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European Parliamentary Research Service Blog
European Parliamentary Research Service Blog
Updated: 3 days 11 hours ago
International trade [What Think Tanks are thinking]
Written by Marcin Grajewski.
The European Union’s international trade has suffered from the COVID-19 pandemic, broken supply chains, the growth of protectionism in many regions and, most recently, from Russia’s war on Ukraine. The United States’ trade policy towards China, which is aimed at curbing the authoritarian country’s growing power, has exacerbated the fragmentation of trade.
The United States has adopted the Inflation Reduction Act, a massive green subsidy programme which analysts and politicians say may lower the competitiveness of some European clean-tech products. The EU is debating how to respond to the Act, including with the envisaged proposal of a Net-Zero Industry Act, setting a number of clean-tech objectives for 2030. The work of the new EU‑US Trade and Technology Council has so far made limited progress in resolving the trade spat.
This note offers links to a series of recent commentaries and reports from major international think tanks and research institutes on international trade policy.
China and the new globalization
Atlantic Council, January 2023
Russian foreign trade tracker
Bruegel, January 2023
Strategic tech cooperation between the EU and India
Clingendael, January 2023
The world trade crisis
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, January 2023
Trade liberalization at a crossroads: The US and China play key roles
Finnish Institute of International Affairs, January 2023
Can the US and Africa usher in a new era for globalization?
Atlantic Council, December 2022
The Trade and Technology Council: The new window for European Union–United States collaboration
Barcelona Centre for International Affairs, December 2022
The European Commission’s proposed anti-coercion instrument from an international law perspective
Barcelona Centre for International Affairs, December 2022
Asia Pacific: The test case for a geopolitical EU trade strategy
Bertelsmann Stiftung, December 2022
The impact of the Ukraine crisis on international trade
Bruegel, December 2022
Transatlantic woes: Neither side can have it all
Carnegie Europe, December 2022
Strengthening US–EU cooperation on trade and technology
Chatham House, December 2022
The future for global trade in a changing climate
Chatham House, December 2022
The contentious U.S.-China trade relationship
Council on Foreign Relations, December 2022
Trade: What’s left of globalisation?
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, December 2022
The Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) and the EU
E3G, December 2022
Competitive and innovative: The winning Europe that we need
European Centre for International Economic Policy, December 2022
2023 will be a defining year for Brexit and trade
European Centre for International Economic Policy, December 2022
How important are Mutual Recognition Agreements for trade facilitation?
European Centre for International Economic Policy, December 2022
A united front: How the US and the EU can move beyond trade tensions to counter China
European Council on Foreign Relations, December 2022
Setting the tone: The value of the EU-US Trade and Technology Council
European Council on Foreign Relations, December 2022
How the EU and the US should overcome their trade and supply chain disputes
European Policy Centre, December 2022
China’s Xi knows that international consensus helps with business
Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale, December 2022
How to save the WTO with more flexible trading rules
Peterson Institute for International Economics, December 2022
Have trade agreements been bad for America?
Peterson Institute for International Economics, December 2022
The World Bank, the IMF, and the GATT/WTO: Which institution most supported trade reform in developing economies?
Peterson Institute for International Economics, December 2022
What do the stalled free trade talks between EU and Switzerland mean for their economies (and the United Kingdom)?
Bertelsmann Stiftung, November 2022
Deglobalisation and protectionism
Bruegel, November 2022
Is globalisation really doomed?
Bruegel, November 2022
China and the challenge to global order
Brookings Institution, November 2022
Rewiring US trade policy to address new global realities
Brookings Institution, November 2022
In a green subsidy race, the EU should not imitate the US
Centre for European Policy Studies, November 2022
The US-EU trade and technology council: assessments and recommendations
Center for Strategic and International Studies, November 2022
Will Biden’s trade policy shift after the midterms?
Council on Foreign Relations, November 2022
The globalization myth
Council on Foreign Relations, November 2022
Managing risks in the EU-China economic relationship
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, November 2022
Has globalisation really peaked for Europe?
European Centre for International Economic Policy, November 2022
The new globalization: SMEs and international trade – the supply chain is as important as direct exports
European Centre for International Economic Policy, November 2022
Refining the EU’s geoeconomic approach to trade policy
Egmont, November 2022
Walking out of the woods: EU industrial policy between the energy crisis and decarbonisation
Istituto Affari Internazionali, November 2022
How the G20 can advance WTO reform
Peterson Institute for International Economics, November 2022
The EU should expand trade with the Indo-Pacific region
Peterson Institute for International Economics, November 2022
The advance of China’s private sector pauses, but the trend is unclear
Bruegel, October 2022
Europe’s promised semiconductor subsidies need to be better targeted
Bruegel, October 2022
China and the West: growing apart as geopolitical tensions grow
Bruegel, October 2022
The role of international trade in realizing an inclusive circular economy
Chatham House, October 2022
Sea change in EU trade policy: Opportunities for diversification in the Indo-Pacific
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, October 2022
Greening global trade Clingendael, September 2022
Read this briefing on ‘International trade‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.
Categories: European Union
Geographical indications for wine, spirit drinks and agricultural products [EU Legislation in Progress]
Written by Nikolina Šajn (1st edition).
On 18 October 2022, the European Parliament’s rapporteur put forward a draft report on the Commission’s proposal for a regulation on geographical indications for wine, spirit drinks and agricultural products, while the discussions continue in the Council on the working party level.
The proposal, which the Commission adopted on 31 March 2022, would bring under a single legal document the provisions on the procedures for registering geographical indications (GIs) for wine, spirit drinks and agricultural products that are currently spread over three regulations. It would increase the powers and responsibilities of producer groups, lay down rules on sustainability undertakings, clarify rules on the use of GI products as ingredients, and improve the protection of GI products online. The Commission would be empowered to transfer its tasks regarding the management of geographical indications, including the scrutiny, opposition, cancellation and amendments procedures, to the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO).
Versions- January 2023: Geographical indications for wine, spirit drinks and agricultural products (1st edition)
31.3.2022
Rapporteur:Paolo De Castro (S&D, Italy)2022/0089 (COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Álvaro Amaro (EPP, Portugal)
Irène Tolleret (Renew, France)
Claude Gruffat (Greens/EFA, France)
Elena Lizzi (ID, Italy)
Mazaly Aguilar (ECR, Spain)
Eugenia Rodríguez Palop (GUE/NGL, Spain)Consultation procedure
(CNS) – Parliament adopts
a non-binding opinion Next steps expected: Committee vote
Categories: European Union
Ask EP 2022 – You asked, we answered!
In 2022, people from across the European Union (EU) and elsewhere in the world turned to the European Parliament and its President, Roberta Metsola to request information, call for action to be taken, express their opinions, or suggest ideas on a wide range of topics.The Citizens’ Enquiries Unit (Ask EP) replied in the 24 EU official languages.
In 2022, Ask EP received 10 839 individual messages and 35 151 campaign enquiries. Citizens wrote on various topics, notably the Russian invasion of Ukraine, EU democracy, energy, environmental protection, fundamental rights, social policy and many others. Ask EP also received questions related to the European Parliament and its Members, its traineeship offers and how to visit Parliament.
Most frequent topics in individual enquiries in 2022
The most frequently addressed topic in 2022 was matters concerning the European Parliament itself. The Parliament received more than 1 450 enquiries, in which citizens expressed interest in the Members of European Parliament and their activities, enquired about traineeship and job opportunities and the possibilities to visit Parliament. They also requested information on topics such as parliamentary questions, committee meetings and the right to petition.
The second most frequent topic on which citizens contacted Ask EP last year related to foreign affairs, with over 1 000 enquiries. In particular, people voiced their concerns following the illegal Russian invasion of Ukraine; many of them were worried about the war in Ukraine and its consequences. Citizens also sent messages regarding other countries, such as China, Afghanistan and the protests in Iran.
Moreover, Parliament replied to approximately 430 enquiries in the area of freedom, security and justice. Citizens made comments and asked questions on various topics, such as the rule of law and democracy, legislation, migration and freedom of movement.
Finally, the European Parliament received many enquiries about citizens’ personal situations with requests for assistance to help them solve problems (financial support, legal aid, cross-border administrative issues, cases of discrimination, etc.). Although neither the European Parliament nor its President are able to resolve many of these types of requests directly, the Ask EP service provided citizens with a contact point and sources of information whenever possible.
Campaign messages sent to the European Parliament in 2022
As a response to political, humanitarian and economic events, citizens often send messages to the President of the European Parliament, expressing their views on current issues and/or requesting action from the Parliament. These messages may sometimes be identical, as part of wider public campaigns.
Between June and September 2022, the President received a large number of messages – almost 17 700 – calling on the House of European History to remove a poster of ‘the Madonna and Christ of Czestochowa with rainbow halos’ from a temporary exhibition.
The Board of Trustees of the House of European History responded, highlighting the story around the poster, as explained and contextualised in the exhibition. It also pointed out that the exhibition presented the views of both critics and proponents of the poster. The poster was one of about 150 selected to be part of the ‘When Walls Talk’ exhibition of posters illustrating European society over the last century.
Since February 2022, the President has received around 1 600 messages calling on her to defend pro-life positions, in particular following a suggestion by French President Emmanuel Macron to include the right to abortion in the European Charter of Fundamental Rights.
In the past, the European Parliament has called on EU countries to safeguard individuals’ rights to make their own informed choices, while recognising that the EU has no direct powers to deal with sexual and reproductive health and rights in EU countries. More recently, the European Parliament proposed to include the right to safe and legal abortion in the Charter of Fundamental Rights. President Metsola has indicated that she would defend Parliament’s position on abortion.
Since November 2022, following the death in police custody of 22 year-old Mahsa Amini, both the European Parliament and its President have received messages requesting support for the protests in Iran. Parliament condemned the killing, as well as the widespread and disproportionate use of force by Iranian security forces against protesting citizens. Parliament called on the Iranian authorities to immediately release and drop any charges against demonstrators.
The President also received almost 900 enquiries from citizens calling on the EU to recognise Georgia’s progress towards EU accession.
A separate campaign, which sent more than 500 messages, called on the President to award the Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought to Julian Assange, co-founder of WikiLeaks (the prize was awarded to The Brave People of Ukraine).
Are you curious about our answers to other campaign messages in 2022? You can find all replies to campaigns – totalling over 50 enquiries – as well as posts on topical themes on the EPRS blog. A selection of other answers to questions frequently posed to the European Parliament can also be found on the EPRS blog.
If you wish, you can put your questions and/or comments to the Citizens’ Enquiries Unit (Ask EP), using our contact form, the Citizens’ app, or by post. We reply in the EU language that you use to write to us.
We look forward to your enquiries in 2023 and beyond!
Your Citizens’ Enquiries Unit (Ask EP)
Categories: European Union
International Holocaust Remembrance Day – 27 January 2023
Written by Magdalena Pasikowska-Schnass with Sophia Stone.
International Holocaust Remembrance Day marks the liberation, on 27 January 1945, of Auschwitz-Birkenau, the largest Nazi concentration and extermination camp. The Holocaust – the ‘systematic, bureaucratic, state-sponsored persecution and murder of approximately six million Jews by the Nazi regime and its collaborators’ between 1933 and 1945 also targeted other groups. These included the Roma, Sinti, the disabled and homosexuals. To commemorate the Holocaust victims, Israel’s President Isaac Herzog will formally address the European Parliament in a special plenary session in Brussels on 26 January 2023. President of the European Parliament, Roberta Metsola and President Herzog are then due to inaugurate the Holocaust Memorial in front of Parliament’s plenary chamber.
The Nazis killed the majority of European Jews, seized Jewish property, destroyed synagogues, Hebrew scripts, Jewish art and cultural property,. Not much was left of Jewish cultural heritage across Europe, not many Jews survived the Holocaust. For a decimated and traumatised Jewish population, it was difficult to claim their identity in Europe. The Holocaust strongly affected the evolution of Jewish culture.
Not bound by country borders, Jews lived for centuries across the European continent, using Hebrew for liturgical and religious purposes, often mixed with the local language. Following the Holocaust, the Judeo-Spanish language known as Ladino, which originated in Spain, almost reached extinction. The Holocaust also affected the use of the Yiddish language, which the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) considers, together with Ladino, endangered. However, thanks to the courage of Jewish communities, who continue to bear witness to Jewish life and culture, as well as revived academic interest during the COVID‑19 lockdowns, there is evidence of a revival of both languages. To help keep this linguistic heritage alive, the EU continues to support their use and related cultural heritage.
Beyond preserving Jewish languages and culture, it is important to continue to inform people of what happened during the Holocaust and its aftermath. Holocaust education allows reflection on legal and ethical issues, whilst promoting critical thinking. As Holocaust denial is on the rise and conspiracy theories, anti-Semitism and xenophobia take up increasing space on social media platforms, a clear view of historical events becomes increasingly important. Holocaust survivor and journalist Marian Turski’s call to ‘Never be a bystander … whenever any kind of minority is discriminated against’, serves as a reminder that everyone should speak out against discrimination. The European Union supports Holocaust education and research through numerous programmes, such as providing a handbook for teachers highlighting links between Holocaust education and human rights, or studies on antisemitism showing the growing insecurity of Jews living in the EU.
The European Parliament has adopted several resolutions on Holocaust remembrance, including an October 2018 resolution on the rise of neo-fascist violence in EU, calling attention to the rise of violence against Jews. The EU calls on EU countries to counter Holocaust denialism, and on November 2018, the EU became a permanent international partner of the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (AISH).
Further reading- The European Union and Holocaust remembrance
- Jewish art collections – Nazi looting
- Ladino: Judeo-Spanish language and culture in Europe
- Yiddish language and culture and its post-Holocaust fate in Europe
- Holocaust education: ‘Never, never be a bystander’
- Holocaust denial in criminal law: Legal frameworks in selected EU Member States
- Supporting Holocaust survivors
Remembering the Shoah, the Massacres on the Eastern Front – Panel Debate
House of European History. Thursday 26 January, 18.30-20.30 CET. Hybrid event.
Categories: European Union
The EU’s energy markets [What Think Tanks are thinking]
Written by Marcin Grajewski.
Energy prices have recently fallen in the European Union, easing slightly the crisis caused by Russia’s 11-month-old war on Ukraine. EU emergency measures , diversification of supplies and a benign winter have reduced energy costs, which skyrocketed after Russia curtailed fossil fuel exports with the aim of pressing the EU to reduce support for Ukraine, and due to EU sanctions on Moscow.
In December, EU governments agreed to cap gas prices, hoping to better shield European households and businesses from price spikes, which have fuelled inflation and undermined economic growth. On 17 January, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said she would propose a Net-Zero Industry Act, which envisages a number of clean tech objectives for 2030, to compete with the U.S. large green subsidy package. Nevertheless, the challenge to secure Europe’s energy supply in the long term will not be easily overcome.
This note gathers links to the recent publications and commentaries from many international think tanks on the energy market. Earlier publication on the topic can be found in a previous edition of the ‘What Think Tanks are Thinking’ series.
European natural gas imports (data set)
Bruegel, January 2023
How does the U.S. government use the Strategic Petroleum Reserve
Council on Foreign Relations, January 2023
European battery regulation: An exemplary step forward in more ways than one
Institute for Sustainable Development and International Relations, January 2023
The G7’s role in developing a platform for global cooperation on industrial decarbonization
Atlantic Council, December 2023
Europe and the Caspian: The gas supply conundrum
Atlantic Council, December 2023
How can we measure the impact of carbon prices on global warming?
Brookings Institution, December 2022
Buying time for proper electricity market reform
Bruegel, December 2022
Energy crisis: Five questions that must be answered in 2023
Bruegel, December 2022
National energy policy responses to the energy crisis
Bruegel, December 2022
Will the European Union price cap on Russian oil work?
Bruegel, December 2022
Exploring cost-effective support mechanisms for hydrogen mobility infrastructure
Centre for European Policy Studies, December 2022
The revision of the Third Energy Package for gas
Centre for European Policy Studies, December 2022
Are we about to see a big bonus for Europe’s low-carbon ETS producers?
Centre for European Policy Studies, December 2022
Recommendations for a future-proof electricity market design
Centre on Regulation in Europe, December 2022
Will an EU oil price cap limit Russian aggression?
Chatham House, December 2022
The EU needs alternatives to Russian energy: Here’s the plan
Council on Foreign Relations, December 2022
You can’t switch off the sun: How Germany can gain energy sovereignty with renewables
European Council on Foreign Relations, December 2022
Walking out of the woods: EU industrial policy between the energy crisis and decarbonisation
Instituto Affari Internazionali, December 2022
The Ukrainian conflict and the energy crisis: Sustaining the energy transition
Instituto Affari Internazionali, December 2022
Energy: Which security?
Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale, December 2022
Trend to watch 2023: Green awakening
Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale, December 2022
Europe’s energy crisis: High stakes for the MENA region
Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale, December 2022
Europe’s looming energy disaster
Bruegel, November 2022
Surviving the winter: Ukraine ahead of an energy crisis
Centre for Eastern Studies, November 2022
In a green subsidy race, the EU should not imitate the US
Centre for European Policy Studies, November 2022
How to save energy in a smarter way
Centre for European Reform, November 2022
Tracking Europe’s energy security: Four lessons from the EU’s new energy deals
European Council on Foreign Relations, November 2022
Fair energy transition for all: How to get there?
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, November 2022
The share of renewables in energy consumption is increasing
Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy, November 2022
How to accelerate renewable energies in France? The challenge of territorial integration and value sharing
Institute for Sustainable Development and International Relations, November 2022
Just energy transition partnerships: Can they really make a difference, and how?
Institute for Sustainable Development and International Relations, November 2022
Are small modular reactors Europe’s energy salvation?
Instituto Affari Internazionali, November 2022
Germany energy policy in turbulent times: Between transition chances and lock-in risks
Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale, November 2022
Nuclear energy and global energy security in the new tripolar world order
Atlantic Council, October 2022
How to help people in Europe and Central Asia pay their energy bills
Brookings Institution, October 2022
How European Union energy policies could mitigate the coming recession
Bruegel, October 2022
Europe’s quest for energy security and the renewed case for a strong Mediterranean green energy partnership
Bruegel, October 2022
Electricity markets will need an overhaul, but not now
Centre for European Policy Studies, October 2022
Russia: threats and offers of energy cooperation
Centre for Eastern Studies, October 2022
The European wholesale electricity market: From crisis to net zero
Centre on Regulation in Europe, October 2022
Deals of a lifetime: Why the EU should include renewables in its response to the energy crisis
European Council on Foreign Relations, October 2022
Running on empty: How trust among EU states can survive the energy crisis
European Council on Foreign Relations, October 2022
Transitioning towards energy security beyond EU borders: Why, where and how?
GLOBSEC, November 2022
The European Union’s uneasy journey through the energy crisis
Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy, October 2022
The United States and the euro zone face different challenges in battling inflation
Peterson Institute for International Economics, October 2022
How does permitting for clean energy infrastructure work?
Brookings Institution, September 2022
An assessment of Europe’s options for addressing the crisis in energy markets
Bruegel, September 2022
The EU’s energy plan for a difficult winter: What are the options?
Centre for European Reform, September 2022
To what extent has the EU Green Deal changed EU energy policies
College of Europe, September 2022
How the Inflation Reduction Act will help the United States to lead in the clean energy economy
Council on Foreign Relations, September 2022
Europe’s energy and resource challenge: The Arctic is part of the solution
Egmont, September 2023
State of the Union: How the energy crisis can strengthen EU unity
European Council on Foreign Relations, September 2022
Putin vs Monnet: European resilience, energy and the Ukraine war
Instituto Affari Internazionali, September 2022
Read this briefing on ‘The EU’s energy markets‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.
Categories: European Union
Plenary round-up – January I 2023
Written by Clare Ferguson and Katarzyna Sochacka.
The highlights of the January I 2023 plenary session were debates on the conclusions of the European Council meeting of 15 December 2022 and the presentation of activities planned under the Swedish Presidency of the Council of the European Union. The session opened with a ceremony marking the 30th anniversary of the single market, followed by a debate with the Council and Commission on the matter.
Debates were held on the surge of respiratory infections and the shortage of medication in Europe; on the need to increase transparency, integrity and accountability in the EU institutions; on terrorist threats posed by far-right extremist networks; on criminalisation of humanitarian assistance, as well as on the Global Gateway. Members also debated foreign affairs issues, including the EU’s response to the appalling attack against civilians in Dnipro; strengthening action against the Putin regime and military support; and the establishment of a tribunal on the crime of aggression against Ukraine. The High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Josep Borrell, spoke on the EU response to the protests and executions in Iran, and on strengthening the EU‑Latin America partnership.
During question time, Members posed questions to Commissioner Janusz Wojciechowski on EU action to tackle food price inflation in Europe. Finally, Parliament elected Marc Angel (S&D, Luxembourg) to the post of Vice‑President of the European Parliament.
Thirtieth anniversary of the single marketIn relation to EU freedoms, for 30 years, the single market has benefited Europeans through free competition under fair rules and the liberty to live, work, shop and retire anywhere in Europe. Estimates suggest the single market has added between 8 % and 9 % to EU gross domestic product. With 447 million consumers and 23 million companies, however, the single market is a constantly evolving entity, which needs to adapt to challenges such as the pandemic. Members adopted, by a large majority, a resolution, tabled by the Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO), which underlines the single market’s vital role in creating a European polity. The IMCO text seeks renewed Member State commitment to implementing and enforcing existing single market legislation correctly, and looks forward to renewed action to strengthen and modernise the single market.
Strengthening EU rules on waste shipmentsStronger rules on waste shipments would ensure that EU efforts to recycle waste do not lead to environmental degradation outside the EU. Members debated and adopted a report from Parliament’s Committee on Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI) calling for stronger European Commission proposals to this end, not least on monitoring what actually happens to waste exported outside the EU. The committee would like to see an assessment of waste management in non-EU countries that takes labour standards into consideration, as well as an end to EU exports of plastic waste. The vote sets Parliament’s position for negotiations on EU rules on waste shipments with the Council.
Unshell – Rules to prevent misuse of shell entities for tax purposesWhile shell companies, or ‘shells’ (entities with no, or minimal, economic activity) may serve commercial or business functions, they are also used to evade taxes. In response to a European Commission proposal for an instrument to ‘unshell’ companies being used to abuse the tax system, Parliament debated and voted overwhelmingly in favour of a Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) report. Members support the ECON proposals to lower gateway thresholds to prevent EU shell companies from benefiting from tax advantages, impose shorter deadlines to address rebuttals, and review the rules to prevent misuse of shell entities for tax purposes after five years. The proposal now requires unanimity in the Council, where negotiations are ongoing, following consultation of Parliament.
Revision of the European Works Councils DirectiveEuropean works councils (EWCs) represent EU employees of large multinational companies, to ensure that their rights are protected. Despite an evident lack of effective consultation, however, the European Commission does not plan to revise the current EWC Directive. Members debated a legislative-initiative report from the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs (EMPL), which calls on the Commission to take action to ensure European works councils provide meaningful consultation, end exemptions, and introduce tougher penalties. The vote will take place in plenary on 2 February.
Human rights and democracy in the worldThe consequences, particularly for the most vulnerable, of Russia’s war on Ukraine are highlighted in the response to the Commission’s 2021 annual report on human rights and democracy in the world, drafted by Parliament’s Subcommittee on Human Rights (DROI). The report calls for a strong approach to war criminals and human rights violators in the context of the war in Ukraine. It also condemns the increasing threats to freedom of expression in many countries, and welcomes EU action to protect the most vulnerable, wherever they live. In this respect, Members debated and adopted the Human rights and democracy in the world, 2021 report, which in particular favours integrating human rights values in trade agreements, and looks forward to greater cooperation between EU institutions on human rights issues.
Annual reports on the implementation of the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) and common security and defence policy (CSDP) in 2022In a dynamic geopolitical situation, the EU can demonstrate its capacity to address external vulnerabilities in a robust manner – such as the unprecedented decision to mobilise funding for Member State weapons delivery to defend Ukraine against Russian aggression. Members debated and adopted the Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET) 2022 annual report on implementation of the CFSP, which highlights the combined effects of Russia’s war against Ukraine and worsening climate and energy crises, with increasingly assertive authoritarian regimes such as China and Iran posing new risks to stability. In its report, AFET proposes that the EU redouble its efforts to strengthen international security through a military and defence union, by supporting qualified majority voting (QMV) in the Council on security issues, ensuring greater strategic autonomy, and stronger mitigation of climate change vulnerabilities.
Members also debated and adopted a second AFET report, on EU defence initiatives, its 2022 report on the EU’s CSDP. Noting the dramatic deterioration of the security situation resulting from Russia’s actions, the committee urges that the EU provide all necessary assistance to Ukraine. It welcomes progress made in 2022, such as on the Strategic Compass, and looks forward to proposals for stronger EU defence financing. Not limited to European soil, the report calls for stronger security partnerships in Africa and in the maritime sphere, particularly the Indo-Pacific. It also welcomes the climate change and defence roadmap, and underlines the need for more investment in ‘green’ defence.
Protection of the EU’s financial interests and combating fraud – Annual report 2021Corruption is a major challenge for the EU – all Member States are affected by the problem to some extent – and this exposure to organised crime, undetected fraud and high-level corruption can seriously harm the EU’s budget. Combating fraud and protecting the EU’s financial interests is therefore crucial. Members debated and adopted a Committee on Budgetary Control (CONT) own-initiative report on these efforts, detailed in the European Commission’s 2021 annual report on the protection of the EU’s financial interests (known as the PIF report).
Opening of trilogue negotiationsMembers challenged the mandate for negotiations from the Employment and Social Affairs (EMPL) Committee on the proposal for a directive on improving working conditions in platform work, and a vote on confirming the mandate is now scheduled in plenary on 2 February 2023.
Read this ‘plenary at a glance’ on ‘Plenary round-up – January I 2023‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.
Categories: European Union
EU-US climate and energy relations in light of the Inflation Reduction Act
Written by Lasse Boehm with Chiara Scalamandrè.
The war in Ukraine has put Europe’s dependence on energy imports under the spotlight. The United States (US) has stepped in and pledged to increase its exports of liquefied natural gas (LNG) to Europe. While this helps address the shortfall in energy imports from Russia in the short term, it raises the question as to how far the EU wants to build an energy partnership with the US.
Closely intertwined with the energy challenge is the fight against climate change. With the European Union (EU) committing to more ambitious policies within the framework of the Green Deal, it has an interest in international partners also raising their level of ambition. Here, too, the US is a key partner. As one of the world’s largest CO2 emitters, the US also plays a key role in bringing the world closer to reaching the goals of the Paris Agreement.
The US Inflation Reduction Act, a huge investment bill pouring billions of dollars into the American economy by favouring US-made clean energy and technology, brings these considerations together. The EU will have to consider how to integrate its climate, energy and industrial policies, so as to contribute towards climate goals and energy security while at the same time retaining the global competitiveness of its economy. This, in turn, has far-reaching repercussions for related policy areas such as international trade, as well as for the ongoing debate over the future of the EU’s budget and its macroeconomic governance framework.
Read the complete briefing on ‘EU-US climate and energy relations in light of the Inflation Reduction Act‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.
Categories: European Union
Revision of Council Directive 94/80/EC: Electoral rights of mobile Union citizens in municipal elections [EU Legislation in Progress]
Written by David de Groot (1st edition).
On 25 November 2021, the European Commission put forward a proposal to modify Council Directive 94/80/EC on the right of mobile EU citizens to vote and stand as candidates in municipal elections. The proposal tied in with the Commission President’s priority for a new push for European democracy. The proposal was presented together with three others: a proposal to modify Directive 93/109/EC on EU citizens’ right to vote and stand as candidates in elections to the European Parliament; a proposal on transparency and targeting of political advertising; and a proposal to revise EU Regulation No 1141/2014 on the funding of European political parties and foundations.
Although Directive 94/80/EC gave EU citizens living in another Member State the right to vote and stand in municipal elections under the same legal provisions and procedures as citizens of that Member State, the procedures under which these rights are exercised are subject to national legislation and procedures, which vary between Member States. The Commission’s proposal has been designed to address some of the concerns raised during the years since the directive entered into force and, in particular, the fact that despite the measures in place, mobile EU citizens still face difficulties in exercising their electoral rights in municipal elections.
Versions- January 2023: Revision of Council Directive 94/80/EC: Electoral rights of mobile Union citizens in municipal elections (1st edition)
25.11.2021
Rapporteur:Joachim Stanisław Brudziński (ECR, Poland)2021/0373(CNS)Shadow rapporteurs:Paulo Rangel (EPP, Portugal)
Domènec Ruiz Devesa (S&D, Spain),
Yana Toom (Renew, Estonia),
Damian Boeselager (Greens/EFA Germany), Konstantinos Arvanitis (The Left, Greece)Consultation procedure
(CNS) – Parliament adopts
a non-binding opinion Next steps expected: Vote in committee on draft report
Categories: European Union
30 years of the European single market
Written by Giulio Sabbati.
The European single market celebrates its 30th anniversary this year. On 1 January 1993, the then 12 Member States abolished border controls between each other, launching free movement of people, goods, services and capital. This infographic celebrates the single market’s anniversary, looking at the history of the European Union (EU) in terms of macro-economic indicators as the number of Member States has grown. It shows exports of goods, services and investments; movement of people within the EU to live, study or work; and the digital single market, covering e-commerce sales of enterprises and online purchases by individuals. The final section looks at the EU in the world.
Although we are celebrating the 30th anniversary of the single market, the idea of a unified Europe began in the 1950s with the founding of the Communities. But to secure the single market, many steps were required. The timeline below highlights the major milestones needed to achieve the single market.
Read the complete infographic on ‘30 years of the European single market‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.
Categories: European Union
The Global Gateway: Taking stock after its first year
Written by Marcin Szczepański.
The global investment gap between high-income and low- and middle-income countries has been widening in recent years, even more so in the aftermath of the double crisis caused by the pandemic and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. This divergence and underfunding are also negatively affecting global connectivity, which requires substantial financial resources for both its expansion and its maintenance. This is important for recovery from the current crisis, as the modern world is based on multifaceted links between communities, economies and countries, and connectivity is known to contribute to economic growth, supply chain efficiency and resilience to shocks.
Since 2015, the EU has been making efforts to narrow this investment gap and support global connectivity, not least to counter the influence of China’s Belt and Road Initiative. However, experts considered EU assistance and investments to be fragmented, leading to inefficiencies, gaps and overlaps. Taking into account this and the growing importance of connectivity, made clear by the pandemic, the EU launched its Global Gateway strategy on 1 December 2021. Its worldwide scope is not limited to selected regions or countries.
The strategy promises to mobilise up to €300 billion in investment to boost smart, clean and secure digital, energy and transport links and strengthen health, education and research systems across the world. Perhaps the most significant initiative so far has been the launch of the first regional Global Gateway Africa-Europe Investment Package in February 2022. Other deliverables include the signing of international agreements and the inauguration of the first infrastructure projects.
Many think tanks and experts have welcomed the Global Gateway as an attempt to boost efficiency, coherence and strategic drive in the EU’s connectivity and investment policies. Opinions are divided, however, on whether sufficient funding can be mobilised and it remains to be seen if the Team Europe approach, bringing together the EU, financial institutions and Member States, will deliver.
Read the complete briefing on ‘The Global Gateway: Taking stock after its first year‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.
Poorer countries attract less private investment in infrastructure and see a dip in the number of projects funded
Categories: European Union
European defence industry reinforcement through common procurement act (EDIRPA) [EU Legislation in Progress]
Written by Sebastian Clapp (1st edition).
On 19 July 2022, the Commission put forward a proposal for a regulation on establishing the European defence industry reinforcement through common procurement act (EDIRPA). On 1 December 2022, the Council adopted its general approach. EDIRPA is a short-term joint defence procurement instrument worth €500 million. It seeks to address the most urgent and critical defence capability gaps and is aimed at incentivising Member States to procure defence products jointly. It does not prescribe what will be procured, as this is left up to the Member States that will need to fulfil the criteria set by EDIRPA.
The proposal follows the Russian invasion of Ukraine, which has reshaped the geopolitical environment in Europe dramatically and intensified discussions across EU capitals on defence investments and capabilities. Given a practical mandate at the Versailles Summit in March 2022, the Commission presented a defence investment gap analysis in May 2022, proposing the EDIRPA as one of a number of means to address defence-related investment, capability and industrial gaps
Versions- January 2023: European defence industry reinforcement through common procurement act (EDIRPA) (1st edition)
19.7.2022
Rapporteur:Michael Gahler (EPP, Gerrnany) and Zdzisław Krasnodębski (ECR, Poland)2022/0219(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:To be appointedOrdinary legislative procedure (COD)
(Parliament and Council on equal footing
– formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Publication of draft report
Categories: European Union
Ground Zero for EU Air Travel Restrictions after China ends its Zero-Covid policy
Written by Monika Kiss.
After a series of relaxations of China’s zero-tolerance COVID measures at the end of 2022 (the country was practically closed for inbound travellers with most types of visas for almost three years), the Chinese government announced on 26 December 2022 that it would reopen its border to international travellers from 8 January 2023. This reopening means that China has dropped the requirements for five days quarantine in a hotel and three additional days of self-isolation at home that applied to international arrivals. However, travellers must still present a negative COVID‑19 test result obtained within 48 hours before departure. This measure applies to inbound travellers coming for business, employment, study and family visits. At the same time, the government declared its intention to increase international flights and to bring the schedule back to pre-coronavirus levels.
Following these announcements, bookings for international tickets for a date after 8 January 2023 increased by more than 85 % for both outbound and inbound travellers, according to International Air Transport Association (IATA) data.
Source: International Air Transport Association, 2023, ‘China to reopen border to international travelers’, All Rights Reserved. Available at IATA Economics page.As early as mid-December 2022, just one week after the first mitigating measures, China has seen a significant outbreak of COVID‑19. The Chinese government has been criticised, among others, by the World Health Organization (WHO), for under-representing the real number of COVID‑19 cases and deaths. The Chinese National Health Commission takes a ‘narrow’ definition of COVID‑19 death, taking only deaths caused by pneumonia and respiratory failure after contracting the virus into account. The WHO intends to continue monitoring the situation and urged all countries to maintain vigilance.
In this context, some countries, such as the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan, India and Malaysia, have introduced measures for travellers arriving from China. Some EU Member States also started applying measures as well from the end of December 2022. Italy imposed mandatory tests for passengers from China upon arrival, after 97 positive results were registered from a sample of 212, and has called on the EU to follow suit. Spain decided to test, to carry out temperature checks, and to impose COVID certificates. France has required pre-travel negative tests from passengers from China, masks on planes and PCR tests on arrival for all passengers. Belgium has announced it will not require test results from travellers, but is testing the wastewater from planes and scanning the samples for new variants. Differing reasons were advanced for these diverging and uncoordinated responses: past experiences of COVID‑19, fear of new variants, concerns about the reliability of Chinese data, or economic reasons (for instance, Austria decided not to ask for tests, as China is the most important Asian source market for the coming tourism season). Following the European Union’s Integrated Political Crisis Response (IPCR) meeting on 4 January 2022, called by the Swedish Presidency of the Council of the European Union, EU countries agreed on a coordinated precautionary approach, including the following elements for Member States:
- recommendation to wear a mask or FFP2/N95/KN95 respirators on all passengers on flights to and from China,
- advice to incoming and outgoing international travellers, as well as to aircraft and airport personnel, regarding personal hygiene and health measures,
- recommended introduction for all passengers departing from China to Member States, of the requirement for a negative COVID‑19 test taken not more than 48 hours prior to departure from China,
- recommendation to complement these measures with:
- random testing of passengers arriving from China on arrival in the Member States, as appropriate, and the sequencing of all positive results to strengthen surveillance of the epidemiological situation,
- testing and sequencing of wastewater from airports with international flights and aircraft arriving from China,
- continuing to promote vaccine sharing and the uptake of vaccines, including booster doses, particularly among vulnerable groups.
The EU Member States agreed to assess the situation and review the introduced measures by mid-January 2023.
This coordinated approach led to reinforced measures in several EU countries, Belgium, for instance requires a negative PCR test, valid for 48 hours, before boarding the plane as of 8 January 2023, as does Austria from 7 January 2023. Besides the Member States already mentioned, Germany, Latvia, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Sweden have so far stepped up rules on travellers from China in response to the rising cases.
Some stakeholders in the transport sector have been critical of the EU approach. In a joint statement, Airlines for Europe (A4E), International Air Transport Association (IATA) and ACI (Airports Council International) stated that the EU recommendation was not in line with the assessment published by the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) on 3 January 2023. The ECDC has declared that the current surge of COVID‑19 cases in China is not expected to affect the epidemiological situation in the EU/European Economic Area (EEA), because the COVID‑19 variants circulating in China are already present in the EU/EEA, and the population has already acquired higher immunity. Systematic testing of travellers from China is not therefore considered a scientifically driven and risk-based measure.
The measures taken by EU Member States were also subject to criticism in China, stating that these are ‘attempts to manipulate the COVID measures for political purposes’. China also threatened to ‘take countermeasures based on the principle of reciprocity’.
China also declined an EU offer of help through vaccine donations, with the Chinese government insisting that the situation is under control and that the country has an adequate quantity of medical supplies.
On 10 January 2023, the European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) and the ECDC published a joint statement as an addendum to the Aviation Health Safety Protocol. This document reiterates the recommendations of the Swedish Presidency, recommending airports and operators ensure:
- the use of masks or respirators for passengers and crew on flights,
- enhanced personal hygiene and health measures for both travellers and aircraft and airport personnel,
- the requirement for a negative COVID-19 test taken not more than 48 hours (RADTs) or 72 hours (NAATs) prior to departure,
- facilitated random testing of passengers upon arrival, and support for local health authorities in sampling wastewater from airports and aircraft.
Before the pandemic, Chinese tourists represented an important share of the EU’s tourism sector. Statistics show the number of outbound journeys of Chinese tourists has grown steadily during the last decade. Of the nearly 170 million outbound trips from China in 2019, nearly all were for private purposes, rather than business trips. Chinese tourist spending on international tourism has also increased strongly over the last ten years, reaching a peak of over US$277 billion in 2018.
Some 28 % of trips made by Chinese tourists were to the EU, with a preference for larger cities. France was the EU country most visited by Chinese tourists in 2019, with more than 2.4 million Chinese visitors, who spent around €4 billion. Other popular EU destinations included Italy, Spain, Germany, the Netherlands, Greece and Austria. In 2021, arrivals from China in the European country totalled roughly 55 000, dropping from around 158 000 in 2020 and over 1.55 million in 2019. In 2020, due to the pandemic and the severe COVID‑19 measures in China, the number of outbound tourists fell to around 20.3 million
Travel figures are more moderate in the other direction. Before the pandemic, China was the 11th most popular destination outside the EU for EU citizens. In 2018, EU residents made 1.75 million trips to China. Trips to China represented close to 2 % of the total number of trips made outside the EU in 2018, 48 % of which were for professional purposes. The number of trips to China declined considerably because of the pandemic and the related measures, to 125 000 trips in 2020 and 26 000 in 2021, mostly for professional purposes.
Although China’s lifting of COVID‑19 measures does not signal a green light for international leisure tourists willing to visit China, the Chinese government plans to ease restrictions for tourists and to issue tourist visas, without indicating a timeline. This development could boost both aviation and tourism, presuming that China intends to ease travel restrictions gradually. It remains to be seen if the measures taken by the EU will impact this trend.
Categories: European Union
Revision of Directive 2011/98/EU on the single permit to reside and work [EU Legislation in Progress]
Written by Anita Orav(1st edition).
Most migrants arrive in Europe legally, to work, study or join family members. Over a million of the first residence permits granted to non-EU third-country nationals in 2019 were for work purposes. The EU shares competence on legal migration with Member States but can set conditions for third-country nationals’ entry into and legal residence in Member States. However, Member States retain the right to determine admission numbers for third-country nationals seeking work. The Single Permit Directive lays down a single application procedure for a combined work and residence permit, and a common set of rights for third-country workers legally residing in an EU country.
In its communication ‘Attracting skills and talent to the EU’, adopted on 27 April 2022, the European Commission announced an overhaul of the EU’s acquis on legal migration. It also proposed a recast of the Single Permit Directive, with the objective of simplifying the application process for living and working in the EU and improving rights for residents and their family members. In the European Parliament, the proposal has been assigned to the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, which debated a draft report prepared by the rapporteur on 1 December 2022.
Versions- January 2023: Revision of Directive 2011/98/EU on the single permit to reside and work (1st edition)
27.4.2022
Rapporteur:Javier Moreno Sánchez (S&D, Spain)2022/0131(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Lena Düpont (EPP, Germany)
Jan-Christoph Oetjen (Renew, Germany)
Tineke Strik (Greens/EFA, the Netherlands)
Tom Vandendriessche (ID, Belgium)
Patryk Jaki (ECR, Poland)
Konstantinos Arvanitis (GUE/NGL, Greece)Ordinary legislative procedure (COD)
(Parliament and Council on equal footing
– formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Awaiting Committee decision
Categories: European Union
European Parliament Plenary Session – January I, 2023
Written by Clare Ferguson with Sophia Stone.
After a run of difficult years, Members of the European Parliament begin 2023 with a full agenda and some thorny issues to be grasped.
In a key debate on Wednesday morning, Members are scheduled to hear European Council and Commission statements on the conclusions of the European Council meeting of 15 December 2022. Earlier, on Tuesday morning, they are due to hear Council and Commission statements presenting the Swedish Presidency of the Council’s programme of activities for the next six months. Sweden’s priorities are: to protect citizens and freedoms; promote a new growth and investment model; a climate-neutral, green, fair and social Europe; and to promote Europe’s interests and values globally.
In relation to EU freedoms, for 30 years, the single market has benefited us all through free competition under fair rules and the liberty to live, work, shop and retire anywhere we like in Europe. Estimates suggest the single market has added between 8 % and 9 % to EU gross domestic product. That’s not to say that there is no room for improvement – 447 million consumers and 23 million companies mean that the single market is a constantly evolving entity, which needs to adapt to challenges such as the COVID‑19 pandemic. In addition to a ceremony to mark this noteworthy anniversary, Members are expected to debate a motion for resolution on Monday evening, tabled by the Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO). Underlining the single market’s vital role in creating a European polity, the IMCO text seeks renewed Member State commitment to implementing and enforcing existing single market legislation correctly and looks forward to renewed action to strengthen and modernise the single market. Members will also hear statements from the European Commission and Council.
While the single market has made it much easier to do business across borders in the European Union, wider globalisation sometimes causes issues when decisions affecting workers for multinational companies are taken far from their workplace. European works councils (EWCs) represent EU employees of large multinational companies, to ensure that their rights are protected. Despite an evident lack of effective consultation, however, the European Commission does not plan to revise the current EWC Directive. On Thursday morning, Members are due to debate a legislative-initiative report from the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs (EMPL), calling on the Commission to take action to ensure European works councils provide meaningful consultation, and an end to exemptions, tougher penalties and access to justice.
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Accept YouTube ContentThe EU is, above all, a peace project. However, in a dynamic geopolitical situation, the EU can demonstrate its capacity to address external vulnerabilities in a robust manner – such as the unprecedented decision to mobilise funding for Member State weapons delivery to defend Ukraine against Russian aggression. In a debate on Tuesday afternoon, Members are due to discuss annual reports for 2022 on implementation of the common foreign and security policy, implementation of the common security and defence policy, and human rights and democracy in the world.
Russia’s war against Ukraine has added to worsening climate and energy crises, and increasingly assertive authoritarian regimes such as China and Iran are posing new risks to stability. In its 2022 report on the implementation of the common foreign and security policy (CFSP), Parliament’s Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET) proposes that the EU redouble its efforts to strengthen international security through a military and defence union, by supporting qualified majority voting (QMV) in the Council on security issues, ensuring greater strategic autonomy, and stronger mitigation of climate change vulnerabilities.
The AFET committee takes up the challenges triggered by Russia’s aggression, to focus on EU defence initiatives in its 2022 report on the EU’s common security and defence policy. (CSDP). Noting the dramatic deterioration of the security situation resulting from Russia’s actions, the committee urges that the EU provide all necessary assistance to Ukraine. It welcomes the new initiatives taken in 2022, such as progress on the Strategic Compass, and looks forward to proposals for stronger EU defence financing. Not limited to European soil, the report calls for stronger security partnerships in Africa and in the maritime sphere, particularly the Indo-Pacific. It also welcomes the climate change and defence roadmap, and underlines the need for more investment in ‘green’ defence. Following up on the Conference on the Future of Europe, the report calls for further discussion of using QMV in the Council for CSDP matters.
The consequences, particularly for the most vulnerable, of Russia’s war, are highlighted in a response to the European Commission’s 2021 annual report on human rights and democracy in the world, which details the greatly deteriorating environment. The report from Parliament’s Subcommittee on Human Rights (DROI) for the Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET) calls for a strong approach to war criminals and human rights violators in the context of the war in Ukraine. It also condemns the increasing threats to freedom of expression in many countries, and welcomes EU action to protect the most vulnerable, wherever they live. In this respect, the Human rights and democracy in the world, 2021 report is particularly in favour of integrating human rights values in trade agreements, and looks forward to greater cooperation between EU institutions on human rights issues.
Peace and security: interactive infographic on Peace and Security.
Food price inflation is another consequence of the war, as well as other factors including extreme weather, affecting all EU citizens. Parliament strongly supports the measures to address the impacts of the Russian invasion on energy and food prices in the EU, particularly those aimed at reducing dependence on imports and increasing domestic production. Parliament has also called for measures to shelter citizens from the worst inflation in commodity prices and has encouraged EU countries to consider taking tax measures to ease access to essential goods. Members are expected to put their questions to representatives of the European Commission on EU action to tackle food price inflation in Europe on Tuesday afternoon.
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Accept YouTube ContentStronger rules on waste shipments are needed to ensure that EU efforts to recycle waste do not lead to environmental degradation outside the EU. A report from Parliament’s Committee on Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI) considers that European Commission proposals to this end could be strengthened, not least on monitoring what actually happens to waste exported outside the EU. The committee would like to see an assessment of waste management in non-EU countries that takes labour standards into consideration, as well as an end to EU exports of plastic waste. Members are expected to debate the report on Monday evening, with a subsequent vote setting Parliament’s position for negotiations on EU rules on waste shipments with the Council.
Corruption is a major challenge for the EU – all Member States are affected by the problem to some extent – and this exposure to organised crime, undetected fraud and high-level corruption can seriously harm the EU’s budget. Combating fraud and protecting the EU’s financial interests is therefore crucial. Members are due to debate a Committee on Budgetary Control (CONT) own-initiative report on these efforts, detailed in the European Commission’s 2021 annual report on the protection of the EU’s financial interests (known as the PIF report), on Wednesday afternoon. Noting the challenging context in 2021 due to the COVID‑19 pandemic, the CONT committee nevertheless underlines the need for timely parliamentary scrutiny of the spending of the extraordinary EU funds made available for the recovery.
While shell companies, or ‘shells’ (entities with no, or minimal, economic activity) may serve commercial or business functions, they are also used to evade taxes. In response to a European Commission proposal for an instrument to ‘unshell’ companies being used to abuse the tax system, Parliament is set to debate a Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) report on Monday evening. The report proposes lower gateway thresholds to prevent EU shell companies from benefiting from tax advantages, shorter deadlines to address rebuttals, and welcomes plans to review the rules to prevent misuse of shell entities for tax purposes after five years. The proposal requires unanimity in the Council, where negotiations are ongoing, following consultation of Parliament.
Parliament’s 14 vice-presidents replace the president in the discharge of his or her duties, among other duties, and sit as a Member of Parliament’s Bureau, responsible for financial, organisational and administrative decisions on Parliament’s functioning. On Wednesday lunchtime, Parliament will vote to elect a new vice-president, after voting last month to remove the vice-president subject to ongoing investigations by Belgian authorities for alleged wrongdoing.
European Parliament Plenary Session – January I, 2023 – agenda
- Ten issues to watch in 2023: https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLPPfzoqPUImUT7HIcA7l34ieoAtU7GnWU
- Ten issues to watch in 2023
- State of play in the European Council in December 2022
- Priority dossiers under the Swedish European Council Presidency
- Thirtieth anniversary of the EU single market
- Revision of European Works Council Directive
- Report on the implementation of the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) in 2022
- Report on the EU’s common security and defence policy (CSDP) in 2022
- Human rights and democracy in the world, 2021
- Question time: Food price inflation
- Strengthening EU rules on waste shipments
- Protection of the EU’s financial interests and combating fraud: Annual report 2021
- Unshell – Rules to prevent misuse of shell entities for tax purposes
- Vacancy for a Parliament vice-president
Categories: European Union
Taking stock of progress towards the European education area
Written by Krisztina Binder.
The European education area (EEA) is about promoting cooperation among European Union (EU) Member States to build more resilient and inclusive national education and training systems. The aim is also to improve access to quality education and lifelong learning for all across the EU.
EU leaders first endorsed the vision for a European education area at the Gothenburg Social Summit in 2017. Following the first initiatives, the overall approach to forming the EEA by 2025 was outlined in a 2020 European Commission communication and two 2021 Council of the EU resolutions.
On 18 November 2022, the Commission adopted its progress report on the achievement of the EEA by 2025. The report highlights the first results of the implementation of actions and reforms and points to some positive trends in education, such as the decreasing number of early school leavers and the rising tertiary educational attainment rate. It is estimated that overall EU spending on education and skills will triple between 2021 and 2027 compared to the previous budget period. However, warning signs suggest that more far-reaching, longer-term, efforts are needed to address inequalities in and improve the quality of education and training.
A mid-term review process informed by the Commission’s 2022 progress report will take place in 2023. In this context, an event with the European Parliament has also been scheduled. The Commission is expected to publish a comprehensive report on the achievement of the EEA in 2025.
While in its November 2021 resolution, Parliament expressed its belief that the EEA could and should play a unique role in improving access to and quality of education, it also underlined the need for a more holistic approach and suggested clear priorities and achievable targets for the actions. In its May 2022 resolution, Parliament welcomed the Commission proposals to develop a European approach to micro-credentials, individual learning accounts and learning for environmental sustainability as a step towards the EEA. These initiatives are considered an opportunity to make the possible benefits of the EEA more visible to European citizens.
Read the complete briefing on ‘Taking stock of progress towards the European education area‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.
Categories: European Union
Latest on Russia’s war on Ukraine [What Think Tanks are thinking]
Written by Marcin Grajewski.
As Russia’s war on Ukraine has entered into its 11th month, Moscow’s forces have launched fierce attacks in the east of the country, hoping for gains after a series of retreats in the second half of 2022. In some of the most intense fighting since the invasion, Russia’s onslaught focused on the salt-mining town of Soledar, a stepping-stone in Moscow’s push to capture the entire Donbas region.
In the preceding weeks, Russia has been bombing Ukraine’s critical infrastructure, depriving many areas and people of electricity, heating and water supplies.
Ukraine is preparing to receive Patriot air defence missiles from the United States and Germany. Ukrainian troops were due soon to arrive in the United States to begin training on this advanced defence system.
Meanwhile, the EU has agreed to introduce a price cap for Russian oil at US$60 per barrel.
This note gathers links to the recent publications and commentaries from many international think tanks on Russia’s war on Ukraine. Earlier analyses of the war can be found in a previous edition of the ‘What Think Tanks are Thinking’ series.
Refugees must be central to the reconstruction of Ukraine
Brookings Institution, January 2023
European natural gas imports
Bruegel, January 2023
Germany must move past the crossroads
Carnegie Europe, January 2023
War in Ukraine bolstered EU solidarity: Will it last?
Centre for European Reform, January 2023
Expert insights: Russia and Ukraine
Clingendael, January 2023
The risk of ‘refugee fatigue’: Three ways European leaders can support Ukrainians fleeing the war
European Council on Foreign Relations, January 2023
Announcements of new military equipment for Ukraine: Day 315 of the war
Eastern Studies Centre, January 2023
L’Union européenne face à la guerre en Ukraine: La puissance libérale et ses limites
Fondation Robert Schumann, January 2023
Disinformation as a weapon of war: the case for prebunking
Friends of Europe, January 2023
The threat of war fatigue
German Marshall Fund, January 2023
In focus: Russian exports to the EU before the invasion of Ukraine
Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy, January 2023
Russian offensive campaign assessment
Institute for the Study of War, January 2023
The land war in Ukraine as winter takes hold
International Institute for Strategic Studies, January 2023
Belarus and Russia move to the next stage of integration
Polish Institute of International Affairs, January 2023
Ukraine and the new two war construct
Rand Corporation, January 2023
The myth of America’s Ukraine fatigue
Rand Corporation, January 2023
Proposals to seize Russian assets to rebuild Ukraine
Brookings Institution, December 2022
Supporting international accountability for Ukraine
Brookings Institution, December 2022
What lessons do past international efforts at rebuilding war-torn countries hold for organizing the reconstruction of Ukraine?
Brookings Institution, December 2022
The Russia-Ukraine war and its ramifications for Russia
Brookings Institution, December 2022
Ukraine is the victim: Negotiations should be Kyiv’s decision
Brookings Institution, December 2022
The impact of the Ukraine crisis on international trade
Bruegel, December 2022
Will the European Union price cap on Russian oil work?
Bruegel, December 2022
The war in Ukraine highlights European rifts
Carnegie Europe, December 2022
The risks of negotiating an end to the war in Ukraine
Carnegie Europe, December 2022
The $300 billion question: How to get Russia to pay for Ukraine’s reconstruction
Centre for European Policy Studies, December 2022
Feel free to talk about Ukraine, but don’t expect miracles
Centre for European Reform, December 2022
Now is not the time for Ukraine to negotiate
Centre for European Reform, December 2022
Are France and Germany wavering on Russia?
Centre for European Reform, December 2022
Open-source intelligence in Ukraine: Asset or liability?
Chatham House, December 2022
Russian imperial mindset must change for real victory
Chatham House, December 2022
Will an EU oil price cap limit Russian aggression?
Chatham House, December 2022
Putin and the Third Rome
Clingendael, December 2022
Three scenarios for the future of Russia-West relations
Clingendael, December 2022
The old is dying and the new cannot be born: A power audit of EU-Russia relations
Council on Foreign Relations, December 2022
Russia-proofing Europe
Council on Foreign Relations, December 2022
Aggression on trial: The tricky path towards prosecuting Russian war leaders
Council on Foreign Relations, December 2022
Russia’s response to Western oil sanctions
Eastern Studies Centre, December 2022
What news from the Ukrainian front: A net assessment
Egmont, December 2022
No security for Ukraine or Europe without a secure Black Sea and Mediterranean
Egmont, December 2022
Helping Ukraine survive the winter is a life-or-death imperative
European Policy Centre, December 2022
Les armes livrées à l’Ukraine depuis janvier 2022. Base de données et fiche d’information
Groupe de Recherche et d’Information sur la Paix et la Sécurité, December 2022
Les Kadyrovtsy en Ukraine: les limites de ‘l’arme psychologique’ de Poutine
Groupe de Recherche et d’Information sur la Paix et la Sécurité, December 2022
Population displacements in the Ukraine War: The challenge of first humanitarian assistance
Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy, December 2022
10 conflicts to watch in 2023
International Crisis Group, December 2022
Pour l’Ukraine: Les yeux ouverts
Institut français des relations internationales, December 2022
Soviet history shapes African attitudes towards the Ukraine War
Italian Institute for International Political Studies, December 2022
Ukraine: After winter, spring?
Italian Institute for International Political Studies, December 2022
EU foreign policy integration at times of war: From short-term responses to long-term solutions
Istituto Affari Internazionali, December 2022
The Ukrainian conflict and the energy crisis: Sustaining the energy transition
Istituto Affari Internazionali, December 2022
The EU’s latest bargain with Hungary’s Orban unlocks aid to Ukraine
Peterson Institute for International Economics, December 2022
Russia’s war on Ukraine: A sanctions timeline
Peterson Institute for International Economics, December 2022
Zelensky visits the U.S. to rally support
Polish Institute of International Affairs, December 2022
Russian attacks may prompt increased refugee flows from Ukraine
Polish Institute of International Affairs, December 2022
EU development cooperation policy faces challenges amid the war in Ukraine
Polish Institute of International Affairs, December 2022
Responding to a limited Russian attack on NATO during the Ukraine war
Rand Corporation, December 2022
The trouble with Russian blacklisting
Rand Corporation, December 2022
The attack on Ukraine and the militarisation of Russian foreign and domestic policy
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, December 2022
Read the complete briefing on ‘Latest on Russia’s war on Ukraine‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.
Categories: European Union
Geoeconomics in an age of empires: What does Africa risk? [Ten issues to watch in 2023]
Written by Angelos Delivorias.
This is the seventh edition of an annual EPRS publication aimed at identifying and framing some of the key issues and policy areas that have the potential to feature prominently in public debate and on the political agenda of the European Union over the coming year.The topics analysed encompass the 2024 European elections, budgeting in times of crises and war, lessons for public investment in the EU from the EU recovery instrument, the fiscal and monetary policy mix, climate
and socio-economic tipping points, the impact of increasing fuel prices on transport, cyber-resilience in the EU, protecting media freedom and journalists, the future of Russia, and geoeconomics in an age of empires
For 30 years after the end of the Cold War, the US was the global military and economic hegemon. As the EU widened and deepened, and great powers such as Russia and China, but also emerging middle powers such as Brazil, India, and Turkey, used economic means to increase their global influence and pursue geopolitical aims, scholars argued that the world was becoming multipolar. The past decade, however, marked the limits of multilateralism (and need for reform), leaving room to growing power rivalry. Countries with regional or great power ambitions have used soft power, but also threats and the use of force, to alter the status quo in their favour. This brought supply chains, critical minerals and great power politics to the centre of conversations, and led some analysts and politicians to support the idea that the world has entered a ‘new Age of Empires’. The competition for power deriving from access to materials and influence through investment and economic advantage becomes particularly striking when narrowing the focus to regions of overlapping involvement of major and middle powers with aspirations of expanding influence. To illustrate this, it is interesting to compare the strategies of three different countries towards Africa, a key partner of the EU and a continent undergoing great changes and with great potential for growth, because of its critical raw materials and the opportunities it presents for infrastructure investments, as well as its vulnerability to food and economic crises.
China has been Africa’s largest trading partner for 12 years and is its fourth-biggest investor. China’s trade with Africa, limited until the millennium, began increasing substantially around 2005 and has kept increasing ever since, reaching US$113 billion in exports and US$78 billion in imports in 2019. In 2019, total Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) in Africa amounted to US$44 billion (vs US (the top investor) FDI of US$78 billion). One third of Chinese FDI in Africa is channelled to infrastructure and construction, while one fourth goes to mining and extraction of raw materials. Similarly, since the early 2000s, China has emerged as Africa’s largest bilateral lender (62 % of African bilateral debt). Chinese credits to Africa amounted to US$148 billion in 2019, with US$44 billion for investments in infrastructure, US$36 billion to energy, and US$18 billion to mining and extraction. These loans have helped finance large-scale investments but have also resulted in the build-up of debt-service burdens. They also contain clauses that make debt less transparent, making debt estimation, renegotiation and restructuring more difficult. Through its relations with Africa, China aims at accessing the continent’s natural resources, markets to export its manufactured goods, and allies in the diplomatic isolation of Taiwan. Its activities in Africa prioritise economic over political and security interests. Nonetheless, to support its interests, China has also offered military and law-enforcement assistance, and established a naval base in Djibouti. Xi Jinping’s third term should contribute to maintaining the trend. At the same time, the slowing down of the Chinese economy as a result of COVID-19, and the increasing tensions between the US and China may change the Chinese strategy. Similarly, the opaqueness of some Chinese loan deals with African governments and labour issues on the ground may increase African countries’ reticence towards increased ties.
If the 1990s post-Soviet turmoil ended many of Russia’s global ambitions, including in Africa, recent years have seen renewed Russian interest in the continent. Since 2010, Moscow’s strategy and activities have pursued the aim of strengthening its position in the intensifying struggle over access to commodities, transit routes and markets, by developing infrastructure connecting different regions and forging diplomatic and economic links across different continents. Efforts already intensified in the middle of the decade and culminated in 2019 with Russia’s co-hosting (with Egypt) of the inaugural Russia-Africa summit. Russia has modest trade with Africa, (US$20 billion per year), which is heavily imbalanced toward Russian exports of arms and grain (Russia controls 49 % of the overall arms market), and import of minerals, diamonds and oil contracts. Russia has also attempted to negotiate nuclear power deals with several African countries (including Egypt, Nigeria, Ghana and Kenya). Beyond the supply of weapons, Russia is involved militarily in Africa, through its military instructors, its private military companies such as the Wagner group, and through the role played by its navy and air force (deployments, military exercises, basing agreements). While the stated aim is to protect strategic resources and transit routes, there are also allegations (especially for private groups) that they also engage in smuggling and transnational crime. The country also uses credit policy channels (debt write-offs, export credits, credit from its state-owned companies, as well as unpaid USSR claims to African countries it inherited). Going forward, it is difficult to say whether the presence of Russia in Africa will grow or diminish. On the one hand, 25 African states chose not to condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, acknowledging historic ties with the Soviet Union and the Russian presence on the continent. On the other hand, the fallout of food and energy inflation may change the perception of some African countries. Lastly, while scenarios for a post-conflict Russia are still unclear (see issue 9: Russia, quo vadis?), its strategy may change as a result of the significant blow to its economy and the evolution in public opinion, following its invasion of Ukraine.
The primary motivation of Turkey, an emerging middle power, for stronger relations with African countries is economic. Africa has natural resources that Turkey needs for its manufacturing and industrial sectors, including oil and gas. In that context, trade has grown from US$5.4 billion in 2003 to US$25.3 billion in 2021, and Turkey’s president promised in 2021 to double that amount. FDI has similarly increased from US$100 million in 2003 to US$6 500 million in 2021. To further increase trade and to counter the influence on the continent of the Gülen movement, accused of being behind the 2016 failed coup attempt in Turkey, the country also tries to expand Turkish cultural-religious influence on the continent, notably by investing a lot in education projects. Aside from trade and investment, Turkey uses soft power instruments such as humanitarian aid and development assistance programs (e.g. Turkish Red Crescent). Lastly, in 2017, Turkey opened its first military base in Africa, in Somalia. Turkey benefits from the fact that, contrary to some EU countries, it has no colonial past haunting its relations with Africa; in contrast with China, it has not been accused of debt trap diplomacy; and contrary to Russia, it maintains a pro-sovereignty narrative, which resonates in the area. Against possible expansion is the country’s economic crisis. Also, the presidential elections scheduled for June 2023 may result in a change in strategy.
In the aforementioned context, the EU, for which multilateralism is both a foundational principle and part of strategic operational guidance, has positioned itself in Africa through several initiatives, including the European Peace Facility and the Global Gateway strategy, which will mobilise up to €300 billion of investment (half of which has been pledged to Africa) in strategic sectors up to 2027. To maximise results on the continent, it has suggested using the Global Gateway to mobilise finance and tackle the root causes of food insecurity, merging the strategy with the European Green Deal, to mutually reinforce them, or considering debt-for-climate swaps with African countries.
The European Parliament has expressed its concern that, in many areas, Africa has become a new arena of great power competition. It has criticised human rights violations by private military and security companies in Africa, particularly the Wagner group. It called for human rights and the environment to be preserved in fossil fuels projects, stressed the benefits of multilateralism and concerted action at international level, and called for increased investment in Africa to realise the potential for EU-Africa partnership in agriculture and the environment, economic development and sustainable and inclusive growth.
Read the complete in-depth analysis on ‘Ten issues to watch in 2023‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.
Categories: European Union
Russia, quo vadis? [Ten issues to watch in 2023]
Written by Anna Caprile.
This is the seventh edition of an annual EPRS publication aimed at identifying and framing some of the key issues and policy areas that have the potential to feature prominently in public debate and on the political agenda of the European Union over the coming year.The topics analysed encompass the 2024 European elections, budgeting in times of crises and war, lessons for public investment in the EU from the EU recovery instrument, the fiscal and monetary policy mix, climate
and socio-economic tipping points, the impact of increasing fuel prices on transport, cyber-resilience in the EU, protecting media freedom and journalists, the future of Russia, and geoeconomics in an age of empires
Russia’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine has shaken the geopolitical foundations of Europe, opening a colossal security and identity rift in the Eurasian space. Its outcome will shape Europe’s and Russia’s futures, in seemingly drastically divergent directions. In 2023 and beyond, the EU will have consequential choices to make, which will determine when and how these paths converge again, no matter how difficult this might seem today.
The war seen from Moscow: An evolving narrativeThe war Russia is fighting now is not the war the Kremlin prepared for. The ‘special operation’ in Ukraine, started on 24 February 2022, was planned as a necessary intervention to ‘fix’, at last, the ‘Ukrainian issue’ – a permanent source of trouble for Moscow practically since the auto-dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. As 2023 starts, nothing has gone ‘according to plan’ for the Kremlin, and the Russian army has suffered a series of humiliating defeats, to which Putin has responded by doubling down: mobilisation of 300 000 additional men, illegal annexation of 15 % of Ukrainian territory, and the less-than-subtle threat to resort to nuclear weapons. The Kremlin has changed the war narrative accordingly: it is no longer an intervention against a ‘puppet-Nazi’ government; it has become an existential fight against the ‘imperialist’ West and its attempts to ‘destroy Russia’. ‘The goal of that part of the West is to weaken, divide and ultimately destroy our country’ were Putin’s opening words at the solemn ceremony of the illegal incorporation of the four annexed regions, on 21 September 2022, addressing the whole Russian nomenclature.
The response of the Russian public has also evolved, under brutal suppression of anti-war movements and an increasingly controlled information environment. Levada Centre opinion polls, so far considered reliable, show majority support for the Russian army, but with growing concerns and an overwhelmingly pessimistic view of the future amongst Russians who have not fled the country. Most consequently, above the noise of the Kremlin’s professional pundits, there seems to be a decisive shift amongst influential Russian intellectual elites, including those who initially condemned the invasion, towards the belief that the vital interest of the Russian state are now at stake. As a showcase, the article published in May 2022 by Dmitri Trenin, director of the Carnegie Moscow Centre until early 2022, and now member of the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC): ‘How Russia must reinvent itself to defeat the West ‘hybrid war’: Russia’s very existence is under threat.‘
Russia next: The way backward?The retreat of the Russian army from Kherson, the only Ukrainian provincial capital they controlled, and allegedly part of the Russian Federation after the illegal annexation, is a crucial moment in the war. Different military scenarios are in view, with momentous decisions ahead for all parties. Yet, no matter how the conflict evolves, the path Russia has set itself appears dramatically clear already. The Russia that will emerge from this conflict, even if it manages to obtain something that it can depict as a victory at home, will be economically, militarily, and geopolitically weaker. Economically, the cumulative effect of the unprecedented sanctions is starting to mount, decoupling Russia from international finance, foreign investment and high technology components. The exodus of highly educated professionals has moved a vibrant part of the economy away, with GDP declining 3.2 % in 2022 and a similar forecast for 2023. With the progressive decoupling of EU countries from Russian oil and gas, Putin is turning towards other markets, such as China and India, where he has less negotiation space, to preserve his main source of revenue. Militarily, Russia has so far suffered an estimated 100 000 casualties, depriving itself of its best units and revealing its extraordinary weaknesses, and consumed a large arsenal of costly weaponry, difficult to replenish under the sanctions regime. Geopolitically, Russia has achieved the opposite of the declared objectives: NATO will become larger and closer to Russian borders with the incorporation of Sweden and Finland, Ukraine’s national identity has been reinforced and its European aspirations, alongside Moldova’s and Georgia’s, have been firmly consolidated. Meanwhile, Russia is rapidly losing space in what it considered a safe sphere of influence in the Southern Caucasus and Central Asia. Internationally, Russia finds itself increasingly cornered with the status of a pariah state: self-excluded from the Council of Europe, banned from cultural and sports events, condemned and held accountable by the UN General Assembly, designated a state sponsor of terrorism by the European Parliament, following similar resolutions by several EU national parliaments. The G20 meeting in Indonesia was a resounding diplomatic blow for Russia, which will find itself increasingly dwarfed by its alleged regional partner, China. The challenges ahead for the Kremlin are multiple, mounting and feeding each other. The immobility until 2036, which Putin assured for himself with the 2020 constitutional amendments, is less sure than before, and speculation on possible scenarios multiply.
Under a first scenario, already under way now, Putin’s regime evolves into a ‘boosted’ version of itself, towards an increasingly entrenched over-authoritarian, over-centralised, semi-totalitarian regime. Ever-harder political repression and, possibly, the full application of martial law allow federal and regional governments to meet war requirements, including a new mobilisation wave. In parallel, various existing indoctrination programmes, especially addressed to young people, would be accelerated and enlarged. Internal think-tanks have already anticipated a blueprint with different development models for this scenario, under self-explanatory titles: the most promising, according to the authors, appears to be ‘USSR 2.0’; the most controversial, ‘Nation Z’. Stretching further what is already an over-centralised and over-authoritarian regime could lead, however, to paralysis in Kremlin decision-making, with fatal consequences, especially on the battlefield. This leads to a second scenario:the meltdown. An accumulation of military setbacks and crises, and a growing sense of abandonment by disenfranchised groups of population and regions, would erode both regional and economic elites’ support, as well as popular confidence in the current regime, setting it in the direction of collapse. The outcome may be very different, also depending on the situation on the battlefield. The regime could try to avoid its collapse by replacing Putin with a new figure with more political space who could re-conduct Russia out of the impasse – through a timely manoeuvre blessed by the security services, either with Putin’s consent or on grounds of alleged or real Putin health problems. 2024 presidential elections, should they not be postponed under martial law, to avoid a Belarus-type scenario, could be the chosen moment for a change of ‘roof’, keeping safe the very same power elites under an appearance of legality. Putin’s replacement may, however, prove impossible, either because too many different clashing interests would block each other, or because by that time the war would have become untenable. The meltdown could then degenerate into a period of ungovernable chaos, where the para-military actors now boosted by the Kremlin (such as Yevgueniy Prigozhin and his Wagner group, and Ramzan Kadyrov’s Chechen militias), would have a reigning hand. From there onwards, the space for speculation would open up widely: it could, finally, be the moment for a true regime change, perhaps around well-known opposition leaders such as Alexey Navalny. However, a power vacuum could also bring the rise of far-right movements, increasingly empowered under the war rhetoric. And it could also lead, perhaps simultaneously, to the still unlikely, but extremely dangerous, fragmentation of the Russian Federation. Some analyst already see Russia as the next failed state. Whatever scenario unfolds, it will probably emerge, at least, as a failed empire.
Read the complete in-depth analysis on ‘Ten issues to watch in 2023‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.
Categories: European Union
Protecting media freedom and journalists in the EU [Ten issues to watch in 2023]
Written by Maria Diaz Crego.
This is the seventh edition of an annual EPRS publication aimed at identifying and framing some of the key issues and policy areas that have the potential to feature prominently in public debate and on the political agenda of the European Union over the coming year.The topics analysed encompass the 2024 European elections, budgeting in times of crises and war, lessons for public investment in the EU from the EU recovery instrument, the fiscal and monetary policy mix, climate
and socio-economic tipping points, the impact of increasing fuel prices on transport, cyber-resilience in the EU, protecting media freedom and journalists, the future of Russia, and geoeconomics in an age of empires
The year 2023 is expected to be marked by the adoption of innovative EU legislative proposals in the area of media freedom and pluralism, notably the anti-SLAPPs directive and the European media freedom act. The focus of EU institutions in this area in the run-up for the 2024 European elections has to be linked to the key role media play in contemporary democracies.
Media freedom and pluralism, entrenched as fundamental rights in both the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU and the European Convention on Human Rights, are indissociable from democracy as they protect the pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness without which democratic societies cannot flourish. Media not only provide the information that citizens need to make sound political choices but they also play other important roles, such as: i) acting as ‘watchdogs’ of our democracies and increasing the accountability of our representatives; ii) providing analysis of what is happening and helping citizens to understand an increasingly complex world; iii) boosting inclusiveness and making the voices of minorities heard; and iv) acting as a public forum for dialogue among citizens and groups with diverse points of view.
For media to play an effective role in a democratic society, citizens must have ‘access to a variety of information sources, opinion, voices etc. in order to form their opinion without the undue influence of one dominant opinion-forming power’, as highlighted by the European Commission. Past and current battles for control of media outlets clearly show how powerful media can be when it comes to shaping the views of citizens, and how they can be used to ensure the survival of a specific regime by extolling its achievements and reducing critical comments to a minimum.
Figure 6 – Media freedom and pluralism in the EUNo European Union Member State is free from risks to media freedom and pluralism, although the extent and gravity of those risks varies greatly across Europe, as confirmed by the World Press Freedom index, the Media Pluralism Monitor and the Commission rule of law annual reports (see Figure 6). The 2022 editions of the latter two show a negative shift as regards the journalistic profession, due to an increase in the number of threats to journalists (two journalists were murdered in the EU in 2021, whereas none were in 2020) and in the number of strategic lawsuits filed against media for providing information on issues of public interest (also known as ‘strategic lawsuits against public participation’ or SLAPPs). Both 2022 reports highlight concerns relating to the high concentration of news media on the continent, as well as to the need for further transparency of media ownership in many EU Member States. Editorial autonomy, understood as the protection against undue external interference in the editorial news‑making process, and the risk of political control, especially as regards public media, are also considered indicators of particular concern for the EU area in both 2022 reports.
Action in the media sector, originally aimed at establishing a single market for media services, is not new to the EU and dates back to the 1980s and the adoption of the Television without Borders Directive, repealed by the current Audiovisual Media Services Directive. However, the focus of attention of EU institutions in this particular area seems to be changing and partly moving towards a policy more centred on fundamental rights and the protection of media freedom and pluralism as a prerequisite for the proper democratic functioning of our institutions.
In this vein, as committed in the European democracy action plan (2020), in November 2021 the Commission adopted a legislative proposal on political advertising. The proposal aims to establish safeguards against manipulative techniques in political advertising and ensure the political pluralism that allows democratic institutions to thrive. It would establish common European rules on transparency of political advertising, requiring publishers to clearly label political advertisements as such and include information such as who is the sponsor, who paid, and how much, for it, and the election(s) or referendum(s) to which the advertisement is linked. In addition, the proposal would include a partial ban on the use of targeting and amplification techniques for political purposes, and prohibit those that involve the processing of sensitive personal data. The ban seeks to address therisks of fragmentation of the political debate and manipulation of voters raised by some techniques of political (micro‑)targeting frequently used in political campaigns.
To address challenges faced by journalists to inform independently and safely on issues of public interest, and respond to growing concerns over the prevalence of SLAPPs within the EU, the Commission presented a proposal on 27 April 2022 for an anti-SLAPPs directive that aims to protect not only journalists, but also anyone exercising freedoms of expression and/or information as regards issues of public interest, from abusive and manifestly unfounded lawsuits. As the proposal would apply to civil SLAPP cases with a cross-border dimension only, it was issued together with a recommendation setting out guidance for Member States to take effective measures to address purely domestic SLAPP cases, including in the area of criminal or administrative law.
In September 2022, the European Commission adopted a proposal for a European media freedom act that aims to set common European rules ensuring media freedom and pluralism in different areas. It would protect journalistic sources, and media and journalists from the use of surveillance technologies. Moreover, it would focus on media ownership transparency and the editorial independence of media providers providing news and current affairs content, by requiring them to inform about their direct and indirect ownership and imposing on them an obligation to establish internal safeguards geared at guaranteeing the independence of individual editorial decisions, once the editorial line of the media outlet has been defined. As the proposal would leave a wide margin of discretion to media providers as to the internal safeguards to put in place, it is accompanied by a recommendation setting out a catalogue of voluntary best practice to strengthen editorial independence. Finally, the proposal would also establish common rules for transparent and non-discriminatory allocation of state advertising to media and to ensure further independence of public media, among other things by requiring that their funding is adequate and stable and their governing board and head of management is appointed in a transparent and non-discriminatory manner and cannot be dismissed before the end of their term except in specific cases defined by national law. These legislative initiatives are all currently being analysed by the co-legislators. If approved, they would definitively shape the media ecosystem of Europe and the way media exercise their watchdog function for years to come.
Read the complete in-depth analysis on ‘Ten issues to watch in 2023‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.
Categories: European Union
Cyber-resilience in the EU [Ten issues to watch in 2023]
Written by Polona Car.
This is the seventh edition of an annual EPRS publication aimed at identifying and framing some of the key issues and policy areas that have the potential to feature prominently in public debate and on the political agenda of the European Union over the coming year.The topics analysed encompass the 2024 European elections, budgeting in times of crises and war, lessons for public investment in the EU from the EU recovery instrument, the fiscal and monetary policy mix, climate
and socio-economic tipping points, the impact of increasing fuel prices on transport, cyber-resilience in the EU, protecting media freedom and journalists, the future of Russia, and geoeconomics in an age of empires
As cyber-attacks proliferate, 2023 is expected to see progress on several EU legislative and non-legislative proposals aimed at protecting infrastructure, connected devices, and the whole information and communications technology (ICT) supply chain to counter the wave of cyber-attacks.
A changing cybersecurity threat landscapeRussia’s war against Ukraine has put cyber-resilience in the spotlight. Russia’s aggression includes massive cyber-attacks on Ukraine but also on Ukraine’s partners in the EU. Even before the war, cyber-attacks were a great concern for the European private and public sectors (such as the cyber-attack against the German Bundestag in 2021). A ransomware attack occurred every 11 seconds in 2021, expected to accelerate to every 2 seconds by 2031, costing US$10.5 trillion annually by 2025. Cybercrime is the fastest-growing wealth transfer worldwide, inflicting increasing costs on the world economy with malicious actors becoming increasingly sophisticated. Rapid digital transformation, accelerated by the COVID-19 pandemic and geopolitical tensions, has increased the playing-field for cybercriminals. The 2022 ENISA report on the threat landscape in the EU revealed that 10 terabytes of data are stolen every month. Ransomware, which scores highest on the list of cyber-attacks in the EU, is followed closely by distributed denial of service (DDOS) attacks, with the largest ever DDoS attack in Europe recorded in July 2022. The Cisco annual internet report estimates that DDoS attacks will double from 7.9 million in 2018 to 15.4 million globally by 2023. Health service providers, pipelines, airports, ministries, hotel chains, banks and digital service providers are just a few examples of entities that have suffered from cyber-attacks over the past few years. Russia’s aggression against Ukraine is also provoking the rise of hacktivism and a surge in disinformation. Of particular concern are the growing capabilities of malicious actors, now using attacks against complete supply-chains.
Protecting the critical infrastructureEspecially disturbing are attacks against critical infrastructure such as energy, health and finance, which increasingly rely on IT, becoming extensively vulnerable to cyber-attacks. Russia’s hybrid approach, merging physical and cyber-attacks, has demonstrated that disruption of essential services is a realistic threat to the EU. For example, the attack on the satellite communication provider just one hour before Russia’s attack on Ukraine affected internet services and wind farms across Europe. The Directive on the Resilience of Critical Entities (CER), together with the revised Directive on the Security of Network and Information Systems (NIS2), respond directly to this challenge. However, the fast-evolving threat landscape, and incidents such as the cyber-attack against the Danish railway network in November 2022, demand accelerated implementation of the new legal framework. Hence, the Council adopted a recommendation in December 2022, to step up efforts aimed at protecting critical infrastructure, and foster inter- and intra-EU cooperation. In particular, it would urge Member States to implement measures under the 5G cybersecurity toolbox, considering the high dependency of essential services on 5G and its importance for the development of digital services. The subsequent EU policy on cyberdefence aims to increase the EU’s cyberdefence capabilities and synergies between military and civilian cyber communities. The connectivity of critical infrastructure will be provided by the infrastructure for resilience, interconnectivity and security by satellite (Iris²), a sovereign space-based secure connectivity system, to be functioning in orbit by 2024
Advancing operational capacityNIS2 formally establishes the EU cyber-crises liaison organisation network (CyCLONe), rapid crisis-management coordination in case of large-scale cross-border cyber-incidents while the Joint Cyber Unit (JCU) ensures a coordinated response between civilian, law enforcement, diplomatic and cyberdefence communities, and should be fully implemented by 30 June 2023. EU cybersecurity capacity-building will be done in the framework of the European cybersecurity competence centre (ECCC), which is to become operational by March 2023. The centre aims to improve technological sovereignty through strategic cybersecurity investments. Together with the network of national coordination centres (NCCs), it will form the cybersecurity shield for the EU, powered by artificial intelligence (AI) and complemented by EU supercomputing infrastructure developed by the European high-performance computing joint undertaking. The first six quantum computers are expected to be available by the second half of 2023.
Protecting connected devicesConnected devices, such as home security applications, toys connected to the internet and smart cameras, expected to amount to three times in number the global population by 2023, have the potential to open the door to malicious actors and impact the whole supply chain, if hacked. To address this threat, the cyber resilience act (CRA) proposal would impose cybersecurity obligations on a very wide range of digital products before they are placed on the market. The proposal would impose high fines for non-compliance and ban products that do not abide by the rules. This could have an impact beyond EU borders, becoming an international reference for the cybersecurity of digital products. Intensive negotiations are expected on this proposal in 2023.
Protecting the supply chainThe October 2022 Council conclusions on ICT supply chain security should be materialised in the creation of the ICT supply chain security toolbox, to complement the coordinated supply chain risk assessment for ICT products under NIS2. The 5G security toolbox criteria could serve as an example when defining high-risk vendors – such as Huawei – for the security of ICT supply chains.
Progress is expected too on domain name systems (DNS) resolver (converting domain names such as www.name.eu into computer friendly IP-addresses, e.g. 192.168.2.1). A public European DNS resolver service (DNS4EU) should develop in 2023 as an alternative to public (non-EU) resolvers prevailing on the market, which would enhance the EU’s cybersecurity abilities and contribute to its digital sovereignty. We can also expect the finalisation of the EU certification schemes for cybersecurity of ICT products (EUCC) and for cloud services (EUCS), where it remains to be seen if disputed sovereignty requirements will be comprised in the scope of the latter.
Bridging the cybersecurity skills gapThe EU response to cyber-threats will depend immensely on having a sufficient and sufficiently trained cybersecurity workforce. The European cybersecurity skills framework (ECSF) will play an important role in defining the cybersecurity profession. The cybersecurity skills academy, which the European Commission has announced for the third quarter of 2023, could address the cybersecurity gap.
Read the complete in-depth analysis on ‘Ten issues to watch in 2023‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.
Categories: European Union
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