European Parliamentary Research Service Blog

Written by Nicole Scholz (1st edition),

© gustavofrazao / Fotolia

The European Commission has proposed to amend Directive 2004/37/EC by expanding its scope and by including and/or revising occupational exposure limit values for a number of cancer- or mutation-causing substances. The initiative is proceeding in steps. The first proposal of May 2016 covered 13 priority chemical agents, the second, of January 2017, a further seven. The current (third) proposal addresses an additional five.

Broad discussions with scientists and the social partners fed into all three proposals. Reacting to the Commission’s set of measures as a whole, trade unions have acknowledged the importance of further action to improve the existing framework, reiterating the need to reach the target of 50 limit values in 2020, while some considered it necessary to extend the scope of the CMD to substances that are toxic to reproduction. Actors on the employers’ side, while in principle supporting further revisions of the directive, have underlined, among other things, the need to ensure that values are proportionate and feasible in terms of technical implementation.

While welcoming the Commission proposal, the rapporteur’s draft report of 29 June 2018 proposes, inter alia, to grant incentives to businesses that comply with the directive. Moreover, it opts to include, within the scope of the directive, the protection of workers from exposure to hazardous, or harm-causing, medicines (including cytotoxic ones, which are used in the treatment of cancer).

Versions

• July 2018: ‘Limits on exposure to carcinogens and mutagens at work: Third proposal‘ (1st edition)

Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2004/37/EC on the protection of workers from the risks related to exposure to carcinogens or mutagens at work Committee responsible: Employment and Social Affairs (EMPL) COM(2018) 171
05.04.20182018/0081(COD)

Ordinary legislative procedure (COD) (Parliament and Council on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Rapporteur: Laura Agea (EFDD, Italy) Shadow rapporteurs: Marita Ulvskog (S&D, Sweden) Next steps expected: Discussions in EMPL and committee vote

With European elections coming up in May 2019, you probably want to know how the European Union impacts your daily life, before you think about voting. In the latest in a series of posts on what Europe does for you, your family, your business and your wellbeing, we look at what Europe does for victims of terrorism.

Every year Europe commemorates victims of terrorism on 11 March. This European Remembrance Day was established after the 2004 Madrid bombings, which left 191 people dead and around 2 000 injured. But Europe does not limit its action to commemoration. European legislation aimed specifically at combating terrorism dates back to 2002, and introduced a common understanding of terrorist offences and minimal penalties for perpetrators across Europe. It recognised the vulnerability of terrorism victims and the assistance they and their families need.

Twitter Hashtag #EUandME

© MoiraM / Fotolia

With the recent wave of attacks, which affected nine EU countries between 2015 and 2018, the European Union reinforced its arsenal to protect citizens and help victims. A law adopted in 2017 not only tightens the rules and sanctions related to terrorist activities, but also provides for better support for victims. Complementing earlier legislation on the rights of victims of crime, this law addresses victims’ needs, such as medical and psychological care or legal advice, and puts emergency mechanisms in place to assist them in the aftermath of an attack. Moreover, victims from another European country should receive the same assistance and compensation as residents of the country where the attack occurred, even when they return home. To ensure more efficient cooperation between countries, a Coordination Centre for Victims of Terrorism will open in 2019. An EU country faced with a terrorist attack can also ask for help under the EU solidarity clause and benefit from the crisis response arrangements involving political coordination.

Further information

• European Commission webpage on assistance to victims of terrorism and their families, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/crisis-and-terrorism/victims_en
• European Parliament, study ‘How can the EU and the Member States better help victims of terrorism?’, 2017,  http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2017/596805/IPOL_STU(2017)596805_EN.pdf
• Fight against terrorism – definitions of terrorist crimes and support to victims, summary of legislation, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/LSU/?uri=CELEX:32017L0541

Written by Irina Popescu (1st edition),

© aterrom / Fotolia

On 23 March 2018, the European Commission proposed a multiannual plan for management of fisheries in a northeast Atlantic area along the western coast of the EU, known as the Western Waters. The plan covers fisheries exploiting stocks of fish and crustaceans living close to the sea bottom (i.e. ‘demersal fisheries’), and several deep-sea stocks. The proposed plan aims to ensure that stocks are exploited sustainably and that management is based on the most up-to-date scientific information. The EU fishing fleet concerned mainly includes vessels from Belgium, Germany, France, Ireland, Spain, Portugal and the United Kingdom.

The proposal follows the pattern set by the recently adopted North Sea multiannual plan. It would allow a certain flexibility in setting fishing opportunities, by defining ranges of fishing mortality based on the best available scientific advice, and would introduce safeguard measures based on biomass levels, so as to restore stocks when they fall below safe biological limits. The plan would not include quantified values for fishing mortality or biomass levels. These are instead provided by the latest scientific advice available, and directly used by the Council when fixing fishing opportunities.

Versions

• July 2018: ‘Multiannual plan for fisheries in the Western Waters‘ (1st edition)

Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a multiannual plan for fish stocks in the Western Waters and adjacent waters, and for fisheries exploiting those stocks, amending Regulation (EU) 2016/1139 establishing a multiannual plan for the Baltic Sea, and repealing Regulations (EC) No 811/2004, (EC) No 2166/2005, (EC) No 388/2006, (EC) 509/2007 and (EC) 1300/2008 Committee responsible: Fisheries (PECH) COM(2018) 149
23.3.2018

 

2018/0074(COD)

Ordinary legislative procedure (COD) (Parliament and Council on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Rapporteur: Alain Cadec (EPP, France) Shadow rapporteurs:

 

  Ricardo Serrão Santos (S&D, Portugal)
Baroness Nosheena Mobarik (ECR, UK)
Izaskun Bilbao Barandica (ALDE, Spain)
João Ferreira (GUE/NGL, Portugal)
Linnéa Engström (Greens/EFA, Sweden) Next steps expected: Committee vote

Written by Krisztina Binder, graphics: Giulio Sabbati,

© chris / Fotolia

Negotiations on an EU-Japan trade agreement were officially launched in March 2013. Following the political agreement in principle reached in July 2017, a final accord on the EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) was announced in December 2017. On 18 April 2018, the European Commission proposed to the Council of the European Union to sign and conclude the agreement. The Commission expects that the EU-Japan EPA can be signed in July 2018, and aims to have the agreement come into effect before the end of its mandate in 2019, following approval by the Council and the European Parliament.

The EU-Japan EPA will establish a free trade area with a combined market of around 640 million consumers that accounts for roughly a third of the world’s gross domestic product (GDP). The 2016 Trade Sustainability Impact Assessment (Trade SIA) of the agreement indicated that EU exports to Japan could rise by up to 34 %, and according to a more recent Commission estimate, European companies would save up to €1 billion in customs duties per year as a result of the EU-Japan EPA.

In addition to exploiting the untapped potential of bilateral trade, the agreement is also of strategic importance, conveying a strong message of the parties’ commitment to promoting a free and fair trading system based on rules, and to reject trade protectionism.

Economic Partnership Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and Japan, of the other part Committee responsible: International Trade (INTA) Rapporteur: Pedro Silva Pereira (S&D, Portugal)

Read the complete briefing on ‘International Agreements in Progress – EU-Japan trade agreement: a driver for closer cooperation beyond trade‘ on the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Maria Margarita Mentzelopoulou and Costica Dumbrava,

© Uskarp / Shutterstock

Access to citizenship status is an important prerequisite for enjoying rights and privileges, such as migration and political rights, as well as for developing a sense of identity and belonging. Since the establishment of Union citizenship, all persons who are nationals or citizens of an EU Member State enjoy the status of EU citizenship, which confers on them a number of additional rights and privileges. However, Member States retain full control over who can be recognised as a citizen.

Although the legal rules on the acquisition and loss of citizenship in the EU Member States remain fairly divergent, one can identify a number of key trends and issues. The need to integrate long-term immigrants has pushed EU countries to amend their citizenship laws. This often resulted in making citizenship both more liberal (lowering residence requirements and tolerating dual citizenship) and more restrictive (introducing integration clauses and citizenship tests). The surge in terrorist activities in the EU, which involve citizens, prompted several Member States to revise or reactivate citizenship provisions allowing for citizenship to be revoked.

Concerns about immigrants’ integration, allegiance and belonging, as well as about the cultural and economic consequences of regional integration and globalisation are at the heart of recent debates about citizenship in Europe. As the Maltese case of investor citizenship shows, the issue of access to citizenship is no longer a matter that concerns Member States alone. The bundling of national and EU citizenship means that Member States have a certain responsibility towards each other when taking decisions over who to accept (or reject) as citizens.

Read this briefing on ‘Acquisition and loss of citizenship in EU Member States: Key trends and issues‘ on the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Click to view slideshow.

Written by Didier Bourguignon (1st edition),

© Arcansél / Fotolia

Most of the plastic in our oceans originates from land-based sources. On European beaches, plastics make up 80-85 % of marine litter, which is considered a major threat to marine and coastal biodiversity. Marine litter also costs the European Union economy an estimated €259 million to €695 million per year.

In May 2018, the European Commission put forward a legislative proposal seeking to address the issue of marine litter from plastics. The proposal would introduce a series of measures regarding the top 10 single-use plastics found on European beaches, as well as fishing gear, with a view to reducing their impact on the environment and ensuring a functional internal market.

In the European Parliament, the Committee on Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI) is considering the proposal. The Environment Council discussed the proposal on 25 June 2018.

Versions

• July 2018: ‘Single-use plastics and fishing gear: Reducing marine litter‘ (1st edition)

Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the reduction of the impact of certain plastic products on the environment Committee responsible: Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI) COM(2018) 340
12.3.2018

 

2018/0172(COD)

Ordinary legislative procedure (COD) (Parliament and Council on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Rapporteur: Frédérique Ries (ALDE, Belgium) Shadow rapporteurs:

 

 

  Karl-Heinz Florenz (EPP, Germany)
Massimo Paolucci (S&D, Italy)
Mark Demesmaeker (ECR, Belgium)
Lynn Boylan (GUE/NGL, Ireland)
Margrete Auken (Greens/EFA, Denmark)
Piernicola Pedicini (EFDD, Italy)
Sylvie Goddyn (ENF, France) Next steps expected: Publication of draft report.

Marine litter on EU beaches, by count (2016)

Written by Elena Lazarou,

© railwayfx / Fotolia

On 11 and 12 July 2018 the NATO Heads of State and Government will meet in Brussels for the 28th NATO summit. The summit comes at a time of tension in transatlantic relations, but also of continuing threats and challenges posed to the alliance. Against this background, leaders will focus on strengthening defence and deterrence, modernising the alliance and enhancing relations with the EU. Burden-sharing among allies is set to be one of the most controversial items on the agenda. In 2018 only eight out of twenty nine NATO members are estimated to be reaching the 2 % of gross domestic product (GDP) defence spending target.

The Brussels summit aims to push forward the agenda, decisions and actions agreed upon at previous summits, notably in Wales (2014) and Warsaw (2016). Yet there are fears that the insistence of US President Donald Trump that the focus be placed on burden sharing and demands that the NATO allies spend more on defence, might lead to the side-lining of other items on the agenda. The situation is aggravated by the current climate in transatlantic relations, which has deteriorated since the most recent G7 summit in Canada.

The summit in Brussels will also seek to secure progress on EU-NATO cooperation, aiming to produce a second joint statement, following that agreed upon in Warsaw in 2016. After two years of increased EU action to build up strategic autonomy in defence through initiatives such as PESCO and the European Defence Fund, cooperation with NATO is critical when it comes to taking European defence forward.

Introduction

Defence expenditure estimates for 2017 (% GDP)

The 2018 NATO summit will take place in Brussels on 11 and 12 July 2018. The Heads of State and Government of the 29 members of the alliance are likely to reach a consensus on practical proposals on enhancing deterrence and responding to the ongoing political, security and economic challenges emanating from the east and south. Discussions on the future of the alliance, for instance on burden sharing and potential enlargement, will almost certainly prove more contentious.

Founded in 1949, NATO ‘remains committed to fulfilling its three core tasks: collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security’. These are reflected in the six themes around which the Brussels summit has been organised, namely (1) strengthening deterrence and defence; (2) projecting stability and fighting terrorism; (3) enhancing the NATO- EU partnership; (4) modernising the alliance; (5) achieving fairer burden-sharing; and (6) shared values and transatlantic unity.

Following a meeting of NATO’s defence ministers in June, there is a fair expectation that some key deliverables will emerge from the summit. These include launching a new NATO readiness initiative, referred to as the ‘Four Thirties’ (capacity for 30 mechanised battalions, 30 air squadrons and 30 combat vessels to be ready within 30 days or less to counter possible aggression by 2020), and increasing the NATO command structure by 1 200 personnel and two new commands (for the Atlantic in Norfolk, Virginia, and for military mobility in Ulm, Germany). Significant progress is also expected on NATO-EU relations, in the form of a new joint declaration between NATO’s secretary general and the presidents of the European Council and the European Commission. Military mobility, a flagship area of EU-NATO cooperation, is meanwhile likely to figure prominently.

Progress in these areas will inevitably depend on achieving a climate of unity among allies from the two sides of the Atlantic. Diverging positions between the EU and the US on issues such as the Iran nuclear deal (JCPOA) and potentially Russia, as well as issues beyond security, such as trade and tariffs, have raised concerns in this regard. Moreover, the expected tension over the item of burden-sharing among NATO members, particularly following the issuing of letters from President Trump to several NATO member leaders, urging them to spend more on defence, has done little to improve the climate. In 2018, just eight out of twenty-nine NATO members are estimated to be reaching the 2 % of GDP defence spending target agreed upon in 2014 as a pledge with a view to 2024.

Background

Since the first NATO summit in Paris in 1957, 27 summits have taken place at key junctures in the history of the alliance. Decisions taken at summits are issued in the form of declarations and communiqués and then translated into action by the relevant actors, namely the North Atlantic Council’s subordinate committees and NATO’s command structure, which cover the whole range of functions and activities of the alliance. NATO summits are normally attended only by member countries, but occasionally convene in different formats, including, for example, meetings of defence or foreign ministers, Heads of State or Government of countries belonging to the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, the NATO-Russia Council, the NATO-Ukraine Commission or the NATO-Georgia Commission. They can also include leaders from countries contributing troops to a NATO-led operation or high-level representatives from international organisations such as the UN.

Deteriorating security, globally and on Europe’s periphery, led to two landmark summits being held in 2014 and 2016. The 2014 NATO Wales summit was marked by the Ukraine crisis, growing instability in the southern neighbourhood and rising transnational threats, for instance from ISIL/Da’esh. Allied leaders had been expected to focus on NATO’s withdrawal from Afghanistan, but Russia’s annexation of Crimea and support for separatists in eastern Ukraine shifted their focus. NATO leaders returned to the fundamental debate over NATO’s strategic approach to Russia, its deterrence and defence posture, and its core purpose: collective defence as enshrined in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty.

Many of the same issues were on the Warsaw agenda in 2016 but additional challenges to Euro-Atlantic security included rising terrorism and unprecedented migrant and refugee flows. A major outcome of the summit was the agreement to intensify NATO’s deterrence posture by increasing the alliance’s military presence in the east. First steps included deploying multinational battlegroups in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland. In the Middle East, allies pledged to make further capacity-building efforts in Iraq, to support the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL by deploying surveillance aircraft to gather intelligence, and to maintain Operation Resolute Support in Afghanistan beyond 2016. A decision was also made to expand NATO’s presence in the Mediterranean Sea, especially in cooperation with EUNAVFOR MED (Operation Sophia). An important outcome of the summit was the EU-NATO joint declaration which outlined areas for enhanced cooperation, including countering hybrid threats, stepping up operational cooperation at sea and on migration, coordinating cyber-security and defence, developing the interoperable defence capabilities of EU Member States and alliance members, strengthening the defence industry, increasing coordination on exercises and building up the defence and security capacity of partners in the east and south. The range of decisions made at the Warsaw summit reflected the division of interests and priorities within the alliance. At the 2016 summit leaders adopted the ‘Enhanced Forward Presence’ (EFP) in Poland and the Baltic States and the ‘Tailored Forward Presence’ (TFP) in the Black Sea region.

Issues to watch and stakeholder views

Within the context of the summit’s official agenda, experts analysing and forecasting the outcomes of the leaders’ encounter have been focusing on the following specific themes:

Transatlantic relations and burden sharing

This will be President Trump’s first official NATO summit. The summits are traditionally an opportunity for allies to show a common front against security challenges, but the aforementioned tension in transatlantic ties risks jeopardising this. Experts are concerned that distrust generated in the area of trade will seep into discussions and weaken consensus on the way ahead for NATO. They argue that the summit should move past the issue of burden sharing. Yet, as others point out, this age-old debate is expected to ‘reach a moment of reckoning this year’ leading to what is referred to as ‘strategic adjustment on a grand scale’ whereby the European allies will move towards investing more in defence capabilities. Further concern has been raised by the American president’s decision to meet Russian president Vladimir Putin in Helsinki shortly after the summit, on 16 July.

For some, much will much will depend on how President Trump decides to approach the summit, both publicly and privately, and on whether he will confirm the US unconditional commitment to NATO’s collective defence clause, regardless of the issue of defence budgets and burden sharing. In spite of his rhetoric, the Trump administration has so far supported the defence of Europe’s eastern flank through the European Deterrence Initiative which adds more than US$15 billion to NATO’s hard power. The US is also expected to outline its role for the new Atlantic command.

EU-NATO relations

With growing threats in Europe’s periphery, the summit will inevitably focus on boosting security in Europe, including through countering Russian aggression and tackling challenges related to the ongoing crises in the Middle East and North Africa. EU Member States are expected to reiterate the benefits for NATO of closer EU cooperation in the field of defence, such as PESCO, the European Defence Industrial Development Programme (EDIDP) and the European Defence Fund, and to downplay any concerns held by non-EU NATO members. In this respect, the expected EU-NATO joint statement will further solidify complementarity between the EU initiatives and NATO.

Regional focal points

Russia’s growing presence in the BIack Sea has led several think tanks to argue that the summit will be used to focus on NATO’s operations in the region, as well as on the role of the partnerships with Georgia and Ukraine. NATO’s Mediterranean partnerships should also come into the spotlight, as they are important in building defence capacity, as should the potential NATO training mission in Iraq. A ‘hub’ for the south was recently established at Joint Force Command in Naples. NATO leaders are also likely to open accession negotiations with the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

Russia represents the most pressing and, according to the Heritage Foundation, ‘existential’ threat to NATO members; the effort to build up deterrence measures is explicitly in response to Russia. For the American conservative think tank, a united and robust response to Russia should be the major outcome of the summit. In the same vein, Chatham House experts argue that tensions among allies should not get in the way of dealing with Russia, and offer several recommendations in this vein, including a focus on the Arctic and the Black Sea; making progress in the areas of military mobility and situational awareness; and updating the 2011 NATO maritime strategy. Concrete actions aside, however, according to experts from the German Marshall Fund, ‘it is not the military deliverables from the Brussels summit that will be key for deterring Russia; what is paramount is unity among the allies, and especially transatlantic unity’.

Main references

Anxious anticipation ahead of NATO Brussels summit, German Marshall Fund, July 2018.

Counting dollars or measuring value. Assessing NATO and partner burden sharing, Center for Strategic and International Studies, July 2018.

Download this briefing on “2018 NATO summit: A critical time for European defence” in PDF.

Read also: ‘European Deterrence Initiative: the transatlantic security guarantee‘.

Written by Marcin Grajewski,

© luzitanija / Fotolia

NATO heads of state or government will meet in Brussels on 11 and 12 July for a keenly awaited summit. Some analysts and diplomats fear a tense atmosphere, following US President Donald Trump’s tough treatment of European allies at a recent meeting of the G7 group of developed countries, and his imposition of steep tariffs on imports of steel and aluminium from the EU.

President Trump is expected to pressure many NATO members to increase their military spending level to the agreed 2 % of GDP guideline, with particular emphasis on Germany. The NATO summit precedes President Trump’s meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin on 16 July in Helsinki, where some analysts speculate some rapprochement might take place. President Trump’s unpredictability and his widely criticised attitude towards President Putin is causing unease at home and abroad regarding the potential outcome of this summit.

This note offers links to commentaries and studies on NATO and European defence by major international think tanks. Earlier papers on the same topic can be found in a previous edition of ‘What Think Tanks are Thinking’, published in December 2017.

Anxious Anticipation Ahead of NATO Brussels Summit
German Marshall Fund, July 2018

Counting Dollars or Measuring Value. Assessing NATO and Partner Burden Sharing
Center for Strategic and International Studies, July 2018

Trump’s two summits: Can NATO navigate the dangers?
Centre for European Reform, July 2018

The 2018 NATO summit: The burden of transatlantic burden-sharing
Clingendael, July 2018

Tailored assurance: Balancing deterrence and disarmament in responding to NATO-Russia tensions
Institut français des relations internationales, July 2018

NATO’s force generation and deployment
German Marshall Fund, July 2018

NATO needs a strategy for countering Russia in the Arctic and the Black Sea
Chatham House, July 2018

More than burden-sharing. Five Objectives for the 2018 NATO Summit
Center for New American Security, June 2018

EUISS Yearbook of European security 2018
European Union Institute for Security Studies, June 2018

Why joining France’s European Intervention Initiative is the right decision for Germany
Egmont, June 2018

EU defence capability development: Plans, priorities, projects
European Union Institute for Security Studies, June 2018

Military mobility returns to the forefront in Europe
Rand Corporation, June 2018

The future of NATO’s Mediterranean dialogue
German Marshall Fund, June 2018

The United States and Russia target Germany
Carnegie Europe, June 2018

Rethinking the regional order for post-Soviet Europe and Eurasia
Rand Corporation, June 2018

Priorities for Central Europe ahead of NATO Brussels summit
German Marshall Fund, June 2018

Ein schwieriger Gipfel für die Nato
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, June 2018

A perennial candidate waits for NATO to open its door
German Marshall Fund, June 2018

Security needs a new narrative
German Marshall Fund, June 2018

Can Reagan show Trump how to save the INF Treaty?
Council on Foreign Relations, June 2018

The defence of Finland and Sweden: Continuity and variance in strategy and public opinion
Finnish Institute for International Studies, June 2018

The Other Europe? How Central Europe views the continent’s security concerns and aspirations
Royal United Services Institute, June 2018

Will the upcoming Missile Defense Review maintain the current course or plot a new direction?
Brookings Institution, June 2018

Before the Brussels Summit: How is the NATO Alliance Doing, Really?
Royal United Services Institute, May 2018

The EU and multilateralism in an age of great powers
Egmont, July 2018

NATO Brussels summit: Prospects and opportunities
International Centre for Defence and Security, May 2018

European defense cooperation: Headed in the right direction?
Rand Corporation, May 2018

Poland courts American boots
Carnegie Europe, May 2018

The ‘New Turkey’ as a NATO member: Domestic state transformation and competing strategic cultures
Finnish Institute of International Affairs, May 2018

The dangerous geopolitics of populism, and what NATO and the EU can do about it
Egmont, May 2018

The art of dealing with Trump
Clingendael, May 2018

Defending Europe: ‘Global Britain’ and the future of European geopolitics
The Henry Jackson Society, May 2018

Georgia looks to the NATO Brussels summit
German Marshall Fund, April 2018

NATO’s bad apples
Carnegie Europe, April 2018

NATO allies go head to head in Syria
German Marshall Fund, April 2018

The future of the United States and Europe: An Irreplaceable partnership
Chatham House, April 2018

Between continuity and erosion: Three scenarios for the future of transatlantic relations
College of Europe Policy Brief, April 2018

Preventing escalation in the Baltics: A NATO playbook
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 2018

Strategic warning on NATO’s Eastern flank
Rand Corporation, March 2018

A guide for EU-NATO security cooperation on foreign terrorist fighters
Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, March 2018

NATO’s intelligence: Adaptation challenge
GLOBSEC Policy Institute, March 2019

Franco-German differences over defense make Europe vulnerable
Carnegie Europe, March 2018

Report on EU comprehensive approach to conflict prevention and peacebuilding
Istituto Affari Internazionali, Centre for European Policy Studies, European Peacebuilding Liaison Office, March 2018

EU-NATO alignment after Brexit
Carnegie Europe, March 2018

Autonomie stratégique: Le nouveau Graal de la défense européenne
Groupe de recherche et d’information sur la paix et la sécurité, March 2018

Groupe de recherche et d’information sur la paix et la sécurité, March 2018

NATO’s next nuclear challenges
Carnegie Europe, March 2018

PESCO: Good News for NATO from the EU
Egmont, February 2018

Preparing for the NATO summit: Why military mobility should be on top of the agenda
Rand Corporation, February 2018

Assessing the conventional force imbalance in Europe: Implications for countering Russian local superiority
Rand Corporation, February 2018

European regional organizations and climate-related security risks: EU, OSCE and NATO
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, February 2018

NATO summit 2018: An implementation summit?
German Marshall Fund, February 2018

Why we are unconvinced NATO’s cyber policy is more aggressive, and that’s a good thing
Council on Foreign Relations, February 2018

European defense vs. NATO: Not the right fight
Carnegie Europe, February 2018

NATO and the south: Opportunities for coherence and integration
Real Instituto Elcano, February 2018

New tasks for EU-NATO cooperation
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, January 2018

An American perspective on Pesco: The dangers of de-linking EU defence from NATO
Policy Exchange, January 2018

Revisiting the EU’s security partnerships
European Union Institute for Security Studies, January 2018

Transatlantic relations: Converging or diverging?
Chatham House, January 2018

The United Kingdom and the future of European security and defence
Friends of Europe, January 2018

Poland and European defence integration
European Council on Foreign Relations, January 2018

Read this briefing on ‘NATO Summit and European defence‘ on the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Silvia Polidori,

© Drical/Shutterstock.com

A study and a briefing published by the European Parliament’s (EP) Science and Technology Options Assessment (STOA) Panel, based on a proposal submitted by the EP Committee on Regional Development (REGI), provide policy options offering new directions in cohesion policy for the post-2020 period. The publications focus on scientific and technological priorities and means for policy implementation aimed at enhancing regional economic strengths and thereby building confidence in the EU’s added value. The study and briefing stem from a workshop organised by STOA, and draw upon follow-up interviews, and recent research and policy evaluation reports. Their draft versions were presented to the STOA Panel and the REGI Committee. A sample of the main policy options is given below:

New technologies for improved productivity: The least competitive regions need to develop more flexibility when facing new challenges and improve their ability to position their economies dynamically. In the next stage, cohesion policy should promote ‘excellence in innovation’ in the regional economic context, as a new EU policy instrument.

Knowledge for innovation-led growth through smart specialisation: The implementation of the smart specialisation strategy is often disappointing, due to a lack of resources, potential partners, tech transfer support systems etc. To overcome the huge differences in the tangible and intangible resource base among EU regions, an ‘impact-focused’ approach is recommended in designing future cohesion policy initiatives, to make innovation-led growth more relevant and achievable.

Better governance through technology and big data: Digital technology represents an opportunity to make cohesion policy initiatives more effective and transparent. It provides a variety of instruments for rethinking public policy, and the workings of democratic institutions at the regional and national levels.

Bringing the regional authorities back in: To speed up regional policy-making and achieve more and better results, regional authorities should reconsider their leadership role. For these reasons, cohesion policy should allow for a wider variety of management practices and operational programmes to help EU funding of innovation-led growth to succeed in any type of region.

Dynamic positioning as a fast and flexible approach: Following failures to ‘smartly specialise’ by using a region’s own resources, a dynamic strategic approach by the regional authorities can be achieved by: (a) an ongoing regional ‘economic diagnosis’, which defines and explains principal and practical challenges; (b) a flexible guiding policy dealing with both obstacles and opportunities; and (c) a set of coherent actions needed to address the ever-changing regional circumstances.

Revising the current framework of regional innovation policy: Mission-oriented innovation policy could become an important complement to other development policies, especially in regions that lack the variety of resources needed to develop strategies through smart specialisation. Mission orientation will typically respond to sector-specific needs and wider societal challenges, and could open up new markets.

Shaping markets through mission-oriented investments: Some regional authorities are implementing more ‘market-creating’ policy frameworks, by combining horizontal (sector-neutral) policies and vertical (sector-specific) policies. EU cohesion policy needs to embrace the evolution towards more active public-sector involvement in innovation-led growth in various regions and promote conditions for evolving business ecosystems that generate growth.

‘Outside-in’ approaches to innovation-led growth: Some regions are implementing ‘outside-in’ policies to seize opportunities for acquiring up-to-date technology, expertise and inventive solutions by actively inviting inward investments. European and global production networks, in particular in manufacturing, are potential assets for promoting innovation-led growth in a region, serving as catalysts for advancing new industrial capabilities in the region.

Science parks as nodes of innovation: Science and technology parks highlight the importance of local and regional clustering of competencies for invention and innovation. Cohesion policy could support them as effective nodes in networks that foster business development, particularly small, knowledge-intensive enterprises with growth potential.

Tapping the potential of the digital platform economy: Digital platforms easily attract new customers, clients and other users and drive the scaling-up of SMEs into larger enterprises. This affects regions too. Cohesion policy must help the EU’s regional economies to increase value by availing of existing digital platforms and by building new ones.

To find out more about the policy options, consult the study. As recommended by Ramón Luis Valcárcel Siso (EPP, Spain), EP Vice-President responsible for STOA, Constanze Krehl (S&D, Germany) and Lambert van Nistelrooij (EPP, The Netherlands), all Members of the REGI Committee, STOA will circulate the study and the briefing to the relevant actors responsible for future cohesion policy at European and national levels.

Written by Nera Kuljanic,

Scientists and Members of the European Parliament recently got together at the European Parliament in Strasbourg. The aim of the event, organised jointly by the Science and Technology Options Assessment (STOA) Panel of the European Parliament (EP) and the European Research Council (ERC), was to showcase Europe’s research and innovation efforts through programmes such as Horizon2020 and one of its most successful initiatives, the ERC. The event also aimed at stimulating exchanges on the role of fundamental research in designing the future of Europe. The event was very timely, as it took place just a week before the European Commission (EC) announced its proposal for Horizon Europe, the next research and innovation framework programme, due to start in 2021.

The event attracted 14 Members (including Industry, Research and Energy Committee Chair Jerzy Buzek) and 22 researchers funded by the ERC, Commissioner for Research, Science and Innovation Carlos Moedas and three Nobel Prize winners, among other participants. In addition, EP President Antonio Tajani, EC Vice-President Andrus Ansip and Bulgarian Minister of Education and Science Krassimir Valchev took part in the high-level science-policy debate organised the day before.

Building bridges between science and politics

Science and technology are more and more part of our everyday lives and even part of who we are. A lot of issues coming before policy-makers and politicians have a scientific or technological dimension and can be extremely complex. In addition, policy-makers need to design research and innovation programmes that will best respond to the opportunities and challenges that Europe will face over the next decade and beyond. So how do we know what these opportunities and challenges are, and how can we prepare a programme of scientific research that will deliver a meaningful response to them at the European level?

Collaboration is the answer: researchers and experts from different domains must work together, and policy-makers need to make sure the issues are put on the agenda and design policies which stimulate progress for the benefit of the whole society.

“ERC is the best thing that ever happened in Europe for the quest for knowledge”. #Nobel laureate, ERC grantees Jean-Marie Lehn speaks to @Europarl_EN. “Without basic research there is no progress” @EP_ThinkTank https://t.co/5SmnWsUmHe

— ERC Europe (@ERC_Research) May 31, 2018

“ERC is the best thing that ever happened in Europe for the quest for knowledge”. #Nobel laureate, ERC grantees Jean-Marie Lehn speaks to @Europarl_EN. “Without basic research there is no progress” @EP_ThinkTank https://t.co/5SmnWsUmHe

— ERC Europe (@ERC_Research) May 31, 2018

Terrific debate on Science and Communication, Science and Society Engagement for Social Innovationa and Social Impact @ERC_Research #ERCSTOA. Here the link to our piece coming straight from #Villaverde https://t.co/fcjm7CBIaw pic.twitter.com/1nzPKpi4y8

— Manuel Franco (@mfranco_uah) May 31, 2018

Are you already working alongside a #robot? #Digital transformation is going to affect all our workplaces – policymakers ask scientists what the impacts might be at #ERCSTOA @ClareMoodyMEP @EvaKaili @PaulRuebig #STOA pic.twitter.com/hRNIlQsm08

— EP Research Service (@EP_ThinkTank) May 30, 2018

‘Don’t be shy about what you do!’

Opening the event, Eva Kaili (EL, S&D), STOA Chair, emphasised once again that Members need to have access to the scientific evidence when working on different issues and how much they value interactions with scientists like this one. To emphasise the need for making such exchanges a regular practice, Professor Jean-Pierre Bourguignon, ERC President, went on to point out the differences between the two worlds: science needs time, patience and perseverance, while politicians often think and act on shorter time-scales, and the two worlds seem to speak different languages.

Commissioner Carlos Moedas made a link between the exploration of the world in the 1400s and the world of research. Highlighting some of today’s remarkable discoveries by European researchers, which were hardly publicised in the media (graphene, 7 Earth-like planets orbiting a star), he told the scientists ‘Don’t be shy about what you do!’ and emphasised the importance of science communication in raising awareness and excitement about scientific progress and the potential of its discoveries. His words were echoed by Professor Jean-Marie Lehn, co-recipient of the 1987 Nobel Prize in Chemistry, who invited young people to embrace a career in science: ‘Science should build bridges between disciplines and generations … It will shape the future of humanity … Participate in this!’

From rethinking the role of the car to engaging citizens through science

Besides the line-up of distinguished speakers, the highlight of the event were the parallel exchange sessions during which MEPs, ERC grantees and other participants discussed techno-scientific topics of interest to them and/or linked to their ongoing work. The exchange sessions were organised around the following topics: modern energy solutions, eco-efficient transport, sustainable management of natural resources, potentials and challenges of the information society, health and life sciences, and science policy, communication and global networking.

A more detailed account of the event is available in the report. A short video clip about the event is available here. To keep up to date with STOA activities, follow our website, the EPRS blog, Twitter and the Think Tank pages.

Click to view slideshow.

Written by Ralf Drachenberg,

current members of the European Council and the year that they joined the institution

The European Council is one of the most important European institutions and receives a lot of media attention when it meets. However, many aspects of this institution are less well known, and citizens may ask themselves who the Members of the European Council are, how long the European Council has existed, and how its role has developed over time. Our ‘European Council: facts and figures’ briefing tries to provide information that would be useful to know the next time the EU Heads of State or Government are in town.

The role of the European Council, as defined in Article 15(1) TEU, is to ‘provide the Union with the necessary impetus for its development’ and to define its ‘general political directions and priorities’. Although EU leaders have been meeting routinely in the European Council since 1975, that title did not appear in the Treaties until 1987. At that point, the European Commission President also officially became a member of the European Council. It was only with the adoption of the 1992 Maastricht Treaty that the European Council and its role were broadly defined for the first time.

The data regarding the frequency of European Council meetings, shows that in practice, EU Heads of State or Government meet a lot more often than the four annual meetings stipulated in the Lisbon Treaty. The types of meetings has also increased to include formal and informal meetings, as well as the recent EU27 format. The European Council deals with many topics, but not all with the same intensity. The main topics discussed by the European Council in their conclusions have often been macro-economics, business and finance, the single market, and foreign policy issues. More recently, attention has turned to migration, which has become the most prominent topic due to the unprecedented flows into the EU.

Historically, the European Council leaders only decided to meet regularly as the ‘European Council’ at the Paris Summit of December 1974. The European Council became an official EU institution only when established in the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, at the same time that the office of a full-time President was established. The role of the President of the European Council and his reporting responsibilities to the European Parliament has also evolved. While in the early years of the full-time President, a report was made to the Parliament after each formal and informal meeting, this has not always been the case since 2014. The Lisbon Treaty also ended the routine attendance of foreign affairs ministers, who up until then had been present to assist their Head of State or Government.

Today, the European Council membership is made up of the Heads of State or Government of the 28 EU Member States, as well as the Presidents of the European Council and of the European Commission. Although not a member of the European Council, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the European Commission also takes part in its meetings. The President of the European Parliament is ‘invited to be heard’ at European Council meetings. This has not always been the case, as the type of participants and organisation of the European Council have developed through successive Treaty changes, as well as expanding its role and areas of responsibility. The average length of European Council membership varies significantly between Member States. When considering the political composition of the European Council over time, it is clear that almost all Heads of State or Government belonged to the same three political groups until the early 2000s, whereas the diversity of political affiliation has broadened in recent years. Although female membership has increased in recent years, improving the gender balance, since its creation the European Council has remained a largely male-dominated forum. The average age of its members, being highest in 1992 at 59 years old, recently stabilised in the low 50s.

Read this briefing on ‘European Council: Facts and Figures‘ on the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Click to view slideshow.

Written by Eric Pichon,

© European Union, EPRS

L’accord de partenariat entre l’Union européenne et les pays d’Afrique, des Caraïbes et du Pacifique (ACP) expire en 2020. Le principal défi pour l’Union européenne est de maintenir ses relations dans la région, tout en restant fidèle aux valeurs promues dans les Traités européens. La renégociation de cet Accord de Cotonou offre l’opportunité de rationaliser les relations entre les pays ACP et l’Union, en tenant compte des objectifs de développement durable des Nations unies, des nouvelles stratégies européennes dans les régions concernées, des nouvelles ambitions des pays ACP et de l’évolution de l’équilibre des pouvoirs au niveau mondial. La question du financement est également sur la table.

Favoriser la prospérité, la stabilité et la démocratie chez les partenaires de l’UE permettrait, selon la Commission européenne et le Service européen pour l’action extérieure, de mieux faire face aux causes profondes de la migration irrégulière et des déplacements forcés.

La Commission européenne a présenté au Conseil son option privilégiée : un accord-cadre complété par des partenariats spécifiques avec les trois sous-régions. Le groupe ACP a adopté son mandat de négociation en mai 2018. Les négociations formelles devraient commencer à la fin de l’été 2018.

Négociations concernant un nouvel accord de partenariat UE-ACP Committee responsible: Développement (DEVE) 2018/2634 (RSP) Rapporteur: Linda McAvan (S&D)

Read the complete briefing on ‘Le futur partenariat de l’Union européenne avec les pays d’Afrique, des Caraïbes et du Pacifique‘ on the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Click to view slideshow.

With European elections coming up in May 2019, you probably want to know how the European Union impacts your daily life, before you think about voting. In the latest in a series of posts on what Europe does for you, your family, your business and your wellbeing, we look at what Europe does for people wanting to gain digital skills.

We live in a digital age, where the fast pace of technological development is transforming our economies and societies profoundly. Almost all jobs now require some level of digital skills, as does participation in society in general. In this context, digital literacy has become a life skill and the inability to access or use the internet seems unthinkable to many of us. However, about 44 % of adults in the EU have low digital skills and about 20 % have never used the internet, which can hamper their social integration and personal development.

© Rawpixel.com / Fotolia

While education remains a responsibility of the individual Member States, the EU supports actions aimed at improving digital skills. Since 2007, ’digital competence’ has been recognised as one of the eight essential skills to have in relation to lifelong learning.

The EU has been investing for more than 20 years, under the Structural Funds, in digital literacy projects for all, including for socially disadvantaged groups. It has funded programmes aimed at helping teachers and learners with digital technologies, and research projects aimed at developing user-friendly accessible technology. As part of the New Skills Agenda for Europe initiative, an EU digital competence framework has been developed to better test abilities. A digital skills job coalition has also been launched, where the EU has gone into partnership with stakeholders to work together to help improve digital skills.

Further information

• EPRS briefing, Digital skills in the EU labour market, 2017, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2017/595889/EPRS_IDA(2017)595889_EN.pdf
• EPRS briefing, Bridging the digital divide in the EU, 2015, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2015/573884/EPRS_BRI(2015)573884_EN.pdf
• European Commission, New Skills Agenda for Europe, http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=1223#qualifications

 

With European elections coming up in May 2019, you probably want to know how the European Union impacts your daily life, before you think about voting. In the latest in a series of posts on what Europe does for you, your family, your business and your wellbeing, we look at what Europe does for phone and internet users.

Almost all of us use telecom services: about 82 % of EU citizens have used the internet in the last 3 months, 360 million Europeans use it every day and there are around 700 million SIM cards currently in circulation in the EU.

The European telecom sector used to be run exclusively by state monopolies. However, in the 1980s the EU started promoting liberalisation, gradually opening the markets up to competition. This brought prices for telecom services down: the traditional providers’ share of the fixed-line telephone market shrunk, and in most countries consumers began paying less for national long-distance and international calls. New entrants in both the fixed-line and mobile markets have given consumers a greater choice of service provider and products. Thanks to EU action, roaming charges for calls, text messages and data were finally abolished on 15 June 2017. This means people travelling abroad within the EU are using their mobile phones much more than before. In effect, Europeans tend to spend on less on telecommunication services than the citizens or USA or Japan.

© F8studio / Fotolia

The EU has also done a lot to promote broadband. This has helped to reduce prices in most EU countries and means that 99.9 % of EU households now have access to fixed or mobile broadband. EU consumer protection laws, meanwhile, aim to guarantee a reasonable quality of service at affordable prices, ensure free access to emergency telephone numbers, the right to a written contract lasting just two years, transparent information, and the possibility to switch providers in a day without changing phone number.

Further information

• EPRS publication on roam like at home by default, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2016/595857/EPRS_BRI%282016%29595857_EN.pdf
• EPRS publication on broadband as a universal service, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2016/581977/EPRS_BRI(2016)581977_EN.pdf
• EPRS publication on European Gigabit Society, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=EPRS_BRI(2017)603979

 

With European elections coming up in May 2019, you probably want to know how the European Union impacts your daily life, before you think about voting. In the latest in a series of posts on what Europe does for you, your family, your business and your wellbeing, we look at what Europe does for people who hate wasting food.

Approximately 88 million tonnes of food, or 173 kilograms per person, is wasted in the EU per year, according to estimates by an EU-funded research project FUSIONS. Households and processing together account for 72 % of EU food waste.

© SpeedKingz/ Shutterstock.com

In August 2016, an EU platform on food loss and food waste was established, to help EU countries tackle the problem. The European Commission has announced that it will try to clarify EU legislation make food donation easier and enable the use of former foodstuffs for animal feed. One important aim is to improve date marking: in particular ‘best before’ labelling, which consumers find confusing and can lead them to throw away food that could still be used. The Commission has compiled a set of good practices in food waste reduction on its food waste website, including examples of food redistribution programmes in EU countries.

The European Court of Auditors released a special report on combating food waste in January 2017. Under the new waste framework directive, the Commission will create a common methodology to calculate food waste by the end of 2019, and urge EU countries to reduce food waste by 30 % by 2025 and to halve it by 2030. The EU-funded research programme REFRESH, running until June 2019, is testing new approaches to tackle food waste through pilot projects. An EU-funded study on date marking, published in February 2018, will also inform EU prevention of food waste.

Further information

• European Commission’s Directorate General for Health and Food Safety website,
  https://ec.europa.eu/food/safety/food_waste_en
• European Commission’s Directorate General for Health and Food Safety website,
  https://ec.europa.eu/food/safety/food_waste/eu_actions_en
• EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service: series of publications relating to food waste in Europe, https://bit.ly/2HECZxV

With European elections coming up in May 2019, you probably want to know how the European Union impacts your daily life, before you think about voting. In the latest in a series of posts on what Europe does for you, your family, your business and your wellbeing, we look at what Europe does for cooks and foodies.

As a cook or a ‘foodie’, you value products that are delicious, authentic and safe. Europeans enjoy a wide choice of top quality products, ranging from Greek olive oil, Spanish ham and Belgian chocolate, to Swedish herring. Thanks to the freedom of trading within the internal market, all of these products can be sold anywhere in the EU. You can be sure that the food is safe to eat because of EU food safety rules, strict limits for pesticide residues and mandatory information about allergens.

Some regional specialities have a long tradition and a reputation for high quality. EU quality logos protect such geographical products against cheating, so you know that a product sold as Parma ham is actually made in the Parma region according to quality standards.

Are you afraid that delicacies like bluefin tuna will disappear from the shelves, due to overfishing? Fishing quotas in EU waters are increasingly based on scientific criteria, to ensure that fish stocks have a chance to regenerate.

© M.studio / Fotolia

As a consumer, you are interested in what your food contains and how it is produced. EU rules ensure that food products are labelled with the ingredients and the nutritional value, and the EU organic label certifies that products satisfy strict rules regarding animal welfare and the use of pesticides and fertilisers.

In reaction to reports that branded products sold in new EU Member States use lower-quality ingredients than similarly branded products sold elsewhere, the European Commission issued guidelines to ensure that all consumers in the EU have access to the same high-quality products.

Further information

• EPRS publication ‘European Commission guidelines on dual quality of branded food products’, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=EPRS_BRI(2017)608804
• Fact Sheets on the European Union: Food Safety,http://www.europarl.europa.eu/atyourservice/en/displayFtu.html?ftuId=FTU_2.2.6.html
• European Commission website on EU quality logos, https://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/quality/schemes_en
• European Commission website ‘The organic logo guarantees’, https://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/organic/consumer-trust/certification-and-confidence/the-organic-logo-guarantees_en

Written by Marcin Grajewski,

© jpldesigns / Fotolia

US President Donald Trump met North Korean leader Kim Jong-un for a historic summit in Singapore on 12 June 2018. They reached a short agreement that emphasised the North’s commitment to ‘work toward complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula’, but provided no details on when Pyongyang would give up nuclear weapons or how that might be verified. Following the summit, the United States announced it had agreed with South Korea to suspend all planning on joint military exercises.

This note offers links to reports and commentaries from some major international think-tanks and research institutes on the summit. More reports on North Korea and related issues can be found in a previous edition of ‘What Think Tanks are thinking’, published in June 2018 before the summit.

Trump-Kim summit: Gambler’s diplomacy
European Council on Foreign Relations, June 2018

Trump-Kim summit: China and Kim are winners
Atlantic Council, June 2018

US–North Korea summit statement lacks definition
Chatham House, June 2018

Does China win or lose from the US-North Korea thaw?
Cato Institute, June 2018

US-North Korea summit explained: The key players’ views
KF-VUB, German Marshall Fund, June 2018

The Singapore summit’s uncertain legacy
Council on Foreign Relations, June 2018

No, the North Korean nuclear threat is not “over”
Carnegie Europe, June 2018

Are the Korean Peninsula and the world safer after Singapore?
United States Institute of Peace, June 2018

Faint praise for the Trump–Kim Singapore Summit statement
International Institute for Strategic Studies, June 2018

The North Korean summit is over: Now for the hard part
Center for a New American Security, June 2018

Singapore summit: North East Asia set for strategic realignment
Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, June 2018

US-North Korea summit: Singapore round goes to Chairman Kim
Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, June 2018

The conventional military balance on the Korean Peninsula
International Institute for Strategic Studies, June 2018

Success with North Korea still needs Japan
Rand Corporation, June 2018

Don’t dismiss the Trump-Kim summit so quickly
Brookings Institution, June 2018

Kim Jong-un’s two strategic decisions
Korea Economic Institute, June 2018

China’s Xi Jinping will sleep more soundly after the Singapore summit
Royal United Services Institute, June 2018

Singapore was just the first episode of Trump’s North Korea show
The German Marshall Fund of the United States, June 2018

How to increase pressure if diplomacy with North Korea fails
Atlantic Council, June 2018

Singapore summit: It’s a start, not a miracle
Heritage Foundation, June 2018

What does the Singapore summit mean for South Korea, China and Japan?
United States Institute of Peace, June 2018

Singapore summit: The meeting is the message
Council on Foreign Relations, June 2018

5 steps to take after Trump’s North Korea summit
Cato Institute, June 2018

Beyond the Trump-Kim summit: A coalition is critical for achieving denuclearization
Atlantic Council, June 2018

Kim Jong-un’s tools of coercion
Brookings Institution, June 2018

Deep Dish: Trump-Kim summit: What happened, why, and what’s next
Chicago Council on Global Affairs, June 2018

The Trump doctrine is winning and the world is losing
International Institute for Strategic Studies, June 2018

Difficulties integrating North Korean defectors suggest challenges in reunifying Korea
Rand Corporation, June 2018

Why this wasn’t Kim’s father’s – or grandfather’s – summit
Rand Corporation, June 2018

After North Korea summit, military cooperation can reduce tensions
United States Institute of Peace, June 2018

North Korea must come clean about its dirty money
Center for a New American Security, June 2018

Assessment of the Singapore summit
Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 2018

Read this briefing on ‘US-North Korea summit‘ on the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Katarzyna Sochacka and Clare Ferguson,

© European Union 2018 – Source : EP

The July plenary session highlights were: the continuation of the debate on the Future of Europe, this time with the Prime Minister of Poland, Mateusz Morawiecki, the discussion on the outcome of the European Council meeting of 28-29 June 2018, and the review of the Bulgarian and presentation of the activities of the Austrian Presidencies. The European Commission and Council participated in discussions on the Ebola outbreak in the Democratic Republic of Congo. VP/HR Federica Mogherini’s statement on the migration crisis and humanitarian situation in Venezuela and at its borders was also discussed. Angola’s President, João Manuel Gonçalves Lourenço, addressed Parliament in a formal sitting. Parliament approved, inter alia, proposals for a European Travel Information and Authorisation System, a European Defence Industrial Development Programme, financial rules applicable to the general EU budget and two amending budgets for 2018. Parliament agreed on the conclusion of a partnership agreement between the EU and Armenia and approved the reform of the electoral law of the EU. Three reports on the social and market aspects of the first mobility package were rejected and sent back to the Transport and Tourism Committee.

ETIAS

Parliament approved the trilogue agreement on proposals for a European Travel Information and Authorisation System (ETIAS) to manage information on third-country nationals travelling into the Schengen area. Parliament wants to ensure that the information used in the proposed online system to address the current lack of information about visa-exempt nationals travelling into Europe, is strictly relevant, and that the system is secure, transparent and accountable.

Mobility Package

Parliament rejected the three reports, as amended, on postings, resting/driving times and cabotage (the social and market rules in the mobility package). Following a vote in the Transport and Tourism Committee (TRAN) on 4 June, and subsequent rejection of the negotiating mandates in plenary on 14 June, this new round of votes effectively returns the proposals to the committee.

While the majority of the TRAN committee voted in favour of enforcement requirements and specific rules for posting drivers in the road transport sector; and on daily and weekly driving times, minimum breaks and rest periods and positioning by means of tachographs, the Employment and Social Affairs Committee reintroduced its amendments to focus on drivers’ working conditions in the road transport sector.

Members also largely approved a report on reducing charges on heavy-duty vehicles for the use of certain road infrastructure. This report is part of the mobility package and a special legislative procedure applies, in which Parliament is only consulted.

Partnership Agreement between the EU and EAEC and Armenia

Parliament voted in favour of concluding the Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement between the EU and Armenia. Provisionally applied since 1 June 2018, the EU-Armenia Agreement was signed on 24 November 2017. In the non-legislative resolution adopted in parallel, Members considered the signature of this agreement to constitute an important step forward in EU and Armenia cooperation, and translates the commitment to deepening their political and economic relations.

European Defence Industrial Development Programme

Members adopted (478 votes to 179, with 23 abstentions) the European Defence Industrial Development Programme. Part of the European Defence Fund, where the EU has responded to increased security threats and key allies’ withdrawal of support, by creating a €500 million envelope to fund development of defence equipment and technologies, and boost the competitiveness of the EU defence industry. The proposed programme tightens up eligibility criteria, notably for third-country entities participating in programme financed actions. Priorities are direct management and a greater emphasis on SME access to the market.

Integrated farm statistics

Farm statistics provide evidence used to make decisions on where to allocate funding within the framework of the EU common agricultural policy. In line with its policy to update all its statistical data, the Commission proposes updating integrated farm statistics to make collection more flexible, detailed, and coherent, and to reduce the data collection burden. Parliament adopted the agreement on this draft regulation.

Reform of the electoral law of the European Union

Members of the European Parliament approved, by a comfortable majority (397 votes to 207, with 62 abstentions) the reform of the electoral law of the EU ahead of the European elections of May 2019. Among other things, the reform introduces minimum thresholds for larger constituencies, although these will not be implemented until the 2024 EU elections. The reforms also include provisions on extending voting to different methods, and increased data protection. The idea of enabling EU citizens to vote from third countries was, however, not taken up by the Council.

Financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union

Parliament discussed and approved the compromise agreed on the revision of the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union. The new revised Financial Regulation limits trust funds to external actions, retains the non-profit principle, and ends transfers from structural funding to the European Fund for Strategic Investments (EFSI), as well as maintaining the competences of the budgetary authority. Reforms to the financial rules for five regulations in the common agricultural policy field were agreed in December.

Amending budget No 2/2018: 2017 surplus

Parliament approved Amending Budget No 2 to the 2018 EU budget, which moves the surplus from the 2017 EU budget to the 2018 budget. The sum involved, €555.5 million, will decrease Member States’ contributions to the 2018 budget. The surplus is a result of a previous amending budget, plus the high level of competition fines feeding into the EU budget in 2017, as well as delays in spending.

Amending budget No 3/2018: Extension of the Facility for Refugees in Turkey

Parliament approved an amending budget for €500 million in aid to be paid in 2018 as the second tranche of the Facility for Refugees in Turkey. Parliament agreed to the funding for some 5 000 teachers providing education for over 300 000 refugee children in Turkey, on the condition that Parliament is fully associated in the decision-making process on the facility, when reviewed under the 2019 budgetary procedure.

2019 budget – trilogue mandate

Parliament also considered and adopted its mandate for trilogue negotiations for the 2019 draft EU budget, its position for initial negotiations with the Council. Parliament’s priorities for the 2019 budget are sustainable growth, innovation, competitiveness, citizenship, security, the fight against climate change, transition to renewable energy, migration, and young people.

Statute for social and solidarity-based enterprises

Parliament adopted a legislative-initiative resolution on a statute for social and solidarity-based enterprises, calling for a common definition, based on specific criteria, enabling enterprises with a positive social, environmental or community impact, that employ 14.5 million people, to overcome regulatory obstacles.

Opening of trilogue negotiations

Two parliamentary committees’ decisions to enter into interinstitutional (trilogue) negotiations were confirmed: four reports on financial services proposals (ECON); and on the European citizens’ initiative (AFCO). A confirmatory vote was held on the latter, allowing negotiations with the Council to begin. As for the proposal on copyright in the digital single market (JURI), the plenary voted against the decision to enter into interinstitutional negotiations, meaning the report will come back to the agenda for the September part-session.

Read this ‘At a glance’ note on ‘Plenary round-up – Strasbourg, July 2018‘ on the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Angelos Delivorias (1st edition),

© designer491 / Fotolia

Investment funds are products created to pool investors’ capital and to invest it in a collective portfolio of securities. In the European Union, the characteristics of a range of different types of investment funds have been established in Union law, and most funds on the market are categorised as one of these types. The market in the EU is smaller than in the United States, despite there being far more funds in the EU. This is the reason why the European Commission has adopted two legislative proposals: one for a regulation aligning national marketing requirements and regulatory fees and harmonising the process and requirements for the verification of marketing material by national competent authorities, and the other for a directive harmonising the conditions under which investment funds may exit a national market and allowing European asset managers to engage in pre-marketing activities.

Versions

• July 2018: ‘Cross-border distribution of investment funds‘ (1st edition)

Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2009/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Directive 2011/61/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to cross-border distribution of collective investment funds;
Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on facilitating cross-border distribution of collective investment funds and amending Regulations (EU) No 345/2013 and (EU) No 346/2013 Committee responsible: Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) COM(2018) 92
COM(2018) 110
12.3.2018 

2018/0041 (COD)
2018/0045 (COD)

Ordinary legislative procedure (COD) (Parliament and Council on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Rapporteur: Wolf Klinz (ALDE, Germany) Shadow rapporteurs:

  Alain Lamassoure (EPP, France)
Mady Delvaux (S&D, Luxembourg)
Syed Kamall (ECR, UK)
Matt Carthy (GUE/NGL, Ireland) Next steps expected: Publication of draft report.

Written by Monika Kiss (1st edition),

© macrovector / Fotolia

The rapid increase in the number of Europeans working in a Member State other than their own, the large number of daily cross-border commuters and the need for information on job opportunities and rights at home and abroad (ensured by good cooperation between national authorities) necessitates the establishment of a European-level coordinating body.

In response to the above circumstances, the European Commission has proposed to set up such a body – a European Labour Authority (ELA) – that would replace or reorganise, or cooperate with existing structures dealing with information for individuals and employers, mediate between national labour authorities and social security bodies, and gather viable data on posted workers and commuters.

Questions relating to the European Commission proposal concern the empowerment and role of the ELA, its internal structure and its relations to existing organisations in the domain.

Versions

• July 2018: ‘European Labour Authority‘ (1st edition)

Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a European Labour Authority Committee responsible: Employment and Social Affairs (EMPL) COM(2018) 131 of 13.3.2018

2018/0064(COD)

Ordinary legislative procedure (COD) (Parliament and Council on an equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Rapporteur: Jeroen Lenaers (EPP, the Netherlands) Shadow rapporteurs:

  Georgi Pirinski (S&D, Bulgaria)
Ulrike Trebesius (ECR, Germany)
Rina Ronja Kari (GUE/NGL, Denmark)
Joelle Mélin (ENF, France) Next steps expected: Vote on report in committee