Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

Zu den Ergebnissen der jüngsten Bund-Länder-Beratungen und der Verlängerung des coronabedingten Lockdowns äußert sich Marcel Fratzscher, Präsident des Deutschen Instituts für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW Berlin), wie folgt:

Die Entscheidung einer Verlängerung des moderaten Lockdowns mit klaren Prioritäten für einen konditionierten Ausstieg ist richtig und klug. Sie ist richtig, weil die Risiken einer frühzeitigen Lockerung angesichts der rückläufigen, aber nach wie vor hohen Fallzahlen und der befürchteten Verbreitung von Mutationen unverhältnismäßig hoch sind. Die Entscheidung ist klug, weil sie versucht einen breiten Konsens zu finden und allen Bürgerinnen und Bürgern gerecht zu werden. Ein hohes Maß an Akzeptanz ist die wichtigste Voraussetzung für eine erfolgreiche Begrenzung der zweiten Infektionswelle und eine graduellen Normalisierung des täglichen Lebens. Wenn diese Akzeptanz schwindet, dann wird jede Strategie scheitern müssen und die Politik die Kontrolle über die Pandemie vollends verlieren. 

Die Entscheidung wird viele der Kritikerinnen und Kritiker noch lauter aufschreien lassen. Die Strategie der Politik eines im Vergleich zu anderen europäischen Ländern moderaten Lockdowns ist der beste Weg für Deutschland. Härtere Strategien, wie Zero-Covid oder No-Covid, und weichere Strategien der schnellen Lockerungen würden mit hoher Wahrscheinlichkeit scheitern und damit sehr viel größeren Schaden für Gesundheit, Gesellschaft und Wirtschaft anrichten.

Der Fehler der gegenwärtigen Strategie liegt nicht in deren Zielen oder Maßnahmen, sondern in einer zu inkonsequenten Umsetzung und einer schlechten Kommunikation. Vor allem die Zerstrittenheit der Politik zur Öffnung von Kitas und Schulen zerstört weiter viel Vertrauen in die Politik und wird die Konflikte weiter befeuern. 

Der Hauptfokus sollte nicht der Zeitpunkt der Lockerung sein, sondern wie durch sehr viel besseres Testen, Nachverfolgen und Isolieren wieder mehr Kontrolle über die Pandemie gewonnen werden kann. Dies wird das entscheidende Instrument zur Bekämpfung der zweiten Infektionswelle in den kommenden Monaten sein.

UN political engagement in Nepal between 2002 and 2018 has long been considered a successful example of sustained and innovative support to a critical peace process. Many governments in the broader region, however, have largely eschewed international assistance in resolving conflicts, perceiving it as an unnecessary infringement on state sovereignty or a threat to regional balances of power.

This paper looks at lessons the UN could learn from its political presence in Nepal. It summarizes the four periods of the UN’s involvement, highlights best practices, and reviews the challenges faced and how they shaped the range of actions available to the UN. It concludes with eight lessons for the UN:

• Foster relationships with key conflict parties before there is a need for an active UN political role;
• Use indirect means to keep the regional players positively engaged, when direct means fail;
• Draw on or generate high-quality, fast, actionable, and representative conflict information;
• Design UN missions according to context;
• Manage a mission’s (perceived or real) footprint in order to maximize leverage;
• Build a dedicated communications strategy to help set and manage expectations regarding what a mission can and cannot do;
• Consider using human rights monitoring as the groundwork for conflict resolution; and
• Be willing to make unpopular decisions, if they are the right decisions for sustaining the peace.

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In the context of international migration from African countries to Europe, the EU widely applies the strategy of curbing irregular migration. EU efforts focus on combating the root causes of migration and flight as well as achieving African compliance on return and re-admission. This approach ignores the interests of the countries of origin. It also undermines what countries of origin do to deal with migration in their own states. In West Africa, the regional organisation ECOWAS strongly promotes migration management, and introduced the 2008 ECOWAS Common Approach on Migration with guidelines for migration governance in the region. Ghana, as one of the first ECOWAS member states, adopted a National Migration Policy (NMP) in 2016. The country has a long history of migration, has experienced different migration trends and is affected by various streams of migration. As little is known about the country’s policy responses to migration, this study investigates migration policy-making in Ghana. It specifically examines the case of the NMP for Ghana and aims at uncovering stakeholder involvement in the policy-making process as well as its determinants. Guided by an analytical framework derived from theoretical considerations of the advocacy coalition framework, the interconnection of institutions, actors and ideas and an extensive literature review, the study uses a qualitative approach. The results are based on 14 weeks of field research in Ghana in which 40 experts were interviewed. Together with an analysis of a plethora of secondary data the study finds that when deciding to get involved in the policy-making process for the NMP for Ghana, stakeholders tend to be led by their interests and the resources they possess, as these are what their power is based on. The research further reveals that the NMP does not primarily address a perceived problem related to migration within Ghana, that is to say the internal migration flows from deprived to less deprived areas. Rather it largely pursues the interests of the EU, who is the main financer of the policy, to foster migration control. The results of the study therefore suggest that in the policy formulation process for Ghana’s NMP, internal interests were outweighed by the external agenda of the EU.

In the context of international migration from African countries to Europe, the EU widely applies the strategy of curbing irregular migration. EU efforts focus on combating the root causes of migration and flight as well as achieving African compliance on return and re-admission. This approach ignores the interests of the countries of origin. It also undermines what countries of origin do to deal with migration in their own states. In West Africa, the regional organisation ECOWAS strongly promotes migration management, and introduced the 2008 ECOWAS Common Approach on Migration with guidelines for migration governance in the region. Ghana, as one of the first ECOWAS member states, adopted a National Migration Policy (NMP) in 2016. The country has a long history of migration, has experienced different migration trends and is affected by various streams of migration. As little is known about the country’s policy responses to migration, this study investigates migration policy-making in Ghana. It specifically examines the case of the NMP for Ghana and aims at uncovering stakeholder involvement in the policy-making process as well as its determinants. Guided by an analytical framework derived from theoretical considerations of the advocacy coalition framework, the interconnection of institutions, actors and ideas and an extensive literature review, the study uses a qualitative approach. The results are based on 14 weeks of field research in Ghana in which 40 experts were interviewed. Together with an analysis of a plethora of secondary data the study finds that when deciding to get involved in the policy-making process for the NMP for Ghana, stakeholders tend to be led by their interests and the resources they possess, as these are what their power is based on. The research further reveals that the NMP does not primarily address a perceived problem related to migration within Ghana, that is to say the internal migration flows from deprived to less deprived areas. Rather it largely pursues the interests of the EU, who is the main financer of the policy, to foster migration control. The results of the study therefore suggest that in the policy formulation process for Ghana’s NMP, internal interests were outweighed by the external agenda of the EU.

In the context of international migration from African countries to Europe, the EU widely applies the strategy of curbing irregular migration. EU efforts focus on combating the root causes of migration and flight as well as achieving African compliance on return and re-admission. This approach ignores the interests of the countries of origin. It also undermines what countries of origin do to deal with migration in their own states. In West Africa, the regional organisation ECOWAS strongly promotes migration management, and introduced the 2008 ECOWAS Common Approach on Migration with guidelines for migration governance in the region. Ghana, as one of the first ECOWAS member states, adopted a National Migration Policy (NMP) in 2016. The country has a long history of migration, has experienced different migration trends and is affected by various streams of migration. As little is known about the country’s policy responses to migration, this study investigates migration policy-making in Ghana. It specifically examines the case of the NMP for Ghana and aims at uncovering stakeholder involvement in the policy-making process as well as its determinants. Guided by an analytical framework derived from theoretical considerations of the advocacy coalition framework, the interconnection of institutions, actors and ideas and an extensive literature review, the study uses a qualitative approach. The results are based on 14 weeks of field research in Ghana in which 40 experts were interviewed. Together with an analysis of a plethora of secondary data the study finds that when deciding to get involved in the policy-making process for the NMP for Ghana, stakeholders tend to be led by their interests and the resources they possess, as these are what their power is based on. The research further reveals that the NMP does not primarily address a perceived problem related to migration within Ghana, that is to say the internal migration flows from deprived to less deprived areas. Rather it largely pursues the interests of the EU, who is the main financer of the policy, to foster migration control. The results of the study therefore suggest that in the policy formulation process for Ghana’s NMP, internal interests were outweighed by the external agenda of the EU.

In recent decades, global extreme poverty has been substantially reduced. While over a third of the world’s population lived below the extreme poverty line (less than $1.90 per day) in 1990, that share had fallen to just 10% by 2015 (World Bank, 2018). This dramatic improvement has shown the world that it is possible to end extreme poverty, and the international development community has thus set itself a goal to do that by 2030. Meanwhile, national inequality has also become a topic of greater focus in the development policy debate in recent years (World Bank, 2016). These two distinct, but connected, issues have been recognised by the international community with inclusion in the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), as both a goal to end poverty (SDG 1) and a goal to reduce inequality within countries (SDG 10).

In recent decades, global extreme poverty has been substantially reduced. While over a third of the world’s population lived below the extreme poverty line (less than $1.90 per day) in 1990, that share had fallen to just 10% by 2015 (World Bank, 2018). This dramatic improvement has shown the world that it is possible to end extreme poverty, and the international development community has thus set itself a goal to do that by 2030. Meanwhile, national inequality has also become a topic of greater focus in the development policy debate in recent years (World Bank, 2016). These two distinct, but connected, issues have been recognised by the international community with inclusion in the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), as both a goal to end poverty (SDG 1) and a goal to reduce inequality within countries (SDG 10).

In recent decades, global extreme poverty has been substantially reduced. While over a third of the world’s population lived below the extreme poverty line (less than $1.90 per day) in 1990, that share had fallen to just 10% by 2015 (World Bank, 2018). This dramatic improvement has shown the world that it is possible to end extreme poverty, and the international development community has thus set itself a goal to do that by 2030. Meanwhile, national inequality has also become a topic of greater focus in the development policy debate in recent years (World Bank, 2016). These two distinct, but connected, issues have been recognised by the international community with inclusion in the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), as both a goal to end poverty (SDG 1) and a goal to reduce inequality within countries (SDG 10).

Voluntary sustainability standards (VSS) offer demand-led or market-based regulatory instruments that can help implement the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. In its activities with key VSS stakeholders from Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico and South Africa, the Managing Global Governance (MGG) Programme of the German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) aims to help utilise the transformative potential of VSS.

Voluntary sustainability standards (VSS) offer demand-led or market-based regulatory instruments that can help implement the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. In its activities with key VSS stakeholders from Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico and South Africa, the Managing Global Governance (MGG) Programme of the German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) aims to help utilise the transformative potential of VSS.

Voluntary sustainability standards (VSS) offer demand-led or market-based regulatory instruments that can help implement the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. In its activities with key VSS stakeholders from Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico and South Africa, the Managing Global Governance (MGG) Programme of the German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) aims to help utilise the transformative potential of VSS.

2020 was a setback for the global goals. Here are 3 ways the EU can lead the way to a more sustainable future. This article is written by Guillaume Lafortune, Director of SDSN Paris, Guido Schmidt-Traub, Partner, SYSTEMIQ, Adolf Kloke-Lesch‬, Executive Director of SDSN Germany, and Grayson Fuller, SDG Index Analyst, SDSN.

2020 was a setback for the global goals. Here are 3 ways the EU can lead the way to a more sustainable future. This article is written by Guillaume Lafortune, Director of SDSN Paris, Guido Schmidt-Traub, Partner, SYSTEMIQ, Adolf Kloke-Lesch‬, Executive Director of SDSN Germany, and Grayson Fuller, SDG Index Analyst, SDSN.

2020 was a setback for the global goals. Here are 3 ways the EU can lead the way to a more sustainable future. This article is written by Guillaume Lafortune, Director of SDSN Paris, Guido Schmidt-Traub, Partner, SYSTEMIQ, Adolf Kloke-Lesch‬, Executive Director of SDSN Germany, and Grayson Fuller, SDG Index Analyst, SDSN.