Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik / Briefing Paper

This article analyzes the success factors for external engagement aimed at fostering peace in conflict-affected states. It focuses on a set of three factors that have been under-researched so far: the strategic prioritization between stability and democracy, the degree of coordination, and the mode of interaction. We compare international engagement in six countries—Burundi, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Nepal, Senegal, and Timor-Leste. These countries all struggled with violent conflict and experienced a democratic transition in the period 2000–2014. We use an innovative approach to assess the impact of external engagement by analyzing twenty critical junctures in the domestic political processes of these countries mainly linked to elections, constitution-writing processes, and peace agreements, as well as disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration. Based on over 300 interviews, we find that prioritizing stability over democratization is problematic, good international coordination has positive effects, and preferring cooperative forms of interaction over coercion is mostly but not always useful. In discussing these general features of international support, this article contributes to the broader discussion of factors that explain the impact external actors can have on transformative political processes after conflict.

This chapter explores the potential effect of China’s cooperation on African authoritarian regimes and states, using the case of Rwanda. First, we will discuss the interests of Chinese actors in engaging with Rwanda, and more specifically, to what extent statehood and regime type matter to Chinese actors. Second, we will analyze the interests of Rwandan actors in engaging with China. In particular, we will investigate to what extent and under what conditions Chinese engagement helps Rwanda’s regime survival and weakens or strengthens Rwanda’s statehood. Due to scarcity of resources, Rwanda’s elite professes a tangible and ambitious development-orientation. Yet, we argue, China’s engagement with Rwanda is driven by political, strategic, and aid-policy interests, whereas business interests do not play a prominent role. Rwanda’s economic and political aspirations, for their part, prevent the government from getting too close to Beijing, as that would increase the risk of being overlooked as a small actor. Rather, an independent foreign policy and an ability to pique China (without overly annoying it) seems crucial. China’s direct impact on regime survival thus is limited in the case of Rwanda.

This chapter explores the potential effect of China’s cooperation on African authoritarian regimes and states, using the case of Rwanda. First, we will discuss the interests of Chinese actors in engaging with Rwanda, and more specifically, to what extent statehood and regime type matter to Chinese actors. Second, we will analyze the interests of Rwandan actors in engaging with China. In particular, we will investigate to what extent and under what conditions Chinese engagement helps Rwanda’s regime survival and weakens or strengthens Rwanda’s statehood. Due to scarcity of resources, Rwanda’s elite professes a tangible and ambitious development-orientation. Yet, we argue, China’s engagement with Rwanda is driven by political, strategic, and aid-policy interests, whereas business interests do not play a prominent role. Rwanda’s economic and political aspirations, for their part, prevent the government from getting too close to Beijing, as that would increase the risk of being overlooked as a small actor. Rather, an independent foreign policy and an ability to pique China (without overly annoying it) seems crucial. China’s direct impact on regime survival thus is limited in the case of Rwanda.

Die europäische Entwicklungspolitik hat ihren Ursprung in der in den Römischen Verträgen von 1957 vereinbarten Unterstützung der überseeischen Länder und Gebiete. Sie hat sich parallel zum europäischen Erweiterungsprozess zu einem alle Weltregionen abdeckenden Politikbereich entwickelt. Heutzutage betreuen die europäischen Institutionen etwa 20 Prozent der gesamten europäischen Entwicklungsfinanzierung. Seit 2015 konzentriert sich die europäische Entwicklungspolitik mehr auf Migration und damit verbunden auf wirtschaftliche Kooperation mit afrikanischen Staaten. Aktuelle Initiativen und politische Debatten zeigen einen noch unentschiedenen Richtungskampf: Beschreitet man weiter den Weg der „klassischen“ Entwicklungszusammenarbeit und erhält die etablierten Kooperationsformen mit den afrikanischen, karibischen und pazifischen Staaten? Oder setzt sich der Ansatz einer integrierten Außenpolitik durch, in der Entwicklungspolitik stärker anderen außenpolitischen Interessen untergeordnet wird?

Die europäische Entwicklungspolitik hat ihren Ursprung in der in den Römischen Verträgen von 1957 vereinbarten Unterstützung der überseeischen Länder und Gebiete. Sie hat sich parallel zum europäischen Erweiterungsprozess zu einem alle Weltregionen abdeckenden Politikbereich entwickelt. Heutzutage betreuen die europäischen Institutionen etwa 20 Prozent der gesamten europäischen Entwicklungsfinanzierung. Seit 2015 konzentriert sich die europäische Entwicklungspolitik mehr auf Migration und damit verbunden auf wirtschaftliche Kooperation mit afrikanischen Staaten. Aktuelle Initiativen und politische Debatten zeigen einen noch unentschiedenen Richtungskampf: Beschreitet man weiter den Weg der „klassischen“ Entwicklungszusammenarbeit und erhält die etablierten Kooperationsformen mit den afrikanischen, karibischen und pazifischen Staaten? Oder setzt sich der Ansatz einer integrierten Außenpolitik durch, in der Entwicklungspolitik stärker anderen außenpolitischen Interessen untergeordnet wird?

Die Bilder von den verheerenden Waldbränden in Australien haben den Jahreswechsel nach 2020 beherrscht. Feuersbrünste, die sich schnell ausbreiten und Barrieren überspringen; Menschen, die sich an die Strände flüchten und dort dicht gedrängt mit ihren Tieren unter einem orangefarbenen Himmel auf Hilfe warten: Apokalyptische Bilder, wie wir sie sonst eher von Katastrophen in ärmeren Ländern kennen. Auf den Zusammenhang zwischen steigenden Temperaturen, extremer Dürre und wachsendem Risiko von Waldbränden hat auch in Australien die Forschung seit 30 Jahren immer wieder hingewiesen. In den australischen Medien spielt das aber kaum eine Rolle, ebenso wenig gelangte die australische Regierung bislang zu dieser Einsicht. Dies hat in Australien Tradition. Zuletzt blockierte das Land zusammen mit Russland und Saudi-Arabien die Klimaverhandlungen im Dezember in Madrid, um den Export seiner Kohlevorräte und deren heimische Verstromung nicht zu gefährden.

Die Bilder aus Australien führen uns vor Augen, welche Folgen bereits etwas mehr als 1°C globale Erwärmung in einem ohnehin heißen und trockenen Kontinent haben: Australiens Ökosysteme können Feuern in den trockenen Sommern standhalten, nicht aber Bränden in diesem Ausmaß. In Europa erreichen uns diese Bilder als Mahnung. Die Folgen und Ursachen des Klimawandels werden in den Medien breit behandelt und von Politik und Gesellschaft diskutiert.

Hier liegt der wesentliche Unterschied zu Australien: Europa weiß, dass es den Klimawandel gibt und will sich ihm (entgegen)stellen. Mit dem European Green Deal verfügt die Europäische Union nun über ein Programm, um Treibhausgasemissionen europaweit koordiniert zu senken und bis 2050 Klimaneutralität zu erreichen. Die dabei entstehenden Lasten sollen geteilt werden, um insbesondere auch osteuropäische Mitgliedstaaten mitzunehmen. Dieser Ansatz der von Ursula von der Leyen geführten Kommission kann den Menschen Mut machen, die für „climate action now!“ 2019 auf die Straßen gegangen sind – wenn er ernsthaft umgesetzt wird und dabei auch die Schwächen in der Klima- und Energiepolitik der Mitgliedstaaten benannt und von diesen korrigiert werden. So muss zum Beispiel Deutschland die rechtlichen und wirtschaftlichen Blockaden für den weiteren Ausbau der erneuerbaren Energien schnell auflösen und mit dem Umbau des Verkehrssystems ernst machen.

Der European Green Deal geht aber auch weit über Klimapolitik hinaus und will Transformationen in Schlüsselbereichen nachhaltiger Entwicklung vorantreiben. Er zielt unter anderem auf die Verringerung des Ressourcenverbrauchs durch eine saubere Kreislaufwirtschaft, ein gesundes, umweltfreundliches Landwirtschafts- und Ernährungssystem, und eine Mobilitätswende. Alle europäischen Politiken und Programme werden verpflichtet, sich am Green Deal auszurichten. So soll auch die wirtschaftspolitische Koordinierung in der EU Nachhaltigkeit und menschliche Wohlfahrt ins Zentrum der Wirtschaftspolitik rücken und die Ziele der globalen Agenda 2030 für nachhaltige Entwicklung zum Hauptthema der Politikgestaltung und des politischen Handelns in der EU machen.

Dies ist nach fünf Jahren des Zögerns und Reflektierens das erste Mal, dass die Europäische Union Nachhaltigkeit und Klima ins Zentrum ihres Handelns stellt. Nachhaltigkeit als Markenkern des europäischen Regierungsprogramms setzt auch neue Maßstäbe für Relevanz und Struktur der in 2020 weiterzuentwickelnden Deutschen Nachhaltigkeitsstrategie.

Die Kommission will mit dem Green Deal Chancen für ein besseres Leben in Europa nutzen, Vorteile im wirtschaftlichen Wettbewerb erschließen sowie globale Verantwortung und internationale Glaubwürdigkeit wieder stärken. Dafür muss die EU nicht nur intern überzeugend und kraftvoll handeln, sondern auch ihre Außenbeziehungen sowohl zu anderen Industrieländern als auch zu den Schwellen- und Entwicklungsländern kohärent umgestalten. Wenn von der Leyens Konzept einer „geopolitischen Kommission“ für nachhaltige Politik beherzt mit Leben erfüllt wird, könnte dies internationale Politik grundlegend verändern.

Die Entwicklungspolitik müsste Nachhaltigkeit und Klimawandel zur übergreifenden Priorität  erklären und ihr Handeln in allen Bereichen konsequent darauf ausrichten. So könnte auch der weitere Ausbau von Kohlekraftwerken verhindert werden, insbesondere auf dem afrikanischen Kontinent. Die Neukonzipierung der europäischen Strategie zu Afrika bietet dafür eine Chance, zu der die deutsche EU-Ratspräsidentschaft in diesem Jahr entscheidend beitragen kann.

Insgesamt muss die EU durch Nutzung ihres gesamten außenpolitischen und außenwirtschaftlichen Instrumentariums dazu beitragen, dass ihre Partner weltweit wirtschaftliche Entwicklung an den Chancen des 21. Jahrhunderts orientieren, statt am fossilen Zeitalter festzuhalten. So würden Nachhaltigkeits- und Klimapolitik zu zentralen Bestandteilen auch der europäisch-australischen Kooperationsbeziehungen.

Das im Juni beschlossene EU-Mercosur-Handelsabkommen steht bereits vor seinem Start in der Kritik. Besonders die befürchtete Erosion von Umweltschutz und Menschenrechten in Brasilien weckt öffentlichen Widerstand. Europas mahnender Fingerzeig ist dabei allerdings zu einseitig. Vielmehr lässt sich Brasilien mit dem Abkommen selbst auf ein entwicklungspolitisches Risiko ein. Denn obwohl seine Agrarexporte vom zollfreien Marktzugang in die Europäische Union (EU) profitieren dürften, sind die Folgen für die Wirtschaft des Landes viel weitreichender als die Bedrohung des Amazonas-Regenwaldes.

The European Union (EU) has been struggling to find a shared course on African migration since the entry into force of the Schengen Agreement (1995). It has done so through two interrelated processes of negotiation. To begin, parties have negotiated internal and external migration policies. In addition, they have negotiated narrative frames about migration and whether migration should be interpreted rather as an opportunity or as a threat. In times in which narrative frames increasingly shape policy negotiations, it becomes very important to analyse how policymakers negotiate narrative frames on migration and how these shape policy responses. However, such an analysis is still missing. This article investigates how the negotiation of EU policies on African migration from 1999 until 2019 has been influenced by a  simultaneous process of negotiation of narrative frames on migration. It does so based on policy analysis and interviews with European and African policymakers. It finds two major trends in EU negotiation processes: migration-security narratives have strengthened national-oriented approaches, and migration-development narratives have strengthened transnational-oriented approaches. The two approaches have always been interlinked. However, in the last years, security-oriented national approaches have increasingly influenced development-oriented transnational approaches.

This article discusses the 2015 European Neighbourhood Policy review and its aftermath, focusing on the impacts of preference formation and coordination among member state and EU-level actors on the coherence of a complex policy framework. Drawing on hitherto unexplored empirical material, it argues that a perception of crisis among key decision-makers evolved into a consensus that turmoil in the neighbourhood posed serious threats to Europe. This facilitated a coordination effort among EU member states to reach common positions on a narrow set of policy priorities, especially security, counter terrorism and border control. Member state unity and direction from the European External Action Service limited the European Commission’s autonomy and facilitated the prioritisation of security-related cooperation in the neighbourhood. The outcome of this process was a more focussed and therefore more coherent policy framework, but also one with dramatically reduced ambition. Support for liberal-democratic political and economic transformation in the EU’s image was stripped away, leaving a securitised policy framework aimed at increasing 'resilience' to perceived threats from the neighbourhood.

Für die Umsetzung der Agenda 2030 für Nachhaltige Entwicklung sind enorme Investitionen auf globaler Ebene nötig, dennoch bleiben Entwicklungsländer oftmals von globalen Flüssen ausländischer Direktinvestitionen (ADI) aus-geschlossen. Neben wirtschaftlichen Determinanten, wie Markt¬größe, Infrastruktur oder Arbeitsmärkten, spielen die Vorhersagbarkeit, Effizienz und Transparenz der regulatorischen Rahmenbedingungen eine zentrale Rolle. Steuerliche Anreize und inter¬nationale Investitionsabkommen (IIAs) haben dagegen kaum Auswirkungen auf ADI (Weltbank, 2018). Vor diesem Hintergrund fordern die Agenda 2030 für nachhaltige Entwicklung und die Aktionsagenda zur Entwicklungsfinanzierung von Addis Abeba einen geeigneten internationalen Rahmen, der Investitionen in Entwicklungsländern befördert und deren Beitrag zu nachhaltiger Entwicklung stärkt.
In diesem Zusammenhang ist es von Bedeutung, dass im Rahmen der 11. Ministerkonferenz der Welthandelsorganisation (WTO) im Dezember 2017 eine Ministererklärung verabschiedet wurde, die Aufnahme sogenannter „Structured Discussions“ mit dem Ziel fordert, ein „multilaterales Rahmenwerk für Investment Facilitation zu errichten“. Investment Facilitation ist ein neuer Ansatz, der verschiedene praktische Maßnahmen umfasst, die darauf abzielen, nationale Investitionssysteme transparenter und vorhersehbarer zu machen, die Verfahren für ausländische Investoren zu vereinfachen und die Koordination und Kooperation der wichtigsten Akteure zu verbessern.
Die seit März 2018 laufenden Structured Discussions zeigen, dass eine Reihe von Mitglieder die WTO nachwievor als geeignetes Forum zur Verhandlung neuer Themen sehen. Während es zuvor Industrieländer waren, die vor 20 Jahren in der WTO ein multilaterales Investitionsabkommen durchzusetzen versuchten, geht die Initiative zur Verhandlung eines internationalen Rahmens Investment Facilitation (Investment Facilitation Framework - IFF) heute vor allem von Schwellen- und Entwicklungsländern aus. Viele dieser Länder haben sich in den vergangenen Jahren zu Gast- und Heimatländern für ADI entwickelt. Ihre gestärkte Rolle hat dazu geführt, dass nunmehr praktische Investment Facilitation-Maßnahmen zur Förderung von ADI in Entwicklungsländern auf der Agenda stehen und strittige Punkte, wie die Liberalisierung und der Schutz von Investitionen sowie die Investor-Staat-Schieds¬klauseln außen vor gelassen werden.
Das vorliegende Paper gibt einen Überblick über die Debatte über ein internationales Rahmenwerk für Investment Facilitation. Wir skizzieren vier zentrale Herausforderungen bei der Aushandlung eines Rahmenwerks für Investment Facilitation innerhalb der WTO, das auf eine nachhaltige Entwicklung ausgerichtet ist:

1. Die genaue Konzeptionalisierung von Investment Facilitation, als Vorrausetzung für empirische Untersuchungen der potentiellen Auswirkungen eines IFF.
2. Der Schutz des Politikspielraums von Entwicklungsländern und der Aufbau ihrer Verhandlungskapazitäten.
3. Die Unterstützung von Governance-Mechanismen auf nationaler Ebene für nachhaltige Entwicklung.
4. Transparenz gegenüber den Ländern, die noch nicht an den Gesprächen teilnehmen und gesellschaftlichen Akteuren als zentrale Voraussetzung für einen erfolgreichen Ausgang des Prozesses

Social cohesion is an important precondition for peaceful and economically successful societies. The question of how societies hold together and which policies enhance social cohesion has become a relevant topic on both national and international agendas. This Briefing Paper stresses the contribution of revenue collection and social policies, and in particular the interlinkages between the two.
It is evident that revenue mobilisation and social policies are intrinsically intertwined. It is impossible to think carefully about either independently of the other. In particular, revenue is needed to finance more ambitious social policies and allow countries to reach goals, such as those included in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Similarly, better social policies can increase the acceptance of higher taxes and fees.
Furthermore, and often underestimated, a better understanding of the interlinkages between revenue generation and social policies can provide a significant contribution to strengthening social cohesion – in particular, concerning state–citizen relationships.
In order to shed light on these interlinkages, it is useful to have a closer look at the concept of the “fiscal contract”, which is based on the core idea that governments exchange public services for revenue. Fiscal contracts can be characterised along two dimensions: (i) level of endorsement, that is, the number of actors and groups that at least accept, and ideally proactively support, the fiscal contract, and (ii) level of involvement, that is, the share of the population that is involved as taxpayer, as beneficiary of social policies or both. In many developing countries, either because of incapacity or biased state action towards elite groups, the level of involvement is rather low.
Given the common perception that policies are unjust and inefficient, in many developing countries the level of endorsement is also low. It is precisely in these contexts that interventions on either side of the public budget are crucial and can have a significant societal effect beyond the fiscal realm.
We argue that development programmes need to be especially aware of the potential impacts (negative and positive) that work on revenue collection and social policies can have on the fiscal contract and beyond, and we call on donors and policy-makers alike to recognise these areas as relevant for social cohesion. We specifically identify three key mechanisms connecting social policies and revenue collection through which policy-makers could strengthen the fiscal contract and, thereby, enhance social cohesion:

1. Increasing the effectiveness and/or coverage of public social policies. These interventions could improve the perceptions that people – and not only the direct beneficiaries – have of the state, raising their willingness to pay taxes and, with that, improving revenues.
2. Broadening the tax base. This is likely to generate new revenue that can finance new policies, but more importantly it will increase the level of involvement, which will have other effects, such as increasing government responsiveness and accountability in the use of public resources.
3. Enhancing transparency. This can stimulate public debate and affect people’s perceptions of the fiscal system. In order to obtain this result, government campaigns aimed at diffusing information about the main features of policies realised are particularly useful, as are interventions to improve the monitoring and evaluation system.

Social cohesion is an important precondition for peaceful and economically successful societies. The question of how societies hold together and which policies enhance social cohesion has become a relevant topic on both national and international agendas. This Briefing Paper stresses the contribution of revenue collection and social policies, and in particular the interlinkages between the two.
It is evident that revenue mobilisation and social policies are intrinsically intertwined. It is impossible to think carefully about either independently of the other. In particular, revenue is needed to finance more ambitious social policies and allow countries to reach goals, such as those included in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Similarly, better social policies can increase the acceptance of higher taxes and fees.
Furthermore, and often underestimated, a better understanding of the interlinkages between revenue generation and social policies can provide a significant contribution to strengthening social cohesion – in particular, concerning state–citizen relationships.
In order to shed light on these interlinkages, it is useful to have a closer look at the concept of the “fiscal contract”, which is based on the core idea that governments exchange public services for revenue. Fiscal contracts can be characterised along two dimensions: (i) level of endorsement, that is, the number of actors and groups that at least accept, and ideally proactively support, the fiscal contract, and (ii) level of involvement, that is, the share of the population that is involved as taxpayer, as beneficiary of social policies or both. In many developing countries, either because of incapacity or biased state action towards elite groups, the level of involvement is rather low.
Given the common perception that policies are unjust and inefficient, in many developing countries the level of endorsement is also low. It is precisely in these contexts that interventions on either side of the public budget are crucial and can have a significant societal effect beyond the fiscal realm.
We argue that development programmes need to be especially aware of the potential impacts (negative and positive) that work on revenue collection and social policies can have on the fiscal contract and beyond, and we call on donors and policy-makers alike to recognise these areas as relevant for social cohesion. We specifically identify three key mechanisms connecting social policies and revenue collection through which policy-makers could strengthen the fiscal contract and, thereby, enhance social cohesion:

1. Increasing the effectiveness and/or coverage of public social policies. These interventions could improve the perceptions that people – and not only the direct beneficiaries – have of the state, raising their willingness to pay taxes and, with that, improving revenues.
2. Broadening the tax base. This is likely to generate new revenue that can finance new policies, but more importantly it will increase the level of involvement, which will have other effects, such as increasing government responsiveness and accountability in the use of public resources.
3. Enhancing transparency. This can stimulate public debate and affect people’s perceptions of the fiscal system. In order to obtain this result, government campaigns aimed at diffusing information about the main features of policies realised are particularly useful, as are interventions to improve the monitoring and evaluation system.

Climate change, migration flows, security – growing challenges like these are calling for new responses from EU development policy. Achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) by 2030 will in itself require additional financial resources of up to USD 2.5 trillion every year in middle- and low-income countries. Although the European Union (EU) and its Member States are already the biggest donors worldwide, the amount of public funds available is not enough to reach the SDGs. In their search for solutions, therefore, state and non-state actors are focusing squarely on linking public- and private-sector funding. Faced with ambitious climate targets and China’s growing involvement in development finance, the current debate on the EU’s future external financing is centred around reforming the institutional architecture. Such reforms are intended to boost green energy and employment in the partner countries and communicate a coherent European model of socioeconomic development to the outside world. While all actors agree that the EU’s external financing architecture should be simpler, more visible and more efficient (European Commission, 2018), views on how this could actually be achieved vary widely. This led the Council of the EU to task a high-level Wise Persons Group with formulating various scenarios for creating an EU Development Bank. EU development financing is plagued by conflicting national and supranational interests and often sees institutional concerns prioritised over matters of content. Against this backdrop, we argue that institutional and content-related interests need to be better aligned if development financing is to be made more efficient and more sustainable. In particular, a reformed architecture for the EU’s external financing has to do more to reconcile European sustainability and development goals with the needs of partners. Measuring impact against uniform standards will both help to achieve overarching objectives and convey a successful European development model. Given the importance of private capital for development finance, a reformed financial architecture should also consider the interests and rationales of the private sector. However, this will only be a winning formula if social, environmental and human rights standards do not take a back seat.

Climate change, migration flows, security – growing challenges like these are calling for new responses from EU development policy. Achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) by 2030 will in itself require additional financial resources of up to USD 2.5 trillion every year in middle- and low-income countries. Although the European Union (EU) and its Member States are already the biggest donors worldwide, the amount of public funds available is not enough to reach the SDGs. In their search for solutions, therefore, state and non-state actors are focusing squarely on linking public- and private-sector funding. Faced with ambitious climate targets and China’s growing involvement in development finance, the current debate on the EU’s future external financing is centred around reforming the institutional architecture. Such reforms are intended to boost green energy and employment in the partner countries and communicate a coherent European model of socioeconomic development to the outside world. While all actors agree that the EU’s external financing architecture should be simpler, more visible and more efficient (European Commission, 2018), views on how this could actually be achieved vary widely. This led the Council of the EU to task a high-level Wise Persons Group with formulating various scenarios for creating an EU Development Bank. EU development financing is plagued by conflicting national and supranational interests and often sees institutional concerns prioritised over matters of content. Against this backdrop, we argue that institutional and content-related interests need to be better aligned if development financing is to be made more efficient and more sustainable. In particular, a reformed architecture for the EU’s external financing has to do more to reconcile European sustainability and development goals with the needs of partners. Measuring impact against uniform standards will both help to achieve overarching objectives and convey a successful European development model. Given the importance of private capital for development finance, a reformed financial architecture should also consider the interests and rationales of the private sector. However, this will only be a winning formula if social, environmental and human rights standards do not take a back seat.

Adopted by the United Nations (UN) General Assembly in December 2018, the Global Compact on Refugees (GCR) and its Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF) point to a paradigm shift in international refugee policy. The social and economic independence of refugees in destination countries and communities in particular is to be increased. In return, the international community commits to engage in burden- and responsibility-sharing by supporting hosting countries and communities with knowledge and resources. With this new deal, the UN announced its intention to break existing vicious cycles of displacement and dependence on aid in order to ensure that refugees and host communities benefit equally from the measures.
The East African nation of Kenya is one of 15 pilot countries working to promote the implementation of the CRRF. The Kenyan Government pledged at the UN Summit for Refugees and Migrants in September 2016 to integrate refugees more effectively and involve them in national and local development planning processes. It underscored its commitments in March 2017 in the context of the regional Nairobi Declaration and Action Plan (NAP). While the national operational plan announced at the time has not yet been adopted, individual commitments are already being implemented. These also include the (further) development of the integrated refugee settlement of Kalobeyei in Turkana Country in the far north-west of the country, a project supported by the international community as part of the CRRF, but originally initiated at local level.
The example of Kenya and Turkana County shows that the (capacity for) implementation of global agreements depends not least on the specific interests of sub-national actors. Requirements of the CRRF, such as better infrastructure for refugees and host communities, are compatible with the local government’s economic development priorities. The capacity of Kenyan counties to take action has also been improved as a result of the decentralisation process in 2010. To a certain degree at least, counties can challenge the national security-related narratives which restrict the opportunities of refugees to participate in society to this day. In neighbouring Tanzania, implementation of the CRRF failed due in no small part to the fact that barely any consideration was given to the concerns of local actors in the nation’s centralised political system.
Based on our analysis, we make the following recommendations for German development policy:

• Local state and non-governmental actors should be involved in drafting global norms and dialogue between municipalities should be promoted,
• Partner governments should be made aware of the benefits of integrating refugees and political and administrative implementation should be supported,
• Local stakeholders should be actively involved and supported in the planning and prioritisation of refugee integration strategies.

Adopted by the United Nations (UN) General Assembly in December 2018, the Global Compact on Refugees (GCR) and its Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF) point to a paradigm shift in international refugee policy. The social and economic independence of refugees in destination countries and communities in particular is to be increased. In return, the international community commits to engage in burden- and responsibility-sharing by supporting hosting countries and communities with knowledge and resources. With this new deal, the UN announced its intention to break existing vicious cycles of displacement and dependence on aid in order to ensure that refugees and host communities benefit equally from the measures.
The East African nation of Kenya is one of 15 pilot countries working to promote the implementation of the CRRF. The Kenyan Government pledged at the UN Summit for Refugees and Migrants in September 2016 to integrate refugees more effectively and involve them in national and local development planning processes. It underscored its commitments in March 2017 in the context of the regional Nairobi Declaration and Action Plan (NAP). While the national operational plan announced at the time has not yet been adopted, individual commitments are already being implemented. These also include the (further) development of the integrated refugee settlement of Kalobeyei in Turkana Country in the far north-west of the country, a project supported by the international community as part of the CRRF, but originally initiated at local level.
The example of Kenya and Turkana County shows that the (capacity for) implementation of global agreements depends not least on the specific interests of sub-national actors. Requirements of the CRRF, such as better infrastructure for refugees and host communities, are compatible with the local government’s economic development priorities. The capacity of Kenyan counties to take action has also been improved as a result of the decentralisation process in 2010. To a certain degree at least, counties can challenge the national security-related narratives which restrict the opportunities of refugees to participate in society to this day. In neighbouring Tanzania, implementation of the CRRF failed due in no small part to the fact that barely any consideration was given to the concerns of local actors in the nation’s centralised political system.
Based on our analysis, we make the following recommendations for German development policy:

• Local state and non-governmental actors should be involved in drafting global norms and dialogue between municipalities should be promoted,
• Partner governments should be made aware of the benefits of integrating refugees and political and administrative implementation should be supported,
• Local stakeholders should be actively involved and supported in the planning and prioritisation of refugee integration strategies.

The European Union (EU) approach to migration in Africa has significantly shifted in the last few years. Notably since 2015, it has focused on preventing irregular migration and privileges engagement with the main countries of origin and transit of migrants. In the context of the 2015 Joint Valletta Action Plan (JVAP), a funding instrument – the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF) –was created to channel development aid in support of EU interests in curbing migration.
As reflected in historical and more recent policy agendas, economic integration and free movement within the continent and its regions constitute key elements of African development ambitions and narratives. But an increasing body of research suggests that EU activities (in particular the EUTF) sideline or even undermine African stakeholders and interests in decision-making and programming on migration.
This paper analyses the effects of EU political dialogue and programming on regional free movement (RFM) in two African regions: the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in the Horn of Africa and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in West Africa. These regions receive the greatest amount of EUTF funding. While both IGAD and ECOWAS have frameworks on RFM, these are at very different stages of development.
The analysis, based on literature review and field research, shows that EU approaches to and impact on RFM differ significantly in the two regions. In the IGAD region, the EU is not undermining but rather supporting free movement – albeit not as significantly as it could. In contrast, in the ECOWAS region the EU’s focus on preventing irregular migration is undermining progress on RFM.
At least three factors drive this difference: 1) institutional coherence and decision-making powers vary considerably in the two regions; 2) whereas some powerful member states in the IGAD region consider free movement to be a barrier to their hegemonic role, member states in the ECOWAS region largely see it as positive; and 3) EU migration programming in these regions is driven by different levels of urgency – with the largest number of irregular migrants coming from West Africa, the EU’s objective of curbing migration is more accentuated in the ECOWAS region.
A number of policy processes between and within the EU and Africa are currently underway that could reshape how the EU engages with Africa on migration issues, provided existing tensions are acknowledged and addressed. Since RFM is in the long-term interests of both parties, given its potential value to contribute to growth, development and stability within Africa, the EU should pursue the following programmatic steps for its support:

• Supporting regional organisations. This includes tailored capacity support in strategic direction, analytical capacity and outreach to member states. This should build on lessons from existing EU projects in support of RFM.
• Enhancing coherence between security and development. This means for example that existing programmes addressing irregular migration are examined regarding their impact on free movement.
• Improving capacity of EU delegations. This requires linking the regional EU delegations more effectively to EU delegations in member states to support joint regional and national level actions on RFM.

The European Union (EU) approach to migration in Africa has significantly shifted in the last few years. Notably since 2015, it has focused on preventing irregular migration and privileges engagement with the main countries of origin and transit of migrants. In the context of the 2015 Joint Valletta Action Plan (JVAP), a funding instrument – the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF) –was created to channel development aid in support of EU interests in curbing migration.
As reflected in historical and more recent policy agendas, economic integration and free movement within the continent and its regions constitute key elements of African development ambitions and narratives. But an increasing body of research suggests that EU activities (in particular the EUTF) sideline or even undermine African stakeholders and interests in decision-making and programming on migration.
This paper analyses the effects of EU political dialogue and programming on regional free movement (RFM) in two African regions: the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in the Horn of Africa and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in West Africa. These regions receive the greatest amount of EUTF funding. While both IGAD and ECOWAS have frameworks on RFM, these are at very different stages of development.
The analysis, based on literature review and field research, shows that EU approaches to and impact on RFM differ significantly in the two regions. In the IGAD region, the EU is not undermining but rather supporting free movement – albeit not as significantly as it could. In contrast, in the ECOWAS region the EU’s focus on preventing irregular migration is undermining progress on RFM.
At least three factors drive this difference: 1) institutional coherence and decision-making powers vary considerably in the two regions; 2) whereas some powerful member states in the IGAD region consider free movement to be a barrier to their hegemonic role, member states in the ECOWAS region largely see it as positive; and 3) EU migration programming in these regions is driven by different levels of urgency – with the largest number of irregular migrants coming from West Africa, the EU’s objective of curbing migration is more accentuated in the ECOWAS region.
A number of policy processes between and within the EU and Africa are currently underway that could reshape how the EU engages with Africa on migration issues, provided existing tensions are acknowledged and addressed. Since RFM is in the long-term interests of both parties, given its potential value to contribute to growth, development and stability within Africa, the EU should pursue the following programmatic steps for its support:

• Supporting regional organisations. This includes tailored capacity support in strategic direction, analytical capacity and outreach to member states. This should build on lessons from existing EU projects in support of RFM.
• Enhancing coherence between security and development. This means for example that existing programmes addressing irregular migration are examined regarding their impact on free movement.
• Improving capacity of EU delegations. This requires linking the regional EU delegations more effectively to EU delegations in member states to support joint regional and national level actions on RFM.

The social contract is a key concept in social science literature focusing on state–society relations. It refers to the “entirety of explicit or implicit agreements between all relevant societal groups and the sovereign (i.e. the government or any other actor in power), defining their rights and obligations towards each other” (Loewe & Zintl, forthcoming).
The analysis of social contracts helps the understanding of: (i) why some societal groups are socially, politically or economically better off than others, (ii) why some revolt and demand a new social contract and, thus, (iii) why a country descends into violent conflict. In addition, the concept shows how foreign interventions and international co-operation may affect state–society relations by strengthening the position of the state or of specific societal groups. It illustrates that state fragility, displacement and migration can arise from social contracts becoming less inclusive.
Nevertheless, the term “social contract” has so far been neither well defined nor operationalised – to the detriment of both research and of bi- and multilateral co-operation. Such a structured analytical approach to state–society relations is badly needed both in research and in politics, in particular but not exclusively for the analysis of MENA countries. This briefing paper sets the frame, suggesting a close analysis of (i) the scope of social contracts, (ii) their substance and (iii) their temporal dimension.
After independence, MENA governments established a specific kind of social contract with citizens, mainly based on the redistribution of rents from natural resources, development aid and other forms of transfers.
They provided subsidised food and energy, free public education and government jobs to citizens in compensation for the tacit recognition of political regimes’ legitimacy despite a lack of political participation. But with growing populations and declining state revenues, some governments lost their ability to fulfil their duties and focused spending on strategically important social groups, increasingly tying resource provision to political acquiescence.
The uprisings that took place in many Arab countries in 2011 can be seen as an expression of deep dissatisfaction with social contracts that no longer provided either political participation or substantial social benefits (at least for large parts of the population).
After the uprisings, MENA countries developed in different directions. While Tunisia is a fair way towards more inclusive development and political participation, Morocco and Jordan are trying to restore some parts of the former social contract, providing for paternalistic distribution without substantial participation. In Egypt’s emerging social contract, the government promises little more than individual and collective security, and that only under the condition of full political acquiescence. Libya, Yemen and Syria have fallen into civil wars with no countrywide new contract in sight, and Iraq has been struggling for one since 2003. In addition, flight and migration also affect the social contracts of neighbouring countries such as Jordan, Turkey, and Lebanon.
All MENA countries are designing, or will need to design, new social contracts in order to reduce the current instability and enable physical reconstruction. This briefing paper informs on the status of conceptual considerations of social contract renegotiation in MENA countries and its meaning for international co-operation with them.
 

The social contract is a key concept in social science literature focusing on state–society relations. It refers to the “entirety of explicit or implicit agreements between all relevant societal groups and the sovereign (i.e. the government or any other actor in power), defining their rights and obligations towards each other” (Loewe & Zintl, forthcoming).
The analysis of social contracts helps the understanding of: (i) why some societal groups are socially, politically or economically better off than others, (ii) why some revolt and demand a new social contract and, thus, (iii) why a country descends into violent conflict. In addition, the concept shows how foreign interventions and international co-operation may affect state–society relations by strengthening the position of the state or of specific societal groups. It illustrates that state fragility, displacement and migration can arise from social contracts becoming less inclusive.
Nevertheless, the term “social contract” has so far been neither well defined nor operationalised – to the detriment of both research and of bi- and multilateral co-operation. Such a structured analytical approach to state–society relations is badly needed both in research and in politics, in particular but not exclusively for the analysis of MENA countries. This briefing paper sets the frame, suggesting a close analysis of (i) the scope of social contracts, (ii) their substance and (iii) their temporal dimension.
After independence, MENA governments established a specific kind of social contract with citizens, mainly based on the redistribution of rents from natural resources, development aid and other forms of transfers.
They provided subsidised food and energy, free public education and government jobs to citizens in compensation for the tacit recognition of political regimes’ legitimacy despite a lack of political participation. But with growing populations and declining state revenues, some governments lost their ability to fulfil their duties and focused spending on strategically important social groups, increasingly tying resource provision to political acquiescence.
The uprisings that took place in many Arab countries in 2011 can be seen as an expression of deep dissatisfaction with social contracts that no longer provided either political participation or substantial social benefits (at least for large parts of the population).
After the uprisings, MENA countries developed in different directions. While Tunisia is a fair way towards more inclusive development and political participation, Morocco and Jordan are trying to restore some parts of the former social contract, providing for paternalistic distribution without substantial participation. In Egypt’s emerging social contract, the government promises little more than individual and collective security, and that only under the condition of full political acquiescence. Libya, Yemen and Syria have fallen into civil wars with no countrywide new contract in sight, and Iraq has been struggling for one since 2003. In addition, flight and migration also affect the social contracts of neighbouring countries such as Jordan, Turkey, and Lebanon.
All MENA countries are designing, or will need to design, new social contracts in order to reduce the current instability and enable physical reconstruction. This briefing paper informs on the status of conceptual considerations of social contract renegotiation in MENA countries and its meaning for international co-operation with them.