Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

The European Green Deal can be considered as a roadmap of key policies for the EU's climate agenda, based on which the Commission has started, and will continue to develop, legislative proposals and strategies from 2020 onwards. The European Green Deal aims at transforming the EU’s economy towards sustainability and carbon neutrality. First and foremost, it defines internal plans and strategies for the EU that will also have global effects. Directed at internal transformation, this ambitious plan can make Europe a role model and a global leader, but it also involves domestic and external challenges. For promoting the global public good, the EU will need partners to jointly work with. This paper provides an overview of the core elements of the Green Deal and connects them to concepts of EU leadership. On this basis, it examines the need and entry points for EU cooperation with major global partners and (re)emerging economies, including China, Brazil, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Russia, and South Africa. The authors argue that the success of the European Green Deal depends on close coordination with these powers and finds that the legitimacy and credibility of the EU's climate leadership can only be ensured by engaging intensively with actors from the Global South and with the various centres of an increasingly multipolar world.

The European Green Deal can be considered as a roadmap of key policies for the EU's climate agenda, based on which the Commission has started, and will continue to develop, legislative proposals and strategies from 2020 onwards. The European Green Deal aims at transforming the EU’s economy towards sustainability and carbon neutrality. First and foremost, it defines internal plans and strategies for the EU that will also have global effects. Directed at internal transformation, this ambitious plan can make Europe a role model and a global leader, but it also involves domestic and external challenges. For promoting the global public good, the EU will need partners to jointly work with. This paper provides an overview of the core elements of the Green Deal and connects them to concepts of EU leadership. On this basis, it examines the need and entry points for EU cooperation with major global partners and (re)emerging economies, including China, Brazil, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Russia, and South Africa. The authors argue that the success of the European Green Deal depends on close coordination with these powers and finds that the legitimacy and credibility of the EU's climate leadership can only be ensured by engaging intensively with actors from the Global South and with the various centres of an increasingly multipolar world.

The European Green Deal can be considered as a roadmap of key policies for the EU's climate agenda, based on which the Commission has started, and will continue to develop, legislative proposals and strategies from 2020 onwards. The European Green Deal aims at transforming the EU’s economy towards sustainability and carbon neutrality. First and foremost, it defines internal plans and strategies for the EU that will also have global effects. Directed at internal transformation, this ambitious plan can make Europe a role model and a global leader, but it also involves domestic and external challenges. For promoting the global public good, the EU will need partners to jointly work with. This paper provides an overview of the core elements of the Green Deal and connects them to concepts of EU leadership. On this basis, it examines the need and entry points for EU cooperation with major global partners and (re)emerging economies, including China, Brazil, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Russia, and South Africa. The authors argue that the success of the European Green Deal depends on close coordination with these powers and finds that the legitimacy and credibility of the EU's climate leadership can only be ensured by engaging intensively with actors from the Global South and with the various centres of an increasingly multipolar world.

Momentan weist die UN-Nachhaltigkeitsgovernance einige Schwächen auf. Verbesserungen würden eine ehrgeizigerer Unterstützung von nationalen Nachhaltigkeitsprozessen in den neun verbleibenden Jahren bis 2030 erlauben. Mitglieder des Rats für Nachhaltige Entwicklung haben gemeinsam mit Wissenschaftlerinnen von SWP und DIE Reformoptionen für eine effektivere UN-Nachhaltigkeitsgovernance entwickelt.

Momentan weist die UN-Nachhaltigkeitsgovernance einige Schwächen auf. Verbesserungen würden eine ehrgeizigerer Unterstützung von nationalen Nachhaltigkeitsprozessen in den neun verbleibenden Jahren bis 2030 erlauben. Mitglieder des Rats für Nachhaltige Entwicklung haben gemeinsam mit Wissenschaftlerinnen von SWP und DIE Reformoptionen für eine effektivere UN-Nachhaltigkeitsgovernance entwickelt.

Momentan weist die UN-Nachhaltigkeitsgovernance einige Schwächen auf. Verbesserungen würden eine ehrgeizigerer Unterstützung von nationalen Nachhaltigkeitsprozessen in den neun verbleibenden Jahren bis 2030 erlauben. Mitglieder des Rats für Nachhaltige Entwicklung haben gemeinsam mit Wissenschaftlerinnen von SWP und DIE Reformoptionen für eine effektivere UN-Nachhaltigkeitsgovernance entwickelt.

The current approach to governing the UN’s sustainable development work has a number of shortcomings. If improved, the UN could more ambitiously support national efforts for sustainable development in the remaining nine years until 2030. Even in the absence of large institutional reforms, an upwards spiral towards more ambitious and self-reflective reporting and learning could be initiated. However, the challenges ahead are complex. More ambitious UN reforms for include establishing a UN Sustainable Development Council – an upgraded and transformed ECOSOC.

The current approach to governing the UN’s sustainable development work has a number of shortcomings. If improved, the UN could more ambitiously support national efforts for sustainable development in the remaining nine years until 2030. Even in the absence of large institutional reforms, an upwards spiral towards more ambitious and self-reflective reporting and learning could be initiated. However, the challenges ahead are complex. More ambitious UN reforms for include establishing a UN Sustainable Development Council – an upgraded and transformed ECOSOC.

The current approach to governing the UN’s sustainable development work has a number of shortcomings. If improved, the UN could more ambitiously support national efforts for sustainable development in the remaining nine years until 2030. Even in the absence of large institutional reforms, an upwards spiral towards more ambitious and self-reflective reporting and learning could be initiated. However, the challenges ahead are complex. More ambitious UN reforms for include establishing a UN Sustainable Development Council – an upgraded and transformed ECOSOC.

Social protection is a powerful development policy tool. If well designed, it can contribute to manifold social, economic, and political goals such as those in the Agenda 2030 Its primary goal is to reduce poverty, vulnerability, and inequality. More indirectly, however, it can also promote education, health, gender justice, access to water, investment and pro-poor growth. And it can be a cornerstone in social contracts thereby stabilising societies, political systems and state-society relations. In most countries of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), however, social protection systems are not well designed and, hence, have only marginal effects on all of these goals.

Social protection is a powerful development policy tool. If well designed, it can contribute to manifold social, economic, and political goals such as those in the Agenda 2030 Its primary goal is to reduce poverty, vulnerability, and inequality. More indirectly, however, it can also promote education, health, gender justice, access to water, investment and pro-poor growth. And it can be a cornerstone in social contracts thereby stabilising societies, political systems and state-society relations. In most countries of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), however, social protection systems are not well designed and, hence, have only marginal effects on all of these goals.

Social protection is a powerful development policy tool. If well designed, it can contribute to manifold social, economic, and political goals such as those in the Agenda 2030 Its primary goal is to reduce poverty, vulnerability, and inequality. More indirectly, however, it can also promote education, health, gender justice, access to water, investment and pro-poor growth. And it can be a cornerstone in social contracts thereby stabilising societies, political systems and state-society relations. In most countries of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), however, social protection systems are not well designed and, hence, have only marginal effects on all of these goals.

REDD+ is a mechanism to address climate change by reducing deforestation and forest degradation. In this article, the implementation of the REDD Early Movers- REM/Visión Amazonia program in Guaviare, Colombia, is analyzed, focusing on the implementation challenges and scope of the program when addressing deforestation drivers in a post-conflict context. By taking a historical perspective on regional deforestation challenges in Guaviare, we link these challenges to the recent deforestation trends in the region. This article demonstrates the particular challenges to implementing REDD+ in the Colombian post-conflict context related to the power vacuum left by the FARC retreat, land grabbing for speculation and cattle ranching, power asymmetries and corrupted regional elites. The article concludes that the current scope of REM does not sufficiently address the main drivers of deforestation, and that REM's focus on campesinos and indigenous communities will not significantly reduce the substantial deforestation rates in the present post-conflict context.

REDD+ is a mechanism to address climate change by reducing deforestation and forest degradation. In this article, the implementation of the REDD Early Movers- REM/Visión Amazonia program in Guaviare, Colombia, is analyzed, focusing on the implementation challenges and scope of the program when addressing deforestation drivers in a post-conflict context. By taking a historical perspective on regional deforestation challenges in Guaviare, we link these challenges to the recent deforestation trends in the region. This article demonstrates the particular challenges to implementing REDD+ in the Colombian post-conflict context related to the power vacuum left by the FARC retreat, land grabbing for speculation and cattle ranching, power asymmetries and corrupted regional elites. The article concludes that the current scope of REM does not sufficiently address the main drivers of deforestation, and that REM's focus on campesinos and indigenous communities will not significantly reduce the substantial deforestation rates in the present post-conflict context.

REDD+ is a mechanism to address climate change by reducing deforestation and forest degradation. In this article, the implementation of the REDD Early Movers- REM/Visión Amazonia program in Guaviare, Colombia, is analyzed, focusing on the implementation challenges and scope of the program when addressing deforestation drivers in a post-conflict context. By taking a historical perspective on regional deforestation challenges in Guaviare, we link these challenges to the recent deforestation trends in the region. This article demonstrates the particular challenges to implementing REDD+ in the Colombian post-conflict context related to the power vacuum left by the FARC retreat, land grabbing for speculation and cattle ranching, power asymmetries and corrupted regional elites. The article concludes that the current scope of REM does not sufficiently address the main drivers of deforestation, and that REM's focus on campesinos and indigenous communities will not significantly reduce the substantial deforestation rates in the present post-conflict context.

DIW-Präsident Marcel Fratzscher kommentiert die Entscheidungen des Bund-Länder-Treffens zum weiteren Corona-Kurs wie folgt:

Auch die jüngsten Corona-Beschlüsse zeigen die Hilflosigkeit der Politik und kommen einer Kapitulation gegenüber dem Virus gleich. Bereits die Entscheidung der Ministerpräsidentenkonferenz von Anfang März hat sich in vielerlei Hinsicht als Fehler herausgestellt. Schon vor zweieinhalb Wochen hatten Virologinnen und Virologen genau vor dem jetzt eingetreten Szenario gewarnt. Daher war die aktuelle Kehrtwende unvermeidbar. Aber auch für die neue Entscheidung gilt: Sie ist wieder einmal ein fauler Kompromiss, der den Verantwortlichen eine Gesichtswahrung ermöglicht, aber zu wenig tut, um das Virus zu stoppen.     

Die Entscheidung der MPK ist inkonsistent und inkonsequent. Die Politik verschließt weiterhin die Augen vor der Realität einer sich massiv ausweitenden dritten Infektionswelle. Anstatt in der Vergangenheit versprochene Maßnahmen konsequent umzusetzen, versucht die Politik auf Bund- und Länderebene, die Verantwortung an die lokalen Behörden abzuschieben. Der Flickenteppich an Maßnahmen wird die Intransparenz, die fehlende Nachvollziehbarkeit und damit den Kontrollverlust der Politik nur weiter verschärfen. Die verantwortlichen Politiker lenken von ihrer Verantwortung ab, auch indem sie einen unzutreffenden Widerspruch zwischen dem Schutz von Leben und Gesundheit und dem Schutz der Wirtschaft herstellen.

Die zu späten und widersprüchlichen Entscheidungen der vergangenen sechs Monate haben den größtmöglichen wirtschaftlichen Schaden verursacht. Sie haben maximale Unsicherheit geschaffen, so dass Unternehmen keine Orientierung mehr haben. Diese Unsicherheit ist Gift für die Wirtschaft und wird unweigerlich zu zahlreichen Unternehmensinsolvenzen und einem Anstieg der Arbeitslosigkeit führen. Der beste Schutz für die Wirtschaft ist eine schnelle Begrenzung der dritten Infektionswelle, verlässliche Regeln und eine klare Zukunftsperspektive. Das fehlt der deutschen Wirtschaft heute mehr denn je. 

Die Beschlüsse der MPK werden der deutschen Wirtschaft nicht helfen, sondern die wirtschaftliche Erholung nach der Pandemie erschweren. Ich erwarte, dass die Politik sehr bald weitere wirtschaftliche Hilfen wird beschließen müssen. Neue und deutlich weniger bürokratische Überbrückungshilfen, eine stärkere Unterstützung für kleine Unternehmen und eine frühzeitige Verlängerung des Kurzarbeitergeldes werden nötig sein, um Unternehmen in den am stärksten betroffenen Branchen wenigstens halbwegs unter die Arme greifen zu können.

Event Video 

In a webinar organized on March 22, 2021 under the theme “MENA Water Challenges: An Opportunity for Regional Cooperation,” IPI MENA Director Nejib Friji underscored the need for a multi-layered, coherent and comprehensive approach to unleash the potential of water as a tool for regional integration and cooperation. The event coincided with World Water Day.

“Cooperation on water issues can lead to political processes enabling-cross border coordination which in turn diminishes tensions,” Mr. Friji said.

During his keynote address, Mr. Mahdi Al-Hamdani, the Iraqi Minister of Water Resources, acknowledged the growing challenges the region faces, citing population growth, urban expansion, and climate change in addition to security and political challenges, pointing to Iraq’s Tigris and Euphrates regions as examples. He called for unified awareness, cooperation and effective management of water resources at all levels of the multilateral system in order to achieve the United Nations’ sustainable development goals related to water.

Ms. Akissa Bahri, former Tunisian Minister of Agriculture, Water Resources and Fisheries, stressed that the MENA region’s strategy for water security should focus on “strengthening collaboration and integration” among countries in the region. She pointed to the North African aquifer system as an example of a sustainable, regional cooperative management system via Algeria, Libya, and Tunisia’s collective action in successfully garnering support and funding from international bodies.

Ms. Lena Salame, Conflict Management Specialist at Geneva Water Hub (GWH), poignantly reminded the audience that “unlike other resources, there is no alternative for water.” She said only through committing to the water agenda, might we “mobilize political will – it is the key ingredient to making the [UN’s humanitarian, peace, and sustainable development] agendas move forward.”

Mr. Waleed Zubari, Professor of Water Resources Management at Arabian Gulf University (AGU), raised the dilemma on the perception of water’s “value” in the Gulf region—one of the most water stressed subregions—where its value is often equated to price. The region’s reliance on desalination bears high costs on the financial, economic, and environmental fronts.

Mr. Maruan El-Krekshi, Head of MENA Department at Crisis Management Initiative (CMI) in Finland, shared his organization’s efforts in water diplomacy, particularly with regard to their conflict resolution activities. He highlighted the efficacy of using water as an entry point to convene relevant actors in the region to cooperate within and beyond the context of conflict in the region, drawing from CMI’s work in Libya since 2015.

German Ambassador to Bahrain, Kai Boeckmann announced Germany’s plans to join the Middle Eastern Desalination Research Center (MEDRC), and reiterated Germany’s intention to contribute to cooperation over water disputes in the region.

Among those who took part in the discussion were Raji Unnikrishnan from Bahrain daily newspaper, Gulf Daily News (GDN); Mr. Ebrahim Nonoo, President of the Association of Gulf Jewish Communities; Ms. Arwa Kooli, journalist from Dar Assabah; and Joanna Meyer, a water advocate.

The event was hosted by the IPI MENA office. As a key instrument of peace, water remains at the top of IPI MENA’s Regional Integration project.