures such as buildings. These installations would also be exempt from some environmental assessments. Small-scale installations (50 kW or less) for ‘renewables self-consumers’, as defined in the RED, would benefit from ‘positive administrative silence’, whereby the permit would be considered granted if there was no feedback from the relevant authorities within a month of the application being submitted.

Repowering renewable plants

The permit-granting period for repowering (i.e. the renewal or upgrading) of renewable power plants would be limited to 6 months; this period would also cover all relevant environmental assessments that needed to be made. Environmental assessments would be limited to potential impacts resulting from the change or extension compared to the original project. Moreover, a simplified procedure for grid connections would apply in cases of repowering not exceeding a 15 % increase in total capacity.

Heat pumps

The proposal introduces a 3-month deadline for permit granting for the installation of heat pumps. The grid connection of smaller heat pumps would be permitted automatically following notification to the relevant entity (up to 12 kW capacity, or up to 50 kW capacity if installed by a renewables self-consumer).

Legislative context

As part of the REPowerEU plan of May 2022 to phase out Russian fossil fuels and accelerate the clean energy transition, the Commission proposed a targeted revision of the Renewable Energy Directive. This revision aims to increase to 45 % the target share of renewable energy sources in EU consumption by 2030. The currently binding target is 32 %, while a broader RED revision as part of the ‘fit for 55’ package proposed a target of 40 %. The REPowerEU revision also proposed simplified procedures for renewable energy installations, overlapping to some extent with the newly proposed regulation on accelerating the deployment of renewables that is the focus of this paper (e.g. permit granting for solar installations and repowering of renewable energy power plants). While negotiations on the longer-term revision of the RED are currently ongoing, the newly proposed regulation is seen as a temporary emergency measure responding to the need to achieve some of the REPowerEU objectives faster in the light of the worsening energy crisis, in particular the objective to accelerate the rollout of renewables.

European Parliament position

As Article 122 TFEU is the legal basis, the Parliament is not participating in the negotiations. However, it has taken a position on the revised version of the RED, which includes provisions that touch upon the same topics. On 14 September 2022, Parliament adopted its first-reading position on the RED revision proposed under the ‘fit for 55’ package. The position supported the streamlining of permitting procedures for both renewable energy projects and related grid infrastructure projects. It also highlighted the importance of accelerating the deployment of solar rooftops and heat pumps in order to reduce fossil fuel imports.

On 14 November 2022, Parliament’s Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE) voted on its draft amendments to the RED revision under REPowerEU. The report supports the new target of 45 %, calls for shorter approval periods for new renewable installations and supports simplified assessments. Parliament is expected to vote on this report during its December 2022 plenary session.

In its resolution of 5 October 2022 on the EU’s response to the increase in energy prices in Europe, Parliament commented on the use of Article 122 as the legal basis for the recent regulation on an emergency intervention to address high energy prices. It regretted that the Commission proposal took the form of a Council regulation under Article 122 rather than a regulation under the ordinary legislative procedure. Parliament also confirmed its readiness to ‘act swiftly on this pressing issue if called upon, as it requires full democratic legitimacy and accountability’. The currently proposed regulation on accelerating renewables is the fourth in a series of energy-related acts proposed in 2022 under Article 122. The others include the above-mentioned regulation to address high energy prices, the regulation on gas demand reduction and the recently proposed regulation on enhancing solidarity through better coordination of gas purchases, exchanges of gas across borders and reliable price benchmarks.

The Member States’ ambassadors to the EU (Coreper) discussed the text on 18 November 2022. The energy ministers in the Council are expected to reach a political agreement on 24 November 2022.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Accelerating the deployment of renewable energy during the crisis‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Tarja Laaninen (1st edition).

An independent media is a pillar of democracy and an important part of the economy, helping to shape public opinion and hold those in power to account. In recent years, however, there have been increasingly worrying trends across the European Union (EU), as documented in the annual rule of law reports by the European Commission and other tools such as the Media Pluralism Monitor.

Published on 16 September 2022, the European media freedom act (EMFA) proposes a new set of rules and mechanisms to promote media pluralism and independence across the EU, and amends the Audiovisual Media Services Directive (AVMSD, Directive 2010/13/EU). The aim is to prevent political interference in editorial decisions and ensure transparency of media ownership. Member States will be required to assess the impact of media concentrations. The proposed act stresses the importance of an independent and adequately funded public service media, and seeks to protect journalists from having to disclose their sources and from the use of spyware against them. It also sets requirements for fair audience measurement systems and transparent allocation of state advertising. Media content would be better protected against unjustified online content removal, and a new European board for media services would be established to assist in the implementation of the EU media law framework.

In the European Parliament, the Committee on Culture and Education (CULT) has been designated the committee responsible, with the Committees on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) and Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO) asked to give opinions. The procedure is in its initial stages and in the preparatory phase in Parliament.

Versions

• November 2022: European media freedom act (1st edition)

Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a common framework for media services in the internal market (European Media Freedom Act) and amending Directive 2010/13/EU Committee responsible:Culture and Education (CULT)COM(2022)457
16.09.2022Rapporteur:To be appointed2022/0277(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Ordinary legislative procedure (COD) (Parliament and Council on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Initial discussions in committee

Written by Rosamund Shreeves.

Adopted in 1989, the United Nations (UN) Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) was the first international instrument to explicitly recognise children as human beings with innate rights. Ratified by 197 countries, including all EU Member States, it has become the landmark treaty on children’s rights, outlining universal standards for the care, treatment, survival, development, protection and participation of all children.

The promotion and protection of children’s rights is one of the key objectives embedded in Article 3(3) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU). Moreover, Article 24 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU recognises that children are entitled to ‘protection and care as is necessary for their well-being’. The same article recognises that the child’s best interests should be the primary consideration for public authorities and private institutions.

Over the years, the EU has moved from a sectoral approach towards a more coherent policy approach. Whereas initially, children’s rights were developed in relation to specific areas – such as the free movement of persons – since 2000 the EU has taken a more coordinated line. This briefing offers an overview of the most relevant actions at European level to address and promote children’s rights before looking at upcoming challenges.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Children’s rights in the EU in the light of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Marie Lecerf and Micaela Del Monte.

More than 8 months into Russia’s war on Ukraine, there is no end in sight. The invasion has forced millions of people to flee Ukraine or seek refuge in other parts of the country, causing a European humanitarian crisis of enormous proportions. The chaos created by the conflict has increased the risk of violence and exploitation exponentially, especially for the most vulnerable people, such as those with disabilities. Estimates show that around 2.7 million people with disabilities in Ukraine face a disproportionate risk of violence or death, and lack access to medical support; this number will most likely increase as the conflict goes on. Since the war began, the European Parliament has been drawing attention to the needs of people with disabilities.

The humanitarian situation of people fleeing or being displaced within Ukraine

As of 8 November 2022, the United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR) estimated that over 7.8 million people had fled from Ukraine to neighbouring countries since the start of the conflict; more than 4.6 million of them had registered for temporary protection or similar national protection schemes in Europe. As of 14 November, 16 631 civilian casualties (6 557 killed and 10 074 injured) were recorded in Ukraine, though the figures could be higher owing to the ongoing hostilities and ensuing difficulties in reporting. The raging conflict keeps increasing the numbers of casualties and the extent of the destruction and displacement within Ukraine, thus causing one of the greatest European humanitarian crises of recent times.

Specific risks facing Ukrainians with disabilities in times of conflict

People with disabilities (PWDs) in Ukraine were already extremely vulnerable prior to the Russian invasion. Taking this into account, the European Commission’s 2021-2027 action plan on integration and inclusion mentioned that migrants with disabilities may face discrimination. It stressed the special educational needs of children with disabilities and also pointed to the difficulties migrants with disabilities face in accessing the labour market. During armed conflicts, the needs and vulnerabilities of PWDs are amplified, as is the risk of discrimination towards them. The war in Ukraine is no exception: the mass displacement and chaos triggered by the conflict have raised serious concerns about violations of human rights inside and outside the country, in particular those of vulnerable people, such as women, children, LGBTI people, Roma and PWDs. In April 2022, the UN Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UNCRPD) warned that 2.7 million PWDs in Ukraine were at risk of being abandoned in their homes or in residential care, with ‘no access to life-sustaining medications, oxygen supplies, food, water, sanitation, support for daily living and other basic facilities’. June 2022 estimates show that more than 143 000 PWDs have been displaced since the outbreak of the war.

Furthermore, the conflict has exposed PWDs to a disproportionate risk of death or injury and hampered their access to emergency information. PWDs often have no way to reach shelters or safe places, and because of mass displacement they have been disconnected from their support networks. The UN ‘Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine, 1 February to 31 July 2022′ pointed to a lack of ‘access to bomb shelters, evacuation trains, necessary medication and adequate housing suited to their needs’ for PWDs. Another UN report stressed that Ukrainian children ‘with visual, hearing, developmental or intellectual disabilities’ are at higher risk of danger because ‘they may not have learned about or understood what was happening’ or were removed from or abandoned in their institutions without appropriate support. Non-governmental organisation (NGO) Inclusion Europe reported that before the war, around 261 000 people in Ukraine had disability status due to intellectual and psychosocial disorders. The sirens, explosions and alarms, in addition to the bombing and shelling, have caused them stress, depression and anxiety, in some cases exacerbating their chronic disease. Moreover, Inclusion Europe points to the difficulty such people face in accessing medical services, psychological assistance and psychiatric care, and to the fact that autistic people cannot stay in overcrowded bomb shelters.

Similarly, the World Economic Forum stresses that PWDs are facing a ‘crisis within a crisis’ not only because civilian infrastructures, including hospitals and residential care facilities, are under shelling but also because people in wheelchairs or who are visually or otherwise impaired are facing unprecedented challenges in trying to escape the hostilities. This is why the NGO Humanity and Inclusion has highlighted the urgent need to ensure that the specific needs of PWDs are identified and taken into account in humanitarian measures. Likewise, UN experts call ‘for urgent action to protect Ukrainian children with disabilities in residential care institutions’. Stakeholders, such as the European Disability Forum and the European Association of Service providers for Persons with Disabilities (EASPD), are also closely monitoring the situation of PWDs who are in Ukraine or have fled the country.

International and European Union initiatives

A September 2022 UNCRPD report on the situation of PWDs in Ukraine points to states’ obligations regarding PWDs in the context of armed conflict. It refers to Article 11 of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, which requires states parties to ensure the inclusion of PWDs when meeting their obligations under international law, including international humanitarian and human rights law. At the time of writing, there were 185 states parties to the convention; it was ratified by both Russia (2012) and Ukraine (2010).

Since the war began, the EU has activated its Temporary Protection Directive, coordinated the largest EU Civil Protection Mechanism operation to date and stepped up its financial assistance to Ukraine (the EU and its Member States have disbursed €1.4 billion in humanitarian aid to Ukraine since 2014). The EU has also arranged for the cohesion funds to be used to help Member States welcome fleeing Ukrainians. In March 2022, a Commission communication on welcoming those fleeing war in Ukraine stressed the need to pay particular attention to vulnerable categories, including children with special needs or disabilities and PWDs in general. It pointed out that the European Social Fund Plus can support community-based services and accommodation, especially for those with special needs or disabilities, and also for children and the elderly.

This year, the Commission, together with the European Disability Forum, is organising the annual conference to mark the European Day of Persons with Disabilities. The conference will focus on: issues faced by young people with disabilities; the international instruments available in support of PWDs; and the escalation of violence in Ukraine, which has affected PWDs particularly badly. In line with EU operational guidance on the inclusion of PWDs in EU humanitarian aid, the needs of PWDs are mainstreamed in EU actions to foster a disability-inclusive humanitarian response. Similarly, EU-funded projects in Ukraine, run by partners such as Humanity and Inclusion and the World Health Organization, target and prioritise PWDs in terms of protection, psychosocial support, hygiene, health and shelter.

The European Parliament’s position

In its resolution of 1 March 2022, Parliament recalled that ‘attacks against civilians and civilian infrastructure as well as indiscriminate attacks are prohibited under international humanitarian law and therefore constitute war crimes’. It called on the Commission, EU Member States and UN agencies to offer humanitarian assistance to the civilian population. Parliament stressed the needs of ‘vulnerable groups, minorities, and women and children, since they are particularly affected in conflict situations and need special protection and support, in particular children in institutional care, unaccompanied children, and children with disabilities and other serious illnesses’ and highlighted the need to ‘ensure that they continue to receive the necessary care and life-saving treatment and are immediately evacuated to safety’. In its resolution of 7 April 2022, Parliament called for the promotion of mechanisms to relocate refugees among the Member States, including fast coordinated transportation of refugees, in particular unaccompanied children and children with disabilities. Members reiterated their concern about PWDs in a resolution of 19 May 2022, underlining the importance of offering specialised protection and care to PWDs coming from Ukraine, and a resolution of September 2022 calling on Member States to ‘address the plight of vulnerable groups, including … people with disabilities in EU public statements about forcible transfers, and to support activists and NGOs on the ground who are trying to take care of them and facilitate their safe return’.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Russia’s war on Ukraine: People with disabilities‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Alex Wilson.

The European Commission has adopted a proposal to improve the functioning of EU gas markets during the current energy crisis. It introduces a joint purchasing tool, seeks to improve efficiency and security of gas supply, and limits prices and volatility. The proposed Council regulation is under discussion among EU Member States.

Background

On 18 October 2022, the European Commission adopted a proposal for a Council regulation enhancing solidarity through better coordination of gas purchases, exchanges of gas across borders and reliable price benchmarks. This is one of several urgent EU legislative actions undertaken to address the energy crisis triggered by Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine. The proposal is linked to the Commission’s REPower EU plan (18 May 2022), which aims to end Europe’s reliance on energy imports from Russia and accelerate the clean energy transition. And it is closely related to other emergency EU legislation adopted over the course of 2022, including an EU Regulation on filling in gas storage levels; a Council Regulation voluntarily curbing gas consumption over the winter period; and a Council Regulation containing a series of emergency measures (demand reduction, market intervention and windfall levies) to address the problem of very high energy prices across the EU in 2022 and 2023 (see EPRS briefing on the topic).

Legal basis

The proposed Council regulation uses Article 122 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) as its legal basis, like many other urgent EU proposals adopted in the face of the energy crisis. Article 122 TFEU is designed for use in case of a serious threat to energy supplies, and it is certainly the case that close energy ties between the EU and Russia (until recently the leading supplier of fossil fuels to Europe) have collapsed because of the invasion of Ukraine in 2022. This deterioration of energy relations is evident from the EU embargo on imports of Russian coal; the impending EU embargo on Russian oil and oil-related products; and the drastic reduction in Russian pipeline gas supplies. Article 122 TFEU can accelerate the process of EU decision-making in an emergency situation, because it only requires the agreement of the Council of the EU and does not provide for any legislative role for the European Parliament. However, frequent use of Article 122 TFEU can reduce the level of democratic scrutiny over EU policies. The normal legal basis for EU energy policies is Article 194 TFEU, which is being used to revise more permanent legislation on EU gas markets. Furthermore, Article 194 TFEU was used to agree the EU regulation on gas storage, which was swiftly adopted by the Parliament and Council under an expedited procedure.

Main features of the proposed Council regulation

This proposal aims to develop greater joint purchasing of gas and ensure the efficient operation of gas infrastructure, pipelines and LNG terminals. It also includes measures to enhance security of supply, and takes action to address the current problem of high prices and volatility in EU gas markets. In light of the emergency character of the Council regulation and its related legal basis (Article 122 TFEU), the Commission has proposed that it should be valid for a period of one year, albeit with the possibility of prolongation.

Joint purchasing

The EU would take the first concrete steps towards the joint purchasing of gas by developing a temporary joint purchasing tool. The tool would be ready by spring 2023 and impact on gas supplies during the next filling season (i.e. ahead of winter 2023/2024). Joint purchasing would involve a two-step process. Firstly, gas purchasing companies would aggregate their demand using a dedicated service provider, hired under a public procurement procedure. Member States would have to ensure at least 15 % of their storage filling requirements for next year were included by their companies in the demand aggregation process (roughly 13.5 billion cubic metres across the EU as a whole). The second step would involve some of these companies voluntarily deciding to form a gas purchasing consortium (or even multiple consortia that vary by region). The idea is that a gas purchasing consortium could negotiate lower prices and ensure a more stable supply, especially in a context of scarcity. This proposal is consistent with a longstanding demand of the European Parliament for a joint EU gas purchasing mechanism.

Efficient operation of pipelines and LNG terminals

The proposal grants the gas system operators more tools to react rapidly to changes in gas flows and possible contractual congestion. These are becoming more problematic because of the urgent need to diversify gas supplies away from Russia, which in turn sharply increases the EU’s reliance on liquefied natural gas (LNG) supplies, obtained from a wide range of exporting countries. The proposal envisages a transparency platform and the development of an organised market of secondary capacities for LNG imports, similar to those already in existence for the transport of gas via pipelines. This is consistent with the Commission’s legislative proposal (December 2021) to reform EU gas and hydrogen markets.

Security of supply

The proposal would facilitate Member States in taking further steps to reduce EU gas demand beyond this winter. Security of supply will remain a major concern going into the following winter (2023-2024) because of the (likely) total interruption of Russian gas supplies, making it much harder to fill in gas storage sites to their full capacity. To better prepare for an emergency, Member States would be able to redefine their protected consumers, so long as vulnerable households continue to be protected in all circumstances. Member States would likewise be able to reduce the ‘non-essential consumption’ of protected customers, provided this does not lead to disconnection. Critical gas-fired power plants would now be covered by a solidarity protection obligation. Default rules for bilateral solidarity between Member States would henceforth apply in all instances where no solidarity agreements exist. This has now become a necessity, given that only six out of the 40 required solidarity agreements are in place. In the event of an EU or regional emergency involving major gas disruptions and supply shortages, the Council of the EU would have the possibility to decide on an efficient allocation of gas capacities.

Addressing high prices and volatility

The proposal would develop a new complementary benchmark for LNG imports to Europe. The Dutch Title Transfer Facility (TTF), Europe’s main market hub for gas, remains too dependent on prices for pipeline gas from Russia, with the result that its operation may now be artificially inflating EU gas prices. The EU Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) would be tasked with developing this new benchmark. The proposal also envisages the future possibility of developing a gas market correction mechanism, in the form of a potential new Council Regulation that would establish a maximum dynamic price at which natural gas transactions can take place in the TTF spot markets.

The proposal would introduce an intra-day price volatility management mechanism aimed at limiting large price movements in electricity and gas derivatives contracts within the same trading day, and which would complement existing ‘circuit breakers’ established on trading platforms. To this specific end, and to better assess issues relating to high pricing and volatility, ACER and the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) would be allocated new tasks and required to cooperate more closely.

The proposal does not include concrete measures to implement a price cap on gas imports to the EU, and therefore does not fully address the European Council’s request for a ‘temporary dynamic price corridor’ and a ‘temporary EU framework to cap the price of gas in electricity generation’ (see below).

Next steps

Member States are in the process of negotiating the final text of the Council regulation, and some have expressed their dissatisfaction with a text that does not contain concrete proposals for a cap on gas prices, as requested by the European Council on 20-21 October 2022. The Commission has previously expressed its concerns about the unintended consequences of a gas price cap, arguing that it could disincentivise demand reduction and jeopardise security of supply to Europe. Nevertheless, some kind of plan to curb gas prices could form part of the process of Member States agreeing to the text of this Council regulation.

The Council regulation is currently under discussion and may be adopted at the extraordinary meeting of energy ministers on 24 November 2022, possibly alongside a new plan to limit future gas prices.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Enhancing solidarity in EU gas markets‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Marcin Grajewski.

Russia has recently launched the heaviest missile barrage against Ukraine since it began its attack on the country nearly nine months ago. This follows the Ukrainian counter-offensive in the east and south, which led to Russia abandoning the southern city of Kherson, the only regional capital it had captured since the February invasion.

On 15 November, a missile landed in Poland, killing two and sparking fears that Russia had attacked a NATO country. A NATO and Polish investigation showed that the blast most likely came from a stray rocket of the Ukrainian air defence system. However, the military alliance said Moscow, not Kyiv, was ultimately responsible for the explosion in Poland. At their summit in Bali, G20 leaders issued a closing declaration saying that ‘most members strongly condemned the war in Ukraine’, although it acknowledged that ‘there were other views’.

This note gathers links to the recent publications and commentaries from many international think tanks on Russia’s war on Ukraine. Earlier analyses of the war can be found in a previous edition of the ‘What Think Tanks are Thinking’ series.

Financing and governing the recovery, reconstruction, and modernization of Ukraine
Brookings Institution, November 2022

Can EU enlargement gain momentum?
Centre for European Reform, November 2022

If Russia goes nuclear: Three scenarios for the Ukraine war
Council on Foreign Relations, November 2022

Russia’s withdrawal from Kherson
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, November 2022

Massive strikes on civilian infrastructure
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, November 2022

The war against Ukraine and European defence: When will we square the circle?
Egmont, November 2022

Defend. Resist. Repeat: Ukraine’s lessons for European defence
European Council on Foreign Relations, November 2022

How to defeat Russia and prevent nuclear armageddon with one weird trick
European Council on Foreign Relations, November 2022

More tortoise, less hare: How Europeans can ramp up military supplies for Ukraine in the long war
European Council on Foreign Relations, November 2022

De quoi le Président Poutine a-t-il peur?
Fondation Robert Schuman, November 2022

Dear Israel, time to step up on Ukraine
Friends of Europe, November 2022

L’europe face à la Russie: Quel avenir pour la stratégie des sanctions?
Institut Jacques Delors, November 2022

After Ukraine, a shattered multilateralism?
Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale, November 2022

How the Ukraine war could disrupt climate policies in the MENA region
Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale, November 2022

Ukraine: unconventional impact at sea?
International Institute for Security Studies, November 2022

Where do the war in Ukraine and sanctions against Russia lead
International Institute for Peace, November 2022

Western Balkans accession to EU: Lessons for Ukraine
Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, November 2022

Living in limbo: Displaced Ukrainians in Poland
Migration Policy Institute, November 2022

The waning India-Russia partnership is an unexpected effect of the war in Ukraine
Polish Institute of International Affairs, November 2022

Iran assists Russia with weapons: The military and political consequences
Polish Institute of International Affairs, November 2022

Putin’s ‘popular Monarchism’ leads Russia into ruin
Wilson Centre, November 2022

U.S. perception of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine
Wilson Centre, November 2022

Heroic arts: The Remarkable story of Ukrainian artists confronting Russia
Wilson Centre, November 2022

Ukraine recovery and reconstruction: cities must be part of it
Barcelona Centre for International Affairs, October 2022

Takeaway from Berlin Ukraine recovery conference: Donor coordination for Ukraine is coming but not here yet
Brookings Institution, October 2022

Ukrainian recovery funding must be tied to anti-corruption
Brookings Institution, October 2022

Russia may prefer sabotage of critical infrastructure over nuclear weapons
Brookings Institution, October 2022

History reveals how to get Ukraine reconstruction right: anti-corruption
Brookings Institution, October 2022

Ukrainian refugees: Challenges in a welcoming Europe
Brookings Institution, October 2022

How have sanctions impacted Russia?
Bruegel, October 2022

Is European support for Ukraine dependent on the United States?
Carnegie Europe, October 2022

Is European support for Ukraine dependent on the United States?
Centre for European Reform, October “022

A struggle to survive: Ukraine’s economy in wartime
Centre for Eastern Studies, October 2022

Russia and Ukraine
Clingendael, October 2022

Can Iranian drones turn Russia’s fortunes in the Ukraine war?
Council on Foreign Relations, October 2022

On the Ukraine war, Germany has a leadership problem. Here’s why
Council on Foreign Relations, October 2022

The EU and Ukraine: Strategy and morality
Egmont, October 2022

Putin’s last ally: Why the Belarusian army cannot help Russia in Ukraine
European Council on Foreign Relations, October 2022

No loitering: What Russia’s Iranian drones could mean for Ukraine
European Council on Foreign Relations, October 2022

Mob unhappy: Why Russia is unlikely to emerge victorious in Ukraine
European Council on Foreign Relations, October 2022

Old order dying: What European decision-makers think of Russia
European Council on Foreign Relations, October 2022

Strengthening the impact of EU sanctions against Russian aggression in Ukraine
European Policy Centre, October 2022

EU responses to Ukrainian arrival: Not (yet) a blueprint
European Policy Centre, October 2022

Keeping a cool head: How to improve the EU migration crisis response
European Policy Centre, October 2022

Zelensky hopes for security guarantees
German Marshall Fund, October 2022

Russia’s dirty bomb claim is a dirty lie
Heritage Foundation, October 2022

Implications of the War in Ukraine on Asia
International Institute for Strategic Studies, October 2022

Russia’s ‘dirty bomb’ diplomacy
International Institute for Strategic Studies, October 2022

Quelle défense pour Taïwan? Réflexions au miroir de la guerre en Ukraine
Institut Thomas More, October 2022

Sanctions against Russia: EU seeks coordination to limit circumvention
Polish Institute of International Affairs, October 2022

Ukraine’s dream could be Taiwan’s nightmare
Rand Corporation, October 2022

The West and Russia the day after
Rand Corporation, October 2022

Russia’s comments about a ‘dirty bomb’ betray the state’s weakness
Wilson Centre, October 2022

Read this briefing on ‘Russia’s war on Ukraine nine months on‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Bruno Bilquin.

The European Peace Facility (EPF), operational since July 2021, finances activities with military implications, and supports the armies of partner countries and EU Member States with infrastructure, training and equipment. Reacting to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, for the first time in its history the EU has now mobilised funds for the delivery by Member States of military equipment, including lethal weaponry, to assist a partner country.

EPF military assistance for Ukraine to date

The EPF entered into force in March 2021. Its financial ceiling is €5.692 billion (2021 prices) for 2021 to 2027, with an annual ceiling due to increase from €420 million in 2021 to €1.132 billion in 2027. Member States make yearly contributions to the EPF, an off-budget tool, in proportion to their gross national incomes.

Reacting quickly and unanimously to Russia’s war on Ukraine, which began on 24 February 2022, the Council has now adopted 12 decisions, providing for six tranches, each consisting of two assistance measures (mainly lethal equipment but also non-lethal support) for the Ukrainian armed forces (UAF). Each tranche has been worth €500 million. The Council’s two most recent decisions were adopted on17 October 2022 – 2022/1971 and 2022/1972 – and also allowed the financing to be used for the maintenance and repair of military equipment already delivered.

The six tranches of EPF-funded military equipment for Ukraine delivered by Member States are worth €3 billion, split between lethal equipment and platforms (€2.82 billion) and non-lethal support (€0.18 billion). In just 8 months, more than half the EPF’s 7-year budget has been mobilised. Through the EEAS-hosted clearing house and the EPF committee, Member States can ask to be reimbursed, in part at least, for the equipment they have delivered, for lethal support, such as tanks, air defence systems, anti-aircraft and anti-tank missiles and ammunition, and non-lethal support, such as bullet-proof vests, helmets, first aid kits and fuel. Three Member States that used their constructive abstention with regard to the provision of lethal support on 17 October 2022, have made additional contributions, totalling €0.1 billion, for non-lethal support, raising the total EPF contribution to military assistance for Ukraine to €3.1 billion.

EU military assistance mission in support of Ukraine
In response to the Ukrainian authorities’ request for an EU military training mission, at its meeting on 17 October 2022, the Council set up an EU military assistance mission in support of Ukraine (EUMAM Ukraine). This was intended to enhance the military capability of the UAF to conduct military operations effectively, to enable Ukraine to defend its territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders, effectively exercise its sovereignty, and protect civilians. The EUMAM will train 15 000 UAF personnel, in at least two training centres in Member States (one in Poland, the other in Germany), with the mission’s operational headquarters within the EEAS-hosted Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC) in Brussels. The mission will be open to the participation of third states, such as the United Kingdom, the United States and Canada. The initial duration of this non-executive mission is 2 years. The EPF will finance the mission’s common costs up to €106.7 million. Use of the EPF elsewhere in the world

The EPF was not designed to respond to a war on the European continent. Its original purpose was to allow the financing of common foreign and security policy (CFSP) activities with military or defence implications, and to express the EU’s ambition as a global security provider, for both its citizens and its partners. During its first 18 months of existence, the EPF has been used to fund the military component of CSDP (common security and defence policy) activities, mainly in Ukraine, but also, in other countries of the Eastern Neighbourhood, in the Western Balkans and in sub-Saharan Africa, and to assist the armies of partner countries, but without lethal elements.

Eastern Neighbourhood and Western Balkans

On 2 December 2021, the Council, established three EPF assistance measures for non-lethal equipment for the armies of Georgia (€12.75 million, Decision (CFSP) 2021/2134), Moldova (€7 million, Decision (CFSP) 2021/2136), and Ukraine (€31 million, Decision (CFSP) 2021/2135). On 30 June 2022 it adopted a further assistance measure for Moldova (€40 million of non-lethal equipment, Decision (CFSP) 2022/1093) and on 4 November 2021 an assistance measure (€10 million) for Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) (Decision (EU) 2021/1923), to provide the country’s demining battalion with medical and transport vehicles, and metal detectors). On 9 June 2022 the Council adopted an assistance measure (€6 million) for the Balkan Medical Task Force (BMTF), to equip the medical units of the armies of five Western Balkan non-EU countries (Albania, BiH, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia), and of Slovenia (Decision (CFSP) 2022/906).

Sub-Saharan Africa

In the 2021-2022 period, the Council adopted a number of assistance measures and one concept note in relation to this region, incidentally the scene for the first ever mobilisation of EPF funds (for African Union (AU)-led PSOs):

• on 22 July 2021, the Council approved an assistance measure (€130 million, Decision (EU) 2021/1210) in the form of a general support programme for peace support operations (PSOs) of the African Union for 2021;
• on 21 April 2022, the Council agreed a new assistance measure to mobilise additional funding (€600 million, Decision (CFSP) 2022/667) for those PSOs, covering the years 2022 to 2024. Under this decision, the Council approved additional support to enhance the operational effectiveness of the Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF) of the Lake Chad Basin against Boko Haram, in partnership with the AU (€10 million). The EPF funding of €600 million also includes additional support (€120 million) for the military component of the AU mission in Somalia/AU Transition Mission in Somalia (AMISOM/ATMIS), approved by the Council on 6 July 2022, and support (€15 million) for the Southern African Development Community (SADC) mission to Mozambique (SAMIM), approved on 8 September 2022. EPF support for AU-led PSOs now totals €730 million. This support was previously funded under the African Peace Facility;
• on 30 July 2021, the Council released a concept note for an urgent measure (€4 million) to equip the EU Training Mission in Mozambique (EUTM MOZ);
• on 19 November 2021, the Council approved an assistance measure (€40 million, Decision (CFSP) 2021/2032) for rapid reaction forces trained by EUTM MOZ;  
• on 21 April 2022, the Council mobilised €45 million (Decision(CFSP) 2022/668) to further equip these forces;
• on 18 July 2022, the Council agreed an assistance measure (€25 million, Decision (CFSP) 2022/1236) for the army of Niger;
• on 2 December 2021, Council approved an assistance measure in support of the Malian army, in conjunction with the EU Training Mission in Mali (EUTM Mali) (€24 million, Decision (CFSP) 2021/2137);
• in April 2022, the Council suspended the operational part of the training of the Malian army under the EUTM Mali, given the likely increasing interferences and abuses of Wagner mercenaries. The Council confirmed this suspension on 17 October 2022.

In addition to these direct military assistance measures for partner countries, the EPF also funds the common costs of active CSDP military operations and missions in sub-Saharan Africa (such as EUTM MOZ). These cover 5 to 10 % of an operation’s total costs. They used to be funded under the Athena mechanism.

European Parliament position
On 8 June 2022, in its recommendation on EU foreign, security and defence policy, Parliament called for the right to be involved in the implementation and scrutiny of the EPF; for Ukraine to be supplied with weapons without delay, in line with its needs, notably by using the EPF; and for increased assistance for Georgia and Moldova through the EPF.
In its resolution of 6 October 2022 on Russia’s escalation of its war of aggression against Ukraine, Parliament called on the High Representative/Vice President of the Commission to coordinate weapons deliveries through the clearing house, including an EU initiative for the delivery of advanced weapons systems, such as Leopard tanks, and called on Member States to start training Ukrainian soldiers immediately in this regard. It also called on Member States and other countries supporting Ukraine to consider a lend-lease military assistance facility for Ukraine.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘European Peace Facility: Ukraine and beyond‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Clare Ferguson with Sophia Stone.

Members gather in Strasbourg for the second plenary session of November 2022 against a backdrop of continued global tension. The agenda once again reflects the difficult situation, with tough budgetary decisions, threats to EU resilience, Ukraine’s situation and EU enlargement all scheduled for debate. Nevertheless, Members will also attend a ceremony to mark a more joyous occasion: Parliament’s ‘birthday’ on Tuesday. Members of the European Parliament, directly elected since 1979, have now represented European citizens’ for 70 years, culminating in Parliament’s position today as a cornerstone of the EU’s democratic legitimacy.

The social and economic crisis triggered by COVID-19, Russia’s war on Ukraine and the resulting energy price rises, are foremost in everyone’s mind. Parliament will therefore hold a question time session on Tuesday afternoon, during which Members will pose questions to the European Commission on the direction of future legislative reform of the economic governance framework. Amid challenging market conditions and the rising cost of refinancing, Members are expected to debate a Committee on Budgets (BUDG) report on the borrowing strategy to finance Next Generation EU – the Union’s temporary post-coronavirus pandemic recovery instrument (NGEU) – on Monday evening. The report welcomes the smooth implementation of the strategy, allowing payment of a combination of loans and grants to Member States through EU programmes. However, the BUDG committee also underlines the need for transparency, urging the Commission to present systematic accounts of the spending to Parliament for proper scrutiny. In light of the growing cost of financing the NGEU debt, the committee also notes that new own resources are needed urgently, both those already under consideration and those due to be proposed in 2023. Members are therefore also due to consider another BUDG report on Tuesday, calling for rapid adoption of a decision on three new own resources. The resources proposed would gather contributions to the EU budget from an extended emissions trading scheme (ETS), a carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM), and a share of reallocated very large multinational company profits. The report also highlights the need for ambitious, balanced and transparent own resources that do not depend on taxing citizens, and that move away from gross national income-dependent resources towards financing tailored to objectives.

Members are also expected to hold a debate on Tuesday on the joint text agreed with the Council in conciliation on the 2023 EU budget, where a last-minute provisional agreement was reached between the negotiators early this week. The compromise reflects Parliament’s priorities to increase funding to address the consequences of the war in Ukraine, the energy crisis, the post-pandemic recovery and to boost the green and digital transitions.

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On Tuesday morning, with recent gas pipeline sabotage and the damage done by the pandemic fresh in mind, Members are set to debate a report from the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE), following a political agreement reached with the Council on boosting the resilience of critical entities in the EU. The proposal seeks to ensure key infrastructure and networks throughout the EU are prepared to face disruption, whether due to natural causes or hostile actors. The agreement covers 11 sectors, but allows for the exclusion of nationally sensitive entities such as defence, parliaments and central banks. Parliament’s negotiators have ensured protection for systems safeguarding the rule of law, and that entities covering six or more Member States will qualify as of particular European significance.

The rise in cyber-attacks and disinformation also demonstrate the need to set out a strong digital policy direction for Europe, in light of the omnipresence of digital technology in almost every aspect of modern life. On Thursday morning, Members are due to consider a provisional agreement reached with the Council on a proposal to establish the ‘Path to the digital decade‘ programme, setting out action to pursue the EU digital strategy to 2030. Negotiators representing Parliament’s Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE) secured a strong role for Parliament in scrutinising progress on the digital targets. Measured according to a ‘digital compass’, these will strengthen broadband infrastructure, digitalise public and private sectors, narrow the digital divide and progress the adoption of new technologies such as artificial intelligence.

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The situation in Ukraine of course remains high on the agenda. On Tuesday afternoon, Members will pose questions to the High Representative/Vice-President of the Commission Josep Borrell on the impact of Russia’s war of aggression on non-EU countries, in relation to the ‘Black Sea Grain Initiative‘ agreement. While the agreement has helped to prevent a widespread food global crisis, countries dependent on food imports and aid remain very vulnerable to any change in the situation. The recent renewal of the agreement – despite Russia’s indications that it would pull out – should also ease the pressure over the winter.

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An €18 billion Ukraine support package has been proposed for 2023, in the form of highly concessional loans backed by the EU budget. Three acts must be passed for disbursement to begin in early January, and if Parliament approves use of the urgent procedure, Members could vote directly on all three proposals for macro-financial assistance to Ukraine on Wednesday.

On Wednesday, Members are expected to vote on a motion for a resolution recognising the Russian Federation as a state sponsor of terrorism, tabled following a debate on 18 October. So far, none of the EU sanctions in retaliation for Russia’s aggression refer to Russia as a terrorist state or a state sponsor of terrorism, a change which could facilitate the confiscation of Russian assets.

Ukraine’s recent request to join the EU, swiftly followed by Moldova and Georgia, has put enlargement firmly back on the agenda. However, European integration prospects for the Western Balkans and Türkiye have seen little progress in recent years. Aimed at re-energising EU enlargement policy, Members will debate an own-initiative report from Parliament’s Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET) on a new EU enlargement strategy on Tuesday afternoon. The AFET committee proposes to overhaul the process and provide candidates with roadmaps setting specific milestones to reach on their path to EU membership. The report further suggests formal suspension of the current negotiations with Türkiye.

Members are expected to consider another AFET committee own-initiative report on Tuesday, on the deteriorating political and security situation in Libya. The report proposes to nominate an EU special representative for Libya, redoubling EU diplomatic efforts to promote peace. The AFET committee also recommends strong support for United Nations-led reconciliation efforts seeking a peaceful and democratic transition, in a country where weak governance and a proxy war have strengthened violent groups at the cost of democracy.

On Tuesday morning, Members are set to return to a proposal, blocked in the Council for years, to legislate to improve gender balance on boards in the EU. Gender-diverse company boards contribute to transparency and gender equality in the workplace and provide undeniable economic benefit. Nonetheless, only 34.1 % of the largest EU companies’ board members are women. Parliament has long pushed for progress on the proposal, finally reaching agreement with the Council on the text earlier this year. Parliament negotiators have ensured a 2026 deadline for companies to hit the target of minimum 33 % women directors, and specific penalties for companies that do not comply.

Finally, the common fisheries policy (CFP) gives EU countries equal access to fisheries resources in each other’s waters, but with a long-standing temporary provision enabling countries to reserve waters up to 12 miles from their coastlines for local and neighbouring fishing vessels: Croatian vessels may fish in Slovenian coastal waters, and vice versa, for instance. As the current agreement, which allows Member States to limit access to the 12-mile zone expires at the end of the year, Members are due to vote on Tuesday on a provisional agreement to extend the rules on access to coastal waters for another 10 years.

European Parliament Plenary Session – November II 2022 – agenda

Most of our ‘at a glance’ notes are available in several languages:

• The European Parliament at 70: Origins and long-term trajectories
• Borrowing strategy to finance Next Generation EU
• System of own resources of the EU
• 2023 EU Budget
• Resilience of critical entities
• 2030 policy programme: ‘Path to the digital decade
• Macro-financial assistance for Ukraine in 2023
• Russia’s war on Ukraine: Designating a state as a sponsor of terrorism
• New EU strategy for enlargement
• Situation in Libya
• Extension of EU rules on access to coastal waters
• Question time: New orientations for the EU’s economic governance framework
• Question time: The impact on third countries of Russia’s war on Ukraine in relation to the ‘Black Sea Grain Initiative’ agreement

Citizens often turn to the European Parliament to ask what the European Union (EU) is doing to eradicate forced and child labour worldwide.

According to estimates by the International Labour Organization (ILO), 27.6 million people (including 3.3 million children) are in forced labour while child labour affects 160 million children (almost one in ten). These phenomena occur across all continents to varying degrees. Eradication of forced labour by 2030 and child labour by 2025 is enshrined in the United Nations Sustainable Development Goal 8.7.

The European Union (EU) has a long history of promoting respect for human rights and related labour rights, including decent work and freedom from forced labour, through a variety of internal and external policies. These include working together with international organisations, such as the International Labour Organization, World Trade Organization (WTO) and the Group of Seven (G7).

EU action to combat forced and child labour

The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights explicitly prohibits forced labour (Article 5) and child labour (Article 32).

The EU has several laws in place to tackle forced labour, for instance on human trafficking and on sanctions against employers of migrants in an irregular situation. In addition, the European Commission has issued guidance to help EU businesses comply with international standards on forced labour in their operations and supply chains.

The EU purses a zero-tolerance approach to child labour in its international trade policy. It also works to address the root causes of child labour by tackling poverty, reducing inequalities, and increasing access to quality education and social protection. To achieve this, the EU supports partner governments, local actors and businesses, especially in the most affected countries. For example, EU free trade agreements require trading partners to implement the ILO’s conventions on the worst forms of child labour and on minimum working age. The EU participates in initiatives on specific supply chains, for cocoa and cotton for example, aiming to eliminate child labour.

The 2021-2024 EU strategy on child rights, adopted in March 2021, aims at tackling poverty and social exclusion, protecting and promoting the rights of children and building the best possible life for them both in the European Union and across the world.

The Council-led European Child Guarantee initiative promotes equal opportunities for all children, regardless of their background, in the EU. This includes access to early childhood education and care, education, play and leisure activities, healthcare, nutrition and housing. Each EU country has appointed their Child Guarantee Coordinator and should prepare national action plans to 2030.

European Parliament position on forced and child labour

In a March 2021 resolution regarding sustainable and responsible corporate behaviour, the European Parliament called for a ban on importing products related to severe human rights violations such as forced or child labour. It also stressed that the objective of combating these practices must be included in all EU free trade agreements.

In a June 2022 resolution on new EU rules on products made by forced labour, Parliament called for cooperation with partners who support ending forced labour globally and banning goods made by forced labour.

Besides monitoring EU external action, refining existing tools and considering new instruments to end forced labour and child labour, the European Parliament also adopts resolutions on specific issues.

In February 2020, Parliament adopted a resolution on child labour in mines in Madagascar, in which it highlighted that the EU long-term budget for 2021‑2027 should reflect the EU’s commitment to eliminate the worst forms of child labour.

In December 2020, Parliament adopted a resolution on forced labour and the situation of the Uyghurs in Xinjiang and in December 2021 a resolution on forced labour in the Linglong factory in Serbia.

New EU rules under discussion

In February 2022, the Commission put forward a proposal for a directive to foster sustainable corporate behaviour. Under these new rules, companies would be required to address adverse impacts of their activities on human rights (such as child labour and exploitation of workers), and on the environment, (pollution and biodiversity loss for example), both inside and outside the EU.

In reaction to a suggestion by Parliament in June 2022, the Commission put forward a proposal for a regulation in September 2022, which would ban products made by forced labour from being sold in the EU.

Further information

• Corporate due diligence and corporate accountability, European Parliamentary Research Service, Legislative Train Schedule
• Ban on import of goods produced using modern forms of slavery and forced labour including that of children, European Parliamentary Research Service, Legislative Train Schedule
• Questions and Answers: Prohibition of products made by forced labour in the Union Market, European Commission, September 2022.
• External policy tools to address modern slavery and forced labour, European Parliamentary Research Service, Study, May 2022.

Keep sending your questions to the Citizens’ Enquiries Unit (Ask EP)! We reply in the EU language that you use to write to us.

Written by Luisa Antunes.

Antimicrobial-resistant infections are predicted to become the second biggest cause of death worldwide by 2050. Despite increasing investment in the development of new antimicrobials, awareness campaigns on antimicrobial misuse and abuse, and monitoring of antimicrobial use and resistance in animals, humans and the environment, antimicrobial resistance continues to grow and the last three decades have not seen even one novel antimicrobial class reach the market. Could the answer lie in a ‘Trojan horse’ strategy to disrupt a natural physiological process common to all bacteria?

In Homer’s telling of the fall of Troy, following an unsuccessful 10‑year siege, the Greeks offered the Trojans a large wooden horse. Once the gift was inside the city walls, out came an army, led by Odysseus, who destroyed the city and ended the war. While it may seem far-fetched to use an old Greek myth as an analogy for the fight against antimicrobial resistance (AMR), the market dearth of new antimicrobials, despite millions of euros invested, means bold new strategies are needed.

The Trojan horse that could be ‘offered’ to antimicrobial-resistant bacteria is gallium. This metal-based nanoparticle strategy exploits an essential living requirement for all living beings: iron acquisition. As an essential micronutrient, during an infection iron is used as a pawn in a tug of war between humans and bacteria: our organism sequesters iron in red blood cells, as well as in heme, ferritin and lactoferrin molecules; in parallel, bacteria secrete iron chellators (siderophores and heme carriers) that bind host ferric iron (Fe(III)) and transport it to the bacterial cell. Using gallium (Ga(III)) as an antimicrobial would mean tricking the bacteria into believing they have acquired iron. Gallium is an iron-mimetic metal, of similar electric charge, ion diameter and biochemistry to iron. It can enter bacterial cells through iron membrane receptors, like a Trojan horse, and then replace iron in physiological processes. However, unlike iron, it cannot be reduced to divalent gallium. Therefore, it inhibits essential cell biochemical processes that depend on iron as a co-factor, quickly becoming toxic for the bacteria and leading to its death.

Gallium is not a novel promise. This FDA-approved drug for cancer treatment was shown more than 10 years ago to successfully inhibit the virulence of Acinetobacter baummannii, a nosocomial bacterial pathogen that has become resistant to virtually all known antimicrobials, including ‘last resort‘ ones. Since then, gallium’s antimicrobial activity has been demonstrated for other multidrug-resistant (MDR) bacteria considered by the World Health Organization (WHO) to be critical priority pathogens for the development of new antimicrobials. These include Pseudomonas aeruginosa, Enterobacterales species and Mycobacterium tuberculosis, responsible for tuberculosis, the second most deadly communicable disease (after COVID-19), causing 1.5 million deaths per year. More specifically, gallium was effective in a pilot phase Ib trial involving 20 patients with cystic fibrosis and chronic P. aeruginosa lung infections.

The exploration of bacterial iron acquisition as a novel antimicrobial strategy is not limited to the Trojan horse effect of gallium. Cefiderocol (developed by Shionogi) is a broad-spectrum siderophore-cephalosporin combination drug that showed activity against carbapenem-resistant pathogens for the treatment of complicated urinary-tract infections in double-blind clinical trials. In 2020, the European Medicines Agency (EMA) authorised its use as a ‘reserve’ against Gram-negative infections with limited treatment options. It is currently the only iron-acquisition antimicrobial authorised in the EU. Two other siderophore-cephalosporin products, GSK-3342830 (by GSK) and GT-1 (by Geom Therapeutics), are no longer in active development. The translational gap between the available evidence from preclinical research on iron-acquisition strategies as a target of antimicrobial drugs and the lack of follow-through in clinical trials could partially reflect known issues of fragmentation of EU health research and market failures.

Potential impacts and developments

When Alexander Fleming discovered penicillin in 1928, medicine entered a modern era, in which communicable diseases once responsible for child mortality, such as tuberculosis, pneumonia and diarrhoea, could finally be treated, contributing to a progressive improvement in life expectancy and quality. The emergence of bacteria resistant to all known antimicrobials could now push us back to a pre-antibiotic era, where people die from minor infections. The WHO has thus declared AMR to be a top 10 global public health threat.

Developing effective antimicrobials, raising health professional and public awareness to reduce the abuse and misuse of existing antimicrobials, strengthening surveillance, and investing in infection prevention and universal access to high-quality healthcare are some of the policy measures that the European Commission and WHO have indicated as an effective AMR response that integrates human, animal and environmental health (‘One Health’).

Effectively tackling AMR would reduce the mortality burden due to AMR infections. AMR directly caused 1.27 million worldwide deaths in 2019, estimated to rise to 10 million by 2050, surpassing cancer. In the EU alone, AMR is responsible for 33 000 yearly deaths, a trend which continues to increase, especially in eastern and southern countries, and is linked in part to lower investment in public healthcare.

A second impact would be reduced economic burden on EU national healthcare systems, which exceeds €1.1 billion yearly. COVID-19 showed how a health emergency can place extraordinary pressure on healthcare professionals and divert necessary attention from leading diseases (e.g. cardiovascular disease, dementia and cancer). The OECD estimates that applying simple policy measures proposed by the WHO (hygiene, antimicrobial stewardship, diagnostics and awareness campaigns) would save, in a year, about €3 for every €2 invested.

The emergence of ‘superbugs’ is a slow-motion pandemic, driven by the ease of lateral gene transfer in microbial communities and international spread through travel, including tourism and the food industry. Its cross-border nature calls for multidisciplinary, international coordination. Investing in universal antimicrobial access and access to safe water and sanitation would reduce the 5.7 million deaths worldwide due to treatable bacterial infections (e.g. cholera, dysentery, typhoid) in low- and middle-income countries and prevent dissemination of AMR.

Anticipatory policy-making

The EU supports research and development (R&D) projects on new therapeutics, vaccines and diagnostic tools through the FP7 and Horizon 2020 framework programmes and partnerships with Member States and industry. The EU-IMI partnership project GNA NOW is investing over €30 million in the discovery of new antimicrobials by 2024. The Health Emergency Preparedness and Response Authority considers AMR one of the top three priority cross-border threats and has allocated €580 million to the procurement of therapeutics against priority pathogens.

As part of the Pharmaceutical Strategy for Europe, the European Commission is currently revising EU pharmaceutical legislation, with expected adoption by the end of 2022. It includes ‘orphan’ medicinal products, used to treat rare diseases, a field typically underinvested in by the pharmaceutical industry. MDR tuberculosis and cystic fibrosis are examples of such diseases, for which new drugs and vaccines are urgently needed.

The discussion on antimicrobial R&D financing models usually centres around either ‘push‘ or ‘pull‘ incentives, which pay, respectively, for the inputs and outputs of R&D. Push incentives reduce the R&D cost for companies, whereas pull incentives reward successful R&D. A novel incentive model is ‘de-linkage’ (e.g. the UK’s ‘Netflix’ subscription and the US PASTEUR Act), where governments pay an annual subscription for new antimicrobials, regardless of use. Another recent strategy involves transferrable exclusivity extensions, which have faced criticism due to higher medicinal costs. A proposed solution has been the creation of a European public infrastructure to accompany the entire drug cycle independently of market failures.

Lastly, research into infection prevention and surveillance could be more effective than the development of new antimicrobials. Vaccines contribute to disease mitigation and eradication, with low resistance. With the innovation in RNA technologies and medical AI, we could soon see new vaccines against cystic fibrosis pathogens and tuberculosis, relieving pressure on AMR. Developments in diagnosis, such as wastewater monitoring, metagenomics and AMR gene sequencing, could further help to hinder AMR infections at their inception.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘What if a ‘Trojan horse’ strategy could help address antimicrobial resistance?‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Listen to podcast ‘What if a ‘Trojan horse’ strategy could help address antimicrobial resistance?’ on YouTube.

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Written by Marcin Grajewski.

Leaders and government officials from across the world are meeting at the annual climate summit amid warnings that it might soon be too late to take meaningful measures to slow down the global warming that threatens to impoverish life on Earth and is already causing weather anomalies. ‘We are on a highway to climate hell with our foot on the accelerator… Humanity has a choice: Cooperate or perish,’ United Nations Secretary-General, Antonio Guterres, said at the beginning of the meeting in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt.

The meeting – the 2022 United Nations Climate Change Conference of Parties, or COP27 – is scheduled to last until 18 November. At the centre of discussions now are the aid and investment that rich countries could provide to poorer nations to help them develop without increasing emissions of greenhouse gases. Officials are also debating a mechanism for compensating poorer countries for losses and damage caused by climate change, which has partly come due to the emissions of wealthy countries.

This note offers links to recent commentaries, studies and reports from international think tanks on climate issues published in the recent few months.

How Europe can salvage its climate credibility at COP27
Atlantic Council, November 2022

To meet energy security and climate goals, Africa needs investment in infrastructure
Atlantic Council, November 2022

The IEA World Energy Outlook 2022 highlights climate finance needs ahead of COP27
Atlantic Council, November 2022

China’s energy security realities and COP27 ambitions
Atlantic Council, November 2022

COP27: An opportunity to get serious about climate migration
Brookings Institution, November 2022

COP27 must focus on actions, not words
Carnegie Europe, November 2022

Loss and damage finance in the climate negotiations
Chatham House, November 2022

What are the key issues at COP27?
Chatham House, November 2022

Geopolitical problems must not hamper progress at COP27
Chatham House, November 2022

Stop funding climate disaster
Corporate Europe, November 2022

Global climate agreements: Successes and failures
Council on Foreign Relations, November 2022

Perilous pathogens: How climate change is increasing the threat of diseases
Council on Foreign Relations, November 2022

Climate change and regional instability in the Horn of Africa
Council on Foreign Relations, November 2022

Perspectives on designing a climate club: Alliance-building to strengthen international climate cooperation
EPICO, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, November 2022

Fair energy transition for all: How to get there?
European Policy Centre, November 2022

Climate disinformation is killing the planet
Friends of Europe, November 2022

Why international climate summits are doomed to fail, Part 1: Aspirations untethered from reality
Heritage Foundation, November 2022

Just energy transition partnerships: Can they really make a difference, and how?
Institute for Sustainable Development and International Relations, November 2022

Brazil rainforest destruction accelerates to fastest rate since 2008
Wilson Center, November 2022

COP27 and financing for sustainable energy development
Atlantic Council, October 2022

It is unfair to push poor countries to reach zero carbon emissions too early
Brookings Institution, October 2022

In defence of borrowing for climate action
Centre for European Reform, October 2022

Aligning food systems with climate and biodiversity targets
Chatham House, October 2022

The deadly climate gamble
Corporate Europe, October 2022

COP27 Climate Summit in Egypt: What to expect
Council on Foreign Relations, October 2022

We’ll always have Paris: How to adapt multilateral climate cooperation to new realities
European Council on Foreign Relations, October 2022

An African COP: What’s at stake for COP27?

Institute for Sustainable Development and International Relations, October 2022

Collaborating and delivering on climate action through a climate club: an independent report to the G7
London School of Economics, October 2022

Climate club: The way forward
Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies, October 2022

COP27’s success hinges on loss and damage finance discussions
World Resources Institute, October 2022

Where do we stand on COP26 climate promises? A progress report
World Resources Institute, October 2022

How does permitting for clean energy infrastructure work?
Brookings Institution, September 2022

How can the European Union adapt to climate change?
Bruegel, September 2022

EU climate change due diligence: Addressing climate change in the corporate sustainability due diligence proposal
Institute for European Environmental Policy, September 2022

Net-zero, circular transition in road transport
Institute for European Environmental Policy, September 2022

Russia’s climate action and geopolitics of energy transition: The uncertain and unsettling outlook following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine
Istituto Affari Internazionali, September 2022

Faire du fonds social pour le climat un levier de la lutte contre la pauvreté énergétique
Institut Jacques Delors, September 2022

How carbon tariffs and climate clubs can slow global warming
Peterson Institute for International Economics, September 2022

Europe and the Eastern Mediterranean: The potential for hydrogen partnership
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, September 2022

Climate club ‘green certificate’ would boost membership
Bruegel, August 2022

What the historic U.S. Climate Bill gets right and gets wrong
Council on Foreign Relations, August 2022

Serious gaming: Grounding and directing climate action
The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, August 2022

How can the European Union adapt to climate change while avoiding a new fault line?
Bruegel, July 2022

A Transatlantic energy and climate pact is now more necessary than ever
Bruegel, July 2022

Mobilising EU investors to narrow the developing-country climate-finance gap
Bruegel, July 2022

Conference on the Future of Europe: What is next for EU climate policies
Ecologic, July 2022

Read this briefing on ‘The COP27 climate talks‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Laurence Amand-Eeckhout.

On the occasion of World Diabetes Day, the European Parliament is expected to hold a debate on prevention, management and better care of diabetes in the EU during the November II plenary session. World Diabetes Day – marked every year on 14 November – was proclaimed by the United Nations in 2007 to raise awareness of diabetes and related complications, and to promote prevention and care, including through education.

Background

Diabetes is a chronic disease that occurs when the pancreas is no longer able to produce insulin, or when the body cannot make good use of the insulin it produces. Insulin helps glucose get into the cells. If the body is not able to produce insulin or use it effectively, the result can be raised blood glucose levels (hyperglycaemia), causing damage to the heart, blood vessels, eyes, kidneys, teeth and nerves. People with diabetes are also more likely to become severely ill if infected by the Covid-19 virus.

There are three main types of diabetes: type 1, type 2 and gestational. Type 1 results from a lack of insulin production and is diagnosed mainly in childhood and in teenagers. Its causes are still unknown (a genetic predisposition can exist, but the inheritance pattern is unknown). Daily insulin injections are required to keep blood glucose levels under control. Type 2, which accounts for 90 % of all diabetes cases, results from the body being unable to use the insulin it produces effectively. Type 2 is diagnosed mainly in adults, although an increase in cases has recently been observed among children. Type 2 diabetes often results from excess body weight and physical inactivity. A healthy lifestyle, regular physical activity and maintaining a normal body weight can help prevent type 2 diabetes. However, those who have already contracted type 2 diabetes require oral drugs and/or insulin to maintain safe blood glucose levels. Gestational diabetes consists of high blood glucose during pregnancy. Women who are affected and their children are at increased risk of developing type 2 diabetes later in life.

‘Education to protect tomorrow‘ is the theme of the second year of the World Diabetes Days 2021-23 campaign ‘Access to Diabetes Care‘, underlining the need for better access to quality diabetes education for health professionals and people living with diabetes. Every year, the World Diabetes Day campaign focuses on a dedicated theme that runs for one or more years.

Facts and figures

According to the International Diabetes Federation (IDF), approximately 537 million adults (aged 20 to 79) around the world were living with diabetes in 2021. This number is expected to rise to 783 million by 2045. In addition, 541 million adults are at increased risk of developing type 2 diabetes.

Almost one in two (240 million) adults living with diabetes are undiagnosed.

The life expectancy of people living with diabetes is likely to be reduced as a result of their condition.

In the EU specifically, it is estimated that over 32 million people are suffering from diabetes.

Direct costs relating to diabetes reached estimated 9 % of total health expenditure in the EU in 2019, while diabetes can also result in indirect costs that are harder to measure, such as reduced work productivity.

EU action on diabetes

EU Member States are responsible for their own healthcare policies and systems. However, according to Article 168 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, EU action should complement national policies. The EU focuses on prevention, research, information and education, while also fostering cooperation between Member States.

This is an update of an ‘at a glance’ note from November 2021.

The European Commission addresses diabetes in its work on non-communicable diseases (NCDs). It is supporting Member States as they work towards reaching the nine targets on NCDs of the United Nations (UN) and World Health Organization by 2025, as well as UN sustainable development goal 3.4, which aims to reduce premature mortality from NCDs by one third by 2030. To this end, in 2018 the Commission set up a steering group on health promotion, disease prevention and management of non-communicable diseases, which identifies best practice for dissemination and transfer between countries.

The new Healthier Together EU non-communicable diseases initiative (which covers the period 2022 to 2027), launched by the Commission in December 2021, aims to support EU countries in reducing the burden of NCDs, including diabetes, while improving citizens’ health, as part of efforts to build a European health union. The EU4Health programme, adopted in March 2021, and other EU programmes will support the implementation of the initiative in the EU Member States.

In the field of prevention, the Commission’s action focuses mainly on the key risk factors for type 2 diabetes, encouraging the promotion of healthy eating and physical activity and the reduction of obesity and the harmful use of tobacco and alcohol. The EU4Health programme will continue to provide funding for prevention during the 2021-2027 period. It will also support efforts to facilitate access to medicines and medical supplies, digitalise healthcare services, and set up a European health data space to promote the exchange of and access to various types of health data.

Under the Horizon Europe research and innovation programme, the EU supports several projects geared towards preventing diabetes, improving treatment and translating new knowledge into innovative applications.

MEPs Mobilising for Diabetes (MMD)

The MEP Interest Group on Diabetes MMD, which is continuing the work of the EU Diabetes Working Group, was set up in 2020 and is co-chaired by Sirpa Pietikäinen (EPP, Finland) and Christel Schaldemose (S&D, Denmark). The group aims to foster EU policy action around a series of priorities: improving diabetes care and risk reduction; promoting better access to medicines and technologies; and eliminating discrimination against people living with diabetes. In February 2021, the group published a Blueprint for action on diabetes in the European Union by 2030. On the occasion of World Diabetes Day 2022, it will organise a breakfast symposium on ‘Improving diabetes care for more resilient healthcare systems‘.

Challenges

Diabetes represents a growing threat in the EU. The ageing and increasingly overweight population, unhealthy diets and sedentary lifestyles are resulting in a rapidly increasing number of type 2 diabetes cases. Investment in prevention is essential to prevent diabetes through a healthy lifestyle starting in childhood.

This year’s World Diabetes Day focuses on education. Education plays a significant role in preventing not just diabetes but also its complications. This involves a cross-sectoral policy response relating to health, nutrition, education, mass media campaigns, social services, urban mobility, and physical and recreational activities.

Delivering better long-term care for patients living with diabetes means reducing significant disparities, both between and within Member States, so that all patients have access to quality medicines and medical devices at an affordable price. Lessons can be learned from the Covid-19 pandemic, which has highlighted health inequalities across the EU. The European Commission is organising a high-level conference on 22‑23 November 2022 on how we can better prepare ourselves for future health threats. Investment in research (e.g. innovative tools and technologies, such as continuous glucose monitoring systems and new insulin delivery systems) and improved digitalisation of health services can improve patients’ quality of life and help to reduce health inequalities.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘World Diabetes Day 2022‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Katarzyna Sochacka and Clare Ferguson.

The highlight of the November I 2022 plenary session was the debate on the conclusions of the European Council meeting of 20‑21 October 2022, during which European Union leaders discussed the latest developments in Russia’s military campaign against Ukraine, Europe’s energy crisis, and external relations – with China in particular.

Members also debated Commission statements on the outcome of the modernisation of the Energy Charter, the EU response to the increasing crack-down on protests in Iran, and on the recent communication on ensuring the availability and affordability of fertilisers. Parliament adopted several legislative proposals, including on digital finance, cybersecurity and distortive foreign subsidies. 

Digital finance

In a joint debate on digital finance, Members discussed provisional agreements on two complementary files on information and communications technologies (ICT) in finance. Aimed at harmonising ICT resilience in EU financial institutions, Members first debated the proposed digital operational resilience act (DORA). Given the likely consequences of operational disruption in the financial sector, common key requirements across the EU could well assist Member States to increase resilience to cyber-attack more effectively than if each EU country sets out separate rules. Members then considered the proposal to amend existing directives on the regulation and supervision of the financial system. Part of the digital finance package, this new legislation should also reduce the risk of cyber-incidents across financial markets, whilst still encouraging innovation and competition. Parliament adopted both texts, which need now to be formally adopted by the Council to come into force.

REPowerEU in recovery and resilience plans

Members debated and adopted a joint report by Parliament’s Committees on Budgets (BUDG) and on Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) on extending the use of the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) as the main funding tool for the REPowerEU chapters in EU countries’ recovery and resilience plans. These aim at ending EU dependence on Russian fossil fuels and accelerating investment in clean energy and reforms. The joint report underlined the need to help citizens and businesses facing hardship from high energy prices and the effects of COVID-19. The vote sets Parliament’s position for negotiations with the Council.

Cybersecurity across the Union

Members debated and adopted a provisional agreement reached with the Council expanding the laws dealing with attacks on critical infrastructure and cybercrime, under an updated Network and Information Security Directive (NIS2). To protect critical sectors such as energy, transport, water, health, digital infrastructure and finance, all of which require a high level of protection, more entities and sectors will be obliged to take security measures. The increased scope should help strengthen European cybersecurity in the long term, including by establishing a cyber-crisis liaison network. Parliament has ensured that the directive will apply to central and regional public administrations. Once formally adopted by the Council, EU Member States will have 21 months to transpose the measures into national law.

Corporate Sustainability

Companies can play their part in protecting the environment and human rights as well as ensuring social responsibility and diversity on company boards. The proposed corporate sustainability directive amends and broadens the rules on sustainability reporting for companies, banks and insurance companies. Members debated and adopted a joint text negotiated with the Council by Parliament’s Committee on Legal Affairs, which aims to balance requirements for all companies (with at least 250 employees and a turnover of €40 million), to adhere to common standards in their impact on the environment, human rights, social standards and work ethics, with lighter reporting required of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs).

Distortive foreign subsidies

Foreign state financing can provide companies with an unfair financial advantage over their EU competitors. Members debated and adopted a provisional agreement on a proposed regulation to tackle such distortive foreign subsidies. Aimed at ensuring fair competition between all companies operating in the single market, the proposal suggests a threshold above which companies must notify the Commission about subsidies they receive from abroad, especially during mergers and acquisitions – seeking a balance between positive outcomes and market distortion. Parliament’s Committee on International Trade (INTA) has ensured that additional measures strengthen the notification thresholds, with other support taken into consideration, specific channels for informing the Commission and for verification, shorter deadlines, and transparency of assessment.

Full application of the Schengen acquis in Croatia

Under the Schengen agreement, citizens enjoy free movement between countries, without controls at internal borders. However, Croatia, along with Bulgaria, Cyprus and Romania – all part of the Schengen Agreement – continue to be subject to internal border controls while awaiting the agreement of the other Member States to become full participants in Schengen. Croatia has now been assessed as meeting all the necessary conditions for full application of the Schengen rules, meaning an end to internal border controls with the country, a decision backed by Parliament’s Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE). Parliament debated and adopted its opinion, and it is now for the Council to decide on Croatia’s status.

Opening of trilogue negotiations

Three committee decisions to enter into interinstitutional negotiations were announced: from the Transport and Tourism (TRAN) Committee on the proposal for a directive on the inclusion of improved stability requirements and its alignment with stability requirements defined by the International Maritime Organization; and on the proposal for a directive on the framework for the deployment of intelligent transport systems in the field of road transport and for interfaces with other modes of transport; and from the Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) Committee, on the proposal for a regulation on digital information exchange in terrorism cases.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘Plenary round-up – November I 2022‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Clare Ferguson with Sophia Stone.

How do we best protect ourselves in the digital age? Russia’s war on Ukraine and the resulting energy crisis underline the need to boost the European Union’s energy efficiency and cybersecurity. The agenda for the first plenary session of November 2022 therefore centres around joint debates on energy policy, digital finance and cybersecurity in the EU. Members will also hear about the outcome of the European Council meeting of 20 and 21 October, during which the European Union leaders discussed the latest developments in Russia’s military campaign against Ukraine, Europe’s energy crisis and external relations, in particular with China.

Russia’s aggression has intensified the need to protect EU citizens from the consequences of cyber-attack. In Wednesday’s joint debate on digital finance, Members are expected to discuss two complementary files on information and communications technologies (ICT) in finance. Members are first due to debate the digital operational resilience act (DORA), proposed to harmonise ICT resilience in EU financial institutions. The Single Rulebook for financial services already governs risks to financial institutions, but it hardly touches upon ICT operational risks. Given the likely consequences of operational disruption in the financial sector, common key requirements across the EU could increase resilience to cyber-attack more effectively than if each EU country sets out separate rules. The ECON committee has ensured a differentiated approach for small, micro- and interconnected entities. Members are then set to consider a proposal also aiming to reduce ICT risks, by amending existing directives on the regulation and supervision of the financial system. Part of the digital finance package, this new legislation should reduce the risk of cyber-incidents across financial markets, whilst still encouraging innovation and competition. The ECON committee has underlined the need for proportionality for SMEs, and the necessity for robust governance.

Cyber-attacks remain on the agenda for Thursday, when Members are set to consider a provisional agreement reached with the Council expanding the laws dealing with attacks on critical infrastructure and cybercrime, under an updated Network and Information Security Directive (NIS2). To protect critical sectors such as energy, transport, water, health, digital infrastructure and finance, all of which require a high level of protection, more entities and sectors will be obliged to take security measures. The increased scope should help strengthen European cybersecurity in the long term, including by establishing a cyber-crisis liaison network. Parliament has ensured that the directive will apply to central and regional public administrations. Once agreed, the EU Member States will have 21 months to transpose the measures into national law.

When the EU put the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) in place to support the recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic, energy efficiency was already a strong focus. On Wednesday afternoon , Members are due to debate a joint report by Parliament’s Committees on Budgets (BUDG) and on Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) on extending the use of the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) as the main funding tool for the REPowerEU chapters in EU countries’ recovery and resilience plans. These aim at ending EU dependence on Russian fossil fuels and investing in clean energy and infrastructure. The joint report insists that funding prioritise investment schemes for small businesses and micro-enterprises, and especially tackling energy poverty for vulnerable households, in light of the ongoing global energy market disruption. The vote will set Parliament’s position for negotiations with the Council.

Companies can also play their part in protecting the environment and human rights as well as ensuring social responsibility and diversity on company boards. The proposed corporate sustainability directive should amend and broaden the rules on sustainability reporting for companies, banks and insurance companies. On Wednesday afternoon, Members are expected to consider a joint text negotiated with the Council by Parliament’s Committee on Legal Affairs that aims to balance requirements for all companies (with at least 250 employees and a turnover of €40 million), to adhere to common standards in their impact on the environment, human rights, social standards and work ethics, with lighter reporting required of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Companies will need to publish reports on their sustainability policies, to be certified independently.

Foreign state financing of companies can provide unfair financial advantage over their EU competitors. Members are due to consider a provisional agreement on a proposed regulation to tackle such distortive foreign subsidies on Thursday. Aiming to ensure fair competition between all companies operating in the single market, the proposal suggests a threshold above which companies must notify the Commission about subsidies they receive from abroad, especially during mergers and acquisitions – seeking a balance between positive outcomes and market distortion. Parliament’s Committee on International Trade (INTA) has ensured that additional measures strengthen the notification thresholds, with other support taken into consideration, specific channels for informing the Commission and for verification, shorter deadlines, and transparency of assessment.

Under the Schengen agreement, citizens enjoy free movement between countries, without controls at internal borders. However, Croatia, along with Bulgaria, Cyprus and Romania – all part of the Schengen agreement – continue to be subject to internal border controls while awaiting the agreement of the other Member States to become full participants in Schengen. Croatia has now been assessed as meeting all the necessary conditions for full application of the Schengen rules, meaning an end to internal border controls with the country, a decision backed by Parliament’s Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE), in a report scheduled for consideration on Wednesday afternoon. Once the Parliament has adopted its opinion, it will be up to the Council to decide on Croatia’s status.

November I 2022 Plenary Session agenda

• Corporate sustainability reporting directive
• Full application of the Schengen acquis in Croatia
• A high common level of cybersecurity – NIS2
• Distortive foreign subsidies
• REPowerEU chapters in recovery and resilience plans
• Digital operational resilience act (DORA)
• Amending digital operational requirements in financial services legislation

Written by Gisela Grieger with Rita Mendonca Barbosa Amorim.

On 26 October 2022, EPRS held an online roundtable on the 2022 US mid-term elections, which discussed the likelihood of a shift in power in the United States House of Representatives and the US Senate, as well as the domestic and foreign policy implications resulting from such a change.

Etienne Bassot, Director of the Members’ Research Service of EPRS, welcomed the participants and the audience. After providing introductory remarks he passed on the floor to keynote speaker Miapetra Kumpula-Natri, (S&D, Finland), First Vice-Chair of the European Parliament’s Delegation for relations with the United States.

Miapetra Kumpula-Natri approved the Biden administration’s focus not only on Asia and notably on China, but also on the European continent that faces President Putin’s war against the West. She stressed that, in the run-up to the mid-terms on 8 November, the manifestation of extreme social conservatism in the US has mobilised the defenders of liberal values: of equality and women rights. However, she added that high inflation and fuel prices might outweigh concerns about abortion rights as the top political issue for many voters. Miapetra Kumpula-Natri emphasised that her greatest hope was that the mid-terms would be better than the 2020 presidential elections, so that Americans would regain trust in democracy. On EU-US trade relations, she raised concerns about recent US laws, such as the Inflation Reduction Act, that contain ‘America only’ provisions, highlighting that tensions with the US administration require cooperation grounded in democracy.

Elena Lazarou, acting Head of Unit of the External Policies Unit of EPRS, presented the panel: Bruce Stokes, Visiting Senior Fellow, German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF); Sarah Paden, Vice-President and National Political Director, Progressive Policy Institute; Mark Strand, President of the Congressional Institute and former Chief of Staff to US Senator Jim Talent; and Leslie Vinjamuri, Director, US and Americas Programme, Chatham House. Elena Lazarou set the scene by summarising the reasons for Europeans’ focus on the US and on the mid-terms. Opening the panel discussion, she highlighted the great interest on this side of the Atlantic in US politics and in parliamentary cooperation with the US Congress.

Bruce Stokes emphasised that the US is an increasingly unstable democracy, since 10 of the last 12 elections resulted in a change of power in the White House, the House of Representatives or the Senate. He stressed that the US was deeply divided along party lines on almost every issue, including the economy, health care, violent crime, and climate change. Some 68 % of Democrats say that climate change is an important issue, but only 9 % of Republicans agree. Democrats want politicians to protect women’s rights, and abortion remains an important issue that may galvanise voters to vote Democrat, perhaps offsetting the Republican advantage in other voter segments. Importantly, 81 % of Democrats and 79 % of Republicans believe that the other party’s agenda would destroy America, another reflection of the deep polarisation of US society. As a result, Bruce Stokes concluded that building bridges in the new Congress could be extremely difficult. As for voter intentions, Republicans who previously trailed Democrats in national-level Congressional generic ballots that ask voters which party they would support in the election, have turned the page to lead these polls. A 26 October 2022 model suggests that Democrats would lose 20 to 30 House seats, enough for Republicans to take control. According to Bruce Stokes, the races in Georgia, Nevada and Pennsylvania will determine who will control the Senate.

Sarah Paden argued that what happens in the mid-terms is determinative of the 2024 presidential elections. She explained that state elections are important to US citizens when it comes to ‘bread and butter issues’ and that legislation is increasingly passed through state legislatures every year, in comparison to legislation passed by Congress. She focused on two developments: first, a new type of Republican candidate has emerged that is more extreme then Trump himself, with the new activist wing of the Republican Party becoming the mainstream, which has consequences for the political discourse. Second, a new breed of Republican election deniers have stoked very divisive rhetoric about the ‘stolen’ 2020 election and the legitimacy of Joe Biden’s presidency, are among the candidates for key roles in the US decentralised electoral system. Given the considerable latitude states have in the administration of elections, the success of election deniers could play a significant role in the next election cycle.

Mark Strand pointed out that, historically, the president’s party loses House seats in the mid-terms, adding that there were only two exceptions in recent history. In 2002, when George W. Bush won seats in the House after 9/11 and in 1998, when Republicans sought to impeach Bill Clinton and Democrats kept control of the House. He explained that this logic does not hold true for the Senate, since Senate races are more personality-driven. He stressed that Democrats currently hold a very narrow majority in the House and that the Senate is divided 50/50 with the Vice-President (who is also the president of the Senate) breaking the tie. Democrats only need to keep their 50 votes to maintain control of the Senate. Republicans, by contrast, would need to pick up one seat to flip the majority. In addition, Mark Strand indicated that Americans are quite comfortable with a divided government, since they are naturally suspicious of concentrated power. He added moreover that Americans are in a very angry place. It has been over 20 years since more people were satisfied with the way things are going in the country than it is today. According to the polls he presented, a majority of voters say that the government is corrupt and rigged against people like them and this sentiment is also shared by independent voters, who are most likely to determine the outcome of this election. Polls show that there is an immense polarisation between Democrats and Republicans, with both parties unwilling to work together, and cooperation even seen as a political danger. As a result, Mark Strand concluded that Americans are concerned about the future of democracy as a whole and believe that democracy is in danger of collapse.

Leslie Vinjamuri turned to foreign policy issues, arguing that the number one foreign policy issue is climate and that there is more bipartisanship on that than less. However, Donald Trump ensured that climate change and science remained fundamentally and deeply contested in significant and substantial parts of the Republican Party. According to Vinjamuri, although Europeans are worried about the competitive aspects of the Inflation Reduction Act, the law is a highly consequential achievement, including on climate. She argued that the mid-terms would not lead to a reversal of Biden’s climate policies, because Republicans would not gain the two-thirds majority required. However, a Republican majority in the House would lead to increased Republican oversight activities and provide a platform for rhetoric empowering climate denialism in a way that could be consequential in the run-up to the 2024 presidential elections. She argued that despite bipartisan consensus on China, if Republicans gain a majority in the House, the Biden administration’s two tracks – to compete and to cooperate with China – would become much more difficult to sustain, as Republicans would double-down on competition, turning the discourse into a more ideological one. On Russia, she posited that, if the Republicans gain a majority, there is a great chance that US support to Ukraine would decrease. However, US voters seem to support US aid to Ukraine and this would hold, especially if Russia continues to strike civilian targets in Ukraine. 

Several questions were raised during the Q&A session related to the policy implications for transatlantic relations of a shift of power in the US Congress, on China, and on climate issues. Bruce Stokes argued that if Republicans gain control in Congress, President Biden could veto Republican-led legislation, enacted by both chambers. He added that the establishment of a Republican-led select committee on China could lead to a further deterioration of US-China relations and could impact the EU’s willingness to cooperate with the US on policies towards China. Moreover, Stokes reminded the audience that Republicans have also expressed their interest in investigating the dealings of Hunter Biden, Joe Biden’s son, with both China and Ukraine, which could have repercussions for Congressional approval of support for Ukraine.

Written by Dessislava Yougova (1st edition).

Stratospheric ozone absorbs ultraviolet radiation from the sun and reduces the overall amount of radiation reaching the Earth’s surface. Ozone-depleting substances (ODS) are human-made chemicals that, once emitted, reach the upper atmosphere and destroy the protective ozone layer, causing what is known as the ozone hole. They have significant adverse impacts on human health and the environment and are also greenhouse gases with high global warming potential.

Regulation (EC) No 1005/2009 on substances that deplete the ozone layer lays down rules on the production, use, trade, recovery, recycling, reclamation and destruction of ODS and sets out requirements and measures for products and equipment containing these substances. On 5 April 2022, the European Commission submitted a proposal for a regulation on ODS repealing the current one. The aim is to increase the efficiency of the existing measures in order to achieve additional emission reductions in line with the European Green Deal, to ensure more comprehensive monitoring of ODS, to reduce the administrative costs by simplifying the rules, to modernise the licensing system and reduce costs for industry, and to improve the coherence with other pieces of legislation such as Regulation (EU) No 517/2014 on fluorinated greenhouse gases, which is being revised in parallel. One of the main objectives of the proposal is to prevent emissions from old products and equipment still containing ODS that have to be recovered and destroyed.

The file has been referred to the European Parliament’s Committee on Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI). The rapporteur – Jessica Polfjärd (EPP, Sweden) – published her draft report on 6 October 2022.

Versions

• October 2022: Revision of the Ozone Regulation (1st edition)

Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on substances that deplete the ozone layer and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1005/2009 Committee responsible:Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI)COM(2022)151
5.4.2022Rapporteur:Jessica Polfjärd (EPP, Sweden)2022/0100(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Rovana Plumb (S&D, Romania)
Ondřej Knotek (Renew, Czechia)
Pär Holmgren (Greens/EFA, Sweden)
Anna Zalewska (ECR, Poland)
Anja Hazekamp (The Left, Netherlands)Ordinary legislative procedure (COD) (Parliament and Council on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Committee vote on draft report

Written by Gregor Erbach and Sara Catharina Svensson.

The 27th United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP27) will take place in Sharm el‑Sheikh, Egypt on 6-18 November 2022. Implementation, climate finance for developing countries, and options to address ‘loss and damage’ are expected to be some of the focus points of the conference this year. 

While per capita emissions are increasing in most developing countries, including China, India, and Egypt, they are falling in richer regions such as the US, UK and the EU. However, per capita emissions in lower-income countries including India, Egypt and Brazil are still far below the world and EU average. The latest UNEP emissions gap report emphasises that current efforts to curb emissions will not be enough to keep the increase in global temperature to 1.5 degrees Celsius. Egypt has made this year’s conference the ‘Implementation COP’, to ensure that countries turn objectives into action.

The African Group, Egypt, China, India and several other countries want to see financial support for ‘loss and damage‘ brought to the table at COP. At COP26, last year, developing countries’ demands for a loss and damage response fund almost jeopardised the Glasgow Climate Pact. As a compromise, the conference launched the Glasgow Dialogue to discuss funding for ‘loss and damage’.

The European Parliament has adopted a resolution on COP27, welcoming the Glasgow Dialogue and calling for new sources of public finance prioritising grants to address the loss and damage associated with climate change. However, the Glasgow Dialogue received some criticism last year and may cause fresh tensions at COP27.

Another big issue will be the delivery of finance pledges. At COP 15, high-income nations committed to mobilise US$100 billion a year in new and additional climate funding for climate mitigation and adaptation in developing nations by 2020. Although the EU has raised its climate finance steadily since 2013, the developed countries still do not reach their collective target. High inflationary pressure and energy prices, causing developed countries to struggle with their own economies, may undermine the high levels of foreign aid that will be needed to provide for both the pledged finance and the potential loss and damage funds. However, many developing countries are also suffering from high energy prices and recessions, as well as climate impacts. This may increase the pressure on the US, the EU and the other developed countries to step up.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine and the current energy crisis have highlighted the interplay between climate change and international security. For example, the RePowerEU plan is intended to accelerate the rollout of renewable energy and reduce energy consumption, to put an end to the EU’s dependence on Russian gas.

The European Parliament has highlighted that the EU could reduce its GHG emissions by more than 55 % by 2030 if the EU adopts the ‘fit for 55‘ package and the RePowerEU plan. A trilogue agreement on the proposal to sell only zero-emission cars and vans by 2035 has recently been reached, signalling that the EU is serious about taking action to reach its climate targets. Parliament also supports policies and contributions to international climate finance and has urged the developed countries to make sure the promised US$100 billion is spent each year. 

See also:

• COP26 outcomes
• COP27
• Climate change and international security
• New partnership with Africa
• Climate action in the EU
• Fit for 55
• Loss and Damage: L&D

Interactive infographics

• https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/infographics/climateaction/
• https://epthinktank.eu/2018/12/03/cop-24-making-the-paris-agreement-operational/