Written by Marc Jütten.
Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and United States-China rivalry continue to dominate the global political and economic landscape in 2023. Challenges to the multilateral rules-based global order are redefining strategic relations. In its attempt to foster alliances, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President (HR/VP) and the European Commission adopted a joint communication setting out a new agenda for relations between the European Union and the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) on 7 June 2023. To strengthen and modernise the strategic partnership, reinforced political engagement, boosted trade and investment, and more sustainable investment through the Global Gateway connectivity strategy are key priorities of the EU strategy towards the region – one of the most aligned in terms of interests, culture and values.
Less than a year earlier, on 27 October 2022, Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) and EU foreign ministers adopted the joint CELAC-EU Roadmap 2022‑2023 in Buenos Aires. This paved the way for the long-awaited EU-CELAC Summit to take place in Brussels, set for 17‑18 July 2023, under the Spanish Presidency of the Council of the EU. Expectations are high, as this will be the first fully-fledged summit in 8 years.
EU-CELAC relations are not free of challenges: the LAC countries’ stance on Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine (including EU sanctions against Russia), China’s emergence as a key actor in Latin America, political and ideological divisions and economic asymmetries within the LAC region, and concerns relating to EU legislation on the green transition all need to be addressed. A litmus test for the strategic partnership will also be whether the partners manage to finalise the three key pending international agreements (Mercosur, Mexico and Chile).
Read the complete briefing on ‘Strengthening ties: A new agenda for the EU’s relations with Latin America and the Caribbean‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.
Written by Laurence Amand-Eeckhout (1st edition).
On 26 Avril 2023, the European Commission put forward a ‘pharmaceutical package’ to revise the EU’s pharmaceutical legislation and make medicines more available, accessible and affordable, while supporting the competitiveness and attractiveness of the EU pharmaceutical industry, with higher environmental standards. The package includes proposals for a new directive and a new regulation, which would replace the existing pharmaceutical legislation, including the legislation on medicines for children and for rare diseases. The package is completed by a communication and a Council recommendation to step up the fight against antimicrobial resistance. The legislative proposals are now in the hands of the co-legislators.
VersionsWritten by Karin Smit Jacobs (1st edition).
On 1 March 2023, the European Commission published its legislative proposal on driving licences – a matter of EU competence – with the purpose of enabling the free movement of persons and goods throughout the EU by modernising the driving licence system. This involves making driving licence rules future-proof, improving road safety and simplifying rules for those wanting to get a driving licence. The proposal provides for accompanied driving for young learners, zero tolerance for drunk driving, better preparation for micro-mobility, and the introduction of digital driving licences.
In the European Parliament, the legislative file was assigned to the Committee on Transport and Tourism (TRAN) on 27 April 2023. The rapporteur was appointed on 3 May 2023.
VersionsWritten by Stefano De Luca (1st edition).
The EU’s digital decade connectivity target aims at ensuring a fixed gigabit network (1 Gbps) covers all EU households, and for 5G coverage for all populated areas by 2030. A high-quality digital infrastructure based on such very high-capacity networks would underpin almost all sectors of a modern and innovative economy. The long-term success of a digital economy based on the internet of things, machine-to-machine technologies, cloud computing and big data, will crucially depend on access to the highest quality telecommunications infrastructure.
The proposed gigabit infrastructure act, introducing a regulation that would review and replace the existing Broadband Cost Reduction Directive, aims at facilitating and stimulating the provision of very high-capacity networks by promoting the joint use of existing physical infrastructure and by enabling a more efficient deployment of new physical infrastructure, so that such networks can be rolled out faster and at lower cost.
In Parliament, the file has been allocated to the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE).
VersionsWritten by Marcin Grajewski.
On 14 June 2023, the European Parliament adopted its negotiating position on the draft Artificial Intelligence Act, strengthening some provisions to protect people better from potential violations of their fundamental rights. Following this vote, Parliament will start negotiations with the national governments and the European Commission on the final shape of the legislation, which will be a decisive step in the European Union becoming the world’s first region to regulate artificial intelligence (AI).
The recent launches of AI tools capable of generating direct textual answers to questions, notably ChatGPT, and the development of general-purpose AI technologies are expected to revolutionise the application of AI in society. The US and China are also working on AI regulation. In addition, the US and EU hope to negotiate a voluntary code of conduct for AI firms.
The Artificial Intelligence Act would regulate AI according to the level of risk: the higher the risk to individuals’ fundamental rights or safety, the greater the system’s obligations. The EU’s proposed high-risk list includes AI in critical infrastructure, education, human resources, public order and migration management. Parliament’s position on the proposal seeks to ban real-time remote biometric identification systems in publicly accessible spaces and most ‘post’ remote biometric identification systems, as well as AI predictive policy systems, based on gender, race, ethnicity, citizenship status, religion, or political orientation.
This note offers links to recent reports and commentaries from some major international think tanks and research institutes on artificial intelligence. More publications on the topic can be found in a previous edition of What think tanks are thinking.
ChatGPT and health care: implications for interoperability and fairness
Brookings Institution, June 2023
Metaverse economics part 1: Creating value in the metaverse
Brookings Institution, June 2023
Around the halls: What should the regulation of generative AI look like?
Brookings Institution, June 2023
Why the EU must now tackle the risks posed by military AI
Centre for European Policy Studies, June 2023
AI governance must balance creativity with sensitivity
Chatham House, June 2023
Future-proofing AI: regulation for innovation, human rights and societal progress
Foundation for European Progressive Studies, June 2023
Regulating AI: workers’ intellect versus Big Tech oligarchs
Foundation for European Progressive Studies, June 2023
Future-proofing AI: regulation for innovation, human rights and societal progress
Foundation for European Progressive Studies, June 2023
Artificial Intelligence in the Covid-19 Response
Rand Corporation, June 2023
The regulators are coming for your AI
Atlantic Council, May 2023
The US government should regulate AI if it wants to lead on international AI governance
Brookings Institution, May 2023
Senate hearing highlights AI harms and need for tougher regulation
Brookings Institution, May 2023
Are the FTC’s tools strong enough for digital challenges?
Brookings Institution, May 2023
Machines of mind: The case for an AI-powered productivity boom
Brookings Institution, May 2023
The politics of AI: ChatGPT and political bias
Brookings Institution, May 2023
The age of competition in generative artificial intelligence has begun
Bruegel, May 2023
The UK’s competition authority is ready to regulate big tech
Centre for European Reform, May 2023
Strict ban on china will cost us dearly in science
Clingendael, May 2023
Artificial Intelligence enters the political arena
Council on Foreign Relations, May 2023
Here’s what to expect on China, AI, green energy, and more when EU and US officials meet in Sweden
European Policy Centre, May 2023
The US-EU Trade and Technology Council: Assessing the record on data and technology issues
European Policy Centre, May 2023
ChatGPT’s work lacks transparency and that is a problem
Rand Corporation, May 2023
Why US technology multinationals are looking to Africa for AI and other emerging technologies: Scaling tropical-tolerant R&D innovations
Atlantic Council, April 2023
The EU and U.S. diverge on AI regulation: A transatlantic comparison and steps to alignment
Brookings Institution, April 2023
How artificial intelligence is transforming the world
Brookings Institution, April 2023
Artificial intelligence is another reason for a new digital agency
Brookings Institution, April 2023
Workforce ecosystems and AI
Brookings Institution, April 2023
The problems with a moratorium on training large AI systems
Brookings Institution, April 2023
With the AI Act, we need to mind the standards gap
Centre for European Policy Studies, April 2023
Recalibrating assumptions on AI towards an evidence-based and inclusive AI policy discourse
Chatham House, April 2023
AI has escaped the ‘sandbox’: Can it still be regulated?
European Policy Centre, April 2023
The world needs a time out on AI development
Friends of Europe, April 2023
Large language models: Fast proliferation and budding international competition
International Institute for Strategic Studies, April 2023
Comparing Google Bard with OpenAI’s ChatGPT on political bias, facts, and morality
Brookings institution, March 2023
How generative AI impacts democratic engagement
Brookings institution, March 2023
A high-level view of the impact of AI on the workforce
Bruegel, March 2023
Artificial intelligence adoption in the public sector: A case study
Bruegel, March 2023
Like it or not, the EU needs American cloud services
Centre for European Reform, March 2023
Access to data and algorithms: For an effective DMA and DSA implementation
Centre on Regulation in Europe, March 2023
ChatGPT has opened a new front in the fake news wars
Chatham House, March 2023
Artificial intelligence, diplomacy and democracy: from divergence to convergence
Friends of Europe, March 2023
Read this briefing on ‘Artificial intelligence‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.
Written by Clare Ferguson and Katarzyna Sochacka with Rebecca Fredrick.
The war in Ukraine was again central to the plenary session in June, with a debate on the humanitarian and environmental consequences of the destruction of the Nova Kakhovka dam and sustainable reconstruction and the integration of Ukraine into the Euro-Atlantic community. Another important debate concerned the preparation of the European Council meeting set for 29‑30 June 2023, in particular in the light of the recent steps forward on agreeing the EU migration pact.
Members held a number of debates, inter alia, on the rule of law in Poland, negotiations on the European electoral law, establishment of an EU ethics body, the water crisis in Europe, and how to make Europe the place to invest. Members also debated the situation in Lebanon, in Nicaragua and on the state of the EU-Cuba Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement.
Finally, Members held the latest ‘This is Europe’ debate, this month with Nikos Christodoulides, the President of Cyprus. And, in a formal sitting, they heard an address by Vjosa Osmani, President of the Republic of Kosovo.
Artificial intelligence actThe EU is keen to ensure a ‘human-centric’ approach to regulating artificial intelligence (AI), to ensure an optimum balance between the benefits and risks of these new technologies. Members voted overwhelmingly in favour of a joint Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO) and Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) Committee report which proposes to greatly amend the proposed artificial intelligence act, setting Parliament’s position for trilogue negotiations. The changes would increase the number of prohibited practices, and introduce stricter categorisation of high-risk systems, such as those that risk harming people’s health, safety, fundamental rights or the environment – and social media platforms and systems used to influence political processes. The report also proposes boosting protection of fundamental rights, health, safety, the environment, democracy and the rule of law in general-purpose AI systems like ChatGPT and increasing their transparency. National governance and enforcement should be stronger, and Parliament proposes to establish a new EU AI body to ensure the rules are applied.
Batteries and waste batteriesMembers adopted the proposed new regulatory framework for batteries, agreed in interinstitutional negotiations in December 2022. The proposal seeks to address all steps of a battery’s life cycle, setting rules for sustainability (minimum recycled content, performance criteria, etc.), safety, labelling, and disposal. It also introduces due diligence obligations for businesses sourcing raw materials. With the goal of zero-emission mobility in mind, the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI) sought to widen the proposed scope to include batteries used in light transport (e.g. e-scooters).
Electronic evidence in criminal mattersNew technology offers the opportunity to revolutionise the exchange of evidence in criminal investigations, including across borders. In a joint debate, Members considered and adopted a compromise reached between the co-legislators on cross-border access to electronic evidence. To make evidence easier for law enforcement authorities to access, two new pieces of legislation will therefore introduce a European production order and a European preservation order. The compromise text on the proposals includes a mandatory 10‑day response deadline for production orders (8 hours in emergencies) and a notification system for some categories of data, among other things.
European Union Drugs AgencyMembers adopted the provisional text agreed in trilogue negotiations, following a LIBE committee report, on the proposal to strengthen the EU Drugs Agency’s mandate. It seeks to shift the focus of the Agency away from law enforcement and control-related issues and towards harm reduction and health. The illicit drugs landscape in Europe has changed greatly since the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA) was set up to provide scientific analysis in 2006, with drugs such as amphetamines and ecstasy increasingly produced in the EU. Members also demand greater transparency in the EMCDDA, and more focus on the human rights, age and gender dimensions of drug use and addiction.
EU-Mauritius Fisheries Partnership AgreementFisheries agreements between the EU and non-EU countries generally focus on the fight against illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing. The EU/Mauritius Fisheries Partnership Agreement is part of a set of EU tuna agreements aimed at sustainable fishing in the western Indian Ocean. Signed in December 2022, a four-year protocol implementing the agreement currently applies provisionally. Members voted to grant Parliament’s consent to concluding the protocol, allowing fishing opportunities for up to 40 EU vessels.
Pegasus spywareFollowing the discovery that government bodies from both EU and non-EU states have used Pegasus spyware and equivalents against journalists, politicians, diplomats, civil society actors and others, the European Parliament established a Committee of Inquiry to investigate the use of Pegasus and equivalent surveillance spyware (PEGA) in March 2022. Members debated the committee’s findings and adopted a recommendation to the Commission and the Council. The PEGA committee recommendation condemns governments’ illegitimate use of spyware. It underlines failures to implement EU law, not just by those Member States that have used spyware, but also criticises EU support for non-EU countries to develop surveillance capacities. Parliament calls for common EU standards on use of spyware, better enforcement of related EU law (including data protection law and the Dual-use Regulation) and for new legislation placing due diligence requirements on producers and exporters of surveillance technologies.
Assessment of the communication on outermost regionsRemote, insular or small in size, with a challenging geography or climate, a lack of economic opportunity often disadvantages those living in the EU’s outermost regions. Members considered an own-initiative report from the Committee on Regional Development (REGI) on the assessment of the European Commission’s 2022 strategy to improve living conditions in the EU’s outermost regions. The committee supports greater ambition for these regions, particularly to provide more opportunities for young people. One demand is to reproduce the compensation scheme mitigating higher prices in agriculture in the fisheries, transport, energy and other sectors. The committee underlines the importance of sustainable tourism in these regions, and highlights the need for better digital infrastructure and connectivity.
Food security and the long-term resilience of EU agricultureMembers debated a Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development (AGRI) own-initiative report on ensuring food security and the long-term resilience of EU agriculture. Parliament has long pushed for stronger strategic autonomy in food and agricultural supplies such as fertiliser. Parliament also supports measures to shield consumers from food inflation. The AGRI report recommends taking measures to ensure food safety both at home and globally, including to reduce dependence on imports and support farmers in the search for innovative means to produce food. The AGRI report nevertheless opposes a blanket ban on the use of pesticides and fertilisers, which it states could threaten farmers’ livelihoods.
Question Time – Relations between Armenia and AzerbaijanDuring ‘question time’ with the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Josep Borrell, Members heard answers to questions regarding relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan and the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh and in the Lachin Corridor, where the EU is playing a prominent role in trying to prevent a flare-up in the frozen conflict between the two countries.
Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘Plenary round-up – May II 2023‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.
Written by Ralf Drachenberg.
‘This is Europe’ – an initiative proposed by the President of the European Parliament, Roberta Metsola – consists of a series of debates with EU leaders to discuss their visions for the future of the European Union. In his address to the European Parliament on 13 June 2023, the reunification of the island was a central theme for the President of Cyprus, Nikos Christodoulides. He stressed that the EU has every interest, but also an ‘obligation to actively contribute to its final settlement’ by taking a leading role in the process. He stressed that the wider Middle East and Gulf were the EU’s neighbourhood, and that Cyprus was the ‘geopolitical gateway’ from the EU to the MENA region. He also called for further European integration, and promised to promote the deepening of the EU within the European Council.
We must regain the trust of our citizens in the great European ideal of peace, cooperation, solidarity and prosperity. To achieve this, we first need to do more to make European citizens aware of what the EU is doing to ensure their safety and improve their daily lives, and perhaps we need to communicate better what is happening and what will happen.
Nikos Christodoulides
BackgroundRoberta Metsola launched the ‘This is Europe’ initiative shortly after her election as president of the European Parliament in January 2022. Nikos Christodoulides is the 10th EU leader to have addressed the Parliament since its Conference of Presidents endorsed the initiative on 28 April 2022. These debates will continue during subsequent sessions. A similar Parliament initiative, ahead of the 2019 European elections, saw a number of EU leaders speak in Parliament’s plenary sessions about their views on the future of Europe. A 2019 EPRS analysis of those debates pinpointed similarities and differences in EU leaders’ views.
Figure 1 – Time devoted by Nikos Christodoulides to various topics in his speechThe ‘This is Europe’ initiative is particularly relevant in the context of the Conference on the Future of Europe (CoFoE), a bottom-up exercise which allowed EU citizens to express their opinions on the EU’s future policies and functioning. On 30 April 2022, the CoFoE plenary adopted 49 proposals (see EPRS overview), including more than 300 measures by which they might be achieved. As a follow-up, Parliament adopted a resolution, by a large majority, calling for a convention in accordance with Article 48 of the Treaty on European Union. This call was backed by the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen in her State of the Union speech on 14 September 2022.
At the June 2022 European Council meeting, the Heads of State or Government ‘took note’ of the CoFoE proposals. While calling for ‘an effective follow-up’, they did not provide specific guidelines in this respect. Instead, they merely stated that each EU institution should follow up on the proposals ‘within their own sphere of competences’, rather than acting jointly. EPRS research has shown that there is significant convergence between the results of the CoFoE and the priorities of the European Council, as expressed in the latter’s 2019‑2024 strategic agenda and its conclusions over the past 3 years. The European Council, under the impulse of its President, Charles Michel, is initiating the reflection process on the priorities for the next institutional cycle, which will lead to the 2024-2029 Strategic Agenda.
Main focus of Nikos Christodoulides’ speechChristodoulides addressed a wide range of topics in his speech to Parliament (see Figure 1). In terms of words, he devoted most attention to i) the reunification of Cyprus, ii) the eastern Mediterranean, iii) migration, and iv) Cyprus in the EU.
Cyprus settlementWith newly re-elected Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan having called for international recognition of the Turkish-occupied northern part of Cyprus, Christodoulides reiterated his ‘unwavering efforts’ to reunify Cyprus through a comprehensive settlement in line with international law, UN Security Council resolutions and EU law, values and principles. As reflected in the level of attention dedicated to this topic, the President stated that reunification was the ‘highest priority’ of his government.
Eastern MediterraneanThe Cypriot President stressed that maintaining a stable and secure environment in the eastern Mediterranean was not just to the benefit of the region and its people, but also of strategic importance for the EU. He added that challenges in this region could only be addressed collectively, and that Cyprus, together with Greece, promoted regional cooperation to create regional synergies and partnerships.
MigrationHe welcomed the agreement reached in the Council the previous week on two important parts of the new pact for migration and asylum, and expressed the hope that negotiations between the co-legislators would proceed speedily. In Christodoulides’s view, for the migration pact to succeed, it is important to maintain a balance between solidarity and the principle of responsibility, and to keep working hard on the external aspects of migration, so as to reduce irregular flows.
Cyprus in the EULooking back over Cypriot membership of the EU, Christodoulides identified Cyprus’s accession to the EU as the ‘greatest historic achievement since the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus’. Looking ahead to 2026, when Cyprus is due to hold the rotating presidency of the Council of the EU, Christodoulides pledged to be ‘an honourable mediator to ensure institutional cohesion’; he plans various initiatives as part of the EU’s political cooperation with the Mediterranean and the wider Middle East.
Specific proposals and positionsThe President of Cyprus used the opportunity to present his views on how the European Union should advance in specific policy areas, summarised below.
Policy issuePriority action and proposals (quotes)Energy‘Gas has a vital role to play in the energy transition, as the most environmentally friendly conventional fuel and a potential raw material to produce hydrogen’.Russia’s war on Ukraine‘We will never allow border changes stemming from violence and war. We will never accept the result of Russia’s aggression against an independent, sovereign state’.Strategic autonomy‘The EU must be strategically autonomous, in areas such as security, energy, health and elsewhere’.Table – Specific proposals made by Nikos Christodoulides, by policy areaRead this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘‘This is Europe’ debate in the European Parliament: Speech by Nikos Christodoulides, President of Cyprus, 13 June 2023‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.
Written by Alessandro D’Alfonso.
Next Generation EU (NGEU) is the unprecedented instrument created by the European Union (EU) to help Member States recover from the socio-economic impact of the COVID‑19 crisis, while also addressing structural challenges such as the green and digital transition. Its main spending tool is the €723.8 billion Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) that finances ambitious packages of reform and investment measures agreed in the Member States’ national recovery and resilience plans (NRRPs). Given the RRF’s strong links with the European Semester, the EU’s economic governance coordination framework regularly takes stock of progress in RRF implementation.
Combined with additional data on payments received so far by Member States (30.6 % of the approved allocation on average) and the milestones and targets linked to those payments (11 % of the overall objectives under the plans), the documents in the 2023 European Semester spring package provide an overview of the state of play in the implementation of the RRF in individual Member States. According to the European Commission, the deployment of the RRF is broadly on track. Variations appear to be emerging across the EU, however, since on the basis of the country-specific recommendations and reports, Member States can be classified into four broad groups as regards implementation of their NRRPs: 1) well under way (in 9 Member States); 2) under way (14); 3) under way with significant delays (2); and 4) significantly delayed (2).
With 89 % of the milestones and targets still to be achieved, the years to 2026, the final year for the RRF, will be crucial for successful completion of the plans. Their ongoing revision, not least for the inclusion of new REPowerEU chapters on reinforced energy measures, may trigger delays in 2023, but it is also an opportunity to address current challenges, such as unexpectedly high inflation. As of 12 June 2023, only a quarter of Member States had submitted their REPowerEU chapters, which must be agreed and operational by the end of 2023 at the latest.
Read the complete briefing on ‘Recovery and resilience plans in the 2023 European Semester: Progress and country-specific recommendations‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.
National recovery and resilience plans (NRRPs) as of 12 June 2023: European Semester assessment, payments received and milestones and targets achievedWritten by Martina Prpic (1st edition).
On 19 December 2022, the European Commission put forward a proposal for the targeted revision of Directive 2011/36/EU, which is the main EU instrument to combat trafficking in human beings and protect its victims. Despite progress achieved in fighting this crime, the Commission reports that, on average, 7 000 people per year are victims of human trafficking in the EU and that this figure is most likely only the tip of the iceberg. Moreover, forms of exploitation have evolved over time and have adapted to the new environment. For instance, criminal networks are now taking advantage of the possibilities offered by new technologies to recruit victims. Most recently, the Russian invasion of Ukraine has generated a massive displacement of women and children and created new opportunities for criminal organisations. While a large majority of victims of trafficking for sexual exploitation are women and girls, men are more victims of trafficking for labour exploitation, the share of which is increasing, or are forced to commit criminal activities. Against this background, the Commission is proposing a set of amendments to strengthen the current rules, further harmonise provisions across Member States in order to reduce demand, and collect robust data and statistics.
VersionsWritten by Costica Dumbrava (1st edition).
In December 2022, the Commission presented two proposals to revise the rules on the collection and transfer of advance passenger information (API) data – data collected by air carriers at check-in and sent to competent authorities in the country of destination prior to the flight’s take-off. One of the proposals is for a new regulation on the collection and transfer of API data for the prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of terrorist offences and serious crime.
The proposal seeks to align the rules on the collection and transfer of API data with the rules on the processing of passenger name records (PNR) – data from air travellers’ ticket reservations – in order to increase the effectiveness of the fight against serious crimes and terrorism in the EU. The proposal provides uniform criteria for the collection and transfer of API data on extra-EU flights and selected intra-EU flights. It builds on the provisions of another proposal for a regulation on the collection and transfer of API data for enhancing and facilitating external border controls. Both proposals rely on the establishment of a centralised router to enable the transmission of API data between air carriers and the competent national authorities dealing with API data.
The proposal falls under the ordinary legislative procedure. In the European Parliament, the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) has appointed a rapporteur, Assita Kanko (ECR, Belgium), who has begun preparing a draft report.
VersionsWritten by Eric Pichon.
What is at stake?The Cotonou Agreement is the widest and most comprehensive binding partnership agreement between the EU and third countries: it connects one-fifth of the world’s population and covers trade, development and political cooperation between the EU and 78 countries in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific (ACP). Signed in 2000, it was set to expire after twenty years. However, it has been extended several times (currently until 30 June 2023) to offer the possibility of setting up a new agreement. After a long and challenging negotiation process, which was also affected by the COVID‑19 pandemic, the chief negotiators have proposed a new and improved agreement. It reflects the changes and challenges that have emerged since 2000 and is expected to shape the future of EU-ACP relations.
What is new in the future agreement?The ACP Group of States became an international organisation in April 2020: the Organisation of ACP States (OACPS). The new legal framework for EU relations with the current 79 OACPS members will therefore be the ‘OACPS-EU Partnership Agreement’. However, it is likely that the final name will be something more catchy, perhaps based on the location of the official signature – maybe ‘Samoa’.
There will also be a new structure for the agreement, with a ‘foundation’ that defines the ACP and EU common values and interests, such as democracy, human rights, sustainable development and climate action. On top of that, three separate regional pillars for Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific will focus on their specific needs and priorities. For example, the African pillar will deal with issues such as peace and stability, democracy and good governance, economic and human development, migration and mobility, and climate change. The Caribbean pillar will emphasise regional integration and disaster resilience. The Pacific pillar will highlight the maritime dimension of the partnership. The new agreement will also be more flexible, allowing for different levels of action (continental, regional, national) and different types of cooperation (political dialogue, development assistance, trade arrangements), depending on each context.
How does the European Parliament fit in?The partnership is more than just a formal agreement. It is a living collaboration between the two sides. To make this happen, the partnership has a solid institutional framework that involves representatives from both sides at different levels: ministers, ambassadors, and parliamentarians.
The Joint Parliamentary Assembly (JPA) is a key part of this framework. It brings together 78 Members of the European Parliament and 78 members of ACP countries’ parliaments.[1] They meet twice a year, once in the ACP and once in the EU, to discuss fair and sustainable development, security, climate, youth employment, gender equality, human rights, or any topic of common concern. They adopt resolutions that provide jointly agreed positions on these important issues.
What is on the agenda in June?The next plenary session will take place in Brussels (26‑28 June 2023), where JPA members will debate on timely topics such as hybrid threats, the reform of the United Nations Security Council, the humanitarian situation in countries affected by terrorism, and the situation in Haiti.
The plenary session will also feature debates with Jutta Urpilainen, the European Commissioner for international partnerships, with Johan Forssell, Development Minister of Sweden, Alan Ganoo, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Mauritius – the two countries respectively preside the EU and OACPS Councils – and with the European Economic and Social Committee.
The Joint Parliamentary Assembly organises additional events during its plenary weeks. In June 2023 a Youth Forum and a Women’s Forum will take place, where participants from both sides will exchange views and ideas, as well as a seminar on the best practices to fight disinformation.
In addition, the Development Committee of the European Parliament has invited the JPA members to join a public hearing on helping developing countries deal with their debt issues.
What is next?The European Parliament fought hard to keep the Joint Parliamentary Assembly in the future partnership, and it succeeded. The future agreement not only preserves the Joint Parliamentary Assembly but also creates three joint assemblies for EU relations with respectively, Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific. These assemblies will allow for more focused and tailored cooperation at the regional level. The European Parliament’s ACP unit has worked with JPA Bureau Members from both sides on drafting the rules of procedures for the four future assemblies. These draft rules will be presented and be put to a vote during the JPA plenary session in June 2023.
Parliament and the JPA are eagerly waiting for the future partnership to come into force. They hope that the remaining obstacles will be overcome soon, for the Council to give its green light, and that there will be no delay in this crucial step.
Want to know more?After Cotonou: Towards a new agreement with the African, Caribbean and Pacific states, International Agreements in Progress Briefing, EPRS, April 2023
Check the Legislative train Schedule for updates on the state of play of the proposed future agreement.
Visit the Joint Parliamentary Assembly website.
[1] The OACPs has 79 members but Cuba is not party to the Cotonou Agreement. South Africa decided to leave the OACPS as of 2 September 2022 and will not participate in the future agreement. The Maldives became a full member of the OACPS on 10 December 2022.
Written by Costica Dumbrava (1st edition).
In December 2022, the Commission presented two proposals to revise the rules on the collection and transfer of advance passenger information (API) data – data collected by air carriers at check-in and sent to border control authorities in the country of destination prior to a flight’s take-off. The current directive on the collection and transfer of API data will be replaced by two regulations: one on the collection and transfer of API data for border management purposes, and another on the collection and transfer of API data for law enforcement purposes.
The proposal on the collection and transfer of API data for border management seeks to enhance and facilitate the effectiveness and efficiency of border checks at external borders and to combat irregular immigration. It provides a revised and extended list of API data and makes mandatory the collection of API data on all scheduled and non-scheduled flights into the EU. It also establishes a new technical solution (a router) to enable air carriers to transfer API data to the competent national authorities though a single, centralised system, under strict data protection and security rules.
The proposal falls under the ordinary legislative proposal where the European Parliament and the Council act as co-legislators. In the European Parliament, the rapporteur appointed in the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) has started preparing a draft report.
VersionsWritten by Pieter Baert (1st edition).
The rise of e-commerce has required the system of value-added tax (VAT) to adapt and ensure that the rules allow for a smooth and fraud-proof transaction between customer and seller. The major overhaul of the VAT rules for e-commerce in 2021 introduced a series of important simplifications for businesses, such as the creation of an import one-stop shop (IOSS). The IOSS allows businesses to declare and remit VAT on all their business-to-consumer (B2C) distance sales of imported goods across the EU (i.e. goods bought online by a customer established in the EU with the goods dispatched from a third country) through one single VAT return, rather than in each country where they make a sale. However, at the moment, the IOSS operates with a threshold, whereby the distance selling of goods with a value above €150 cannot be declared in the IOSS.
Having assessed that the €150 threshold constitutes a burden to businesses, the Commission proposed on 17 May 2023 to further expand the IOSS by removing the threshold entirely. This change would open the use of the IOSS to a wider range of businesses, which would benefit from lower compliance costs. The proposal is subject to a special legislative procedure, requiring unanimous support in the Council, following consultation of the European Parliament and the European Economic and Social Committee.
VersionsWritten by Marcin Grajewski.
The European Union has found new impetus for enlargement in the wake of Russia’s war on Ukraine, making progress in what was once called the EU’s most successful policy. A year ago, the EU granted Ukraine and Moldova official EU candidate status and also opened the same possibility for Georgia. Politicians and analysts more and more often say that the EU should become more involved in the Western Balkan countries, which saw their membership prospects open 20 years ago. If it does not, those countries could drift away politically from the Union and exacerbate conflicts in the post-Yugoslav area. For Turkey, EU membership is no longer a priority, while popular support for EU accession is declining in Serbia, partly due to the influence of Russia.
‘There is a new awareness inside the EU. We finally realise that it is not enough to just wait for our friends outside the Union to move closer to us. It is not enough to say that the door is open. We must also take responsibility to bring the aspiring members of our Union much closer to us,’ European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said at the GLOBSEC conference in Bratislava in May.
This note gathers links to the recent publications and commentaries from many international think tanks on enlargement and issues with EU accession countries.
The future of the European Political Community
European Council on Foreign Relations, June 2023
Who is afraid of Georgian democracy?
Carnegie Europe, May 2023
Time to get serious about Moldova
Carnegie Europe, May 2023
Is the EU ready for further enlargement?
Carnegie Europe, May 2023
The European Political Community: From Prague to Chisinau and beyond
European Policy Centre, May 2023
Applying for EU membership in time of war: ‘Accession through war’ of Ukraine
Istituto Affari Internazionali, May 2023
Keeping friends closer: Why the EU should address new geoeconomic realities and deepen partnerships with its neighbours
Bertelsmann Stiftung, April 2023
How Russia’s invasion of Ukraine tested the international legal order
Brookings Institution, April 2023
Why Ukraine needs security guarantees
Carnegie Europe, April 2023
Bosnia and Herzegovina: Gas disputes along ethnic lines
Centre for Eastern Studies, April 2023
Croatia’s prime minister: There should be fewer roadblocks for EU enlargement to the Balkans, and Ukraine
Atlantic Council, March 2023
Is the EU doing enough for Eastern Europe?
Carnegie Europe, March 2023
The politics of dialogue: How the EU can change the conversation in Kosovo and Serbia
European Council on Foreign Relations, March 2023
Georgia must get its act together to become an EU candidate country
European Policy Centre, March 2023
Ukraine’s accession talks need bold action in Kyiv and Brussels
European Policy Centre, March 2023
Europe and Russia on the Balkan front: Geopolitics and diplomacy in the EU’s backyard
Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale, March 2023
Making the EU and member states policy towards the Western Balkans socio-economically more sustainable
Österreichische Gesellschaft für Europapolitik, March 2023
Consequences of the war in Ukraine: Two areas of contention -Turkey and the Balkans
Rand Corporation, March 2023
The normalisation of relations between Kosovo and Serbia
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, March 2023
Can enlargement be the EU’s most successful foreign policy, again?
Carnegie Europe via Aspenia, February 2023
The EU must reconcile geopolitics and democracy
Carnegie Europe, February 2023
Closer to the West? Serbia’s foreign policy after the Russian invasion of Ukraine
Centre for Eastern Studies, February 2023
Dutch parliament demands geopolitical alignment in EU enlargement
Clingendael, February 2023
Ukraine: Conflict at the crossroads of Europe and Russia
Council on Foreign Relations, February 2023
Resolving the Kosovo-Serbia dispute: The key to limiting Russia’s influence in the Balkans
European Policy Centre, February 2023
Can the EU still wrest the Balkans from their blighted history?
Fondation Robert Schuman, February 2023
Role of regional organizations and initiatives towards acceleration of the Western Balkans’ European integration
Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, February 2023
How enlargement accomplishes European unity while changing its nature
Jacques Delors Institute, February 2023
The EU should fast-track negotiations for Ukraine’s membership
Peterson Institute for International Economics, February 2023
The impressive EU-Ukraine summits: Alongside the inadequate enlargement methodology
Stockholm Centre for Eastern European Studies, February 2023
Western Balkan foreign and security ties with external actors
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, February 2023
Hedging its bets: Serbia between Russia and the EU
Carnegie Europe, January 2023
Czech Presidency of the Council of the European Union: Enlargement as a strategic decision
EUROPEUM, January 2023
Russia’s war in Ukraine: Rethinking the EU’s eastern enlargement and neighbourhood policy
German Council on Foreign Relations, January 2023
Read this briefing on ‘EU enlargement‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.
Written by Silvia Kotanidis.
The investiture of the President of the European Commission is a process that has evolved since the beginning of European integration. From the Treaty of Rome to the beginning of the 1980s, the role of the European Parliament was almost inexistent. With the 1983 Stuttgart Declaration, Parliament acquired an embryonic consultative role whereby the non-binding opinion of the Enlarged Bureau (Parliament’s Bureau plus leaders of the political groups) was sought prior to the appointment of the President. In 1992, the Treaty of Maastricht formalised the consultation of the European Parliament, but its role remained non-binding. The 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam introduced Parliament’s approval to the investiture procedure when it entered into force in 1999, and this was retained with the Treaty of Nice in 2001. Finally, in 2009 the Treaty of Lisbon introduced the procedure applicable today, establishing a political link between the vote on the President of the European Commission. According to Article 17(7) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), the Commission President is today elected by Parliament by a majority of the component Members in a process in which the European Council, acting by qualified majority and taking into account the elections to the European Parliament, proposes a candidate to the European Parliament.
The lead candidate process is a political process, based on the European political parties nominating the (lead) candidate they would support as President of the Commission, ahead of the European elections. The lead candidate then fronts the electoral campaign across the EU and presents the political programme of the party of reference. The lead candidate, or Spitzenkandidaten process, was run for the first time in 2014, and a second time in 2019, with contrasting results. However, the idea had been floated in European circles and academia since the 1990s. Supporters consider that the lead candidate process could make the process of selection of the leader of the ‘EU executive’ more transparent and shelter the choice from intergovernmental influence and the ‘horse trading’ dynamics often present in the European Council. A further purpose was to provide greater democratic legitimacy to the office of head of the European Union’s executive by giving voters the chance to influence the choice of the Commission President. This would have brought EU political processes closer to their national versions, making the EU method of appointing EU leaders more comprehensible to the public. A further purpose was to inject some dynamism into EU elections by personalising the electoral campaign and associating a specific candidate with a political programme, which should motivate citizens to turn out to vote. Finally, the lead candidate process was thought to be a step towards the creation of a European demos, i.e. a place where candidates campaigning across the EU discuss EU-wide issues, addressing EU voters.
The lead candidate process was run for the first time in 2014 with Jean‑Claude Juncker, the European People’s Party (EPP) lead candidate, elected President of the Commission. However, in 2019, the process was not as successful, as Ursula von der Leyen was appointed by the European Council as President of the Commission without having been a Spitzenkandidat. Research on the impact of the lead candidate process has highlighted that the 2014 Spitzenkandidaten process gained a certain visibility in media debates, giving prominence to EU-related topics. This increased visibility was also linked to the contingent financial and sovereign debt crises and to the polarisation introduced to the debate between pro-European and Eurosceptic movements. Turnout however remained stagnant in 2014 (with a slight fall of 0.36 percentage points compared to 2009) and the visibility of the lead candidates remained low (19 % of the respondents to a 2014 post-election survey recognised Jean-Claude Juncker, while 17 % recognised Martin Schulz, lead candidate of the Party of European Socialists, PES), with higher peaks in the lead candidates’ home countries. However, a higher percentage of respondents (41 %) recognised that a vote for a lead candidate and for a specific European party was a vote for the future President of the European Commission. The link between the lead candidates and the national political parties, a connection that boosts lead candidates’ visibility during electoral campaigns, was not strong. This is also recognised in a European Commission report on the 2014 European elections and by some commentators (e.g. Peñalver and Priestley). Notwithstanding these flaws, the 2014 lead candidate process can be considered a positive experience, as it helped end the decline in voter turnout, added transparency to the selection of candidates for the President of the Commission and instilled self-confidence in the Commission, which could now claim to be more political thanks to enhanced popular legitimacy.
In 2019, the repetition of the experiment had to take account of European Council President Donald Tusk’s declaration, ahead of the elections, that renewed adoption of the lead candidate process was not automatic and that the European Council claimed full ownership of the right to propose a candidate to Parliament. With more preparation by the European political parties, the lead candidate process was run by almost all European political parties, including some that had not participated in the process in the 2014 elections. Among the main reasons for the failure of the lead candidate process in 2019, commentators highlight the lack of a candidate with the requisite experience required by the European Council (e.g. Jim Cloos). De Wilde also mentions the unsuccessful 2018 electoral reform, which would have introduced a Union-wide constituency, as a factor in the lack of support for the lead candidate process; the lack of a truly European electoral debate; and the fragmented opinion of European political parties regarding some lead candidates. Notwithstanding these weaknesses, turnout increased in 2019 (+8.05 percentage points), the highest turnout in European elections since 1994.
After the 2019 set-back, the question is whether the lead candidate process has a future, considering that – in addition to the commendable aim to improve transparency, legitimacy and personalisation – it, in principle, brings the EU closer to citizens by emulating national processes of selection of the premier. This study explores several avenues that could keep the lead candidate process alive.
A first avenue consists of improving the status quo by working on the interinstitutional dimension, intra-parliamentary cohesion, and improving practical arrangements to facilitate the process. This option presupposes that a certain degree of maturity is reached in relations between the two participating institutions and that the European Parliament and European Council work in synergy. European political parties should therefore carefully select their lead candidates with a view to incorporating the requirements that the European Council considers indispensable, at an early stage. For the European Council, this would mean going beyond the wording of the Treaty provision and recognising the development of European societies that demand greater transparency in politics and more involvement for citizens in political life. If the right equilibrium is reached, the repetition of the lead candidate process over time could lead to the establishment of a constitutional convention or practice.
A second avenue could be the recognition of the lead candidate process in an interinstitutional agreement, a legal instrument provided for under Article 295 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), which however does not include the European Council as one of the possible contracting institutions, casting some doubt on the legal feasibility of this option. This was proposed in the pending reform of the European Electoral Act (legislative resolution of 3 May 2022 on the proposal for a Council Regulation on the election of the Members of the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage (2020/2220(INL) – 2022/0902(APP)).
A third option would be to incorporate the lead candidate process in a reform of the European Electoral Act. The 2015 Hübner-Leinen report made an attempt in this direction, to which the introduction of a Union-wide constituency was later added. However, this reform was not adopted by the Council.
A fourth option would be to refer to the lead candidate in the Treaties. This option would require an ordinary Treaty revision, which is a legally burdensome procedure, due to the ‘double unanimity’ required, as well as presenting political difficulties. Treaty provisions incorporating the lead candidate process could provide, for example, that in the framework of the necessary consultations the European Council hears the lead candidates before formalising the proposal for a Commission President candidate; that the European Council must vote on the first- or second-ranking lead candidate before resorting to a different candidate; that the European Council considers as a candidate for the Commission President, the lead candidate able to garner a parliamentary majority; that the European Council is required to consider the lead candidate with the most votes (or second-most), or finally to invert the role of the institutions by making Parliament the institution that proposes the candidate for President of the Commission to the European Council, which must then vote on that proposal.
The Spitzenkandidaten process is one of the measures proposed by the Conference on the Future of Europe. Proposal 38(4) states that ‘European citizens should have a greater say on who is elected as President of the Commission. This could be achieved either by the direct election of the Commission President or a lead candidate system’. This desire of citizens to be able to influence EU decisions and the choice of EU leadership should not be overlooked in following up on the Conference’s results. In this respect, the lead candidate process can play a considerable role.
Read the complete study on ‘Spitzenkandidaten or the lead candidate process: Ways to Europeanise elections to the European Parliament‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament
Written by Andrés García Higuera with Clemens Weichert.
Open strategic autonomy is about ensuring that the EU has the capacity to cope alone if necessary but without ruling out cooperation whenever possible. It goes some steps beyond smart supply chain management by taking into account geopolitics as well as economic factors. It relies on foresight to identify threats and ensures resilience by anticipating the required responses. Could the resulting preparedness also prevent crises by normalising situations that would otherwise become emergencies?
In recent years, the world has gone through repeated crises –the economic crisis, migration, Russia’s invasion of Crimea, Brexit, the COVID-19 pandemic, the shortage of semiconductors, Russia’s further invasion of Ukraine, the energy crisis, rogue cyberattacks, political tensions with Asia, etc. As the European Union (EU) is close both geopolitically and economically to Ukraine, the impact of the war on its economy is particularly acute. The OECD recently published a simulation of the likely effects of the war and the commodity price changes, showing drops in growth almost twice as large in the eurozone as in the United States. While the consequences of Russia’s actions and the subsequent disruptions to European supply chains are only now beginning to be fully appreciated, the EU needs to respond to these crises as supply chains for food, energy, raw materials, satellite communications and semiconductors, among others, are currently at risk. Also, very recently, the COVID-19 crisis put enormous pressure on health supply chains for face masks, respirators, hydroalcoholic gel, tests and vaccines.
According to the dictionary definition, a ‘crisis’ is ‘a time of great disagreement, confusion, or suffering’. In some of the recent instances of crisis, it was the material shortages of strategic products that really made the situation dire and brought about disagreement, confusion and a considerable part of the suffering. The strategic impact of logistics has long been been acknowledged . Napoleon, for example, was aware of the need to take it into account to increase the mobility of his artillery and supply his troops. He offered a prize for new methods to improve food preservation, which led to inventions such as canned food. Napoleon sought to make war situations less disruptive for his side, while the enemy would be hard put to cope. However, he failed to grasp the overarching scale of the problem; can openers were only invented 50 years after canned food.
Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘What if open strategic autonomy could break the cycle of recurring crises?‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.
Listen to podcast ‘What if open strategic autonomy could break the cycle of recurring crises?’ on YouTube.
Please accept YouTube cookies to play this video. By accepting you will be accessing content from YouTube, a service provided by an external third party.
If you accept this notice, your choice will be saved and the page will refresh.
Accept YouTube ContentWritten by Magdalena Pasikowska-Schnass.
As digital technologies have been increasingly permeating our lives, artificial intelligence (AI) has gradually made it onto the scene too, but without much fanfare. This once daunting prospect has become a part of our lives even in domains that do not seem to belong to a futurist world, such as cultural heritage and museums. The results are both promising and surprising: reconstructing a piece of art, completing an unfinished composition of a great musician, identifying the author of an ancient text, or providing architectural details for a potential reconstruction of the Notre-Dame de Paris cathedral would have seemed like science fiction just a few years ago.
Applying AI in the public cultural domain requires investment in many areas, the most obvious being infrastructure, equipment and highly qualified human resources. Human resources are essential, as AI needs to be fed with high-quality data to be trained to perform its tasks. Data needs to be interoperable and properly described with metadata. Moreover, copyright issues must be resolved before such data is used, and cultural heritage professionals need to learn how to navigate this complex terrain skilfully.
The EU has a rich cultural heritage, and its numerous top museums and works of art are a precious resource for its cultural and creative industry. Yet, it depends on the United States for its online cultural platforms and on Asia for its equipment. Presently, it is making efforts to change all this and to preserve its cultural and creative resources in digital form in order to amass the data needed to put AI at the service of its cultural heritage and museums. AI can also be beneficial for archaeological and historic research, helping deepen knowledge and localise sites. To foster these developments, the EU has issued recommendations setting targets for the 3D digitisation of the Member States’ cultural heritage sites and monuments, but also for relevant capacity building and training.
Read the complete briefing on ‘Artificial intelligence in the context of cultural heritage and museums: Complex challenges and new opportunities‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.
Listen to policy podcast ‘Artificial intelligence in the context of cultural heritage and museums’ on YouTube.
Please accept YouTube cookies to play this video. By accepting you will be accessing content from YouTube, a service provided by an external third party.
If you accept this notice, your choice will be saved and the page will refresh.
Accept YouTube ContentWritten by Clare Ferguson with Rebecca Frederick.
With only a year to go before the 2024 European elections, Members of the European Parliament meet in Strasbourg from 12 to 15 June 2023 with a very full agenda, and a focus on security. The key political debates scheduled for Wednesday morning, are expected to be on the preparation of the European Council meeting of 29‑30 June 2023 and the rule of law in Poland in the context of recent changes to the electoral law and the new investigative committee on Russian interference in Poland’s internal security. The session will open with a statement marking the World Day against Child Labour.
The President of the Republic of Kosovo, Vjosa Osmani, is expected to address a formal sitting on Wednesday morning. A ‘This is Europe’ debate with the President of Cyprus, Nikos Christodoulides, is scheduled for Tuesday morning. Following the recent deterioration on the ground, Members are due to hold a debate on Ukraine on Tuesday morning, on the humanitarian and environmental consequences of the destruction of the Nova Kakhovka dam, and the sustainable reconstruction and integration of Ukraine into the Euro-Atlantic community.
Russia’s war on Ukraine, the pandemic and the effects of climate change pose enormous challenges to food security. Although there is no shortage of food in Europe today, it is clear that food security and a resilient agricultural sector are strategic matters both for developing countries and for the EU. Parliament has long pushed for stronger strategic autonomy in food and agricultural supplies such as fertiliser. Parliament also supports measures to shield consumers from food inflation. On Tuesday afternoon, Members are due to debate a Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development (AGRI) report on ensuring food security and the long-term resilience of EU agriculture. The report recommends taking measures to ensure food safety both at home and globally, including reducing dependence on imports and supporting farmers in the search for innovative means to produce food. The AGRI report nevertheless opposes a blanket ban on the use of pesticides and fertilisers, which it states could threaten farmers’ livelihoods.
Please accept YouTube cookies to play this video. By accepting you will be accessing content from YouTube, a service provided by an external third party.
If you accept this notice, your choice will be saved and the page will refresh.
Accept YouTube ContentFollowing the discovery that government bodies from both EU and non-EU states have used Pegasus spyware and equivalents against journalists, politicians, diplomats, civil society actors and others, the European Parliament established a Committee of Inquiry to investigate the use of Pegasus and equivalent surveillance spyware (PEGA) in March 2022. In a joint debate scheduled for Wednesday afternoon, Members are due to debate the committee’s findings, with a view to making a recommendation to the Commission and the Council. The draft recommendation condemns governments’ illegitimate use of spyware. It underlines failures to implement EU law, not just by those Member States that have used spyware, but also criticises European Commission and European External Action Service support for non-EU countries to develop surveillance capacities. Parliament calls for common EU standards to regulate Member State use of spyware, better enforcement of related EU law (including data protection law and the Dual-use Regulation) and for new legislation placing due diligence requirements on producers and exporters of surveillance technologies.
The EU is keen to ensure a ‘human-centric’ approach to regulating artificial intelligence (AI), to ensure an optimum balance between the benefits and risks of these new technologies. To set Parliament’s position for trilogue negotiations with the Council, Parliament is expected to debate a joint Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO) and Civil Liberties (LIBE) Committee report on Tuesday afternoon, which proposes to greatly amend the proposed artificial intelligence act. The changes proposed touch upon the definition, set a larger number of prohibited practices, and stricter categorisation of high-risk systems, such as those that risk harming people’s health, safety, fundamental rights or the environment – and social media platforms and systems used to influence political processes. The report also proposes boosting protection of fundamental rights, health, safety, the environment, democracy and the rule of law in general-purpose AI systems like ChatGPT and increasing their transparency. National governance and enforcement should be stronger, and Parliament proposes to establish a new EU AI body to ensure the rules are applied.
New technology offers the opportunity to revolutionise the exchange of evidence in criminal investigations, including across borders. Members are expected to vote on a compromise reached with the co-legislators in a joint debate on Monday afternoon. To make evidence easier for law enforcement authorities to access, two pieces of legislation would introduce a European production order and a European preservation order. The compromise text on the proposals includes a mandatory 10-day response deadline for production orders (8 hours in emergencies) and a notification system for some categories of data, among other things. Should Members adopt the agreed texts on cross-border access to electronic evidence, they then go to the Council for its adoption.
A Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) report sought to shift the focus away from law enforcement and control-related issues and towards harm reduction and health during interinstitutional negotiations on a proposal to strengthen the EU Drugs Agency’s mandate. The illicit drugs landscape in Europe has changed greatly since the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA) was set up to provide scientific analysis in 2006, with drugs such as amphetamines and ecstasy increasingly produced in the EU. Members also demand greater transparency in the EMCDDA, and more focus on the human rights, age and gender dimensions of drug use and addiction. Members will vote on the adoption of the provisional text agreed in trilogue negotiations.
Batteries are found in countless everyday devices and are an important means of storing intermittent renewable energy. In its push for climate neutrality, the EU is modernising its legislative framework on batteries. A proposal on batteries and waste batteries seeks to address all steps of a battery’s life cycle, setting rules for sustainability (minimum recycled content, performance criteria, etc.), safety, labelling, and disposal. It also introduces due diligence obligations for businesses sourcing raw materials. With the goal of zero-emission mobility in mind, the European Parliament’s Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI) seeks to widen the proposed scope to include batteries used in light transport (e.g. e-scooters). This addition, as well as tougher due diligence requirements recommended by ENVI, was included in the provisional agreement on the proposal for a new regulatory framework for batteries, concluded in interinstitutional negotiations in December 2022, on which Members are due to vote on final adoption on Wednesday.
Remoteness, insularity or small in size, with a challenging geography or climate, and a lack of economic opportunity often disadvantages those living in the EU’s outermost regions. On Monday, Parliament is expected to consider an own-initiative report from the Committee on Regional Development (REGI) on the assessment of the European Commission’s 2022 strategy to improve living conditions in the EU’s outermost regions. The REGI committee would like to see greater ambition for these regions, particularly to provide more opportunities for young people. One demand is to reproduce the compensation scheme mitigating higher prices in agriculture in the fisheries, transport, energy and other sectors. The committee underlines the importance of sustainable tourism in these regions, and highlights the need for better digital infrastructure and connectivity.
Fisheries agreements between the EU and non-EU countries generally focus on the fight against illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing. The EU/Mauritius Fisheries Partnership Agreement is part of a set of EU tuna agreements aimed at sustainable fishing in the western Indian Ocean. Signed on 21 December 2022, a new four-year protocol implementing the agreement currently applies provisionally. During the votes scheduled for Wednesday lunchtime, Members are set to decide on giving Parliament’s consent to concluding the protocol, allowing fishing opportunities for up to 40 EU vessels.
Members have an opportunity to question the High Representative/Vice-President, Josep Borrell on Tuesday afternoon on relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan and the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh and in the Lachin Corridor. He will also make statements on the situations in Lebanon and in Nicaragua, as well as on the state of the Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement with Cuba.
On Thursday, Members are set to vote on the composition of the European Parliament for the coming term. They are expected to propose slight adjustments in the number of Members to be elected in each Member State, to take account of population changes since the 2019 elections. The final decision will then be taken by the European Council, which must first obtain formal consent from the Parliament. The Council and Commission will earlier in the week make statements on the negotiations on the European electoral law, with little progress shown since the Parliament formally submitted its proposal to revamp the 1976 Electoral Act in May 2022.
Further reading:Written by Vivienne Halleux (1st edition).
As required by EU water legislation, and in line with the European Green Deal’s zero pollution ambition, on 26 October 2022 the European Commission tabled a proposal to revise the lists of surface water and groundwater pollutants that need to be monitored and controlled for the purpose of protection of EU freshwater bodies, and the associated environmental quality standards. The proposal also seeks to remedy shortcomings identified in the current framework as regards chemical pollution in waters, and notably to enable swifter adaptation to scientific knowledge.
Stakeholders’ views on the proposed text are mixed. Non-governmental organisations are pushing for more ambition, for instance on chemical mixtures, pesticides, deadlines, and producers’ responsibility for covering monitoring costs. Industry representatives have meanwhile expressed some concerns, notably about the achievability and scientific grounding of certain new standards.
In Parliament, the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI), responsible for the file, is scheduled to vote on its legislative report before summer 2023.
VersionsWritten by Guillaume Ragonnaud.
The EU has the world’s largest single market. Home to 345 million people when it was launched in 1993, it now numbers 447 million consumers and 23 million companies, and covers a considerable range of policy areas. This year, the single market is celebrating its 30th anniversary.
While the single market generates many jobs and considerable economic benefits, many hurdles remain. In March 2020, the Commission identified the top 13 barriers to cross-border activity (such as red tape), and the five main root causes of these barriers (such as inadequate enforcement of legislation).
Furthermore, recent shocks – including the pandemic and Russia’s war on Ukraine – resulting in restrictions to free movement, shortages of goods and services, and rising energy prices, have shown not only how vulnerable the single market can be to crises, but also the extent to which the EU economy relies on a well-functioning single market.
In May 2022, the plenary of the Conference on the Future of Europe proposed to deepen the single market further. On 18 January 2023, Parliament adopted a resolution on the 30th anniversary of the single market. Reaffirming its readiness to play its role in the process, Parliament called for renewed commitment from the Member States and the other EU institutions, and a specific agenda for action towards 2030 and beyond, to strengthen and develop the single market further, not least in areas such as services, energy, telecommunications and the digital single market.
On 16 March 2023, the Commission put forward a communication on the single market at 30, in which it discusses a possible way towards further single market integration.
This is an update of an ‘at a glance’ note published for the ceremony marking the anniversary during the January plenary session. An EPRS infographic provides additional information on the single market.
Read the complete briefing on ‘The single market at 30 (1993-2023)‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament