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Not long ago, the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) was seen as one of the major sources of tension between London and its partners. Since Brexit was decided however, the UK has hinted that it wishes to maintain a role within CSDP. Brexit does look easier to manage on defence - intergovernmental by nature - than on other issues. But with recent developments (EDF, PESCO), this may no longer be true. Could Brexit end up improving Euro-British cooperation in defence, or increase the divide?
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Source : © European Union, 2018 - EP

On 19th of April, 21 students from 8 Member States graduated from the first EDA Defence Energy Managers Course (DEMC). The DEMC aims at increasing energy efficiency and reducing energy consumption in the military domain through the application of defence-specific Energy Management Systems (EnMSs) based on the ISO 50001 standard.  The DEMC is the first of its kind to be run at multi-national level and to deliver both theoretical and practical EnMS training to energy managers from European navies, armies and air forces.  

The implementation of EnMSs under DEMC resulted in saving around 2,5 GWh of energy consumed, reaching normalised reductions in energy consumptions of up to 25.2%.

The course was split into 5 distinct modules (3 classroom-type and two practical of total duration of 12 months) with this first pilot run launched in April 2017. Participants improved their know-how on the complexities of managing energy within a defence organisation. They were also able to acquire the capacity to structure, implement and improve effective EnMSs and to enhance their skills thanks to on-going mentoring, alumni relations and membership in the European Defence Energy Network (EDEN) with permanent access to its established on-line resources.

The DEMC marks another important milestone in EDA’s approach to sustainability in defence and fulfils the level of ambition of the EDA Member States for capacity building in energy management, already identified through the first round of the Consultation Forum for Sustainable Energy in the Defence and Security Sector (sponsored by the European Commission) and the EDA’s own Energy and Environmental Working Group, developing  mainstream sustainability concepts within the defence sector as enablers for improved military capability and reduced environmental footprint of military activities.
 

Background

The course began with a 5-day classroom-type session (module 1) to guide the participants with the framework and requirements of ISO 50001 EnMS standard and to familiarise them with energy data analysis techniques. Then followed a 6-month mentoring session (module 2) on the development of the core structure of the EnMSs to be applied, including visits at participating Member States’ sites, webinars and extensive one-on-one mentoring. It was followed by module 3 (3-day classroom type session) which, besides reviewing the progress made so far, further elaborated on the EnMS requirements especially related to training, design, procurement, operations (including deployments). The subsequent 5-month mentoring session (module 4), included site visits, during which energy internal audits were  conducted, coupled with further support though webinars and tailored guidance. The concluding 3-day classroom type module (module 5) focused on reviewing the developed EnMSs and providing further guidance on operational control issues related to energy.

The pilot run of the Defence Energy Managers’ Course (DEMC – Pilot) was attended by MoD / Armed Forces’ personnel from Belgium, Germany, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Romania, Sweden and The  Netherlands. During this pilot course, the EnMS concept was developed and is currently applied at 10 military installations of diverse uses (from military academies to armoured vehicles’ camps and naval depos).

With such a successful outcome of the DEMC - Pilot, up to 6 steady state DEMC could be envisaged over the next 3 years. The steady state courses will build upon the pilot course taking into account gained experience, recommendations and feedback from participating Member States. 

The project is delivered by GEN Europe and the Centre for Renewable Energy Sources & Savings (CRES). It is run by the European Defence Agency’s Innovative Research Unit.
 

More information: 

• Defence Energy Managers' Course Holds First Session 
• New Defence Energy Managers Course Launched

 [AN1]http://eda.europa.eu/info-hub/press-centre/latest-news/2017/04/24/defence-energy-managers'-course-holds-first-session

 [AN2]http://eda.europa.eu/info-hub/press-centre/latest-news/2017/01/20/new-defence-energy-managers-course-launched

 

   

From January 1, 2019, the Russian Volga will cease providing AN-124 capacity for EU and NATO states under NATO's heavy military air transport program SALIS (Strategic Airlift Interim Solution), which includes 17 European member states and Canada. The loss is sensitive: Under Salis, Antonov and Volga have each had an AN-124 permanently stationed at Leipzig-Halle Airport since March 2006, with additional uplift available at short notice.

Unfortunately, the SALIS Program Office did not succeed in overcoming the Russian withdrawal, despite the long negotiations. The move comes just over a year after the Russian freighter operator announced the end of the near-decade-long Russlan collaboration to market AN-124 capacity with Ukraine’s Antonov. A move thought to be in response to western sanctions on Russian companies. Negotiations conducted by the Salis steering board last week failed to avert the withdrawal. After Volga-Dnepr subsidiary AirBridgeCargo lost about half its 21 landing slots at Schiphol last year, Russia reportedly threatened to ban Dutch carriers from its airspace. Shortly after, KLM struck a deal with ABC over additional slots.

The ending of the Salis contract puts pressure on NATO and the EU, which need access to the world’s largest commercial cargo aircraft. This is a serious loss of capacity: the Ukrainian An-124s of Antonov's air transport industry are only flying 900 flights per year - the largest fleet with two Russian aircraft has been available to SALIS's designers for up to 2300 hours per year.

There is always the possibility that the withdrawal is part of a larger play by Volga-Dnepr president Alexey Isaikin, who is looking to set up a German cargo airline, with AN-124s registered in Germany, at Leipzig. By registering an AN-124 to a German company, the Volga-Dnepr group would no longer be caught in the crossfire of political skirmishes between Russia and elsewhere, which includes problems with Antonov maintenance. And as an EU company, it might get preferential treatment for military shipments over Ukraine’s Antonov. It also adds pressure on Germany, which is keen to develop Leipzig-Halle as a freight airport, to OK the new airline’s AOC and aircraft registration. (Although as one source told The Loadstar, Lufthansa Cargo was unlikely to welcome a new freighter airline on its doorstep, and would “go ape-shit”.)

Tag: SALISVolga-Dnepr

Die Frage, wie die EU Friedensförderung in Entwicklungsländern finanzieren soll, beschäftigt Politiker und Experten seit Jahren. Einerseits betrifft dies formelle und rechtliche Aspekte im Zusammenhang mit Haushaltsressourcen und Finanzierungsvorschriften. Andererseits berührt das Thema aber auch die viel tiefer greifenden politischen und sogar moralischen Fragen, ob die EU Entwicklungshilfegelder zur Finanzierung von Sicherheitsmaßnahmen nutzen sollte, wie sie am besten auf die berechtigten Bedürfnisse von Partnern in von Konflikten betroffenen Ländern reagieren kann und welche Art von zivilen und/oder militärischen Maßnahmen die EU im Rahmen ihrer auswärtigen Beziehungen unterstützen kann. Auch in den EU-internen Verhandlungen für den nächsten Mehrjährigen Finanzrahmen (MFR) für 2021-2027 sind diese Fragen von größter Bedeutung. Dieses Mal liegt ein interessanter Vorschlag auf dem Tisch, der zumindest eine Zeit lang eine pragmatische und umsetzbare Lösung bieten könnte. Im Dezember 2017 forderte der Europäische Rat den Rat für Auswärtige Angelegenheiten auf, bis Frühjahr 2018 eine Empfehlung zu einem eigenständigen Instrument zum Kapazitätsaufbau zur Förderung von Sicherheit und Entwicklung (CBSD) zu verabschieden. Vor diesem Hintergrund hat die Hohe Vertreterin der EU für Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik, Federica Mogherini, vorgeschlagen, die EU solle eine Europäische Friedensfazilität (EPF) einrichten. Die Grundidee besteht darin, die EPF als außerbudgetären Fonds zu führen und damit Friedensförderung und Kapazitätsaufbau in den Sicherheitssektoren der Partnerländer zu finanzieren. Dass Mogherinis Vorschlag einem anderen EU-Friedensförderungsinstrument, der Afrikanischen Friedensfazilität (APF), ähnelt, ist kein Zufall. Durch die APF unterstützt die EU die Afrikanische Union in der Finanzierung ihrer Aktivitäten zur Friedensförderung und ihrer Friedensmissionen. Ein Grundproblem ist dabei, eine stabile, vorhersagbare Finanzierung zur Verfügung zu stellen. Dies hat sich aufgrund der rechtlichen Beschränkungen bei der Finanzierung von Militäraktivitäten aus dem EU-Haushalt als schwie­rig erwiesen. Dieses Dilemma lässt sich nur mit einem außerbudgetären Instrument wie der EPF lösen, das die legitime Anforderung erfüllt, Friedensmissionen zu unterstützen und gleichzeitig eines der Grundprinzipien der EU einhält. Das vielversprechendste Modell besteht darin, die EPF in Form eines Treuhandfonds zu errichten, in den Direktzahlungen seitens der Mitgliedsstaaten einfließen. Der Vorteil bestünde hierbei in der Flexibilität bezüglich der EU-Haushaltsvorschriften, dem Zusätzlichkeitsprinzip (es könnte ein Mix aus ODA- und Nicht-ODA-Ausgaben finanziert werden) und der Sichtbarkeit, da die EPF ein globales Instrument wäre, das auf der bewährten Logik der APF basiert. Dieses Modell birgt aber auch das Risiko, dass ein solches Instrument aufgrund starken politischen Drucks primär zur Abwehr von Bedrohungen wie Terrorismus und irregulärer Migration eingesetzt werden könnte. Mitgliedsstaaten und die Kommission könnten versuchen, eine Kontrolle durch das Europäische Parlament zu verhindern. Das institutionelle Design der EPF wird jedoch entscheidend sein, wenn es seine Mission erfüllen und die Bemühungen der Entwicklungsländer unterstützen soll, eine sichere Entwicklungsbasis zu bieten.

One more set of slides today, this one from a speech by Vice Admiral Igor Kostyukov, the first deputy chief of the Main Directorate of the Russian General Staff, on the topic of security in the Asia-Pacific region. MCIS has put on its website the text of his speech in Russian and video in Russian only.

Április 15.-én vasárnap az AHU a 33. Vivicittá Városvédő Futás Félmaratonján szurkolhatott jótékony futó nagyköveteinek,

EDA's "European Funding Gateway for Defence" (EFGD) now provides defence stakeholders with guidance on European funding available for Circular Economy, REACH-related substitution of hazardous chemical substances, Energy and Environmental Management in Defence.

Our comprehensive funding gateway has been updated with information on grants, loans and risk capital available for the Defence sector under the following EU Programmes:

• LIFE,
• Cohesion Fund (ESIF) and
• ELENA (Horizon 2020 - as deployed by the European Investment Bank).

 
More information:

• European Funding Gateway for Defence
• COSME platform
• Industry portal

 

Quand Lucio Caracciolo, le directeur de Limes, m'appelle au cours des vacances de Noel pour me parler de son projet de numéro spécial sur la France (passionnant sommaire ici), une longue conversation s'engage : il y a matière à trois ou quatre articles tant le sujet est passionnant ou, plus exactement, tant le regard d'un Italien sur notre géopolitique soulève énormément d'idées nouvelles.

Finalement, je lui propose deux articles : un sur le nucléaire, l'autre sur le débat stratégique. Voici ci-dessous les introductions en français et les résumés en italien.

LA STRATEGIA CHE NON C’È

Quel débat stratégique en France en 2018 ?

L’arrivée au pouvoir du président Macron est apparu à beaucoup comme un brusque bouleversement des logiques politiques habituelles : si la chose est patente en France, elle paraît aussi très réelle sur la scène internationale où la magie médiatique de ce jeune président a donné à beaucoup le sentiment d’un « Kennedy à la française ». Sous les apparences, qu’en est-il pourtant au fond ? Les premières décisions reflètent-elles un débat stratégique préalable ? ont-elles au contraire alimenté ce débat en France ? Pas vraiment, il faut en convenir, même si les actes et les déclarations ont mis les questions de défense dans le cercle d’attention des médias, pas toujours pour les bonnes raisons.

L’ascesa di Macron non ha innescato una vera riflessione sugli obiettivi da assegnare alle Forze armate. Fornire fondi adeguati ai militari non basta a fare una strategia. E nemmeno la vecchia novità dell’Europa della difesa. Il servizio nazionale universale.

A molti l’ascesa alla presidenza di Emmanuel Macron è apparsa come portatrice di un brusco sconvolgimento delle consuete logiche politiche. Tanto in Francia quanto all’estero, dove il luccichio mediatico trasmette l’immagine di un «Kennedy à la française». Al di là delle apparenze, quanto c’è di vero? Le prime decisioni prese dall’Eliseo sono il riflesso di un ragionamento strategico? O, al contrario, ne alimentano uno sulla traiettoria del paese? Bisogna ammettere che non è così. I primi gesti e le prime dichiarazioni dell’inquilino dell’Eliseo hanno puntato i riflettori sull’ambito della difesa. Ma non sempre per buone ragioni.

Il presidente e i militari

La confusa campagna elettorale della primavera 2017 non aveva innescato un intenso dibattito strategico, essendo troppo concentrata sulle personalità e sui colpi di scena per dedicare attenzione ai dettagli dei programmi. Non che ce ne fosse bisogno: questa volta molto più di altre i temi della difesa occupavano un posto risibile nei documenti propositivi dei candidati. Solo il capo di Stato maggiore delle Forze armate, il generale Pierre de Villiers, aveva sostenuto in un discorso accademico a settembre 2016 e in una lunga intervista nel dicembre successivo la necessità di raggiungere il 2% del pil per la spesa militare. Tutti i concorrenti per l’Eliseo l’avevano ripreso per indossare la maschera del responsabile difensore del paese di fronte alle crescenti minacce. La Francia era ancora scossa dagli attentati di Parigi e la sicurezza continuava a essere un tema portante.

Una volta eletto, Macron ha fatto alcune mosse volte a collocarlo all’altezza dell’eredità di Charles de Gaulle. Dalla sua intronizzazione, si è circondato di simbolismi: risalita degli Champs Elysée…

Giù le mani dalla forc de frappe

Le nucléaire militaire français : de l’assurance mais des incertitudes

En Europe, la France est avec la Grande-Bretagne l’un des deux pays qui, du fait de sa maîtrise de la bombe, possède une école stratégique nucléaire fournie. Le débat y est classiquement articulé entre partisans et opposants, selon un clivage ancien qui n’a pas beaucoup évolué. Régulièrement, les opposants publient une tribune ou se saisissent d’un événement de l’actualité internationale pour faire valoir leur inquiétude : ce fut par exemple le cas en janvier dernier lorsque les scientifiques américains, avancèrent « l’horloge de la fin du monde » d’une demi-heure vers l’apocalypse. On en parle au mieux une journée, le débat tombe à plat et l’on continue comme avant. De l’autre côté, les partisans de l’arme nucléaire publient régulièrement ouvrages et analyses . La France est d’ailleurs probablement le seul pays d’Europe à produire autant de documents de conception stratégique, d’une part pour confirmer les thèses, d’autre part pour les faire évoluer de micro avancées tenant compte des évolutions récentes, qu’elles soient techniques, géopolitiques ou tout simplement politiques.

Macron vuole ravvivare la discussione pubblica sul deterrente atomico. Le posizioni interne. Il dibattito in America e Regno Unito. L’improbabile condivisione della Bomba francese con Berlino. Ma l’ortodossia nucleare per ora non si tocca.

In Europa, la Francia è assieme al Regno Unito l’unico paese che, grazie al possesso della Bomba, ha una scuola strategica nucleare degna di tale nome. Il dibattito nel nostro paese è classicamente diviso fra partigiani e oppositori, secondo un’antica linea di faglia che non si è molto evoluta nel tempo. Di tanto in tanto, gli oppositori 1 pubblicano commenti o si rifanno a un fatto d’attualità internazionale per comunicare la propria inquietudine, come quando lo scorso gennaio gli scienziati americani hanno spostato «l’orologio della fine del mondo» mezz’ora avanti verso l’apocalisse. Se ne parla un giorno, quando va bene, poi il dibattito muore lì come se nulla fosse. Sull’altra sponda, i partigiani divulgano con molta più assiduità le proprie opere e analisi 2. La Francia è probabilmente l’unico paese d’Europa a produrre un numero apprezzabile di documenti strategici che da un lato confermano le tesi principali dei pro-nuclearisti e dall’altro fanno loro compiere piccoli passi in avanti per riflettere le più recenti evoluzioni tecniche, geopolitiche o semplicemente politiche.

Il dibattito è comunque praticamente immobile, anche perché l’arma nucleare gode di un solido sostegno presso l’opinione pubblica: il 61% dei francesi ritiene che il possesso della Bomba sia un punto forte dei n…

Une salve sur deux n’a pas pu être tirée.

En 2018, nous avions rencontré l’auteure de l’initiative «Pour une eau potable propre». Nous republions son portrait avant le scrutin du 13 juin.

Jean-Claude Juncker joue sa survie politique mercredi au Parlement européen. Les députés, réunis en session plénière à Strasbourg, vont en efet se prononcer sur le « SelmayrGate », le scandale – révélé par Libération- de la promotion express, le 21 février, de l’Allemand Martin Selmayr de son poste de chef de cabinet du président de la Commission à celui de secrétaire général, et ce, en violation du statut de la fonction publique européenne, un texte voté par le Parlement européen et les États. Pour la quasi-totalité des parlementaires, Martin Selmayr ne doit sa position, qui est désormais celle de vrai patron de la Commission, qu’à un coup d’État, mal mené qui plus est. Mais de là à demander son départ, il y a un pas que beaucoup hésitent à franchir, surtout depuis que Juncker a lié son sort au sien. « Martin Selmayr ne démissionnera pas. Si vous vous attendez à une démission, ce sera la mienne», a-t-il lancé, le 22 mars, aux chefs de gouvernement conservateurs du PPE qui lui demandaient des comptes. Une inversion de la causalité politique qui confirme que c’est bien le secrétaire général qui détient les clefs du pouvoir à la Commission.

Juncker a encore été plus loin en demandant à ses commissaires de le soutenir, mercredi dernier, lors d’une réunion à huis clos. Et tous, y compris les socialistes et les libéraux, l’ont fait, même si le Français Pierre Moscovici et l’Italienne Fedrica Mogherini ont estimé qu’à l’avenir il faudra être plus prudent… Politiquement, cela signifie que le collège lie son sort à celui du président qui a lui-même lié le sien à celui de son eurocrate favori…

Tout va donc se jouer sur un point : les députés vont-ils prendre le risque d’une crise politique en demandant la démission de Selmayr ? Personne ne peut prédire l’issue des votes, vu la colère et l’indignation que cette affaire a suscitée sur les bancs parlementaires comme le montre la réunion, lundi soir, de la commission de contrôle budgétaire du Parlement qui a, à la surprise générale, durci le projet de résolution qui sera débattu mercredi. À la quasi-unanimité, les députés ont voté un amendement demandant la réouverture de la procédure de recrutement du secrétaire général, ce qui veut dire en creux la démission de Selmayr.

L’Assemblée plénière va donc soit ratifier ce texte, soit le durcir, soit le rejeter. Pour l’instant, le conservateur Juncker ne peut compter, de façon absolument certaine, que sur le soutien, au sein du PPE, le premier groupe de l’Assemblée (219 sièges), de la CDU-CSU allemande, des Autrichiens de l’ÖVP et du PP espagnol, soit 56 voix sur 751... Pour le reste, les jeux sont ouverts : ainsi, les Italiens (15) ont des comptes à régler avec le secrétaire général accusé d’avoir fait le jeu des démagogues par sa gestion de la crise des réfugiés. De même, LR (20) campe sur une position dure. Sans aller jusqu’à un vote contre Selmayr, une partie du groupe pourrait s’absenter lors du vote, ce qui reviendrait au même.

Chez les socialistes, la division, c’est habituel, est encore forte. Sur une ligne dure, on trouve les Français, les démocrates italiens, les Néerlandais et les Belges (50 députés). Le PSOE (14), lui, soutient Selmayr et Juncker parce qu’ils ferment les yeux sur la crise catalane. Les autres hésitent, à l’image des Allemands (27) qui sont en colère contre les mauvaises manières de leur compatriote, qui, de plus, doit toute sa carrière à la CDU-CSU. Les autres groupes sont déterminés, à faire le ménage : une grande partie du groupe libéral, les Verts, mais aussi les eurosceptiques et les europhobes. Autant dire qu’il existe sur le papier une nette majorité en faveur de la démission de Selmayr. « Même s’il s’en sort, ce sera de justesse, ce qui sera tout aussi terrible, car, pour la première fois dans l’histoire européenne, un haut fonctionnaire de la commission aura réussi l’exploit de susciter un vote de défiance contre lui d’une moitié du Parlement! Franchement, il devrait d’ores et déjà avoir démissionné pour sauver ce qu’il y a à sauver », juge un haut fonctionnaire du Parlement.

N.B.: version actualisée de mon article paru dans Libération du 16 avril

Photo: REUTERS/Francois Lenoir

A megszűnt repülőalakulatok tagjait általában messzire sodorja egymástól az élet. Vannak ugyan, akik szinte napi kapcsolatban maradnak, századszinten azonban ritkán találkoznak az egykori szárnytársak. Öt évvel a legutóbbi találkozójuk után ismét összejött a hazai Szu-22-es közösség, hogy megemlékezzenek a taszári 101. Felderítő Repülőszázad felállításának 35. évfordulójáról, és felidézzék az együtt töltött éveket. A találkozó szervezője a század egykori repülőműszaki tiszthelyettese, Horváth István (Buci) volt, aki a 2013-as találkozót és az An-26-os rendszerbe állításának 40 éves találkozóját is megszervezte. Buci invitálására április 14-én, egy verőfényes szombati napon, közel 140 egykori szuhojos látogatott Taszárra.

Gyülekeznek a volt századtársak a taszári önkormányzat épülete előtt, ami egykoron a Helyőrségi Művelődési Otthon volt.

Az épület előtti parkból Gagarin szobra figyeli az egykori hajózókat és műszakiakat.

Pataki Sándor taszári polgármester – volt Szu-22-es repülőműszaki tiszthelyettes – beszéde után a század volt parancsnoka, Balogh Imre nyugállományú altábornagy nyitotta meg a találkozót.

A kép jobb alsó részén (mellényben) a szervező, Horváth István ül. 

A találkozó résztvevői Máté László előadását hallgatják. 

Vándor Károly, az egykor Magyarországon állomásozó szovjet repülőcsapatok történetének hazai kutatója könyvet ad át Balogh Imrének. A könyv Pável Belenyin alezredes, az utolsó kunmadarasi ezredparancsnok személyes ajándéka, témája a Szu-17-es harci alkalmazása. 

Az égen egy Robinson R22-es köszönti a találkozó résztvevőit.

Búcsúzó áthúzás a taszári főutca felett.

A találkozó résztvevői kis csoportokban indulnak a volt bázis területén lévő repülőmúzeumba.

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A Szu-22-eseknek Magyarországon bő egy évtized jutott. Az utolsó üzemképes gép, a 15-ös oldalszámú Szu-22M3 1997 februárjában szállt fel Taszárról és repült át Pápára, a "temetőbe". 

Csillagos felségjelű Szu-22-es géppár Vincze Ferenc festményén.

Szu-22-es pilóták és a műszakiak névsora. Előbbiek mögött a század rendszerváltás előtti jelvénye látható.

Szuhoj-fészek, ahogy a felderítő konténer kamerája látta.

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Ezúton is szeretném megköszönni, hogy ezen a találkozón, mások mellett jómagam is a század tiszteletbeli tagja lehettem. Külön köszönettel tartozom azoknak, akik saját személyes történeteiken keresztül engedtek betekintést a század mindennapjaiba. Ezek azok a történetek amelyeket, ha nem dokumentálunk, akkor egy idő után örökre elvesznek.

Szórád Tamás

A megszűnt repülőalakulatok tagjait általában messzire sodorja egymástól az élet. Vannak ugyan, akik szinte napi kapcsolatban maradnak, századszinten azonban ritkán találkoznak az egykori szárnytársak. Öt évvel a legutóbbi találkozójuk után ismét összejött a hazai Szu-22-es közösség, hogy megemlékezzenek a taszári 101. Felderítő Repülőszázad felállításának 35. évfordulójáról, és felidézzék az együtt töltött éveket. A találkozó szervezője a század egykori repülőműszaki tiszthelyettese, Horváth István (Buci) volt, aki a 2013-as találkozót és az An-26-os rendszerbe állításának 40 éves találkozóját is megszervezte. Buci invitálására április 14-én, egy verőfényes szombati napon, közel 140 egykori szuhojos látogatott Taszárra.

Gyülekeznek a volt századtársak a taszári önkormányzat épülete előtt, ami egykoron a Helyőrségi Művelődési Otthon volt.

Az épület előtti parkból Gagarin szobra figyeli az egykori hajózókat és műszakiakat.

Pataki Sándor taszári polgármester – volt Szu-22-es repülőműszaki tiszthelyettes – beszéde után a század volt parancsnoka, Balogh Imre nyugállományú altábornagy nyitotta meg a találkozót.

A kép jobb alsó részén (mellényben) a szervező, Horváth István ül. 

A találkozó résztvevői Máté László előadását hallgatják. 

Vándor Károly, az egykor Magyarországon állomásozó szovjet repülőcsapatok történetének hazai kutatója könyvet ad át Balogh Imrének. A könyv Pável Belenyin alezredes, az utolsó kunmadarasi ezredparancsnok személyes ajándéka, témája a Szu-17-es harci alkalmazása. 

Az égen egy Robinson R22-es köszönti a találkozó résztvevőit.

Búcsúzó áthúzás a taszári főutca felett.

A találkozó résztvevői kis csoportokban indulnak a volt bázis területén lévő repülőmúzeumba.

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A Szu-22-eseknek Magyarországon bő egy évtized jutott. Az utolsó üzemképes gép, a 15-ös oldalszámú Szu-22M3 1997 februárjában szállt fel Taszárról és repült át Pápára, a "temetőbe". 

Csillagos felségjelű Szu-22-es géppár Vincze Ferenc festményén.

Szu-22-es pilóták és a műszakiak névsora. Előbbiek mögött a század rendszerváltás előtti jelvénye látható.

Szuhoj-fészek, ahogy a felderítő konténer kamerája látta.

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Ezúton is szeretném megköszönni, hogy ezen a találkozón, mások mellett jómagam is a század tiszteletbeli tagja lehettem. Külön köszönettel tartozom azoknak, akik saját személyes történeteiken keresztül engedtek betekintést a század mindennapjaiba. Ezek azok a történetek amelyeket, ha nem dokumentálunk, akkor egy idő után örökre elvesznek.

Szórád Tamás

VIDEO. Pour la premiere operation qu'il a decidee seul, le president s'est explique sur l'usage de la force sans mandat de l'ONU. A-t-il convaincu ?

VIDEO. Pour la premiere operation qu'il a decidee seul, le president s'est explique sur l'usage de la force sans mandat de l'ONU. A-t-il convaincu ?

I wrote this up quickly on Saturday for friends, and it seemed to get a positive reaction, so I decided to expand a bit and send it out to the wider world…

The United States (and the Trump administration) came out well. The would saw a measured response that showed US willingness to follow up words with actions, while also showing that Trump’s rash tweets do not equal rash actions (at least vis-a-vis Russia). Jim Mattis in particular showed that he is the chief voice of reason and restraining figure in the administration.

At the same time, the strikes accomplished little in practical terms. Syria’s ability to make and use chemical weapons was largely unaffected, because what they are using now is chlorine gas, rather than the sarin that was made in its chemical weapons program prior to 2013. Chlorine gas is much easier to make and is almost certainly made at sites other than the ones that were targeted (and even if it was being made there, it can relatively easily be made elsewhere).

For this reason, Syria (and Assad) also came out well. For the price of a few destroyed buildings they got to take over Douma and wipe out the last rebel controlled zone near Damascus. The main question is the extent to which the strikes will deter Assad from using chemical weapons in the future. My guess is that there will be some short-term deterrent effect (because of worries that the next strike will be more damaging), but little long-term effect — because of beliefs that US memories fade and because of cost-benefit calculations that show that use of chemical weapons in certain situations is highly effective in demoralizing enemies and causing them to surrender (see Douma) while also forcing somewhat reluctant allies such as Russia to publicly support Assad.

Russia is a (minor) loser for this round — Russian officials made big loud statements early on, but then clearly got scared of being painted into a corner and started backing off a few days ago. In the end, the situation showed that Russia cannot deter the United States from hitting an ally, but it can limit the extent of the strike and the choice of targets. Also, Syria’s (older) Russian-made air defenses were completely ineffective, while potentially more effective modern air defenses under Russian control were not activated. In other words, the US strikes clearly showed both the extent and the limits of Russian influence in the region. Russian leaders clearly care about this image problem, thus the somewhat ridiculous statements about Syrian air defenses successfully intercepting US missiles supposedly aimed at airfields that the US and its allies did not target.

The military balance in the region is clearly revealed. In a few days, the US and its allies were able to gather a set of forces that are much stronger than what Russia could bring to bear in the region. This is not the early 1970s, when much of the world believed that the Soviet Union could more or less match the maximum US presence in the Eastern Med (even if present-day Russian analysts are skeptical about the actual strength of Russian military forces in the region at the time). The Russian military (in terms of conventional forces) is stronger than it was a few years ago and is more than a match for any of its other adversaries, but it’s still far weaker than the US military.

Finally, the impact of the strike on US domestic politics is pretty certainly going to be short-term and very limited. Some of Trump’s isolationist allies on the far right were appalled and highly critical, but they will come back to the fold soon enough since they have no alternative to supporting Trump. What’s more, Democratic politicians’ critiques that the attack should not have been done without Congressional authorization are not likely to last long, because actually having that debate in Congress is not in their interest politically (which way to vote — to authorize Trump to use force or to allow other countries to carry out chemical weapons attacks with impunity?). Better to just carp from the sidelines on this issue and go back to the various scandals after a couple of days.

So, to sum up, the world avoided a big international crisis through a combination of US restraint, Russian desire to avoid escalation in a situation where it did not have escalation dominance, and good use of US-Russian deconfliction channels. The strike itself was not particularly effective at achieving its stated goals vis-a-vis Syria, but was good at signaling US intent and capabilities for the future (including the limits of that intent). The major problem that remains is that given what I described above, Assad is unlikely to have been deterred from future use of chemical weapons and therefore we may well be back in the same place again a few months or a year from now.

My interview with Rabbi Michael Shudrich originally appeared in the March 23rd print issue of The Jewish Press and on their online edition. It is posted here with permission.


Rabbi Michael Schudrich. Credit: Rabbi Michael Schudrich

Although several weeks have passed, indignation over Poland’s “Holocaust Law” still pervades the Jewish community. The law outlaws blaming Poland for crimes committed during the Holocaust, but it has been seen by many as an attempt to deny the Holocaust itself. In reaction, some have suggested boycotting Poland, including ending student trips to the country.

Rabbi Michael Schudrich, chief rabbi of Poland, sees matters in a very different light, arguing that much of the criticism of the new law is misplaced. He recently shared his perspective with The Jewish Press.

The Jewish Press: Before we address the new law, please provide a brief primer on the modern Jewish community of Poland?


Rabbi Schudrich: What’s important to know is that before the war there were 3.5 million Jews, who were murdered by the Germans and their accomplices. That still leaves 10 percent – 350,000 Polish Jews – survived the war. Most of the Jews left, but not all. Those that remained basically stayed in Communist Poland without being Jewish. Many did not even tell their children and grandchildren that they were Jewish.

It remained a deep dark secret from 1939 to 1989. In 1989, communism fell, at which point the not-so-young survivors were confronted with the question: Do I feel safe enough today to tell my children and grandchildren that I am really Jewish? Since 1989, thousands and thousands – perhaps even tens of thousands – of Poles have discovered their Jewish roots. That is the story of Polish Jewry today.

What’s your take on Poland’s new “Holocaust Law”?

The law was not written with the Holocaust as its main concern. It is designed to protect the good name of Poland from false accusations. There really is a fundamental misunderstanding of what the law is about. To say “Polish death camps” is not true, and it is very painful for Poles to hear it.

Now, the way they constructed the law, one could imagine that it speaks about Polish collaborators. But this law is not about the Holocaust directly; it’s about protecting the good name of Poland.

There is a growing number on the right that doesn’t like to talk about the bad things Poles did in the past. But it’s not about distorting the history of the Holocaust. It’s not anti-Semitic; it’s pro-Polish. In other words, it’s not that they don’t want to talk about the fact their grandfathers or uncles collaborated with the Germans because they don’t like Jews. Rather, they don’t want to talk about their grandfathers and uncles [having done something] bad.

Now, the problem is that the way they wrote this very poorly-written law may make it seem like I can be prosecuted if I say a Pole killed a Jew during the war. But fundamentally, this law is not about the tragedy of what happened to the Jews. It’s about hiding what the Poles did.

But isn’t hiding this history a distortion of history?

Yes, but on the other side, to say that all Poles are anti-Semites is also a distortion of history. When survivors say the Poles were worse than the Germans, that’s because the Germans could not tell a Jew from a non-Jew in Poland, and therefore Polish collaborators became very important because they could point out the Jews. The Jews were more threatened by their Polish neighbor than by the Germans who wouldn’t recognize them.

But people misunderstand today. They think the Polish government worked with the Germans. That is simply not true. Germans thought of the Holocaust, planned the Holocaust, and did the Holocaust with the help of collaborators in every country. But without the Germans, there would have been no Holocaust.

So there is a battle against stereotypes on both sides. Now I, personally, as a Jew, am far more offended by the false stereotypes that Poles say about Jews than I am by the false stereotypes Jews say about Poles. What I hear from the Polish side is more difficult than what I hear from the Jewish side. But that anti-Semitic things are said in Poland doesn’t mean we are permitted to say anti-Polish lies.

What does the average Pole on the street think of this law?

Poland was not really free until 1989. It was occupied by the Soviet Union. Poland has only been able to deal with its past since 1989, and this is coming up now because some Poles feel their name is being besmirched. Unfortunately, the way they reacted leaves them worse off than they were before, which is a great irony.

They are a certain segment of the population that likes the law very much. And there is a whole other bunch of people that really don’t get why it is necessary. I believe that certainly more than half the country is against the law.

Has Poland seen a rise in anti-Semitism since this controversy erupted?

For me the concern is not rising anti-Semitism, but that we have heard – because of this controversy – anti-Semitic statements that we have not heard in 25 years. That is the issue.

You have been quoted as saying that Jews should respond to this law by “looking for new ways to connect with the [Polish] Jewish community.” How should they go about doing that?

When people say, “Stop going to Poland,” who is that going to hurt? The Poles would actually be relieved not to have to confront Jewish visitors. And the truth is that right now is the most sensitive period we’ve lived through in 25 years, and all of a sudden we are left by ourselves.

[The boycott] isn’t happening – people have not stopped coming to visit Poland. But the concept is very flawed. So many tens of thousands of Jews visit today. We recently had the yahrzeit of Reb Elimelech of Lizhensk. Many Jews come for many different reasons. And when you come, you should make sure to stop by a living Jewish community such as Warsaw, Krakow, Lodz, Wroclaw, and Gdansk. Bring presents, even small things like your favorite Jewish book or favorite Jewish music tape.

People should write to the Polish embassies and consulates where they live and tell them they are concerned by what’s happening. Write also to your senator and congressman to keep the pressure on — about the law, but also about not allowing discussion of it to permit people to make anti-Semitic statements.

You have been in contact with members of the Polish government. What is your assessment of where they stand on this law?

The problem is no longer the law; the problem is the language and dialogue – or lack of dialogue – around the law. The government has to clearly state that the anti-Semitism we’ve heard is unacceptable. That has nothing to do with the law. People cannot say anti-Semitic things today and think it’s acceptable.

This is something the Polish government is trying to address, but so far has not done so very successfully. They are not sure how to do it. Of all the political leaders in Poland, the president has been the most forthcoming. He visited the JCC in Krakow and said there is no place for anti-Semitism in Poland today and that Poland wants its Jews to stay, which is important for a Polish leader to say. He also spoke on the 50th anniversary of the expulsion of Jews from Poland in 1968 and asked for forgiveness. Keep in mind that he was very young back then.

Where do you see the Jewish community in Poland 20 years down the road?

Twenty years from now? I can’t imagine because I couldn’t begin to imagine 20 years ago what would be today.



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