European Parliamentary Research Service Blog

Written by Sebastian Clapp and Philippe Perchoc.

As part of its Jean Monnet seminar series, the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) organised a two-day seminar entitled ‘European strategic autonomy, sovereignty and responsibility: Opportunities and challenges in the shadow of Russia’s war on Ukraine’ in Bazoches and Paris on 8 and 9 July 2022. The panellists included representatives of the Council, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Globsec, Institut Jacques Delors, the German Marshall Fund and a former Ukrainian Deputy Minister of Defence and staff from the secretariats of Parliament’s Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET) and Sub-committee on Security and Defence (SEDE).

The first part of the event took place at OECD Headquarters in Paris. In his opening statement, Secretary-General of the European Parliament, Klaus Welle, underlined that the war in Ukraine has triggered a return of geopolitics to Europe. He posed the questions whether Russian President Vladimir Putin is proposing a new bipolar world order, with Russia and China constituting one pole, and whether there is a new era of clashing value systems. If so, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) alone does not have all the tools necessary to counter the new Russian threat. However, the European Union (EU), with its comprehensive approach, could provide a large part of the answer. He noted that, with the return of geopolitics, it is critical for the EU to act geopolitically and to work with partners. Important steps were taken at the Versailles Summit when it comes to European defence and strategic autonomy and with the Strategic Compass. Nevertheless, the EU will need support from the United States to build up European resilience. It will be especially important to align defence procurement and boost joint deterrence and defence, together with the USA.

The first panel examined the implications of the Russian war on Ukraine for EU strategic autonomy. Panellists reflected on the broader and longer-term trends linked to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, with a particular emphasis on food security, energy and defence. The effects of the war on Ukraine on global food security were underlined. Already increasing before the war, global hunger has now become fundamentally worse, not least as Ukraine was the biggest supplier of wheat to the World Food Programme. More and more countries will now be dependent on food aid, and at higher prices. The participants also considered the looming energy crisis. Worryingly, US liquified natural gas (LNG) will not be enough to substitute for Russian gas and will be prohibitively expensive; some speakers argued that the EU is not doing enough to solve the energy crisis. On defence, panellists emphasised that, while the possibility of war has always existed, the EU approach was one of ‘waiting for problems to go away’. This has failed. One panellist emphasised that is essential to pay attention to what is happening outside the West, pointing to the importance of finding a way to ‘co-exist with China’.  

The event continued at the Jean Monnet House in Bazoches on the following day. In her opening message, President of the European Parliament, Roberta Metsola, emphasised the historic importance of the Jean Monnet House to European integration and highlighted that Jean Monnet and his guests discussed the first, albeit unsuccessful, projects for a European Defence Community at the house. She underlined that in a time of great geopolitical threat, strategic autonomy has become more pertinent than ever, , and outlined the key areas the EU27 leaders have identified as most important to the strategic sovereignty of the Union (defence, energy, the economy and food security). The first European integration projects were centred around energy, and today this issue is back on the table. She also noted that, in the face of Russia’s war on Ukraine, the EU reacted collectively and decisively and took unprecedented action in the area of sanctions, energy and military aid and focused most on the area of defence and the key measures agreed to in the Strategic Compass and Versailles Declaration.

In her introductory remarks, Vice-President Eva Kailli (S&D, Greece) emphasised that the EU has shown unity in response to recent crises, but noted that the EU lacks foresight. She underlined that a deeper analysis of what is coming is necessary, to ensure better preparedness. The EU must switch from shortsighted policies to long-term strategies based on foresight. Foresight is essential to building a ‘real preparedness plan’ for key areas, such as energy, defence, and raw materials. Foresight is also key to the EU’s green and digital transitions. Eva Kaili commended the European Parliament’s pioneering role in integrating foresight into policy-making, through the European Strategy and Policy Analysis System (ESPAS) and the Panel for the Future of Science and Technology (STOA). She also emphasised the EPRS’s adoption of foresight practices and underlined that the EPRS and STOA provide lawmakers with ‘clarity and perspective’, allowing Members to ‘see and plan further’. 

The second panel discussed the progress made in the EU’s pursuit of strategic autonomy/strategic sovereignty in the past six months, drawing on the Strategic Compass and on the Versailles agenda, and reflected on the challenges facing the EU’s capacity to act and to build resilience. Participants highlighted the European Defence Fund as one of the most important initiatives of recent times, with EU co-financing of defence procurement an extremely promising way forward for EU defence policy (vaccine procurement during COVID‑19 was given as an example of successful joint procurement), that complements NATO. However,  greater ambition and new sources of funding are necessary. The importance of critical technologies and reduction of strategic dependencies was also highlighted during the session. Commission initiatives, such as the roadmap on critical technologies for security and defence and the defence investment gap analysis were highlighted. The defence of the Eastern flank of NATO was also discussed, with a particular emphasis on scenarios looking at how the war on Ukraine will end and what the consequences could be for European defence.

The final session explored the importance of partnerships under the theme ‘From strategic autonomy to strategic responsibility? Partnering in times of great crisis’. Panellists discussed the state-of-play of the EU’s partnerships and cooperation with NATO, the USA, the United Kingdom and ‘like-minded partners’ and its implications for security and defence, energy and the economy. In terms of continued US commitment to NATO, the importance of the next US elections was underlined and the risks of a further shift in US foreign policy priorities towards the Indo-Pacific were discussed. One panellist suggested a transatlantic Erasmus programme to foster transatlantic cooperation in future generations. On Ukraine, the effectiveness of EU support to Ukraine including weapons deliveries to Ukraine was discussed. The European Parliament’s support to the Ukrainian Parliament was also underlined. Panellists discussed the UK’s partnerships with the EU, underlining that to the UK, EU foreign policy remains essential across the UK political spectrum; with the UK also supporting stronger EU-NATO cooperation. The session concluded that the war on Ukraine has underlined the alignment of the EU, the UK and the US on defence matters.

This meeting was the second in an annual series on strategic autonomy held at the Jean Monnet house. This year’s session was an occasion to reflect and discuss in a very different context to the first session in 2021. With these regular meetings, EPRS hopes to contribute to continued European and transatlantic dialogue.

Written by Aidan Christie.

The European Parliament traditionally holds two plenary sessions in Strasbourg in the month of October, and for the first of them, Members will focus on events beyond the EU’s borders. The key debate this session, on Wednesday morning, will address, with the Council and Commission, the latest developments in Russia’s war on Ukraine. The debate comes in the context of Russia’s recent escalation of the conflict and its attempts to annex additional areas of Ukrainian territory. A further topical debate will discuss the problems of anti-European and anti-Ukrainian propaganda circulated within the EU in support of Russia. Following last month’s debate on energy prices, Members are due to vote a resolution on the issue, as Europe seeks ways to deal with the energy price and supply crisis ahead of the winter season.

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On Monday evening, Members will debate provisional agreements reached with Council negotiators on two proposals that aim to create a European Health Union. Drawn up in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, the European Commission’s plans aim to ensure the EU is better prepared for future health threats. The proposed regulation on serious cross-border health threats would ensure the EU and each Member State have in place complementary preparedness plans for health crises. These would be coordinated, and regularly reviewed and updated. In addition, networks would be developed to improve contacts and knowledge-sharing among epidemiological and medical surveillance bodies. The proposed extension of the mandate of the European Centre for Disease Control (ECDC) would broaden its role to monitor health systems across the EU, and ensure data are made available to address all major health threats.

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Later that evening, Parliament will address measures to bring the latest rules of the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC) into EU law. The western Indian Ocean is a key fishing ground for tuna for the EU fishing fleet, with a catch of some 217 000 tonnes in the area in 2020. As a contracting party to the IOTC, the EU is obliged to ensure its conservation and fisheries management measures are taken over into EU law. Members are due to vote on an agreement reached with the Council on the proposed measures.

On Tuesday, the long-running issue of compatibility of chargers for electronic devices – such as smart phones, tablets, cameras, headphones, game consoles and portable speakers – is finally due to be resolved, when Members vote on the proposal on a common charger for such devices. With a voluntary approach from industry not having reduced the numbers of chargers needed by consumers, nor their frustration at not having a compatible one to hand, the Commission proposed to standardise chargers using the USB Type-C connector and port. Members will vote on the text agreed with the Council in trilogue, which should simplify life for consumers and reduce electronic waste.

During Tuesday’s voting session, Members will vote on a range of legislative proposals, including one on the establishment of an EU customs single window, enabling traders and shippers to deal with all the varied documentary requirements – such as those relating to health, the environment, agriculture, and compliance with standards, as well as customs – through a single electronic gateway. Another proposal to be voted is that on the modernisation of the way agricultural statistics are collected in the EU, specifically on new rules for data on input and output of agricultural activity, including use by farmers of agro-chemicals.

Tuesday afternoon in the plenary session will feature, among other debates, two rounds of question time, where Members have the chance to pose questions on specific topics. First, to a member of the Commission, on the issue of tackling depopulation through cohesion policy instruments, and then to the High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy, on heightening tensions between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Among other foreign policy issues to be tackled in Tuesday afternoon’s debates are the protests in Iran, following the death in police custody of Mahsa Amini. Iran has seen growing protests across the country, and their increasingly brutal repression by the authorities, since the death of Amini on 16 September. The 22-year-old Kurdish woman was arrested for allegedly violating the Iranian law requiring women to wear a veil. The protests are reportedly being led by women in solidarity with Amini, but commentators underline that the demonstrations also come in a context of deteriorating economic conditions and the soaring cost of living.

Members will also consider a set of recommendations to the Commission, Council and High Representative on EU policy on the Horn of Africa. The eight countries in this region suffer from violent conflict and food insecurity, but are of strategic interest for the EU, being on major trading routes through the Red Sea and Indian Ocean. EU policy towards the region is shifting from one focused on development to take much greater account of security concerns. Parliament is due to consider a report from the Committee on Foreign Affairs, which assesses the strategy on the Horn of Africa agreed by the Council in May 2021. The report makes recommendations on implementation of the strategy, in particular underlining the need to combat the influence of third parties in the region that do not act under similar values to those of the Union.

On Wednesday, after debating Russia’s war in Ukraine, Members will turn to another situation with pressing humanitarian needs, the widespread flooding in Pakistan. The country is prone to extreme weather events, and since early 2022 has experienced a run of exceptional weather, with heat waves being followed by the heaviest monsoon rains in over a century. Over a third of the country has been under water, equivalent to an area three times the size of Portugal. More than 1 600 people have been killed, many times that injured, and some 8 million have been displaced. On top of damage to houses, infrastructure and farms have also been badly hit.

Visit the Parliament’s website for the full agenda for the week’s plenary session.

Related EPRS publications:

Protests in Iran over the death of Mahsa Amini

The floods in Pakistan and the global and EU humanitarian responses

European Health Union: Regulating cross-border threats to health, and a renewed ECDC mandate

A common charger for electronic devices: Revision of the Radio Equipment Directive

The Horn of Africa

Customs single window

Transposition of management measures for Indian Ocean tuna fisheries

Statistics on agricultural input and output

Question time: Tackling depopulation through cohesion policy instruments

Question time: Heightening tensions between Armenia and Azerbaijan

Written by Anna Caprile and Eric Pichon.

Besides huge human losses and destruction, Russia’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine – the ‘breadbasket of Europe’ – has triggered energy and food supply challenges, exacerbating existing food systems vulnerabilities, already weakened under the effect of climate change and the COVID‑19 pandemic.

Fears of an unprecedented global food crisis similar to, or even worse than, the 2007‑2008 crisis have mounted, magnifying ripple effects for security, migration and political instability. The supply shock provoked by the blockade of Ukrainian exports, coupled with record price levels for energy and basic commodities, led several nations to adopt export restrictions, fuelling market shocks and speculative operations, leading to unpredictability in global food supply.

As the war continues and the stakes become higher, Russia has increasingly been using food shortage fears as a new weapon in its hybrid war, and food security has been at the top of the international political agenda since February 2022.

The response of the international community, including a United Nations–Turkey-brokered agreement to unblock exports from Black Sea ports, has calmed fears of an imminent widespread food global crisis. A number of food import and food aid-dependent countries, however, remain highly vulnerable to food price and foreign exchange volatility.  

This publication updates and expands an ‘at a glance’ note from April 2022.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Russia’s war on Ukraine: Impact on global food security and EU response‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Global exports of basic commodities: Russia’s and Ukraine’s shares (2021)

Written by Agnieszka Widuto.

Since Russia invaded Ukraine, Europe has found itself in an energy crisis. Skyrocketing gas and electricity prices, coupled with energy supply concerns, have obliged the European Union (EU) to take action to mitigate the situation.

Reducing energy consumption is seen as one of the key measures the EU Member States can take to reduce energy bills and tackle supply issues. It can help them reduce their energy import dependency and prepare for a winter of possible gas supply disruptions. It can also help the EU reach its climate goals in line with the European Green Deal.

The EU has taken a number of steps both to align its policies with more ambitious climate goals and to boost energy independence. In terms of long-term measures, the Energy Efficiency Directive is currently being revised to increase the EU-wide targets for the reduction of energy consumption by 2030. Similarly, the Energy Performance of Buildings Directive is also under revision to further improve the energy efficiency of buildings. One of the ways to achieve this would be through an enhanced energy performance certification system, boosting renovation rates and popularising solar panels.

Further EU measures aimed at saving energy and reducing demand in the short term include: a plan to reduce gas demand so as to ensure sufficient supplies in the winter; a proposed reduction of electricity demand as part of efforts to combat high energy prices; and an EU energy saving plan under REPowerEU, to cut the EU’s reliance on Russian fossil fuels. Key actions leading to reduced energy consumption include stepping up building renovation, implementing energy efficiency solutions, accelerating the rollout of renewables and promoting behavioural change by means of information campaigns. Reducing energy demand is part of broader ongoing efforts to address the energy crisis, complementing action aimed at diversifying imports, boosting EU energy production and redesigning the EU energy market.

The European Parliament has supported measures to reduce energy demand reduction, improve energy efficiency and increase energy savings in a number of resolutions.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Energy saving and demand reduction‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Andrés García Higuera.

Artificial intelligence (AI) has been the subject of such strong political and social debate that the question of its suitability for its main original purpose – improving supply chain efficiency – may come as a surprise. What if AI really could help strategic sectors cope with pressure? More specifically, could the agri-food sector benefit from this technology to compensate for the shortages broadly forecast as a result of today’s crises?

The crisis resulting from the unprovoked Russian attack on Ukraine shows the huge impact that disruptions on supply chains can have on the EU economy, not least in its agri-food sector. Providing outstanding benefits and challenges, AI has applications at various stages of the agri-food chain, including but not limited to precision farming, value chain integrity, personalised nutrition, reduction and prevention of food waste, enhancement of food safety, and transparency and traceability in the agri-food chain. The technology also has the potential to reshape the agri-food sector; mark a successful transition to climate-neutral Agriculture 4.0; and spur progress toward meeting Sustainable Development Goal 2 to end hunger, achieve food security, improve nutrition and promote sustainable agriculture.

According to a recent Eurobarometer publication on agriculture, nearly half of Europeans think that securing a stable food supply in the EU at all times should be a main common agricultural policy (CAP) objective. As with other technological advances, AI in this domain comes with its own set of benefits, risks, ethical issues and societal implications. Questions raised with respect to AI include how to balance potential benefits against possible risks; how to govern the use of these technologies; and how to incorporate socio-ethical value considerations into the policy and legal frameworks under development.

The reinforcing effect of combining AI with other new technologies is sure to disrupt many sectors, including agri-food. As the role of AI in agriculture and food production has grown in importance in recent years, the agricultural sector has witnessed increased use of sophisticated equipment, such as robots, satellites, drones, other automated vehicles and sensor-based monitoring and irrigation systems. These pieces of machinery serve as sources of data, for example concerning production processes and conditions on the farm, including data on crop growth, soil characteristics, pests, and weather conditions. In automated systems, AI allows real-time monitoring and analysis of agricultural processes, generating critical knowledge to fine-tune strategies for optimal resource utilisation, boosting productivity while minimising environmental impact. The use of AI in supply chain management is also gaining relevance, as the provision of seeds, fertilisers, cattle feed and water resources becomes more complex; and the same is happening with the final products. Tracking systems based on the internet of things (IoT), such as those relying on radio-frequency identification (RFID), have become essential to improving supply chain efficiency and ensuring product quality and customer safety.

Potential impacts and developments

A recent STOA study analysed the potential of precision agriculture for the future of farming in Europe. The potential applications of AI in the agri-food sector go even further. They can help to improve the way food is processed, packaged, stored, transported, prepared, served, eaten and not wasted. Along the agri-food chain, automation, robotisation and AI can help achieve greater productivity while reducing the need for a human workforce. In addition, plant breeding can help to make food production more sustainable, by developing crop varieties that require fewer inputs, for instance. Moreover, genome editing can enable the targeted alteration of a few DNA letters within the existing genetic blueprint of an organism. From the identification of genetic variants to agricultural production and changes in consumer behaviour, AI has the potential to become a game-changing technology in the agri-food domain.

While holding great promise, this rapidly developing field nevertheless raises concerns regarding equitable access, privacy and liability, as well as bias, inclusiveness, accuracy, data set availability and representativeness, data ownership, cybersecurity and the terms used to integrate big data and AI technologies into agri-farm systems. As various AI applications are gradually implemented, they may lead to the loss of user self-determination and agency, and widen the digital divide. They may also open the agri-food sector to non-traditional actors, support new generations of farmers, contribute to the loss of traditional jobs, and enable the development of new business models. Lastly, the digitalisation of agriculture, including AI applications, does not automatically lead to greater sustainability. If data and AI-based solutions are geared only to making traditional agricultural practices more productive, this could actually amplify the negative impact of unsustainable farming practices. It is essential to use AI’s potential to address the profound challenges facing the current food system and ensure citizens enjoy the benefits of AI without being exposed to unnecessary risks.

Anticipatory policy-making

The application of AI in the agri-food chain has to be considered in the context of the objectives and initiatives relating to the relevant EU legislation and policies. These include the European Green Deal, the CAP, the farm to fork strategy, as well as the proposed AI act. Attention should also be paid to the agricultural specificities of different EU regions and Member States, and the diversity of actors in the agri-food chain.

The proposed EU AI act’s high-risk AI list (Annex III) does not explicitly mention AI applications in agriculture. However, it could be argued that several actual or foreseeable AI applications in agriculture would fall within the scope of that list, especially since that list is neither exhaustive nor fixed. As AI can control food production, even select livestock or which crops to grow depending on a series of factors that may include geopolitical and strategical considerations, this would mean increasing the collection and sharing of data – to be used first to adjust decision-making processes based on machine learning and then as inputs for subsequent decisions. To make these strategical decisions as efficient as possible, farmers will have to share data to an extent that may present problems in a competitive market. And this may include the collectivisation of data at supranational level, which may also pose geo-strategical concerns. These considerations need to be taken into account while developing European legislation, such as the data act still under discussion, and also when deploying adopted regulations, such as the Data Governance Act.

The growing complexity of the management process in the agri-food sector can also have the effect of increasing inequalities by making these tools more readily available to bigger producers and leaving smaller farmers, unable to adapt, behind. Furthermore, there is growing concern about bias in the decision-making process that may prioritise some producers over others, depending on their size, type of production or region. Ensuring proper deployment of AI applications would require the development of a risk governance framework for anticipating and predicting concerns relating to data management and AI applications in the agri-food domain. This would have to include the classification and assessment of risks, as well as risk monitoring and management. A strict liability approach can be complemented with legislative sandboxes, given the need to maintain a balance between the objective of protecting people and society on the one hand and fostering innovation arising from the constant and rapid developments in the AI field on the other.

There is much to be gained, given that AI was first developed by industry as a tool to help improve efficiency in production and logistics. Crisis management requires the same elements as coping with the complexity and unpredictability of supply chains. In the context of the European Green Deal, AI has huge potential to help optimise the management of production and distribution of strategic goods – applications very close to its original purpose. These could include: microchips; water and energy generation and transport (from hydrocarbons to renewables, hydrogen and grid management); as well as fertilisers; pesticides; and food products such as meat and grain.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘What if AI could make the agri-food sector more resilient?‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Listen to policy podcast ‘What if AI could make the agri-food sector more resilient?’ on YouTube.

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Written by Magdalena Pasikowska-Schnass and Agnieszka Widuto.

Culture plays a fundamental role in human life. It is also an essential source of identity, at local, regional, national and European levels, while making a significant contribution to the EU economy. EU cultural policy relates to cultural heritage, i.e. cultural sites and museums, but also to the cultural and creative sector, for instance the audiovisual and design sectors.

The EU supports culture through a variety of initiatives, including the European Capitals of Culture scheme. A number of EU programmes also offer funding for cultural projects, for instance the Creative Europe programme, Horizon Europe and New European Bauhaus. Several regional policy funds meanwhile provide support for cultural events, the regeneration of cultural sites, the preservation of cultural heritage, cultural tourism, and cultural and creative sector businesses.

The COVID-19 pandemic has had a significant impact on the cultural and creative sector, as repeated lockdowns saw the closure of cultural institutions and infrastructure. As one of the worst affected sectors of the economy, the EU included culture in its coronavirus response investment initiatives and the REACT-EU (Recovery Assistance for Cohesion and the Territories of Europe) programme aimed at dealing with the consequences of the pandemic.

Local and regional authorities have a role to play in supporting cultural life and participation in their communities. Arts and cultural facilities are usually associated with urban centres, though they also have potential in non-urban areas, small towns and rural communities. The presence of cultural sites increases the attractiveness of a region, while well-developed cultural and creative sectors help to enhance the regional economy. Culture can also play an important role in the regeneration of disadvantaged and post-industrial areas. The European Parliament has called for increased support for culture as part of the post-pandemic recovery efforts. As Europe emerges from the crisis, culture can help to strengthen regional development.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Culture and regional development‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Listen to policy podcast ‘Culture and regional development’ on YouTube.

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Written by Marcin Szczepański.

The EU-US Trade and Technology Council (TTC) was formally launched during the EU-US Summit in June 2021 to intensify transatlantic cooperation, expand bilateral trade and investment, and reinforce the parties’ technological and industrial leadership. Another aim is to ensure that trade and technology serve society and economy while preserving shared values. The TTC has held two high-level political meetings, in September 2021 in Pittsburgh and in May 2022 in Paris-Saclay. These meetings steer cooperation within the TTC and guide its 10 working groups whose remit includes technology standards, secure supply chains, tech regulation, global trade challenges, climate and green technologies as well as investment screening and export controls.

Since its launch, the TTC has created a community of experts and policy-makers from both sides of the Atlantic who now regularly work together. Joint work in areas such as standards, integrity of information, supply chains, green public procurement and addressing non-market practices has yielded the TTC’s first successful steps. Moreover, Russia’s war on Ukraine is thought to have strengthened both the transatlantic relationship as a whole and the TTC, which has played a key role in ensuring swift and coordinated roll-out of export controls. After the war broke out, the TTC started supporting coordinated economic action to counter Russia’s autocratic attempts to also undermine the security of other nations. Yet, while the TTC has done well in areas related to war, some underline that it must deliver tangible results across all the work strands to increase its importance and impact.

So far, the TTC has focused mostly on information-sharing, joint mapping, risk identification and exploring options for closer cooperation in the future. Its success may well depend on the degree of alignment the parties can achieve across the policy areas and on whether they can move from joint identification of issues to elaborating common responses and solutions to them. The European Parliament supports the establishment and work of the TTC, while calling for a more democratic scrutiny over it. The next TTC meeting will take place before the end of 2022 in the United States.

Read the complete briefing on ‘EU-US Trade and Technology Council Impact of the war in Ukraine and the way forward‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Main EU and US export controls on trade with Russia since the invasion of Ukraine

Written by Isabelle Gaudeul-Ehrhart.

Welcome to the European Parliament Info Hub. Located next to the Agora Simone Veil, just outside the main European Parliament buildings in Brussels, this cosy new space has been designed for a well-informed public who are already on the Esplanade and are curious to know more about European affairs and the history of European integration. Amongst the highlights, the Info Hub shines a spotlight on the speeches that have made Europe.

The European Parliament Info Hub is a comfortable and welcoming space where you can broaden your knowledge of current affairs and explore topical content, or delve deeper into background material offered by Parliament’s communication and research services. You can dip into open access research material, attend regular policy talks and civil society events, or challenge your thinking at the Info Hub’s temporary exhibitions. The Hub also offers numerous in-person and on-screen activities, from presentations about the EU and its institutions, policies and legislation to videos, podcasts, a ‘What Europe does for me‘ touch screen, and a selection of speeches that have made Europe.

A selection of videos to celebrate the power of the spoken word in powerful, moving, visionary speeches

The European Union we know today is not the result of treaties and legislation only. It is also a vibrant project, strengthened over the years – decades, actually – with women and men calling to citizens as well as leaders, mobilising words, emotions and arguments, with a view to rally people around their vision. We have gathered videos of these speeches and made them available in their original languages as well as with subtitles in all official languages. Some are well-known, others are unusual, all are worth a look.

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The speeches cover subjects ranging from history to peace, hope, values and challenges. Come and watch these women and men, leaders, activists, historians, etc., from our shared past or more recent history, delivering speeches to Europeans.

An informal opening of the Info Hub took place on 13 July, with European Parliament Secretary‑General Klaus Welle, Director-General for Communication Jaume Duch Guillot and acting Director-General for the European Parliamentary Research Service Étienne Bassot – you can see them in this photograph watching the video ‘Powerful, moving, visionary: Speeches that have made Europe‘.

European Parliament Secretary‑General Klaus Welle, Director-General for Communication Jaume Duch Guillot and acting Director-General for the European Parliamentary Research Service Étienne Bassot

You too can visit the Info Hub individually or in small groups from Monday to Friday from 9 am to 6 pm, and on Saturdays and Sundays from 10 am to 6 pm.

Written by Clément Evroux.

Since the Lisbon strategy, launched by the European Council on 23-24 March 2000, the EU’s ambition has been to become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world. The growing effects of the ecological crisis, from climate change to the loss of biodiversity, digitalisation and mounting geopolitical tensions have broadened the scope of innovation policies to the transformations required by both sustainability and preparedness to crises, such as the Covid-19 pandemic.

Today, the EU’s innovation performance gives a mixed picture. While the EU has managed to keep its scientific base at the forefront of the global race, it has not been able to disseminate the new knowledge, technologies and solutions created by EU actors across Member States. Consequently, since the early 1990s, the euro area’s average productivity rate has lagged behind that of the United States, and the gap in productivity among EU regions signals the existence of an innovation divide.

With the adoption of a communication on a new European innovation agenda on 5 July 2022, the European Commission aims to encourage innovators to make better use of EU single market finance opportunities, as well as to attract new private and public investors to reinforce EU financial and capital markets.

The communication presents a set of legislative and non-legislative initiatives based on five flagships areas – access to finance; framework conditions for deep tech innovation; tackling the innovation divide; deep tech talents; and improving innovation policies – which cut across the von der Leyen Commission’s political priorities. The initiatives will allow EU investment to be targeted to promoting scale-up of EU innovative businesses, and to provide additional cooperative opportunities for all EU actors in the fields of education and research and innovation (R&I). The forthcoming adoption of the revised State aid framework for R&I is expected to incentivise further national and regional R&I investments, thus delivering on the five flagships.

Read the complete briefing on ‘A new European innovation agenda‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Marcin Grajewski.

The European Commission’s President, Ursula von der Leyen, unveiled a package of measures to curb energy prices, which skyrocketed in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and stressed the EU’s unwavering solidarity with Ukraine, in her annual State of the Union address delivered on 14 September. The plan envisages cuts in the use of electricity across the bloc, a cap on the revenues of companies which produce electricity at low cost, aid for companies and individuals hit by the energy crisis and, possibly, mandatory limits on the price of gas.

On Ukraine, von der Leyen promised to maintain EU sanctions on Russia, to continue financial aid to the country devastated by the war, and work to ensure Ukraine’s seamless access to the EU’s single market. During her speech to the European Parliament in Strasbourg, she also vowed determination in pursuing green energy goals, including the creation of a hydrogen energy market. She said the Commission would propose new ideas for the EU’s economic governance, including more flexibility on Member States’ paths to debt reduction, and an SME relief package that would include a single set of tax rules for doing business in Europe.

This note offers links to recent commentaries and reports from international think tanks on the State of the Union and related issues. Recent papers on the war on Ukraine can be found in a recent edition of What Think Tanks are Thinking, and on the energy crisis in another publication from the series.

What’s next for European energy security? Our experts decipher the State of the European Union address
Atlantic Council, September 2022

A grand bargain to steer through the European Union’s energy crisis
Bruegel, September 2022

Germany must shake off its habit of finding excuses for inaction
Brookings Institution, September 2022

European unity can endure the winter of discontent
Carnegie Europe, September 2022

Five lessons on international rule of law support
Carnegie Europe, September 2022

In this State of the Union, President von der Leyen must say it loud and clear: Business as usual is over
Centre for European Policy Studies, September 2022

The EU needs a bigger playing field, not a level playing field
Centre for European Reform, September 2022

The economic basis of democracy in Europe
Chatham House, September 2022

How deliberative and participatory processes can save democracy from itself
Friends of Europe, September 2022

Energy unity or breakup? The EU at a crossroads
Istituto Affari Internazionali, September 2022

In defence of the Union’s values and economy: State of the Union address
Polish Institute of International Affairs, September 2022

Beyond European strategic autonomy?
Centre for European Reform, August 2022

The U.S. could cope with deglobalisation, Europe couldn’t
Centre for European Reform, August 2022

A German Proposal that may finally break the EU fiscal rules stalemate
German Council on Foreign Relations, August 2022

Taking stock, moving forward: Reflections following the conference on the Future of Europe
Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy, August 2022

After the Conference on the Future of Europe: Time to make reforms happen
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, August 2022

Legal options for a green golden rule in the European Union’s fiscal framework
Bruegel, July 2022

EU enlargement in a new light
Bruegel, July 2022

The awakening of geopolitical Europe?
Carnegie Europe, July 2022

Third time lucky? How to appoint the next president of the European Commission
Centre for European Policy Studies, July 2022

With a looming winter gas crisis, the EU doesn’t need an empty symbol of solidarity
Centre for European Policy Studies, July 2022

Overall, the French EU Council Presidency was a success… but not everyone agrees
Centre for European Policy Studies, July 2022

The European (geo)political community and enlargement reform: Two important but separate discussions
European Policy Centre, July 2022

Europe’s moment of truth: United by adversity?
European Policy Centre, July 2022

Fragmentation risk in the euro area: no easy way out for the European Central Bank
Bruegel, June 2022

Yet another failure of EU leadership in the Western Balkans
Centre for European Policy Studies, June 2022

The European Council and Council of the EU: What lessons from Covid-19 decision-making?
Centre for European Policy Studies, June 2022

Peace versus justice: The coming European split over the war in Ukraine
European Council on Foreign Relations, June 2022

Moving EuropE Together, through citizens’ deliberations
European Policy Studies, June 2022

Adding ambition to Europe’s unity
European Policy Studies, June 2022

After Russia’s invasion of Ukraine: Unity is good, but ambition is better
European Policy Studies, June 2022

Towards transnational lists in 2024?
Jacques Delors Institute, June 2022

European confederation: A much-maligned concept
Jacques Delors Institute, June 2022

Spitzenkandidaten: Oui ou non?
Jacques Delors Institute, June 2022

EU democracy after the Conference on the Future of Europe
Carnegie Europe, May 2022

The good, the bad and the ugly of the Conference on the Future of Europe
Centre for European Policy Studies, May 2022

Will the EU rethink enlargement?
Centre for European Reform, May 2022

The European Political Community: A new anchoring to the European Union
Jacques Delors Institute, May 2022

Read this briefing on ‘The State of the Union‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Ralf Drachenberg.

‘This is Europe’ – an initiative proposed by the President of the European Parliament, Roberta Metsola – consists of a series of debates with EU leaders to discuss their visions for the future of the European Union. On 13 September, the Prime Minister of Finland, Sanna Marin, was the fifth EU leader to address the Parliament since its Conference of Presidents endorsed the initiative on 28 April 2022. Ms Marin stressed that the European Union was the most important political framework for each of its Member States, and that its unity was its greatest strength. She also emphasised that Europe’s strategic autonomy was one of the most important discussions in the Union, regarding the EU’s ability to meet external challenges and to safeguard the functioning of our societies in all circumstances.

This is not the first and will not be the last crisis we live through. Despite the difficult times, and precisely because of them, we must rely on our greatest strengths: trust in each other and unity with each other.

Sanna Marin Background

Launched by Roberta Metsola soon after her election as President of the European Parliament in January 2022, the ‘This is Europe’ initiative is particularly relevant in the context of the Conference on the Future of Europe (CoFoE), a bottom-up exercise allowing EU citizens to express their opinions on the Union’s future policies and functioning. A similar initiative by the Parliament took place between January 2018 and April 2019, ahead of the 2019 European elections, when different EU leaders spoke in the Parliament’s plenary sessions about their views on the future of Europe. An EPRS analysis of the Future of Europe debates identified the similarities and differences between the views expressed by EU leaders.

Figure 1 – Time devoted by Sanna Marin to various topics in her speech

On 30 April 2022, the CoFoE plenary adopted 49 proposals, containing more than 300 measures by which they might be achieved. As a follow-up to the CoFoE, Parliament adopted a resolution, by a large majority, calling for a convention, on the basis of Article 48 of the Treaty on European Union. This call was backed by the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, in her State of the Union speech on 14 September 2022.

At the June 2022 European Council meeting, the Heads of State or Government ‘took note’ of the CoFoE proposals. While calling for ‘an effective follow-up’, they did not provide concrete guidelines in this respect, just stating that each EU institution should do this ‘within their own sphere of competences’, rather than doing it jointly among the EU institutions. Recent EPRS research (see The Conference on the Future of Europe and the European Council) has shown that there is significant convergence between the results of the CoFoE and the priorities of the European Council as expressed in its Strategic Agenda for 2019‑2024 and in its conclusions over the past three years.

Main focus of Sanna Marin’s speech

While Ms Marin addressed a wide range of topics in her speech to the Parliament (see Figure 1), she devoted a significant amount of attention to the following themes: i) Russia’s war in Ukraine; ii) energy policy, iii) European integration, and iv) the economy/economic governance.

Russia’s war in Ukraine

The Finnish prime minster put strong emphasis on Russia’s war in Ukraine. She highlighted the significance of the EU’s joint response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine with extensive sanctions, underlining that the EU’s unity was its greatest strength and that this unity was needed now more than ever.

Energy policy

For Sanna Marin, the availability and price of energy are amongst the most crucial issues the EU must tackle in the coming months and years. She stressed that the EU and its Member States had to make sure that energy was available across Europe and be prepared to take exceptional measures to lower energy prices.

European integration

Whilst stressing Finland’s constructive approach to the development of the EU, she argued that a crisis was not the right moment for Treaty change. She believes that citizens are not asking for institutional changes, but rather for reforms that respond to the major challenges and people’s everyday concerns.

Economy/economic governance

The Finnish prime minister called for a rules-based and responsible economic policy. The EU’s key tools, such as the European Semester, should be further developed to better take account of the interactions between economic, social, employment and environmental actions.

Specific proposals and positions

The Finnish prime minister used the opportunity to present her views on how the European Union should advance in specific policy areas, also making some new proposals, as summarised below.

Policy issuePriority action and proposals (quotes)Support for Ukraine‘Above all, we must continue to provide Ukraine with all forms of support and be prepared to impose even stricter sanctions.’Enlargement‘The European Union’s doors must be open to any European state that wishes to become part of our community of values and is committed to carrying out the necessary reforms.’EU budget‘We cannot develop the EU’s ability to act by increasing the budget or loosening our common rules for the economy. The recovery instrument was a necessary one-off solution, not a model for future crises, as we have agreed together.’Defence‘The war has shown how important it is for Europe to have its own defence materiel production.’Fiscal‘The most important task of the fiscal policy regulatory framework is to curb the Member States’ excessive indebtedness and the associated risks.’Digital/technology‘Going forward, one of the most important issues concerns our technological skills and knowledge. Europe must strengthen its technological capabilities. We cannot afford to be naive about this. ‘Table 1 – Specific proposals made by Sanna Marin per policy area

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘‘This is Europe’ debate in the European Parliament: Speech by Sanna Marin, Prime Minister of Finland, on 13 September 2022‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Monika Kiss.

Today, more than 70 % of the European Union (EU) population lives in cities – and this is projected to reach almost 84 % in 2050. As they attract more people, cities increasingly face traffic-related challenges, such as congestion, poor air quality and excessive noise.

A will to find ways to make cities more viable and to protect people’s health has been evident throughout the EU in recent years. Alternative transport methods, such as sustainable public transport or car sharing are on the rise, and there are incentives at local and EU-level to promote active mobility – notably cycling and walking. The uptake of zero-emission vehicles, as well as a more sustainable and healthier urban mobility are encouraged in the EU 2020 sustainable and smart mobility strategy and are priorities under the new European urban mobility framework, published in 2021.

Electric kick-scooters, also known as stand-up electric scooters or e-scooters, are a fairly new means of active mobility. They have gained popularity over the past few years with more and more companies launching their vehicles with ride-sharing programmes. However, the number of private e-scooters is also increasing steadily. A 2020 Eurobarometer survey shows that 8 % of EU citizens – mainly in big cities – use a privately owned bike or scooter as their main mode of daily transport, and an additional 1 % uses shared bikes or scooters on a daily basis. Numbers are the highest in the Netherlands (41 %), followed by Sweden (21 %). Privately owned scooters are also used in combination with public transport.

E-scooters have several advantages. Because they do not get held up in traffic, they are a relatively fast mode of transportation. They also take up little parking space. Unlike cars or motorbikes, they tend not to pollute the air, depending on how their electricity consumption is produced. All these characteristics would make them an ideal means of transport. However, they have some significant drawbacks. The main issue is the danger of accidents. Finnish researchers found that e-scooter riders are three to five times more likely to be injured than cyclists or motorcycle riders. In addition to scooter riders themselves, they may also injure pedestrians and drivers of other vehicles. Inappropriate parking of e-scooters is also an unresolved issue: as there is no parking space provided specifically for e-scooters, they are often parked in spaces reserved for cars or bicycles, or are abandoned in spaces needed for pedestrians to walk safely. For these reasons, they have already been banned from traffic in certain city areas. In other cases their number, or the periods they can be in use has been reduced by local authorities.

As use of e-scooters has spread, the rules across the EU have diverged. The terms of use are regulated at local and Member State level and national regulations differ in many important points. The most important difference is whether e-scooters qualify as motorised vehicles (for instance in Ireland), or if users of e-scooters are considered as pedestrians using sports or leisure equipment (such as in Finland). In other Member States, for instance in Latvia or in Luxemburg, e-scooter users are on an equal footing with cyclists. From this distinction, other differences ensue between national rules, for instance in which spaces e-scooters are allowed to drive: on roads, on bike paths or on the pavement, or whether they are allowed in pedestrian areas, at pedestrian crossings or in public places. Other differences between Member States include: whether drivers of e-scooters are required to hold a licence; whether they are obliged to pay taxes; or to register their vehicles; or whether insurance is mandatory. The use of protective equipment (for instance bicycle helmets), also depends on the status of e-scooters, as does the minimum permitted age for drivers, ranging from 8 years (in France) to 15 years (in Denmark).

The maximum speed limit also varies between Member States. Limits are in general set at 20 or 25 km/h, but can also depend on the location (for instance 6 km/h in pedestrian zones v 25 km/h on roads in Italy).

These differences between national regulations can be very confusing, for instance for tourists visiting other countries or citizens who move to other Member States for work-related reasons. A possible harmonisation of rules at EU-level that also includes obligations for companies and local authorities (for instance providing appropriate parking spaces, making protective equipment mandatory or sanctioning infringements) could be considered.

In this way, the advantages of this new means of transport could be exploited more safely, for the benefit of cities and their inhabitants.

Written by Pieter Baert (1st edition).

While shell companies – company entities that have no or minimal economic activity – can serve useful commercial and business functions, they are sometimes abused by companies or individuals for aggressive tax planning or tax evasion. To ensure sustainable public finances under the exceptional circumstances imposed by the Covid-19 pandemic, in December 2021, the European Commission presented a proposal on preventing shell companies from misusing their structure for tax purposes (‘Unshell’).

The proposal introduces a ‘filtering’ system for EU company entities, which will have to pass a series of gateways, relating to income, staff and premises, to ensure there is sufficient ‘substance’ to the entity. Those entities that are deemed to be lacking in substance are presumed to be ‘shell companies’ and, if they are unable to rebut this presumption through additional evidence regarding the commercial, non-tax rationale of the entity, they will lose any tax advantages granted through bilateral tax treaties or EU directives, thereby discouraging their use. While ‘Unshell’ targets only shell entities located within the EU, in 2022 the Commission will launch a proposal to tackle non-EU shell entities.

Versions

• ‘Unshell’ – Rules to prevent the misuse of shell entities for tax purposes (1st edition)

Proposal for laying down rules to prevent the misuse of shell entities for tax purposes and amending Directive 2011/16/EU Committee responsible:Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON)COM(2021) 565
22.12.2021Rapporteur:Lidia Pereira (EPP, Portugal)2021/0434(CNS)Shadow rapporteurs:Paul Tang (S&D, the Netherlands)
Gilles Boyer (Renew, France)
Ernest Urtasun (Greens/EFA, Spain)
Gunnar Beck (ID, Germany)
Michiel Hoogeveen (ECR, the Netherlands)
Mick Wallace (The Left, Ireland)Ordinary legislative procedure (COD) (Parliament and Council on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Vote in committee

Written by Katarzyna Sochaka and Clare Ferguson.

The highlight of the September 2022 plenary session was the annual address by the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, on the State of the European Union (SOTEU). Ukraine’s First Lady, Olena Zelenska, was present for SOTEU and the debate that followed, where Russian aggression in Ukraine was again an important point. A ‘This is Europe’ debate was held with the Prime Minister of Finland, Sanna Marin. Members also debated Council and Commission statements on the EU response to the increase in energy prices in Europe, the urgent need for action at EU level to ensure humane treatment of migrants in Europe, the consequences of extreme weather phenomena and increasing EU efforts to fight climate change, and on the ecological disaster in the Oder River. Debates also took place on the state of the SME Union, surveillance and predator spyware systems in Greece, and the situation in the Strait of Taiwan.

Energy efficiency and renewable energy

Reducing consumption and boosting use of renewables will be key to helping Europe weather the energy crisis. Members debated and adopted positions based on two Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE) reports on proposals from the ‘fit for 55’ package (the EU’s plans to achieve climate neutrality by 2050). Parliament adopted its position on the proposal to revise the Energy Efficiency Directive, by a large majority. To fight climate change and rising energy prices, the Parliament therefore seeks a more ambitious reduction in both primary and final consumption. The ITRE report proposes binding national contributions based on Member States’ consumption levels, setting milestones in 2025 and 2027, and targets energy consumption in public buildings. Members also voted overwhelmingly in favour of a second ITRE report, on revising the Renewable Energy Directive. The committee supports the new 45 % renewable energy sources target, and seeks further innovative renewable energy and storage technology targets, to improve flexibility to cope with peaks in demand. The report also proposes tightening sustainability criteria for biomass and accelerating grants for renewables permits. It sets more ambitious targets for the transport sector and greater promotion of renewable fuels in the maritime sector. The results of the votes set Parliament’s position on the files for interinstitutional negotiations with the Council.

Adequate minimum wages

While EU governments set their own minimum wage levels, Members debated and adopted a provisional agreement on new EU legislation to ensure minimum wage protection is available to workers throughout the EU and thus will lead to a decent standard of living. Parliament has succeeded in enhancing workers’ access to a minimum wage in the proposal, setting an 80 % threshold for collective bargaining. Under the new rules, statutory minimum wages should be updated every two (or four, if indexed) years. Member States have two years to transpose the directive into national law.

Deforestation regulation

Despite their crucial role in mitigating climate change, the loss of forests to agricultural expansion is becoming acute, driven by production of agricultural commodities, many of which are exported to the EU. Demanding that companies ensure the products they sell in the EU are not the result of deforestation, Members adopted a report from the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI) by a large majority. In its report on the European Commission’s response to Parliament’s demands to tackle the issue by introducing new rules on export due diligence, the committee calls for the proposed deforestation regulation to cover a significantly higher level of minimum controls on a wider range of commodities, set stronger penalties and mandatory compensation, and protect human rights. The result of the vote sets Parliament’s position for negotiations with the Council on the proposal.

Interim report on the 2021 proposal for a revision of the MFF

Members adopted a Committee on Budgets (BUDG) report on the 2021 proposal for a revision of the multiannual financial framework (MFF), setting out the Parliament’s position before the Council formally asks for its consent to the revision. The revision is needed to raise the MFF ceilings to incorporate the social climate fund and to introduce an automatic annual adjustment of the MFF ceilings based on new own resources, to allow for the repayment of Next Generation EU borrowing. The BUDG committee report also calls for additional funding to help vulnerable household and transport users in the transition to climate neutrality. The report supports the use of all available Union budget instruments to provide economic and financial support, both to Ukraine and to help EU citizens face the consequences of Russia’s aggression.

Draft amending budget No 2/2022

Noting that implementation of the EU’s 2021 budget left a high surplus (over €3.2 billion), mostly from higher than expected customs revenues, competition fines and some under-spending, Members also adopted a BUDG report on an amending budget. Draft amending budget No 2/2022 (DAB 2/2022) will therefore enter this sum as revenue in the 2022 budget, reducing Member State contributions accordingly.

Statute and funding of European political parties and foundations

Parliament adopted a Committee on Constitutional Affairs (AFCO) report on the proposal to revise the rules applicable to European political parties and foundations. The AFCO report proposes that parties from Council of Europe members that are not EU Member States should be eligible to become European parties, and proposes changes to their financing. To ensure parties comply with EU values, the committee proposes to streamline the deregistration procedures, particularly in cases where parties have not met standards on transparency, gender balance or the use of political advertising.

Fisheries measures

In a joint debate on fisheries measures, Members adopted two Fisheries Committee (PECH) reports. The first highlights the importance of transposing the new 2022 conservation measures for north-west Atlantic fisheries management. The EU is a party to the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO), and is therefore obliged to transpose new NAFO measures, so that they apply to EU vessels. The EU is also party to the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC), and Members also adopted a PECH report on a provisional agreement to transpose the WCPFC management measures for tuna fisheries.

Renewed partnership with the Southern Neighbourhood

Members adopted a Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET) report on a renewed partnership with the Southern Neighbourhood, which comes as the effects of Russia’s war on Ukraine are being felt in the region, not least on food security. The AFET report urges action to seize the momentum to boost long-term growth and development through economic cooperation. It also encourages promotion of regional integration in the southern Mediterranean, with a view to establishing a Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area.

Question time: The state of play of the war in Ukraine

During Question Time, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the Commission, Josep Borrell, debated the state of play of the war in Ukraine with Members, noting that EU sanctions are helping Ukraine to continue to defend itself against Russian aggression.

Opening of trilogue negotiations

Members confirmed, without votes, mandates for negotiation: two from the Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO) Committee, on the proposal for a regulation on standardisation organisations concerning European standards and European standardisation deliverables, and on the proposal for a directive on consumer credits; from the BUDG and Budgetary Control (CONT) committees on a proposal for a regulation on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union; as well as a mandate from the PECH committee on a proposal for a regulation on restrictions to the access to Union waters.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Plenary round-up – September 2022‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Clément Evroux (1st edition).

The COVID-19 pandemic has shone a light on the growing importance of digital health technologies, both to enable remote medical care and to facilitate the health response by international, national and local authorities. At the same time, personal health data have been key for containment measures such as the EU digital COVID-19 certificate.

The European Commission’s proposal for a regulation on a European health data space aims to improve individuals’ access to and control of their electronic personal data (primary use), while facilitating data re-use for societal good across the EU (secondary use). Grounded in the EU data strategy, which mentions health as one of the nine European common data spaces, it cuts across several other EU policy priorities, such as the health union and the digital single market.

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The proposal establishes a set of rules, infrastructure and governance mechanisms to promote both primary and secondary uses of electronic health data, while ensuring data protection and strengthening cybersecurity.

The Commission expects the initiative to have a broad socio-economic impact, ranging from improving people’s health, to facilitating the uptake of evidence-based policy-making. Its success is thought to depend not only on the capacity to implement the legal basis effectively, but also on broader conditions such as EU-wide connectivity, social trust and digital skills.

The legislative procedure is in its early stages. A European Parliament rapporteur has not yet been appointed.

Versions

• European health data space (1st edition)

Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the Union Health Data Space Committee responsible:Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE)COM(2022) 0197
3.5.2022Rapporteur:2022/0140(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Ordinary legislative procedure (COD) (Parliament and Council on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Publication of draft report

Written by Carla Stamegna (1st edition).

In July 2021, the European Commission tabled a proposal to establish a new EU authority to counter money laundering and the financing of terrorism (AMLA), in the context of a package of legislative proposals aimed at implementing the 2020 action plan for a comprehensive Union policy on preventing money laundering and the financing of terrorism. The AMLA would be the centre of an integrated system composed of the Authority itself and the national authorities with an AML/CFT supervisory mandate. It would also support EU financial intelligence units (FIUs) and establish a cooperation mechanism among them.

The Council achieved a partial political agreement on the proposal on 29 June 2022. In Parliament, the file was referred to the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs ECON) and the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE). The co-rapporteurs issued their joint report in May 2022.

Versions

• Anti-money-laundering authority (AMLA): Countering money laundering and the financing of terrorism (1st edition)

Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the Authority for Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism and amending Regulations (EU) No 1093/2010, (EU) 1094/2010, (EU) 1095/2010 Committees responsible:Economic and Monetary Affairs ECON) and Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE)COM(2021) 421
20.7.2021Co-rapporteurs:Luis Garicano (Renew, Spain); Emil Radev (EPP, Bulgaria)2021/0240(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Isabel Benjumea Benjumea (EPP, Spain); Caterina Chinnici (S&D, Italy); Pedro Marques (S&D, Portugal); Ramona Strugariu (Renew, Romania); Gwendoline Delbos-Corfield (Greens/EFA, France); Ernest Urtasun (Greens/EFA, Spain); Gunnar Beck (ID, Germany); Annalisa Tardino (ID, Italy); Joachim Stanisław Brudziński (ECR, Poland); Andżelika Anna Możdżanowska (ECR, Poland); Clare Daly (The Left, Ireland); Martin Schirdewan (The Left, Germany)Ordinary legislative procedure (COD) (Parliament and Council on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Adoption of report in committee

Written by Costica Dumbrava.

The EU has imposed progressively harsher sanctions on Russia, first in response to Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014, and then in response to its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Successive packages of EU sanctions, adopted in the framework of the EU’s common foreign and security policy, include entry restrictions for specific individuals linked to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine.

After partially suspending the EU-Russia visa facilitation agreement in February 2022, the Council decided to fully suspend the agreement in September 2022. This made the visa application process for all Russian nationals more expensive, lengthier and subject to increased scrutiny.

The EU Visa Code, which lays down common procedures and conditions for issuing short-stay (Schengen) visas, requires the competent authorities of the Schengen states to examine and decide on each individual visa application. An individual assessment is also required by the Schengen Borders Code when carrying out checks at the EU’s external borders.

In both contexts, the competent authorities of the Schengen state concerned need to assess whether individuals pose a threat to public policy, internal security, public health or international relations. Moreover, an individual who has previously obtained a Schengen visa may still be denied entry into the territory of a Schengen state based on the (separate) risk assessment carried out during the border check. Neither the Visa Code nor the Schengen Borders Code contain provisions on imposing generalised visa or entry bans, however.

Read the complete briefing on ‘EU entry restrictions in relation to Russia’s war on Ukraine‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Number of Schengen visas issued at consulates in 2020-2021 Number of Schengen visas issued at consulates in Russia in 2021

Written by Marcin Grajewski.

The European Union is debating how to respond to the energy crisis resulting from Russia’s war on Ukraine. Energy prices are surging in the EU and elsewhere, as Russia curtails fossil fuel exports with the aim of pressing the Union to reduce its support for Ukraine. Gas prices are now some ten times their average over the last decade. Individual EU governments are offering their citizens and businesses financial relief, but they face the dilemma of balancing this aid with allowing energy prices to grow in order to discourage consumption. Some countries are reopening polluting coal-fired power plants and delaying closures of nuclear energy generators.

The European Commission proposed, in September, EU-wide measures against Russia’s energy market manipulation. They would force firms and individuals to use less energy in certain circumstances, and envisage windfall charges on some power generators, which would be returned to consumers. It offers liquidity aid for energy firms and proposes a cap on the price of Russian gas. EU energy ministers discussed the ideas on 9 September, but reached no firm conclusions.

This note gathers links to the recent publications and commentaries from many international think tanks on the energy market. Earlier analyses of high energy prices can be found in a previous edition of the ‘What Think Tanks are Thinking’ series.

A grand bargain to steer through the European Union’s energy crisis
Bruegel, September 2022

Gazprom: Dip in production and exports, profits up
Centre for Eastern Studies, September 2022

Why gas price caps and consumer subsidies are both extremely costly and ultimately futile
Centre for European Policy Studies, September 2022

The energy market in time of war
Centre on Regulation in Europe, September 2022

To preserve Western interests in the Gulf, we need to expand the scope of our engagement
Friends of Europe, September 2022

Winds of change in the Eastern Mediterranean: Between hydrocarbons and renewable energy geopolitics
Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy, September 2022

Energy unity or breakup? The EU at a crossroads
Istituto Affari Internazionali, September 2022

Russia’s climate action and geopolitics of energy transition: The uncertain and unsettling outlook following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine
Istituto Affari Internazionali, September 2022

How carbon tariffs and climate clubs can slow global warming
Peterson Institute for International Economics, September 2022

Closing nuclear generation amounts to running in place on climate
Atlantic Council, August 2022

The climate bill’s oil and gas provisions are a worthwhile trade-off
Brookings Institution, August 2022

China’s role in supplying critical minerals for the global energy transition: What could the future hold?
Brookings Institution, August 2022

The grand energy bargain Europe needs to defeat Putin
Bruegel, August 2022

European natural gas imports
Bruegel, August 2022

Russia in a gas war with Europe
Centre for Eastern Studies, August 2022

It would be a strategic mistake for the EU to ditch the Energy Charter Treaty
Centre for European Policy Studies, August 2022

Climate extremes: The energy required for adaptation calls for stronger mitigation efforts
Centro Euro-Mediterraneo sui Cambiamenti Climatici, August 2022

Attacks on Ukraine nuclear plant: What’s at stake?
Chatham House, August 2022

How the U.S. oil and gas industry works
Council on Foreign Relations, August 2022

The role of energy production through the waste-to-energy cycle
Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale, August 2022

Power of need: Energy security in the Western Balkans
European Council on Foreign Relations, August 2022

A reform strategy to transform energy: From piecemeal to system-wide change
Peterson Institute for International Economics, August 2022

Green energy depends on critical minerals. Who controls the supply chains?
Peterson Institute for International Economics, August 2022

Who controls critical mineral supply chains for green energy?
Peterson Institute for International Economics, August 2022

EU seeks to import more gas from the Caspian basin
Polish Institute of International Affairs, August, 2022

As North African energy links are redrawn, Italy becomes Europe’s southern gas hub
Barcelona Centre for International Affairs, July 2022

A German gas crisis will cause jitters across Europe
Brookings Institution, July 2022

The future of mining in Latin America: Critical minerals and the global energy transition
Brookings Institution, July 2022

Europe needs energy solidarity, not a North-South rift
Bruegel, July 2022

A Transatlantic Energy and Climate Pact is now more necessary than ever
Bruegel, July 2022

European Union demand reduction needs to cope with Russian gas cuts
Bruegel, July 2022

With a looming winter gas crisis, the EU doesn’t need an empty symbol of solidarity
Centre for European Policy Studies, July 2022

The impact of the Ukraine war on global energy markets
Centre for European Reform, July 2022

Retail energy markets under stress
Centre on Regulation in Europe, July 2022

Timing is the key to the Gulf replacing Russian oil
Chatham House, July 2022

The cold man of Europe: Germany’s energy emergency
European Council on Foreign Relations, August 2022

Europe’s carbon border adjustment moves to trilogue: Potential impact on trade and WTO compatibility still unclear
European Centre for International Political Economy, July 2022

Managing the energy and food crises: Exceptional times call for exceptional measures
European Policy Centre, July 2022

La crise énergétique montre l’importance de la solidarité européenne devant les chocs asymétriques
Fondation Robert Schuman, July 2022

The green transition is a strategic transition
Friends of Europe, July 2022

Polish energy policy in search of equilibrium
German Marshall Fund, July 2022

Europe’s long winter: Escaping the energy crisis
Institute of International and European Affairs, July 2022

The de-globalisation of oil: Risks and implications from the politicisation of energy markets
Istituto Affari Internazionali, July 2022

Sense and nonsense behind energy price caps
Istituto Affari Internazionali, July 2022

Technological innovation and the energy value chains in the transition to a low-carbon economy
Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale, July 2022

Winter is coming: Gas demand regulation in the EU in preparation for a crisis
Polish Institute of International Affairs, July 2022

Revitalising EU-Ukraine cross-border infrastructure for a secure, clean energy future
Regulatory Assistance Project, July 2022

The hydrogen ambitions of the Gulf States
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, July 2022

Read this briefing on ‘Russia’s war on Ukraine fuels energy crisis‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Rafał Mańko.

European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s third State of the Union address, scheduled for 14 September 2022, will be delivered at a time when the European Union and its Member States are facing unprecedented geopolitical and economic challenges. Rising energy prices and accelerating climate change are testing the EU’s resilience. On a more positive note, the recovery and resilience plans of most Member States have been approved, and the Next Generation EU spending programme will provide financing for the EU’s green transformation. Nevertheless, the enforcement of EU values (Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union), and in particular the rule of law, remains a challenge; the application of the Conditionality Regulation could provide the tools to address some of the related issues. Other points worth noting are that months after the Conference on the Future of Europe ended, the European Commission’s follow-up to its outcome is still underway, and that the coronavirus pandemic, although no longer the main topic of concern, is continuing to have a profound effect on lives and societies.

The EU State of the Union address, delivered to the European Parliament by the president of the European Commission, dates back to 2010. The address takes stock of the achievements of the past year and presents priorities for the year ahead. It is an important tool when it comes to the Commission’s ex-ante accountability vis-à-vis Parliament and is also aimed at rendering the definition of priorities at EU level more transparent and at communicating them to the public. The event chimes with similar practices in national democracies. The United States, for instance, has a long-standing tradition of presidential State of the Union addresses. In contrast to the US constitution, the EU Treaties do not prescribe a State of the Union address; the EU version was established by the 2010 Framework Agreement on relations between Parliament and the Commission.

This briefing further updates an earlier one from September 2016, originally written by Eva-Maria Poptcheva.

Read the complete briefing on ‘State of the Union address, European Parliament, 2022‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Elena Lazarou and Branislav Stanicek.

With war having returned to the European continent, measuring the level of threats to peace, security and democracy around the world – as the ‘Normandy Index’ does – is more important than ever. The annual Index was presented for the first time on the occasion of the Normandy Peace Forum in June 2019, as a result of a partnership between the European Parliament and the Region of Normandy. The Index has been designed and prepared by the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS), in conjunction with and on the basis of data provided by the Institute for Economics and Peace. This paper sets out the findings of the 2022 exercise, which draws on data compiled in 2021, and explains how the Index can be used to compare peace – defined on the basis of a given country’s performance against a range of predetermined threats – across countries and regions. It is complemented by 60 individual country case studies, derived from the Index.

The paper forms part of the EPRS contribution to the 2022 Normandy World Peace Forum. It is accompanied by two papers, one on the EU’s contribution to peace and security in 2022, and the other on EU peace-building efforts in the Eastern Neighbourhood.

Read the complete study on ‘Mapping threats to peace and democracy worldwide: Normandy Index 2022‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Highest and lowest scoring countries in 2022