Die im DIW Berlin angesiedelte forschungsbasierte Infrastruktureinrichtung Sozio-oekonomisches Panel (SOEP) sucht ab sofort bis zu zwei
studentische Hilfskräfte (w/m/div)
für 8-15 Wochenstunden
Ihre Aufgabe ist die Mitwirkung bei der Datenaufbereitung und der Generierung von nutzerfreundlichen Variablen (in R), der Programmierung und Testung von Fragebögen (in limesurvey) sowie der Unterstützung der Forschung im Rahmen der Projekte „Bremer Initiative zur Stärkung der frühkindlichen Entwicklung (BRISE). Dabei lernen Sie neben der Programmierung von Fragebögen, die Arbeit mit komplexen Mehrebenendaten, die Arbeit mit R und das wissenschaftliche Arbeiten in einem interdisziplinär orientierten Team.
DIW-Präsident Marcel Fratzscher kommentiert die heutige Sitzung des EZB-Rats wie folgt:
-->Die EZB hat signalisiert, dass sie ihren expansiven Kurs noch für längere Zeit wird fortsetzen müssen. Die Erwartungen derer, die auf ein schnelleres Ende der Anleihenkäufe gehofft hatten, wurden enttäuscht. Die EZB ist noch bei weitem nicht in der Lage, einen Kurswechsel zu vollziehen.“Restore Our Earth!” was the theme and rallying cry for this year’s Earth Day on 22 April. This is not something that could be achieved on a single day. Yet, Earth Day 2021 might signal a greater turning of the tide. Events like US President Biden's Leaders Summit on Climate or milestone legislation like the European Climate Law can be stepping stones that lead the way into the "Green Twenties".
“Restore Our Earth!” was the theme and rallying cry for this year’s Earth Day on 22 April. This is not something that could be achieved on a single day. Yet, Earth Day 2021 might signal a greater turning of the tide. Events like US President Biden's Leaders Summit on Climate or milestone legislation like the European Climate Law can be stepping stones that lead the way into the "Green Twenties".
“Restore Our Earth!” was the theme and rallying cry for this year’s Earth Day on 22 April. This is not something that could be achieved on a single day. Yet, Earth Day 2021 might signal a greater turning of the tide. Events like US President Biden's Leaders Summit on Climate or milestone legislation like the European Climate Law can be stepping stones that lead the way into the "Green Twenties".
Es spricht vieles dafür, dass wir am Beginn des „grünsten“ Jahrzehnts stehen, das die Welt seit Beginn der Industrialisierung gesehen hat. Die Chancen dafür stehen besser als noch vor wenigen Jahren gedacht. Entscheidend ist, dass die aktuellen Konjunkturpakete infolge der COVID-19-Pandemie als Hebel sozial-ökologischer Kurskorrekturen angesetzt werden und nicht auf die Wiederherstellung des Status quo ante zielen.
Es spricht vieles dafür, dass wir am Beginn des „grünsten“ Jahrzehnts stehen, das die Welt seit Beginn der Industrialisierung gesehen hat. Die Chancen dafür stehen besser als noch vor wenigen Jahren gedacht. Entscheidend ist, dass die aktuellen Konjunkturpakete infolge der COVID-19-Pandemie als Hebel sozial-ökologischer Kurskorrekturen angesetzt werden und nicht auf die Wiederherstellung des Status quo ante zielen.
Es spricht vieles dafür, dass wir am Beginn des „grünsten“ Jahrzehnts stehen, das die Welt seit Beginn der Industrialisierung gesehen hat. Die Chancen dafür stehen besser als noch vor wenigen Jahren gedacht. Entscheidend ist, dass die aktuellen Konjunkturpakete infolge der COVID-19-Pandemie als Hebel sozial-ökologischer Kurskorrekturen angesetzt werden und nicht auf die Wiederherstellung des Status quo ante zielen.
Die EU hat heute die Einigung auf ein neues Klimaziel für das Jahr 2030 bekannt gegeben. Dazu ein Statement von Claudia Kemfert, Energieökonomin und Leiterin der Abteilung Energie, Verkehr, Umwelt am Deutschen Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW Berlin):
Grundsätzlich ist es gut, dass sich die EU nach langen zähen Verhandlungen auf ein erhöhtes Klimaziel geeinigt hat. Aus zwei Gründen wird es jedoch nicht ausreichen. Erstens: Das Emissionsminderungsniveau von 55 Prozent ist zu niedrig, um die Pariser Klimabeschlüsse zu erfüllen. Studien zeigen, dass eigentlich eine Emissionssenkung um 60 Prozent hätte beschlossen werden müssen. Dies erfordert erheblich mehr Anstrengungen vor allem mit Blick auf den Ausbau erneuerbarer Energien und mehr Energieeinsparungen. Zweitens: Die Einbeziehung negativer Emissionen ist eine Mogelpackung und gefährdet die Erreichung des Ziels. Da sogenannte negative Emissionen gegengerechnet werden, wird das eigentliche Emissionsminderungsziel geschwächt. Da gerade Wälder immer mehr unter dem Klimawandel leiden, wird es ohnehin eine Herausforderung sein, diese in ausreichendem Umfang zu erhalten. Auch durch die Pflanzung neuer Wälder wird es kaum gelingen, die Emissionen zu senken, da diese über lange Zeiträume vorhanden sein müssen, um in nennenswertem Umfang CO2 zu absorbieren. Zudem werden so reale Emissionsminderungen eher verhindert. Daher wäre es besser gewesen, man hätte sich auf absolute und reale Emissionsminderungen von mindestens 55 Prozent geeinigt, ohne negative Emissionen gegenrechnen zu können.Access to the labour market plays an essential role in allowing displaced populations to sustain their livelihoods and integrate into their host communities. Long-term displacement situations and a decline in resettlement have spurred the quest for local integration (UNHCR, 2019). The majority of displaced populations are hosted by neighbouring low- and middle-income countries (LMICs), where the Covid-19 pandemic places additional strain on scarce resources.
Access to the labour market plays an essential role in allowing displaced populations to sustain their livelihoods and integrate into their host communities. Long-term displacement situations and a decline in resettlement have spurred the quest for local integration (UNHCR, 2019). The majority of displaced populations are hosted by neighbouring low- and middle-income countries (LMICs), where the Covid-19 pandemic places additional strain on scarce resources.
Access to the labour market plays an essential role in allowing displaced populations to sustain their livelihoods and integrate into their host communities. Long-term displacement situations and a decline in resettlement have spurred the quest for local integration (UNHCR, 2019). The majority of displaced populations are hosted by neighbouring low- and middle-income countries (LMICs), where the Covid-19 pandemic places additional strain on scarce resources.
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IPI and the Global Challenges Foundation cohosted a virtual policy forum on April 20th that focused on the synergies and connections between the youth, peace, and security (YPS), and climate action agendas, including how to ensure more meaningful engagement with youth leaders across the world on peace and climate governance. It also launched an issue brief on this topic.
Youth have emerged as a powerful voice in the fight against climate change, demanding transformative change to safeguard the planet. Many youth-led organizations from around the world are also engaged in initiatives to build peace and prevent violence in their communities. Youth movements are increasingly calling for their voices to be heard and for policymakers to include them in decision-making processes at the local, national, and global levels.
The following questions guided the discussion:
This event brought together stakeholders from governments, the United Nations, and civil society, ensuring intergenerational and inclusive participation.
Opening Remarks:
H.E. Dr. Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein, IPI President
Speakers:
H.E. Ms. Inga Rhonda King, Permanent Representative of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines to the UN
H.E. Ms. Johanna Lissinger Peitz, Ambassador for Stockholm+50
Mr. Selwin Hart, Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Climate Action and Assistant Secretary-General for the Climate Action Team
Ms. Nisreen Elsaim, Chair of UN Secretary-General’s Youth Advisory Group and Chair of the Sudan Youth Organization on Climate Change
Ms. Disha Sarkar, Ambassador for the International Youth Conference from India
Moderator:
Ms. Jimena Leiva Roesch, IPI Senior Fellow and Head of the Peace and Sustainable Development Program
In several African regions, economic integration has successfully reduced tariff protection by freezing the opportunity to raise applied tariffs against fellow integration partners above those promised. In this paper, we examine whether the regional tariff commitments on the continent have come at the expense of adverse side-effects on the prevalence of other – non-tariff – trade barriers. More specifically, regional tariff commitments have not only amplified applied tariff overhangs – the difference between Most Favoured Nation (MFN) bound tariffs and effectively applied tariffs – for African members of the World Trade Organization (WTO), but have also sharply reduced their tariff policy space within Africa, thus leaving regulatory policies such as sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures and technical barriers to trade (TBT) as two of the few legitimate options to level the playing field with market competitors. Comparing the effects of applied tariff overhangs towards all vis-à-vis African trading partners on SPS and TBT notifications of 35 African WTO members between 2001 and 2017, we find no overall relationship between tariff overhangs and import regulation in our preferred model setting. By contrast, larger tariff overhangs specific to intra-African trade relations have a significant share in increasing the probability of SPS measures and TBT. Our findings have important implications for future Pan-African integration under the recently launched African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) in that success in fostering continental economic integration does not exclusively depend on the realisation of tariff liberalisation, but at the same time on a mindful coordination with non-tariff provisions.
In several African regions, economic integration has successfully reduced tariff protection by freezing the opportunity to raise applied tariffs against fellow integration partners above those promised. In this paper, we examine whether the regional tariff commitments on the continent have come at the expense of adverse side-effects on the prevalence of other – non-tariff – trade barriers. More specifically, regional tariff commitments have not only amplified applied tariff overhangs – the difference between Most Favoured Nation (MFN) bound tariffs and effectively applied tariffs – for African members of the World Trade Organization (WTO), but have also sharply reduced their tariff policy space within Africa, thus leaving regulatory policies such as sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures and technical barriers to trade (TBT) as two of the few legitimate options to level the playing field with market competitors. Comparing the effects of applied tariff overhangs towards all vis-à-vis African trading partners on SPS and TBT notifications of 35 African WTO members between 2001 and 2017, we find no overall relationship between tariff overhangs and import regulation in our preferred model setting. By contrast, larger tariff overhangs specific to intra-African trade relations have a significant share in increasing the probability of SPS measures and TBT. Our findings have important implications for future Pan-African integration under the recently launched African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) in that success in fostering continental economic integration does not exclusively depend on the realisation of tariff liberalisation, but at the same time on a mindful coordination with non-tariff provisions.
In several African regions, economic integration has successfully reduced tariff protection by freezing the opportunity to raise applied tariffs against fellow integration partners above those promised. In this paper, we examine whether the regional tariff commitments on the continent have come at the expense of adverse side-effects on the prevalence of other – non-tariff – trade barriers. More specifically, regional tariff commitments have not only amplified applied tariff overhangs – the difference between Most Favoured Nation (MFN) bound tariffs and effectively applied tariffs – for African members of the World Trade Organization (WTO), but have also sharply reduced their tariff policy space within Africa, thus leaving regulatory policies such as sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures and technical barriers to trade (TBT) as two of the few legitimate options to level the playing field with market competitors. Comparing the effects of applied tariff overhangs towards all vis-à-vis African trading partners on SPS and TBT notifications of 35 African WTO members between 2001 and 2017, we find no overall relationship between tariff overhangs and import regulation in our preferred model setting. By contrast, larger tariff overhangs specific to intra-African trade relations have a significant share in increasing the probability of SPS measures and TBT. Our findings have important implications for future Pan-African integration under the recently launched African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) in that success in fostering continental economic integration does not exclusively depend on the realisation of tariff liberalisation, but at the same time on a mindful coordination with non-tariff provisions.
Carbon pricing is effective in reducing emissions while having limited negative economic effects. However, researchers and policymakers should be aware of several methodological issues that may reduce the reliability of the evidence on carbon pricing.