Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

A consistent finding in the literature is that anti-dumping (AD) acts as a significant barrier to bilateral trade, in particular, during the time such measures are in force. Adding to a relatively scarce empirical literature, however, we identify adverse impacts of AD which survive well beyond its revocation. More specifically, while we cannot rule out a slight post-revocation recovery, we find empirical evidence that once affected bilateral trade does not fully recover on average following revocation. We use panel data at the Harmonized System four-digit (HS4) level of aggregation to produce these results and show that they are robust to the duration of AD cases, the time of their imposition and revocation, differentiation by economic sector and the nature of imposing countries. Several explanations for our observed empirical results seem plausible, and we provide a theoretical framework which suggests our results could be driven by market exit or underinvestment of targeted firms.

A consistent finding in the literature is that anti-dumping (AD) acts as a significant barrier to bilateral trade, in particular, during the time such measures are in force. Adding to a relatively scarce empirical literature, however, we identify adverse impacts of AD which survive well beyond its revocation. More specifically, while we cannot rule out a slight post-revocation recovery, we find empirical evidence that once affected bilateral trade does not fully recover on average following revocation. We use panel data at the Harmonized System four-digit (HS4) level of aggregation to produce these results and show that they are robust to the duration of AD cases, the time of their imposition and revocation, differentiation by economic sector and the nature of imposing countries. Several explanations for our observed empirical results seem plausible, and we provide a theoretical framework which suggests our results could be driven by market exit or underinvestment of targeted firms.

A consistent finding in the literature is that anti-dumping (AD) acts as a significant barrier to bilateral trade, in particular, during the time such measures are in force. Adding to a relatively scarce empirical literature, however, we identify adverse impacts of AD which survive well beyond its revocation. More specifically, while we cannot rule out a slight post-revocation recovery, we find empirical evidence that once affected bilateral trade does not fully recover on average following revocation. We use panel data at the Harmonized System four-digit (HS4) level of aggregation to produce these results and show that they are robust to the duration of AD cases, the time of their imposition and revocation, differentiation by economic sector and the nature of imposing countries. Several explanations for our observed empirical results seem plausible, and we provide a theoretical framework which suggests our results could be driven by market exit or underinvestment of targeted firms.

Area-Based Management Tools (ABMTs) are spatial instruments for conservation and managing different forms of ocean use. A multitude of ABMTs exists in marine areas within and beyond national jurisdiction, ranging from tools for the regulation of specific human activities (e.g. fisheries, shipping, or mining) to cross-sectoral tools (e.g. such as marine protected areas, MPAs, and marine spatial planning, MSP). By applying expert elicitation and reviewing scientific and grey literature we evaluate the contribution of ABMTs to sustainable development goals (SDGs) as set out under the United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, including for SDG 14 that directly addresses the conservation and sustainable use of oceans, seas, and marine resources. We find that fisheries-related and conservation-related ABMTs, and MSP offer the greatest potential contributions to SDG 14 and to SDGs in general. Moreover, there is high complementarity and synergy among different ABMTs for most SDG 14 targets and other SDGs, with the exception of SDG target 14.6 Prohibit fisheries subsidies and SDG 7 Affordable and clean energy. We find that some ABMTs contribute directly to goal attainment, while others contribute in more nuanced or even unexpected ways. Furthermore, context-specific factors that relate to political and legal factors, enforceability, transparency, governance structure, and inclusivity are crucial for unlocking the full potential of ABMTs of attaining multiple SDGs, as shown through examples. The major challenge to face in the next decade is ensuring durable and equitable outcomes from ABMT implementation by coordinating ABMT initiatives established by different organisations and responsible authorities. It is also critical that outcomes are monitored and evaluated across environmental, social, economic, governance, and health dimensions, with indicators addressing management effectiveness and not only ABMT area coverage.

Area-Based Management Tools (ABMTs) are spatial instruments for conservation and managing different forms of ocean use. A multitude of ABMTs exists in marine areas within and beyond national jurisdiction, ranging from tools for the regulation of specific human activities (e.g. fisheries, shipping, or mining) to cross-sectoral tools (e.g. such as marine protected areas, MPAs, and marine spatial planning, MSP). By applying expert elicitation and reviewing scientific and grey literature we evaluate the contribution of ABMTs to sustainable development goals (SDGs) as set out under the United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, including for SDG 14 that directly addresses the conservation and sustainable use of oceans, seas, and marine resources. We find that fisheries-related and conservation-related ABMTs, and MSP offer the greatest potential contributions to SDG 14 and to SDGs in general. Moreover, there is high complementarity and synergy among different ABMTs for most SDG 14 targets and other SDGs, with the exception of SDG target 14.6 Prohibit fisheries subsidies and SDG 7 Affordable and clean energy. We find that some ABMTs contribute directly to goal attainment, while others contribute in more nuanced or even unexpected ways. Furthermore, context-specific factors that relate to political and legal factors, enforceability, transparency, governance structure, and inclusivity are crucial for unlocking the full potential of ABMTs of attaining multiple SDGs, as shown through examples. The major challenge to face in the next decade is ensuring durable and equitable outcomes from ABMT implementation by coordinating ABMT initiatives established by different organisations and responsible authorities. It is also critical that outcomes are monitored and evaluated across environmental, social, economic, governance, and health dimensions, with indicators addressing management effectiveness and not only ABMT area coverage.

Area-Based Management Tools (ABMTs) are spatial instruments for conservation and managing different forms of ocean use. A multitude of ABMTs exists in marine areas within and beyond national jurisdiction, ranging from tools for the regulation of specific human activities (e.g. fisheries, shipping, or mining) to cross-sectoral tools (e.g. such as marine protected areas, MPAs, and marine spatial planning, MSP). By applying expert elicitation and reviewing scientific and grey literature we evaluate the contribution of ABMTs to sustainable development goals (SDGs) as set out under the United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, including for SDG 14 that directly addresses the conservation and sustainable use of oceans, seas, and marine resources. We find that fisheries-related and conservation-related ABMTs, and MSP offer the greatest potential contributions to SDG 14 and to SDGs in general. Moreover, there is high complementarity and synergy among different ABMTs for most SDG 14 targets and other SDGs, with the exception of SDG target 14.6 Prohibit fisheries subsidies and SDG 7 Affordable and clean energy. We find that some ABMTs contribute directly to goal attainment, while others contribute in more nuanced or even unexpected ways. Furthermore, context-specific factors that relate to political and legal factors, enforceability, transparency, governance structure, and inclusivity are crucial for unlocking the full potential of ABMTs of attaining multiple SDGs, as shown through examples. The major challenge to face in the next decade is ensuring durable and equitable outcomes from ABMT implementation by coordinating ABMT initiatives established by different organisations and responsible authorities. It is also critical that outcomes are monitored and evaluated across environmental, social, economic, governance, and health dimensions, with indicators addressing management effectiveness and not only ABMT area coverage.

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On December 2nd, IPI hosted a Global Leaders Series event featuring H.E. Mr. Moussa Faki Mahamat, Chairperson of the African Union Commission.

The African Union Commission (AUC) is integral to the promotion of sustainable peace and democratic governance on the African continent. These priorities and initiatives serve as a foundation for collective action, from pursuing regional integration at the political and economic levels to championing governance, development, and peace as interrelated normative and policy agendas. To further support these priorities and advance Africa’s interests on the global stage, the AUC has strengthened its partnerships with Africa’s regional economic communities and mechanisms, the United Nations, and other regions and countries.

The AUC’s upcoming twentieth anniversary and its recently completed institutional reforms offer a moment for reflection on recent progress and ongoing challenges. Despite tangible progress in recent years, African countries continue to confront structural and proximate threats to collective peace and security. Exclusive political leadership detracts from the consolidation of democratic-governance institutions and inclusive economic development, testing social contracts and giving rise to civic unrest. The COVID-19 pandemic is still reverberating across the continent and straining already fragile economies and domestic social structures. Climate degradation is exacerbating already significant humanitarian needs and amplifying the pressures of rapid urbanization and a majority-youth population. The continent’s aspirations to silence all guns and end armed conflicts have been weakened by fragile political agreements, transnational security and criminal threats, and rising geopolitical tensions that undermine the prospects for sustained multilateral action.

IPI’s Global Leaders Series discussion with H.E. Mahamat will focus on contemporary peace and security trends on the African continent as well as opportunities and priorities for strengthening sustainable peace and democratic governance over the coming years. It will also provide an opportunity to reflect on the African Union’s role as a multilateral institution supporting continental peace and security and its efforts to strengthen Africa’s geopolitical effectiveness and unity.

H.E. Moussa Faki Mahamat, now in his second term as Chairperson of the African Union Commission, has held this position since January 2017. H.E. Mahamat has previously served in multiple official capacities for the Republic of Chad, including as Prime Minister and Head of Government, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Director of the presidential cabinet, and President of the country’s Economic, Social and Cultural Council. He also chaired the Security Council in December 2014, including the general debate on December 19, 2014 on “threats to international peace and security: cross-border terrorism and crime.” H.E. Mahamat chaired the Peace and Security Council of the African Union in September 2013 and steered the Extraordinary Summit on Antiterrorism in Ouagadougou.

This event was moderated by Dr. Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein, President and CEO of IPI.

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IPI in partnership with the Government of Qatar, hosted on December 2nd a virtual policy forum entitled “From Glasgow to Sharm El Sheikh: Accelerating Climate Finance.”

COP 26 delivered an outcome representing incremental progress on climate change. While this outcome is a step in the right direction is not enough to avert the most devastating consequences of climate change. Climate and the COVID-19 pandemic has further increased the need for climate finance: the world now faces the worst economic crisis since the Second World War, causing loss of revenue and rising debt, especially in the countries that are most in need. At this event, we hope to discuss possible ways in which the financial system can align with the Paris Agreement. To stay below 1.5C, finance will be a critical component in unlocking greater ambition on mitigation and increasing trust among countries.

Opening Remarks:
H.E. Mr. Abdulla Shahid, President of the 76th Session of the UN General Assembly

Speakers:
H.E. Mr. Osama Mahmoud Abdel Khalek Mahmoud, Permanent Representative of the Arab Republic of Egypt to the UN
H.E. Mr. James Kariuki, Deputy Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom to the UN
Mr. Selwin Hart, Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Climate Action and Assistant Secretary-General for the Climate Action Team
Ms. Rachel Kyte, Dean of The Fletcher School at Tufts University
Ms. Jimena Leiva Roesch, IPI Senior Fellow and Head of the Peace and Sustainable Development Program

Closing Remarks:
H.E. Sheikha Alya Ahmed Bin Saif Al-Thani, Permanent Representative of the State of Qatar to the UN

Moderator:
Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein, IPI President

This blog post assesses the outcomes of the UN climate change conference "COP26", which convened in Glasgow, Scotland, between 31 October and 13 November 2021. It assesses what COP26 actually delivered, what this implies for the implementation of the Paris Agreement and international climate cooperation, and what remains to be done as the multilateral climate process moves towards COP27 in Egypt in 2022.

This blog post assesses the outcomes of the UN climate change conference "COP26", which convened in Glasgow, Scotland, between 31 October and 13 November 2021. It assesses what COP26 actually delivered, what this implies for the implementation of the Paris Agreement and international climate cooperation, and what remains to be done as the multilateral climate process moves towards COP27 in Egypt in 2022.

This blog post assesses the outcomes of the UN climate change conference "COP26", which convened in Glasgow, Scotland, between 31 October and 13 November 2021. It assesses what COP26 actually delivered, what this implies for the implementation of the Paris Agreement and international climate cooperation, and what remains to be done as the multilateral climate process moves towards COP27 in Egypt in 2022.

Grüner Wasserstoff wird als wichtiges Element einer globalen Energiewende gesehen. Die großen Mengen an Wasserstoff, die im Industrie- und Verkehrssektor der Industrieländer zur Dekarbonisierung eingesetzt werden sollen, können klimaverträglich vor allem in Entwicklungsländern erzeugt werden. Costa Rica gehört zu den potentiellen Erzeugerländern, und kann recht schnell auf eine steigende Nachfrage reagieren. Ein besonderer natürlicher Standortvorteil ist, dass Solar- und Windenergie, Wasserkraft und Geothermie große Potentiale aufweisen und in unmittelbarer geographischer Nähe auch umfangreiche Mengen an Wasser für die Elektrolyse zur Verfügung stehen. Gleichzeitig hat das Land gut qualifizierte Arbeitskräfte und auch leistungsfähige Einrichtungen der Forschung und Entwicklung. Dies ist besonders in einer frühen Phase wichtig, wenn viele Elemente und Prozesse einer Wasserstoffökonomie sich noch zwischen großtechnischer Demonstration und Implementierung befinden. Das Papier plädiert dafür, dass Costa Rica nicht ausschließlich auf den Export von grünem Wasserstoff setzt, sondern gleichzeitig auch lokale Nutzungsmöglichkeiten in den Blick nimmt. Damit können die Treibhausgasemissionen des Landes weiter gesenkt, Importe fossiler Energieträger substituiert und Beschäftigung aufgebaut werden.

Grüner Wasserstoff wird als wichtiges Element einer globalen Energiewende gesehen. Die großen Mengen an Wasserstoff, die im Industrie- und Verkehrssektor der Industrieländer zur Dekarbonisierung eingesetzt werden sollen, können klimaverträglich vor allem in Entwicklungsländern erzeugt werden. Costa Rica gehört zu den potentiellen Erzeugerländern, und kann recht schnell auf eine steigende Nachfrage reagieren. Ein besonderer natürlicher Standortvorteil ist, dass Solar- und Windenergie, Wasserkraft und Geothermie große Potentiale aufweisen und in unmittelbarer geographischer Nähe auch umfangreiche Mengen an Wasser für die Elektrolyse zur Verfügung stehen. Gleichzeitig hat das Land gut qualifizierte Arbeitskräfte und auch leistungsfähige Einrichtungen der Forschung und Entwicklung. Dies ist besonders in einer frühen Phase wichtig, wenn viele Elemente und Prozesse einer Wasserstoffökonomie sich noch zwischen großtechnischer Demonstration und Implementierung befinden. Das Papier plädiert dafür, dass Costa Rica nicht ausschließlich auf den Export von grünem Wasserstoff setzt, sondern gleichzeitig auch lokale Nutzungsmöglichkeiten in den Blick nimmt. Damit können die Treibhausgasemissionen des Landes weiter gesenkt, Importe fossiler Energieträger substituiert und Beschäftigung aufgebaut werden.

Grüner Wasserstoff wird als wichtiges Element einer globalen Energiewende gesehen. Die großen Mengen an Wasserstoff, die im Industrie- und Verkehrssektor der Industrieländer zur Dekarbonisierung eingesetzt werden sollen, können klimaverträglich vor allem in Entwicklungsländern erzeugt werden. Costa Rica gehört zu den potentiellen Erzeugerländern, und kann recht schnell auf eine steigende Nachfrage reagieren. Ein besonderer natürlicher Standortvorteil ist, dass Solar- und Windenergie, Wasserkraft und Geothermie große Potentiale aufweisen und in unmittelbarer geographischer Nähe auch umfangreiche Mengen an Wasser für die Elektrolyse zur Verfügung stehen. Gleichzeitig hat das Land gut qualifizierte Arbeitskräfte und auch leistungsfähige Einrichtungen der Forschung und Entwicklung. Dies ist besonders in einer frühen Phase wichtig, wenn viele Elemente und Prozesse einer Wasserstoffökonomie sich noch zwischen großtechnischer Demonstration und Implementierung befinden. Das Papier plädiert dafür, dass Costa Rica nicht ausschließlich auf den Export von grünem Wasserstoff setzt, sondern gleichzeitig auch lokale Nutzungsmöglichkeiten in den Blick nimmt. Damit können die Treibhausgasemissionen des Landes weiter gesenkt, Importe fossiler Energieträger substituiert und Beschäftigung aufgebaut werden.

This study explores to what extent the COVID-19 crisis affects the long-term prospects for industrial development. The focus of the study is on latecomer economies – those facing an uphill battle because they joined global markets at a point in time when other economies had already established global production networks.
In a first step, we analyse how the prospects for industrialisation are changing, mainly as a consequence of three global megatrends: digitalisation and automation of production; global economic power shifts; and the greening of economies. These trends create new opportunities for latecomer industrialisation, but they also raise entry barriers to markets, especially for country with weak innovation systems.
We then explore COVID-19 effects through the analytical lens of the pre-COVID megatrends. While the pandemic has had a severe impact on the world economy, such impacts will not change the ongoing trends fundamentally. The ongoing recovery from COVID-19 is not showing much structural transformation – despite many voices demanding to “build back better”. Yet, the pandemic is accelerating or decelerating some of the previous trends. One is the trend towards online trading. The dominance of international trading platforms may lead to concentration in “upstream” activities such as manufacturing, crowding out weaker market actors. At the same time, platform economies are boosting delivery activities, such as courier services. Another trend that may be accelerated by the pandemic is towards the reshoring of previously offshored productive tasks, yet, evidence here is mixed, and we may see other risk-hedging strategies rather than large-scale reshoring. We may also see the gap between dynamic economies in East/Southeast Asia and other developing regions widening, because the former recovered faster due to vaccination programmes and fiscal stimulus packages. Regarding the greening of economies, some major economies initiated green fiscal stimulus packages, accelerating for example the development of global green hydrogen economy. Also, the trend towards tele-work is reducing emissions from the transport sector. Overall, however, the pandemic does not seem to alter the ongoing, but slow, progress towards greener economies.   
We conclude with police recommendations in five domains: i) Fostering economic resilience through economic diversification; ii) the need to develop pharmaceutical and medical supply industries in all countries; iii) increased investments in digital capabilities, including the ability to regulate platform economies; iv) strengthening domestic revenue generation to increase policy space and resilience, including pro-environmental fiscal reforms; and v) improving international governance e.g. in the domains of intellectual property rights and technology-sharing.

This study explores to what extent the COVID-19 crisis affects the long-term prospects for industrial development. The focus of the study is on latecomer economies – those facing an uphill battle because they joined global markets at a point in time when other economies had already established global production networks.
In a first step, we analyse how the prospects for industrialisation are changing, mainly as a consequence of three global megatrends: digitalisation and automation of production; global economic power shifts; and the greening of economies. These trends create new opportunities for latecomer industrialisation, but they also raise entry barriers to markets, especially for country with weak innovation systems.
We then explore COVID-19 effects through the analytical lens of the pre-COVID megatrends. While the pandemic has had a severe impact on the world economy, such impacts will not change the ongoing trends fundamentally. The ongoing recovery from COVID-19 is not showing much structural transformation – despite many voices demanding to “build back better”. Yet, the pandemic is accelerating or decelerating some of the previous trends. One is the trend towards online trading. The dominance of international trading platforms may lead to concentration in “upstream” activities such as manufacturing, crowding out weaker market actors. At the same time, platform economies are boosting delivery activities, such as courier services. Another trend that may be accelerated by the pandemic is towards the reshoring of previously offshored productive tasks, yet, evidence here is mixed, and we may see other risk-hedging strategies rather than large-scale reshoring. We may also see the gap between dynamic economies in East/Southeast Asia and other developing regions widening, because the former recovered faster due to vaccination programmes and fiscal stimulus packages. Regarding the greening of economies, some major economies initiated green fiscal stimulus packages, accelerating for example the development of global green hydrogen economy. Also, the trend towards tele-work is reducing emissions from the transport sector. Overall, however, the pandemic does not seem to alter the ongoing, but slow, progress towards greener economies.   
We conclude with police recommendations in five domains: i) Fostering economic resilience through economic diversification; ii) the need to develop pharmaceutical and medical supply industries in all countries; iii) increased investments in digital capabilities, including the ability to regulate platform economies; iv) strengthening domestic revenue generation to increase policy space and resilience, including pro-environmental fiscal reforms; and v) improving international governance e.g. in the domains of intellectual property rights and technology-sharing.

This study explores to what extent the COVID-19 crisis affects the long-term prospects for industrial development. The focus of the study is on latecomer economies – those facing an uphill battle because they joined global markets at a point in time when other economies had already established global production networks.
In a first step, we analyse how the prospects for industrialisation are changing, mainly as a consequence of three global megatrends: digitalisation and automation of production; global economic power shifts; and the greening of economies. These trends create new opportunities for latecomer industrialisation, but they also raise entry barriers to markets, especially for country with weak innovation systems.
We then explore COVID-19 effects through the analytical lens of the pre-COVID megatrends. While the pandemic has had a severe impact on the world economy, such impacts will not change the ongoing trends fundamentally. The ongoing recovery from COVID-19 is not showing much structural transformation – despite many voices demanding to “build back better”. Yet, the pandemic is accelerating or decelerating some of the previous trends. One is the trend towards online trading. The dominance of international trading platforms may lead to concentration in “upstream” activities such as manufacturing, crowding out weaker market actors. At the same time, platform economies are boosting delivery activities, such as courier services. Another trend that may be accelerated by the pandemic is towards the reshoring of previously offshored productive tasks, yet, evidence here is mixed, and we may see other risk-hedging strategies rather than large-scale reshoring. We may also see the gap between dynamic economies in East/Southeast Asia and other developing regions widening, because the former recovered faster due to vaccination programmes and fiscal stimulus packages. Regarding the greening of economies, some major economies initiated green fiscal stimulus packages, accelerating for example the development of global green hydrogen economy. Also, the trend towards tele-work is reducing emissions from the transport sector. Overall, however, the pandemic does not seem to alter the ongoing, but slow, progress towards greener economies.   
We conclude with police recommendations in five domains: i) Fostering economic resilience through economic diversification; ii) the need to develop pharmaceutical and medical supply industries in all countries; iii) increased investments in digital capabilities, including the ability to regulate platform economies; iv) strengthening domestic revenue generation to increase policy space and resilience, including pro-environmental fiscal reforms; and v) improving international governance e.g. in the domains of intellectual property rights and technology-sharing.

Social cohesion is key for sustainable development. While social cohesion has suffered in many societies from the consequences of the Covid-19 pandemic, high levels of social cohesion have helped to overcome critical situations during the pandemic in other societies. As a consequence, protecting and strengthening social cohesion has become an increasingly central goal for most countries and the international community. Despite the strong interest in the topic, the questions of how to define social cohesion and make it an observable phenomenon through proper measurement are still contested, in both academia and policy circles. To date, no consistent, temporally and geographically spread-out data on the different elements of social cohesion exists that would allow for a global analysis of social cohesion. This rather fragmented picture of analytical approaches calls for a more universal definition and measurement of social cohesion. This paper aims to provide a narrow and measurable definition of social cohesion that travels across regions and countries. Conceptually, it proposes a definition of social cohesion that incorporates the core elements of existing and widely used definitions of social cohesion across disciplines (trust, identity, cooperation for the common good). Our contribution is to offer a definition of social cohesion that is broad enough to cover the essentials holding societies together while at the same time keeping it lean enough to analyse the causes and consequences of social cohesion, for instance the relationship between social cohesion and inequalities or political institutions. Methodologically, we propose an application of our concept to the African context. It is not only a first step towards a more global and inter-regional measurement of social cohesion, but also the basis for further knowledge-creation, the identification of patterns of social cohesion and the analysis of its causes and consequences. From a policy-oriented perspective, a more unified definition of the core elements of social cohesion and its measurement can inform policies that aim at protecting and fostering social cohesion. In development cooperation, it will help not only to build indicators for designing programme objectives and for evaluation and monitoring, but also to advance evidence-based theories of change.

Social cohesion is key for sustainable development. While social cohesion has suffered in many societies from the consequences of the Covid-19 pandemic, high levels of social cohesion have helped to overcome critical situations during the pandemic in other societies. As a consequence, protecting and strengthening social cohesion has become an increasingly central goal for most countries and the international community. Despite the strong interest in the topic, the questions of how to define social cohesion and make it an observable phenomenon through proper measurement are still contested, in both academia and policy circles. To date, no consistent, temporally and geographically spread-out data on the different elements of social cohesion exists that would allow for a global analysis of social cohesion. This rather fragmented picture of analytical approaches calls for a more universal definition and measurement of social cohesion. This paper aims to provide a narrow and measurable definition of social cohesion that travels across regions and countries. Conceptually, it proposes a definition of social cohesion that incorporates the core elements of existing and widely used definitions of social cohesion across disciplines (trust, identity, cooperation for the common good). Our contribution is to offer a definition of social cohesion that is broad enough to cover the essentials holding societies together while at the same time keeping it lean enough to analyse the causes and consequences of social cohesion, for instance the relationship between social cohesion and inequalities or political institutions. Methodologically, we propose an application of our concept to the African context. It is not only a first step towards a more global and inter-regional measurement of social cohesion, but also the basis for further knowledge-creation, the identification of patterns of social cohesion and the analysis of its causes and consequences. From a policy-oriented perspective, a more unified definition of the core elements of social cohesion and its measurement can inform policies that aim at protecting and fostering social cohesion. In development cooperation, it will help not only to build indicators for designing programme objectives and for evaluation and monitoring, but also to advance evidence-based theories of change.