Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

This year, 2023, offers political momentum for strengthening the global climate finance architecture under and outside the United Nations climate change regime. In November 2022, the 27th Conference of the Parties (COP27) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) marked a breakthrough on loss and damage with an agreement for establishing new funding arrangements, including a fund. Parties also recognized the need for rethinking development finance and endorsed a plea to reform multilateral development banks (MDBs). In addition, parties to the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement are currently negotiating a new collective quantified goal on climate finance, which is to be agreed by 2024. Japan, holding the 2023 Group of Seven (G7) presidency, carries a key responsibility for initiating relevant processes to revive the climate finance agenda together with the G7 partner countries. As the G7 countries are the main providers of adaptation finance, as well as the major shareholders having voting power to enable reforms of the MDBs, the G7 Hiroshima Summit must catalyze a debate for a systemic transformation and chart a long-term strategic outlook for the G7 states as global leaders on climate action. This policy brief makes three proposals to that end: (i) strengthen multilateral funding under the United Nations climate change regime; (ii) reinforce efforts to balance climate finance flows; and (iii) push for reforming the MDBs to strengthen their role and effectiveness in providing finance for adaptation and loss and damage.

This year, 2023, offers political momentum for strengthening the global climate finance architecture under and outside the United Nations climate change regime. In November 2022, the 27th Conference of the Parties (COP27) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) marked a breakthrough on loss and damage with an agreement for establishing new funding arrangements, including a fund. Parties also recognized the need for rethinking development finance and endorsed a plea to reform multilateral development banks (MDBs). In addition, parties to the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement are currently negotiating a new collective quantified goal on climate finance, which is to be agreed by 2024. Japan, holding the 2023 Group of Seven (G7) presidency, carries a key responsibility for initiating relevant processes to revive the climate finance agenda together with the G7 partner countries. As the G7 countries are the main providers of adaptation finance, as well as the major shareholders having voting power to enable reforms of the MDBs, the G7 Hiroshima Summit must catalyze a debate for a systemic transformation and chart a long-term strategic outlook for the G7 states as global leaders on climate action. This policy brief makes three proposals to that end: (i) strengthen multilateral funding under the United Nations climate change regime; (ii) reinforce efforts to balance climate finance flows; and (iii) push for reforming the MDBs to strengthen their role and effectiveness in providing finance for adaptation and loss and damage.

This year, 2023, offers political momentum for strengthening the global climate finance architecture under and outside the United Nations climate change regime. In November 2022, the 27th Conference of the Parties (COP27) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) marked a breakthrough on loss and damage with an agreement for establishing new funding arrangements, including a fund. Parties also recognized the need for rethinking development finance and endorsed a plea to reform multilateral development banks (MDBs). In addition, parties to the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement are currently negotiating a new collective quantified goal on climate finance, which is to be agreed by 2024. Japan, holding the 2023 Group of Seven (G7) presidency, carries a key responsibility for initiating relevant processes to revive the climate finance agenda together with the G7 partner countries. As the G7 countries are the main providers of adaptation finance, as well as the major shareholders having voting power to enable reforms of the MDBs, the G7 Hiroshima Summit must catalyze a debate for a systemic transformation and chart a long-term strategic outlook for the G7 states as global leaders on climate action. This policy brief makes three proposals to that end: (i) strengthen multilateral funding under the United Nations climate change regime; (ii) reinforce efforts to balance climate finance flows; and (iii) push for reforming the MDBs to strengthen their role and effectiveness in providing finance for adaptation and loss and damage.

As the number of refugees has continued to grow in post-independence Africa, host governments across the continent have developed stringent refugee policies that are detached from historical transborder relationships in which refugees and host communities interact. The stringent policies are underpinned by the assumption that host communities view refugees from the state-centric perspective of non-citizens as undesirable foreigners or outsiders. Host governments’ insistence that the solution lies in refugees eventually repatriating to their countries of origin drives refugee policies that undermine solutions instead of building and capitalizing on solutions generated at the level of host communities. The exclusion of local histories and social dynamics in host regions has led to policies that neither hold up to humanitarian standards nor serve their intended non-integration objectives. Some host governments are reluctant to implement local integration and have maintained exclusionary policies for a long period of time when the realities in the host communities show that refugees are included and participate in various community activities. Host governments perpetuate this disjuncture between policy and local practice by assuming or pretending that refugees will wait for repatriation instead of finding solutions in the host countries where some of them have lived for decades. Contrary to the non-integration objectives of official encampment policies and scholarship that assumes that the absence of official integration policies deters integration, many refugees have defied the stereotypical portrayal of refugees as “bare life” which denotes prioritization of mere survival as opposed to the quality of life. They have managed to find solutions and live their lives as active and productive members of their host countries. This article specifically addresses the situation of Somali refugees in Ethiopia and Kenya. It argues that the absence of local integration policies or reluctance by host governments to implement them where they exist does not automatically mean that refugees are unable to integrate in their host countries. Host government policies against integration are mediated by refugees’ self-initiative and resourcefulness.

As the number of refugees has continued to grow in post-independence Africa, host governments across the continent have developed stringent refugee policies that are detached from historical transborder relationships in which refugees and host communities interact. The stringent policies are underpinned by the assumption that host communities view refugees from the state-centric perspective of non-citizens as undesirable foreigners or outsiders. Host governments’ insistence that the solution lies in refugees eventually repatriating to their countries of origin drives refugee policies that undermine solutions instead of building and capitalizing on solutions generated at the level of host communities. The exclusion of local histories and social dynamics in host regions has led to policies that neither hold up to humanitarian standards nor serve their intended non-integration objectives. Some host governments are reluctant to implement local integration and have maintained exclusionary policies for a long period of time when the realities in the host communities show that refugees are included and participate in various community activities. Host governments perpetuate this disjuncture between policy and local practice by assuming or pretending that refugees will wait for repatriation instead of finding solutions in the host countries where some of them have lived for decades. Contrary to the non-integration objectives of official encampment policies and scholarship that assumes that the absence of official integration policies deters integration, many refugees have defied the stereotypical portrayal of refugees as “bare life” which denotes prioritization of mere survival as opposed to the quality of life. They have managed to find solutions and live their lives as active and productive members of their host countries. This article specifically addresses the situation of Somali refugees in Ethiopia and Kenya. It argues that the absence of local integration policies or reluctance by host governments to implement them where they exist does not automatically mean that refugees are unable to integrate in their host countries. Host government policies against integration are mediated by refugees’ self-initiative and resourcefulness.

As the number of refugees has continued to grow in post-independence Africa, host governments across the continent have developed stringent refugee policies that are detached from historical transborder relationships in which refugees and host communities interact. The stringent policies are underpinned by the assumption that host communities view refugees from the state-centric perspective of non-citizens as undesirable foreigners or outsiders. Host governments’ insistence that the solution lies in refugees eventually repatriating to their countries of origin drives refugee policies that undermine solutions instead of building and capitalizing on solutions generated at the level of host communities. The exclusion of local histories and social dynamics in host regions has led to policies that neither hold up to humanitarian standards nor serve their intended non-integration objectives. Some host governments are reluctant to implement local integration and have maintained exclusionary policies for a long period of time when the realities in the host communities show that refugees are included and participate in various community activities. Host governments perpetuate this disjuncture between policy and local practice by assuming or pretending that refugees will wait for repatriation instead of finding solutions in the host countries where some of them have lived for decades. Contrary to the non-integration objectives of official encampment policies and scholarship that assumes that the absence of official integration policies deters integration, many refugees have defied the stereotypical portrayal of refugees as “bare life” which denotes prioritization of mere survival as opposed to the quality of life. They have managed to find solutions and live their lives as active and productive members of their host countries. This article specifically addresses the situation of Somali refugees in Ethiopia and Kenya. It argues that the absence of local integration policies or reluctance by host governments to implement them where they exist does not automatically mean that refugees are unable to integrate in their host countries. Host government policies against integration are mediated by refugees’ self-initiative and resourcefulness.

Green hydrogen – produced with renewable energy – is indispensable for the decarbonisation of economies, especially concerning “hard-to-abate” activities such as the production of steel, cement and fertilisers as well as maritime transport and aviation. The demand for green hydrogen is therefore booming. Currently, green hydrogen is far more expensive than fossil fuel-based alternatives, but major initiatives are underway to develop a global green hydrogen market and bring costs down. Green hydrogen is expected to become cost-competitive in the mid-2030s.
Given their endowment with solar and wind energy, many countries in the Global South are well-positioned to produce low-cost green hydrogen and are therefore attracting investments. Whether and to what extent these investments will create value and employment for – and improve environmental conditions in – the host economies depends on policies. This discussion paper analyses the potential industrial development spillovers of green hydrogen production, distinguishing seven clusters of upstream and downstream industries that might receive a stimulus from green hydrogen. Yet, it also underlines that there is no automatism. Unless accompanied by industrial and innovation policies, and unless there are explicit provisions for using revenues for a Just Transition, hydrogen investments may lead to the formation of socially exclusive enclaves.
The paper consists of two parts. Part A provides basic information on the emerging green hydrogen market and its technological ramifications, the opportunities for countries with abundant resources for renewable energy, how national policies can maximise the effects in terms of sustainable national development and how this can be supported by international cooperation. Part B delves into the specific case of South Africa, which is one of the countries that has an advanced hydrogen roadmap and hosts several German and international development projects. The country case shows how a national hydrogen strategy can be tailored to specific country conditions and how international cooperation can support its design and implementation.

Green hydrogen – produced with renewable energy – is indispensable for the decarbonisation of economies, especially concerning “hard-to-abate” activities such as the production of steel, cement and fertilisers as well as maritime transport and aviation. The demand for green hydrogen is therefore booming. Currently, green hydrogen is far more expensive than fossil fuel-based alternatives, but major initiatives are underway to develop a global green hydrogen market and bring costs down. Green hydrogen is expected to become cost-competitive in the mid-2030s.
Given their endowment with solar and wind energy, many countries in the Global South are well-positioned to produce low-cost green hydrogen and are therefore attracting investments. Whether and to what extent these investments will create value and employment for – and improve environmental conditions in – the host economies depends on policies. This discussion paper analyses the potential industrial development spillovers of green hydrogen production, distinguishing seven clusters of upstream and downstream industries that might receive a stimulus from green hydrogen. Yet, it also underlines that there is no automatism. Unless accompanied by industrial and innovation policies, and unless there are explicit provisions for using revenues for a Just Transition, hydrogen investments may lead to the formation of socially exclusive enclaves.
The paper consists of two parts. Part A provides basic information on the emerging green hydrogen market and its technological ramifications, the opportunities for countries with abundant resources for renewable energy, how national policies can maximise the effects in terms of sustainable national development and how this can be supported by international cooperation. Part B delves into the specific case of South Africa, which is one of the countries that has an advanced hydrogen roadmap and hosts several German and international development projects. The country case shows how a national hydrogen strategy can be tailored to specific country conditions and how international cooperation can support its design and implementation.

Green hydrogen – produced with renewable energy – is indispensable for the decarbonisation of economies, especially concerning “hard-to-abate” activities such as the production of steel, cement and fertilisers as well as maritime transport and aviation. The demand for green hydrogen is therefore booming. Currently, green hydrogen is far more expensive than fossil fuel-based alternatives, but major initiatives are underway to develop a global green hydrogen market and bring costs down. Green hydrogen is expected to become cost-competitive in the mid-2030s.
Given their endowment with solar and wind energy, many countries in the Global South are well-positioned to produce low-cost green hydrogen and are therefore attracting investments. Whether and to what extent these investments will create value and employment for – and improve environmental conditions in – the host economies depends on policies. This discussion paper analyses the potential industrial development spillovers of green hydrogen production, distinguishing seven clusters of upstream and downstream industries that might receive a stimulus from green hydrogen. Yet, it also underlines that there is no automatism. Unless accompanied by industrial and innovation policies, and unless there are explicit provisions for using revenues for a Just Transition, hydrogen investments may lead to the formation of socially exclusive enclaves.
The paper consists of two parts. Part A provides basic information on the emerging green hydrogen market and its technological ramifications, the opportunities for countries with abundant resources for renewable energy, how national policies can maximise the effects in terms of sustainable national development and how this can be supported by international cooperation. Part B delves into the specific case of South Africa, which is one of the countries that has an advanced hydrogen roadmap and hosts several German and international development projects. The country case shows how a national hydrogen strategy can be tailored to specific country conditions and how international cooperation can support its design and implementation.

This paper proposes the establishment of an “Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform for Water Sustainability (ISPWAS)” to undertake a science-based global water assessment to forge a new relationship between science and policy-making. Thus it would bring evidence-based knowledge and rigorous analysis to policy-making sustainably addressing increasingly complex interconnected water challenges across sectors and bridge the growing science-policy gap that exists in many  countries. ISPWAS would share world-class, science-based, solution-oriented knowledge to support Member States in their decision and innovative policy-making that underpins and addresses the complexities of sustainably managing water  resources. It would help to identify and address the severe deficiencies in human capacity and water governance that hinder effective water management. ISPWAS would undertake the global assessment implemented through national entities with an intergovernmental validation mechanism. Governments need to base their policy and decision-making on sound scientific evidence. The widening science-policy gap must be closed to ensure that policies and regulations are more relevant and based on state-of-the-art science. ISPWAS would assist Member States in improving their knowledge of available tools and information for tackling water issues and their use in policy-making. It would facilitate coordination and exchanges among water-related efforts within  and between countries and aid Member States in monitoring national or global initiatives. Finally, ISPWAS would help to position water issues at the forefront of global sustainability agendas and processes. In short, it would significantly transform  water management and potentially be a major “game-changer” for accelerating implementation of Agenda 2030 and beyond.

This paper proposes the establishment of an “Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform for Water Sustainability (ISPWAS)” to undertake a science-based global water assessment to forge a new relationship between science and policy-making. Thus it would bring evidence-based knowledge and rigorous analysis to policy-making sustainably addressing increasingly complex interconnected water challenges across sectors and bridge the growing science-policy gap that exists in many  countries. ISPWAS would share world-class, science-based, solution-oriented knowledge to support Member States in their decision and innovative policy-making that underpins and addresses the complexities of sustainably managing water  resources. It would help to identify and address the severe deficiencies in human capacity and water governance that hinder effective water management. ISPWAS would undertake the global assessment implemented through national entities with an intergovernmental validation mechanism. Governments need to base their policy and decision-making on sound scientific evidence. The widening science-policy gap must be closed to ensure that policies and regulations are more relevant and based on state-of-the-art science. ISPWAS would assist Member States in improving their knowledge of available tools and information for tackling water issues and their use in policy-making. It would facilitate coordination and exchanges among water-related efforts within  and between countries and aid Member States in monitoring national or global initiatives. Finally, ISPWAS would help to position water issues at the forefront of global sustainability agendas and processes. In short, it would significantly transform  water management and potentially be a major “game-changer” for accelerating implementation of Agenda 2030 and beyond.

This paper proposes the establishment of an “Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform for Water Sustainability (ISPWAS)” to undertake a science-based global water assessment to forge a new relationship between science and policy-making. Thus it would bring evidence-based knowledge and rigorous analysis to policy-making sustainably addressing increasingly complex interconnected water challenges across sectors and bridge the growing science-policy gap that exists in many  countries. ISPWAS would share world-class, science-based, solution-oriented knowledge to support Member States in their decision and innovative policy-making that underpins and addresses the complexities of sustainably managing water  resources. It would help to identify and address the severe deficiencies in human capacity and water governance that hinder effective water management. ISPWAS would undertake the global assessment implemented through national entities with an intergovernmental validation mechanism. Governments need to base their policy and decision-making on sound scientific evidence. The widening science-policy gap must be closed to ensure that policies and regulations are more relevant and based on state-of-the-art science. ISPWAS would assist Member States in improving their knowledge of available tools and information for tackling water issues and their use in policy-making. It would facilitate coordination and exchanges among water-related efforts within  and between countries and aid Member States in monitoring national or global initiatives. Finally, ISPWAS would help to position water issues at the forefront of global sustainability agendas and processes. In short, it would significantly transform  water management and potentially be a major “game-changer” for accelerating implementation of Agenda 2030 and beyond.

Die Weltbank hat einen längst überfälligen Reformprozess eingeleitet. Angesichts erheblicher Finanzierungslücken bei der Verwirklichung der Ziele für nachhaltige Entwicklung (SDGs) und des Pariser Abkommens haben Akteur*innen weltweit eine rasche und umfassende Reform der internationalen Finanzarchitektur gefordert. Das ist essentiell, damit das Finanzsystem zur Lösung der vielfältigen Krisen des 21. Jahrhunderts beitragen kann. Forderungen für Reformen finden sich beispielsweise im Independent Review of Multilateral Development Banks Capital Adequacy Frameworks (2022) der G20, in der Bridgetown-Initiative 2022 und in Erklärungen führender Entscheidungsträger*innen, darunter der Premierministerin von Barbados, Mia Mottley, und der deutschen Entwicklungsministerin Svenja Schulze.

Die kürzlich von der Weltbank veröffentlichte Evolution Roadmap ist ein positiver Schritt in die richtige Richtung. Zwar sind die Pläne der Bank für eine erweiterte Mission – mit neuem Schwerpunkt auf Resilienz und Nachhaltigkeit – zu begrüßen, sie bedürfen jedoch einer erheblichen Aufstockung ihrer Finanzierungskapazitäten. Auf der Frühjahrstagung 2023 (10.–16. April) sind die Anteilseigner der Weltbank dabei allerdings nicht viel weitergekommen.

Die Reform der Weltbank zielt maßgeblich darauf ab, der Finanzierung von Lösungen für globale Herausforderungen Priorität einzuräumen. Bisher hat sich die Bank vor allem auf die Unterstützung einzelner Länder konzentriert und weniger auf globale, grenzüberschreitende öffentliche Güter, wie der Reduzierung von Kohlenstoffemissionen, der Pandemievorsorge oder dem Schutz der Regenwälder. Im Rahmen der Evolution Roadmap könnte die Bank nationalen Regierungen zusätzliche und billigere Darlehen anbieten, um Anreize für die Bereitstellung solcher globalen öffentlichen Güter zu schaffen und so über den traditionellen Schwerpunkt auf Armutsbekämpfung hinauszugehen.

Die erweiterte Mission der Bank ist ein hehres Ziel, das jedoch einer massiven Aufstockung der Mittel bedarf. Im Wesentlichen gibt es drei Wege, die Handlungsfähigkeit der Bank zu stärken: eine Kapitalerhöhung durch die Anteilseigner, eine bessere Hebelwirkung der Weltbank-Bilanzen und die Mobilisierung von Privatkapital. Zwar haben sich die Anteilseigner auf der Frühjahrstagung nicht zu einer Kapitalerhöhung verpflichtet, allerdings stimmten sie einer Senkung des Verhältnisses zwischen Eigenkapital und Krediten von 20 Prozent auf 19 Prozent zu. Dieses Verhältnis gibt an, wie viele Schulden die Weltbank im Verhältnis zum Wert ihrer Aktiva aufnehmen kann. Dieser Schritt und andere damit zusammenhängende Änderungen bei der Verwendung des Bankkapitals werden die Finanzkraft der Bank in den nächsten zehn Jahren voraussichtlich um bis zu 50 Mrd. USD erhöhen.

Dieser Betrag ist jedoch weitaus geringer als für die Umsetzung der ambitionierten Reformagenda der Bank erforderlich wäre. In einem Bericht von 2022 schätzen die Ökonom*innen Vera Songwe und Nicholas Stern, dass die Entwicklungsländer bis 2030 jährlich 1 Billion US-Dollar an externer Infrastrukturfinanzierung benötigen, um ihre Emissionen im Einklang mit dem 1,5°C-Ziel zu reduzieren. Folglich wird die Finanzierung der Reformagenda der Weltbank stark vom dritten Weg abhängen: der Mobilisierung von Privatkapital.

Eine solche Konzentration auf privates Kapital birgt jedoch Risiken. Bisherige Erfahrungen haben gezeigt, dass Mischfinanzierungen, d. h. der strategische Einsatz öffentlicher Entwicklungsfinanzierung zur Mobilisierung zusätzlicher Privatmittel, mit jährlichen Beträgen von durchschnittlich gerade einmal 10,7 Mrd. USD für den Zeitraum 2011–2022 nur schwer in Gang kommt. Daher ist die Strategie der Weltbank vorrangig einem bisher weitgehend erfolglosen Ansatz zu folgen äußerst riskant. Darüber hinaus ist bei Mischfinanzierungen immer zwischen privater Rendite und öffentlichem Nutzen abzuwägen. Ein verstärkter Rückgriff auf Mischfinanzierungen ohne erweiterte Transparenzmechanismen, die sicherstellen, dass die versprochenen Wirkungen für nachhaltige Entwicklung und globale öffentliche Güter tatsächlich eintreten, kann die Fähigkeit der Bank untergraben, ihre erweiterte Mission zu erfüllen.

Es ist besorgniserregend, dass die Weltbank nicht mit einer überzeugenden Strategie zur Erhöhung ihrer Finanzierungskapazitäten aufwartet. Knappe konzessionäre Mittel sollten nicht von der Armutsbekämpfung auf die Bereitstellung globaler öffentlicher Güter umgelenkt werden. Wachstum und Armutsbekämpfung sind bereits durch die COVID-19-Pandemie, die wachsende Schuldenkrise und die dem russischen Angriff auf die Ukraine geschuldete Krise der Lebenshaltungskosten ins Stocken geraten. Darüber hinaus besteht die Gefahr, dass die Weltbank ihren geografischen Schwerpunkt von Ländern mit niedrigem Einkommen (LIC) auf Länder mit mittlerem Einkommen (MIC) verlagert, sollte sie ihre Mission um die Bereitstellung globaler öffentlicher Güter erweitern. Das Nachsehen hätten dann womöglich ärmere Länder.

Zusammenfassend erklärt die Weltbank in ihrer Roadmap zu Recht, dass „die konzessionäre Finanzierung für MICs ein zusätzlicher Posten sein sollte, um die dringendsten globalen Herausforderungen zu bewältigen, jedoch nicht zulasten ärmerer Länder gehen darf“. Um diese Verpflichtung einzuhalten, sind jedoch erhebliche Kapitalerhöhungen seitens der Anteilseigner sowie weitreichende Entscheidungen für eine verbesserte Hebelwirkung der Bankbilanzen erforderlich.

Die Weltbank hat einen längst überfälligen Reformprozess eingeleitet. Angesichts erheblicher Finanzierungslücken bei der Verwirklichung der Ziele für nachhaltige Entwicklung (SDGs) und des Pariser Abkommens haben Akteur*innen weltweit eine rasche und umfassende Reform der internationalen Finanzarchitektur gefordert. Das ist essentiell, damit das Finanzsystem zur Lösung der vielfältigen Krisen des 21. Jahrhunderts beitragen kann. Forderungen für Reformen finden sich beispielsweise im Independent Review of Multilateral Development Banks Capital Adequacy Frameworks (2022) der G20, in der Bridgetown-Initiative 2022 und in Erklärungen führender Entscheidungsträger*innen, darunter der Premierministerin von Barbados, Mia Mottley, und der deutschen Entwicklungsministerin Svenja Schulze.

Die kürzlich von der Weltbank veröffentlichte Evolution Roadmap ist ein positiver Schritt in die richtige Richtung. Zwar sind die Pläne der Bank für eine erweiterte Mission – mit neuem Schwerpunkt auf Resilienz und Nachhaltigkeit – zu begrüßen, sie bedürfen jedoch einer erheblichen Aufstockung ihrer Finanzierungskapazitäten. Auf der Frühjahrstagung 2023 (10.–16. April) sind die Anteilseigner der Weltbank dabei allerdings nicht viel weitergekommen.

Die Reform der Weltbank zielt maßgeblich darauf ab, der Finanzierung von Lösungen für globale Herausforderungen Priorität einzuräumen. Bisher hat sich die Bank vor allem auf die Unterstützung einzelner Länder konzentriert und weniger auf globale, grenzüberschreitende öffentliche Güter, wie der Reduzierung von Kohlenstoffemissionen, der Pandemievorsorge oder dem Schutz der Regenwälder. Im Rahmen der Evolution Roadmap könnte die Bank nationalen Regierungen zusätzliche und billigere Darlehen anbieten, um Anreize für die Bereitstellung solcher globalen öffentlichen Güter zu schaffen und so über den traditionellen Schwerpunkt auf Armutsbekämpfung hinauszugehen.

Die erweiterte Mission der Bank ist ein hehres Ziel, das jedoch einer massiven Aufstockung der Mittel bedarf. Im Wesentlichen gibt es drei Wege, die Handlungsfähigkeit der Bank zu stärken: eine Kapitalerhöhung durch die Anteilseigner, eine bessere Hebelwirkung der Weltbank-Bilanzen und die Mobilisierung von Privatkapital. Zwar haben sich die Anteilseigner auf der Frühjahrstagung nicht zu einer Kapitalerhöhung verpflichtet, allerdings stimmten sie einer Senkung des Verhältnisses zwischen Eigenkapital und Krediten von 20 Prozent auf 19 Prozent zu. Dieses Verhältnis gibt an, wie viele Schulden die Weltbank im Verhältnis zum Wert ihrer Aktiva aufnehmen kann. Dieser Schritt und andere damit zusammenhängende Änderungen bei der Verwendung des Bankkapitals werden die Finanzkraft der Bank in den nächsten zehn Jahren voraussichtlich um bis zu 50 Mrd. USD erhöhen.

Dieser Betrag ist jedoch weitaus geringer als für die Umsetzung der ambitionierten Reformagenda der Bank erforderlich wäre. In einem Bericht von 2022 schätzen die Ökonom*innen Vera Songwe und Nicholas Stern, dass die Entwicklungsländer bis 2030 jährlich 1 Billion US-Dollar an externer Infrastrukturfinanzierung benötigen, um ihre Emissionen im Einklang mit dem 1,5°C-Ziel zu reduzieren. Folglich wird die Finanzierung der Reformagenda der Weltbank stark vom dritten Weg abhängen: der Mobilisierung von Privatkapital.

Eine solche Konzentration auf privates Kapital birgt jedoch Risiken. Bisherige Erfahrungen haben gezeigt, dass Mischfinanzierungen, d. h. der strategische Einsatz öffentlicher Entwicklungsfinanzierung zur Mobilisierung zusätzlicher Privatmittel, mit jährlichen Beträgen von durchschnittlich gerade einmal 10,7 Mrd. USD für den Zeitraum 2011–2022 nur schwer in Gang kommt. Daher ist die Strategie der Weltbank vorrangig einem bisher weitgehend erfolglosen Ansatz zu folgen äußerst riskant. Darüber hinaus ist bei Mischfinanzierungen immer zwischen privater Rendite und öffentlichem Nutzen abzuwägen. Ein verstärkter Rückgriff auf Mischfinanzierungen ohne erweiterte Transparenzmechanismen, die sicherstellen, dass die versprochenen Wirkungen für nachhaltige Entwicklung und globale öffentliche Güter tatsächlich eintreten, kann die Fähigkeit der Bank untergraben, ihre erweiterte Mission zu erfüllen.

Es ist besorgniserregend, dass die Weltbank nicht mit einer überzeugenden Strategie zur Erhöhung ihrer Finanzierungskapazitäten aufwartet. Knappe konzessionäre Mittel sollten nicht von der Armutsbekämpfung auf die Bereitstellung globaler öffentlicher Güter umgelenkt werden. Wachstum und Armutsbekämpfung sind bereits durch die COVID-19-Pandemie, die wachsende Schuldenkrise und die dem russischen Angriff auf die Ukraine geschuldete Krise der Lebenshaltungskosten ins Stocken geraten. Darüber hinaus besteht die Gefahr, dass die Weltbank ihren geografischen Schwerpunkt von Ländern mit niedrigem Einkommen (LIC) auf Länder mit mittlerem Einkommen (MIC) verlagert, sollte sie ihre Mission um die Bereitstellung globaler öffentlicher Güter erweitern. Das Nachsehen hätten dann womöglich ärmere Länder.

Zusammenfassend erklärt die Weltbank in ihrer Roadmap zu Recht, dass „die konzessionäre Finanzierung für MICs ein zusätzlicher Posten sein sollte, um die dringendsten globalen Herausforderungen zu bewältigen, jedoch nicht zulasten ärmerer Länder gehen darf“. Um diese Verpflichtung einzuhalten, sind jedoch erhebliche Kapitalerhöhungen seitens der Anteilseigner sowie weitreichende Entscheidungen für eine verbesserte Hebelwirkung der Bankbilanzen erforderlich.

Die Weltbank hat einen längst überfälligen Reformprozess eingeleitet. Angesichts erheblicher Finanzierungslücken bei der Verwirklichung der Ziele für nachhaltige Entwicklung (SDGs) und des Pariser Abkommens haben Akteur*innen weltweit eine rasche und umfassende Reform der internationalen Finanzarchitektur gefordert. Das ist essentiell, damit das Finanzsystem zur Lösung der vielfältigen Krisen des 21. Jahrhunderts beitragen kann. Forderungen für Reformen finden sich beispielsweise im Independent Review of Multilateral Development Banks Capital Adequacy Frameworks (2022) der G20, in der Bridgetown-Initiative 2022 und in Erklärungen führender Entscheidungsträger*innen, darunter der Premierministerin von Barbados, Mia Mottley, und der deutschen Entwicklungsministerin Svenja Schulze.

Die kürzlich von der Weltbank veröffentlichte Evolution Roadmap ist ein positiver Schritt in die richtige Richtung. Zwar sind die Pläne der Bank für eine erweiterte Mission – mit neuem Schwerpunkt auf Resilienz und Nachhaltigkeit – zu begrüßen, sie bedürfen jedoch einer erheblichen Aufstockung ihrer Finanzierungskapazitäten. Auf der Frühjahrstagung 2023 (10.–16. April) sind die Anteilseigner der Weltbank dabei allerdings nicht viel weitergekommen.

Die Reform der Weltbank zielt maßgeblich darauf ab, der Finanzierung von Lösungen für globale Herausforderungen Priorität einzuräumen. Bisher hat sich die Bank vor allem auf die Unterstützung einzelner Länder konzentriert und weniger auf globale, grenzüberschreitende öffentliche Güter, wie der Reduzierung von Kohlenstoffemissionen, der Pandemievorsorge oder dem Schutz der Regenwälder. Im Rahmen der Evolution Roadmap könnte die Bank nationalen Regierungen zusätzliche und billigere Darlehen anbieten, um Anreize für die Bereitstellung solcher globalen öffentlichen Güter zu schaffen und so über den traditionellen Schwerpunkt auf Armutsbekämpfung hinauszugehen.

Die erweiterte Mission der Bank ist ein hehres Ziel, das jedoch einer massiven Aufstockung der Mittel bedarf. Im Wesentlichen gibt es drei Wege, die Handlungsfähigkeit der Bank zu stärken: eine Kapitalerhöhung durch die Anteilseigner, eine bessere Hebelwirkung der Weltbank-Bilanzen und die Mobilisierung von Privatkapital. Zwar haben sich die Anteilseigner auf der Frühjahrstagung nicht zu einer Kapitalerhöhung verpflichtet, allerdings stimmten sie einer Senkung des Verhältnisses zwischen Eigenkapital und Krediten von 20 Prozent auf 19 Prozent zu. Dieses Verhältnis gibt an, wie viele Schulden die Weltbank im Verhältnis zum Wert ihrer Aktiva aufnehmen kann. Dieser Schritt und andere damit zusammenhängende Änderungen bei der Verwendung des Bankkapitals werden die Finanzkraft der Bank in den nächsten zehn Jahren voraussichtlich um bis zu 50 Mrd. USD erhöhen.

Dieser Betrag ist jedoch weitaus geringer als für die Umsetzung der ambitionierten Reformagenda der Bank erforderlich wäre. In einem Bericht von 2022 schätzen die Ökonom*innen Vera Songwe und Nicholas Stern, dass die Entwicklungsländer bis 2030 jährlich 1 Billion US-Dollar an externer Infrastrukturfinanzierung benötigen, um ihre Emissionen im Einklang mit dem 1,5°C-Ziel zu reduzieren. Folglich wird die Finanzierung der Reformagenda der Weltbank stark vom dritten Weg abhängen: der Mobilisierung von Privatkapital.

Eine solche Konzentration auf privates Kapital birgt jedoch Risiken. Bisherige Erfahrungen haben gezeigt, dass Mischfinanzierungen, d. h. der strategische Einsatz öffentlicher Entwicklungsfinanzierung zur Mobilisierung zusätzlicher Privatmittel, mit jährlichen Beträgen von durchschnittlich gerade einmal 10,7 Mrd. USD für den Zeitraum 2011–2022 nur schwer in Gang kommt. Daher ist die Strategie der Weltbank vorrangig einem bisher weitgehend erfolglosen Ansatz zu folgen äußerst riskant. Darüber hinaus ist bei Mischfinanzierungen immer zwischen privater Rendite und öffentlichem Nutzen abzuwägen. Ein verstärkter Rückgriff auf Mischfinanzierungen ohne erweiterte Transparenzmechanismen, die sicherstellen, dass die versprochenen Wirkungen für nachhaltige Entwicklung und globale öffentliche Güter tatsächlich eintreten, kann die Fähigkeit der Bank untergraben, ihre erweiterte Mission zu erfüllen.

Es ist besorgniserregend, dass die Weltbank nicht mit einer überzeugenden Strategie zur Erhöhung ihrer Finanzierungskapazitäten aufwartet. Knappe konzessionäre Mittel sollten nicht von der Armutsbekämpfung auf die Bereitstellung globaler öffentlicher Güter umgelenkt werden. Wachstum und Armutsbekämpfung sind bereits durch die COVID-19-Pandemie, die wachsende Schuldenkrise und die dem russischen Angriff auf die Ukraine geschuldete Krise der Lebenshaltungskosten ins Stocken geraten. Darüber hinaus besteht die Gefahr, dass die Weltbank ihren geografischen Schwerpunkt von Ländern mit niedrigem Einkommen (LIC) auf Länder mit mittlerem Einkommen (MIC) verlagert, sollte sie ihre Mission um die Bereitstellung globaler öffentlicher Güter erweitern. Das Nachsehen hätten dann womöglich ärmere Länder.

Zusammenfassend erklärt die Weltbank in ihrer Roadmap zu Recht, dass „die konzessionäre Finanzierung für MICs ein zusätzlicher Posten sein sollte, um die dringendsten globalen Herausforderungen zu bewältigen, jedoch nicht zulasten ärmerer Länder gehen darf“. Um diese Verpflichtung einzuhalten, sind jedoch erhebliche Kapitalerhöhungen seitens der Anteilseigner sowie weitreichende Entscheidungen für eine verbesserte Hebelwirkung der Bankbilanzen erforderlich.

Bund, Kommunen und Gewerkschaften haben sich auf einen neuen Tarifvertrag für den öffentlichen Dienst geeinigt. Dazu eine Einschätzung von Marcel Fratzscher, Präsident des Deutschen Instituts für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW Berlin):

Die Tarifeinigung im öffentlichen Dienst ist eine Notlösung, die kurzfristig zwar den Arbeitskampf beendet, die grundlegenden Probleme jedoch nicht löst. Die Einigung bedeutet durchschnittliche Lohnerhöhungen von rund elf Prozent. Positiv ist, dass Menschen mit geringen Löhnen prozentual sogar ein höheres Lohnplus bekommen – sie erfahren im Alltag allerdings auch eine deutlich höhere Inflation als Menschen mit hohen Löhnen. 

Dennoch bedeutet dieser Tarifabschluss einen Kaufkraft- und Wohlstandsverlust für die Beschäftigten. Denn nach einer Inflationsrate von rund sieben Prozent im Jahr 2022, voraussichtlich sechs Prozent im Jahr 2023 und wohl noch einmal etwa drei Prozent im Jahr 2024 werden die Löhne im öffentlichen Dienst am Ende der Laufzeit rund sechs Prozent weniger Kaufkraft haben. Dies bedeutet, dass es wohl mindestens noch weitere fünf Jahre dauern wird, bis die Löhne im öffentlichen Dienst den Kaufkraftverlust aufgeholt und die Beschäftigten den Wohlstand haben, den sie 2021 hatten. Ich erwarte daher auch in den kommenden Jahren eine deutliche Zunahme der Arbeitskämpfe in Deutschland, auch im öffentlichen Dienst.

Für die Kommunen bedeuten die Mehrkosten von 17 Milliarden Euro eine massive finanzielle Belastung, die zu weiteren Einschränkungen der Daseinsfürsorge führen wird. Nicht erst seit dieser Krise, sondern seit mehr als 20 Jahren sind knapp ein Drittel der Kommunen in Deutschland überschuldet und nicht in der Lage, die Daseinsfürsorge ausreichend zu gewährleisten. Die Investitionslücke bei den Kommunen belief sich bereits vor dieser Krise auf 160 Milliarden Euro. Die Krise der Kommunen wird sich so lange weiter verschärfen, bis die Politik eine dringend notwendige Reform des Bund-Länder-Finanzausgleichs, eine bessere finanzielle Ausstattung und eine Entschuldung der Kommunen umsetzt. Die Gelder des Staates sind vorhanden: Der Staat ist der große Gewinner dieser Inflation, denn bei Bund und Ländern sprudeln die Steuereinnahmen. Allerdings hat vor allem der Bund durch die Steuerentlastung im Zuge des Abbaus der kalten Progression einen großen Teil dieser Gelder lieber an Besserverdienende zurückgegeben.

Meine Erwartung ist, dass ohne Reformen der Tarifabschluss die Lage für alle Beteiligten verschlechtern wird – Beschäftigte im öffentlichen Dienst müssen den Gürtel enger schnallen, die Fachkräftelücke wird sich vergrößern und die Daseinsfürsorge vor allem der Kommunen wird sich weiter verschlechtern.

Event Video 
Photos

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Forced marriage is a distinct form of conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV) used strategically by armed groups. Although recent rulings at the International Criminal Court (ICC), such as the case of The Prosecutor v. Dominic Ongwen, have built precedent for charging and convicting non-state armed groups with forced marriage as a distinct form of crime against humanity, policymakers and practitioners have more work to do to prevent and address the long-term impacts of forced marriage. Forced marriage not only directly affects forced wives (and their children) but also harms entire communities. Forced marriage can lead to cycles of violence and have negative repercussions on human security, including livelihoods, education, and health in communities.

IPI and UN Women cohosted a policy forum on April 19th to discuss the forms and impacts of forced marriage and provide key recommendations for policymakers and practitioners to address gaps, broaden perceptions, and disrupt binaries. This event launched a novel dataset documenting the use of forced marriage by non-state armed groups by IPI’s Head of Women, Peace and Security Program Phoebe Donnelly and PhD Candidate in Political Science at Duke University Emily Myers.

Pauline Brosch of UN Women provided a policy perspective and touched on strategies that the international community can take to better address forced marriage and other forms of conflict-related sexual violence. Teddy Atim of the Feinstein International Center, a practitioner and researcher of humanitarian emergencies and post-conflict settings, drew on examples of recovery from forced marriage in Northern Uganda to highlight multiplier effects, such as the likelihood of conflict-related sexual violence survivors experiencing ongoing violations in return communities.

The event aimed to help member states and UN officials align policies related to conflict-related sexual violence, like forced marriage, with the data and realities on the ground. Survivors must always have a seat at the table: “We can only address the root cause of forced marriage and other forms of conflict-related sexual violence if we involve survivors,” emphasized Victoria Nyanjura founder of Women in Action for Women and survivor of forced marriage.

In light of the discussions at the event, it is clear that there is a need for increased capacity and accountability. Forced marriage is a chronic feature of the political economy of war and takes place in contexts where rule of law has collapsed due to protracted conflict and instability, affirmed Alejandro Sánchez of the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict.

The launch event took place a day before the conference entitled “Catalyzing Change: Ongwen, Sexual and Gender-Based Crimes, and Intersectional Feminist Practice in International Criminal Justice.” This conference, hosted by the Cardozo Law Institute in Holocaust and Human Rights, in partnership with UN Women and others, analyzed the impact of the ICC case The Prosecutor v. Dominic Ongwen on the treatment of forced marriage (and other sexual and gender-based crimes) in international law. Panelists at this conference included civil society and legal experts from Uganda, who were able to connect with key stakeholders in the UN community at IPI’s event.

Opening Remarks:
Jenna Russo, Director of Research and Head of the Center for Peace Operations, International Peace Institute

Speakers:
Phoebe Donnelly, Senior Fellow and Head of Women, Peace, and Security Program, International Peace Institute
Emily Myers, PhD Candidate in Political Science at Duke University and National Science Foundation Graduate Research Fellow (virtual)
Teddy Atim, Visiting Fellow at the Feinstein International Center, Tufts University
Pauline Brosch, Policy Analyst, Peace and Security, UN Women
Victoria Nyanjura, Founder, Women in Action for Women (WAW)
Alejandro Sánchez, Deputy Team Leader, Programmes and Communications, Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict

Moderator:
Jenna Russo, Director of Research and Head of the Center for Peace Operations, International Peace Institute

Responsible consumption and production are key to sustainable development, and are therefore a Sustainable Development Goal (SDG 12) in their own right. Consumption and production patterns also need to be socially responsible and economically viable. Private-sector requirements and state supply chain regulations, which have become more widespread in recent years, are designed to ensure that products consumed in high-income countries but manufactured (at least partially) in low-income countries are produced in line with certain social and environmental standards. Although progress has been made, many questions remain, particularly regarding whether the local social and economic impacts are sufficient.
Cotton made in Africa (CmiA) is a certification initiative within the textile industry. Established 18 years ago as part of one of the largest public-private partnerships of German Development Cooperation with private foundations and private companies around an agriculture-based supply chain, CmiA – like its sister scheme the Better Cotton Initiative (BCI) – seeks to ensure compliance with specific environmental and social conditions in the cotton production process. Wherever it is implemented and monitored, the CmiA-standard provides retailers and consumers with the assurance that the cotton in the textiles and garments in question has been produced in line with CmiA-requirements. Up to now, about one million smallholder households with six to seven million family members in Africa produce under the label. This Policy Brief reflects on the impact that the introduction of CmiA has had on certified farmers, as well as on the challenges facing this standard following its successful market launch, and draws broader lessons learned for sustainability standards. The key findings are as follows:
• CmiA shows that sustainability standards do not only work for high-priced niche markets but can also be implemented in the mass market.
• While cotton is a non-food cash crop, the revenues it generates can boost food security among smallholders via the income channel and can also promote local food production through a number of other impact channels.
• Standard-setting must be accompanied by support for farmers so that they are able to comply and activate impact channels. It remains a huge challenge not only to guarantee social and ecological standards but also to achieve a “living income” for smallholder farmers.
• For all the benefits of publicly funding the start-up phase of implementing sustainability standards, it must be ensured that these standards are subsequently financed from the value chain itself. Textile retailers and consumers ultimately have to pay for the goods they consume and which have been manufactured under sustainable conditions.
• As the mass-market implementation of sustainability standards takes time and patience, we cannot expect to see dramatic improvements in the local living conditions and incomes of the farmers in the short to medium term. Instead, this will require continuous investment in smallholder production and in the local environments over many years.
• Transitioning from pesticide-intensive production to a system that does not use such products without major productivity losses is challenging but seems feasible.
• In order to determine whether, and to what extent, the wellbeing of smallholder farmers is increased by complying with sustainability standards, good and continuous impact assessment is needed and this must be adapted to the especially complex conditions of African smallholder agriculture.

Responsible consumption and production are key to sustainable development, and are therefore a Sustainable Development Goal (SDG 12) in their own right. Consumption and production patterns also need to be socially responsible and economically viable. Private-sector requirements and state supply chain regulations, which have become more widespread in recent years, are designed to ensure that products consumed in high-income countries but manufactured (at least partially) in low-income countries are produced in line with certain social and environmental standards. Although progress has been made, many questions remain, particularly regarding whether the local social and economic impacts are sufficient.
Cotton made in Africa (CmiA) is a certification initiative within the textile industry. Established 18 years ago as part of one of the largest public-private partnerships of German Development Cooperation with private foundations and private companies around an agriculture-based supply chain, CmiA – like its sister scheme the Better Cotton Initiative (BCI) – seeks to ensure compliance with specific environmental and social conditions in the cotton production process. Wherever it is implemented and monitored, the CmiA-standard provides retailers and consumers with the assurance that the cotton in the textiles and garments in question has been produced in line with CmiA-requirements. Up to now, about one million smallholder households with six to seven million family members in Africa produce under the label. This Policy Brief reflects on the impact that the introduction of CmiA has had on certified farmers, as well as on the challenges facing this standard following its successful market launch, and draws broader lessons learned for sustainability standards. The key findings are as follows:
• CmiA shows that sustainability standards do not only work for high-priced niche markets but can also be implemented in the mass market.
• While cotton is a non-food cash crop, the revenues it generates can boost food security among smallholders via the income channel and can also promote local food production through a number of other impact channels.
• Standard-setting must be accompanied by support for farmers so that they are able to comply and activate impact channels. It remains a huge challenge not only to guarantee social and ecological standards but also to achieve a “living income” for smallholder farmers.
• For all the benefits of publicly funding the start-up phase of implementing sustainability standards, it must be ensured that these standards are subsequently financed from the value chain itself. Textile retailers and consumers ultimately have to pay for the goods they consume and which have been manufactured under sustainable conditions.
• As the mass-market implementation of sustainability standards takes time and patience, we cannot expect to see dramatic improvements in the local living conditions and incomes of the farmers in the short to medium term. Instead, this will require continuous investment in smallholder production and in the local environments over many years.
• Transitioning from pesticide-intensive production to a system that does not use such products without major productivity losses is challenging but seems feasible.
• In order to determine whether, and to what extent, the wellbeing of smallholder farmers is increased by complying with sustainability standards, good and continuous impact assessment is needed and this must be adapted to the especially complex conditions of African smallholder agriculture.