European Parliamentary Research Service Blog

Written by Izabela Cristina Bacian,

© Shutterstock

Given the unprecedented circumstances surrounding the COVID-19 outbreak and the potential EU-wide ramifications, Heads of State or Government of the 27 EU Member States welcomed the initiative to hold a special meeting by video-conference on 10 March 2020. European Council President Charles Michel expressed his sympathy for all those citizens affected by the disease and, in particular, for Italy, the country most affected so far. The Member States discussed the COVID-19 outbreak and agreed on four lines of action to contain the spread of the disease. The President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, the President of the European Central Bank, Christine Lagarde, the President of the Eurogroup, Mario Centeno, and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the European Commission, Josep Borrell, also took part in the discussion.

The format of the meeting was exceptional in several aspects. It is noteworthy that, for the first time, a video-conference call, bringing all EU Heads of State or Government together, as well as many representatives from other institutions, was organised in such a formal manner. The meeting was followed by a regular press conference, and resulted in the President of the European Council releasing its conclusions. Given the very productive outcome of the meeting, it is possible that such a format could be used more frequently in the future.

Following the discussion, EU leaders identified four priorities: 1) Limiting the spread of the virus; 2) Provision of medical equipment; 3) Promotion of research; and 4) Tackling the socio-economic consequences. Member States agreed that all measures taken should be based on science and be proportionate, and that all relevant information would be shared through existing coordination mechanisms. It will be essential that medical equipment be made available, and the European Commission will pursue joint public procurement, prioritising protective equipment and respiratory devices. Member States called for more research, including towards the development of a vaccine. The Commission has already mobilised €140 million of public and private funding for research on vaccines, diagnosis and treatment. Moreover, it will assemble a team of epidemiologists and virologists from different Member States to agree guidelines to apply at European level.

The Heads of State or Government agreed to act in a coordinated manner to address the socio-economic impact of the virus outbreak on specific affected sectors and employees, in particular, small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). In this context, a flexible application of EU rules on state aid and the Stability and Growth Pact would be needed. The Commission will propose concrete measures before the Eurogroup meeting on 16 March 2020. Lastly, the Commission will bring forward a Corona Response Investment Initiative to support health systems, SMEs, the labour market and other vulnerable sectors. The Commission intends to make €7.5 billion in liquidity available in the coming weeks, which could be increased to €25 billion.

Regarding the impact of the COVID-19 outbreak on the aviation industry, legislation will be proposed to temporarily loosen the airport slot usage obligations on airlines under EU law. Under the EU Airport Slots Regulation (EEC 95/93), airlines are required to use 80 % of their allocated slots, or face losing their right to such slots in future seasons. The European Council will follow up on all of these issues during its meeting on 26-27 March 2020.

Read this ‘At a glance’ on ‘Outcome of the video-conference call of EU Heads of State or Government on10 March 2020‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Marcin Grajewski,

© Oleksii Synelnykov / Shutterstock

The highly contagious new coronavirus, known as COVID-19, is spreading globally at a very rapid pace, having infected about 114 000 people and killed nearly 4 000 at the time of writing, according to the situation report from the World Health Organization (WHO). It has sparked fears of a global pandemic with unpredictable consequences, including significant potential economic damage. China, Italy, Iran, South Korea, Japan, and now France, Germany and Spain, are the countries most affected by the virus. These and other governments are facing a very major challenge to stop the spread of the disease and ward off a deep economic crisis.

This note offers links to recent commentaries and reports from international think tanks on the coronavirus and related issues.

How Europe should manage the Coronavirus-induced crisis
Centre for European Policy Studies, March 2020

Uncharted territory: Italy’s response to the coronavirus
European Council on Foreign Relations, March 2020

How to fight the economic fallout from the Coronavirus
Chatham House, March 2020

Designing an effective US policy response to Coronavirus
Peterson Institute for International Economics, March 2020

To save the Italian economy from the Coronavirus, Rome prescribes a stimulus
Bruegel, March 2020

Ill will: Populism and the Coronavirus
European Council on Foreign Relations, March 2020

Economics in the time of COVID-19
Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry, March 2020

Coronavirus outbreak intensifies: Q&A with RAND experts
Rand Corporation, March 2020

China and Japan sharing weal and woe in the face of epidemic
China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations, March 2020

ROK’s COVID-19 epidemic tendency and Sino-ROK cooperation
China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations, March 2020
The Coronavirus outbreak could disrupt the U.S. drug supply
Council on Foreign Relations, March 2020

A Japan divided over COVID-19 control
East Asia Forum, March 2020

Will Covid-19 topple China’s one-party regime?
German Marshall Fund, March 2020

Coronavirus is already changing the world
Atlantic Council, March 2020

What should a fiscal response to a COVID-19 outbreak look like?
Brookings Institution, March 2020

Russia’s not ready for Coronavirus
Council on Foreign Relations, March 2020
Governments and businesses brace for Coronavirus impact
Atlantic Council, March 2020

The Coronavirus is exposing the limits of populism
Brookings Institution, March 2020

Africa confronts falling oil prices amid Coronavirus
Council on Foreign Relations, March 2020

Coronavirus and the oil market: The effects thus far and what to expect next
Atlantic Council, March 2020

The Coronavirus will reveal hidden vulnerabilities in complex global supply chains
Brookings Institution, March 2020

The impact of Coronavirus on Gulf economies
Atlantic Council, March 2020

If Italy gets sick, the whole world catches a cold
American Enterprise Institute, March 2020

COVID-19: Tips for a saner digital diet in these viral times
Heinrich Böll Stiftung, March 2020

The cruise that escaped COVID-19 outbreak
China Institute of International Studies, March 2020

The Coronavirus outbreak is the shape of things to come
Council on Foreign Relations, February 2020

China’s fight against COVID-19 epidemic: A decisive campaign
Shanghai Institutes for International Studies, February 2020

The Coronavirus and freedom of expression in China: Not so fast
Istituto Affari Internazionali, February 2020

What you need to know about the Coronavirus outbreak
Council on Foreign Relations, February 2020

As the Coronavirus spreads, can the EU afford to close its borders?
Bruegel, February 2020

China and the geopolitics of the Coronavirus
Clingendael, February 2020

How to save lives in a COVID-19 pandemic
Resolve to Save Lives, February 2020

Companies must move supply chains further from China
Bruegel, February 2020

Preparing for the Coronavirus and other epidemics in Africa
Brookings Institution, February 2020

Preparing for pandemics such as Coronavirus: Will we ever break the vicious cycle of panic and neglect?
Brookings Institution, February 2020

Epidemic tests China’s supply chain dominance
Bruegel, February 2020

China’s Coronavirus will not lead to recession but to stimulus and even more debt
Bruegel, February 2020

Read this briefing on ‘Coronavirus (COVID-19)‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Mihalis Kritikos,

© Shutterstock

Analytics have changed the way disease outbreaks are tracked and managed, thereby saving lives. The international community is currently focused on the 2019-2020 novel coronavirus (COVID-19) outbreak, first identified in Wuhan, China. As it spreads, raising fears of a worldwide pandemic, international organisations and scientists are using artificial intelligence (AI) to track the epidemic in real-time, to effectively predict where the virus might appear next and develop an effective response.

On 31 December 2019, the World Health Organization (WHO) received the first report of a suspected novel coronavirus (COVID-19) in Wuhan. Amid concerns that the global response is fractured and uncoordinated, the WHO declared the outbreak a public health emergency of international concern (PHEIC) under the International Health Regulations (IHR) on 30 January 2020. Warnings about the novel coronavirus spreading beyond China were raised by AI systems more than a week before official information about the epidemic was released by international organisations. A health monitoring start-up correctly predicted the spread of COVID‑19, using natural-language processing and machine learning. Decisions during such an outbreak need to be made on an urgent basis, often in the context of scientific uncertainty, fear, distrust, and social and institutional disruption. How can AI technologies be used to manage this type of global health emergency, without undermining protection of fundamental values and human rights?

Potential impacts and developments

In the case of COVID-19, AI has been used mostly to help detect whether people have novel coronavirus through the detection of visual signs of COVID-19 on images from lung CT scans; to monitor, in real time, changes in body temperature through the use of wearable sensors; and to provide an open-source data platform to track the spread of the disease. AI could process vast amounts of unstructured text data to predict the number of potential new cases by area and which types of populations will be most at risk, as well as evaluate and optimise strategies for controlling the spread of the epidemic. Other AI applications can deliver medical supplies by drone, disinfect patient rooms and scan approved drug databases (for other illnesses) that might also work against COVID-19. AI technologies have been harnessed to come up with new molecules that could serve as potential medications or even accelerate the time taken to predict the virus’s RNA secondary structure. A series of risk assessment algorithms for COVID-19 for use in healthcare settings have been developed, including an algorithm for the main actions that need to be followed for managing contacts of probable or confirmed COVID-19 cases, as developed by the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control.

Certain AI applications can also detect fake news about the disease by applying machine-learning techniques for mining social media information, tracking down words that are sensational or alarming, and identifying which online sources are deemed authoritative for fighting what has been called an infodemic. Facebook, Google, Twitter and TikTok have partnered with the WHO to review and expose false information about COVID-19.

In public health emergency response management, derogating from an individual’s rights of privacy, non-discrimination and freedom of movement in the name of the urgency of the situation can sometimes take the form of restrictive measures that include domestic containment strategies without due process, or medical examination without informed consent. In the case of COVID-19, AI applications such as the use of facial recognition to track people not wearing masks in public, or AI-based fever detection systems, as well as the processing of data collected on digital platforms and mobile networks to track a person’s recent movements, have contributed to draconian enforcement of restraining measures for the confinement of the outbreak for unspecified durations. Chinese search giant Baidu has developed a system using infrared and facial recognition technology that scans and takes photographs of more than 200 people per minute at the Qinghe railway station in Beijing. In Moscow, authorities are using automated facial recognition technology to scan surveillance camera footage in an attempt to identify recent arrivals from China, placed under quarantine for fear of COVID‑19 infection and not expected to enter the station. Finally, Chinese authorities are deploying drones to patrol public places, conduct thermal imaging, or to track people violating quarantine rules.

Anticipatory policy-making

As a governance system, the WHO has limited enforcement tools, whereas its surveillance system is fully dependent on states’ willingness to meet their good-faith reporting requirements. However, reporting compliance remains low, raising questions about the ability of low and middle-income countries (LMICs) to meet IHR obligations in the absence of adequate resourcing and financial support and about the effectiveness of the main legal framework of ‘essential’ capacities required by nations to prevent, detect and rapidly respond to public health threats. However, AI technologies have the potential to challenge the state’s monopoly of information control and operationalise the WHO’s right to receive reports from non-state sources, particularly if and when those reports contradict reports provided by the state.

The development of vaccines and drugs in response to public health emergencies also presents particular legal and ethical challenges. The European Commission and the European Medicines Agency have put procedures in place to speed up the assessment and authorisation of vaccines for use during a public health emergency, either via the pandemic preparedness vaccine marketing authorisation or the emergency procedure. The EMA recently activated its plan for managing emerging health threats, whereas the Commission and the Innovative Medicines Initiative (IMI) launched fast-track calls for proposals for the development of therapeutics and diagnostics to combat COVID-19 infections. Using the paragraph 6 system, provided by the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), countries are allowed to import cheaper generics made under compulsory licensing if they are unable to manufacture the medicines themselves. Adopting measures to counteract the potentially adverse health impact of IP protection and sharing preliminary research results with all actors in the response is a crucial component of any integrated global alert and response system for epidemics that aims at making the benefits of research available to the local population without undue delay. AI’s capacity to quickly search large databases and process vast amounts of medical data can essentially accelerate the development of a drug that can fight COVID-19 but also raises questions about the criteria used for the selection of the relevant data sets and possible algorithmic bias. Most public health systems lack the capacity to collect the data needed to train algorithms that would be reflective of the needs of local populations, take local practice patterns into account and ensure equity and fairness.

As public health emergencies can be deeply socially divisive, stretch public-health capacities and limit rights to privacy and informational self-determination, it is important for policy-makers to rationally consider the ethics of their crisis-management policies. Although the Siracusa Principles may allow for the provision of limitation, or derogation, from the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), confining the outbreak of a lethal disease in emergency contexts should be ethically justifiable, necessary and proportionate. In all cases, least liberty-infringing alternatives should be used to achieve the public health goal. The WHO guidance for managing ethical issues in infectious disease outbreaks and the guidance on ethical issues in research in global health emergencies could help to ensure appropriate ethical oversight and collaboration, to help combat social stigmatisation of those affected, or perceived to be affected, by the disease.

However, given the absence of a comprehensive human rights framework that would underpin effective outbreak surveillance at the international level, the management of the risks associated with infectious diseases is likely to remain an ongoing challenge for global health governance. The massive use of AI tracking and surveillance tools in the context of this outbreak, combined with the current fragmentation in the ethical governance of AI, could pave the way for a wider and more permanent use of these surveillance technologies, leading to a situation known as ‘mission creep’. Coordinated action on inclusive risk assessment and strict interpretation of public health legal exemptions, such as that envisaged in Article 9 of the General Data Protection Regulation, will therefore be key to ensuring the responsible use of this disruptive technology during public health emergencies. Accordingly, preventing AI use from contributing to the establishment of new forms of automated social control, which could persist long after the epidemic subsides, must be addressed in ongoing legislative initiatives on AI at EU level.

Read this ‘At a glance’ on ‘What if we could fight coronavirus with artificial intelligence?‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Marcin Grajewski,

© Waraporn Wattanakul / Shutterstock

The European Green Deal is a key policy plank of the new European Commission led by President Ursula von der Leyen. It is a package of measures that aims to radically cut emissions of greenhouse gases while creating jobs in clean industries. Its main objectives are for the EU to become climate neutral by 2050, radically reduce other types of pollution, help European companies to become world leaders in green products, and offer aid to regions affected by this economic transition.

This note offers links to recent commentaries, studies and reports from international think tanks on the Green Deal and climate issues. More studies on the topics can be found in a previous item from these series, published in early December 2019.

Europe’s Green Deal must reach beyond its borders
Bruegel, February 2020

Digging the trenches: The EU and the Green Deal
European Council on Foreign Relations, February 2020

Five things to look for in the Green New Deal
World Resources Institute, February 2020

The EU Green Deal can go global, but ‘climate diplomacy’ won’t be easy
Friends of Europe, February 2020

The European Green Deal: Winning the climate change
Centre international de formation européenne, February 2020

Berlin will make or break the European Green Deal
Bruegel, February 2020

There is no Green Deal without a just transition
Instituto Affari Internazionali, February 2020

Low carbon energy transition as a driver and solution to energy poverty and injustice
Centre international de formation européenne, February 2020

Are financial markets aligned with climate action? New evidence from the Paris Agreement
LCE, Gratham Instutute on Climate Change, Centre for Climate Change Economics and Policy February 2020

How to implement a WTO-compatible full border carbon adjustment as an important part of the European Green Deal
Österreichische Gesellschaft für Europapolitik, January 2020

European green finance is expanding, a discount on bank capital would discredit it
Bruegel, January 2020

What businesses can do for the European Green Deal
Jacquest Delors Institute, January 2020

The just transition fund: 4 benchmarks for success
E3G, January 2020

Climat: l’Europe a brûlé ses vaisseaux
Terra Nova, January 2020

The colour of money: Green deals, cohesion funds, and the populist challenge
European Council on Foreign Relations, January 2020

Climate laws in Europe
Ecologic Institute, January 2020

A trillion reasons to scrutinise the Green Deal Investment Plan
Bruegel, January 2020

How the European Green Deal will succeed or fail
E3G, December 2019

The Green Deal will make or break Europe
European Council on Foreign Relations, December 2019

Can Europe offer a Green Deal to the world?
Centre for European Policy Studies, December 2019

EU trade policy: Global enforcer for the European Green Deal
European Policy Centre, December 2019

Making the political weather to combat climate change
Centre for European Policy Studies, December 2019

Ein flexibler Kompromiss: Der Europäische Rat trägt den European Green Deal mit
Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, December 2019

The European Green Deal needs a reformed fiscal framework
Bruegel, December 2019

The European Green Deal: A promising start and a long road ahead
European Policy Centre, December 2019

Delivering climate neutrality: Accelerating EU decarbonisation with research and innovation funding
E3G, December 2019

Boosting EU climate finance: Mitigate more without neglecting adaptation in poorer countries
European Centre for Development Policy Management, December 2019

European Green Deal: Bring in the Western Balkans
European Council on Foreign Relations, December 2019

Five pillars for a CO2-free industry in Europe and Italy
Instituto Affairi Internazionali, December 2019

EU climate policy as a challenge for Central Europe
E3G, December 2019

A budget to address the climate emergency
Heinrich Böll Stiftung, December 2019

Raising the game on Paris Alignment: Six memos on the multilateral development banks’ Paris alignment approach
New Climate Institute, December 2019

National laws and policies on climate change Adaptation: A global review
Centre for Climate Change Economics and Policy, December 2019

Social consequences of climate change: Building climate friendly and resilient communities via transition from planned to market economies
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, December 2019

Read this briefing on ‘The European Green Deal‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Gianluca Quaglio with Sophie Millar,

Drug development: heavily ‘drug-focused’ rather than ‘patient-focused’

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For a drug to be prescribed to a patient, it must first be rigorously tested for efficacy and safety and subsequently be approved by relevant authoritative bodies, such as the European Medicines Agency (EMA). However, it has been underlined that the current framework of drug development is heavily ‘drug-focused’ rather than ‘patient-focused’. This means that the end users of the drug, the patients, are not generally placed at the centre of the drug development paradigm. In other words, achieving regulatory approval is seen as the ultimate goal, eclipsing somewhat the use of a drug in its real-world setting. This is not helped by the lack of regulatory demands or incentives for gathering such real world data.

Clinical trials generally recruit a very specific set of participants with small variability, who do not ultimately fully reflect the target population to receive the novel therapy under investigation. The resulting ‘research gap’ highlights the disconnect between the pre-approval development of medicines and their post-approval use in real-world contexts (Figure 1). In Europe, most clinical research focuses primarily on drug development for regulatory approval, instead of addressing patient and public-health needs.

Figure 1 – Research gap between drug development and real world healthcare delivery ©Pot Regnier/STOA

Establishing treatment optimisation as part of personalised medicine development

A shift in drug development is emerging, with momentum towards greater recognition of precision or personalised medicine and patient-centred approaches. The Council of the European Union, while accepting that there is no common definition of the term precision (personalised) medicine, noted that this is generally understood to refer to a medical model that uses the characterisation of individuals’ phenotypes and genotypes to tailor the right therapeutic strategy for the right person at the right time and/or to determine the predisposition to disease and/or to deliver a targeted prevention strategy (Council of the EU, 2015).

A patient-focused approach, termed treatment optimisation or applied research, would bridge the gap between the first stage (regulatory approval) and the second stage (real-world application) of drug development, giving strength to the direction of personalised medicine development.

Numerous drugs are authorised on the market, with limited knowledge on how to use them for dose, sequence, combination and duration of treatment. The treatment optimisation approach could answer questions such as: whether a lower dose of the drug could produce the same results with potentially fewer toxic side effects; how the drug performs in terms of patient-relevant outcome measures such as quality of life and overall survival; and long-term use effects. There is therefore a need for investigation of the optimal way to use medicines.

Role of key stakeholders in the current drug development system

Developing a drug and bringing it into clinical practice is a complex process involving multiple partners in several areas, namely: (i) pharmaceutical industry; (ii) regulatory agencies; (iii) payers (in healthcare, this term generally refers to entities other than patients that finance or reimburse the cost of health services); (iv) Health Technology Assessment (HTA) agencies; (iv) clinicians; (v) patients; (iv) academia. Although they have a common goal (the benefit of the patient), they work with different priorities and methodology. For example, while pharmaceutical companies seek – among other things – profit, researchers want to develop their medical tools and academic career, regulators assess the therapeutic efficacy, and payers make sure that the medical innovations are worth the public investment (Figure 2).

©Pot Regnier/STOA

The presence of different actors in the drug development process does not help to narrow the research gap between the first stage and the second stage of drug development.

The STOA study

How do we move to more patient and society-centred drug development, taking all stakeholders’ perspectives and needs into account? It is about bridging the gap between two dimensions that are often misunderstood: (i) efficacy, which is demonstrated under controlled conditions in classical clinical drug trials, and (ii) effectiveness, defined as how a drug performs in the real world of widely varying patients and doctors in different types of hospitals and clinics.

To provide direction in enabling the implementation of treatment optimisation, 26 experts across 5 stakeholder groups were interviewed for a study carried out by the European Parliament Panel for the Future of Science and Technology (STOA) and entitled ‘Treatment optimisation in drug development’. The report was carried out in collaboration with the European Organisation for Research and Treatment of Cancer (EORTC). The interviewees represented patient organisations, regulator and payer authorities, the pharmaceutical industry, health technology assessment agencies, and academic clinicians.

The majority of interviewees agreed that there are insufficient patient-centred approaches and real-world evidence, and a lack of adequate patient involvement during the design stage of clinical trials. The report highlights that both patient-centred and drug-centred approaches are needed and should indeed complement each other.

A number of important recommendations from interviewees regarding how to implement treatment optimisation strategies emerged, covering the process, funding, timing, design and setting for the conduct of studies. Interviewees either proposed that the process should be led by a consortium of all key stakeholders, or by academia and not-for-profit organisations with input from industry (e.g. drug supply). There was some agreement on funding, in that it should come from a combination of public and private sources. Setting-wise, interviewees either did not have a strong preference (case-by-case basis), or suggested that it should take place at a national level with possible international oversight.

In regard to the design of treatment optimisation methods, the following key features emerged from the interviews: fewer inclusion and exclusion criteria; standard of care or best available treatment as comparators; use of patient-relevant outcome measures; and publication of all results. No clear consensus was reached on blinding (whether participants or study staff should know what treatment is being followed) or randomisation.

Policy options arising from this study centred on when in the drug development ‘pipeline’ the treatment optimisation process should take place, and by which legal mechanism. Three main policy options emerged. Briefly, these were: (i) making the conduct of treatment optimisation studies part of the requirements that manufacturers have to satisfy in order to obtain marketing authorisation for their products; (ii) including treatment optimisation studies as part of the post-authorisation commitments; and (iii) conditional reimbursement mechanisms employed to compel the manufacturers to carry out treatment optimisation studies.

Whatever policy approach prevails, it is clear that significant political effort will be needed for the current legislative frameworks to be modified, at both European and national level.

Written by Marketa Pape,

© MNBB Studio / Shutterstock.com

Transport is a strategic sector of the EU economy. Essential to ensuring free movement, it enables people and goods to overcome distances, borders and natural barriers, directly affecting the everyday lives of all EU citizens. Maintaining the flow of goods from producers and manufacturers to consumers makes efficient transport systems a backbone of European integration. For the single market to function well in all regions, the EU needs sustainable, efficient and fully interconnected transport networks.

As the demand for transport services grows, reducing transport emissions and negative impacts on human health and the environment has become one of the main challenges. New technologies, such as digitalisation, and connected and automated mobility, open new possibilities to improve transport safety, security and efficiency, and to reduce emissions, but also transform the employment in the sector in terms of working conditions and required skills. Collaborative economy developments, such as car-sharing and bike-sharing services are changing user behaviour and mobility patterns. EU transport policy needs to help the sector cut emissions drastically by running on less and cleaner energy, utilise modern infrastructure, and reduce its impact on the environment.

The new President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, has put transport on a fast track towards becoming decarbonised and digital. This transformation is to be a key part of her European Green Deal and ‘making Europe fit for the digital age’ priorities. In 2020, the Commission will propose a ‘climate law’, committing the EU to becoming climate neutral by 2050. The European Council has endorsed this objective and Parliament had already called for ambitious goals and a corresponding long-term EU budget. While concrete steps towards this ambitious goal remain to be defined, it will require a step change to make transport modern, sustainable and decarbonised.

Read the complete Briefing on ‘EU policies – Delivering for citizens: Transport policy ‘ on the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Listen to policy podcast ‘Transport policy‘ on YouTube.

Written by Philip Boucher,

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The world of work is regularly disrupted by technology development. From mass production to word processing, innovations have regularly transformed our working lives and, with them, the broader economic system. Artificial intelligence (AI) is the latest in a long line of such technologies. What would happen if AI worked just as well as (or perhaps better than) humans, without taking holidays, getting sick, joining unions or drawing salaries?

AI is defined as systems that ‘display intelligent behaviour by analysing their environment and taking actions – with some degree of autonomy – to achieve specific goals’. In the context of employment, AI could support workers in some tasks, and replace them in others, while offering productivity gains and, potentially, creating new jobs. A fair distribution of costs and benefits depends upon careful management of the rise of AI in the workplace.

Potential impacts and developments

If automation is often directed at ‘dull, dirty and dangerous’ tasks, AI may be stretching the definition of what counts as dull. As they become more capable, AI applications start to perform tasks that may be repetitive and labour intensive, but still require advanced skills and training. For example, AI can now be used to review legal texts. Since human lawyers are still needed to oversee and make use of this work, the result is task displacement and a reduction in the labour needed to do the same amount of work. This could translate into job losses, which might be compensated by lower costs leading to more demand for work, as well as new jobs in the creation and management of automated systems. Estimates vary wildly about how jobs will be created, transformed and lost. Some say 14 % of jobs could be automated, others say 47 %. Digitalisation has created 2 million jobs in the EU over the last 10 years and might continue to create new ones, but this is not automatic. Given the scale and uncertainty of the risks and opportunities, discussions quickly turn to the distribution of costs and benefits.

Several scenarios have emerged. For the pessimists, AI will lead to more unequal societies, as those who can perform valuable tasks or have a stake in the means of production grow wealthy, while the rest face unemployment and poverty. Unlike previous waves of automation, workers lose their role in the production system and, with it, their negotiating position, leading to the emergence of an irrelevant underclass. For the optimists, however, job obsolescence is not a problem if the very concept of employment is also made obsolete. It has been suggested that AI could take over almost all jobs, allowing us to build a ‘Digital Athens‘, in which robots take the unenviable role of slaves, liberating people to occupy themselves exclusively with interpersonal, creative, leisure and sporting activities. Some might choose to work, for satisfaction or additional payment, in technology development or roles where human contact is central, such as providing social care. These two visions appear to be in opposition, but have also been combined into a single vision in which a few countries profit from AI development and provide for their citizens, while others fall behind, leading to pockets of extreme wealth and extreme poverty in different parts of the world.

These scenarios are deliberately provocative, compelling us to reflect upon how AI development and its impacts should be managed. There are many social and technical differences between historic waves of technology development, and it would be reckless to rely upon a few trite observations to simply assume that AI will create as many jobs as it displaces, or that the affected workers will find their way and ultimately be grateful for the transitions that upend their lives. For this reason, it is important to reflect upon the impacts of AI on employment and prepare appropriate responses.

Anticipatory policy-making

The resolution on civil law rules on robotics, adopted by the European Parliament (EP) in 2017, highlighted potential skills shortages, gender inequality issues and the need to ensure the long-term sufficiency of social security systems. A 2018 EP resolution on digitalisation for development highlighted that digital strategies should be aligned with initiatives on education, equality and empowerment. A 2019 resolution on industrial policy in the context of AI highlighted the need for new programmes for education for all ages, as well as training and reskilling initiatives that engage the private sector and the existing workforce.

Along these lines, a range of measures could be taken to ensure that the workers of today and tomorrow have the skills they need to navigate their professional lives, and that society has the skills and capabilities needed to exploit the opportunities for beneficial development of AI. To ensure that the disruption is mobilised to reverse rather than exacerbate social inequalities, such programmes should include initiatives to reduce digital divides, embrace diversity and ensure an equitable distribution of costs and benefits.

Curriculums for the digital age. Even without specific reference to AI development, it is clear that students will benefit from learning computer science and programming. While this will be important for many students’ future careers, it will be valuable for everyone’s ability to navigate and understand their increasingly digital lives. These disciplines could be introduced at an earlier age and for a greater portion of time than today, and could also be combined with other disciplines, for example by applying programming skills to assignments in the sciences and humanities. As job markets are expected to change more rapidly in the future, the next generation of employees may benefit from learning more transferable skills and from ‘learning to learn’. This could be achieved through a greater focus on skill acquisition and problem solving in school curricula. AI training could also be included in the university curriculum for future lawyers, doctors and other professionals who may need to work closely with the technology as their careers advance.

Continued learning for employees. Substantial retraining for mid-career workers would help employers and employees alike to manage transitions in the nature of work and the skills required to flourish. However, once people start their careers, further education is usually limited to either very short courses offered by employers or longer programmes targeting unemployed people. The concept and delivery of continued learning could be renewed to support more proactive retraining that anticipates changing needs during employment. This could include creating new ways of delivering, certifying and financing mid-career retraining that is delivered ‘on-the-job’ with support from universities and professional institutes.

New career roles. It is easier to see how AI can displace current jobs than it is to imagine those it may create. When opportunities for new roles emerge, support could be offered to help employers develop them into established career paths. For example, digital advisors could help users manage their privacy settings, hold service providers to account when rules and agreements are breached, and advise either of them on new risks and liabilities. This and many other career paths require a particular blend of skills (legal, technical and communication), as well as broad recognition and trust. To support the flourishing of such roles, the vocational and professional training sector could be engaged to develop bespoke certification and skill development programmes. Authorities could also stimulate demand by offering new services to citizens, creating roles within the public sector and through public procurement.

Protect platform workers. AI is closely linked to many sectors of the ‘platform economy’, which has blurred the lines between employees and independent workers. These workers depend upon platforms, but have limited access to their algorithms or the vast amounts of data that is collected from across the networks. Furthermore, they often lack the safety nets provided by traditional employers such as regular hours, pension schemes, sick pay and family leave. Measures could be taken to ensure coverage of social protection and collective representation for these and other workers that are vulnerable to unfair distribution of the costs and benefits of AI development.

Further resolutions on fair working conditions, rights and social protection for platform workers and AI in education are in preparation.

Read the complete ‘At a glance’ on ‘What if artificial intelligence made work obsolete?‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Listen to policy podcast ‘What if artificial intelligence made work obsolete?‘ on YouTube.

Written by Clare Ferguson,

© artjazz / Fotolia

In view of the novel coronavirus outbreak, the European Parliament is implementing a range of precautionary measures. However, the Parliament has a duty to maintain its legislative work, and therefore the plenary session is still planned to take place (although the session will now be held in Brussels), with a number of pressing issues on the agenda. The Council and European Commission are expected to make statements on the novel coronavirus on Tuesday morning. Members are likely to support a coordinated European Union (EU) response to minimising the health and economic impact of the epidemic, with a vote on a motion for resolution scheduled for Thursday lunchtime.

International Women’s Day takes place on 8 March, and Members will hear statements from the Council and Commission on women as key agents for change on Tuesday morning. Indeed, young women (such as Greta Thunberg, who addressed Parliament’s Environment Committee on 4 March 2020), are increasingly making their mark on the world stage. However, gender inequalities persist despite the opportunities offered by the digital revolution, and Members will take stock of women’s rights in the digital age in a topical debate on Wednesday afternoon.

On Wednesday morning, Members will hear Council and Commission statements on the migration situation at the Greek-Turkish border and the EU response, where weaknesses in the Dublin system of international protection applications are likely once again to come to the fore. While proposals on EU budget financing for activities related to migration and border management are already on the table for the 2021-2027 multiannual financial framework (MFF), these are yet to be agreed. In a joint debate on Wednesday morning, Members will also hear statements on the conclusions of the special European Council meeting on the next MFF, and on preparations for the European Council meeting scheduled for 26 and 27 March.

Members will hear a number of statements from the Vice-President of the Commission/High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) on Tuesday afternoon. The first concerns a key EU strategic partner in the neighbourhood, Georgia, where elections are due in October 2020. The current government is under considerable criticism for its failure to progress on democratic reform. However, Parliament hopes its support of the country’s membership of the Eastern Partnership will encourage the government to implement the reforms called for under its Association Agreement with the EU. Members will vote on a motion for resolution on Thursday. The VP/HR will also make a statement marking five years of implementation of the Minsk agreements, which were intended to provide a roadmap to move from war to peace in Ukraine. Following Russian incursion, fighting in Ukraine led to EU sanctions on Russia in 2014. As the Minsk agreements have had limited success, fighting continues and the sanctions remain in place. Parliament has repeatedly underlined the Kremlin’s responsibility for the implementation of the Minsk accords. On Thursday, Members will vote on a motion for resolution on the five years of implementation.

Small businesses are the backbone of the EU economy, and a joint debate on Tuesday afternoon will focus on the EU strategies on small and medium-sized businesses and European industry, where Parliament has been keen to support Commission efforts to reduce red tape and administrative burden. Such businesses are also one focus of the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs (EMPL) report on the employment aspects of the 2020 Annual Growth Survey, which Members will discuss on Wednesday afternoon. The report is a step in the European Semester process, which allows EU countries to coordinate on economic reform and budget plans. The committee welcomes the Commission’s focus on attaining the Sustainable Development Goals, and makes several proposals to boost measures to tackle poverty, gender equality and access to health, all aimed at ensuring a just transition in a fair society.

Parliament plays a vital role in scrutinising such EU policy. Parliament’s committees therefore review several major policy areas and prepare an annual report. On Monday evening, Members will consider two Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) reports, where the committee calls for greater Parliamentary involvement in the process. The first report, on the state of play on banking union in 2019, acknowledges the need for a solid banking union to underpin the economy and to encourage competitiveness and convergence. However, the committee calls for greater advances in risk sharing, particularly in face of the threats associated with climate change or digital weaknesses and more specifically, the challenge posed by the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the EU. The second report deals with a review of EU competition policy in 2019. In view of the increased importance of global markets, the EU needs robust policy with international reach. The committee underlines the need, among other measures, to boost European market leaders and reinforce international standards, particularly in the digital field. While supporting the use of State aid for the European Green Deal, the committee also proposes introducing measures to fine countries that distort competition through State aid.

Finally, during voting on Wednesday, the Fisheries Committee recommends that Parliament consent to the conclusion of a new Protocol on the implementation of the EU–São Tomé and Príncipe fisheries agreement. Under the agreement, in exchange for €840 000 in EU assistance (more than half of which is earmarked to promote sustainable fisheries), São Tomé and Príncipe grants access for EU vessels to tuna stocks in the region.

Written by Tania Latici,

© Leoniek van der Vliet / Shutterstock

To ‘unite and strengthen Europe’ is one of the goals expressed by the newly elected President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen. Her predecessor, Jean-Claude Juncker, believed that only ‘a strong and united Europe can protect our citizens against threats internal and external.’ European infrastructure that enables connectivity and ensures a rapid response in case of a crisis is a prerequisite for these visions. Since 2017, awareness has been increasing about the obstacles preventing armed forces from moving effectively and swiftly across borders in crisis conditions. The measures taken to correct this strategic vulnerability are known under the term military mobility.

Existing regulatory, administrative, and infrastructure inconsistencies and impediments across the territory of the European Union (EU) significantly hamper military exercises and training. Military mobility aims to harmonise rules across EU Member States and to explore the potential of a civilian-military approach to infrastructure development. Through measures such as funding dual‑use transport infrastructure, and simplifying diplomatic clearances and customs rules, the European Commission aims to improve military mobility across as well as beyond the EU, in support of missions and operations under the Common Security and Defence Policy. The unique EU contribution is its ability to leverage existing policies in the civilian realm to create added value for the military.

This goal can be achieved only if a whole-of-government approach is applied, which in turn requires close collaboration between different bodies at the EU level, between them and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and between them and various actors at the Member State level. So far, military mobility has enjoyed a high degree of commitment from all stakeholders, which has in turn ensured swift policy implementation. It is becoming increasingly clear that military mobility is an essential piece in the EU’s ambition to become a stronger global actor.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Military mobility: Infrastructure for the defence of Europe‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Listen to policy podcast ‘Military mobility‘ on YouTube.

Written by Rosamund Shreeves and Martina Prpic.

Greta Thunberg, the Swedish teenager who has inspired a youth-led international movement to tackle climate change, is due to address the European Commission and the European Parliament in the same week as International Women’s Day. Seven years ago, the European Parliament awarded the Sakharov prize for freedom of thought to another teenager, Malala Yousafzai, who now spearheads a global campaign for girls’ education. The very fact that the voices of these young women are being heard in international fora shows that progress has been made towards girls’ participation in public life. However, in a recent interview on the rise of youth activism, the now 22 year-old Yousafzai also highlighted the contrast between the large numbers of girls coming forward as activists and the continued under-representation of young people – and women – at the tables where decisions are made.

This is not a new issue. In 1995, the ground-breaking documents adopted at the UN’s World Conference on Women drew attention both to the persistent discrimination facing girls worldwide – and to their potential to advocate for themselves and their communities. In adopting the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action (BPfA), 189 countries committed to uphold women’s rights and take measures in 12 interrelated areas where urgent action was needed, including the specific area of girls’ rights. This year’s 25th anniversary of the BPfA is being marked both by a review of progress and by a push to ensure that younger generations of activists are involved in setting future priorities.

For this year’s review of the BPfA, the EU’s gender equality institute, EIGE, has drawn up a comprehensive report focusing on developments and recommendations for future action. Its key message is that although efforts to advance the situation of women and girls have had an impact, substantial gender inequalities persist across all twelve areas of concern, including girls’ rights.

Poverty alleviation was the first area of concern in the Platform for Action. In 1995, the evidence showed that, worldwide, women and girls were more likely than men and boys to be at risk of or living in poverty. For individuals, this manifested as low income, food insecurity, homelessness, unsafe living conditions, higher risks of illness and barriers to participation in education and social and cultural life. Countries committed to take steps to address the needs of women and girls living in poverty, particularly the most marginalised, and to modify their macro-economic and social policies to take account of the gender dimension. However, 25 years on, gender disparities in poverty levels and impacts persist. Worldwide, women and girls are still 4 % more likely than men and boys to live in extreme poverty. EIGE’s report highlights that in the EU, young people aged 16-24 are currently the most affected age group, whilst children faced the highest risk across all age groups in 2017. Having a parent with a low educational level or from a migrant background increases the vulnerability to poverty and social exclusion. For these age groups, there is little gender difference in the level of risk. However, EIGE points out that the way that data on poverty is collected makes it difficult to see whether girls and boys within households have the same living standards.

There are also aspects of poverty that concern girls and young women specifically. In 2018, the World Health Organization drew attention to the issue of ‘menstrual’ or period poverty in the European Region. Studies find that the inability to afford sanitary products is impeding girls’ education. In 2019, survey research in the UK found that in the past 12 months, one in 20 girls aged between 14 and 21 had struggled to afford products and 4 % had been unable to access them. Over half (52 %) of the girls surveyed had missed school or college because of their period. The most common reason given was period-related cramps (85 %), but 7 % had missed school because they could not access or could not afford sanitary products, the equivalent of one girl in a class of 30 pupils. The European Parliament drew attention to the issue in its resolution of 15 January 2019 on gender equality and taxation policies in the EU, calling on all EU Member States to eliminate the so-called ‘tampon tax’ by making use of the flexibility introduced in the VAT Directive and applying exemptions or 0 % VAT rates. As things stand, VAT rates applied to menstrual hygiene products vary significantly between countries. Advocacy organisations such as the platform ‘Young Feminist Europe’ are calling for 0 % tariffs and distribution of free products.

Other concerns flagged in relation to girls’ rights include:

• Health and wellbeing: The indicators chosen to measure progress in this area at EU level are body self-image and sexual and reproductive health. Survey data for 2014 shows that in all EU countries, girls aged 15 and 13 are significantly more likely than boys of the same age to report that they are ‘too fat’, and the same pattern exists in most countries for 11 year-olds.
• The impacts of gender stereotypes: time-use data for adults shows that women still assume an unequal share of unpaid domestic and care work compared to men, which has consequences for their engagement in paid work and earnings over a lifetime. There is far less data on the division of household labour between girls and boys in the EU. However, a survey conducted amongst children aged 10-12 in 2013/2014 found that this pattern begins early. In the five EU Member States covered in the survey (Estonia, Germany, Poland, Romania, Spain) and the United Kingdom, girls were more likely to help with housework every day. On the other hand, girls were less likely to play sports or exercise on a daily basis.
• Gendered educational pathways: For adults, the labour market continues to be characterised by high levels of gender segregation and this pattern is also evident in secondary and tertiary education. Although girls and boys achieve similar levels in maths and science subjects in school, fewer girls study these subjects beyond the age of 15 and fewer girls expect to pursue careers in science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM). This is a concern, because this sector is likely to expand.
• Emerging opportunities and challenges presented by digitisation: The digital sector could also be a gateway to skilled jobs and new means of expression and participation, but there are potential barriers to girls’ inclusion. It is estimated that one in ten women have already experienced cyber violence since the age of 15, adding to the level of violence experienced already offline. In 2019, the EU added four new indicators to measure the shares of 15 year-old girls and boys who have been cyberbullied and the shares of 16-19 year-old girls and boys who have above basic digital skills, feel confident about using digital technologies, and use digital technologies to take part in political life.

Looking forward, the United Nations has set up a Beijing +25 youth task force to help ensure that young people’s voices are heard in the review and the associated global campaign ‘Generation Equality: Realizing women’s rights for an equal future‘. Girls’ rights will also be mainstreamed in the multi-stakeholder coalitions that will identify concrete actions to be carried out between 2020 and 2025 in six priority areas. Each coalition must include one action that focuses on the rights of adolescent girls and young women and ensure that they are involved in setting priorities and monitoring. Against the backdrop of a global backlash against women’s rights, the aim is to remobilise, create partnerships to address persisting gender gaps and emerging issues, and make real progress on achieving equality for all women and girls worldwide.

In 2019, the European Parliament hosted an event during the European Week of Action for Girls (EWAG), bringing youth advocates and newly-elected Members together to discuss what matters to girls and young women in Europe, and how their needs and interests could be included in the EU’s next gender equality policy. A new EU gender equality strategy for 2020-2024 is due to be adopted by the European Commission on 5 March 2020.

Further reading

• Briefing: Beijing Platform for Action: 25-year review and future priorities, Rosamund Shreeves, Martina Prpic, February 2020.
• Infographic: ‘Beijing Platform for Action – 25 Years On’, Giulio Sabbati, Martina Prpic and Rosamund Shreeves, February 2020.
• Topical Digest Gender equality: a review of progress, March 2020.
  • Towards a new EU gender equality strategy
  • Women in parliaments
  • Women in film: Still fighting the celluloid ceiling
  • Gender equality in sports: (Slowly) changing the game
  • Teaching: A woman’s world
  • Violence against women in the EU: state of play

Read more on the Parliaments’ fight for gender Equality in the EU.

 

The European Parliament regularly receives questions from citizens about its political groups.

© European Union 2017 – Source : EP

In the European Parliament, Members do not act on the basis of nationality, but rather on the basis of political affinity. The Members, and the many political parties they represent, therefore form political groups that share similar values and agendas. These groups occupy specified seating zones in the European Parliament Chamber. Following the European elections in May 2019, seven political groups were formed in the European Parliament. Members who are not part of a political group are known as ‘non-attached’ Members.

This organisation into political groups contributes to the European Parliament’s operational capability and efficiency by preventing fragmentation and by facilitating the decision-making process; however, these groups do not operate as strong a system of group discipline as that found in most national parliaments.

The political groups in the European Parliament are not identical to European political parties. Although most of the national parties represented within a given political group are also members of the corresponding political party at EU level, some political groups bring together more than one European political party.

How are they formed?

Under the European Parliament’s rules of procedure, a political group is made up of a minimum of 25 Members elected from at least one quarter of EU countries (currently seven). A Member may not belong to more than one political group.

Members can form or dissolve a political group at any time during the parliamentary term. If the number of Members falls below the required threshold, the President, with the agreement of the heads of political groups, may allow it to continue to exist until the next sitting, provided that the members of the group continue to represent at least one fifth of EU countries (six) and the group has been in existence for longer than a year.

How are they funded?

Political groups (as well as non-attached Members) are provided with a secretariat funded from the budget of the European Parliament. In 2020, appropriations (covering administrative and operational costs as well as political and information activities) amounted to €63 million. The budget is allocated at the beginning of each year, through a system based on the number of Members in each group (and non-attached Members).

Further information

• The Political groups of the European Parliament, European Parliament.
• European Parliament: Facts and Figures, European Parliamentary Research Service.
• Rules on political groups in the EP, European Parliamentary Research Service.
• Political groups in the European Parliament since 1979: Key facts and figures, European Parliamentary Research Service.

Keep sending your questions to the Citizens’ Enquiries Unit (Ask EP)! We reply in the EU language that you use to write to us!

Written by Monika Kiss,

© European Union, 2020

Demography matters. The economy and the labour market, but also social protection, intergenerational fairness and healthcare, the environment, food and nutrition are all driven by demography. The population of EU countries has grown substantially – by around a quarter since 1960 – and currently it stands at almost 450 million. The numbers are now beginning to stagnate however and are expected to decline from around the middle of the century. With the world population having risen still more substantially and growth continuing, the EU represents a shrinking proportion of the global population. The EU population is also ageing dramatically, as life expectancy increases and fertility rates fall below past levels. This has serious implications across a range of areas including the economy, healthcare and pensions. Free movement within the EU and migration from third countries also play an important role in shaping demography in individual Member States and regions. The ‘in-focus’ section of this year’s edition of the demographic outlook examines food and nutrition-related demographic challenges. It shows that, even if improving food quality and healthier eating habits lead to higher life expectancy, the EU still has to tackle the harmful consequences and prevent the causes of diet-related chronic conditions, such as obesity, diabetes and cardiovascular disease. This paper is the third in a series produced by EPRS on the demographic outlook for the European Union.

Read the complete study on ‘Demographic outlook for the European Union 2020‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Giulio Sabbati,
In cooperation with Olga Griaznova (from GlobalStat | EUI),

The UK withdrew from the European Union on 31 January 2020. From 1 February, it is a third country and therefore considered as such in this publication. The trade figures shown concern a period in which the UK was an EU Member State, whereas the future picture could vary significantly depending on the outcome of trade negotiations between the EU and the UK.

Download this infographic on ‘UK: Economic indicators and trade with EU‘ in PDF.

GlobalStat, a project of the EUI’s Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies and the Francisco Manuel dos Santos Foundation aims to offer the best available gateway to statistical data. It is easily accessible, intuitive to use, and free of charge. In just three clicks it offers data from 1960 onwards for 193 UN countries, five continents and 12 political and regional entities – including the European Union – gathered from over 80 international sources. The project, presents data as diverse as income distribution, water resources, housing, migration, land use, food production, nutrition, or life expectancy, which contributes to a better understanding of the interrelations between human living conditions and globalisation trends.

 

Written by Angelos Delivorias and Nicole Scholz

© BLACKDAY / Shutterstock.com

Despite significant medical progress over the last centuries, infectious diseases such as influenza or malaria still represent a considerable threat to society. While some are endemic to specific geographical regions, others can spread, becoming epidemics or pandemics. While the first and most crucial aspect of an epidemic is, and will always remain, the loss of human life, the spread of a virus can also have important repercussions for national or regional economies.

The evidence reported in various studies indicates that epidemic disease impacts on a country’s economy through several channels, including the health, transportation, agricultural and tourism sectors. At the same time, trade with other countries may also be impacted, while the interconnectedness of modern economies means that an epidemic can also implicate international supply chains.

These considerations, as well as the fact that rapid urbanisation, increasing international travel and climate change all render epidemic outbreaks a global and not simply a local phenomenon, imply that it is important for all countries to take necessary measures to counter this threat. In this context, several initiatives have been proposed, ranging from a single measure (e.g. investing in new antibiotics), to broader solutions to be adopted by developing and developed countries alike.

In the European Union (EU), healthcare organisation and provision are Member State prerogatives and responsibilities. The EU’s actions in this area therefore aim at complementing national policies to help Member States face common challenges, such as epidemics. This support takes place via coordination and exchange of best practices between EU countries and health experts, financial support under Instruments for co-financing, (e.g. the Horizon 2020 research programme and European Fund for Strategic Investments), and the adoption of relevant legislation.

The European Parliament has taken the opportunity, through own-initiative resolutions, to highlight the need for further actions.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Economic impact of epidemics and pandemics‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Naja Bentzen,

EPRS – The Dilemma of Disinformation: How should democracies respond?

Often sponsored by authoritarian state actors, disinformation undermines our democracies by eroding trust in institutions and media, increasing rifts and tensions in society and weakening our ability to take informed decisions. Democracies all over the world – including the United States and the European Union – are currently seeking adequate responses to the ongoing challenge of online disinformation (deliberately designed to deceive people). On 17 February 2020, the first joint event by EPRS and Stanford University discussed how democratic countries can respond effectively to disinformation without compromising core values such as freedom of expression.

Following an introduction by EPRS Director-General Anthony Teasdale, Director of Stanford Internet Observatory and former Facebook Chief Security Officer Alex Stamos presented the Observatory’s research on these topics. Stamos explained that the 2016 US elections saw five ‘lanes’ of interference; two offline – overt propaganda by Russian state broadcaster RT and similar media outlets, as well as people-to-people interactions – and three online lanes:

1) Mimetic warfare: this can take the form of a truly false narrative; amplification of a divisive interpretation of a true fact (‘the Democratic Party rigged the primary against Bernie’); amplification of division or extreme political views; and undermining the very idea of truth – the last two being the key goals of mimetic information operations.

2) Hack and leak: a key actor here is the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (GRU), exemplified by the John Podesta emails. However, people in Brussels (including EU and NATO staff) are also targeted. Following a hack, such content can be leaked strategically (in the Podesta case, via the Russian-sponsored ‘DC Leaks’ platform) to the press.

3) Hacking election infrastructure: In general, this is more of a problem for the USA, where the decentralised elections are posing severe security challenges.

STAMOS, Alex;

Following Alex Stamos’ presentation, Etienne Bassot, Director of the Members’ Research Service, EPRS, moderated the panel discussion. Discussing the challenges and opportunities for democracies facing the ‘disinformation dilemma’ were Paul Nemitz (Principal Adviser in the Commission’s Directorate-General for Justice and Consumers), Wojtek Talko (Communications Adviser to Vice-President of the European Commission for Values and Transparency, Věra Jourová), Erika Widegren (Chief Executive of Re-Imagine Europa) and Naja Bentzen (Policy Analyst, Members’ Research Service, EPRS).

Stamos explained that the real problem is not the existence of disinformation, but the amplification of the message. Social media platforms use different amplification models (advertisements, private groups, recommendation engines etc.). The more a platform amplifies a message, the more responsibility the platform carries. He highlighted the need to focus on curbing amplification of mis- or disinformation (which is legal, but unwanted), rather than on the content side. In other words, you can allow people to access misinformation if they want to, as well as hinder the amplification of the message. In addition, we need to enable the collaborations necessary to finding organised ill-intentioned actors. Academia, governments, social media platforms, non-governmental organisations etc. all need each other at various stages, and social media platforms should be incentivised to allow these relationships to exist.

Alex Stamos’ slides:

https://office365stanford-my.sharepoint.com/:p:/g/personal/stamos_stanford_edu/EXK003qreoRJryhN4YXr4egBjJDbnR10IvHq0V3IOsRspQ?rtime=kTXRcKC210g

Paul Nemitz emphasised that Russian disinformation is not the only problem; our media ecosystem is under tremendous pressure. Last year in America, thousands of journalists lost their jobs. The free press is ‘going down the drain’, because Google and Facebook are draining the information environment for advertising revenue that used to be journalism’s main revenue source. We have to boost our free press, which is a vital component in the functioning of our democracies. There is however no ‘silver bullet’ in terms of social media regulation: we need to both tackle disinformation and the disappearance of traditional media. In the EU, the Commission, policy-makers and academics are united in their calls for a holistic approach to protecting democracy. In the 2019 EU elections, intersectoral, cross-silo cooperation produced good results. For Nemitz, all the steps Stamos advocates must be taken, but we also need an active policy to strengthen our institutions, public broadcasting and the free press. We also need the ‘technical intelligentsia’, experts like Stamos, to engage with parliaments and political parties. Lawmakers may know little about the technical side, but the technical intelligentsia also needs to learn what democracy is.

Erika Widegren

Explaining that Vice-President Věra Jourová is working on a European democracy action plan, intended to provide precisely such a holistic approach, Wojtek Talko fully agreed with the focus on amplification of legal but harmful content; Jourová intends to focus on behaviour rather than content. The challenge is to connect and coordinate various policy instruments and cyber-security, election, technology, and foreign affairs expertise. The European election cooperation network is an example of a complex, cross-sector network that exemplifies the important role of coordination. However, as we are learning, the actors who peddle disinformation are also learning. We have therefore to constantly adjust our responses and develop our technological capacity. Our main goal is to increase social media platforms transparency, make the platforms share information, at least with researchers, and ensure society is fully informed of their activities and intentions. In the long term, Talko concluded, we need to vaccinate society against disinformation.

Erika Widegren, referring to Re-Imagine Europe’s Taskforce on Democracy in a Digital Society, noted that one of their key conclusions was that a deeper change is happening. Digital technology is the third communication revolution, after the inventions of writing and printing, and, as she pointed out in Churchill’s words, ‘we shape the buildings we live in, and afterwards our buildings shape us’. One such example was the arrival of television in the USA, which revolutionised advertising. Before TV, the Teachers’ Union was almost as powerful in society as bankers. All this changed however when money was allowed ‘to talk’. Similarly, we are seeing a more aggressive media environment take hold in the digital age. The incentive online is to go viral, and the easiest way to do so is to pick a fight. Political extremes profit from this tendency, of which Greta Thunberg is a perfect example. The 85 % of the debate regarding whether people love or hate her eclipses her actual message. Democracy is based on compromise and finding solutions, which obviously clashes with this polarisation. For Widegren, ‘we will not be able to recreate what we once had, we need to clean up our “information river” to make it clean, transparent and safe again’.

BASSOT, Etienne; TALKO, Wojtek;

According to recent research published by the Oxford Internet Institute, Naja Bentzen noted that countries where a political party or government agency use social media manipulation campaigns at home has increased by 150 % over the past two years. In 2017, there was evidence of social media manipulation targeting domestic audiences in 28 countries. In 2018, it was 48 countries, and in 2019, the number had jumped to 70 countries. In these countries, such campaigns were used to suppress fundamental human rights, discredit political opposition and drown out political dissent. At the same time, in 2019, there was evidence of agents in seven countries using these techniques to influence audiences abroad: Russia, China, Iran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Venezuela and India. At the same time, research from the StratCom Centre of Excellence in Riga has shown that it is still far easier to buy inauthentic amplification than it is to combat the phenomenon. Generally, authoritarian state actors can react swiftly and firewall their internet from the rest of the internet, criminalise creating and spreading rumours that ‘undermine economic and social order’, as China has done, or ban disrespect of authorities and the spreading of what the government deems to be ‘fake news‘, as has happened in Russia. This type of action is far more difficult for democracies, which strive to maintain human rights and free speech.

A key lesson from the debate was that – precisely because there is no silver bullet – we need coordinated authentic democratic behaviour and responses to combat ‘coordinated inauthentic behaviour’ sponsored by autocracies. Full, advanced democracies carry a significant responsibility for pushing for a rules-based world order in the digital sphere. The EU has put unprecedented pressure on online platforms to counter online disinformation. The ‘Brussels effect’ of the Commission’s final response to the online platforms’ behaviour ahead of the European elections cannot be overestimated: Silicon Valley’s recent charm offensive in Brussels, including Mark Zuckerberg’s visit on the day of the event, speaks volumes for the significance of the EU’s role, and the global responsibility that comes with it.

This event in audio: https://europarl.europa.eu/EPRS/Disinformation_February2020.MP3

Click to view slideshow.

Written by Ralf Drachenberg,

© Shutterstock

On 20-21 February 2020, EU Heads of State or Government held their first meeting specially dedicated to the 2021-2027 Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) since the publication of the European Commission’s proposal in May 2018. Despite intense preparations, and discussions lasting over two days, they failed to overcome their differences to find an agreement. At the end of the meeting, the President of the European Council, Charles Michel, declared that ‘we need more time’. When, and under which conditions, the European Council will reconvene for another attempt to finding an agreement has not decided thus far.

1. Special European Council 20-21 February 2020

On 20-21 February 2020, EU Heads of State or Government met for a special European Council dedicated to the EU long-term budget for 2021-2027. This meeting was also the first European Council after the withdrawal of the United Kingdom (UK) from the EU, the departure of which will lead to an estimated €60-75 billion less funding for the EU’s budget. The President of the European Council, Charles Michel, stressed that the current MFF discussions were made particularly difficult because of Brexit.

After a brief session with all Members of the European Council on 20 February, President Michel met with individual EU Heads of State or Government in ‘bilateral’ meetings until late in the night. Further ‘bilaterals’ took place the next morning. Additionally, President Michel held meetings with groups of Member States, notably with the ‘frugal four’ (Austria, Denmark, the Netherlands and Sweden), the Visegrad countries (Czechia, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia) and other constellations (for example France and Germany, together with the ‘frugal four’). Following a final session around 19.00, with all EU Heads of State or Government, the European Council concluded without a political agreement between the EU Heads of State or Government.

Charles Michel expressed the view that, despite not reaching an agreement, the special meeting of the European Council had been very useful and necessary insofar as it had allowed for a political debate. It had enabled certain conclusions to be drawn, which had helped to assess the different positions and would improve the chances of success in the future. Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, concurred, adding that this was really the first time that the European Council had gone into the details of the various headings of the MFF and discussed the different Member States’ positions.

Following the European Council, the President of the European Parliament, David Sassoli, stated that Parliament was disappointed with ‘the failure of the European Council to find an agreement on the Multiannual Financial Framework and on own resources’. He added that ‘if we want to be able to deliver on the expectations of our citizens, we need to back up our ambitions with sufficient funds’. This disappointment was also expressed by several Heads of State of Government, such as Pedro Sanchez, the Spanish Prime Minister.

2. Main discussion points

Despite the intensive discussions held by Charles Michel with all EU Heads of State or Government in preparation for this special European Council, EU leaders were not able to overcome their differences. Individual EU Heads of State or Government reported that negotiations had been intensive and positions were still far apart; it had evidently not been possible to close the existing gaps at that special meeting. The strongest differences persist on the following points: the level of ambition (the size of the EU budget), the balance between ‘traditional’ European policies (for example, agriculture and cohesion) and new policies and challenges (e.g. migration, climate change and innovation), as well as the question of correction mechanisms and conditionality.

Overall size

A large gap remains between the various positions on the overall size of the 2021-2027 MFF expressed in percentage of gross national income (GNI). While the Parliament calls for a MFF based on 1.3 % of GNI, the European Commission proposed a commitments ceiling at 1.114 % of GNI. Amongst the Member States having disclosed information, most indicate preferences between 1.0 % and 1.11 % of GNI. A group of net contributors to the EU budget (Member States contributing more to the EU budget than the amount of EU funding they receive), and referred to as the ‘frugal’ Member States, insist that the EU’s next seven-year budget should be capped at 1 % of GNI. These ‘frugal four’ convened prior to the European Council to coordinate their positions at the European Council, jointly attended ‘bilateral discussions’ with the European Council President following the closing of an initial session of the European Council with all members, and reconvened together before the start of the Friday session of the European Council.

The Dutch Prime Minister, Mark Rutte, stressed that the differences in views cut across European political party membership. For example, each of the three big European political party affiliations (EPP, S&D/PES and Renew Europe) are represented within the ‘frugal four’ group (Austria, Denmark, the Netherlands and Sweden).

Balance between European policies

Another highly debated point in the MFF discussions is the balance between funding ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ policies. Traditionally, the biggest share of MFF expenditure is earmarked for the common agricultural policy (CAP) and cohesion policies, representing 39 % and 34 % of the 2014‑2020 MFF respectively. In Charles Michel’s proposal for the 2021-2027 MFF, agriculture and cohesion would be reduced by 14 % and 12 % respectively. The ‘friends of cohesion’, a group currently numbering 16 Member States (Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czechia, Croatia, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain), which defends a strong level of cohesion funding and opposes cuts in this area in the 2021‑2027 MFF, stressed on 1 February 2020 that the level of funding for cohesion policy and CAP should be maintained at the same level in 2021-2027 in real terms as under the 2014-2020 MFF. They also support the idea that all rebates would be abolished from the beginning of the next MFF.

In most cases, those Member States that stress the importance of cohesion and agricultural policy also plead for an ambitious long-term 2021-2027 budget, providing ‘the European Union with sufficient resources’ to fulfil its objectives. In contrast, many of the Member States preferring to concentrate on more ‘modern’ policy areas also favour a reduction in, or at least no expansion of, the total EU budget.

Rebates

A number of Member States (i.e. Austria, Germany, Denmark, the Netherlands and Sweden) benefit from rebates or ‘budget correction mechanisms’ to compensate for what is, in their view, ‘a budgetary burden which is excessive in relation to its relative prosperity‘. The biggest and most famous was the UK rebate, obtained by the then UK Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, at the Fontainebleau summit in 1984. Since then, other Member States have argued that their EU budgetary burden is excessive, requesting different forms of reduction in their contribution.

In the context of the UK withdrawal from the EU, the European Commission argued in its MFF proposal that the elimination of all rebates would increase the fairness of the future long-term budget, while at the same time leading to significant increases in contributions by certain Member States. The European Commission therefore proposed to phase out the current rebates over time. The ‘frugal four’, together with Germany, advocate that reductions should also continue in the 2021‑2027 MFF. The request for a fair balance within the group of net contributors (i.e. the continuation of the rebate system) was strongly reiterated by the German Chancellor, Angela Merkel at the special European Council meeting.

Own resources

The EU budget is currently largely financed by three main categories of revenue: i) ‘traditional’ own resources (mainly customs duties); ii) a value added tax based own resource; and iii) the gross national income based own resource. The GNI-based own resource, which is perceived as a national contribution, represented about 67% of revenue in 2018.

The proposal of the European Council’s President includes the idea of two new own resources, based respectively on a ‘national contribution calculated on the weight of non-recycled plastic packaging waste’ and ‘any revenue generated by the European Union emissions trading system exceeding the average annual revenue per Member State generated by allowances auctioned over the period 2016-2018’. President Michel also left open the possibility of introducing ‘possible proposals for additional new own resources’ in the course of 2021-2027, such as a ‘digital or aviation levy, a carbon border adjustment mechanism or a financial transaction tax’. Following the European Council, the Commission President von der Leyen reported that many Member States were in favour of introducing new forms of own resources, but needed to agree on the type of new own resources that could be used at European level.

3. Messages of the President of the European Parliament

When addressing the Special European Council at the start of its meeting, the President of the European Parliament, David Sassoli, reiterated Parliament’s dissatisfaction with the current proposal. President Sassoli underlined that the amount that the European Parliament was asking for was a ‘calculation based on the needs of the Union, on the commitments made by the new Commission and by the strategic agenda of the Council’. He emphasised that ‘we must equip the Union with all the means necessary to address the challenges we have decided to face together’.

From the Parliament’s point of view, one of the shortcomings of the current proposal is linked to the system of rebates. President Sassoli stressed that the proposal, which suggests fully maintaining existing rebates, ‘represents a concession that contrasts with the principle of European solidarity’ and Parliament ‘opposes the perpetuation of this outdated system’. Another inadequacy of the current proposal concerns the conditionality mechanism, insofar as the EU needs to be ‘capable of protecting the budget of the Union when the rule of law is not respected and a systematic violation of European values occurs’. While President Michel has taken on board the idea of a general regime of conditionality, this has been weakened in comparison to the Commission’s proposal. Under Michel’s proposal, a case of deficiencies in the good governance of Member State authorities as regards respect for the rule of law would, following a proposal by the Commission, require approval by qualified majority in the Council, while under the Commission’s proposal it would have to be approved by the Council by reverse qualified majority (i.e. qualified majority would be needed to block the proposal, rather than to approve it).

President Sassoli expressed Parliament’s appreciation of President Michel’s efforts in seeking an agreement, notably with regards to his availability and to his discussions with Parliament. He thanked Michel ‘for his efforts to equip the Just Transition Fund, although this needs to be further increased’, as well as for the attention he has paid to the issue of own resources for the EU budget.

However, President Sassoli warned that the Parliament ‘will not just accept any agreement. There is a very large majority ready to reject any proposal that does not take due account of Parliament’s positions.

4. Next steps

Following the special European Council, Charles Michel indicated that EU Heads of State or Government needed more time. However, he was not able at that point in time to specify the exact working method that ought to be used to reach a ‘political’ agreement and to indicate a specific timeline. It is likely that another special European Council will have to be convened early in March – without waiting for the formal European Council meeting scheduled for 26-27 March 2020. Charles Michel should call this meeting following consultation with the Member States.

Past experience with MFF negotiations has shown that several dedicated European Council meetings have always been necessary to be able to reach an agreement between EU Heads of State or Government. Negotiations in the European Council (with the Commission proposal as the starting point) have already lasted over 21 months. Therefore, despite the European Council’s original aim of speeding up these MFF negotiations, the current round of talks has already taken longer than the time that was necessary to find an agreement during the 2014-2020 MFF negotiations. Moreover, once EU Heads of State or Government have reached a political agreement between themselves, Parliament and Council will still have to negotiate the final agreement, which could take until September or October 2020 at the earliest, assuming the negotiations run according to a similar timetable to that of the 2014-2020 MFF.

Other items Syria

What EU leaders did agree, in the margins of the Special MFF European Council meeting, was a declaration of the European Council on the situation in Idlib. In this declaration, they condemned the renewed military offensive by the Syrian regime and its backers, and called on all actors to cease hostilities immediately. They also urged all parties to the conflict to fully respect their obligations under international humanitarian law, to put a sustainable ceasefire in place, to fully implement their commitments under the Sochi Memorandum of 17 September 2018, and to find a credible political solution in line with the UN Security Council Resolution 2254 and the Geneva Communiqué.

Read this briefing on ‘Outcome of the special European Council, 20-21 February 2020‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Marcin Grajewski,

© metamorworks / Shutterstock.com

Artificial intelligence (AI) is usually understood as the ability for a machine to display human-like capabilities such as reasoning, learning, planning and creativity. The ‘Holy Grail’ for many governments and companies seeking to benefit from the digital revolution, the first to invent and apply true AI could achieve an enormous advantage in economic and military terms. However, there are serious ethical implications in such potential developments. Many aspects of AI have already been applied since the 2000s in machines with sufficiently fast processing speeds, equipped with learning techniques and fed large amounts of data. Current versions of AI help to drive cars, beat chess champions, and offer excellent medical diagnostics, to take a few examples.

This note offers links to recent commentaries, studies and reports from international think tanks on AI and related issues.

Europe needs a DARPA
Bruegel, February 2020

Out of the slow lane: How Europe can meet the challenge of AI
European Council on Foreign Relations, February 2020

The dynamics of data accumulation
Bruegel, February 2020

Artificial Intelligence and cybersecurity
Centre for European Policy Studies, January 2020

Artificial intelligence-based development strategy in dependent market economies: Any room amidst big power rivalry?
Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Institute of World Economics, January 20

Ever cleverer Union: How AI could help EU institutions become more capable, competent, cost-effective and closer to citizens
Open Political Economy Network, December 2019

AI and the productivity paradox
Bruegel, December 2019

A candle in the dark: US national security strategy for artificial intelligence
Atlantic Council, December 2019

Europe’s third way in cyberspace
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, December 2019

It’s not magic: Weighing the risks of AI in financial services
Center for the Study on Financial Innovation, November 2019

Establishing trust in an AI-powered future
Jacques Delors Institute, November 2019

An ambitious agenda or big words? Developing a European approach to AI
Egmont, November 2019

EU–US relations on internet governance
Chatham House, November 2019

The case for a global AI framework
Friends of Europe, November 2019

Diplomacy in the age of artificial intelligence
Real Instituto Elcano, October 2019

The impact of artificial intelligence on strategic stability and nuclear risk
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, October 2019

Intelligence artificielle et politique internationale. Les impacts d’une rupture technologique
Institut français des relations internationales, November 2019

Intelligence artificielle et analyse du risque en matière de stabilité stratégique
Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, October 2019

The case for intelligent industrial policy
Bruegel, October 2019
The case for intelligent industrial policy
Bruegel, October 2019

Analytical report: Preparing the armed forces for disruptive technological changes
European Policy Centre, September 2019

Making Artificial Intelligence work for everyone
Chatham House, September 2019

Artificial Intelligence prediction and counterterrorism
Chatham House, August 2019

Beyond the hype: The EU and the AI global ‘arms race’
Carnegie Europe, August 2019

Machine politics: Europe and the AI revolution
European Council on Foreign Relations, July 2019

Automation, labor market disruption, and trade policy
Peterson Institute for International Economics, July 2019

Harnessing artificial intelligence
European Council on Foreign Relations, June 2019

Intelligence artificielle et réduction du risque nucléaire : Données du problème et argument politique
Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, June 2019

Artificial Intelligence and society: ‘Technology is not destiny’
Chatham House, June 2019

The future of work? Work of the future! On how artificial intelligence, robotics and automation are transforming jobs and the economy in Europe
European Political Strategy Centre, May 2019

Helping the EU win the trust game
Centre for European Policy Studies, April 2019

Intelligence artificielle et avenir du travail : Quelle voie européenne?
Confrontations Europe, April 2019

Artificial Intelligence: Ethics, governance and policy challenges
Centre for European Policy Studies, February 2019

Artificial Intelligence: Tools and online hate speech
Centre on Regulation in Europe, February 2019

IA et emploi en santé: Quoi de neuf docteur?
Institut Montaigne, January 2019

Read this briefing on ‘Artificial intelligence‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Issam Hallak,

© Melinda Nagy / Shutterstock.com

The withdrawal of the United Kingdom (UK) from the European Union (EU) came into effect on 1 February 2020, following the large majority gained by the Conservative Party, led by Boris Johnson, in the UK general election in December 2019. The transition period began on the same day and is due to run until the end of 2020. During this period, although no longer part of the EU institutions, the UK remains in the customs union and single market, and within the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the EU (with some exceptions). Negotiations during the transition period are aimed at reaching agreements that will shape the future EU-UK relationship in a range of domains, and especially that of trade.

In the Political Declaration accompanying the Withdrawal Agreement, the EU and the UK ‘agree to develop an ambitious, wide-ranging and balanced economic partnership’. However, some major obstacles have surfaced. The UK insists that it is unwilling to submit to EU Court of Justice jurisdiction, and demands autonomy in its regulatory and trade policies. The UK indicates that it seeks a free trade agreement similar to that agreed between the EU and Canada: comprehensive, but very different to the previous relationship. The EU has taken note of the UK objectives, but emphasises that the deeper the trade agreement, the more UK regulations and standards must align with those of the EU. To the EU, alignment is essential to preserve a level playing field, on the grounds that the EU and UK are close neighbouring economies and strongly interconnected. The European Commission’s 3 February 2020 recommendation for a Council decision authorising the opening of negotiations on the future relationship confirms this approach.

In this context, time is critical. The Withdrawal Agreement allows for an extension to the transition period, but the UK Withdrawal Act explicitly prohibits extension. In addition, to allow for ratification, the trade agreement should be ready well ahead of the end of the transition period. The Commission recommendation insists on including fisheries (a highly sensitive area of negotiation), in the new economic partnership and that related provisions should be established by 1 July 2020. Time-constrained negotiation may give rise to a limited economic and trade agreement that covers only priority areas, rather than the ambitious single comprehensive agreement sought under the Political Declaration and Commission recommendation.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Future EU-UK trade relationship‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Timeline of UK withdrawal

Written by Christiaan Van Lierop,

© vladystock / Fotolia

While each macro-regional strategy is unique in terms of the countries it brings together and the scope of its policies, they all share the same common aim: to ensure a coordinated approach to issues that are best tackled together. Building on the success of the pioneering 2009 European Union strategy for the Baltic Sea region, this form of cooperation has since become firmly embedded in the EU’s institutional framework, with four strategies now in place, covering a total of 19 Member States and 8 third countries.

Every two years, the European Commission publishes a report to assess the implementation of these strategies, most recently in 2019. With the views of stakeholders and other players helping to complete the picture, it is possible to identify a number of challenges common to all macro-regional strategies in areas such as governance, funding, political commitment and the need to be more results oriented. This, in turn, has helped focus discussions on the future role of macro-regional strategies within the post 2020 cohesion policy framework. For while recent months have seen the idea of a fifth macro-regional strategy resurface, with negotiations now under way on the cohesion policy architecture beyond 2020, the future position of macro-regional strategies within this framework looks set to be the key issue in the coming months for all actors involved in the EU’s macro-regional strategies.

Parliament has actively taken part in this debate, through its participation in trilogues on the cohesion policy package, and its 2018 resolution on the implementation of macro-regional strategies. The current Croatian EU Presidency has also committed to focusing on achieving the goals of macro-regional strategies and ensuring their complementarity with cohesion policy as part of its programme, helping to keep the issue high on the political agenda. Much will depend, however, on the outcome of the ongoing multiannual financial framework (MFF) negotiations, which will be critical not only for macro-regional strategies but also for the future shape of cohesion policy in general.

This is an updated edition of a Briefing from September 2017.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Implementation of macro-regional strategies‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Marcin Grajewski

Policy round table on ‘ Where all students can succeed: Analysing the latest OECD Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) results ‘

Educational performance has largely stagnated in many countries over the last two decades despite increasing spending on education, according to recent findings from the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA), published every three years by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The Paris-based OECD also cautions governments that, while shaping their education policies, they should take such issues as gender, social equality, the culture of cooperation or competition, as well as students’ self-confidence into account. These factors affect the educational process as much as the syllabus, noted OECD experts, politicians and other analysts at an event organised in the European Parliament in late January. The event on PISA, which measures students’ ability to read, do maths and master science subjects, took place in the European Parliamentary Research Service’s (EPRS) Library Reading Room on 29 January 2020. The event was part of the fast developing EPRS-OECD cooperation programme.

PISA skills have been measured since 2000. Anthony Gooch, OECD Director for Public Affairs, stressed that this measurement had an immediate impact due to what news media called ‘the German shock’. This was the discovery in the early 2000s, that German students, thought to be among world leaders in educational terms, actually achieved mediocre results.

VERHEYEN, Sabine (EPP, DE); BELFALI, Yuri

Nearly 20 years later, ‘We have not seen significant progress across countries, whereas if you look at financing, expenditure per student, it has increased, by 15 %’, noted Yuri Belfali, Head of Early Childhood and Schools, Directorate for Education at the OECD. China, Singapore, Estonia and Canada lead the OECD ranking, and, of more than 70 countries taken into account in the study, Kosovo, the Dominican Republic and the Philippines scored the worst.

Those results also made front-page headlines when the current report was published in early December 2019. Belfali presented a more nuanced view of the report, which helps countries understand their challenges better: ‘There was a ranking, but PISA can show much more beyond the ranking. We can understand challenges and opportunities. PISA contributes to peer learning and learning by comparison’, she stated.

BELFALI, Yuri

For example, PISA also values equity, how education systems offer equal opportunities for students regardless of their background. Here, Slovakia displays a big gap between the poorest and richest in society, although it achieves the OECD average. In Portugal, the poorest students are achieving the average in Slovakia. In China, even the poorest student can achieve the OECD average.

Another factor is what the OECD calls a growth mind-set – or students’ belief that they can develop and change themselves for the better. A high growth mind-set is related to students’ high motivation to master tasks and confidence in tackling problems or setting the goals for themselves. Here, for example, Poland scores poorly, despite being among the leaders in the general ranking.

The culture of competition or cooperation is also important. In countries such as high-scorers Netherlands or Denmark, for example, the OECD saw more students open to cooperation than to competition. Competition was much more important in the United Kingdom, United States or Brazil. Cooperation helps the education process. ‘But competition can also be useful, if it is well designed, for students to be encouraged to try something hard. If too much competition impacts on their emotional well-being, however, it may work negatively on students’ performance,’ said Belfali.

BAIOCCO, Sara;

Finally, she noted that the gender gap is a common challenge for all countries, although the type of challenges are different by countries. Typically, girls outperform boys in reading, and boys outperform girls in maths. This then corresponds to their imagined future profession: many girls think they will become doctors, nurses or teachers, while boys consider a future as information technology workers and engineers. According to Belfali, ‘This is not necessarily related to student performance. Even high performing girls in science and maths do not necessarily expect to get into study in engineering or STEM (science, technology, engineering and mathematics). This may be related to expectations transmitted by parents and communities to boys and girls, or the development of confidence’.

Sabine Verheyen (EPP, Germany), Chair of the EP Culture and Education Committee, lauded the OECD study. ‘We want our children to receive the best education possible. And the best way to guarantee this is to take a look around, to compare and to learn from each other. This is what makes the PISA study so valuable,’ she said. She added: ‘In my opinion, it is not desirable to make our European systems exactly the same and equalise everything, but we should make them comparable’.

Sara Baiocco, a Researcher at the Centre for European Policy Studies think tank, highlighted the growing importance of renewing digital skills and learning throughout life in a fast changing labour market. Both Baiocco and Verheyen underlined that the PISA should focus more on digital skills. In response, Belfali announced that there are indeed plans to measure this in the next survey in 2021.

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