Credit: Kim Hong-Ji/Reuters via Gallo Images
By Andrew Firmin
LONDON, Jun 20 2025 (IPS)
On a resounding 79.4 per cent turnout, South Korean voters have delivered a clear mandate for change. Lee Jae-myung of the centrist Democratic Party of Korea (DPK) decisively won the 3 June election, becoming the country’s new president after a turbulent time for South Korean democracy.
Just six months before, South Koreans took to the streets to defend their democracy when President Yoon Suk Yeol tried to impose martial law. Their determination to protect democratic institutions paved the way for electoral change, proving once again that South Koreans deeply value hard-won freedoms.
Failed coup
The road to democratic renewal began with an unprecedented constitutional crisis. Yoon, of the centre-right People Power Party (PPP), had won the presidency in 2022 by the narrowest of margins, benefiting from a backlash against the country’s emerging feminist movement. But his success wasn’t long lived: the PPP suffered a heavy defeat in the 2024 parliamentary election. Hamstrung by a DPK-controlled National Assembly, the besieged Yoon took an unprecedented gamble. On 3 December, he declared martial law.
Yoon claimed his decision was motivated by the need to combat ‘pro-North Korean anti-state forces’, attempting to conflate political opposition with support for the totalitarian menace across the border. Yoon allegedly instructed the military to launch drones into North Korea. He also ordered the army to arrest several political leaders, including Lee and the head of his own party, Han Dong Hoon, and sent troops to try to stop the National Assembly meeting.
Most South Koreans saw this for what it was: an attempt by a failing president to hang onto power through undemocratic means. Their response was immediate and overwhelming. People flooded the streets, massing outside the National Assembly. As the army blocked the gates, politicians climbed fences. Some 190 lawmakers managed to get in, unanimously voting to repeal the martial law declaration.
Yoon made a televised apology but a few days later issued a statement of defiance, insisting his decision had been legitimate and pledging to ‘fight to the end’. The end came quickly. An impeachment vote suspended his presidency. His impeachment trial concluded on 4 April, with the court ordering the end of his presidency and a fresh election. Yoon is now on trial on insurrection charges. His arrest on 15 January followed a dramatic failed attempt on 3 January, when Yoon supporters and his security blocked access to the presidential palace, leading to violent clashes. Protests have continued both for and against Yoon.
Campaign issues
Lee has benefited from the public appetite for change. His campaign tacked rightwards, deemphasising some of the more progressive policies he’d previously championed, such as basic income for young people. This positioning helped win over former PPP supporters appalled by Yoon’s actions and the party’s continuing failure to condemn them.
Lee comfortably beat PPP candidate Kim Moon-soo. But another important factor was a split in the vote on the right: a more conservative party, the Reform Party, had broken off from the PPP and captured 8.3 per cent of the vote. Had these two reunited, they could have prevailed despite Yoon’s dismal record in office.
The martial law crisis dominated the campaign, but it wasn’t the only issue. Economic matters were important for many voters, with South Korea’s once-mighty economy faltering and high living costs and inequality becoming pressing concerns. These worries were exacerbated by the threat of US tariffs: South Korea, the fourth-biggest steel exporter to the USA, faces 50 per cent tariffs.
Political polarisation seems sure to continue following a bruising election campaign that saw the two main candidates accuse each other of planning to destroy democracy. Lee, who survived an assassination attempt in 2024 and faces death threats, campaigned under heavy security. One crucial test of his presidency will be whether he can heal these divides.
Challenges ahead
Lee however enters office carrying his own baggage, in the form of corruption allegations. In 2023, he was indicted on multiple charges over alleged collusion with property developers when he was mayor of Seongnam city. In November 2024, he received a one-year suspended sentence for making false statements about his relationship with the former head of the Seongnam Development Corporation.
A retrial is pending following an appeal, postponed until 18 June to take place after the election; a guilty verdict could have prevented Lee standing. Lee insists the charges against him are politically motivated, but the trial could bring further uncertainty and a potential constitutional crisis.
On the international front, Lee faces the challenge of repairing relations with the USA. The White House made a bizarre comment hinting at Chinese election interference, apparently picking up on far-right disinformation and attempts by the defeated candidates to paint Lee as a China sympathiser.
Relations with North Korea will present perhaps the biggest foreign policy challenge. DPK politicians typically focus on dialogue and bridge-building, and Lee promises to resume the cross-border dialogue that halted under Yoon.
While anything that promotes peace is welcome, civil society that campaigns on North Korea’s dire human rights situation and works with defectors will be on the lookout for potential restrictions. Under the last DPK government from 2017 to 2022, relations with North Korea thawed but civil society groups working on North Korean issues experienced heightened pressure. The government tried to ban the practice of activists using balloons to send humanitarian supplies and propaganda across the border. Civil society will be hoping the new administration doesn’t follow suit.
Time to build bridges
Lee can expect to face little short-term political opposition. Yoon’s actions have left the PPP in disarray and the next parliamentary election isn’t due until 2028. But Lee’s honeymoon isn’t likely to last long. Economic anger could drive more people to embrace regressive politics. In globally tough times, Lee will need to both offer political stability and deliver meaningful economic success.
That’s a difficult task, but there’s a key asset that can help. South Koreans have demonstrated they value democracy. South Korea’s civil society is active and strong. The new administration should commit to working with and nurturing this civic energy.
South Korea’s December resistance proved what people won’t tolerate. Now comes the harder task of building what many will embrace: a more stable, equitable democracy.
Andrew Firmin is CIVICUS Editor-in-Chief, co-director and writer for CIVICUS Lens and co-author of the State of Civil Society Report.
For interviews or more information, please contact research@civicus.org
Picture alliance | Eibner-Pressefoto/Florian Wiegand
European Central Bank President Christine Lagarde wants a larger global role for the euro, but Europe’s economic realities may turn privilege into pressure.
By Peter Bofinger
WURZBURG, Germany, Jun 20 2025 (IPS)
In a recent speech, Christine Lagarde, president of the European Central Bank (ECB), articulated a clear desire for the euro to play a more significant role as an international currency.
This, she argued, could bring substantial benefits to the euro area: ‘It would allow EU governments and businesses to borrow at a lower cost, helping boost our internal demand at a time when external demand is becoming less certain.
It would insulate us from exchange rate fluctuations, as more trade would be denominated in euro, protecting Europe from more volatile capital flows. It would protect Europe from sanctions or other coercive measures.’
Lagarde’s aspiration is that a greater reserve role for the euro would bestow upon Europe some of the so-called ‘exorbitant privilege’ that has, until now, been exclusively enjoyed by the United States.
This ambition stands in stark contrast to the views expressed by the Deutsche Bundesbank (the German Federal Bank) several decades ago, which in 1972, explicitly referred to ‘the Deutsche Mark as a reluctant reserve currency.’
A double-edged sword
The term ‘exorbitant privilege’ was coined in the 1960s by Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, then the French minister of finance. It describes the unique position of the United States, which allows it to sustain a permanent current account deficit without triggering an exchange rate crisis.
The underlying mechanics are straightforward: when a country imports more than it exports, its liabilities to the rest of the world increase. Exporters abroad accumulate higher deposits denominated in the importing country’s currency.
If these exporters are unwilling to increase their exposure to a deficit country, they typically sell their export receipts on the foreign exchange market, exchanging them for deposits in their own currency.
Consequently, the currency of the deficit country depreciates. If the country fails to address its deficit, the exchange rate will continue to depreciate, risking a currency crisis.
This dynamic changes significantly with the ‘exorbitant privilege’. Foreign investors are willing to increase their holdings of US Treasuries by exchanging US dollar deposits, thereby financing the current account deficit without the dollar depreciating.
Therefore, it is a complete misconception for President Donald Trump to interpret the US current account deficit as exploitation of the United States by the rest of the world. As he once stated, ‘The United States of America is going to take back a lot of what was stolen from it by other countries.’
The opposite is true: The current account deficit has enabled US citizens to enjoy a higher standard of living, financed by the rest of the world through the purchase of US government IOUs. Over the past two decades, the current account deficit and the amount of Treasuries purchased by foreigners have moved in roughly tandem.
If Lagarde is now arguing that Europe could benefit from such a privilege by increasing the reserve role of the euro, one must recognise that Europe and the euro area have, until now, typically been current account surplus countries.
As long as this fundamental situation remains unchanged, Europe does not require the ‘privilege’ of foreigners purchasing euro-denominated government securities.
Given this entirely different current account position, it is unclear whether Europe would genuinely benefit from making euro government bonds more attractive as foreign exchange reserves.
If foreigners were to increase their holdings of euro-area government bonds, they would need to purchase euro deposits on the foreign exchange market against other currencies. This would lead to an increase in the effective exchange rate of the euro, resulting in a deterioration in the price competitiveness of euro-area producers.
It was precisely this fear that prompted the Bundesbank to adopt a cautious approach to an increased reserve currency role for the D-Mark in the 1970s.
Therefore, when discussing the ‘exorbitant privilege’, it is crucial to recognise its dual nature. For a currency area with a structural deficit, it prevents the currency from depreciating. For a currency area with a structural surplus, however, it causes an appreciation of the currency, which can have negative effects on its price competitiveness.
Switzerland provides a compelling example. Traditionally, it has maintained a structural current account surplus. The Swiss franc enjoys a strong reputation as a global reserve currency, leading to permanent capital inflows. To prevent the destabilising appreciation of its currency, the Swiss National Bank has had to purchase massive amounts of foreign currencies.
With reserves exceeding $900 billion, it is now the third-largest holder of foreign exchange reserves in the world, surpassed only by China and Japan. A significant portion of these reserves is invested in government bonds.
It would be ironic if the ECB, by increasing the reserve role of the euro, had to intervene to prevent a depreciation of the dollar and invest these funds in Treasuries.
A fundamental deficiency
However, if the aim is to increase the international role of the euro, it is necessary to determine how to boost this process. Since its introduction in 1999, the euro’s share of global exchange reserves has stabilised at approximately 20 per cent after some fluctuations. The euro has not, however, benefited from the decline in the US dollar’s share, which has fallen from over 70 per cent to under 60 per cent.
Instead, other currencies such as the Swiss franc, the pound sterling and the Japanese yen have been able to increase their position as reserve currencies. Therefore, it is unclear whether the euro would benefit from future shifts in international investors’ portfolios away from the US dollar due to ‘Trumpian policies’.
In her speech, Lagarde described the ‘economic foundation’ of a reserve currency role as a virtuous circle between ‘growth, capital markets and international currency usage’. She explained, ‘The development of US capital markets boosted growth… while simultaneously establishing dollar dominance. The depth and liquidity of the US Treasury market in turn provided an efficient hedge for investors.’
Lagarde believes that ‘Europe has all elements it needs to produce a similar cycle’ and concluded: ‘If we truly want to see the global status of the euro grow, we must first reform our domestic economy.’ The ‘reforms’ she outlined included the usual suspects: completing the Single Market, enabling start-ups, reducing regulation, and building the savings and investment union.
Surprisingly, she did not mention the most obvious obstacle to the euro playing a more prominent international role. While US capital markets offer a total treasury supply of $28.3 billion, the euro area’s government bond market remains a patchwork of larger and smaller national issuers. The largest volume is provided by the French market, totalling €3.3 billion.
It would be naïve to believe that this fundamental deficiency of European capital markets could be overcome by ‘structural reforms’ or by the more homeopathic measures for completing the capital market union.
However, Lagarde also offered a promising step forward: joint financing of European public goods, particularly defence. This would help to increase the supply of truly European safe assets.
In sum, there is no obvious case for increasing the role of the euro as a global reserve currency. If the ECB wants to allow ‘businesses to borrow at a lower cost, helping boost our internal demand’, it must simply reduce its policy rate further.
In addition, the fundamental flaw of a segregated market for European government bonds is very difficult to overcome. Nevertheless, attempts to finance European public goods with jointly issued bonds will undoubtedly lead in the right direction.
This is a joint publication by Social Europe and IPS Journal.
IPS UN Bureau
Excerpt:
Peter Bofinger is professor of economics at Würzburg University and a former member of the German Council of Economic ExpertsQuelles sont les entreprises privées qui bénéficient des 250 millions d'euros prêtés par la Hongrie à la Macédoine du Nord ? Le gouvernement s'abrite derrière le secret bancaire pour maintenir l'opacité.
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