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On January 11th, IPI’s Women Peace and Security team hosted a virtual policy forum to launch the recently published policy paper, “From Female Engagement Teams to Engagement Platoons: The Evolution of Gendered Community Engagement in UN Peace Operations.”

This forum featured panelists who discussed the paper’s findings and policy recommendations for UN military decision makers and troop-contributing countries. Panelists considered the operational challenges, gendered assumptions and stereotypes that negatively impact the work of engagement teams and engagement platoons and gendered and racialized assumptions and stereotypes about host communities. The broad goal of the policy forum was to meaningfully discuss and develop a shared understanding of the evolution of gendered community engagement in UN peace operations.

This event and the related research are part of IPI’s Women in Peace Operations (WIPO) project, a multi-year initiative funded by the Government of Canada’s Elsie Initiative for Women in Peace Operations.

Opening Remarks:
Dr. Adam Lupel, IPI Vice President
Ms. Gwyn Kutz, Director-General of the Peace and Stabilization Operations Program, Global Affairs Canada

Speakers:
Gretchen Baldwin, Senior Policy Analyst at IPI’s Women Peace and Security Program
Col. Stephanie Tutton, Chief of the OMA Policy and Doctrine Team, United Nations Department of Peace Operations
Col. Gonzalo Mila, Adviser, Uruguayan Armed Forces
Lt. Yumae Amicone, Uruguayan Army

Moderator:
Dr. Phoebe Donnelly, Research Fellow and Head of IPI’s Women Peace and Security Program

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Bundeswirtschaftsminister Robert Habeck hat heute seine „Eröffnungsbilanz“ für den Klimaschutz vorgestellt. Es folgt eine Einordnung von Claudia Kemfert, Leiterin der Abteilung Energie, Verkehr, Umwelt am Deutschen Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW Berlin):

Endlich herrscht mehr Realismus im Wirtschaftsministerium in Punkto Klimaschutz und Energiewende. Die vorgeschlagenen Maßnahmen gehen allesamt in die richtige Richtung. Die Annahmen zum künftigen Stromverbrauch sind realistischer. Zudem ist begrüßenswert, dass die Ausschreibungsmengen für erneuerbare Energien erhöht werden sollen. Das ist überfällig. Gut ist ebenso, dass mehr Flächenpotenziale für Windenergie genutzt werden sollen. Da sehr viel Versäumtes aufgeholt werden muss, ist es ein sehr ambitioniertes Programm.

So löblich die vorgeschlagenen Maßnahmen und Ziele auch sind, zur Einhaltung des mit dem Pariser Klimavertrags kompatiblen 1,5-Grad-Ziel reichen sie leider immer noch nicht aus. Wir benötigen im Jahr 2030 150 bis 350 Gigawatt (GW) Photovoltaik und 105 bis 150 GW Windkraft. Dies entspricht mindestens einer Verdoppelung der aktuell geplanten Ausbaumengen. Zum einen sollten der angestrebte Anteil erneuerbarer Energien nach oben korrigiert und Ausbauziele klar formuliert werden. Um das 1,5-Grad-Ziel zu erreichen, muss der Anteil der erneuerbaren Energien bei 95 Prozent bis zum Jahr 2030 liegen. Das bedeutet, dass auch mehr Mengen ausgeschrieben werden müssen. Zum anderen müssen Barrieren abgebaut werden: Zwei Prozent der Flächen müssen in jedem Bundesland fest für die Windkraft festgelegt und Genehmigungsverfahren beschleunigt werden.

Mindestabstände für Windanlagen hemmen den Ausbau der Windenergie und fördern nicht die Akzeptanz. Abstandsregeln sollten abgeschafft werden, indem die sogenannte Länderöffnungsklausel im Baugesetzbuch ersatzlos gestrichen wird. Die Akzeptanz kann über finanzielle Beteiligungsmöglichkeiten der Kommunen und Bürger gesteigert werden.

Neben einem vorgezogenen Kohleausstieg sollte auch die Nutzung und Abhängigkeit von Erdgas kontinuierlich reduziert werden. Auch wenn die Energiegewinnung aus Erdgas im Vergleich zu Kohle weniger CO2 freisetzt, trägt die Nutzung von Gas durch den Austritt von Methan zur Steigerung von Treibhausgasen in der Atmosphäre bei. Daher sollte der Einsatz von Erdgas kontinuierlich gesenkt werden.

The concept and implementation of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) have evolved as DDR-related activities have increasingly occurred in environments where armed conflict is ongoing, no peace agreement has been signed, and armed groups designated as terrorist organizations (AGDTOs) are operating. In parallel, reintegration has increasingly been discussed in the UN counterterrorism architecture through the concept of prosecution, rehabilitation, and reintegration (PRR). The changing context has raised challenges related to reintegration, especially reintegration of former members of AGDTOs.

This policy paper analyzes the risks faced by individuals taking part in reintegration processes and by the communities they are reintegrating into. In particular, it analyzes how the designation of an armed group as a terrorist organization by the UN Security Council or by a state impacts these risks while acknowledging that these risks largely depend on the broader context. The paper examines three case studies of current reintegration processes: (1) the process for reincorporating former combatants from the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia–People’s Army (FARC-EP); (2) the defector program for former members of al-Shabaab in Somalia; and (3) the reintegration process for individuals associated with Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Basin.

The paper concludes by recommending several steps the UN could take to help ensure that reintegration processes address protection risks, especially for former members of AGDTOs:

• Tailor reintegration programs to the context, not to whether a group is labeled as a terrorist organization;
• Design reintegration programs to be gender-sensitive and human rights–compliant;
• Ensure that PRR and DDR programs are complementary and adopt the Integrated DDR Standards module on AGDTOs; and
• Keep reintegration and counterterrorism goals distinct.

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While competition in the financial system generally mitigates small- and medium-sized enterprises' (SMEs) financing constraints, this paper theorises that competition by microfinance institutions (MFIs) has adverse effects through aggravating the ‘graduation problem’: Small firms outgrowing microfinance struggle to find financing as conventional financial institutions abstain from downscaling and developing suitable lending instruments for smaller firms if these market segments are narrowed down by upscaling MFIs. Using data from 51 countries between 2002 and 2015, microfinance is found to significantly lower SMEs' access to credit. Credit bureaus can reverse this effect indicating that credit information infrastructure can reconcile a strong microfinance sector with functioning SME finance.

While competition in the financial system generally mitigates small- and medium-sized enterprises' (SMEs) financing constraints, this paper theorises that competition by microfinance institutions (MFIs) has adverse effects through aggravating the ‘graduation problem’: Small firms outgrowing microfinance struggle to find financing as conventional financial institutions abstain from downscaling and developing suitable lending instruments for smaller firms if these market segments are narrowed down by upscaling MFIs. Using data from 51 countries between 2002 and 2015, microfinance is found to significantly lower SMEs' access to credit. Credit bureaus can reverse this effect indicating that credit information infrastructure can reconcile a strong microfinance sector with functioning SME finance.

While competition in the financial system generally mitigates small- and medium-sized enterprises' (SMEs) financing constraints, this paper theorises that competition by microfinance institutions (MFIs) has adverse effects through aggravating the ‘graduation problem’: Small firms outgrowing microfinance struggle to find financing as conventional financial institutions abstain from downscaling and developing suitable lending instruments for smaller firms if these market segments are narrowed down by upscaling MFIs. Using data from 51 countries between 2002 and 2015, microfinance is found to significantly lower SMEs' access to credit. Credit bureaus can reverse this effect indicating that credit information infrastructure can reconcile a strong microfinance sector with functioning SME finance.

Since the early 2000s, populist radical right parties (PRRPs) have more than doubled their electoral support in Europe. Previous research found that PRRPs impact migration policy. However, little is known about whether they also impact other fields of domestic and foreign policy. Using a cross-country panel analysis, we test to what extent the rise of PRRPs has influenced European foreign aid spending. We find that while the rise of PRRPs has not been associated with an overall reduction in foreign aid, it has led to changes in how aid moneys are spent. PRRP strength is linked to a higher share of aid for migration-containment objectives, and less aid for addressing climate change and for multilateral organizations. Our analysis thereby provides evidence that the ‘electoral threat’ of PRRPs puts mainstream parties under pressure not only with regard to migration but also in relation to the climate–development nexus and aid for multilateralism.

Since the early 2000s, populist radical right parties (PRRPs) have more than doubled their electoral support in Europe. Previous research found that PRRPs impact migration policy. However, little is known about whether they also impact other fields of domestic and foreign policy. Using a cross-country panel analysis, we test to what extent the rise of PRRPs has influenced European foreign aid spending. We find that while the rise of PRRPs has not been associated with an overall reduction in foreign aid, it has led to changes in how aid moneys are spent. PRRP strength is linked to a higher share of aid for migration-containment objectives, and less aid for addressing climate change and for multilateral organizations. Our analysis thereby provides evidence that the ‘electoral threat’ of PRRPs puts mainstream parties under pressure not only with regard to migration but also in relation to the climate–development nexus and aid for multilateralism.

Since the early 2000s, populist radical right parties (PRRPs) have more than doubled their electoral support in Europe. Previous research found that PRRPs impact migration policy. However, little is known about whether they also impact other fields of domestic and foreign policy. Using a cross-country panel analysis, we test to what extent the rise of PRRPs has influenced European foreign aid spending. We find that while the rise of PRRPs has not been associated with an overall reduction in foreign aid, it has led to changes in how aid moneys are spent. PRRP strength is linked to a higher share of aid for migration-containment objectives, and less aid for addressing climate change and for multilateral organizations. Our analysis thereby provides evidence that the ‘electoral threat’ of PRRPs puts mainstream parties under pressure not only with regard to migration but also in relation to the climate–development nexus and aid for multilateralism.

Democratisation is hailed as a pathway to peace by some, yet, blamed for provoking renewed violence by others. Can democracy aid explain the effect of democratisation after civil war? Building upon findings that transitions to democracy are prone to violence, this article shows that external democracy aid can mitigate such negative effects. It is the first to disaggregate democracy aid and analyse its effect on peace after civil war. To this end, it uses a configurational approach and focuses on support for competition (for example, promoting free and fair elections), institutional constraints (for example, strengthening the judiciary), and cooperation (for example, facilitating reconciliation). Combining Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) with an illustrative case study on Liberia, it demonstrates that democracy aid can help to prevent recurrence during postconflict democratisation. Two pathways can explain peaceful democratisation: first, fostering ‘cooperative democratisation’ characterised by substantial support for cooperation in lower-risk contexts; and second, fostering ‘controlled competition’ by combining substantial support for institutional constraints and competition. Importantly, democracy support does not trigger renewed violence. These findings speak to the academic debate on the destabilising potential of democratisation processes after civil wars and inform policymakers designing postconflict support strategies.

Democratisation is hailed as a pathway to peace by some, yet, blamed for provoking renewed violence by others. Can democracy aid explain the effect of democratisation after civil war? Building upon findings that transitions to democracy are prone to violence, this article shows that external democracy aid can mitigate such negative effects. It is the first to disaggregate democracy aid and analyse its effect on peace after civil war. To this end, it uses a configurational approach and focuses on support for competition (for example, promoting free and fair elections), institutional constraints (for example, strengthening the judiciary), and cooperation (for example, facilitating reconciliation). Combining Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) with an illustrative case study on Liberia, it demonstrates that democracy aid can help to prevent recurrence during postconflict democratisation. Two pathways can explain peaceful democratisation: first, fostering ‘cooperative democratisation’ characterised by substantial support for cooperation in lower-risk contexts; and second, fostering ‘controlled competition’ by combining substantial support for institutional constraints and competition. Importantly, democracy support does not trigger renewed violence. These findings speak to the academic debate on the destabilising potential of democratisation processes after civil wars and inform policymakers designing postconflict support strategies.

Democratisation is hailed as a pathway to peace by some, yet, blamed for provoking renewed violence by others. Can democracy aid explain the effect of democratisation after civil war? Building upon findings that transitions to democracy are prone to violence, this article shows that external democracy aid can mitigate such negative effects. It is the first to disaggregate democracy aid and analyse its effect on peace after civil war. To this end, it uses a configurational approach and focuses on support for competition (for example, promoting free and fair elections), institutional constraints (for example, strengthening the judiciary), and cooperation (for example, facilitating reconciliation). Combining Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) with an illustrative case study on Liberia, it demonstrates that democracy aid can help to prevent recurrence during postconflict democratisation. Two pathways can explain peaceful democratisation: first, fostering ‘cooperative democratisation’ characterised by substantial support for cooperation in lower-risk contexts; and second, fostering ‘controlled competition’ by combining substantial support for institutional constraints and competition. Importantly, democracy support does not trigger renewed violence. These findings speak to the academic debate on the destabilising potential of democratisation processes after civil wars and inform policymakers designing postconflict support strategies.

A growing impact evaluation literature on antipoverty transfer programmes in low- and middle-income countries measures changes in utilitarian terms, at their unit value. The paper argues that valuing antipoverty transfers is more appropriately done within a framework of prioritarian social welfare functions, as the very presence of these programmes indicates that polities place a greater value on gains and losses among the disadvantaged. The paper applies this framework to the Senior Citizen Grant in Uganda, including survey and experimental work throwing light on social preferences for redistribution. It finds that default utilitarian valuation significantly underestimates the social value of transfer programmes.

A growing impact evaluation literature on antipoverty transfer programmes in low- and middle-income countries measures changes in utilitarian terms, at their unit value. The paper argues that valuing antipoverty transfers is more appropriately done within a framework of prioritarian social welfare functions, as the very presence of these programmes indicates that polities place a greater value on gains and losses among the disadvantaged. The paper applies this framework to the Senior Citizen Grant in Uganda, including survey and experimental work throwing light on social preferences for redistribution. It finds that default utilitarian valuation significantly underestimates the social value of transfer programmes.

A growing impact evaluation literature on antipoverty transfer programmes in low- and middle-income countries measures changes in utilitarian terms, at their unit value. The paper argues that valuing antipoverty transfers is more appropriately done within a framework of prioritarian social welfare functions, as the very presence of these programmes indicates that polities place a greater value on gains and losses among the disadvantaged. The paper applies this framework to the Senior Citizen Grant in Uganda, including survey and experimental work throwing light on social preferences for redistribution. It finds that default utilitarian valuation significantly underestimates the social value of transfer programmes.

The dataset presented in this article contains information about marine Area-Based Management Tools (ABMTs) used to assess their contribution to the United Nations 2030 Sustainable Development Goals. Following the scope of the analysis, ABMTs were identified by scrutinizing international and regional legal sources related to ocean management in the fields of marine conservation, fisheries, deep sea bed mining, underwater natural and cultural heritage, environmental conservation, and marine spatial planning. Legal sources were screened to depict the following characteristics of individual ABMTs: i) management objectives; ii) authorities responsible for delivering such objectives; iii) the system of management and planning entailed in the ABMT including the zoning type; and iv) the specific spatial scope and domain each ABMT refer to in vertical depth and horizontal domain. Data were generated through an internal expert elicitation. Experts, initially trained in the data analysis and related protocol, contributed to the data production because of their specific knowledge and experience in ocean management. This dataset represents a unique source of information for advancing research about monitoring and assessment of the achievement of sustainable development goals that encompasses different types of ABMTs.