European Parliamentary Research Service Blog

Written by Linda Tothova and Sebastian Clapp.

Joint procurement of defence equipment by the EU has gained renewed strategic importance in response to the recent deteriorating security environment and persistent fragmentation within the European defence market. Although the European Defence Agency set a 35 % collaborative procurement benchmark back in 2007, cooperation among Member States remains limited. The 2022 coordinated annual review on defence reported that only 18 % of defence investment took place collaboratively, far below agreed targets. While total EU defence expenditure reached €381 billion in 2025, increased spending has not translated into commensurate growth in joint acquisition. EU institutions continue to highlight duplication issues, capability gaps and over-reliance on non‑EU suppliers.

To address these shortcomings, the Union has expanded financial and regulatory instruments. EDIRPA, EDIP and SAFE provide grants and loans to incentivise joint procurement, while the defence readiness roadmap 2030 raises the ambition to 40 % joint procurement by 2027. Targeted adjustments to the Defence Procurement Directive aim to reduce administrative barriers and facilitate multinational contracting.

Joint procurement offers potential economies of scale, stronger bargaining leverage, greater industrial predictability and enhanced interoperability. Studies indicate that meeting collaborative benchmarks could generate annual savings of several billion euros. Yet significant constraints persist, including differing threat perceptions by national governments, industrial competition that often runs counter to consolidation, governance complexity and risks of cost overruns in multinational programmes.

The European Parliament has consistently supported deeper pooling and interoperability, urging collaborative acquisition to be prioritised in EU instruments while cautioning against incentives that may reinforce national disparities. Sustained progress therefore depends on credible demand aggregation, coherent defence planning and effective coordination across EU and NATO frameworks.

Read the complete briefing on ‘EU joint defence procurement‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Steven Blaakman

Europe is one of the world’s primary destinations for international migrants. In 2024, the region hosted approximately 94 million migrants, the highest number of any region in the world. The biggest share enter via legal means. The EU is experiencing skills shortages, which is partly because of its ageing population, and migrants could play a role in helping to plug them. The EU shares competence on migration and asylum policies with its Member States; EU legislation plays a significant role in managing legal migration, although its impact varies by type of migration.

Nonetheless, data consistently show that most EU legal migration tools are under-used. Blue Cards, an EU initiative to attract highly skilled workers, account for only a fraction of permits issued for employment reasons and few EU countries make significant use of them, which would suggest more work is needed to make them an attractive option. Similarly, the Single Permit, which is a combined work and residency permit, is mostly used by just a handful of EU countries. In recent years, the EU has also launched new initiatives with non-EU countries such as Talent Partnerships and a Talent Pool, but it is too early to say anything about their impact. There is also a directive for seasonal workers, but again only a few EU countries make much use of it.

The EU plays an important role when it comes to asylum by setting common standards, clarifying which EU country is responsible for processing an application, and encouraging solidarity. The European Commission has proposed a Return Regulation to make it easer and faster to return non-EU citizens who were unsuccessful in their bid to obtain asylum. It includes the possibility to create return hubs in non-EU countries, which many Member States are interested in. Temporary protection was used for the first time to help Ukrainians after the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Legal migration to the EU‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Laurence Amand-Eeckhout.

CONTEXT

On 16 December 2025, the European Commission put forward a proposal for a regulation to simplify the rules governing medical devices in the EU. The proposal forms part of a broader package of measures aimed at improving citizens’ health and strengthening the resilience and competitiveness of the health sector. An evaluation of the current EU regulatory framework for medical devices concluded that it has led to unnecessary costs, administrative bottlenecks, regulatory uncertainty for companies, and delays in patient access to medical devices. The proposed revision seeks to address these challenges while ensuring that patient safety remains the highest priority, with faster access to safe and innovative devices. It also aims to reinforce the EU’s competitiveness in the medical technology sector, by establishing a more coherent framework enabling companies to better respond to evolving market conditions, technological developments and patient needs.

LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL

2025/0404(COD) – Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulations (EU) 2017/745 and (EU) 2017/746 as regards simplifying and reducing the burden of the rules on medical devices and in vitro diagnostic medical devices, and amending Regulation (EU) 2022/123 as regards the support of the European Medicines Agency for the expert panels on medical devices and Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 as regards the list of Union harmonisation legislation referred to in its Annex I – COM(2025) 1023, 16 December 2025.

NEXT STEPS IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

For the latest developments in this legislative procedure, see the Legislative Train Schedule: 2025/0404(COD)

Read the complete briefing on ‘Medical devices: Simplifying the rules‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Sebastian Clapp.

Member States’ defence budgets

The 23 EU Member States that are also NATO members have long been guided by NATO’s 2 % of GDP defence spending commitment formalised at the 2014 Wales Summit. Allies agreed to ‘move towards’ the 2 % ‘guideline within a decade’, but in 2021 only seven of the 21 Member States that were then NATO members spent 2 % of GDP on defence. EU Member States participating in permanent structured cooperation (PESCO – all except Malta) also agreed to ‘regularly increase defence budgets in real terms’ under their PESCO commitments.

While defence budgets have increased in real terms since 2018/2019 (previously they had not even reached pre-2008 financial crisis levels), this follows years of chronic under-investment in defence in most Member States. In 2021, their combined defence budgets stood at €218 billion. Meanwhile, strategic rivals such as Russia and China increased their defence budgets by 300 % and 600 % respectively over the last decade, compared to a collective 20 % increase in EU countries (to 2022). The European Commission notes that, if all Member States had spent 2 % of GDP on defence from 2006 to 2020, this would have amounted to an extra €1.1 trillion for defence spending.

Defence budget definition

The EU uses the Classification of Functions of Government (COFOG) definition of defence spending, which includes ‘Military defence; civil defence; foreign military aid, R&D related to defence; defence not elsewhere classified’. NATO’s definition of defence spending is broader, as it includes military pensions, military healthcare (COFOG includes salaries but not healthcare) and, in some cases, spending on forces such as police or coast guards, but excludes civil defence, which COFOG includes. Moreover, discrepancies may arise from the timing of expenditure recording, particularly for military equipment, since NATO reporting does not adhere to national accounts rules on when such expenditure is recorded. Significant differences exist at national level: e.g. Spain wants to include investment in cyber security, counterterrorism and curbing climate change in its definition.

Russia’s war on Ukraine was a wake-up call for the EU. At the March 2022 Versailles Summit, EU leaders agreed to spend ‘more and better’ on defence. The Strategic Compass, a concrete plan of action for EU security and defence to 2030, reaffirmed this. The second von der Leyen Commission (2024-2029) has made defence a key EU priority. The first-ever Commissioner for Defence and Space was appointed and the European Parliament’s Subcommittee on Security and Defence was elevated to a full standing committee. The Commission also pledged to advance the European Defence Union, launched significant initiatives to boost the European defence industry (such as the first-ever European defence industrial strategy, EDIS), and a European defence industry programme (EDIP). The EU also legislated to boost ammunition production and incentivise joint procurement of urgent defence equipment. On 4 March 2025, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen presented the ReArm Europe plan/ Readiness 2030. This aims to leverage €800 billion in defence spending to 2029, including a €150 billion EU-backed loan through the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) instrument and measures to encourage national defence spending by activating the National Escape Clause of the Stability and Growth Pact for an additional 1.5 % of GDP spending on defence, redeployment of EU cohesion funds, European Investment Bank support and private capital mobilisation. On 19 March 2025, the Commission presented its white paper for European defence, outlining a strategic plan to close critical capability gaps, strengthen the defence industry and readiness, support Ukraine, and boost innovation and partnerships to ensure the continent’s long-term security. On 16 October 2025, the Commission and High Representative put forward the European defence readiness roadmap, which sets out clear objectives and milestones to achieve defence readiness by 2030. At the NATO Summit held in The Hague, NATO Allies endorsed a revised defence spending commitment, setting a target of allocating 5 % of GDP to defence by 2035 (3.5 % for core defence expenditure and 1.5 % for broader defence-related expenditure). All Allies, except Spain, have pledged to meet the 5 % defence spending benchmark by 2035. According to the EDA, meeting the 3.5 % of GDP would oblige many Member States to significantly increase spending, amounting to roughly €254 billion and lifting aggregate defence spending to about €635 billion in 2025 and€807 billion in 2035. This does not take into account that 3.5 % does not apply to non-NATO EU Member States. However, a clear distinction exists between political commitments and concrete budgetary planning (see Annex).

Defence spending increases

In 2022, collective annual EU defence budgets had already increased to €240 billion. In 2023, Member States reached a combined €279 billion (1.6 % of GDP) and €343 billion in 2024 (1.9 % of GDP). In 2025, Member States reached an estimated €381 billion (2.1 % of GDP). All EU NATO Allies now spend more than the 2 % defence expenditure benchmark agreed at the 2014 NATO Summit. The four non-NATO EU Member States (Ireland, Malta, Austria and Cyprus) do not. EU defence investment reached €106 billion in 2024 and was set to approach €130 billion in 2025.

Figure 1 – EU Member State defence expenditure, 2025, in % of GDP

Data Source: NATO and IISS, 2025.

However, there are significant regional differences in the EU. Germany’s defence spending rose by 23 % in real terms in 2024 and 18 % in 2025, bringing the 2025 budget to €95 billion, double its 2021 level. Spending increased from 1.27 % of GDP in 2021 to 2.14 % in 2025. Following reform of the constitutional debt brake, Berlin has committed to further increases, with funding projected to reach €117.2 billion in 2026 and €162 billion by 2029, equivalent to 3.2 % of GDP, or 3.5 % when broader defence-related items are included. Northern Europe has also recorded sustained growth. Sweden has enacted major uplifts under its Total Defence 2025 to 2030 framework, prioritising air defence, long range weapons, naval assets and research. Denmark established a DKK50 billion acceleration fund, raising spending to 2.65 % of GDP. Finland has maintained levels above 2 % of GDP and plans to reach 3 % by 2029. The Netherlands has more than doubled its defence budget since 2021, reaching €25.8 billion in 2025, around 2.2 % of GDP. In fiscally constrained states, growth is more calibrated. France increased its 2026 defence allocation to €68.5 billion, or 2.25 % of GDP, despite wider deficit pressures. Spain and Italy have also raised spending to 2 %, though in part by reclassifying security expenditures. Poland and the Baltic States top the ranking in relative terms: Poland records 4.48 %, Lithuania 4.00 %, Latvia 3.73 % and Estonia 3.38 %. According to NATO projections, all EU NATO members reached at least 2 % of GDP on defence spending in 2025 (see Figure 1). By comparison, US defence expenditure (NATO definition) has consistently stayed over 3 %; it was US$935 billion (3.19 % of GDP) in 2024 (≈€868 billion) and an estimated US$980 billion (≈3.2 % of GDP) in 2025 (≈€910 billion).

In aggregate terms, EU defence expenditure exceeds the declared budgets of Russia and China respectively, although both figures warrant caution given limited transparency. Despite lower headline spending, Moscow and Beijing are likely to generate higher cost effectiveness due to lower domestic price levels, integrated planning structures and reduced organisational overhead. Measured in purchasing power parity, Russia’s defence expenditure in 2024 is estimated at €234 billion, around twice the level indicated by market exchange rates, with a similar distortion likely in China. Over the past two decades, defence spending in Russia and China has more than doubled in real terms; Member States’ expenditure has risen by just over 50 % since 2008.

European Parliament position

Parliament has consistently called for an increase in defence spending. In its annual report on the implementation of the common security and defence policy 2025, MEPs welcome rising national defence spending but urge deeper European cooperation to prevent market fragmentation. They warn of persistent deterrence gaps and call for doctrinal adaptation, expanded industrial output and greater interoperability.

Read the complete At a glace note on ‘EU Member States’ defence budgets‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Ionel Zamfir.

The EU has made closing the gender gap in science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM) a priority in its education, research and employment policies. This answers to legal requirements to pursue gender equality through any EU action, as well as to practical imperatives to address a shortage of specialists that limits the EU’s ability to compete in the global technological race. Moreover, existing data show that many young women today have strong maths and science skills but are still largely absent from careers in engineering and information and communications technology (ICT).

Research shows that the under-representation of women in STEM has many causes, including: unwelcoming work environments in STEM jobs, family caring responsibilities, and social norms that discourage girls from pursuing these fields. Tackling these issues requires a combined approach including: challenging rigid gender stereotypes, using gender-sensitive teaching methods in schools, encouraging girls to choose STEM careers, and removing barriers to employment.

The EU pursues gender equality as a cross-cutting priority in various policies that cover STEM, and has adopted specific initiatives to promote women in STEM. In education, it uses a range of measures to support women at all levels, from schools to universities. In research, EU funding now depends on programmes promoting gender equality. In employment, EU laws help remove obstacles that might put women off STEM careers.

The EU also funds projects that support women’s innovation, entrepreneurship, networking and mentoring. The European Parliament strongly backs these efforts, and has called for wider action by the EU and its Member States.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Women in STEM in the EU: How to close the gender gap‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Sarah Sheil.

More than one year into the second von der Leyen Commission and six months after her first State of the Union address in this mandate, the Members’ Research Service of the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) presents its twice-yearly monitoring of the Commission’s delivery. This paper analyses in which areas the Commission has focused its efforts, how much it has achieved against its commitments – primarily set out in the State of the Union address and the 2026 Commission work programme – and how its priorities are articulated.

In terms of announcements, initiatives tabled, and texts adopted, the Commission’s main focus has been on competitiveness. To meet the objectives of the Letta and Draghi reports – quoted as the foundations of this policy – much effort will still be needed, as was confirmed by Mario Draghi soon after the 2025 State of the Union address. This priority underpinned the European Council’s 12 February 2026 competitiveness retreat.

The ‘new era for European defence and security‘ comes next. The mainly non-legislative nature of the second Commission priority translates differently, with initiatives far fewer in number but of high political prominence. This policy area is at the forefront in the interinstitutional joint declaration on the EU’s legislative priorities for 2026.

Read the complete Study on ‘The policy priorities of the von der Leyen II Commission: State of play in March 2026‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Clare Ferguson

The following debate will see Commission and Council statements on the situation in Iran following the US-Israel military operation, including the need to support the Iranian people. On Tuesday lunchtime, Parliament will celebrate International Women’s Day, with the focus this year on gender stereotypes, disinformation and violence, all of which weaken women’s participation in democracy. Nikol Pashinyan, Prime Minister of Armenia, is expected to address Parliament in a formal sitting on Wednesday.

The 2027 annual EU budget will be the last one under the current multiannual financial framework (MFF), and Parliament’s Committee on Budgets (BUDG) is calling for a strong focus on delivery for people, the economy, the planet and providing investments for competitiveness. On Tuesday, Members are set to debate the committee’s report, which emphasises the EU budget’s role in strengthening the bloc’s cohesion in the face of a difficult geopolitical landscape. BUDG also calls to uphold a strong external policy and underlines the agreement between EU institutions that expenditure covering the financing costs of Next Generation EU must not reduce funding for EU programmes. The vote on the guidelines for the 2027 EU budget will set Parliament’s position for the forthcoming interinstitutional negotiations.

On Tuesday, Members are due to debate a Foreign Affairs (AFET) Committee report on the European Union’s enlargement strategy. To date, merit-based EU enlargement has had a largely positive effect, bringing peace and prosperity to countries joining the bloc. With nine candidate countries and one potential candidate awaiting EU membership, Parliament’s own-initiative report on EU enlargement strategy underlines its support for the process and for reform of the current procedure for admitting new members. The report also emphasises enlargement’s strategic potential to strengthen the wider region in the face of geopolitical uncertainty. Finally, the report underlines the need for a strong merit-based process where alignment with the EU’s core values is an unconditional principle of membership.

Under the Treaties, Parliament’s role is to scrutinise proposed EU legislation – and also international agreements – on behalf of European citizens. The revised framework agreement on relations between Parliament and the European Commission aims at strengthening Parliament’s prerogatives as regards the Commission’s duties to inform Parliament of its plans. On Monday, Members will discuss a report prepared by the Constitutional Affairs (AFCO) Committee. The report emphasises that the new framework agreement retains the institutional balance intended in the Treaties, while also creating a clearer and more accountable relationship between the institutions, working in EU citizens’ interests.

Ahead of the 2026 World Trade Organization (WTO) Ministerial Conference, taking place in Cameroon at the end of the month, Members are due to debate a resolution setting out Parliament’s position on the multilateral negotiations, on Wednesday afternoon. Here again, global instability and the retreat from global trade rules mean the need to reform the WTO is urgent, not least to replace the long-broken dispute settlement system, promote a global level playing field and make the rules more flexible. Parliament’s Committee on International Trade (INTA) has tabled a motion for a resolution underscoring Parliament’s support for the multilateral trading system and emphasising the need for greater flexibility. A delegation from the INTA committee is due to attend the Parliamentary Conference on the WTO ahead of the 14th WTO Ministerial Conference.

Closer to home, many citizens are personally concerned about the EU’s housing crisis. While housing policy remains a national competence, Parliament’s Special Committee on the Housing Crisis in the EU (HOUS) has tabled a report recommending action to improve housing affordability. The committee proposes to help tackle the issue through EU rules on short-term rentals, aiming to strike a balance between promoting urban local communities and tourism income. The HOUS committee also proposes action to improve quality in the construction and energy-efficiency sectors and calls on EU governments to support people trying to get into the housing market through tax breaks. Members are due to debate the recommendations on solutions for affordable housing on Tuesday morning.

A shortage of qualified workers in various sectors continues to be an issue in many EU countries. While the EU has already provided a platform to match EU jobseekers with employers, the European Commission is proposing to introduce legislation to create an EU talent pool which would be open to non-EU citizens. Faced with international competition for talent, the proposal would allow EU countries to attract workers, while guarding against creating an alternative pathway to legal migration. Parliament is keen to ensure that the system is fair, protects against discrimination and is rolled out in all EU countries. On Tuesday, Members are set to vote on a text agreed in interinstitutional negotiations on the proposal to establish an EU talent pool.

When using artificial intelligence (AI) to generate text, images or code, many people are unaware of the legal implications of the AI tool’s use of copyrighted material as training data. This can mean that content creators, artists and other rights-holders are neither acknowledged nor paid for their input. On Tuesday, Members are therefore due to vote on an own-initiative report from the Legal Affairs Committee calling for clarification of the legal situation as regards copyright and generative AI.

The EU rules on package travel date back to 2015 and need to be updated to improve passenger protection. Members are therefore due to consider amendments to the Package Travel Directive, following an agreement reached between the co-legislators in December 2025. Parliament’s negotiators succeeded in improving the complaints procedure and consumer information provided on what is included in the ‘package’ they purchase. Parliament is scheduled to vote to conclude its first reading on the legislation to amend the Package Travel Directive on Wednesday.

Quick links to all our publications for this plenary session:

European Parliament Plenary Session March 2026 – agenda

• Parliament’s guidelines for the 2027 EU budget: Section III – European Commission
• Parliament’s own-initiative report on EU enlargement strategy
• New framework agreement on relations between Parliament and Commission
• Towards the 2026 WTO Ministerial Conference
• Addressing the housing crisis in the EU
• Proposal for a regulation establishing an EU talent pool
• Copyright and generative artificial intelligence – Opportunities and challenges
• Package travel: Improved protection for travellers

Countries wishing to join the European Union (EU) must meet a set of legal, economic and political requirements. The progress that a candidate country makes to implement EU law and fulfil these requirements is monitored during the ‘accession negotiation’ process. The European Parliament’s approval is needed before a country can join the EU.

Application and accession requirements

Any European country can apply for EU membership if it respects and undertakes to promote the values common to all EU countries, as defined in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU).

Candidate countries must meet specific political and economic criteria, known as the Copenhagen criteria. These include:

• stable institutions that guarantee democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and the protection of minorities;
• a functioning market economy and the ability to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the EU;
• the ability to take on the obligations that come with EU membership and a commitment to the aims of the political, economic and monetary union.

Accession process

Application stage: A country that wishes to join the EU sends its application to the Council of the European Union, which asks the European Commission to submit an opinion.

Candidate status: If the Commission’s opinion is favourable, the Council may decide to grant the country candidate status. The Council must agree this unanimously.

Negotiations: The Commission carries out a detailed examination of 35 different policy fields (negotiating chapters), together with the candidate country, and either recommends opening negotiations immediately or asks for certain conditions to be met first. The Council then decides (by unanimity) to open negotiations, which take place between the governments of EU countries and the candidate country. Candidate countries may need to undergo a rigorous reform process, with a focus on the functioning of democratic institutions, judicial independence, media pluralism and the fight against corruption and organised crime.

Accession treaty: Once negotiations have been closed, an accession treaty containing the conditions and deadlines of membership is formally drawn up. The treaty is subsequently submitted to the Commission, the Parliament and the Council for approval. Each EU country and the candidate country must ratify (sign)  the accession treaty according to their own procedures.

European Parliament’s role

Parliament monitors the accession process throughout the negotiations with candidate countries. Specifically, the Committee on Foreign Affairs is responsible for coordinating the work on enlargement. The committee regularly exchanges views with the Commissioner responsible for enlargement negotiations, government representatives, experts and civil society actors.

Parliament gives its opinion on the annual Commission reports on individual candidate countries. It adopts resolutions on the accession process and comments on the progress of countries’ reforms.

Parliament also maintains bilateral relations with the parliaments of candidate and potential candidate countries through joint parliamentary committees and inter‑parliamentary meetings which take place once or twice per year.

Parliament’s budgetary powers give it direct influence over the financial aspects of accession, such as the EU funds allocated to support reforms in candidate countries (Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance).

Finally, Parliament must give its consent, by an absolute majority vote of more than half of all Members, before a country can join the EU (Article 49 TEU).

EU enlargement developments

As of early 2026, there are nine candidate countries: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Moldova, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia, Turkey and Ukraine.

Albania and Montenegro have made significant progress on the EU accession path by closing certain negotiating chapters and promoting an anti‑corruption and reform agenda.

In the case of North Macedonia, the opening of the first negotiating chapter depends on constitutional reform, progress on the anti‑corruption agenda and improved relations with neighbouring Bulgaria and Greece.

Ukraine and Moldova were granted candidate status in the aftermath of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Ukraine and Moldova successfully completed the examination of their alignment with EU law in 2025. Once all EU countries agree, the negotiating chapters can be opened.

As regards Serbia, political turmoil and reform stagnation have slowed down the negotiations on matters that remained unresolved.

Accession negotiations with Turkey have been on hold since 2018, as the Turkish government has failed to address backsliding on democracy and the rule of law. In May 2025, Parliament said that Turkey’s accession process could not be re-started under the current circumstances as the accession process requires the fundamental values of the Union to be fully respected.

Political instability and institutional challenges inBosnia and Herzegovina have halted the opening of formal negotiations.

In 2024, the EU found that Georgia was backsliding on the rule of law and fundamental rights and therefore conditions to open negotiations had not been met.

Kosovo applied to join the EU in December 2022 but has not been granted candidate status. In May 2025, Parliament called on the five EU countries [CJ1] (Greece, Spain, Cyprus, Romania and Slovakia) that have not yet recognised Kosovo to do so, so that Kosovo can progress its accession process.

Keep sending your questions to the Citizens’ Enquiries Unit (Ask EP)! We will reply in the EU language in which you write to us.

Written by Naja Bentzen.

New digital technologies are a mixed blessing for women’s rights and representation in the information sphere in general, and in the democratic debate in particular. Innovative digital tools often promise to make public debates more inclusive, for women too. In practice, recent AI-enabled technology – including deepfake tools – appears to facilitate an increasingly hostile information environment for women, with repercussions for their democratic participation both online and offline. 

At the same time, the ongoing global wave of autocratisation goes hand in hand with a backlash against women’s rights and gender equality. Authoritarian regimes have strategic reasons for suppressing women, and often use gendered disinformation to undermine women opposition leaders, as well as to erode confidence in democratic values and rights.

In the European Union, equality between men and women is a fundamental right and a founding value enshrined in the Treaties. Over the past decades, the EU has worked to increase gender equality at home, and used its global influence to support women’s rights abroad. At the same time, its evolving digital regulatory framework aims to make the digital space safe for all, including by protecting the rights of women online.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Women in the age of AI-enabled disinformation‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Alina Dobreva.

CONTEXT

On 16 July 2025, the European Commission adopted its proposal for the 2028-2034 multiannual financial framework (MFF), which was completed on 3 September with the adoption of a second package. The own resources part of the proposal is intended to equip the EU with a diversified revenue stream and sufficient means for delivering on EU priorities, as well as for the repayment of the debt created by Next Generation EU.

Legislative proposal

2025/0574 (CNS) – Proposal for a Council decision on the system of own resources of the European Union and repealing Decision (EU, Euratom) 2020/2053 – COM(2025) 574, 16.7.2025.

NEXT STEPS IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

For the latest developments in this legislative procedure, see the Legislative Train Schedule: 2025/0574 (CNS)

Read the complete briefing on ‘System of own resources: Multiannual financial framework 2028-2034‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Ionel Zamfir

Despite strong political commitments to gender equality at EU and national level, women still remain politically under-represented at all levels of political power. In the European Parliament, as well as in national parliaments, governments and local assemblies, their share most often is under the symbolic 40 % mark. Moreover, after successive electoral cycles in which women’s share in representative assemblies had increased, this trend has slowed down or come to a halt. Progress has also been uneven among Member States, with women remaining markedly under-represented in some Member States.

Gender-balanced political representation is not only important for women and female politicians but also for political parties themselves and the rest of society. It increases trust in the political system and strengthens economic and political governance.

The EU has committed to achieving gender balance in political representation and participation in the EU; however, except for the European elections, its powers in the area remain limited mainly to soft action. It can support the specific actions to be taken by the EU institutions, national governments, political parties, civil society and the media, by issuing recommendations, facilitating the exchange of good practice or funding projects.

There is substantial evidence of the obstacles to women’s political participation and the means to overcome it. This picture is nevertheless not static, as new challenges emerge, particularly from mounting opposition to gender equality, as well as from digital technologies, most recently artificial intelligence, which can both empower women and discourage them.

This updates a March 2024 briefing by Ionel Zamfir.

Source: European Institute for Gender Equality (2025)

Read the complete briefing on ‘Women in politics in the EU: State of play in 2026‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Ivana Katsarova.

Food contact materials (FCMs) include all materials that come into physical contact with food during its production, processing, packaging and storage. They contain thousands of chemicals, some of which can migrate into food, especially at high temperatures, during long contact times or with certain food types.

Scientific evidence shows that such migration is common and may contribute to human exposure to hazardous substances, including endocrine disruptors, carcinogens and reproductive toxicants. Well-known examples include phthalates, bisphenols and PFAS, which remain authorised in some applications despite links to adverse health effects. Current risk assessments often consider substances individually and may underestimate combined or cumulative exposure.

The EU’s core legislation is Regulation (EC) 1935/2004, which sets out general safety and labelling rules, supported by the Good Manufacturing Practice Regulation (EC) 2023/2006. However, only four material types – plastics, ceramics, regenerated cellulose film and active/intelligent materials – are subject to fully harmonised EU rules. The remaining materials (paper, inks, coatings, rubber, metal, etc.) rely mostly on national rules, leading to regulatory fragmentation, uneven safety standards and unclear requirements for industry. In addition, existing rules focus largely on known intentionally added substances, while non‑intentionally added substances (NIAS), impurities and degradation products remain insufficiently addressed.

A 2022 Commission evaluation found the framework only partially effective, with gaps in enforcement, control of NIAS and harmonisation. The Commission has recently reiterated its commitment to further harmonising EU legislation on FCMs.

The European Parliament has pushed for stronger rules, contributing to recent EU‑wide bans on BPA and PFAS in food packaging.

Citizens and stakeholders broadly support a comprehensive revision establishing clearer standards, harmonised testing and stronger consumer protection.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Food contact materials in the EU: State of play‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Liselotte Jensen.

CONTEXT

The carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM) is being implemented to create a level playing field on carbon pricing of specific goods within the EU single market. For CBAM-covered goods, free allowances under the EU′s emissions trading system (ETS) will be progressively phased out by 2034.

With the phase-out of free allowances in CBAM-covered goods, EU operators producing goods for export will be at a disadvantage in markets without similar carbon pricing.

The European Commission is proposing a temporary decarbonisation fund to support certain goods in the aluminium, fertilisers, iron and steel sectors. Other energy-intensive industries at continued risk of carbon leakage could also benefit. The fund would provide short-term support as a temporary bridge solution, pending a review in the context of the forthcoming revision of the EU ETS due in 2026.

Legislative proposal

2025/0418(COD) – Proposal for a regulation establishing the temporary decarbonisation fund – COM(2025) 990, 17 December 2025.

NEXT STEPS IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

For the latest developments in this legislative procedure, see the Legislative Train Schedule: 2025/0418(COD)

Read the complete briefing on ‘Temporary decarbonisation fund‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Gisela Grieger.

Background

Since his return to the White House in January 2025 until 20 February 2026, President Trump imposed unilateral tariffs on US trading partners after declaring several national emergencies under IEEPA on the grounds of the ‘influx of illegal aliens and illicit drugs‘ into the US and the persistent annual US trade in goods deficit. Trump declared Brazil’s actions against former Brazilian president Bolsonaro a national emergency under IEEPA to impose tariffs on Brazil. He also invoked IEEPA, on the grounds of Russian threats to the US, to impose tariffs against US imports from India because of India’s purchases of Russian oil.

The US Supreme Court tariff ruling

On 20 February 2026, a six to three majority of the nine US Supreme Court judges, including two Republican judges nominated during President Trump’s first term – in Learning Resources, Inc., versus Trump, President of the United States – ruled that, although IEEPA provides the US president with far-reaching powers, these do not include the authority to impose tariffs. They therefore ruled that President Trump’s use of IEEPA as an authority to levy tariffs on US trading partners is inconsistent with the US Constitution. The latter grants the power to impose tariffs solely to the US Congress, which, whenever it decided in the past to delegate tariff authority to the US president, stipulated that expressly in the respective legal act.

The Supreme Court ruling does not order the refunding of import tariffs already paid to the US government and thus does not impose an obligation on the US government to refund automatically the tariff revenue it has already collected. To be refunded, US importers will likely be compelled to take legal action individually against the US government at the US Court of International Trade. Senator Elizabeth Warren (D-Mass.), Ranking Member of the Senate Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Committee, stated that there is ‘no legal mechanism for consumers and many small businesses to recoup the money they have already paid’.

Implications of the US Supreme Court ruling for US tariff policy

As a result of the ruling, President Trump can no longer use IEEPA’s emergency authority to levy tariffs and is thus deprived of using the swiftest and most flexible tool in his tariff policy toolbox. IEEPA tariffs levied in 2025 are estimated at US$142 billion, with most of the tariff cost borne by US businesses and consumers.

However, the US Congress delegated the power to levy tariffs to the US president under alternative US legal bases, some of which President Trump has used during his first and second terms. The country-specific tariffs levied against China under Section 301 of the 1974 Trade Act and the national security-based sector-specific tariffs imposed on imports of aluminium, steel and other items under Section 232 of the 1962 Trade Expansion Act have not been challenged by the Court and will remain in place.

Section 301 of the 1974 Trade Act authorises the US president to take ‘all appropriate action’, including tariffs, against trading partners engaging in unfair trade practices that cause harm to US trade. While the imposition of Section 301 tariffs and new investigations have focused on China, in July 2025 the US initiated investigations against Brazil and the first Trump Administration used Section 301 to investigate the use of digital services taxes by a number of countries, including EU Member States.

Section 232 of the 1962 Trade Expansion Act authorises the President to impose tariffs or other restrictions on imports if they are considered a threat to national security. President Trump imposed steel and aluminium tariffs under Section 232 during his first term. In 2025, this legal basis was used for probes into items including cars, pharmaceuticals, trucks, robotics, drones, aircraft, medical equipment and chips.

The US strategy is to shift to the use of another untested legal basis under Section 122 of the 1974 Trade Act that allows the President to move fast to impose a blanket tariff of 15 % for a maximum of 150 days, unless Congress extends it or President Trump restarts the clock, to tackle a ‘large and serious’ US balance-of-payments deficit, that, experts argue, does not exist, and to a greater use of the tested legal bases above.

The Section 122 tariff of 15 %, effective from 24 February 2026, will allow the US government to bridge the time needed for more tariffs to be activated under legal bases that require several months of investigations. According to a Global Trade Alert estimate, the Section 122 tariff would lower the tariff burden on Brazil, China and India, but would increase it on the EU by 0.8 % to 12.5 % (US trade-weighted average: 13.2 %).

Table 1 – The shift in legal bases for US tariff policy in President Trump’s second term

2025 2026US legal basisIEEPASection 301Section 232Section 122Section 301Section 232Source: EPRS.

Another alternative legal basis, as untested as Section 122, is Section 338 of the 1930 Tariff Act (Smoot-Hawley Act) that allows the President to levy tariffs up to 50 % for discrimination against US commerce.

The change of the US legal basis is unlikely to alleviate the economic impact of the tariffs on businesses and consumers. US tariffs, uncertainty and unpredictability in trade with the US are here to stay.

Early reactions to the Supreme Court ruling

The Court ruling had been expected for a long time and the oral argument of 5 November 2025 already suggested scepticism among both Democratic and Republican Supreme Court judges as to whether President Trump’s use of IEEPA was consistent with the US Constitution. The Court decision was welcomed by Democrats, with California Governor Newsom, Illinois Governor Pritzker and Senator Cantwell calling for refunds, and by several Republicans who praised free trade or the separation of powers and had voted for bills to repeal tariffs. By contrast, it drew criticism from the US government and many other Republicans.

EU leaders have cautiously welcomed the ruling. A Commission spokesperson stated that the US Supreme Court ruling is being carefully analysed and that the EU remains in close contact with the US administration: ‘We therefore continue to advocate for low tariffs and to work towards reducing them.’ A later Commission statement called on the US to provide clarity on the next steps.

European businesses have reacted in a muted way, remaining clear-eyed that the ruling will merely lead to different US tools being applied and that it is unlikely to reduce the level of US import tariffs. It is seen as a new source of unpredictability, after European exporters had started to adjust to the US tariff policy before the judgment.

Several governments have signalled their interest in renegotiating past tariff arrangements with the Trump Administration, while the US has stated that the tariff deals negotiated under IEEPA remain in force.

Impact on the tariff provisions of the 2025 EU-US framework agreement

On 24 February 2026, Parliament’s Committee on International Trade (INTA) was set to adopt two legislative reports, drafted by the standing rapporteur for the US and INTA chair, Bernd Lange (S&D, Germany). These reports would feed into Parliament’s first reading position, which was originally due to be adopted during the March 2026 plenary, on two Commission proposals for implementing the EU’s tariff commitments under the 2025 EU-US framework agreement. Following the Supreme Court ruling, on 23 February 2026 Bernd Lange stated – after a meeting with the INTA shadow rapporteurs – that, given the new circumstances, a majority of political group representatives has agreed that the two legislative files ‘should be put on hold until clarity, stability and legal certainty in EU-US trade relations are re-established.’

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘What to expect after the landmark United States Supreme Court tariff ruling?‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Juan Fernando López Hernández

CONTEXT

The Commission is proposing to revise CO2 emission performance standards for new cars and vans. The amendments aim to introduce flexibilities and enhance technology neutrality to achieve the related targets. The proposal also establishes a new labelling system based on CO2 emission performance classes, with the aim of facilitating the purchase of electric vehicles and harmonising labelling across the EU. The proposal builds on feedback from the 2025 strategic dialogue on the future of the automotive industry, which sought to address challenges in the sector. It forms part of the automotive package for a clean and competitive European automotive sector.

Legislative proposal

2025/0420(COD) – Proposal for a Regulation of the of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 2019/631 as regards CO2 emission performance standards for new light duty vehicles and vehicle labelling and repealing Directive 1999/94/EC – COM(2025)995 final, 16.12.2025.

NEXT STEPS IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

The latest developments in the legislative procedure can be followed via the Legislative Train Schedule: 2025/0420 (COD).

Read the complete briefing on ‘Revision of CO2 emission performance standards for new light-duty vehicles and vehicle labelling‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

We replied to citizens who took the time to write to the President (in French and English):

English EU-Mercosur agreements

In December 2025, the European Union (EU) and the Mercosur countries (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay) finished negotiating a partnership agreement. The agreement covers trade and also political dialogue and cooperation in matters such as the environment and human rights.

On 9 January 2026, the Council of the European Union (the governments of EU countries) authorised the European Commission to sign the agreement. The agreement was signed on 17 January.

For the agreement to enter into force, the European Parliament must vote on it. Parliament must either approve or reject the deal, but it cannot change it. All EU countries will also have to approve it.

The EU and Mercosur also signed an interim agreement. This will allow the trade aspects of the deal to be implemented before the partnership agreement as a whole enters into force, which could take several years. Since trade policy is exclusively an EU competence, the interim agreement does not need approval from individual EU countries. It only needs approval from the European Parliament.

Parliament’s position on the EU-Mercosur agreement

On 21 January 2026, Parliament decided to ask the EU Court of Justice to review the agreements’ compatibility with EU Treaties. Parliament will have to wait for the Court of Justice’s decision before taking a final vote on the agreements. The Court of Justice could take over a year to deliver an opinion.

In an October 2025 resolution, the European Parliament highlighted that the agreement would strengthen EU-Mercosur cooperation on common challenges, while counteracting the growing influence of authoritarian actors in the region. Parliament also considered that the agreement would help the EU diversify its supply of critical raw materials.

In a previous resolution in April 2025, the European Parliament expressed concern over the agreement’s potentially negative impact on EU sustainability and safety standards, as well as on the EU agricultural and food sector’s competitiveness.

Provisional application of the partnership and interim agreements

Under the EU Treaties, the Council can decide on the provisional application of international treaties before Parliament approves them.

Before now, Parliament has regretted the Council’s decision to allow the provisional application of international agreements in areas which are subject to Parliament’s consent, such as trade.

Safeguard clause

The European Parliament and the Council have agreed on rules for applying the safeguard clause included in the partnership agreement. This clause allows the EU to suspend trade preferences on imports of agricultural products from Mercosur countries if such imports harm EU producers.

French Accords UE-Mercosur

En décembre 2025, l’UE et les pays du Mercosur (Argentine, Brésil, Paraguay et Uruguay) ont achevé la négociation d’un accord de partenariat. L’accord couvre non seulement le commerce, mais aussi le dialogue politique et la coopération dans des domaines tels que l’environnement et les droits de l’homme.

Le 9 janvier 2026, le Conseil de l’UE (les gouvernements des pays de l’UE) a autorisé la Commission européenne à signer l’accord. La signature a eu lieu le 17 janvier.

Cependant, pour que l’accord entre en vigueur, le Parlement européen doit se prononcer par un vote. Il doit soit approuver soit rejeter l’accord, mais il ne peut pas le modifier. Tous les pays de l’UE devront également l’approuver.

L’UE et le Mercosur ont signé également un accord intérimaire. Celui-ci permettra de mettre en œuvre les aspects commerciaux de l’accord avant l’entrée en vigueur de l’accord de partenariat dans son ensemble, ce qui pourrait prendre plusieurs années. Étant donné que la politique commerciale relève exclusivement de la compétence de l’UE, l’accord intérimaire n’a pas besoin de l’approbation de chaque pays membre. Il requiert seulement l’approbation du Parlement européen.

Position du Parlement sur les accords UE-Mercosur

Le 21 janvier 2026, le Parlement a décidé de demander à la Cour de justice de l’UE d’examiner la compatibilité des accords UE-Mercosur avec les traités de l’Union. Le Parlement doit maintenant attendre la décision de la Cour de justice avant de procéder au vote final sur les accords. La procédure devant la Cour de Justice pourrait durer plus d’un an.

Dans une résolution d’octobre 2025, le Parlement européen a souligné qu’un accord renforcerait la coopération UE-Mercosur face aux défis communs, tout en contrant l’influence croissante des acteurs autoritaires dans la région. Le Parlement a également estimé qu’un accord aiderait l’Union à diversifier ses sources d’approvisionnement en matières premières critiques.

Dans une résolution précédente d’avril 2025, le Parlement européen s’est dit préoccupé par les conséquences potentiellement négatives de cet accord sur les normes de durabilité et de sécurité de l’UE et sur la compétitivité du secteur agricole et alimentaire de l’UE.

Application provisoire des accords de partenariat et intérimaire

En vertu des traités de l’UE, le Conseil peut décider d’appliquer provisoirement des traités internationaux avant que le Parlement ne les approuve.

Par le passé, le Parlement a regretté la décision du Conseil d’autoriser l’application provisoire d’accords internationaux dans des domaines qui sont soumis à l’approbation du Parlement, tels que le commerce.

Clause de sauvegarde

Le Parlement européen et le Conseil se sont mis d’accord sur les règles d’application de la clause de sauvegarde figurant dans l’accord de partenariat. Cette clause permet à l’UE de suspendre les préférences commerciales sur les importations de produits agricoles en provenance des pays du Mercosur si ces importations nuisent aux producteurs de l’UE.

Background

Citizens often send messages to the President of the European Parliament expressing their views and/or requesting action. The Citizens’ Enquiries Unit (AskEP) within the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) replies to these messages, which may sometimes be identical as part of wider public campaigns.

Written by António Vale with Paul Anton Albrecht.

Lasers have a wide range of current applications, in manufacturing, medicine or communications. Their characteristics vary across different fields and they remain under continuous development, with the academic sector pushing the limits of the technology. One field of interest is laser pulse time acontrol and questions about the shortest processes in nature. These ultrashort processes govern our lives and happen all around us: biological processes are driven by protein folding and enzymatic reactions, the movements of molecules and bond breaking create chemical reactions, and the interaction with light leads to different radiation processes. Most of these can be observed in the ‘femtosecond’ regime. One femtosecond is 10‑15 seconds – if a second was as long as the distance from earth to the sun, we would measure at the scale of a hairs’ width – which would be a single femtosecond.

Huge progress has been made in observing this timescale with ultrashort pulses of light, creating snapshots, or even movies of hitherto unseen processes. The light sources behind such discoveries are often particle accelerators such as synchrotrons or newer XFELs. The latter are very long accelerators that are used to bring free electrons close to the speed of light; these then undulate as they go through an array of magnets, causing them to emit, high-energy light pulses in the form of X-rays. Some of these state-of-the-art facilities are European, such as the European XFEL (EuXFEL, which opened at the Deutsches Elektronen-Synchrotron (DESY) in Hamburg in 2017). XFEL is 3.4 km long and incorporates superconducting accelerator technology. This is a key example of European cooperation hosting a world-leading science centre and connecting scientists across nationalities and disciplines.

Future development could lead to interesting possibilities: chemical reactions and the movement of molecules are still much slower than the electronic processes underlying them – their natural timescale is in the attosecond range (a thousandth of a femtosecond – 10-18s). If we return to our metaphor of a second being equal to the distance of the earth to the sun, we are now considering an entity the size of a microscopic virus. This timescale can be reached with methods such as high-harmonic generation (HHG), which led to Agostini, Krausz and L’Huillier’s award of the 2023 Nobel prize for physics for their work on methods to resolve electron dynamics. However, these are limited to lower intensity pulses, achieving this timescale only at ‘small scale’ (tabletop) and under technical compromises. Theoretical studies on these timescales continue, but experimental limits make a direct comparison quite difficult.

Potential impacts and developments

The idea behind investigating any dynamic is most often to make a video of the action. For extremely fast processes, this becomes very difficult, as it is like repeated stop-motion photography using a long-exposure camera and imperfect timing. An investigation is therefore significantly easier with improved camera timing.

To reach the attosecond scale, with high-intensity, high-quality light pulses, several new technological ideas exist, which promise to improve XFELs. These include wakefield acceleration, which accelerates the electrons initially with an additional laser or plasma, reaching high speeds at short length, and technologies that improve the properties and intensity of the resulting laser, such as self-/laser-seeding or enhanced self-amplified spontaneous emission (ESASE). These are already partially implemented in existing and new facilities, such as the Chinese SHINE facility (expected to open in 2026), or the Compact XFEL being built in the United States. Europe relies on existing facilities and established strengths, with plans to improve and upgrade them including an improved electron beam at DESY.

Combining several of these next-generation technologies may allow science to attain the ambitious goal of achieving a reliable resolution of significantly below 100 attoseconds, which could compete with HHG. This would be enough, for example, to precisely track the steps of an electron within a molecule, giving us insight into electronic movements and transitions. This could allow scientists to observe the key steps in light absorption and conversion, charge migration, or chemical reactions. Better understanding of these processes could unlock a range of scientific applications, such as tracing the light-driven path of electrons in photosynthesis, or establishing a new conceptual basis for chemistry by naturally linking structure and dynamics. It could also help drive innovation by, for example, allowing the development of more powerful and energy efficient optoelectronic components, helping overcome production barriers to unlock the potential of quantum device technologies, or a deeper understanding of the charge transfer mechanisms in batteries.

This positions XFELs as a classic example of a research infrastructure which, even if not geared towards immediate innovation outcomes, can be leveraged to progress a wide range of research, which could have a significant potential economic impact. Furthermore, new developments in compact XFELs, which may ultimately allow them to be shrunk to tabletop size, may open the door to direct commercial application in chip manufacturing. Such development would be particularly relevant for EU competitiveness, given the current European monopoly on high-end chip lithography machines through ASML.

Anticipatory policymaking

X-ray free electron lasers demonstrate the challenges involved in closely tracking the shortest processes in nature: it is difficult, but possible. Better control of the attosecond regime is in reach with existing technology but requires upgrading existing facilities (affecting operation) or creating new ones. The high investment required for such projects makes XFELs a poster case for the need for a European strategy on research and technology infrastructures, as recently launched by the European Commission. Cutting-edge infrastructures like this are attractive sites for research: congregating skills and talent, offering unique opportunities, making such centres the first address for EU scientific cooperation, and not only help promote European researcher mobility, but also attract researchers currently based elsewhere.

Given a renewed European focus on competitiveness, it makes sense to design such projects as cross-cutting initiatives, and to seek opportunities to involve the private sector. An ambitious effort to attain high attosecond precision could develop the EU high-tech supply chain (in fields such as electron sources, superconductor technology, or detectors), helping to secure a leading role for Europe in these sectors, as in the case of projects such as the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER). Combining both attractive centres of excellence and scientific fields and more investment in high-tech industry could also be a potential idea for a moonshot project under the next Horizon Europe programme. This could advance research in a plethora of scientific fields, from quantum science over chemistry to biology. In addition, the potential direct commercial viability of this technology, such as in semiconductor manufacturing, could attract innovative funding. This would perpetuate the tradition of European excellence in this field and enable development of a next-generation technology industry in Europe.

Read this ‘At a glance’ note on ‘What if we could track an electron’s every step?‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Vasco Guedes Ferreira with Oona Lagercrantz.

Quantum technologies have transformative potential and are already exerting a significant impact on global economies and society. The European Union (EU) supports the development of these technologies through initiatives such as the Quantum Flagship and Horizon Europe, as well as through national initiatives and programmes. However, the specific role of quantum technologies in supporting the EU’s energy and climate goals has so far received limited and fragmented policy attention. This briefing explores how the emerging quantum ecosystem could help accelerate decarbonisation and address the existing innovation gap that must be bridged to achieve climate neutrality (i.e. net-zero emissions) by 2050. Achieving this goal requires technological breakthroughs in sectors that are currently difficult to decarbonise.

Quantum computing has the potential to transform these areas by, for example, simulating complex molecular interactions that classical computers cannot handle efficiently. Such capabilities could fast-track the development of more efficient batteries, green hydrogen catalysts and carbon capture materials. Quantum sensing is already providing precise tools for monitoring greenhouse gas emissions, and quantum communication has the potential to secure the critical digital infrastructure of future electricity grids. Available evidence indicates that, while the EU is investing seriously in quantum research, it currently lacks a coordinated strategy linking these technologies explicitly to decarbonisation. With the European Commission expected to adopt a quantum act in 2026, policymakers have a unique window of opportunity to address this gap. By integrating long-term decarbonisation objectives into the research and innovation framework, the EU can leverage its scientific leadership to drive the next generation of clean technologies.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Quantum technologies: Can they boost Europe’s decarbonisation?‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

We replied to those who took the time to write to the President.

Main elements of our reply Violence in north‑east Syria may amount to war crimes

In its resolution of 12 February 2026 on the situation in north‑east Syria, the European Parliament expresses concern over credible reports of human rights violations, particularly against the Kurdish population – which may constitute war crimes.

Parliament calls for swift investigations into crimes against civilians by government forces and militias, and urges the Syrian authorities to grant full access to UN bodies.

The European Parliament welcomes the agreement between the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Syrian transitional government, calling on all parties to respect the ceasefire. It denounces Turkey’s continued military intervention in north‑east Syria.

Parliament recalls the decisive contribution of Kurdish forces against Daesh and expresses grave concern over Daesh fighters who have escaped from detention.

It calls on Syrian authorities to protect all ethnic and religious communities, ensuring full recognition, participation and rights for Kurds.

A press release about this resolution is available on the European Parliament’s website. Parliament also adopted resolutions on Syria and the Kurdish community in May 2025, July 2025 and January 2026, during its current mandate.

European Union foreign policy

Although the European Parliament takes political positions on world developments, it is the governments of EU countries that decide the EU’s common foreign and security policy in both the European Council (heads of government) and the Council of the EU (government ministers). The European External Action Service, led by High Representative Kaja Kallas, implements the EU’s foreign and security policy.

Background

Citizens often send messages to the President of the European Parliament expressing their views and/or requesting action. The Citizens’ Enquiries Unit (Ask EP) within the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) replies to these messages, which may sometimes be identical as part of wider public campaigns.

Written by Anna Caprile, Eric Pichon.

Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin has been President of the Russian Federation since 31 December 1999, except for a brief four-year interlude from 2008 to 2012 during which he held the office of prime minister but effectively maintained his political authority.

During Putin’s 26-year rule, Russia has been at war, overtly or covertly, for 21 years. Putin’s first term coincided with the launching of the Second Chechen War, intended to be brief but which lasted for 10 violent years. In 2014, during Putin’s third term, Russia invaded and annexed Crimea, and the initially covert support to the separatist forces in eastern Ukraine gradually became overt, leading up to the full-scale invasion of February 2022. Overlapping with these two armed conflicts, the Russo-Georgian War took place in 2008, and since 2015 Russia has deployed military forces in Syria. Russian paramilitary groups have also expanded operations in Africa.

The transformation of Russia over these 26 years has been fundamental. A series of indicators can help measure its economic evolution, the surge in military expenditure, its demographic decline, the worsening of various freedom and governance rankings, and growing inequality. In a shift towards the east, China has become, by far, Russia’s main trading partner, providing it with a crucial economic and diplomatic lifeline since 2022.

Putin, now 73 years old, was proclaimed President of the Russian Federation for his fifth term in 2024, after obtaining over 88 % of the votes in what was broadly seen as yet another ritual electoral performance. In line with the constitutional reforms introduced in 2020, he can remain in power until 2036.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Russia under Vladimir Putin: His 26-year rule in facts and figures‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.