Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

Donald Trump’s return to the US presidency marks a decisive turn towards economic nationalism, with wide-ranging implications for the Global South. This paper examines how Trump’s trade policy – characterised by high tariffs, reshoring and a retreat from multilateralism – challenges the foundations of the post-war liberal trade order. Drawing on traditions in development economics and international political economy, it explores how Trump’s agenda disrupts export-led growth strategies in developing countries and exacerbates vulnerabilities tied to global value chains. Crucially, it links this trade realignment to a parallel withdrawal from global development cooperation, reflecting a nationalist posture that undermines both aid and trade norms. The paper outlines three scenarios for how Trump’s trade strategy may affect the Global South, ranging from fragmentation and marginalisation to strategic realignment and developmental sovereignty. It concludes by arguing that Trump’s policy stance, while destabilising, also creates an opening to rethink development cooperation, not as aid-driven, but as a vehicle for structural reform, fairer trade rules and renewed institutional agency for the Global South.

Donald Trump’s return to the US presidency marks a decisive turn towards economic nationalism, with wide-ranging implications for the Global South. This paper examines how Trump’s trade policy – characterised by high tariffs, reshoring and a retreat from multilateralism – challenges the foundations of the post-war liberal trade order. Drawing on traditions in development economics and international political economy, it explores how Trump’s agenda disrupts export-led growth strategies in developing countries and exacerbates vulnerabilities tied to global value chains. Crucially, it links this trade realignment to a parallel withdrawal from global development cooperation, reflecting a nationalist posture that undermines both aid and trade norms. The paper outlines three scenarios for how Trump’s trade strategy may affect the Global South, ranging from fragmentation and marginalisation to strategic realignment and developmental sovereignty. It concludes by arguing that Trump’s policy stance, while destabilising, also creates an opening to rethink development cooperation, not as aid-driven, but as a vehicle for structural reform, fairer trade rules and renewed institutional agency for the Global South.

Donald Trump’s return to the US presidency marks a decisive turn towards economic nationalism, with wide-ranging implications for the Global South. This paper examines how Trump’s trade policy – characterised by high tariffs, reshoring and a retreat from multilateralism – challenges the foundations of the post-war liberal trade order. Drawing on traditions in development economics and international political economy, it explores how Trump’s agenda disrupts export-led growth strategies in developing countries and exacerbates vulnerabilities tied to global value chains. Crucially, it links this trade realignment to a parallel withdrawal from global development cooperation, reflecting a nationalist posture that undermines both aid and trade norms. The paper outlines three scenarios for how Trump’s trade strategy may affect the Global South, ranging from fragmentation and marginalisation to strategic realignment and developmental sovereignty. It concludes by arguing that Trump’s policy stance, while destabilising, also creates an opening to rethink development cooperation, not as aid-driven, but as a vehicle for structural reform, fairer trade rules and renewed institutional agency for the Global South.

Middle powers such as Mexico and Turkey have become increasingly influential in international development cooperation over the past two decades. Following the trend of a surge in populist leaders, their development cooperation has recently been combined with highly personalised, leader-centric foreign policy styles. This trend has significant implications for global development. On the one hand, they demonstrate that populist governance does not necessarily undermine international cooperation. The leaders of Mexico and Turkey contrast sharply with inward-looking populist leaders such as Donald Trump, whose approach has weakened multilateralism. On the other hand, however, the personalisation of development cooperation in general carries risks. Although these leaders frame initiatives as pragmatic and altruistic partnerships with developing countries, they often serve domestic political agendas and risk reinforcing transactional, short-term, leader-driven development policy in an era of global fragmentation.

Middle powers such as Mexico and Turkey have become increasingly influential in international development cooperation over the past two decades. Following the trend of a surge in populist leaders, their development cooperation has recently been combined with highly personalised, leader-centric foreign policy styles. This trend has significant implications for global development. On the one hand, they demonstrate that populist governance does not necessarily undermine international cooperation. The leaders of Mexico and Turkey contrast sharply with inward-looking populist leaders such as Donald Trump, whose approach has weakened multilateralism. On the other hand, however, the personalisation of development cooperation in general carries risks. Although these leaders frame initiatives as pragmatic and altruistic partnerships with developing countries, they often serve domestic political agendas and risk reinforcing transactional, short-term, leader-driven development policy in an era of global fragmentation.

Middle powers such as Mexico and Turkey have become increasingly influential in international development cooperation over the past two decades. Following the trend of a surge in populist leaders, their development cooperation has recently been combined with highly personalised, leader-centric foreign policy styles. This trend has significant implications for global development. On the one hand, they demonstrate that populist governance does not necessarily undermine international cooperation. The leaders of Mexico and Turkey contrast sharply with inward-looking populist leaders such as Donald Trump, whose approach has weakened multilateralism. On the other hand, however, the personalisation of development cooperation in general carries risks. Although these leaders frame initiatives as pragmatic and altruistic partnerships with developing countries, they often serve domestic political agendas and risk reinforcing transactional, short-term, leader-driven development policy in an era of global fragmentation.

At the United Nations (UN), as elsewhere, Donald Trump and his administration frame China as the ultimate rival. Yet, as suggested in this paper, Trump’s actions and approach vis-à-vis the UN system are set to ultimately – and unintentionally – play into Beijing’s hands. First, the withdrawal of the United States from individual UN bodies opens up concrete spaces for expanding China’s multilateral weight. Second, a more general disengagement by the United States from the UN system contributes to what Chinese sources refer to as a broader shift from a “US-centred” to a “UN-centred” world where Western hegemony is replaced by increased weight for the UN’s developing-country majority, with China as the latter’s de facto leader. Third, and despite obvious rivalries, Trump shares Xi Jinping’s disdain for more autonomous multilateral bodies and aligns with China’s more transactional approach to the UN. This does not bode well for those committed to a more substantive idea of UN multilateralism that centres on a stable international bureaucracy with a strong normative compass. For Beijing, Trump 2.0 suggests that the shift from a “US-centred” to a “UN-centred” world – where a more transactional approach to multilateralism and the increased weight of developing countries turn China into the central global player – is well underway.

At the United Nations (UN), as elsewhere, Donald Trump and his administration frame China as the ultimate rival. Yet, as suggested in this paper, Trump’s actions and approach vis-à-vis the UN system are set to ultimately – and unintentionally – play into Beijing’s hands. First, the withdrawal of the United States from individual UN bodies opens up concrete spaces for expanding China’s multilateral weight. Second, a more general disengagement by the United States from the UN system contributes to what Chinese sources refer to as a broader shift from a “US-centred” to a “UN-centred” world where Western hegemony is replaced by increased weight for the UN’s developing-country majority, with China as the latter’s de facto leader. Third, and despite obvious rivalries, Trump shares Xi Jinping’s disdain for more autonomous multilateral bodies and aligns with China’s more transactional approach to the UN. This does not bode well for those committed to a more substantive idea of UN multilateralism that centres on a stable international bureaucracy with a strong normative compass. For Beijing, Trump 2.0 suggests that the shift from a “US-centred” to a “UN-centred” world – where a more transactional approach to multilateralism and the increased weight of developing countries turn China into the central global player – is well underway.

At the United Nations (UN), as elsewhere, Donald Trump and his administration frame China as the ultimate rival. Yet, as suggested in this paper, Trump’s actions and approach vis-à-vis the UN system are set to ultimately – and unintentionally – play into Beijing’s hands. First, the withdrawal of the United States from individual UN bodies opens up concrete spaces for expanding China’s multilateral weight. Second, a more general disengagement by the United States from the UN system contributes to what Chinese sources refer to as a broader shift from a “US-centred” to a “UN-centred” world where Western hegemony is replaced by increased weight for the UN’s developing-country majority, with China as the latter’s de facto leader. Third, and despite obvious rivalries, Trump shares Xi Jinping’s disdain for more autonomous multilateral bodies and aligns with China’s more transactional approach to the UN. This does not bode well for those committed to a more substantive idea of UN multilateralism that centres on a stable international bureaucracy with a strong normative compass. For Beijing, Trump 2.0 suggests that the shift from a “US-centred” to a “UN-centred” world – where a more transactional approach to multilateralism and the increased weight of developing countries turn China into the central global player – is well underway.

The European Union (EU) has long prided itself on being a global leader in the provision of official development assistance (ODA) and has sought this status to exert influence on the global development agenda. Based on this position and legacy, as well as given its more recent political ambitions to become a more pronounced and ambitious geopolitical actor, one might expect that the closure of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) would present opportunities for the EU to step up its engagement and expand its influence. Yet the EU’s response has been both hesitant and defensive. This contribution makes two key observations in this respect. First, the EU’s self-assigned status of being a leading global ODA provider was eroding long before Trump re-entered office. Second, due to cuts and incompatible policy preferences, the EU is unwilling and unable to reposition itself in response to the gaps in funding that have resulted from the closure of USAID.

The European Union (EU) has long prided itself on being a global leader in the provision of official development assistance (ODA) and has sought this status to exert influence on the global development agenda. Based on this position and legacy, as well as given its more recent political ambitions to become a more pronounced and ambitious geopolitical actor, one might expect that the closure of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) would present opportunities for the EU to step up its engagement and expand its influence. Yet the EU’s response has been both hesitant and defensive. This contribution makes two key observations in this respect. First, the EU’s self-assigned status of being a leading global ODA provider was eroding long before Trump re-entered office. Second, due to cuts and incompatible policy preferences, the EU is unwilling and unable to reposition itself in response to the gaps in funding that have resulted from the closure of USAID.

The European Union (EU) has long prided itself on being a global leader in the provision of official development assistance (ODA) and has sought this status to exert influence on the global development agenda. Based on this position and legacy, as well as given its more recent political ambitions to become a more pronounced and ambitious geopolitical actor, one might expect that the closure of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) would present opportunities for the EU to step up its engagement and expand its influence. Yet the EU’s response has been both hesitant and defensive. This contribution makes two key observations in this respect. First, the EU’s self-assigned status of being a leading global ODA provider was eroding long before Trump re-entered office. Second, due to cuts and incompatible policy preferences, the EU is unwilling and unable to reposition itself in response to the gaps in funding that have resulted from the closure of USAID.

The second Trump administration has ushered in a radically altered foreign aid environment, with implications that extend far beyond the United States of America. The latter’s retreat from multilateralism and development cooperation – underpinned by hard-power motivations and populist rhetoric – has not only undermined the international standing of the United States but also disrupts the existing global development architecture. In response, other donors, particularly from the OECD Development assistance Committee (DAC), face the dual challenge of maintaining international partnerships while navigating their own domestic pressures. This paper takes stock of recent events and outlines four interconnected suggestions that focus on (1) refining DAC development cooperation approaches, (2) strengthening multilateral development institutions, (3) promoting Southern self-reliance and (4) forging alliances beyond the United States. We argue that although the decline of Western aid hegemony appears inevitable, it also presents an opportunity to reshape development cooperation along more inclusive, strategic and resilient lines.

The second Trump administration has ushered in a radically altered foreign aid environment, with implications that extend far beyond the United States of America. The latter’s retreat from multilateralism and development cooperation – underpinned by hard-power motivations and populist rhetoric – has not only undermined the international standing of the United States but also disrupts the existing global development architecture. In response, other donors, particularly from the OECD Development assistance Committee (DAC), face the dual challenge of maintaining international partnerships while navigating their own domestic pressures. This paper takes stock of recent events and outlines four interconnected suggestions that focus on (1) refining DAC development cooperation approaches, (2) strengthening multilateral development institutions, (3) promoting Southern self-reliance and (4) forging alliances beyond the United States. We argue that although the decline of Western aid hegemony appears inevitable, it also presents an opportunity to reshape development cooperation along more inclusive, strategic and resilient lines.

The second Trump administration has ushered in a radically altered foreign aid environment, with implications that extend far beyond the United States of America. The latter’s retreat from multilateralism and development cooperation – underpinned by hard-power motivations and populist rhetoric – has not only undermined the international standing of the United States but also disrupts the existing global development architecture. In response, other donors, particularly from the OECD Development assistance Committee (DAC), face the dual challenge of maintaining international partnerships while navigating their own domestic pressures. This paper takes stock of recent events and outlines four interconnected suggestions that focus on (1) refining DAC development cooperation approaches, (2) strengthening multilateral development institutions, (3) promoting Southern self-reliance and (4) forging alliances beyond the United States. We argue that although the decline of Western aid hegemony appears inevitable, it also presents an opportunity to reshape development cooperation along more inclusive, strategic and resilient lines.

This paper examines the ideological and policy shifts in US development cooperation under the second Trump administration, and their implications for the international development landscape and global order. It argues that recent US actions – epitomised by a 36-question survey of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the erasure of key development terms from federal documentation – signal a foundational challenge to international development cooperation norms. Five core principles underpinning an emerging “New Washington Dissensus” are identified: (1) dismantling global governance structures, (2) ideological policing through anti-“anti-Americanism”, (3) prioritising border security over traditional development goals, (4) rejecting climate and DEI (diversity, equity and inclusion) agendas and (5) demanding direct economic returns for the United States. These principles are not merely bureaucratic adjustments but represent the construction of a “nationalist conditionality regime” – a strategic reordering of aid to serve domestic political and economic priorities.

This paper examines the ideological and policy shifts in US development cooperation under the second Trump administration, and their implications for the international development landscape and global order. It argues that recent US actions – epitomised by a 36-question survey of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the erasure of key development terms from federal documentation – signal a foundational challenge to international development cooperation norms. Five core principles underpinning an emerging “New Washington Dissensus” are identified: (1) dismantling global governance structures, (2) ideological policing through anti-“anti-Americanism”, (3) prioritising border security over traditional development goals, (4) rejecting climate and DEI (diversity, equity and inclusion) agendas and (5) demanding direct economic returns for the United States. These principles are not merely bureaucratic adjustments but represent the construction of a “nationalist conditionality regime” – a strategic reordering of aid to serve domestic political and economic priorities.

This paper examines the ideological and policy shifts in US development cooperation under the second Trump administration, and their implications for the international development landscape and global order. It argues that recent US actions – epitomised by a 36-question survey of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the erasure of key development terms from federal documentation – signal a foundational challenge to international development cooperation norms. Five core principles underpinning an emerging “New Washington Dissensus” are identified: (1) dismantling global governance structures, (2) ideological policing through anti-“anti-Americanism”, (3) prioritising border security over traditional development goals, (4) rejecting climate and DEI (diversity, equity and inclusion) agendas and (5) demanding direct economic returns for the United States. These principles are not merely bureaucratic adjustments but represent the construction of a “nationalist conditionality regime” – a strategic reordering of aid to serve domestic political and economic priorities.

Since the beginning of US President Donald Trump’s second term in early 2025, not only US development policy but the entire international development cooperation landscape has fundamentally changed. The United States – previously by far the leading actor in global development cooperation – has rapidly withdrawn from key multilateral structures, drastically cut budgets and almost completely shut down the operations of its own development agency, the United States Agency for  International Development (USAID). This move exemplifies a deeper tectonic shift: the end of a phase of Western-dominated global cooperation and broad acceptance of rules-based collaboration, now giving way to a multipolar, power-driven and conflict-laden world order.

Since the beginning of US President Donald Trump’s second term in early 2025, not only US development policy but the entire international development cooperation landscape has fundamentally changed. The United States – previously by far the leading actor in global development cooperation – has rapidly withdrawn from key multilateral structures, drastically cut budgets and almost completely shut down the operations of its own development agency, the United States Agency for  International Development (USAID). This move exemplifies a deeper tectonic shift: the end of a phase of Western-dominated global cooperation and broad acceptance of rules-based collaboration, now giving way to a multipolar, power-driven and conflict-laden world order.