Európai Unió : hírek magyarul

Russia considers multilateralism to be an instrument for promoting and managing multipolarity. It regards the UN as an important component of the international system and would like to see it reflect a multipolar world order, which in Russia’s rhetoric is marked by the dominance of principles of sovereignty and non-interference. This shapes Russia’s approach to the UN development pillar, where it seeks to advance its geopolitical interests, including countering Western influence.
Financially, Russia remains a marginal player in the UN development pillar. Between 2018 and 2022, it was the smallest contributor to UN development activities among the five permanent members of the UN Security Council (P5) and ranked 23rd among all UN member states. In terms of international professional staff, the share of Russian nationals in the UN system has remained below 1 per cent over the past five years, with the majority concentrated in the UN Secretariat. However, its diplomatic missions – particularly in New York and Geneva – are relatively well-staffed and are recognised for their diplomatic skills and expertise.
Lacking prominent material weight, Russia leverages diplomatic and rhetorical tools to project its power. It portrays itself as an “anti-colonial leader” and champion of the Global South. Russia positions itself as an advocate of an alternative approach to development cooperation, affirming in its rhetoric that developing countries have the right to independently choose their model of socio-economic development without external influence or pressure. In line with this, it rejects the imposition of what it argues are Western liberal values on developing states – which it equates with conditionality in development assistance and infringement on sovereignty – and presents itself as a defender of what in Russian discourse are referred to as “traditional values”, which are usually in opposition to individualism and progressivism.
Although Russia’s arguments resonate among Global South states – because they tap into legitimate grievances – there are cases in which its rhetoric appears instrumental and does not match its practices.
While Russia’s material capacity to project its power and position itself as an alternative development partner is limited, its diplomatic efforts, rhetoric and ability to capitalise on the grievances of the Global South as well as Western double standards amid global power shifts position it as a noticeable actor in UN development work, suggesting it should not be prematurely disregarded based on its modest role as a donor.
Main takeaways:
• Strategic use of UN development pillar: Russia engages in UN development work as a platform to advance its broader geopolitical objectives and its view of the international system, including positioning itself rhetorically as a counterweight to Western influence. While already politicised to some extent, this further reinforces the role of UN development work as a stage for power politics.
• Diplomatic leverage: Although Russia’s material weight in UN development pillar is modest, it uses diplomatic channels and discursive engagement in decision-making processes across UN entities and fora to pursue its interests.
• Anti-colonial narratives and normative contestation: Russia rhetorically appeals to the grievances of the Global South and challenges Western-driven norms and approaches to development. It promotes the vision of a multipolar world order with Moscow as one of the poles of power.

1. Nature-based Solutions (NbS) have been gaining prominence across the Rio Conventions primarily as a means of addressing climate change with co-benefits for nature and humans. However, they have also faced significant criticism for enabling greenwashing, encouraging market-driven approaches and not addressing the root causes of environmental degradation. Some critics argue that NbS divert attention from urgent transformative actions such as decarbonisation and systemic economic reforms.

2. We present the case for a broader framework, centred around the concept of Integrated Nature-Climate Action (INCA), which extends beyond NbS to drive the structural changes essential for tackling climate change, biodiversity loss and desertification, while delivering positive outcomes such as supporting livelihoods, addressing inequities and upholding the rights of Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities. We provide examples of INCAs with significant, tractable benefits for people and nature, including the removal of environmentally harmful subsidies, land rights recognition and circular economic transitions.

3. We argue that the wide range of actors mobilised by INCAs would increase the finance available to fill the deficit for climate and biodiversity action. While tracking the impact of these actions could be challenging, existing United Nations (UN) initiatives could provide models for ensuring the integrity of INCA. A clear definition and set of standards must also be agreed upon to avoid the pitfalls that plague NbS. Careful oversight from stakeholders and rightsholders is vital to ensure legitimacy and that the uptake of INCA does not favour one outcome over others.

4. Policy implications: Moving beyond NbS to pursue an inclusive INCA concept can help address the systemic drivers of the global polycrisis. With synergies between the Rio Conventions expected to be a key focus of the upcoming Conference of the Parties for the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP30), there is a clear policy window to broaden the scope of interventions relevant to all three conventions and engage a more diverse array of actors to support enhanced coordination. This is essential for transitioning towards a regenerative economic system that works for people and the planet.

The deadly fire was called a "wake-up call" but ex-residents now live in dangerous temporary shelters.

Accredited journalists are invited to an under-embargo briefing on a new survey on what the public think about the EU and its priorities.

Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

Gun-wielding drivers, extortion and breakdowns, as couple flee new front line in Sudan's conflict.

Population growth due to immigration is often portrayed as a problem rather than a success. This is deeply problematic, not least because Sweden – like Germany – depends on immigration to meet its growing labour market needs

Migration wird in Deutschland oft verzerrt und polarisiert diskutiert – dabei ist sie dringend notwendig. Und das Leugnen dieser Realität behindert weiterhin die Entwicklung einer kohärenten nationalen Strategie.

Calls for development policy to place greater emphasis on national self-interest are growing louder in many donor countries, including Germany. There are indeed good reasons to dovetail Germany’s international policies more effectively. Synergies between develop-ment cooperation (DC), foreign trade promotion and research partnerships have not been harnessed systematically to date, yet they could serve the interests of both Germany and its partner countries alike. Moreover, Germany is facing geopolitical competition from actors who have long been using their DC proactively to pursue strategic interests.
We advocate adopting a development policy that pursues German and European interests in those areas in which they are compatible with development policy objectives. Instead of focusing on the interests of individual companies, it is important to identify long-term ‘win-win’ potential, for example through a more strategic approach to planning DC offers that involves the private sector and ministries more actively prior to intergovernmental negotiations with the partner countries.
At the same time, we warn against subordinating DC to foreign economic policy objectives. Conditions such as tied aid provisions that link financial cooperation to business contracts for German/EU companies are expensive, inefficient and counterproductive in development terms. In addition, this approach would risk losing sight of Germany’s overarching interest in solutions to global problems, such as peacebuilding and climate and biodiversity protection.
We set out five guidelines for a development policy strategy that takes due consideration of Germany’s own interests without harming the partner countries:
1. Avoid strict tied aid provisions. These would be inefficient in development terms and would be of little benefit to German companies. As an export nation, Germany should comply with freedom of contract rules.
2. Pursue the interests of German society as a whole where they align with DC objectives. We distinguish between Germany’s global interests and those of individual companies. DC projects should align economic interests with the common good in the partner country.
3. Develop offers strategically prior to intergovernmental negotiations. The most effective synergies are generated if the private sector and other ministries are involved in preparing DC initiatives at an early stage. To do so, Germany needs to define joint national goals, coordinate ministerial instruments to achieve these goals and evaluate contributions by the private sector in advance.
4. Create strategic partnerships that serve as models. Germany has established a number of bilateral partnerships, especially on energy, raw material security and migration. None of these is exemplary in terms of effective interministerial coordination, private sector involvement or demons-trable benefits for both of the countries involved. At least one flagship project in each of the areas mentioned would make Germany attractive as a credible partner.
5. Expand minilateral formats with European states and influential third countries. Triangular and quadrilateral cooperation with ‘global partners’ and donor countries that share the same or similar interests can help advance Germany’s interests in international development for the common good.

Weekly schedule of President António Costa, 11 August - 31 August 2025.

Az EU nyilatkozattal tiszteleg a vallási intolerancia és erőszak áldozatai előtt, és újólag megerősíti elkötelezettségét a vallás vagy meggyőződés szabadságának védelme, a vallásközi párbeszéd előmozdítása, valamint azon globális projektek támogatása iránt, amelyek fellépnek a megkülönböztetéssel és a gyűlölettel szemben.

Press remarks by President António Costa following the video conference of the members of the European Council.

Statement by President Macron, Prime Minister Meloni, Chancellor Merz, Prime Minister Starmer, President Stubb, Prime Minister Tusk, President Costa, President von der Leyen, following President Trump’s debrief on his meeting with the Russian President in Alaska on 15 August 2025.

Donald Trump elnök és Vlagyimir Putyin elnök alaszkai találkozóját megelőzően Emmanuel Macron elnök, Keir Starmer miniszterelnök és Friedrich Merz kancellár társelnökök vezetésével, valamint Volodimir Zelenszkij elnök és J.D. Vance alelnök részvételével virtuális találkozót tartottak a „tettre készek koalíciója” csoportba tartozó vezetők.

Press statement by President António Costa following the coordination meetings on Ukraine between European Union leaders, President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy and US President Donald Trump, underlining the shared commitment to a ceasefire in Ukraine, respect for Ukraine’s sovereignty, and transatlantic cooperation in pursuit of a just and lasting peace.

A főképviselőnek az Európai Unió nevében tett nyilatkozata egyes harmadik országoknak a libanoni helyzetre tekintettel hozott korlátozó intézkedésekről szóló (KKBP) 2021/1277 határozat módosításáról szóló, 2025. július 25-i (KKBP) 2025/1555 tanácsi határozathoz történő csatlakozásáról.

Az Európai Unió vezetői üdvözlik Donald Trump elnök azon erőfeszítéseit, amelyek célja egyrészt véget vetni Oroszország agressziós háborújának, másrészt igazságos és tartós békét és biztonságot elérni Ukrajna számára. Az Európai Unió kiáll az ukrán nép mellett, egységesen támogatva egy olyan diplomáciai megoldást, amely védi Ukrajna és Európa alapvető biztonsági érdekeit.

A főképviselőnek az Európai Unió nevében tett nyilatkozata egyes harmadik országoknak az ukrajnai helyzetet destabilizáló orosz intézkedések miatt hozott korlátozó intézkedésekről szóló 2014/512/KKBP határozat módosításáról szóló, 2025. július 18-i (KKBP) 2025/1495 tanácsi határozathoz történő csatlakozásáról.

A főképviselőnek az Európai Unió nevében tett nyilatkozata egyes harmadik országoknak az Ukrajna területi integritását, szuverenitását és függetlenségét aláásó vagy fenyegető intézkedések miatti korlátozó intézkedésekről szóló 2014/145/KKBP határozat módosításáról szóló, 2025. július 18-i (KKBP) 2025/1478 tanácsi határozathoz történő csatlakozásáról.

A főképviselőnek az Európai Unió nevében tett nyilatkozata egyes harmadik országoknak a belarusz helyzetre és Belarusznak az Ukrajna elleni orosz agresszióban való részvételére tekintettel hozott korlátozó intézkedésekről szóló 2012/642/KKBP határozat módosításáról szóló, 2025. július 18-i (KKBP) 2025/1471 tanácsi határozathoz történő csatlakozásáról.