Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

Figure 1. Past and current parallel forces around the world (Click for full graphic)

Figure 2. Timeline of parallel force and their type (Click for full graphic)

Since the end of the Cold War, the UN Security Council has authorized or recognized the deployment of more than forty parallel forces that operate alongside UN peace operations. As the Security Council has deployed peace operations in increasingly non-permissive environments, the division of labor between UN missions and these parallel forces has blurred, and their goals have sometimes come into conflict. This raises the question of whether they are partners or competitors.

This report examines the missions that have operated in parallel to UN peace operations to identify how to strengthen these partnerships in the future. It analyzes and categorizes the types of parallel forces that have been deployed and examines the rationales for deploying them. It also looks at strategic and operational challenges, including the challenges unique to peace operations operating alongside a counterterrorism force. Finally, drawing on lessons from past and current parallel deployments, it offers recommendations for member states, the Security Council, and the UN Secretariat. These include:

• Strengthening coordination of assessments, planning, and application of UN standards: The UN and actors deploying parallel forces should conduct joint assessments and planning when deploying or reconfiguring missions. The UN Security Council should also engage more regularly with parallel forces and encourage the continued development of human rights compliance frameworks for them.
• Clarifying roles, responsibilities, and areas of operation: Peace operations and parallel forces should clearly delineate their responsibilities and areas of operation, assess the risks of collocating, and improve strategic communications with the local population. The Security Council should also continue to put in place mechanisms to strengthen the accountability of parallel forces, especially when peace operations are providing support that could contribute to counterterrorism operations.

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The United Nations agendas for Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) and for Protection of Civilians (POC) both deal with protecting vulnerable populations. The comparison of these two agendas and opportunities to enhance protection were the focus of a November 1st IPI-Canada roundtable discussion, held under the Chatham House rule of non-attribution.

Discussants expressed concern that protection of women from sexual violence has been prioritized over other forms of gendered violence, such as female genital mutilation, child marriage, sexual violence against men and LGBTQ communities, trafficking, and domestic violence. One reason, agreed participants, is that gender-based violence is chronically underfunded. In addition, women are often appointed as gender experts solely because of their sex.

The experts lamented the fact that women tend to be seen only as victims of violence and not as agents of protection from violence. To overcome this barrier, speakers highlighted the need for more female uniformed and civilian personnel on the ground in peacekeeping missions with POC mandates and involved in developing POC strategy. Even so, they noted, women’s participation is often treated with a tokenistic, “tick the box” approach.

In order to insure that peacekeeping missions better and more safely engage communities, especially with women, participants agreed that accountability measures in peacekeeping should be strengthened, and that it was necessary to embrace a wider understanding of “protection.” One way to do this, they said, was to frame accountability around the UN Sustainable Development Goals, since UN member state governments have made public commitments to concrete goals and indicators and to carry out certain gender-sensitive measures of protection.

To truly mainstream these concepts, discussants suggested it would be useful to conduct local analysis in conflict communities and examine intercommunal conflicts. Speakers said that the strategic integration points of the WPS and POC agendas were climate change, gender-based violence, and sexual and reproductive health and rights.

The second session of the workshop focused on research questions. Participants pointed out that gender considerations are often an afterthought in peace operations, and explored ways to implement POC that do not reinforce the stereotype of women as victims. They pointed out programs that have been working well and recommended monitoring and scaling up these efforts.

One question that arose was whether domestic violence should be addressed in POC mandates. Discussants argued that intimate partner violence is not unrelated to conflict, and that it must be included in gender-based violence analysis and action. However, doubts were raised as to whether military and police personnel, who are the primary actors in peacekeeping, were the right people to address this intimate type of violence.

Finally, participants discussed how best to incorporate male victims in protection peacekeeping mandates and pointed out that because of patriarchal systems of power, the threats men and boys face are under-reported and protection of men and boys receives less attention. Discussants highlighted the fact that “gender” is not specific to women and that to say, “we need more women in peace operations to carry out the WPS agenda” takes the onus off of men to implement the WPS agenda and reinforces the stereotype of women as victims and men as perpetrators of violence.

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IPI President Terje Rød-Larsen was received on October 29th by His Majesty King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa at Sakhir Palace, who welcomed advanced cooperation between the Kingdom of Bahrain and IPI. Mr. Rød-Larsen was accompanied by IPI Chief of Staff Camilla Reksten-Monsen, IPI MENA Director Nejib Friji, and IPI MENA Policy Analyst Dalya Al Alawi.

On October 30th, Mr. Rød-Larsen was received by the Bahrain Speaker of Parliament Fawzia Zainal. Parliament Members (MP) Mohammed Essa Al-Abbasi, Chairman of the Committee on Legislative and Legal Affairs, MP Ahmed Sabah Al-Salloum President of the Committee on Financial and Economic Affairs, and MP Ali Mohamed Ishaqi Member of the Financial and Economic Affairs Committee were in attendance.

Deputy Prime Minister H.H. Shaikh Ali bin Khalifa Al Khalifa received Mr. Rød-Larsen on October 30th to discuss IPI’s pivotal role in supporting multilateralism and efforts in strengthening the pillars of security and stability.

Interior Minister General Shaikh Rashid bin Abdulla Al Khalifa received Mr. Rød-Larsen on October 30th and spoke on forms of cooperation to reinforce international peace and security. Public Security Chief Major General Tariq Al Hassan was also in attendance.

Mr. Rød-Larsen had a meeting with Foreign Minister Shaikh Khalid bin Ahmed Al Khalifa on October 30th, where they spoke on IPI’s role in reinforcing coexistence and sustainable peace in the MENA region and beyond.

H.H. Sheikh Faisal bin Rashid Al Khalifa, Vice President of the Supreme Council for Environment (SCE) received Mr. Rød-Larsen on October 27th. The meeting delved into SCE-IPI partnership on sustainable development with a focus on water challenges in the MENA region and beyond.

H.E. Shaikh Mohammed bin Khalifa bin Ahmed Al Khalifa, Minister of Oil met with Mr. Rød-Larsen on October 27th to discuss mutual cooperation and partnerships on sustainable development in the region with a focus on clean energy.

On the same day, Mr. Rød-Larsen had a meeting with Electricity and Water Affairs Minister Wael bin Nasser Al Mubarak, where efforts to sustain the availability of electricity and maintain economic growth in line with Bahrain’s 2030 Economic vision was discussed.

Related coverage:
Bahrain TV 7pm News on October 29 (coverage between 6:42-7:47)

Event Video: 
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The international community’s role in supporting women as vital stakeholders in an inclusive and enduring peace in Afghanistan was the subject of an October 30th IPI policy forum cosponsored by Cordaid, the Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security, and the NYU Center for Global Affairs.

Rina Amiri, Senior Fellow at the NYU center and longtime expert on peace and reconciliation in Afghanistan, said that while the world’s weariness with the ongoing Afghan war was speeding up people’s eagerness to come up with a way to end it, it was also resulting in concessions being made on earlier promises of inclusion. “Women’s rights and inclusion has moved from an absolute priority of the international community to something that is relegated just to inter-Afghan talks,” she said.

In light of this, she asked, “What are the arguments that we need to make that we’re not making, how can we move from lip service to genuine commitment, what are the ways that we should be thinking about inclusion and process design?”

IPI Senior Fellow Sarah Taylor spoke of a disturbing discordance between the pledges of UN member states to the women, peace and security agenda that she heard voiced in the Security Council debate on the subject the day before and the reality that women are still being kept from positions of power and influence 19 years after the passage of the landmark resolution 1325. She alluded to the example of the work done in Sudan by women “putting their bodies on the line, breaking curfews, braving tear gas yet still excluded from the discussions that determine the future of their communities.”

Storai Tapesh, Deputy Executive Director, Afghan Women’s Network, said that recent peace negotiations between the Taliban and the United States in the Qatari capital Doha allowed for more women’s participation than in past talks but still did not attract the necessary support from the international community. “We saw the added value of women during the recent dialogues in Doha,” she said. “It was us, the women of Afghanistan, who were putting important issues on the table. As opposed to the men, we were not negotiating out of a position of self-interest but pushing the real issues such as human rights, the red lines of the constitution and the need for an immediate ceasefire.”

Though those talks have now stalled, Ms. Tapesh said the women of Afghanistan are still “very much committed” to them and want to see them resumed and “facilitated” by the international community. Clarifying the kind of support they needed, she said, “Afghan women do not want you to fight our battles; we need support for our voices and space to advocate for peace.”

Testifying to the importance of women’s inclusion to the sustainability of peace processes, Karen Pierce, Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom to the United Nations, said, “You cannot actually build a truly prosperous society that enables any country to realize its full potential if you exclude some 50% of the population from the economic and legal life of the country, never mind the social. More than half of all peace processes collapse within five years if they don’t have sustainable provisions, and those sustainable provisions have been shown in well-documented evidence to include gender and women’s provisions.”

Ambassador Pierce was asked by the discussion moderator, Jake Sherman, director of IPI’s Brian Urquhart Center for Peace Operations, about how to balance the push for women’s rights with the overall push for a peace accord without one jeopardizing the other. “You must have some very robust clauses about human rights and women’s rights, but I don’t know if in a negotiation with an informal organization such as the Taliban, it is good to go in loudly with your red lines,” she said. Instead, she explained, “the point at which you ask for the things you really need is at the end when peace is in sight.” Signaling the critical nature of this sequencing, she warned, “When we sacrifice the long term goal for short term expediency, we end up regretting that quickly and find ourselves back at the table negotiating peace again.”

Ms. Pierce acknowledged that it was particularly difficult to introduce the subject of women’s rights into conversations with the Taliban, a group notorious for its overt sexism and violence against women. “But the fact that is a difficult argument isn’t an argument for not making it,” she said. She added that those who counsel taking up the subject only “at the pace that the Taliban want” are ignoring evidence of women’s rights having been brought into the process successfully with tact, good timing and persistence. “You do it incrementally, you do it gradually, but above all, you do it steadily, don’t go backward.”

Mahbouba Seraj, a member of the Afghan Women’s Network, urged the international community to adopt a principled position on Afghanistan without regard to pleasing one side or the other. “Do not worry about the Taliban or Trump, but take a stance because if you don’t do that and stay on the basis of being wishy washy with the Taliban, then they are going to take advantage of that.”

Teresa Whitfield, Director, Policy and Mediation Division, UN Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, said that actions to include women in peace processes had to go beyond the numbers. “We need to normalize the process that women have substantive contributions in peace processes and not just that there are two women at the table,” she said. She asserted that obtaining respect for Afghan women’s rights would require a “creative” approach, given the nature of the Taliban. “The Taliban doesn’t include women in leadership so we cannot recruit and include them through their political or military power,” she said. Among the alternatives from her office’s experience that she suggested were advisory boards, gender subcommittees, women lawyers, broad consultations with civil society, online platforms, and social media information sharing.

In conclusion, Ms. Whitfield stressed, “The absolutely fundamental need for those of us who represent the international community and are on the outside of conflicts is to put in the legwork, the analysis, the research, the knowledge, and always focus on harnessing international forces. The demand for Afghan women’s rights comes from Afghan women, and that’s what needs to be represented in some shape or form at the table in the peace process.”

Zusammenfassung:

Das Konjunkturbarometer des Deutschen Instituts für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW Berlin) ist im Oktober im Vergleich zum Vormonat leicht gestiegen und liegt nun bei gut 90 Punkten. Zwar dürfte das Bruttoinlandsprodukt in Deutschland im dritten Quartal gegenüber den vorangegangenen drei Monaten erneut gesunken sein (um 0,2 Prozent). Im laufenden vierten Quartal wird es aber wohl zumindest nicht weiter bergab gehen. Die Wirtschaftsleistung dürfte dann in etwa stagnieren.

An assertive Chinese foreign policy poses challenges for Danish and European interests both in faraway seas in Asia, but also increasingly at home, where China’s strategic and commercial interests mix within European borders.

The death of ISIS-leader al-Baghdadi isn´t necessarily the grand victory it’s been presented as. The actual effects hinge on the reaction inside the ISIS-hierarchy - and the Sunni population’s future stance towards the group

Zusammenfassung:

Studie von ForscherInnen des DIW Berlin und ZEW Mannheim auf Basis von Befragung Geflüchteter – Kitas erleichtern Eltern die Integration, insbesondere Müttern – Nach Deutschland geflüchtete Familien sollten frühzeitig über mit Kita-Besuch verbundene Chancen informiert und genügend Kita-Plätze bereitgestellt werden

Besucht ein Kind aus einer nach Deutschland geflüchteten Familie hierzulande eine Kindertageseinrichtung (Kita), ist vor allem die Mutter deutlich besser in die Gesellschaft integriert. Unter anderem spricht und versteht sie besser Deutsch, hat eine höhere Arbeitsmarktorientierung und vermisst ihr Heimatland weniger. Unter dem Strich sind Mütter mit Kita-Kindern – gemessen an einem Gesamtindex für die Integration – um 42 Prozent besser integriert als nach Deutschland geflüchtete Mütter, deren Kind nicht in einer Kita betreut wird. Das haben ForscherInnen des Deutschen Instituts für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW Berlin) und des ZEW – Leibniz-Zentrums für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung  in Mannheim erstmals auf Basis eines repräsentativen Datensatzes belegt. Dafür werteten C. Katharina Spieß und Ludovica Gambaro vom DIW Berlin und Guido Neidhöfer vom ZEW Daten der IAB-BAMF-SOEP-Befragung von nach Deutschland Geflüchteten aus den Jahren 2016 und 2017 aus.

Minda Holm presents research from the project World of the Right

Figure 1. The AMISOM model (Click for full graphic)

Figure 2. AMISOM’s force generation challenges (Click for full graphic)

Deployed to Mogadishu in March 2007, the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) operates through a complicated and extensive system of partnerships. This has been referred to as the “AMISOM model” of “partnership peacekeeping.” While this specific configuration of forces and mechanisms is unlikely to be repeated, AMISOM remains the longest-standing case of a peace enforcement operation built on such international partnerships.

If the AU and UN are going to continue deploying missions into such difficult environments, AMISOM’s experience offers lessons for how partnership peacekeeping can work better. This report summarizes the main operational-level lessons across seven themes: force generation, logistics, security sector reform, protection of civilians, strategic communications, stabilization, and exit strategy. Many of these lessons have not been truly learned, internalized, and acted upon by the actors and organizations in question.

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The UN Security Council adopted the landmark resolution 1325 on women, peace, and security (WPS) in 2000 and since then, the international community has made notable strides toward implementing the WPS agenda through member state commitments. However, in recent years, the world has witnessed backsliding on these commitments and a backlash against robust attempts at women’s inclusion and gender parity.

On October 29th, experts on WPS gathered at an IPI roundtable to launch and discuss the findings of a new report from Gender Action for Peace and Security (GAPS), “The 10 Steps: Turning Women, Peace and Security Commitments to Implementation.” The report includes recommendations for action on women, peace, and security as the 20th anniversary of resolution 1325 approaches.

The “10 Steps” report is the product of consultations with over 200 organizations in conflict-affected states. It recommends precise and actionable steps for realizing the WPS agenda, with a particular focus on the role of civil society. GAPS and its partners found that commitments on Women, Peace and Security are “vast and comprehensive,” but that “in practice this has not translated into the inclusion of gender perspectives and women and girls’ rights in policy and programming.”

Participants began the discussion by addressing the current state of the WPS agenda, especially noting the regression on gender parity and women’s inclusion in formal peace processes. Despite considerable progress on women’s inclusion in peacekeeping, discussants lamented that “it has been easier to get women into military, police, and peacekeeping forces on the ground than to get women into negotiating rooms.”

When women are excluded from peace processes, it was noted, the resulting peace agreements include few or no gender provisions. Accordingly, the WPS agenda has aimed to improve gender inclusion in peace negotiations in order to strengthen the outcomes of such processes. Initially, some progress was made. Before resolution 1325, only 11% of peace agreements made any references to women and gender, but in the following 14 years, this number went up to 27%. However, since 2014, the number has dramatically decreased.

Some participants called for women’s increased “meaningful participation” in the face of such discouraging statistics, but others stressed that the term “meaningful participation” is itself far too vague. Suggestions included making calls for “consequential participation,” or even “feminist participation.” Irrespective of the terminology they chose to employ, many agreed that greater women’s participation is greatly needed.

The roundtable then shifted its focus toward ways to engage civil society in implementing the WPS agenda, as the GAPS “10 Steps” report stressed. Participants acknowledged that governments are not the only drivers of the agenda, and civil society continues to play a vital and integrated role in its actualization. Civil society provides insight that guides state action, and it helps governments stay in touch with challenges to implementation on the ground. Moreover, where state action is often slowed by bureaucratic processes and political tensions, civil society helps to push the agenda along and accelerate progress.

When considering what the next steps member states should take on WPS, participants called for action on an array of issues, including the need for gender-conflict analysis, addressing violence against women, and changing social norms around gender.

The work remaining for the international community, participants argued, is ensuring accountability to the commitments outlined in the nine WPS resolutions that have been adopted by the Security Council. Though the agenda is often thought of as a “gender issue” or “security challenge,” it has much broader implications than these characterizations suggest.

“We are all guardians of this incredible WPS agenda,” agreed participants, and its realization will require creativity and widespread action.

From left: Lauri Mälksoo, Professor of International Law, University of Tartu, Estonia; Adam Lupel, IPI Vice President; and Kristi Raik, Director of the Foreign Policy Institute

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In October, Estonia and Finland brought IPI Vice President Adam Lupel to two separate forums to discuss the sometimes challenging but critical role small states play in policymaking and global affairs.

In April 2019, Dr. Lupel and Lauri Mälksoo, Professor of International Law at the University of Tartu in Estonia, published a policy paper entitled, “A Necessary Voice: Small States, International Law, and the UN Security Council.” The paper concluded that small states on the Security Council are well-placed to provide an important, credible voice with moral authority to remind all member states of their obligations under international law.

Dr. Lupel’s first stop was the Estonian Academy of Science in Tallinn on October 29th, where he delivered remarks during a half-day event. “Recent years have witnessed several cases where small states have driven debates on the Security Council defending international law and the rule based order, in particular international humanitarian law,” he said. The event featured Estonian President Kersti Kaljulaid, Foreign Minister Urmas Reinsalu, and State Secretary Taimar Peterkop, along with academics from Columbia University, the Estonian Foreign Policy Institute, and others.

As an example, Dr. Lupel provided this: “In early 2016, the small state of New Zealand (population under 5 million) initiated discussion on a possible Security Council resolution to help reinforce that bedrock of IHL by convening a multi-stakeholder round table at its UN mission. Soon, a draft resolution was being negotiated by five penholders from a diverse range of countries: Egypt, Japan, New Zealand, Spain, and Uruguay. After extensive negotiations, the final resolution served to clearly remind member states that ‘intentionally directed attacks’ on health facilities and medical workers during armed conflict are war crimes.

“From a negotiation standpoint, the resolution was a tremendous success. It was adopted unanimously, with eighty-five member states as co-sponsors—spearheaded by the bridge-building diplomacy of two small states in partnership with others.”

Dr. Lupel then went on to Helsinki, where on October 30th, about 50 participants from a broad cross-section of the diplomatic community attended a Finland launch of the small states paper, where he delivered an expanded version of his Tallinn talk followed by an extensive Q&A session. The event was moderated by Anna Salovaara, Director of the Unit for UN and General Global Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland.

A common refrain in Denmark is that China is too far away to be a threat to Danish economic, foreign and security policy interests. This is no longer the case. Danish policy-makers acknow- ledge that China’s rise as a global superpower presents Denmark with new challenges. However, transforming this strategic thinking into practice is no simple task.

Nineteen years after the adoption of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325, which reaffirmed the important role of women in peace and security, the international community is reflecting on the impact of this commitment and how to fulfill the women, peace, and security (WPS) agenda. IPI’s WPS program hosted a staff meeting with the US State Department’s civil society delegation of African women leaders on October 28th during the week of the Security Council Open Debate on WPS to exchange expertise on what needs to be done in different country contexts to promote peace and security through a gender lens.

IPI Senior Fellow Sarah Taylor described IPI’s research on the status of the Resolution 1325. The women, from 18 countries, also shared reflections on their country situations, and raised particular issues that were specific to each context such as terrorism by Boko Haram or the misinformation that has affected the conflict in Mali.

In attendance from the US State Department’s civil society delegation were women from:

• Burkina Faso
• Burundi
• Cameroon
• Central African Republic
• Congo
• Ghana
• Kenya
• Mali
• Mauritania
• Mauritius
• Mozambique
• Niger
• Nigeria
• Rwanda
• South Sudan
• The Gambia
• Uganda
• Zambia

 

As the twentieth anniversary of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) on women, peace, and security (WPS) approaches, the ad hoc nature of and limited accountability for implementation of the WPS agenda are undermining its full promise. This is despite increasing recognition that efforts to build and sustain peace are dependent upon the full participation of women and respect for their rights. There is thus a need for concerted, strategic commitment to addressing the remaining gaps in implementation of the WPS agenda.

This paper identifies opportunities for the twentieth anniversary of the adoption of Resolution 1325, particularly for the UN Security Council, its member states, and the UN system. It builds on IPI’s scene-setting issue brief “The Global Pushback on Women’s Rights: The State of the Women, Peace, and Security Agenda.” The paper concludes with several steps the UN and the international community can take to support substantive progress on WPS:

• Use creative mechanisms to increase women’s participation: The multilateral system can support new initiatives such as the regional women mediator networks.
• Leverage the tools of the UN Security Council: The council should consistently request gender-sensitive analysis and recommendations, mainstream the WPS agenda across all policies, and better integrate the work of the Informal Expert Group on WPS into its daily work.
• Significantly strengthen accountability: Increasing accountability requires changing the political calculus for engaging on the WPS agenda, particularly at the national level.
• Move the focus to the field: Dialogue around WPS needs to shift from UN headquarters in New York to focus more on the countries and regions grappling with conflict.
• Increase financing: Donors should increase their financial commitments to the WPS agenda and ensure funding supports long-term peacebuilding efforts.

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Bonn, 28.10.2019. Die neue Europäische Kommission nimmt weiter Gestalt an. Das Team um Kommissionspräsidentin Ursula von der Leyen wird jedoch frühestens am 1. Dezember formell seine Tätigkeit aufnehmen. Vier Mitglieder der Kommission werden für die EU-Außenbeziehungen zuständig sein. Diese vier sind Josep Borrell aus Spanien als Hoher Vertreter für die EU-Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik, die Finnin Jutta Urpilainen, Kommissarin für Internationale Partnerschaften, ein (noch zu bestätigender) Kommissar für Europäische Nachbarschaftspolitik und Erweiterung und Janez Lenarčič aus Slowenien für humanitäre Hilfe und Krisenmanagement. Von der Leyen hat angekündigt, dass ihr Team eine „geopolitische“ Kommission mit einer starken strategischen Ausrichtung in der Außenpolitik sein werde. Grundsätzlich ist dies ein begrüßenswerter Ansatz, ist die EU bisher doch für ihre langwierigen und bürokratischen Entscheidungsprozesse bekannt. Es gibt jedoch frühe Hinweise darauf, dass der Ansatz der neuen Kommission gegenüber der internationalen Zusammenarbeit auch stark von Sicherheitsaspekten geprägt sein wird. Das Phänomen der Versicherheitlichung – welches bedeutet, dass einerseits politische Fragen, die keinen vordergründigen Sicherheitsbezug haben, als Sicherheitsfragen behandelt und andererseits Mittel für die Abwehr wahrgenommener Bedrohungen eingesetzt werden, die eigentlich nicht für sicherheitspolitische Zwecke vorgesehen sind – gewinnt in den Außenbeziehungen der EU seit einigen Jahren an Bedeutung. Besonders deutlich wird dies auf dem Gebiet der Migrationspolitik. Narrative, die Migranten und Geflüchtete als Bedrohung für die Sicherheit, den Wohlstand und die Kultur Europas porträtieren, halten sich hartnäckig. Entwicklungshilfegelder werden zur Finanzierung von Initiativen zur Migrationssteuerung eingesetzt, in denen der Zugang zu EU-Mitteln von Grenzkontrollen und der Rücknahme von Flüchtlingen abhängig gemacht wird. Die Mission Letters, in denen von der Leyen die Aufgaben der Kommissare beschreibt, weisen darauf hin, dass sich daran auch in den nächsten fünf Jahren wenig ändern dürfte. Im Schreiben an Borrell wird der Schaffung einer Europäischen Verteidigungsunion eine hohe Priorität eingeräumt; die Rolle der EU als zivile Friedensstifterin, auf die der Hohe Vertreter wesentlich mehr Einfluss nehmen könnte, findet jedoch keine Erwähnung. Im Schreiben an Urpilainen wird diese aufgefordert, die Mittel der Entwicklungshilfe im Zweifelsfall anzupassen, um die Ziele der EU im Bereich der Migrationssteuerung zu erreichen. Dies würde bedeuten, dass die Mittel für Länder gekürzt werden könnten, die in diesem Bereich nicht (ausreichend) kooperieren. Zwei zentrale Vorschläge für den nächsten mehrjährigen Finanzrahmen der EU verstärken den Eindruck, dass sich das Gleichgewicht von zivilem Engagement für den Weltfrieden zugunsten eines ausgesprochen sicherheitslastigen Ansatzes verschiebt. Der erste Vorschlag betrifft die Schaffung der Europäischen Friedensfazilität, eines außerbudgetären EU-Fonds zur Finanzierung der Sicherheitszusammenarbeit mit Partnerregierungen und regionalen Organisationen. Wenn der 10,5 Millionen Euro schwere Fonds genehmigt wird, könnten damit die Bereitstellung von Waffen und Munition durch die EU finanziert werden. Dies würde eine erhebliche Abkehr vom Kerngedanken der EU als Zivilmacht bedeuten. Zweitens sehen die Vorschläge für den nächsten EU-Haushalt die Aufnahme des 2,3-Milliarden-Instruments für Sicherheit und Frieden in das neue Instrument für Nachbarschaft, Entwicklungszusammenarbeit und internationale Zusammenarbeit der EU vor. Diese Maßnahme könnte die Dimension der zivilen Friedensförderung durch die EU weniger sichtbar machen. Unterstützer der EU als globale Stimme für den Frieden können sich trotzdem dafür einsetzen, dass einige Schlüsselfragen auf der Agenda bleiben. Am wichtigsten ist kurzfristig gesehen die Einrichtung strenger Auflagen für die Europäische Friedensfazilität, um die Lieferung von Waffen in autoritäre und instabile Partnerländer zu verhindern. Daneben muss die zivile Dimension der Friedensförderung und Krisenbewältigung durch die EU gestärkt werden. Eine solche Stärkung könnte angestoßen werden durch die Ausarbeitung einer EU-Strategie für Konfliktprävention und Friedensförderung mit einem besonderen Schwerpunkt auf Mediation und ziviler Konfliktbearbeitung. Eine weitere Maßnahme wäre die Einrichtung einer eigenen Ratsarbeitsgruppe für Konfliktprävention und Friedensförderung. Die Verabschiedung eines entsprechenden Beschlusses im Europäischen Parlament im März spricht dafür, dass eine Nachfrage nach diesen Maßnahmen vorhanden ist, wenn der politische Wille unter den Mitgliedstaaten gefunden werden kann. Zu guter Letzt sollten die Prinzipien zur Wirksamkeit der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit eingehalten werden, vor allem im Hinblick auf Eigenverantwortung der Partner, gegenseitige Rechenschaftspflicht und Transparenz, wenn es darum geht, Initiativen zur Migrationssteuerung oder den Kapazitätsaufbau von Sicherheitskräften in den Partnerländern zu finanzieren.

Der Gesellschaftsvertrag ist ein Schlüsselbegriff in der sozialwissenschaftlichen Literatur, der auf die Beziehungen zwischen Staat und Gesellschaft fokussiert. Er bezeichnet die Gesamtheit expliziter oder impliziter Vereinbarungen zwischen allen relevanten gesellschaftlichen Gruppen und dem Souverän (d.h. der Regierung oder einem anderen Machthaber) über wechselseitige Rechte und Pflichten (Loewe & Zintl, forthcoming).
Die Analyse von Gesellschaftsverträgen verdeutlicht u.a. (i) warum einige Gesellschaftsgruppen sozial, politisch oder wirtschaftlich besser gestellt sind als andere, (ii) warum es Revolten und Forderungen nach neuen Gesellschaftsverträgen gibt, (iii) warum also manche Länder in Gewaltkonflikte abgleiten. Zudem zeigt das Konzept, dass externe Akteure die Bezie¬hungen zwischen Staat und Gesellschaft beeinflussen können, indem sie die Regierung oder bestimmte Gesellschafts¬gruppen stärken. Und es verdeutlicht, dass staatliche Fragilität, Flucht und Migration daraus resultieren können, dass Gesellschaftsverträge weniger inklusiv geworden sind.
Trotzdem ist der Begriff Gesellschaftsvertrag bisher weder klar definiert noch operationalisiert worden – zum Nachteil von Forschung und Politik. Ein strukturierter Ansatz zur Analyse der Beziehungen zwischen Staat und Gesellschaft ist überfällig, v.a. im Hinblick auf die MENA-Länder. Im vorliegenden Papier schlagen wir einen Analyserahmen vor, der auf (i) Geltungsbereich, (ii) Inhalt und (iii) zeitliche Dimension von Gesellschaftsverträgen fokussiert.
Nach Erreichen der Unabhängigkeit schlossen die MENA-Regierungen sehr spezifische Gesellschaftsverträge mit ihren Bürgern, die auf der Umverteilung von Renteneinnahmen aus natürlichen Ressourcen, Entwicklungshilfegeldern und anderen Transfers basierten. Sie versorgten die Bürger mit Lebensmittel- und Energiesubventionen, kostenloser Bildung sowie Jobs im öffentlichen Dienst im Gegenzug dafür, dass diese die Legitimität der Regierungen anerkannten, obwohl es fast keine politische Partizipation gab. Aufgrund von wachsender Bevölkerung und sinkenden Staatseinnahmen konnten die Regierungen ihre Aufgaben aber immer weniger erfüllen. Daher konzentrierten sie ihre Ausgaben immer stärker auf strategisch wichtige Gesellschaftsgruppen und machten sie verstärkt von politischer Zustimmung abhängig. Die Aufstände, die sich 2011 in vielen arabischen Ländern ereigneten, können so auch als Ausdruck tiefer Unzufriedenheit mit den damaligen Gesellschaftsverträgen verstanden werden, die keine politische Partizipation, für große Teile der Bevölkerung aber auch kaum noch Sozialleistungen vorsahen.
Seither entwickelten sich die MENA-Länder in verschiedene Richtungen. Tunesien ist auf gutem Weg zu inklusiver Entwicklung und mehr politischer Partizipation. Marokko und Jordanien versuchen, die alten Gesellschaftsverträge – Ressourcenumverteilung ohne nennenswerte Partizipation – wiederherzustellen. Im neuen Gesellschaftsvertrag Ägyptens verspricht die Regierung wenig mehr als individuelle und kollektive Sicherheit, und auch das nur gegen umfassende politische Zustimmung. In Libyen, dem Jemen und Syrien sind Bürgerkriege ausgebrochen, und es besteht keine Aussicht auf einen neuen landesweiten Gesellschaftsvertrag, um den auch der Irak seit 2003 kämpft. Flucht und Migration beeinträchtigen zudem die Gesellschaftsverträge der Nachbarländer Jordanien, Türkei und Libanon.
Alle MENA-Länder entwerfen derzeit neue Gesellschaftsverträge oder sollten dies bald tun, um Stabilisierung bzw. Wiederaufbau zu ermöglichen. Im Folgenden informieren wir über den Stand der konzeptionellen Überlegungen zur Neugestaltung der Gesellschaftsverträge in den MENA-Ländern und deren Bedeutung für die internationale Zusammenarbeit.