Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

The long-standing tradition of empirical studies investigating the nexus between economic growth and poverty concentrates mainly on monetary poverty. In contrast, little is known about the relationship between economic growth and multidimensional poverty. Consequently, this study seeks to assess the elasticity of multidimensional poverty to growth, especially in low- and middle-income countries. The study employs two novel, individual-based multidimensional poverty indices: the G-CSPI and the G-M0. It relies on an unbalanced panel dataset of 91 low- and middle-income countries observed between 1990 and 2018: this is thus far the largest sample and the longest time span used in the literature to address this research question. Within a regression framework, we estimate the growth elasticity of multidimensional poverty using the first difference estimator. Our study finds that the growth elasticity of multidimensional poverty is −0.46 while using the G-CSPI and −0.35 while using the G-M0: this means that a 10% increase in GDP decreases the multidimensional poverty by approximately 4–5%. There is, however, heterogeneity in the results; in particular, the elasticity is higher in the second sub-period (2001–2018) and for countries with lower initial levels of poverty. Furthermore, a comparative analysis reveals that the elasticity of income-poverty to growth is five to eight times higher than that of multidimensional poverty. In conclusion, our results indicate that economic growth is an important instrument to alleviate multidimensional poverty, but its effect is substantially lower than that on monetary poverty. Therefore, future research should identify other factors and policies, such as social policies, to substantially reduce multidimensional poverty.

The long-standing tradition of empirical studies investigating the nexus between economic growth and poverty concentrates mainly on monetary poverty. In contrast, little is known about the relationship between economic growth and multidimensional poverty. Consequently, this study seeks to assess the elasticity of multidimensional poverty to growth, especially in low- and middle-income countries. The study employs two novel, individual-based multidimensional poverty indices: the G-CSPI and the G-M0. It relies on an unbalanced panel dataset of 91 low- and middle-income countries observed between 1990 and 2018: this is thus far the largest sample and the longest time span used in the literature to address this research question. Within a regression framework, we estimate the growth elasticity of multidimensional poverty using the first difference estimator. Our study finds that the growth elasticity of multidimensional poverty is −0.46 while using the G-CSPI and −0.35 while using the G-M0: this means that a 10% increase in GDP decreases the multidimensional poverty by approximately 4–5%. There is, however, heterogeneity in the results; in particular, the elasticity is higher in the second sub-period (2001–2018) and for countries with lower initial levels of poverty. Furthermore, a comparative analysis reveals that the elasticity of income-poverty to growth is five to eight times higher than that of multidimensional poverty. In conclusion, our results indicate that economic growth is an important instrument to alleviate multidimensional poverty, but its effect is substantially lower than that on monetary poverty. Therefore, future research should identify other factors and policies, such as social policies, to substantially reduce multidimensional poverty.

The long-standing tradition of empirical studies investigating the nexus between economic growth and poverty concentrates mainly on monetary poverty. In contrast, little is known about the relationship between economic growth and multidimensional poverty. Consequently, this study seeks to assess the elasticity of multidimensional poverty to growth, especially in low- and middle-income countries. The study employs two novel, individual-based multidimensional poverty indices: the G-CSPI and the G-M0. It relies on an unbalanced panel dataset of 91 low- and middle-income countries observed between 1990 and 2018: this is thus far the largest sample and the longest time span used in the literature to address this research question. Within a regression framework, we estimate the growth elasticity of multidimensional poverty using the first difference estimator. Our study finds that the growth elasticity of multidimensional poverty is −0.46 while using the G-CSPI and −0.35 while using the G-M0: this means that a 10% increase in GDP decreases the multidimensional poverty by approximately 4–5%. There is, however, heterogeneity in the results; in particular, the elasticity is higher in the second sub-period (2001–2018) and for countries with lower initial levels of poverty. Furthermore, a comparative analysis reveals that the elasticity of income-poverty to growth is five to eight times higher than that of multidimensional poverty. In conclusion, our results indicate that economic growth is an important instrument to alleviate multidimensional poverty, but its effect is substantially lower than that on monetary poverty. Therefore, future research should identify other factors and policies, such as social policies, to substantially reduce multidimensional poverty.

As efforts to mitigate and adapt to the impacts of climate change fall short, discussions around loss and damage (L&D) resulting from climate change have gained urgency. These discussions pivot on questions around financing, which remains very limited. Going into the twenty-seventh UN Climate Change Conference (COP27), the call for a new L&D financial mechanism has been raised by developing countries.

This paper provides a brief overview of the state of play of global negotiations on L&D and explores options for funding arrangements for addressing L&D in the context of the positions of the G77 and Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS). The paper considers options related to four key questions concerning a new mechanism for financing L&D:

1. Where will it be located? A new L&D financial mechanism could be located within the climate regime. However, there could also be complementary mechanisms outside the climate regime.
2. Who will pay for it? There are two broad options for funding: ask for public contributions from donors or impose new taxes. An L&D financial mechanism could adopt both approaches, though some taxes could negatively impact some of the very countries advocating for L&D.
3. Who will control it? Any mechanism should be guided by the principle of Common But Differentiated Responsibility and should be new and additional; needs-based, adequate, and predictable; public and grant-based; guided by vulnerability criteria; and locally driven.
4. What will it do? The fund should make clear how L&D is both distinct from and linked to mitigation and adaptation and should take special care to address critical gaps in financing for slow-onset and noneconomic losses.

Download

The UN Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) was among the first special political missions to receive climate-related language in its mandate, reflecting Somalia’s acute vulnerability to the impact of climate change. In 2020, UNSOM also became the first mission to have an environmental and climate adviser deployed to help implement this mandate. The adviser’s work is structured around three pillars:

1. Mainstreaming the environment and climate throughout the mission’s mandated areas of work;
2. Coordinating UN agencies, government actors, and NGOs working on climate across the humanitarian, development, and peacebuilding sectors; and
3. Supporting the government in developing, funding, and coordinating its climate action plans and policies.

This issue brief reviews the role of the environmental and climate adviser in Somalia, including their areas of work, successes, challenges, and opportunities for replication in other mission settings. Strong buy-in from both mission leaders and national and regional counterparts has facilitated the adviser’s ability to help the mission implement its mandate relating to climate change, environmental degradation, and other ecological challenges. Furthermore, the adviser has successfully helped to coordinate climate-related work, incorporate strategic analyses into climate-related risk assessments and responses, and liaise with local actors. The adviser has also faced challenges, including the broad scope of work tasked to a single person and the unique set of skills required, as well as the political contention surrounding the concept of climate security.

The brief concludes by looking ahead to the growth of environmental and climate advisers in other UN missions and the importance of understanding and addressing interlinkages among climate, peace, and security as the impacts of climate change accelerate.

Download

Die Abteilung Weltwirtschaft im DIW sucht nächstmöglichen Zeitpunkt eine studentische Hilfskraft (w/m/div) für 8 Wochenstunden.

Die im DIW Berlin angesiedelte forschungsbasierte Infrastruktureinrichtung Sozio-oekonomisches Panel (SOEP) sucht für das in Kooperation mit der Universität Bremen durchgeführte Zusammenhaltspanel zum nächstmöglichen Zeitpunkt eine studentische Hilfskraft (w/m/div) für 10 Wochenstunden.

Ihre Aufgabe ist die Mitwirkung bei der umfragemethodischen Erforschung der Daten des Zusammenhaltspanels, inklusive der Aufbereitung, Prüfung, Analyse und Visualisierung von längsschnittlichen und experimentellen Daten. Dabei sind Sie direkt in ein laufendes Datenerhebungsprojekt eingebunden, nehmen unterstützend an der Forschungstätigkeit im Projekt teil und lernen so den ganzen Prozess von der Datenerhebung bis zur Publikation von Forschungsergebnissen kennen.

Die Expertenkommission hat einen Vorschlag für eine deutsche Gaspreisbremse unterbreitet, die eine Einmalzahlung mit einer Deckelung der Gaspreise kombiniert. Karsten Neuhoff, Leiter der Abteilung Klimapolitik im DIW Berlin und Mitglied der Expertenkommission, kommentiert die Gaspreisbremse wie folgt:

Die vorgeschlagene Gaspreisbremse soll zum einen die Verbraucher*innen und Unternehmen entlasten, zum anderen aber auch Anreize zum Gassparen setzen, weil wir mindestens 20 Prozent Gas sparen müssen, um durch den Winter zu kommen. Für dieses Jahr ist eine einmalige Erstattung des Abschlags im Dezember vorgesehen, ab März werden Gaspreise für Verbraucher*innen dann auf 12 Cent pro Kilowattstunde beschränkt. Dadurch, dass aber nur 80 Prozent des Vorjahresverbrauchs gedeckelt sind, bleiben dabei die Anreize zum Gassparen aufrechterhalten. Insgesamt ist diese Lösung relativ leicht und schnell umzusetzen.

Mit der deutschen Gaspreisbremse ist aber das eigentliche Problem der enormen Kosten durch hohe Großhandelspreise noch nicht gelöst. Daher ist es zentral, die vorgeschlagenen Maßnahmen in ein europäisches Maßnahmenpaket zu integrieren. Nur auf europäischer Ebene können wir die Kosten tatsächlich reduzieren. Dazu halte ich einen europäischen Preisdeckel auf den Großhandelsmarkt für eine wirksame Möglichkeit. Er beschränkt die Einkaufskosten für Gas. Der Vorschlag der deutschen Gaspreisbremse zeigt, dass es möglich ist, die notwendigen Anreize zum Gassparen zu erhalten. Somit können Versorgungssicherheit und Bezahlbarkeit in Einklang gebracht werden.

In Germany, the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) leads in coordinating the government’s bilateral development policy priorities and positions. These are then operationalised and carried out in the form of distinct interventions by implementing agencies. The article engages with the different dimensions of cooperation and coordination of the German development finance landscape.

In Germany, the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) leads in coordinating the government’s bilateral development policy priorities and positions. These are then operationalised and carried out in the form of distinct interventions by implementing agencies. The article engages with the different dimensions of cooperation and coordination of the German development finance landscape.

In Germany, the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) leads in coordinating the government’s bilateral development policy priorities and positions. These are then operationalised and carried out in the form of distinct interventions by implementing agencies. The article engages with the different dimensions of cooperation and coordination of the German development finance landscape.

In 2014, Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauretania and Niger established a new regional organisation—the G5 Sahel (“le groupe de cinq pays du Sahel”). This chapter examines and explains the creation of the G5 Sahel. It also analyses the role the European Union and its member states played in promoting the establishment and evolution of the regional organisation. The analysis finds that a regional power vacuum, demands from the G5 Sahel member states, and vital support by the EU and its member states are key explanatory factors for the creation of the G5 Sahel.

In 2014, Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauretania and Niger established a new regional organisation—the G5 Sahel (“le groupe de cinq pays du Sahel”). This chapter examines and explains the creation of the G5 Sahel. It also analyses the role the European Union and its member states played in promoting the establishment and evolution of the regional organisation. The analysis finds that a regional power vacuum, demands from the G5 Sahel member states, and vital support by the EU and its member states are key explanatory factors for the creation of the G5 Sahel.

In 2014, Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauretania and Niger established a new regional organisation—the G5 Sahel (“le groupe de cinq pays du Sahel”). This chapter examines and explains the creation of the G5 Sahel. It also analyses the role the European Union and its member states played in promoting the establishment and evolution of the regional organisation. The analysis finds that a regional power vacuum, demands from the G5 Sahel member states, and vital support by the EU and its member states are key explanatory factors for the creation of the G5 Sahel.