European Parliamentary Research Service Blog

Written by François Théron,

© MoiraM / Fotolia

The European Day of Remembrance of Victims of Terrorism has been established as 11 March each year, marking the Madrid bombings in 2004. The protection of victims of terrorism constitutes an essential part of the EU’s action to address all dimensions of the terrorist threat. Following the wave of terror that has hit Europe in recent years, rules and sanctions related to terrorist activities have been strengthened, while better protection and support to victims of terrorism is being ensured through action at EU level.

Background

Since 2002, the EU has developed the basis for European legislation aimed specifically at combating terrorism, recognising that victims of terrorist offences are vulnerable and therefore specific measures are necessary to protect them. The European Union’s 2005 Counter-Terrorism Strategy underlines that solidarity, assistance and compensation of victims of terrorism and their families constitute an integral part of the response to terrorism, at both national and European levels. In 2010, the Stockholm Programme called for examination of how EU legislation for the protection of victims of crime, in particular victims of terrorism, could be improved. To this end, an integrated and coordinated approach has been developed, through the April 2015 European Agenda on Security, which sets out a comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy that further enhances the protection of victims, regardless of where in the EU a terrorist attack has taken place.

Legal framework

Victims of intentional and violent crime have the right to access national compensation schemes under the April 2004 Council Directive (2004/80/EC) relating to compensation to crime victims. As terrorist attacks qualify as such intentional and violent crime, victims can trigger the application of the EU-wide compensation scheme in situations where the attack was committed in an EU country other than the victim’s country of residence.

The October 2012 Directive (2012/29/EU) on victim’s rights recognises that victims of terrorism may need special attention due to the particular nature of the crime they had to face. A victim of terrorism is a natural person who has suffered harm, including physical, mental and emotional harm or economic loss, insofar as that was directly caused by a terrorist offence, or a family member of a person whose death was directly caused by a terrorist offence and who has suffered harm as a result of that person’s death. Member States should therefore take particular account of their needs by protecting their dignity and security.

Directive (EU) 2017/541 from March 2017 on combating terrorism introduces measures of protection and assistance for victims, such as the right to immediate access to medical and psychological support and information on any legal, practical or financial matters. The directive strengthens the emergency response mechanisms to assist victims of terrorism, immediately after a terrorist attack and for as long as necessary. In particular, EU Member States must ensure that victims of terrorism who are residents of an EU country other than that in which the terrorist offence was committed have full access to support services and compensation schemes available in the country.

Co-legislators’ positions Council of the European Union

In its conclusions on victims of terrorism of May 2018, the Council encourages cooperation between the authorities in charge of protecting the victims of terrorism, in order to facilitate the rapid exchange of information and assistance in the event of a terrorist attack. To meet this objective, the Council invites the EU Member States to nominate contact points at national level in order to share information and build synergies with existing EU structures, such as the European Network on Victims’ Rights, the European Judicial Network (EJN), Eurojust, Europol and crisis management networks.

European Parliament

In May 2018, the European Parliament adopted a resolution on the implementation of Directive 2012/29/EU, it emphasised the specific nature of the victims of terrorism, who fall into a distinct category of victims and have specific needs. It called on the European Commission to propose a specific directive on the protection of victims of terrorism. It also encouraged the Member States to provide adequate information and free legal aid to those victims who are also parties to criminal proceedings, in order that they may obtain applicable compensation. European Parliament

Figures on terrorist attacks and victims

According to Europol, in recent years there has been an increase in the frequency of jihadist attacks, but a decrease in the sophistication of their preparation and execution. In 2017 alone, a total of 205 foiled, failed and completed terrorist attacks were reported in nine EU Member States. In 2017, a total of 1 219 individuals were arrested in the EU for terrorism related offences.

The number of victims in the EU, and Europeans killed by terrorist actions in the rest of the world, amounts to 1 790 victims in the 2000-2017 period. Fifteen European countries have been directly hit by attacks, with a total of 740 people dead. Spain, with 269 deaths, is the country with the most victims, followed by France with 254. The United Kingdom (120), Belgium (36) and Germany (29) come next. Furthermore, 26 other countries have witnessed the death of 1 050 Europeans within their territories.

Likewise, the Special Committee on Terrorism (TERR), established in 2017, called on the Commission, in its November 2018 final report, to put forward a legislative proposal on the victims of terrorism that effectively tackles victims’ needs in the short and long term, including a common definition for the status of ‘victim of terrorism’. In its resolution of 12 December 2018 on the findings and recommendations of the TERR committee, the European Parliament requested the Commission to launch a dialogue with the Member States in order to reduce the large disparities existing in the level of financial compensation granted at national level to victims of terrorist attacks. Moreover, it urged Member States to effectively transpose the provisions set out in Directive 2012/29/EU on victims’ rights and Directive (EU) 2017/541 on combating terrorism. Finally, both the Council and the Parliament have repeatedly called on the Commission to establish an EU Coordination Centre for victims of terrorism (CCVT), which would be a hub of expertise, guidance and support in cases of attacks in a Member State. In March 2018, the Commission committed to have the centre ‘up and running in 2019’.

Among proposals to improve the situation of victims of terrorism, the European Parliament has called on the Member States to:

• Provide specific training for professionals of all relevant national services responsible for assisting the victims of terrorist acts.
• Create coordinated mechanisms for collecting information on the victims of terrorist attacks taking place in their territory, to provide assistance in line with their specific needs.
• Establish a web portal and emergency telephone line at national level, giving access to confidential, free-of-charge and easily accessible support services.
• Establish a coordination centre in the event of a terrorist attack, which includes services such as specialist emotional support, vocational rehabilitation to help victims to find new jobs or change careers, and the facilitation of safe virtual connections with other victims.
• Complement the assistance provided to victims with measures such as cash advances to help cover immediate expenses, childcare and home support, tax relief schemes and aid with transport in the case of disability.
• Hold conferences, and establish memorials and audiovisual material in order to raise awareness among EU citizens.

The Commission has established a European Network of Associations of Victims of Terrorism (NAVT) aimed at fostering cross-border cooperation between associations of victims of terrorist attacks in the Member States, and enhancing the defence of victims’ rights at European level. Among their activities, they identify best practices and share information on the mapping of associations supporting victims of terrorism, funding opportunities as well as maintaining a calendar of relevant events.

Read the complete ‘at a glance’ note on ‘Victims of terrorism‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Marcin Grajewski,

© Николай Григорьев / Fotolia

The situation in Venezuela appears to be approaching a tipping-point, as President Nicolas Maduro faces growing international and domestic pressure to relinquish power to National Assembly leader and self-proclaimed acting President Juan Guaidó. The latter is recognised by many Western countries as the legitimate interim leader of the oil-rich Latin American country, which has seen its economy undermined by mismanagement and corruption. Maduro, political heir to Hugo Chávez, is backed by China, Russia and the country’s military. He has recently ordered troops to block the opposition’s US-backed attempt to bring in aid to the country, leading to violent clashes. To date, some 3.4 million Venezuelans have left the country to escape the crisis.

The European Parliament has already adopted a non-binding resolution that recognised Juan Guaidó as the legitimate interim President of Venezuela.

This note offers links to recent commentaries, studies and reports from major international think tanks on the situation in Venezuela .

Europe should do better on Venezuela
European Council on Foreign Relations, February 2019

Venezuela’s Maidan moment, and why realpolitik is against the interest of the West
Wilfried Martens Centre, February 2019

Russian mercenaries on the march: Next stop Venezuela?
European Council on Foreign Relations, February 2019

Amid political uncertainties, Venezuela’s oil industry situation worsens
Council on Foreign Relations, February 2019

Negotiating Venezuela’s future: First agreement, then elections
Finnish Institute of International Affairs, February 2019

Beginning the endgame in Venezuela
Center for Strategic and International Studies, February 2019

Maduro’s allies: Who backs the Venezuelan regime?
Council on Foreign Relations, February 2019

Venezuela’s Crisis: Italy Clashes with the EU common approach
Istituto Affari Internazionali, February 2019

Putin in Caracas
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, February 2019

China-Venezuela economic relations: Hedging Venezuelan bets with Chinese characteristics
Wilson Center, February 2019

What we heard in Caracas
International Crisis Group, February 2019

Trump is getting it right on Venezuela. In fact, he needs to double down
American Enterprise Institute, February 2019

In Venezuela, Maduro and Guaidó are on a collision course over humanitarian aid
Atlantic Council, February 2019

A Venezuelan refugee crisis
Council on Foreign Relations, February 2019

Why did China stand by Maduro in Venezuela?
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, February 2019

What comes next for Venezuela’s oil industry?
Center for Strategic and International Studies, February 2019

Russian-Venezuelan relations at a crossroads
Wilson Center, February 2019

Venezuela: A rough road ahead
International Crisis Group, January 2019

Venezuela: The rise and fall of a petrostate
Council on Foreign Relations, January 2019

In Venezuela, a potential U.S.-Russian crisis?
Rand Corporation, January 2019

¿Por qué Nicolás Maduro sigue en el poder pese al colapso de Venezuela?
Barcelona Centre for International Affairs, January 2019

Creativity amid crisis: Legal pathways for Venezuelan migrants in Latin America
Migration Policy Institute, January 2019

The top conflicts to watch in 2019: Venezuela
Council on Foreign Relations, January 2019

Venezuelans must lead in building an off-ramp for Maduro
Brookings Institution, January 2019

Amérique latine: L’année politique 2018
Centre d’études et de recherches internationales, Observatoire politique de l’amérique latine et des Caraïbes, January 2018

How many more migrants and refugees can we expect out of Venezuela?
Brookings Institution, December 2018

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘Venezuela‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Eamonn Noonan with Henry Eviston,

ESPAS 2018: Foresight: Thinking about tomorrow today

As is customary, EPRS hosted the second day of the annual ESPAS conference, which took place in late November (the video proceedings are available online). ESPAS is the European Strategy and Policy Analysis System, and this event has become the major interinstitutional foresight set piece of the year in Brussels. The event aims to promote cooperation between European bodies, working towards a common analysis of major global trends, and of the choices and challenges they pose for Europe.

The afternoon opened with a session on Global Power in 2030. Shada Islam, Director of Friends of Europe, sees that it is increasingly difficult to generate international consensus on most important issues, and suggests that a model based on ‘constellations’ could help: multilateral agreements in policy areas such as climate change, security cooperation or development initiatives, each bringing together different sets of countries.

ESPAS 2018: Interview with Nicolas MIAILHE

Dr Bérénice Guyot-Rechard added that the EU must increase its visibility in South and South-Eastern Asia. The EU should seek mutually beneficial cooperation with India on joint priorities such as climate change and sustainable urbanisation. Nicholas Miailhe, President of the Future Society, noted that the EU does not lack the ability to innovate, but rather the business models needed to develop innovation, in contrast to the United States. He argued for a focus on European technological ‘champions’.

A specialist panel on foresight, ‘Thinking About Today Tomorrow’ asked how foresight can be better understood by politicians and the public. Mathew Burrows, of the Atlantic Council, argued that history is an effective tool to make the future relevant. Where leaders see concrete examples from the past, they are more likely to listen to arguments about the unintended consequences of their policies. This can help change how people think – a central objective of foresight. Florence Gaub, deputy director of the EUISS, sees the psychology of foresight as more of an art than a science. Inbuilt emotional traps make it difficult to think clearly about the future. Foresight practitioners are there to ‘annoy’ those decision-makers who think only of the short-term. Policy-makers should aim to be trusted, rather than liked.

ESPAS 2018: Global power in 2030, Catarina TULLY

Catarina Tully, founder of the School of International Futures, added that there is now an effort to teach foresight in schools; as it needs to become a natural part of people’s thinking. Pei Shan Lim added that her Centre for Strategic Futures engages constantly with every level of the Singaporean government. New teaching techniques, such as gaming, are a key part of the effort to embed foresight in officials’ thinking.

Franck Debié, Deputy Head of Cabinet of the Secretary-General of the European Parliament, led the penultimate session and traced the evolution of ESPAS. He highlighted how much has been achieved since 2014, in terms of both institutional cooperation and policy output. The concluding panel included Klaus Welle, Secretary-General of the European Parliament, Ann Mettler, Head of the European Political Strategy Centre, and others. It summed up several themes emerging from the two days: the importance of honest advice, of emotional engagement, of values, and of realism; and the ability to review, test and update positions as necessary.

Our first blog post covering the ESPAS conference’s morning proceedings.

Videos of the Conference discussions.

Interviews with our speakers and participants.

Photos from the event

See more photos on the conference website.

Click to view slideshow.

 

Written by Eamonn Noonan with Henry Eviston,

ESPAS 2018: Welcoming remarks, Ann Mettler & Anthony Teasdale

As is customary, EPRS hosted the second day of the annual ESPAS conference, which took place in late November (the video proceedings are available online). ESPAS is the European Strategy and Policy Analysis System, and this event has become the major interinstitutional foresight set piece of the year in Brussels. The event aims to promote cooperation between European bodies, working towards a common analysis of major global trends, and of the choices and challenges they pose for Europe.

Parliament Vice-President Ramón Luis Valcárcel Siso gave the opening address, following welcoming remarks from EPRS Director-General, Anthony Teasdale, and the Head of the European Policy Strategy Centre, Ann Mettler. The Vice-President reminded guests that the EU stands at a critical juncture. While it prepares for the 2019 elections – ‘one of the world’s largest democratic exercises’ – the EU faces a crisis of confidence from citizens who ‘have felt abandoned’ over the last ten years. ‘This is no time for humility’, therefore – it is fundamental the Parliament remind citizens how it has taken their side.

ESPAS 2018: Keynote Discussion, Professor (Lord) Martin Rees

Lord Martin Rees, UK Astronomer Royal, delivered a keynote speech on ‘Global Governance in the Anthropocene Age’. Lord Rees underlined that we can predict two things for this century: the world will become warmer, and that it will become more crowded. We human beings are not addressing climate change and, therefore, are ‘destroying the book of life before we’ve read it’. Having charted the potential of new technologies, space exploration and life extension to improve humans’ knowledge and wellbeing, Lord Rees concluded by exhorting academics and citizens to put pressure on elected representatives to think globally and to consider the long-term.

The next session dealt with Economy and Society in 2030. The discussion ranged from the EU’s influence as a trendsetter, to the importance of foresight in the EU’s investment strategy. Heather Grabbe of the Open Society European Policy Institute argued that the EU’s scale and its intellectual capacity would help it remain a public policy leader. Bruce Stokes of the Pew Research Center emphasised that the EU must speak to the significant minority that votes for populist parties and is resistant to change – such as that which may emerge from the rise of automation. For Mikolaj Dowgielewicz of the EIB, the EU’s investments must become much more future-focused: the EU lacks investment in innovation, infrastructure, and R&D, particularly compared to Asia. Finally, Daniel Gros of CEPS added that the EU must become qualitatively better if it is to remain a trendsetter.

ESPAS 2018: Keynote discussion, Professor Brigid Laffan

The morning session concluded with a second keynote speech by the European University Institute’s Brigid Laffan on ‘The Future of Social Sciences and their Contribution to Policy-Making’. Brigid Laffan argued that the future of the social sciences lies in three functions: supporting evidence-based policy-making; transforming knowledge and knowledge production; and transforming politics. The tension between politics needing solutions urgently, while science is about careful research and contested knowledge, complicates this first function. The IT-related transformation of knowledge production will create new fields for empirical study, such as parliamentary debates, where the social sciences are well placed to ask difficult questions. Finally, social sciences must compensate for the current lack of good governance.

Our second blog post covering the ESPAS conference’s afternoon proceedings.

Videos of the Conference discussions.

Interviews with our speakers and participants.

Photos from the event

See more photos on the conference website.

Click to view slideshow.

 

Written by Silvia Polidori,

Old-model industries, such as the coal and steel, may well represent a symbol of the first steps towards European integration. This workshop aims to show how a more eco and social-friendly approach to reconverting old-style industry in urban areas might trigger a new development path in the European Union.

Today, our economy and lifestyles are becoming more circular and environmental friendly. This brings with it an industrial reconversion trend, driven by new business models, often based on new technologies, such as digital . How can old industrial areas in or close to towns be sympathetically converted into innovative and eco-friendly zones? How can we make these areas attractive hubs for small and medium enterprises (SMEs) operating in the sustainable management of natural resources, modern energy solutions, and eco-efficient transport? And how is this incorporated in the EU’s current and next regional development strategy?

Fifteen experts from twelve EU Member States, including five Members of the European Parliament (MEPs), representatives of other European institutions, universities and local authorities, will gather to discuss the topic from various angles, highlighting the challenges, and proposing solutions based on policy strategies, legislative proposals and concrete examples.

As mentioned in an EPRS Briefing on ‘Harnessing globalisation for local and regional authorities – Challenges and possible solutions‘, global competition has affected various EU industries (e.g. coal, steel, iron, shipbuilding, automotive and textiles), to an extent that they have had to downsize their activities. Other challenges are also inherent to the topic of industrial transformation, such as the economic impact on urban areas where industry is located. For instance, SMEs may depend on those big industries, and demographic and employment issues are also involved. The long and expensive road to soil reclamation and general decontamination of the affected areas represents another challenge, addressing the environment. Adequate strategies need to be tailored to the specific EU areas, as not all EU urban regions have the same needs. In its ‘Reflection paper on harnessing globalisation’, presented in July 2017 as part of a series of papers on the future of Europe, the European Commission calls for a holistic approach to facing globalisation that also empowers local and regional authorities to successfully address the related challenges.

In its 2016 Resolution 2015/2278(INI) on ‘Cohesion policy and Research and Innovation Strategies for Smart Specialisation’ (rapporteur: Ramón Luis Valcárcel Siso, EPP, Spain), the European Parliament shaped the current EU strategy and legislative framework 2014-2020, based on smart specialisation strategies. These support each region’s existing capabilities and combine them with the activities of local industries. According to a Parliament study, European cohesion policy has contributed to the rehabilitation and new development of industrial areas. A STOA Study on ‘New technologies and regional policy: Towards the next cohesion policy framework’ also provides policy options for the legislator, in view of the adoption of the next regional policy legislation for the 2021-2027 period. In particular, it highlights the role and potential of cohesion policy funding in planning and implementing urban innovation areas. A new generation of science parks can be developed in urban areas, thereby stimulating a wider constituency of entrepreneurs and businesses to innovate and grow.

On 29 May 2018, the European Commission published a ‘proposal for a regulation on the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and the Cohesion Fund (CF)’. The new cohesion policy is expected to focus on five policy objectives, including a Europe closer to citizens, with the support of locally-led development strategies and sustainable urban development. One of the key investment priorities is industrial modernisation. There is also a shift towards investments that promote a low-carbon, circular economy and the fight against climate change. Fighting exclusion and supporting the migrant integration are also high on the agenda. As many of these challenges will be tackled in Europe’s cities and metropolitan areas, the European Commission proposes further strengthening of the urban dimension of cohesion policy. Parliament’s Committee on Regional Development (REGI) adopted the ERDF-CF report in the form of amendments to the Commission’s proposal on 14 February 2019. Among the various points raised, the REGI Committee reiterated its support for sustainable urban development, smart specialisation and for a transition to industry 4.0. The next stage in the Parliament will be to table this report for vote in plenary.

Besides the strategic and legislative framework, representatives from six European towns will present some of the most prominent European cases of mastering industrial and economic reconversion.

Follow the workshop online and join the debate via Twitter: #IndustrialReconversion

To keep up to date with this project and other STOA activities, follow our website, the EPRS blog, Twitter and Think Tank pages.

Written by Marcin Grajewski,

© Negro Elkha / Fotolia

The United States has announced its withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, sparking fears of a fresh nuclear arms race between Russia, the United States and China. The collapse of the 1987 agreement, which bans land-based missiles with a range between 500 kilometres and 5,500 kilometres, has further exacerbated existing concerns about European security caused by the uncertain commitment of US President Donald Trump to the NATO military alliance.

President Trump’s approach to security, coupled with Russia’s assertive behaviour, have prompted the European Union to put forward initiatives to increase its military capabilities. President Trump started a six-month withdrawal process from the Treaty this month, blaming it on Russian violations. Hopes are not high that an agreement can be negotiated during this period. Furthermore, German Chancellor Angela Merkel called on China to join the INF treaty during the 2019 Munich Security Conferece, but China has argued that this would place unfair limits on their military, and refused.

This note offers links to commentaries and studies on the collapse of the INF Treaty and European defence. Earlier papers on defence can be found in a previous edition of ‘What Think Tanks are Thinking’, published in July 2018.

The INF treaty

The end of an era? The INF Treaty, New START, and the future of strategic stability
Brookings Institutions, February 2019

Europe and the end of the INF Treaty
Carnegie Europe, February 2019

Q&A on the US withdrawal from the INF Treaty
American Enterprise Institute, February 2019

The end of the INF Treaty is looming: A new nuclear arms race can still be prevented
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, January 2019

The INF quandary: Preventing a nuclear arms race in Europe. Perspectives from the US, Russia and Germany
Belfer Centre for Science and International Affairs, January 2019

The ailing INF Treaty: What to know
Council on Foreign Relations, January 2019

The demise of the INF treaty: Can the EU save arms control?
Clingendael, January 2019

Der INF-Vertrag vor dem Aus – Bedrohung oder Chance für die internationale Rüstungskontrolle?
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, December 2018

What comes after a U.S. withdrawal from the INF Treaty? The case for a NATO strategy
Center for Strategic and International Studies, February 2019

Will Europe try to save the INF Treaty?
Brookings Institution, December 2018

Dead man walking: Time to put the INF treaty to rest?
International Centre for Defence and Security, November 2018

Terminating the INF Treaty makes no sense
Cato Institute, October 2018

The crumbling architecture of arms control
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, October 2018

Other reports on European defence

Europe in 2019: A critical and transitional year
Center for Strategic and International Studies, February 2019

The way towards the European Defence Union
European Political Strategy Centre, February 2019

Strategische Autonomie Europas
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, February 2019

Misplaced nostalgia for the old West
Carnegie Europe, February 2019

NATO at seventy: An alliance in crisis
Belfer Centre for Science and International Affairs, February 2019

The European blame game
Carnegie Europe, February 2019

Blaming Trump for their problems is the one thing Europeans can agree on
Brookings Institutions, February 2019

Poland’s short-sighted military dependence on the United States
Carnegie Europe, February 2019

America the mercenary: Trump’s plan to bill NATO
European Council on Foreign Relations, February 2019

On the up: Western defence spending in 2018
International Institute for Strategic Studies, February 2019

Pourquoi nous faut-il une armée européenne?
Une armée européenne pour faire quoi?
Une armée européenne dans quel cadre?
Une armée européenne avec qui ?
Une armée européenne sous quelle forme?
Groupe de Recherche et d’information sur la Paix et la Sécurité, January, February 2019

Fighting for Europe: European strategic autonomy and the use of force
Egmont, January 2019

The Franco-German tandem: Bridging the gap on nuclear issues
Institut Français des Relations Internationales, January 2019

1919-2019: How to make peace last? European strategy and the future of the world order
Egmont, January 2019

Contemporary deterrence: Insights and lessons from enhanced forward presence
International Centre for Defence and Security, January 2019

Eyes tight shut: European attitudes towards nuclear deterrence
European Council on Foreign Relations, December 2018

Rising tensions between the West and Russia: What role for arms control?
Clingendael, December 2018

Hybrid and transnational threats
Friends of Europe, December 2018

France and European defence: Continuity in long-term objectives, change in strategy
Finnish Institute of International Relations, December 2018

Strengthening the EU as a security actor: Citizens’ views and perspectives
Trans European Policy Studies Association, December 2018

Preparing for cyber conflict: Case studies of cyber command
International Centre for Defence and Security, December 2018

Permanent deterrence: Enhancements to the US military presence in North Central Europe
Atlantic Council, December 2018

‘Fort Trump” or bust? Poland and the future of European defence
Friends of Europe, December 2018

Strategic autonomy: Towards ‘European sovereignty’ in defence?
European Union Institute for Security Studies, November 2018

NATO priorities after the Brussels summit
Atlantic Council, November 2018

NATO nuclear sharing and the future of nuclear deterrence in Europe
The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, November 2018

A ‘European’ Army? Eminently defensible but not probable for a long time to come
Atlantic Council, November 2018

EU-NATO relations: A long-term perspective
Egmont, November 2018

Die nachrichtendienstlichen Schnittstellen der EU-Sicherheitspolitik
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, November 2018

Ein Europäischer Sicherheitsrat: Mehrwert für die Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik der EU?
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, November 2018

The United States, Russia, and Europe in 2018
Center for Strategic and International Studies, November 2018

The European dimension of nuclear deterrence: French and British policies and future scenarios
Finnish Institute of International Relations, November 2018

‘Fort Trump?’ Is there added value to a permanent U.S. military base in Poland?
Center for Strategic and International Studies, November 2018

Strengthening the EU’s cyber defence capabilities
Centre for European Policy Studies, November 2018

In Sea of Azov, Russia again tests its strength
Chatham House, November 2018

European armaments standardisation
European Union Institute for Security Studies, November 2018

The erosion of strategic stability and the future of arms control in Europe
Institut Français des Relations Internationales, November 2018

Under the gun: Rearmament for arms control in Europe
European Council on Foreign Relations, November 2018

Beyond borderlands: ensuring the sovereignty of all nations of Eastern Europe
Atlantic Council, November 2018

Trump gets NATO backwards
Center for New American Security, November 2018

NATO nuclear sharing and the future of nuclear deterrence in Europe
The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, October 2018

The challenges of NATO nuclear policy: Alliance management under the Trump administration
Finnish Institute of International Relations, October 2018

Addressing the nexus: Regional conventional arms control in a global context
OSCE Network of Think Tanks and Academic Institutions, October 2018

NATO after the Brussels summit: Bruised or emboldened?
German Marshall Fund, September 2018

Hard lessons from Brussels: The key challenges facing NATO
Institute for Foreign Affairs and Trade, September 2018

Debating security plus: Conflict, competition and cooperation in an interconnected world
Friends of Europe, September 2018

Germany and European defence cooperation: A post-Atlantic turn?
Finnish Institute of International Relations, September 2018

PESCO implementation: The next challenge
Clingendael, September 2018

Russia’s Vostok exercises were both serious planning and a show
Chatham House, September 2018

Russia and the Baltics: A testing ground for NATO–EU defence cooperation
Instituto Affari Internazionali, September 2018

PESCO and security cooperation between the EU and Turkey
Istambul Policy Centre, Instituto Affari Internazionali, September 2018

European strategic autonomy: Going it alone?
Clingendael, August 2018

EU-NATO cooperation: Distinguishing narrative from substance
Jacques Delors Institute, July 2018

Tailored assurance: Balancing deterrence and disarmament in responding to NATO-Russia tensions
Institut français des relations internationales, July 2018

Read this briefing note on ‘The INF Treaty and European defence‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Beatrix Immenkamp (1st edition),

© drstokvektor / Fotolia

In the context of the Commission’s proposal for a multiannual financial framework (MFF) for the 2021-2027 period, the Commission published a proposal for a Council regulation establishing a European instrument for nuclear safety complementing the neighbourhood, development and international cooperation instrument on the basis of the Euratom Treaty on 14 June 2018. The proposed regulation will replace Council Regulation (Euratom) No 237/2014 of 13 December 2013 establishing an instrument for nuclear safety cooperation (INSC). The proposed regulation will continue to fund the important activities carried out under the current regulation, namely to support the promotion of a high level of nuclear safety and radiation protection and the application of effective and efficient safeguards of nuclear materials in third countries, building on the activities under the Euratom Treaty.

Versions

• February 2019: ‘Nuclear Safety outside the EU: Proposal for a new Council regulation‘ (1st edition)

Proposal for a Council regulation establishing a European Instrument for Nuclear Safety complementing the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument on the basis of the Euratom Treaty Committee responsible: Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE) COM(2018) 462 of 14.06.2018 Rapporteur: Vladimir Urutchev (EPP, Bulgaria) 2018/0245(NLE) Shadow rapporteurs: Jens Geier (S&D, Germany)
Rupert Matthews (ECR, UK)
Pavel Telička (ALDE, Czech Republic)
Jaromir Kohliček (GUE/NGL, Czech Republic)
Michèle Rivasi (Greens/EFA, Italy)
Dario Tamburrano (EFDD, Italy) Consultation procedure – Parliament adopts only a non-binding opinion Next steps expected: Adoption by Council

Written by Gianluca Quaglio,

© AdobeStock/Pathdoc

The internet has received much negative news coverage in recent years. Articles focus on major privacy scandals and security breaches, the proliferation of fake news, rampant harmful behaviours like cyber-bullying, cyber-theft, revenge porn, the exchange of child porn and internet predation, internet addiction, and the negative effects of the internet on social relations and social cohesion. Nevertheless, some 87 % of European households have internet access at home, and 65 % use mobile devices to access the internet. Europeans aged 16 to 24 years spend 168 minutes per day on mobile internet, dropping to 30 minutes for 55 to 64-year olds. Around 88 % of 15 to 24-year olds use social media, 80 % on a daily basis.

While the social and economic benefits of the internet cannot be denied, some of these developments can severely affect such European values as equality, respect for human rights and democracy. Technology companies are under increasing pressure to mitigate these harmful effects, and politicians and opinion leaders are advocating drastic measures.

The recently published STOA study on ‘Harmful internet use’ covers the damage associated with internet use on individuals’ health, wellbeing and functioning, and the impact on social structures and institutions. While the study does not attempt to cover all possible societal harm relating to the internet, Part I focuses on one specific cause of harm, internet addiction, and Part II covers a range of harmful effects on individuals and society that are associated with internet use. The report concludes with policy options for their prevention and mitigation.

Other studies have already extensively discussed some harmful effects, and these are already subject to a history of policy actions. These include harm to privacy, harm related to cybersecurity and cybercrime, and damage resulting from digital divides. In contrast, this study covers the less-studied but equally important harmful effects that concern individuals’ health, wellbeing and functioning, the quality of social structures and institutions, and equality and social inclusion.

Internet addiction and problematic internet use                             

Internet addiction and problematic internet use prevalence rates vary across studies and countries. The noteworthy discrepancy in prevalence estimates has a number of causes, including the different populations studied, as well as the various diagnostic tools and assessment criteria utilised. With this in mind, it appears that roughly 4 % of European adolescents demonstrate a pathological use of the internet that affects their life and health, while 13 % of adolescents engage in maladaptive behaviour when using the internet. Similar numbers are reported for adults.

Part I of the study focuses on generalised internet addiction, online gaming addiction, and online gambling addiction. Clinical presentations, patient profiling, comorbidities, instruments, interventions, and prognoses are different across these three potential addiction disorders. The study states that the individual, cultural and media-use context significantly contributes to the experience and severity of internet addiction.

The study proposes a set of preventive actions, and evidence to support future policies. It states that offering information, screening tools and campaigns to students in secondary schools and at universities regarding internet-use-related addiction problems can help, especially regarding gaming addiction in adolescent populations. This will require allocating research and resources for schools and their staff, and for families, as well as the establishment of working relationships with health professionals and services.

Harmful social and cultural effects associated with internet use

Part II of the study identifies a number of different harmful social and cultural effects associated with internet use. The evidence points to the occurrence of significant damage to both individuals and society. Some of these harmful effects are described briefly below:

Information overload:Having too much information to be able to adequately understand an issue or make effective decisions. Information overload is associated with loss of control, feelings of being overwhelmed, reduced intellectual performance, and diminished job satisfaction. Studies show that information overload affects up to 20-30% of people.

Damage to social relationships:Extensive internet use, of social media in particular, is correlated with loneliness and social isolation. Intimate relationships can be degraded by internet use, particularly due to viewing online pornography. Malicious online behaviour, particularly cyber-bullying, cyber-stalking and online predation, affects a significant percentage of internet users.

Impaired public/private boundaries: The way in which the internet and smartphones blur the distinction between private and public, and between different spheres of life, including work, home life and leisure, harms the boundaries between people’s public and private lives. Harmful effects that can result from such permeations include loss of quality of life, lack of privacy, decreased safety and security, and harm to social relations – when friends and family members feel they are left behind by new technology.

Harmful effects on cognitive development:Empirical evidence suggests that internet use can have both positive and negative impacts on cognitive development, depending on the person and the circumstances. There is evidence that children’s cognitive development can be damaged by prolonged internet use, including the development of memory skills, attention span, abilities for critical reasoning, language acquisition, reading, and learning abilities. More research is however needed to draw more reliable conclusions.

Damage to communities: Many off-line communities suffer through the partial migration of human activities – shopping, commerce, socialising, leisure activities, professional interactions – to the internet. Online communities sometimes extend off-line communities and sometimes replace them. They are often inadequate replacements, however, as they do not possess some of the valuable or the strongest qualities of off-line communities, and communities may consequently suffer from impoverished communication, incivility, and a lack of trust and commitment.

The study identifies a number of broad policy options for preventing and mitigating these harmful effects. They include, among other things:

1. promoting technology that better protects social institutions, stimulating or requiring tech companies to introduce products and services that better protect social institutions and internet users;
2. education about the internet and its consequences;
3. stronger social services support for internet users: this policy option involves strengthening social services dedicated to internet users to prevent or mitigate harmful effects such as internet addition, antisocial online behaviour or information overload;
4. incentivising or requiring employers to develop policies that protect workers against harmful effects of work-related internet use, such as information overload and the blurring of lines between public and private life;
5. establishing governmental units and multi-stakeholder platforms at EU level,to address the problems of the internet’s harmful social and cultural effects.

Problematic use of the internet (pui) research network

Finally, in relation to internet-caused damage, it is worth mentioning the recent article published by the European Science-Media Hub (ESMH) on the European Problematic Use of Internet (PUI) research network. The project, funded by the European Commission, gathers over 120 psychologists, psychiatrists and neuroscientists, with the objective of reaching a better definition of diagnostic criteria, the role of genetics and personality traits, and the brain-based mechanisms behind internet related disorders.

Written by Mar Negreiro (1st edition),

© kras99 / Fotolia

On 13 September 2017, the Commission adopted a cybersecurity package containing a series of initiatives to further improve EU cyber-resilience, deterrence and defence.

A year later, the Commission presented a proposal for the creation of a European cybersecurity competence centre with a related network of national coordination centres. The initiative aims to improve and strengthen the EU’s cybersecurity capacity, by stimulating the European technological and industrial cybersecurity ecosystem as well as coordinating and pooling necessary resources in Europe.

The competence centre is supposed to become the main body that would manage EU financial resources dedicated to cybersecurity research under the two proposed programmes – Digital Europe and Horizon Europe – within the next multiannual financial framework, for 2021-2027.

Within the European Parliament, the file has been assigned to the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE). The draft report was published on 7 December 2018. The vote in ITRE is expected to take place in February 2019.

Versions

• February 2019: ‘The new European cybersecurity competence centre and network‘ (1st edition)

Proposal for a regulation establishing the European Cybersecurity Industrial, Technology and Research Competence Centre and the Network of National Coordination Centres Committee responsible: Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE) COM(2018) 603 of 12.09.2018 Rapporteur: Julia Reda (Greens/EFA, Germany) 2018/0328(COD) Shadow rapporteurs: Paul Rübig (EPP, Austria)
Jens Geier (S&D, Germany)
Evžen Tošenovský (ECR, Czech Republic)
Angelika Mlinar (ALDE, Austria)
Jaromír Kohlíček (GUE/NGL, Czech Republic)
Barbara Kappel (ENF, Austria) Ordinary legislative procedure (COD) (Parliament and Council on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Vote in committee

With European elections coming up in May 2019, you probably want to know how the European Union impacts your daily life, before you think about voting. In the latest in a series of posts on what Europe does for you, your family, your business and your wellbeing, we look at what Europe does for small investors.

Twitter Hashtag #EUandME

© Drobot Dean / Fotolia

Individual investors who buy securities for themselves (and not on behalf of a fund or a bank) have access to a growing range of investment products, funds and investment-linked insurance policies, also known as ‘packaged retail and insurance-based investment products’ (or PRIIPs), offered by banks and insurance companies. The financial crisis has shown that, when it comes to investing in financial products, the information supplied to investors is of the utmost importance.

That is why the European Union’s ‘PRIIPs Regulation’ obliges companies that produce or sell such investment products to provide investors with a ‘key information document’ (referred to as a KID) for each product.

This document should be at most three pages long (font size 8 to 11) and provide clear information on the product, allowing the investor to take an informed investment decision. It should include at the very least the name of the product and the identity of the producer, the types of investors for whom it is intended, the risk and reward profile of the product (including the maximum potential loss to the investor), the costs to the investor associated with investment in the product, and also information on the complaints an investor can make, in the event of problems with the product or the person producing, advising on or selling it.

Further information

• Investment products, https://europa.eu/youreurope/citizens/consumers/financial-products-and-services/investment-products/index_en.htm
• Key information about investment products, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/LSU/?uri=CELEX:32014R1286

With European elections coming up in May 2019, you probably want to know how the European Union impacts your daily life, before you think about voting. In the latest in a series of posts on what Europe does for you, your family, your business and your wellbeing, we look at what Europe does for child victims of sexual abuse.

Twitter Hashtag #EUandME

© kmiragaya / Fotolia

Did you know that, according to estimates, between 10 % and 20 % of children in Europe suffer sexual abuse before they turn 18? Abuse occurs mainly in their immediate environment, but the internet and new technologies have brought a new dimension to the sexual exploitation of children, which is sometimes of a commercial nature. Victims of online abuse experience high levels of re-victimisation as long after the abuse occurred their images can still be exploited on the web.

The EU has adopted legislation to combat this very serious crime, criminalising a wide range of behaviours, both offline and online, including grooming and webcam sexual abuse, and introducing not only higher penalties, but also preventive measures. The law requires EU countries to ensure that perpetrators are disqualified from professional activities involving contact with children, and facilitates the exchange of information on convictions via the EU criminal records system. EU countries are also required to remove webpages containing or disseminating child pornography promptly. The law aims to protect child victims in criminal investigations and proceedings, and to safeguard their privacy and identity. Moreover, child sexual exploitation is a priority under the EU plan for combating serious crime, in which the EU police agency (Europol) plays an important role.

The public can also help, by taking part in the Europol’s Trace an object campaign, helping to identify the origin of an object linked to investigations, or by contacting the INHOPE network of hotlines to report suspicious online content.

Further information

• EPRS publication on combating sexual abuse of children, 2017, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=EPRS_STU(2017)598614
• European Commission webpage on child sexual abuse, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/organized-crime-and-human-trafficking/child-sexual-abuse_en
• INHOPE – International Association of Internet Hotlines, http://www.inhope.org/gns/home.aspx

Written by Marcin Grajewski,

© weyo / Fotolia

The euro marked its 20th anniversary in January 2019, as debates continued about the single currency’s track-record and the shape of future reform. When the 11 original members of the euro area irrevocably fixed their exchange rates in 1999 and transferred authority over their monetary policies to the European Central Bank, the currency’s advocates hailed the move as the crowning achievement of European integration. Whilist some economists have blamed the euro-zone’s one-size-fits-all approach to interest rates for weakening growth and increasing economic divergencies between certain countries, others have pointed to the euro’s role in underpinning the single makret as well as offering resilience to Europe in withstanding the 2008-09 financial crisis and its aftermath. Opinion polls shows the euro continues to be popular among the citizens.

This note brings together commentaries, analyses and studies by major international think tanks and research institutes on the euro’s merits, its future and related issues. Earlier publications on the topics can be found in a previous edition of the series published in November 2018.

Comment accroître le rayonnement international de l’euro?
Confrontation Europe, February 2019

Twenty years of the euro: Resilience in the face of unexpected challenges
Centre for European Policy Studies, January 2019

Euroframe report 2019: Economic assessment of the euro area
Institut für Weltwirtschaft Kiel, January 2019

An anatomy of inclusive growth in Europe
Bruegel, January 2019

The euro turns 20
Centre for European Policy Studies, January 2019

The euro’s global dreams and nightmares
Centre for European Policy Studies, January 2019

Mapping the conflict between EU member states over reform of the euro zone
LSE Ideas, January 2019

Non-euro countries in the EU after Brexit
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, January 2019

The euro as an international currency
Bruegel, December 2018

Can the euro rival the dollar?
Centre for European Reform, December 2018

The euro: It must change to carry on
Globsec Policy Institute, December 2018

Rebalancing the euro area: A proposal for future reform
Wilfried Martens Centre, December 2018

Does the Eurogroup’s reform of the ESM toolkit represent real progress?
Bruegel, December 2018

The unbalanced monetary union
LUISS School of European Political Economy, December 2018

Deutschland, Frankreich und Italien im Euroraum: Ursprünge, Merkmale und Folgen der begrenzten Konvergenz
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, December 2018

A better European architecture to fight money laundering
Peterson Institute for International Economics, December 2018

Forecast errors and monetary policy normalisation in the euro area
Bruegel, December 2018

Which structural reforms does E(M)U need to function properly?
Wiener Institut für Internationale Wirtschaftsvergleiche, December 2018

Fixing the roof while the sun is shining
Institut der deutschen Wirtschaft, December 2018

The euro zone: A monetary union without a capital market
LUISS School of European Political Economy, December 2018

The international role of the euro
Bruegel, December 2018

Growth prospects, the natural interest rate, and monetary policy
Institut für Weltwirtschaft Kiel, January 2019

On German external imbalances
Centre for European Policy Studies, November 2018

EMU: Holding the supervisor to account
Jacques Delors Institute, November 2018

Comment la Banque centrale européenne a perdu son âme
Institut Thomas More, November 2018

Sovereign risk and asset market dynamics in the euro area
Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales, November 2018

Euro-area sovereign bond holdings: An update on the impact of quantitative easing
Bruegel, November 2018

La sauvegarde de l’euro n’est pas qu’une question économique
Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales, November 2018

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘The euro at 20‘ on the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Angelos Delivorias and Ioannis Zachariadis (1st edition),

© NicoElNino / Fotolia

Since its launch in November 2014, the Investment Plan for Europe (IPE) has had considerable success in mobilising private investment across Europe. Despite its success, investment levels in Europe remain below pre-crisis levels. There is therefore a need to provide for an extended EU investment programme under the new multiannual financial framework (MFF), which caters for multiple objectives in terms of simplification, flexibility, synergies and coherence across relevant EU policies. The InvestEU programme, expected to run from 2021 onwards, has been designed to address this challenge. It will bring diverse EU financial instruments within a single structure, making EU funding for investment projects in Europe simpler and more efficient and flexible. It will build on the success achieved by the European Fund for Strategic Investments (EFSI) and consist of the InvestEU Fund, the InvestEU Advisory Hub and the InvestEU Portal.

Versions

• February 2019: ‘The InvestEU programme: Continuing EFSI in the next MFF‘ (1st edition)

Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the InvestEU programme Committees responsible: Budgets (BUDG) and Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) – jointly under Rule 55 COM(2018) 439 of 6.6.2018 Rapporteurs: José Manuel Fernandes (EPP, Portugal)
Roberto Gualtieri (S&D, Italy) 2018/0229(COD) Shadow rapporteurs: Othmar Karas (EPP, Austria)
Eider Gardiazabal Rubial (S&D, Spain)
Bernd Kölmel (ECR, Germany)
Ralph Packet (ECR, Belgium)
Nils Torvalds (ALDE, Finland)
Ramon Tremosa I Balcells (ALDE, Spain)
Liadh Ni Riada (GUE/NGL, Ireland)
Dimitrios Papadimoulis (GUE/NGL, Greece)
Sven Giegold (Greens/EFA, Germany)
Jordi Solé (Greens/EFA, Spain)
Marco Valli (EFDD, Italy)
Barbara Kappel (ENF, Austria) Ordinary legislative procedure (COD) (Parliament and Council on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Trilogue negotiations

Written by Katarzyna Sochacka and Clare Ferguson,

Copyright © European Union 2019 – Source : EP

The February plenary session highlights included a further debate on the Future of Europe, with Giuseppe Conte, Italy’s Prime Minister; debates on Syria, and the future of the INF Treaty and its impact on the EU; and discussions on Roma integration strategies, and on a reflection paper on a sustainable Europe by 2030. Parliament also held debates on the conclusion of three EU-Singapore agreements; the implementation of Treaty provisions; and the rights of LGBTI people. Members adopted legislative texts, inter alia, on a multiannual plan for stocks fished in the Western Waters; a Union civil protection mechanism; minimum requirements for water reuse; screening of FDI; electronic road toll systems; mutual recognition of goods; cross-border payments and currency conversion charges; and common rules for access to the international market for coach and bus services. Finally, Parliament adopted positions on six further proposed funding programmes for the 2021-2027 period, clearing the way to the launch of negotiations with the Council.

EU-Singapore Partnership

Members supported conclusion of the Free Trade Agreement (425 votes in favour, 186 against, 41 abstentions) and the Investment Protection Agreement with Singapore (436 in favour, 203 against, 30 abstentions). They also gave the green light to the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement. Bilateral negotiations with Singapore were launched in 2010, in place of negotiations with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as a whole. The negotiations with Singapore were completed in 2014. However, a dispute over trade policy powers arose between the Council and the European Commission, which then sought the opinion of the European Court of Justice. Signed in 2018, the three agreements, on free trade, investment protection, and cooperation, will significantly increase the EU’s trading presence in the region, adding to the successful ratification of the EU-Japan free trade agreement. The Council can now proceed to conclude the three agreements. The Investment Protection Agreement also has to be ratified by each individual Member State, in accordance with its internal procedures.

Implementation of Treaty provisions

In a joint debate, Parliament discussed and adopted texts on implementation of the Treaty provisions on EU citizenship, enhanced cooperation, and political control over the Commission. Members debated EU citizenship issues, calling on the Commission to end disenfranchisement of citizens residing in another EU Member State; to improve political and legal follow-up to successful Citizens’ Initiatives; and to boost participation in European elections by improving gender-balanced representation, information dissemination, and intensifying dialogue with citizens. Members called on the Commission to propose a regulation simplifying the legal framework for enhanced cooperation, whereby groups of countries can act together in the absence of agreement among all Member States. Regarding Parliament’s political control of the Commission, Members called for the executive to convert more Parliamentary initiatives into legislative proposals; for reinforced capacity in scrutinising the preparation and implementation of delegated and implementing acts; for political dialogue on Parliament’s stalled proposal on the right of inquiry; and for the Commission to review its administrative procedures for senior staff appointments.

EU-Cote d’Ivoire fisheries agreement

Members debated and approved the EU’s conclusion of the new protocol to the EU-Côte d’Ivoire fisheries agreement, which determines the €682 000 financial contribution paid in return for fishing rights in the area. The protocol should promote genuine sustainable development in local fisheries, and increase the added value to Côte d’Ivoire, in exchange for this use of its natural resources. The new six-year protocol (2018-2024) provides fishing opportunities for the EU tuna fleet in Côte d’Ivoire waters.

Multiannual plan for fisheries stocks in the Western Waters

Parliament approved, by a large majority, the interinstitutional trilogue agreement on a multiannual plan for fisheries in the Western Waters, part of the north-eastern Atlantic. Once adopted by the Council, the new regulation is expected to enter into force in spring 2019. The proposed plan covers fisheries exploiting stocks of fish and crustaceans living close to the sea bottom (known as demersal species), including deep-sea stocks. Parliament is keen to minimise the socio-economic impact of the measures proposed, by ensuring recreational fisheries do not have significant impact on fish stocks, and by expanding the management area for seabass.

EU-Morocco Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreement

Parliament approved the conclusion of the EU-Morocco Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreement, despite concerns regarding disputed waters around the Western Sahara. This agreement will provide fishing rights for128 EU vessels, in return for an average annual EU contribution of €40.15 million.

EU framework for FDI screening

Members adopted the text agreed in trilogue on the creation of a framework for the screening of foreign direct investment into the EU. Under the framework, Member States would retain the power to decide on FDI in their countries, but the Commission will be able to screen and if necessary publish an opinion on FDI, particularly should the investment have a negative effect on another EU Member State. Such inward investments often concern sensitive areas such as water, health, media, aerospace, and election infrastructure, by foreign investors who may be directly or indirectly controlled by foreign governments.

Electronic road toll systems

Parliament debated and adopted the text of a directive on electronic road toll systems following agreement with the Council. The updated rules will ensure vehicles do not need to carry large numbers of on-board devices, and improve information exchange on vehicle data, allowing for the pursuit of vehicle owners registered in another EU Member State for unpaid tolls.

Mutual recognition of goods

The principle of mutual recognition of goods crossing EU borders allows for frictionless trade in goods lawfully marketed in one Member State in any other EU country. Parliament debated and adopted a text agreed with the Council, to revise the current rules so as to address some shortcomings in their application. Member States will now have to justify any market access restrictions, speed up goods assessment, and improve problem-solving procedures. This could mean introducing SOLVIT-based procedures to resolve disputes between companies and authorities more quickly.

Cross-border payments and currency conversion charges

Parliament adopted an agreed text on a Commission proposal to review cross-border payments and currency conversion charges. The new legislation would reduce charges for cross-border euro payments and improve transparency regarding conversion fees.

Report on Bosnia and Herzegovina: 2018 country report

Parliament adopted its report on the Commission’s 2018 country report on Bosnia and Herzegovina. The country has made little progress in its EU accession ambitions, with inter-ethnic tensions making headlines, political, judicial and public administration reforms still lacking, and corruption persisting.

Opening of trilogue negotiations

One parliamentary committee decision, to enter into interinstitutional negotiations regarding European Border and Coast Guard, from the Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) committee, was confirmed.

Read this ‘At a glance’ note on ‘Plenary round-up – Strasbourg, February 2019‘ on the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Ionel Zamfir,

Nigeria, Africa’s largest economy and most populous nation, prepares to hold general elections on 16 February 2019 in an environment characterised by a struggling economy and a volatile security situation. After the first peaceful change of power following the 2015 elections, upcoming elections are expected to be tightly contested.

On 16 February, Nigerians will choose their president and the members of the National Assembly for the next four years. The president has significant powers in Nigeria’s presidential system, combining the functions of head of state and chief of the federal government. To win the presidency, a candidate needs to win the largest share of votes and at the same time obtain at least 25 % of the votes in at least two thirds of the federal states. The legislative body, the bicameral National Assembly, comprises a House of Representatives with 360 members and a Senate with 109 members (three from each state and one from Federal Capital Territory). Members of the National Assembly are elected through a system of first-past-the-post voting in single member constituencies. Two weeks later, on 2 March, Nigerians will vote again, this time in state elections for state governors and legislators.

This time, Nigeria seems better prepared to hold the elections on the planned date, unlike in 2015 when they had to be postponed due to the Boko Haram insurgency. Voter registration has improved: over 84 million voters have registered to vote in the 2019 elections, a 21 % increase compared to the 2014 electoral register. The widespread use of digital technologies is a central feature of the electoral process and, depending on their reliability, they can enhance or, conversely, undermine voters’ trust in the process. In 2015, biometric cards were used for voter identification for the first time, but with frequent technical failures. In the ongoing electoral process, voter registration and identification are based on biometric features – photograph and fingerprints, which are supposed to eliminate multiple registration and voting.

Some doubts linger as to the capacity of electoral and judicial bodies to play a fair and independent role. Following the re-run of the September 2018 Osun governorship election, opposition forces and other stakeholders have questioned the Independent National Electoral Commission’s (INEC) capacity and impartiality. The suspension of the Nigerian Chief of Justice in January 2019 by President Buhari also raised suspicions among civil society that judicial independence in the electoral process could be undermined. Fake news and disinformation, as well as hate speech, remain a major concern, given their potential to fuel electoral violence, a major issue in previous elections.

The electoral landscape is dominated by two major political forces. The governing party, All Progressives Congress (APC), was founded in February 2013 in anticipation of the 2015 elections. Left-leaning, it is affiliated, with a consultative status, to the Socialist International. In the run-up to the elections, the party has experienced infighting, with one faction splitting, as well as a number of defections to the opposition. All these moves were motivated by dissatisfaction with the record of the incumbent president, Muhammadu Buhari.

The opposition is organised in an electoral alliance, the Coalition of United Political Parties (CUPP) that comprises over 40 political parties. In fact, the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) dominates. Founded in August 1998 by a group opposed to the military ruler General Sani Abacha, the PDP had dominated Nigerian politics until the last elections, governing with an absolute majority in the legislative assembly between 1999 and 2015. The CUPP has decided to support a single candidate, namely the PDP candidate, Atiku Abubakar, a former vice-president from 1999 to 2007 to then President Olusegun Obasanjo. Abubakar is a long-time insider in Nigeria’s ruling political circles, having switched sides from PDP to APC and back. He is more popular with voters in the south and south-west of the country.

Central issues in the electoral campaign

Economy in Nigeria

Despite the reform efforts promoted by incumbent President Buhari, the economy has failed to take off. In 2015, Buhari inherited an economy weakened by its over-reliance on oil (as the prices dipped), as well as by public debt and corruption. Nigeria’s economy experienced a period of sustained growth at 5 to 8 % per year from 2000 to 2014, as long as oil prices were high. Afterwards, the economy slowed down considerably, recording negative growth (-1.6 %) in 2016 and reverting to low growth in 2017 (0.8 %). The oil and gas sectors are extremely important for the economy as a source of foreign exchange and in terms of their contribution to GDP. Fuels accounted for 92 % of the country’s merchandise exports in 2017. Buhari’s administration has tried to implement a series of reforms such as fighting corruption, stimulating other economic sectors than oil (such as agriculture and solid minerals), improving tax collection and fiscal discipline, and investing heavily in infrastructure. However, the outcome has been mixed, with some macroeconomic indicators indicating an improvement such as a rise in foreign reserves; a current account surplus and a reduction in inflation. The opposition candidate has promised to cut federal spending and privatise the oil sector. He wishes to promote more investor-friendly policies, is considering an amnesty for corruption suspects to help recover billions of dollars deposited abroad, and wants to create a US$25 billion fund to support private sector investment in infrastructure.

Youth unemployment

With a population estimated at over 180 million in 2015, Nigeria is Africa’s most populous nation and the seventh most populous country in the world. Nigeria’s population is growing very quickly and the country could become the third most populous on the planet with almost 800 million inhabitants by the end of this century, according to United Nations projections. Due to this special demographic dynamic, most of the population is very young and will remain so in the foreseeable future. This poses challenges for the economy, which needs to create jobs for the numerous young people joining the labour force each year. Indicators do not bode well in this respect. Nigeria’s unemployment rate increased from 18.8 % in the third quarter of 2017 to 23.1 % in in the third quarter of 2018 according to the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS).

Security

The security situation remains very volatile in several regions, and critics point to Buhari’s record on security matters as problematic. After Buhari took power, Niger Delta insurgents intensified the country’s economic woes, disrupting oil extraction and transport. After the Buhari administration extended their reintegration programme, they agreed to a fragile peace, but the potential for a new crisis remains high and any troubles are considered a major threat to the country’s economy. In the south, Biafran separatism has again been gaining traction. In response, security forces have brutally cracked down on separatist leaders and protesters, possibly committing extrajudicial killings, according to Amnesty International. In the fight against Boko Haram, the Buhari administration’s record is also mixed. While the group has lost the control it held in 2014 over vast swathes of territory, it has preserved its capacity to conduct murderous attacks on the civilian population and the military outposts in the north-east. This reality contradicts Buhari’s claim that the terrorist group has been defeated. Another security issue that could have an impact on the electoral campaign is the intensifying conflict between Christian farmers and Muslim Fulani herders in the Middle Belt. Buhari, who comes also from the Fulani ethnic group, has being criticised for being biased towards the latter, as security forces have been unable or unwilling to stop most attacks against farmers.

EU democracy support for Nigeria

Against this very troubled background, the electoral stakes are high for Nigeria, but also for democracy in Africa in general. The European Union is committed to consolidate democratic progress in Nigeria. It will be the sixth consecutive time that the EU sends an Election Observation Mission (EOM) to observe Nigeria’s general elections, chaired by Maria Arena, (S&D, Belgium). Since the return of democracy to the country in 1998, EU observers have been present at every general election held from 1999 to 2019. The European Parliament has been involved in all EU EOMs to Nigeria.

The EU has also provided financial and technical assistance to electoral institutions and stakeholders since 1999. As an African, Caribbean, and Pacific Group of States (ACP) country, Nigeria is a beneficiary of the European Development Fund (EDF). According to the National Indicative Programme established with the country, 17.6 % (around €90 million) of planned EDF financing for the period 2014-2020 is reserved for rule of law, governance and democracy. The objective of EU support is to improve economic governance, consolidate the rule of law, enhance peace and security, reinforce democratic processes and help manage migration and mobility.

In 2017, the EU established a specific programme ‘Support to Democratic Governance in Nigeria‘ endowed with €26.5 million from the EDF, for a five year period. It was launched at the beginning of 2018, with the stated purpose of contributing to the consolidation of democracy, while taking inspiration from the recommendations of the 2015 EU EOM. It provides funding to ten organisations that implement various activities (trainings, seminars, capacity development, awareness raising etc.) in support of the Independent National Electoral Commission (€13 million), Nigeria’s National Assembly (€3 million), political parties (€2.7 million), media (€2.6 million) and civil society organisations (€3 million).

The European Parliament is strongly committed to reinforcing electoral processes and democratic institutions and stakeholders in the country. The Parliament’s Democracy Support and Election Coordination Group (DEG) oversees and manages the activities carried out with Nigerian partners. Nigeria was added to the DEG list of priority countries in 2017. Under this framework, a comprehensive programme of capacity-building activities has been developed and implemented with the National Assembly of Nigeria. These have included several joint seminars between Nigerian parliamentarians and EP Members, a fact finding mission to Abuja, as well as training for the staff of the Nigerian parliament.

Written by Philip Boucher,

The STOA workshop ‘Responding to public opposition to low-carbon energy technologies’ gathered academic experts, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), regulators and grid operators to share their perspectives on managing public opposition to and support for low-carbon energy technologies. The event also served as the launch of a new STOA study, which examined a broad range of academic perspectives on the issue. Despite the diverse experiences of the speakers, there was a consensus on the need to translate broad public support for renewable energy into acceptance of the infrastructural developments that are needed to deliver it. The panellists also agreed that public responses are more nuanced than simple support or opposition, and that the key factors for fostering support for infrastructural development are trust, transparency, fairness and cooperation.

Workshop moderator Jens Geier (S&D, Germany) opened the meeting with a reference to the urgent need to decarbonise society, highlighting that support for a clean energy transition is found across Europe, even in areas with a strong mining tradition. Introducing STOA, Paul Rübig (EPP, Austria) explained the importance of gathering evidence and examining all options, taking account not only of technical possibilities, but also of wider social, economic and environmental issues, including how these issues are communicated.

The first panellist – Antonella Battaglini – represented the Renewables Grid Initiative, which brings European NGOs and grid operators together to enable transparent collaborative development of the energy system towards a renewable energy future. She argued that opposition to local projects need to be considered in the context of longer-term issues, such as the future that is desired for the next generations and the actions that are required to achieve it. Environmental NGOs and grid operators need to work together, because clean energy requires infrastructural development, which in turn requires widespread cooperation and support. Her concluding message was that the best strategy cannot come from any single actor, but must be developed through collaboration.

Sarah Mander from the Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research, University of Manchester, is the lead author of the STOA study on ‘Understanding public responses to low carbon technologies’. In her talk, she showed that there is widespread support across Europe for low-carbon energy, while there is often local opposition to projects that could help to deliver it. However, as outlined in the report, characterising such opposition as a selfish ‘not in my back yard’ attitude or as misinformed judgement of the technology is both inaccurate and ineffective. Instead, she argued, responses are on a continuum with many shades of opposition and support for many different reasons, including cultural, symbolic and procedural factors. Often, opposition to specific development is rooted in wider dissatisfaction about citizens’ representation and engagement in wider social, political or economic decision-making. To overcome these issues, she highlighted the role of a ‘social licence to operate’, which goes beyond legal permission to achieve tacit acceptance of local communities.

Representing the European Commission Directorate General for, Catharina Sikow-Magny argued that the need to transform our energy economy is an opportunity for innovation and job creation, but effective transformation will require careful management, with transparency and fairness described as key factors in the success of projects. This is why the European Commission’s ‘projects of common interest‘ (cross-border infrastructure developments to link the energy systems of EU Member States) engage communities continually and provide reliable information to citizens on the expected outcomes of projects. Her concluding message was that there is no ‘one size fits all’ solution, so strategies for managing acceptance need to reflect the individual circumstances.

The next two speakers represented the Irish and Belgian energy grid systems. Rosemary Steen noted that, in her experience as Director of External Affairs at EirGrid, people will support projects that are genuinely in the common interest. Following the trend of consumers increasing becoming ‘prosumers’, more actively involved in decisions about how their energy is delivered to them, she argued that continuous dialogue is the best way to ensure common interest. As Director of Public Acceptance of the Belgian grid operator, Elia, Ilse Tant shared her experience of working together with citizens, mayors and other key stakeholders to design the infrastructure needed to deliver low-carbon energy. She showed how this kind of deep dialogue and cooperation was a constructive means of fostering both understanding and acceptance of the need for energy infrastructure projects.

Following the panel presentations, several interesting questions from the audience were raised, in particular regarding how to rebuild trust in institutions when it is broken. In response, the panellists highlighted that energy transition is not only a motivation to foster public support for low-carbon energy technologies, but is also an opportunity to change the way decisions are made, which could help to rebuild trust in wider institutions.

If you missed out this time, you can access the presentations and watch the webstream of the workshop via the event page.

© mitifoto / Fotolia

The European Parliament regularly receives enquiries from EU citizens living abroad about how to vote in the European elections.

Voting in the country of citizenship

EU citizens living abroad (whether in another EU country or outside the EU) may have the right to vote, under certain conditions, in the European Parliament elections in their country of citizenship.

Practical arrangements to vote in the European elections for people living abroad vary a great deal among EU countries: most countries allow voting at embassies or consulates, several countries allow citizens living abroad to vote by post, a few countries allow voting by proxy, and one (Estonia) allows e-voting. Some countries (such as the Czech Republic, Ireland, Malta and Slovakia) do not allow their citizens living outside the country to vote in the European elections.

Some EU countries require voters to pre-register with their national electoral authorities to be eligible to vote from abroad. Several EU countries (such as Bulgaria, Greece and Italy) grant the right to vote only to their citizens living in another EU country. In addition, most EU countries make special arrangements for diplomats and military personnel serving overseas. For some countries’ citizens (for instance Denmark), voting at embassies takes place prior to election day.

Voting in the country of residence

EU citizens living in an EU country of which they are not nationals have a right to vote in the European Parliament elections in the country where they live, under the same conditions as nationals. Special rules may apply in countries where non-nationals make up more than 20 % of the total electorate.

One citizen = one vote

Double voting in European elections (in the country of residence and in the country of citizenship) is strictly forbidden and subject to penalties. EU countries are required to exchange information at least six weeks before European elections to prevent double voting.

For further details, please refer to the national authorities organising the elections in your country.

Continue to put your questions to the Citizens’ Enquiries Unit (Ask EP)! We reply in the EU language that you use to write to us.

Further information

• Be heard: European elections, European Parliament.
• 2019 European elections: National rules, European Parliamentary Research Service, 2018.
• Your Europe: European elections, European Union.

© artjazz / Fotolia

The European Parliament regularly receives enquiries from citizens about how to stand as a candidate in the European elections.

The conditions people must meet to stand as a candidate in the European elections are set out both by national legislation, and by European legislation, with certain common rules applicable in all EU countries.

Under the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, citizens of a European Union country have the right to vote and to stand as candidates in elections to the European Parliament and in municipal elections in the Member State where they live, under the same conditions as nationals of that State. The detailed arrangements for exercising this right are laid down in 1993 legislation, amended in 2012 (see Article 10).

Nationals of another EU country must be resident in the EU country where they wish to stand as a candidate and comply with the same conditions as set out for nationals. No person may stand as a candidate in more than one EU Member State at the same election.

For specific countries’ electoral procedures, please refer to the national authorities organising the elections in the country where you live.

Continue to put your questions to the Citizens’ Enquiries Unit (Ask EP)! We reply in the EU language that you use to write to us.

Further information

• 2019 European elections: National rules, European Parliamentary Research Service, 2018.
• Your Europe: European elections, European Union.

Written by Joanna Apap,

© Andrew Kazmierski / Fotolia

At the 72nd United Nations (UN) General Assembly on 18 September 2017, 120 countries expressed their commitment to the reforms proposed by UN Secretary-General António Guterres. Since 1946, the UN has undergone a number of reforms either in whole or in part. The term ‘reform’ has proved troublesome for UN member states on account of its lack of clarity and the lack of consensus as to execution. This is particularly apparent in the scepticism expressed by the United States (US) in 2018 regarding the need for global governance, the importance of UN Security Council decisions such as the Iran nuclear deal, and the efficiency of the United Nations.

This briefing explains how the current reform differs from previous ones, in as much as it focuses on management and addresses the criticisms of a lack of accountability and transparency, ineffectiveness, and the deficit in trust between the organisation and its member states in the current system. The United Nations reform agenda centres on three key areas: development, management, and peace and security. First, development reform will bring a bold change to the UN development system in order to achieve the goals of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. This will be centred on the creation of a new generation of country teams led by an independent team of UN country experts (‘resident coordinators’). Second, the simplification of processes, increased transparency and improved delivery of mandates will form the basis of a new management paradigm for the secretariat. Third, peace and security reform will be underpinned by placing priority on conflict prevention and peacekeeping, increasing the effectiveness and coherence of peacekeeping operations and political missions.

Two years after its launch, the reform process is starting to bear fruit, with implementation set to begin in 2019 and a focus on streamlining, accountability, transparency and efficiency. However, the reform process does not make explicit mention of bolstering human rights. This briefing also explores the possibility of capitalising on the current reforms so as to boost the indivisibility of human rights, while taking stock of stakeholders’ reactions to the UN reforms under way.

Read the complete briefing on ‘United Nations reform‘ on the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Ionel Zamfir,

© congres.ecpm.org

The European Union is strongly opposed to the death penalty in all circumstances, and fighting it is a foremost priority of its external human rights policy. While most countries in the world have abolished capital punishment, death sentences continue to be handed down and carried out in a number of countries. The Union uses its diplomatic and political weight to encourage these countries to join the abolitionist ranks, or at the very least to respect international minimum standards. It funds campaigns to increase awareness of the need to end capital punishment, and restricts trade in substances that could be used for executions.

The controversy around capital punishment

In history, the death penalty was applied across the world, in various cultures and religions, for the most serious crimes such as murder, and sometimes also for more trivial ones. For more than two centuries, it has been a matter of vivid philosophical and ethical controversy whether it should be preserved or abolished. Arguments have focused on delivering appropriate retribution and deterring other criminals, among other things. After the end of the Second World War, the abolitionist movement gained momentum, driven by increased public awareness about the value of life and the right to life, the dignity of human beings, the risk of judicial errors and the fact that execution involves torture. A milestone was reached with the adoption by the Council of Europe in 1982 of Protocol No 6 to the European Convention on Human Rights – the first legally binding instrument abolishing the death penalty in peacetime. This protocol has been ratified by 46 of the Council of Europe’s 47 member states; all but Russia. A few years later, in 1989, the first international document aiming at worldwide abolition was adopted by the UN: the Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. To date, it has been ratified by 86 states.

Executions per country in 2017

Today, the abolitionist position has prevailed worldwide, with most countries being abolitionist (106 countries for all crimes, plus 8 for ordinary crimes only, as of July 2018). The latest countries to abolish the penalty, in 2017-2018, were Burkina Faso and Guatemala (for ordinary crimes only), and Guinea and Mongolia (for all crimes). In 2018, the Roman Catholic Church decided that the death penalty is inadmissible under all circumstances. A number of countries are considered ‘abolitionist in practice’ (28 according to Amnesty International, but the number could be higher depending on how this is defined). Around 56 states still retain the penalty, but fewer than half of those actually carry out executions (23 in 2016 and 2017). The trend towards abolition is not linear. In the United States, support for capital punishment is growing again, after a sharp decline from 1996 to 2016, with 54 % of persons surveyed in favour in 2018. In India, capital punishment has recently been extended to certain types of rape after a series of cases that shocked public opinion across the country and in the wider world.

European Union position

All EU Member States have abolished the death penalty. They are bound by the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), particularly its Article 2, which states that ‘Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law’, and by its Protocols No 6 and No 13. The European Union is required by its Treaties to respect and promote human rights in all its internal and external policies. The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights echoes the ECHR in underlining the inalienable right to life in its Article 2. The EU institutions are obliged to take this into account, both in internal and external policies.

To this end, the EU pursues the abolition of the death penalty in the world as a matter of the utmost priority. The EU Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy (2015-2019) includes an objective (No 15) on combatting torture, ill-treatment and the death penalty. In order to streamline all its efforts to fight the death penalty across the world, the Council adopted EU guidelines on death penalty in 1998. These were the first human rights guidelines ever adopted by the Council. They were subsequently updated in 2001, 2008 and 2013. The first point of the guidelines states that, ‘The European Union has a strong and unequivocal opposition to the death penalty in all times and in all circumstances.’ The guidelines set out a list of actions the EU should undertake, such as raising the issue of the death penalty in EU dialogues and consultations with third countries, intervening in legal proceedings on a case-by-case basis (as amicus curiae, or otherwise), encouraging states to ratify the relevant international texts, providing assistance to civil society to promote abolition, and providing assistance in the legal field to enhance the right to a fair and impartial trial. According to these guidelines, in countries that still retain the death penalty, the EU should advocate the establishment of a moratorium, and if this is not possible, for its increasingly restrictive use and for the respect of minimum standards, in line with international law.

In its trade policy, the EU has adopted legislation that prohibits trade in goods that can be used for torture or execution. Such goods include barbiturate agents, used in lethal injections for the execution of human beings. The EU ban caused a shortage of lethal injection materials and considerable hurdles for executions in the United States. The EU contributed to the launch in 2017 of a new global alliance, whose aim is to ban trade in goods that can be used for torture or executions. The Alliance for Torture-Free Trade is an initiative of Argentina, the European Union and Mongolia, bringing together countries from around the world to end the trade in goods used for capital punishment and torture.

The EU also uses its trade policy to encourage countries to comply with their international human rights obligations. The GSP+ system provides trade preferences to countries that ratify and comply with a range of international conventions, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which outlines minimum standards on the use of the death penalty. The 2018 European Commission GSP+ report on Pakistan for example highlighted that the application of the death penalty there remains a grave concern.

The EU is the largest donor in the fight against the death penalty worldwide. According to the Commission, from 2008 to 2016, the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) allocated more than €22 million to projects supporting the fight against the death penalty around the world. The instrument funds civil society organisations that advocate abolition and the establishment of moratoria and, where the death penalty still exists, the observance of international minimum standards.

The EU raises its opposition to the death penalty in international fora, where it aims to build alliances to this end. It has supported the adoption in the UN General Assembly of several resolutions on a moratorium on the use of the death penalty (the last one in December 2018, with the support of 121 nations).

European Parliament position

The European Parliament is strongly opposed to the death penalty, a position it has expressed repeatedly in various resolutions, for example in its December 2018 resolution on the annual EU report on human rights and democracy in the world in 2017. In its 2015 resolution on the death penalty, the Parliament expressed its strong opposition to this type of punishment, and condemned its use to suppress opposition, or on grounds of religious belief, homosexuality or adultery. It also expressed its conviction that death sentences fail to deter drug trafficking or to prevent individuals from falling victim to drug abuse. It has also addressed the death penalty in debates and resolutions on individual countries such as on the death penalty in Indonesia (2015) and on executions in Kuwait and Bahrain (2017).

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘The death penalty and the EU’s fight against it‘ on the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.