Written by Marc Jütten.
President Donald Trump threatens that the US will take back the Panama Canal, a strategic maritime route for global trade, because of perceived Chinese influence in the Canal Zone. In fact, a Hong Kong-based private company owns two of the canal’s five port terminals at strategically important points. The Panama Canal is a key maritime trade route that handles about 40 % of US container traffic and approximately 5 % of world trade.
BackgroundFrom 1904 to 1914, the US completed the building of the Panama Canal. In 1977, President Jimmy Carter and Panamanian military leader Omar Torrijos signed the Neutrality Treaty and the Panama Canal Treaty, referred to as the Torrijos-Carter Treaties, which ended decades of US control over the canal. The agreement guaranteed the canal’s neutrality and passed full sovereignty over the canal to Panama by 31 December 1999. Since then, the Panama Canal has been managed and operated by the Panama Canal Authority (PCA), an agency of the Panamanian government. Over time, various expansion programmes have increased the canal’s traffic handling. The completion of a major expansion in 2016 significantly increased Panama’s revenues and global trade influence, with the works involving a consortium of companies from Spain, Italy and Belgium. In addition, the European Investment Bank (EIB) provided US$500 million, representing 10 % of the project costs and marking the EIB’s largest operation so far in Latin America.
Figure 1 – The Panama Canal © Peter Hermes Furian/Adobe Stock. A global trading hubThe Panama Canal is an artificial 82-kilometre (51-mile) waterway that connects the Atlantic Ocean with the Pacific Ocean (see Figure 1), making it an important trade and logistics hub. By allowing vessels to bypass the southernmost tip of South America, the canal significantly reduces transit times, distances and logistics costs, and is the fastest route for trade between the US east coast and Asia. Overall, the canal connects 180 maritime routes and 1 920 ports worldwide. It generates roughly 4 % of Panama’s GDP, through the tolls paid by vessels using the canal. According to the PCA, the canal handles approximately 5 % of world trade; 40 % of all US container traffic traverses it annually, and more than 70 % of the cargo that goes through the canal originates in or is destined for the US, making the Panama Canal vital to US supply chains. The canal is also a crucial component of US naval strategy, allowing the US Navy to swiftly transfer vessels between the Atlantic and Pacific. China accounted for 21.4 % of the cargo volume transiting the canal, making it the second largest user after the US. Other major users of the waterway include Japan, South Korea and Chile (see Figure 2). From an EU perspective, the third most important trade route, which the Panama Canal connects, is from South America’s west coast to Europe.
The Panama Canal relies on freshwater, which makes it dependent on climate change. In recent years, unprecedented droughts (the El Niño weather phenomenon) have been affecting the water supply from nearby lakes, leading authorities to impose surcharges and weight limits on ships traversing the canal. According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), drought reduced the Panama flows by 5 % in 2023, with economic damage estimated at around 0.5 % of Panama’s GDP for 2024.
Figure 2 – Top countries shipping cargo through the Panama Canal Data source: Panama Canal Statistics. China’s presence in the Panama Canal ZoneA company controlled by CK Hutchison Holdings, a Hong Kong-based private multinational conglomerate corporation, has operated two of the canal’s five port terminals since it won the tender in 1997; their contract was renewed for another 25 years in 2021. The company operates one container terminal at the port of Balboa (on the Pacific side) and another at Cristóbal (on the Atlantic side), which provide access to the Panama Canal Railway. The railway has become increasingly important over the years, among other reasons because of the canal’s chronic lack of water. Because of low water, many large container ships have to offload cargo and transport it by rail to the other end of the canal. The Chinese government lacks any direct institutional channels to influence CK Hutchison’s decision-making. However, experts point out that, if Hutchison were to give preferential treatment to the cargo of Chinese ships, it might have an impact on the supply of goods to the US. According to an announcement made on 4 March 2025, CK Hutchison agreed to sell most of its global ports business, including those on the Panama Canal, to US-led group BlackRock. CK Hutchison stressed that the transaction was purely commercial in nature and unrelated to recent political events. However, in the meantime it has been reported that China’s market regulator said it would carry out an antitrust review of the Panama port deal in accordance with a law to protect fair competition and safeguard the public interest. Consequently, the deal was not signed on 2 April as expected. In addition to the two container terminals, there are other undertakings around the Panama Canal operated by Chinese state-owned companies. In 2024, a new cruise ship terminal was inaugurated, built by a consortium led by China Harbour Engineering Company. The latest project is the construction of the fourth bridge over the Panama Canal, involving a consortium comprising state-owned China Communications Construction Company and China Harbour Engineering Company.
Panama’s sovereign rights under threat?President Trump’s allegations regarding the Panama Canal are two-sided. He accused Panama of charging US ships exorbitant rates to transit the canal and urged free transit for American commercial and military ships. In fact, the PCA charges fees based on the size and type of ships that are using the waterway; rates are uniform, impartial, and non-discriminatory. Panama’s President, Jose Raul Mulino, added that US government vessels, including navy vessels, paid US$6 million a year for the right of passage. The Torrijos-Carter Treaties only granted preferential treatment to vessels from Costa Rica and Colombia. Secondly, Trump claimed that the US would take back the Panama Canal because of Chinese influence in the Canal Zone, which poses a threat and represents a violation of the Torrijos-Carter Treaties. In fact, the Treaties envisage the US having primary responsibility for protecting and defending the canal against armed attacks or other actions which threaten the canal’s security. While Panama rejected US claims threatening Panama’s sovereign rights over the canal, the government has made some concessions, including on migration, the fight against organised crime and security cooperation. Following a visit by US Secretary of State Marco Rubio in February 2025, President Mulino confirmed that Panama would withdraw from China’s Belt and Road Initiative. In addition, Mulino and US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth, during his visit to Panama, issued a joint statement on 8 April that included information about the signature of a memorandum of understanding on enhanced security cooperation. Moreover, Panama and the US would work on a mechanism to compensate for the payment of tolls and charges. However, while the Spanish-language version of the statement, released by Panama, said ‘Hegseth recognised Panama’s leadership and inalienable sovereignty over the Panama Canal’, that line did not appear in the English version released by the Pentagon.
In 2012, the EU and Panama signed the EU-Central America Association Agreement, which establishes a free trade area between the EU and Central America, consisting of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama. In April 2024, the Council adopted a decision to conclude the agreement; this is the final step of the ratification process, which allows for the full implementation of the agreement. The European Parliament gave its consent to the agreement on 11 December 2012. Panama has also established partnerships with the EU under the Global Gateway Investment Agenda.
Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘The Panama Canal: Panama’s sovereign rights under threat?‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.
Rama's supporters are thrilled with his fourth term. But election results are entirely predictable in a well-managed country.
Written by Isabelle Ioannides.
The Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) between the European Union (EU) and the United Kingdom (UK), which entered into force in May 2021, governs the EU’s relationship with the UK, following its withdrawal from the EU. In addition to the European Commission evaluating the implementation of the TCA on an annual basis, Article 776 of the TCA provides for a joint review of the deal’s implementation five years after its entry into force, in 2026.
On 20 November 2024, the European Parliament’s Conference of Presidents approved a joint request from the Committees on Foreign Affairs (AFET) and on International Trade (INTA) to draw up an implementation report in response to the European Commission’s 21 March 2024 report on the implementation and application of the EU-UK TCA.
This briefing seeks to inform the drafting of the joint AFET–INTA implementation report. The briefing provides an analysis of the data on trade flows between the EU and the UK in the last two years (2023 and 2024), in the context of the implementation of the TCA. It should be read in tandem with the European Implementation Assessment on the EU-UK TCA, published by the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) in December 2023, which analyses EU-UK trade flows in the first two years of the TCA’s implementation. That EPRS study was requested by AFET and INTA to inform their 2023 joint implementation report on the same subject.
Similar to the 2023 EPRS study, this briefing concludes that the TCA continues to have a stronger impact on the UK than on the EU in the trade relationship. Trade between the EU and the UK continues to be more complex and challenging compared to when the UK was an EU Member State, even if the implementation of the TCA in the last four years has been generally smooth, with some exceptions. The UK has managed to bounce back from COVID and Brexit less successfully than the EU and has, like the EU-27, been affected by Russia’s war in Ukraine and inflation. EU-UK trade in goods decreased slightly in 2023 and 2024, and it is still below pre-Brexit levels. EU-UK trade in services (the TCA does not cover financial services), continues to be less disrupted, and surpassed pre-COVID‑19 levels as of 2023. At a time of uncertainty on the future direction of trade policy, geopolitical upheaval, and the United States administration’s (potential) new tariffs on imports from its trading partners (including the UK and the EU), the TCA offers an opportunity to deepen EU-UK trade relations.
Read the complete briefing on ‘EU-UK trade flows: Continuities, changes and trends‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.
EU-UK trade in the agri-food sector EU services imports from the UK EU services exports to the UK EU goods imports from the UK EU goods exports to the UK UK share in EU total trade EU-UK trade in goods and services (2010-2024 for goods, 2010-2023 for services) The UK’s top 10 Member State partners in terms of trade in goods (imports and exports) Main EU-27 and UK global partners in terms of trade in goods (exports and imports) Trends in EU-UK total trade versus trade between the EU and the rest of the world (trade in goods and services, imports and exports)